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The Soames Affair 65
hours left before Soames’ next meeting with Debré. 19 He stressed that the matter
must not leak, and asked
‘what sort of relationship can we have with a man whose concept of Europe and Europe’s
relations with the United States is so different from our own? Secondly, what can de
Gaulle’s motive be in making this offer to us: and why at this particular moment’?
For de Gaulle had always been ‘implacably opposed’ to British interests and
objectives, and he had given no sign of readiness to change his position on basic
issues. The problem was that he could now use either a rejection or an acceptance
to harm British interests. If rejected, he could say that he suggested a settling of
differences with Britain but was refused, proving that Britain was not yet ready for
Europe. But if the offer were accepted, he could misrepresent British readiness to
do a deal with the French and to build something new in place of the Communities.
Accepting bilateral talks would mean abandoning the multilateral approach – a
risky move when the issues affected other countries. Stewart concluded that it
would be dangerous to make any positive response to de Gaulle: his terms were
utterly unacceptable and the UK should go on the record as rejecting them. Wilson
should therefore tell Kiesinger of the approach, suggesting that they try to deal with
de Gaulle together and thus avoiding the risk of de Gaulle presenting the British
refusal to the Five in his own terms. 20 The FCO added to the urgency by suggesting
that the French might leak the proposals themselves. 21 Vaïsse accused the FCO and
Stewart himself of being blinded by their animosity to the general. He suggested
also that Stewart, a Labour minister, placed little credibility on the opinions stated
by Soames, a former Conservative minister appointed to the Paris embassy by his
predecessor. 22 Yet while the FCO later confessed to ‘Degaullophobia’, assigning
such motivation to Stewart is simplistic. 23
Wilson, who had already noted his own suspicions to his private secretary
Michael Palliser the day after the Soames-de Gaulle meeting,
‘greatly welcomed this advice and he particularly welcome[d] the conclusion […] that [he]
should speak to Kiesinger about this in the terms which the Foreign Secretary proposes’.
His own initial reactions coincided closely with Stewart’s,
‘particularly the possibility that de Gaulle may be hoping to condition Kiesinger and
even Nixon. What we must clearly avoid is falling into a trap’. 24
19. Telegrams, Stewart (in Luxembourg) to Paris via FCO, 6 February 1969, No.1 and 7 February
1969, No.2; Paris to Stewart (in Luxembourg) via FCO, 6 February 1969, No.131, all UKNA/
PREM/13/2628.
20. Telegrams, Stewart (in Luxembourg) to Wilson, 6 February 1969, Nos.35 and 37 (Prime Minister’s
Personal Message Serial No.T16/69), UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
21. Minute, Morgan to Hood, 7 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/416.
22. M. VAÏSSE, op.cit., p.610.
23. Minute and draft paper, ‘Allegations of Francophobia in the Foreign Office’, Robinson to Tait, 28
April 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/421.
24. Minutes, Palliser to Wilson and Wilson’s note thereon, 5 February 1969; Andrews to Barrington,
7 February 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. The fear that de Gaulle hoped to court Nixon was,
ironically, mirrored by Debré, who suspected that the subsequent British actions were directed at
preventing a Franco-American rapprochement: see M. DEBRÉ, op.cit., p.269.