journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

British Personal Diplomacy and Public Policy: The Soames Affair
59
Melissa Pine
At the end of the 1960s, Anglo-French relations were very strained. The French had
blocked Britain’s second application to join the European Communities (EC) by
vetoing the opening of negotiations in late 1967. In early 1969, however, relations
took a turn for the worse over a diplomatic incident that became known as the
‘Soames affair’. On 4 February 1969, French president Charles de Gaulle presented
the British ambassador in Paris, Christopher Soames, with ‘dramatic ideas’ for the
future of European integration. It was unclear if the proposals were genuine, or if
de Gaulle was setting a trap for the British. In any case, the British informed the
German government (partly because of the pressure imposed by a coincidental visit
by British Prime minister Harold Wilson to the German chancellor, Kurt-Georg
Kiesinger), the other members of the European Communities and the Americans,
and, finally, the press. The result was a deterioration of Anglo-French relations that
ended only after the resignation of de Gaulle. Wilson publicly blamed the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) for pushing him into revealing the talks to Kiesinger,
and several commentators have accepted this assertion. As a result, the FCO
has been judged harshly for its conduct in the episode. Only Philip Zeigler, Wilson’s
official biographer, argued that Wilson had agreed to the course suggested by
the FCO, and criticised him for attempting to disassociate himself from the decision-making
process afterwards. The consensus, however, has been that in the final
outcome, the ‘Soames affair’ was a foreign policy ‘loss’ for the British government
and for Wilson in particular: it was mishandled, and led to a nadir in Anglo-French
relations with no appreciable gains elsewhere. 1
This article describes how the ‘Soames affair’ played out in the diplomatic and
public spheres. It is based on British public and private archival sources, including
official papers in the National Archive (formerly known as the Public Record Office,
Kew London), and the private papers of Lord Wilson of Rivaulx, Lord George-Brown,
Lord Stewart of Fulham and Sir Patrick Riley (British ambassador to Paris 1965-68).
The Wilson papers were not wholly open, while access to the papers of Lord
1. See generally, S. GEORGE, The Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1990, p.55; J. YOUNG, Britain and European Unity, 1945-1992, Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 1993, pp.103-104; C. LORD, British Entry to the European Community under
the Heath Government of 1970-4, Dartmouth Publishing Group, Aldershot, 1993, pp.60-61; R.
BROAD, Labour’s European Dilemmas from Bevin to Blair, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001,
pp.70-71; H. YOUNG, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, Macmillan,
London, 1998, pp.200-208; J. LACOUTURE, De Gaulle the ruler: 1945-1970, Harvill, London,
1991, tr. A. SHERIDAN, pp.474-477; B. LEDWIDGE, De Gaulle, Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
London, 1982, pp.363-367; H. WILSON, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal
Record, Weidenfeld and Nicholson and Michael Joseph, London, 1971, pp.611-612; P. ZEIGLER,
Wilson: The authorised life of Lord Wilson of Rivaulx, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1993,
pp.336-377.