journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

64
Melissa Pine
existing deadlock in the Community. 14 Jean Lacouture emphasised French anxiety
over growing West German strength as a motivating factor for an approach to
Britain. 15 Charles Williams suggested that the proposals formed ‘one more attempt
at asserting France’s international prestige’. 16 The consensus is clearly that the
French were operating from a position of weakness.
Vaïsse presented a detailed account of the de Gaulle-Soames talks. He argued
that, according to a French record made on 7 February, the general welcomed the
opportunity of Anglo-French talks not in order to discuss the British application for
membership of the EC, but in two perspectives:
‘sur le plan économique, il s’agirait d’échanger des vues sur une entente européenne
pour le cas où, dans l’avenir, le Marché commun lui-même s’effacerait pour faire
place á un autre régime; [et] sur le plan politique, d’envisager une concertation
organisée des Etats européennes sur la base d’une indépendance de l’Europe à
l’égard des Etats-Unis’.
He concluded that, ‘l’esprit des deux comptes rendus [that is, the French and the
English] est bien le même et on y retrouve des idées propres au Général’.
Difficulties would come only later, over the way in which the proposals were
presented in the press. 17
The British reaction
However, the British found themselves perplexed. Soames ‘had the impression’
that de Gaulle was taking a new line, perhaps similar ‘to the abortive proposals he
made to Mr Churchill in Paris in November 1944 for a far-reaching Anglo-French
entente’. It could be a tactical attempt to undermine German resolve to fight for the
British application. Or it might be sincere: his awareness of the growing strength of
Germany might be inclining him to ‘look to the West’. This uncertainty led Soames
to request only to seek more information. He would make the point that the government’s
application to the EC stood, and that HMG would consider a new proposal
only if all six member states were on board, and if it were made clear that the initiative
came from France. Soames concluded that de Gaulle had made the proposals
with an open mind. 18 His desire for more information is understandable, but there
is no recognition in his initial telegrams of a need for haste necessitated by
Wilson’s forthcoming visit to Kiesinger, just days away.
In response, Stewart immediately took a hard line, working from Luxembourg
(where he was attending a meeting of WEU) to advise Wilson in the forty-eight
14. M. DEBRÉ, Trois Républiques pour une France, Albin Michel, Paris, 1993, p.266.
15. J. LACOUTURE, op.cit., p.474.
16. C. WILLIAMS, The Last Great Frenchman: a Life of General de Gaulle, Abacus, London, 1995,
p.478.
17. M. VAÏSSE, op.cit., pp.607-608.
18. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 5 February 1969, No.25, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.