journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

60
Melissa Pine
Christopher Soames in the archives of Churchill College, Cambridge, was denied.
Wilson’s cabinet played a minimal role, not discussed here. 2
The article addresses several questions. What was said between de Gaulle and
Soames? How did the British interpret the general’s offer? Who were the key
decision-makers domestically, and in what context did they act? How did Britain, and
particularly Wilson, try to turn the resulting fracas to their advantage? The article does
not attempt an international history of the incident, but concentrates on the British
perspective, which was one thread of a complex issue. It concludes that the ‘Soames
affair’ represents a significant moment in the difficult years that Wilson faced after
1967, and was, in fact, a multiple success for his European policy.
The context
The difficulty with the accepted assessment of the ‘Soames affair’ is that it is taken
out of context. There is a hiatus in the historiography of Britain’s European policy
between the second British application to join the EC, made by Wilson in 1967 and
vetoed by de Gaulle in the same year, to the opening of negotiations for British
entry under Edward Heath’s Conservative government in 1970. 3 Uwe Kitzinger
acknowledges the continuing efforts by Wilson’s government between 1967 and
1970, but he is elliptical on British policy in the period of 1968-1970. 4 John Young
is alone in noting that de Gaulle was ‘upset at this time by efforts of Britain and the
Friendly Five [that is, the Six members of the EC minus France] to consult on foreign
policy through the Western European Union’, but this comment is not linked
explicitly with the general’s proposals to Soames. 5 With the exception of the above
references to the ‘Soames affair’ itself, and a few allusions to the groundbreaking
summit at The Hague in December 1969, Wilson’s post-veto European policy has,
until recently, been largely ignored. 6
2. See United Kingdom National Archive, (formerly Public Record Office), henceforth UKNA,
CAB/128/44/CC(69)9, 20 February 1969 and CC(69)10, 27 February 1969; B. CASTLE, The
Castle Diaries 1964-70, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1984, pp.604-605; R. CROSSMAN,
The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister Volume III, Secretary of State for Social Services, 1968-70,
Hamish Hamilton, London, 1977, p.374. For cabinet politics see H. PARR and M. PINE, Policy
towards the EEC, in: P. DOREY (ed.), The 1964-70 Labour Governments, forthcoming.
3. J. FRANKEL, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute
of International Affairs, London, 1975, p.212; P.M.H. BELL, France and Britain 1940-1994: The
Long Separation, Longman, London and New York, 1997, pp.210-217; S. GEORGE, op.cit., p.48;
D.BUTLER and M. PINTO-DUSCHINSKY, The British General Election of 1970, Macmillan,
London, 1971, p.45.
4. U. KITZINGER, Diplomacy and Persuasion, Thames and Hudson, London, 1973, pp.68-76.
5. J. YOUNG, op.cit., pp.103-104.
6. See especially the biographies: P. ZEIGLER, op.cit., p.336; P. FOOT, The Politics of Harold Wilson,
Penguin, London, 1968, p.237; B. PIMLOTT, Harold Wilson, BCA, London, 1992, pp.434-442; A.
MORGAN, Harold Wilson, Pluto Press, London, 1992, pp.297 and 396.