journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

62
Melissa Pine
Germany away from its traditionally close relations with France and towards more
meaningful support of Britain became a key policy aim. Fortunately for the British,
the successive French rejections of German efforts at compromise did much of the
work for them.
By late autumn 1968, Britain and the Five were increasingly determined to put
pressure on France. Attention was now focused on a scheme from Belgian Foreign
minister Pierre Harmel, to pursue foreign policy co-operation using an existing
institution. Western European Union (WEU) presented obvious advantages in that
its membership encompassed the UK and the Six, and discussion of foreign policy
was already within its remit. Despite – or perhaps even because of – French
obstruction, the UK and the Five took steps towards new co-operation. In October
their Foreign ministers met without the French for the first time since 1963, and
agreed to work towards an accord. In November, they agreed to proceed towards
new integration without France if necessary. In December, they accepted an Italian
paper detailing proposals as the basis for further discussion, and Stewart was
deputed to work on an agreement – which he did throughout January 1969. As will
be seen, Stewart’s work formed a basis for substantive discussion of foreign policy
between Britain and the Five. He felt strongly that Britain was running out of time:
‘I would not go so far as to say that Europe has lost its last chance to make a go of
unity, but I do believe that unless we can show progress in 1969/70 a great chance
may have been lost’. 8
So, in making his proposals to Soames, de Gaulle was reacting in part to the
success of British European policy and to his own increasing inability to direct or
bully the Five into acting in accordance with French interests. Moreover, the British
response to de Gaulle’s proposals must be seen first in the light of French
stonewalling of efforts at compromise, and second in the context of the increasing
likelihood of meaningful collaboration between Britain and the Five in WEU.
Whatever the longer-term pattern of relations between the two states, the
immediate context for the Soames affair was one of mutual frustration and distrust.
The general’s proposals
De Gaulle and Soames met for lunch on 4 February 1969, and Soames wrote his
report back at the British embassy afterwards. Recalling the details of a conversation
was not Soames’ greatest skill: he himself likened the process to ‘trying to
tickle bits of garlic out from behind his teeth’. 9 According to his account, however,
de Gaulle suggested ‘far-reaching bilateral talks’ to see whether Britain and France
could ‘co-operate “in a way which our two countries have never done before”. 10 He
8. Minute, Stewart to Wilson, 7 February 1969, PM/69/13, UKNA/PREM/13/2673.
9. Cited in H. YOUNG, op.cit., p.202.
10. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 4 February 1969, No.121, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.