journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

58
Lasse Michael Boehm
Britain to enter the EEC. The devaluation of the pound, which Wilson had
announced on 19 November, had provided de Gaulle with a suitable opportunity.
Nevertheless, he left public opinion in no doubt that the underlying reasons for the
French veto were political. British entry into EEC, he said,
“would lead to the break-up of a community which could not absorb so monumental
an exception, which could not accept that among its leading members there was a
state which through its politics, its economy, its currency was not at present a part of
Europe”. 81
Conclusion
An analysis of foreign policy-making in Whitehall from the perspective of the
British embassy in Paris leads to the conclusion that Wilson and Brown ignored
important warnings on the possibility of a French veto. Brown in particular, an
outspoken ‘pro-European’, pressed ahead with an early application in 1967, largely
for political reasons.
Brown’s focus on domestic political issues, however, led him to disregard
ambassador Reilly’s advice on the French reaction to a British application. From
the very beginning, Reilly had insisted that de Gaulle was prepared to veto British
entry for a second time. Instead, Brown thought that the Five, Germany, Italy and
the Benelux countries, would apply enough pressure on France to let Britain join
the EEC. It was a fatal misjudgement, which prevented Brown from forging a
better relationship with the French president. The extent of the neglect of de Gaulle
can be seen in Brown’s personal decision to prevent his ambassador from meeting
the French president in the run-up to Wilson and Brown’s important January 1967
visit to Paris. What could have been a chance to establish a new understanding with
France was yet another missed opportunity.
When the decision to apply for a second time was taken, Wilson and Brown
ignored Reilly’s warnings not to press ahead with negotiations too quickly. Moreover,
the Foreign secretary tried to silence his ambassador in France by requesting Reilly
not to report negatively from Paris. Reilly, realising Brown’s strategic mistake of
focussing on the Five, disregarded this order and argued repeatedly for a new
rapprochement with France. Yet, he was ignored by the Prime minister and the
Foreign secretary, and his arguments were challenged by combined opposition from
the Foreign Office, the ministry of Technology and the ministry of Defence.
For his disobedience towards London, Reilly paid with an unhappy ending to
his otherwise distinguished career. In 1968, Brown prematurely relieved him of his
post in Paris and forced him to take early retirement. Neither the Foreign secretary
nor the Prime minister had made sufficient use of the best tools the Foreign Office
provided them with: an embassy only a few hundred yards from the Elysée Palace.
81. The Times, 28 November 1967, p.1.