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56 Lasse Michael Boehm The extent to which Reilly was sidelined by the Foreign Office is demonstrated by the fact that the Foreign Office withheld Reilly’s letter of 20 April and did not inform Wilson of his recommendation of a nuclear deal with France. The Prime minister’s private secretary, Michael Palliser, discovered it only by chance, and told Wilson: “I cannot avoid the feeling that in certain important matters the Foreign Office are being less than frank with us”. 68 Personal diplomacy: the Trianon talks, June 1967 Wilson went to Paris in June 1967 for a summit meeting with de Gaulle, but without specific proposals for closer Franco-British co-operation. The so-called Trianon talks reflect the lack of initiatives on the British side. The Prime minister expected the talks „to be devoted as much to the world situation after the events of early June [The Arab-Israeli conflict] as to anything else”. 69 There was no clear focus on how the differences over Britain’s application could be resolved. When the conversation finally turned to the subject of Europe, Wilson did refer to technological co-operation, but remained vague on details. Britain and France, he said, „must work to create a united Europe so powerful that the two super Powers [sic] would have to take account of it”. He proposed collaboration in the development of military aircraft and the civilian use of nuclear power, but did not mention a nuclear weapons deal. 70 Predictably, de Gaulle remained unconvinced. He doubted that Britain was willing to enter the EEC unequivocally. „The fact remained”, he told Wilson, „that British entry would introduce to the Communities an element broadly favourable to the ‘Atlantic’ concept”. 71 Despite the French president’s continued unwillingness to accept Britain’s application, and Reilly’s repeated warnings of a veto, Wilson was still optimistic. He told Reilly: “I return more convinced than ever that we are right to maintain the pressure, to go on refusing to take ‘no’ for an answer”. 72 De Gaulle, he wrote to American president Lyndon Johnson, was still opposed to British entry but this should not influence British policy: ”if we keep firmly beating at the door (as I told him unequivocally we should) and do not falter in our purpose or our resolve I am not sure that he any longer has the strength finally to keep us out”. 73 Reilly acknowledged that de Gaulle’s position was significantly weakened: 68. UKNA: PREM13/1482, Palliser to Prime minister, 13 May 1967. 69. H. WILSON, op.cit., p.402. 70. UKNA: PREM13/1731, record of discussion, 19 June 1967, 4 p.m. 71. Ibid. 72. UKNA: FO146/4639, Wilson to Reilly, 21 June 1967. 73. UKNA: PREM13/1521, FO to Washington, message for Johnson, 23 June 1967.
Our Man in Paris 57 “I would guess that in the country as a whole his position, already eroded by successive elections, has been too much shaken for him now to be able to restore it by any spectacular manoeuvre such as a referendum on a constitutional or other suitable issue”. 74 Nevertheless, he warned the Foreign Office, this would not lessen the French president’s opposition to British entry: „We must therefore expect all his present policies to be maintained and indeed accentuated”. 75 Applying even more pressure on France would be nothing but counter-productive: “As I understand it, our present policy is to do everything possible to secure an early decision accepting the opening of negotiations. […] This, however, seems to me a considerable gamble. […] Purely seen from here, and unless it is definitely considered that a quick No to negotiations is better than long uncertainty, there is advantage in playing this hand with great patience. […] The tactics on our part which the French would find most difficult to deal with would be polite, steady inexorable persistence. – ‘fermeté’ if you like – and absence of drama. I think that there would be real risks in forcing an early confrontation”. 76 The veto: November 1967 In late October, Reilly was bluntly warning of an imminent French veto: “I think that we should now be wise to assume that the General’s objective is to ensure not only that we do not enter the Communities, but also that we are not able to influence their decisions through our participation in negotiations for our entry, until at least 1970”. 77 The absence of any positive signals from the French government changed the mood in the Foreign Office. On 26 October 1967 Alun Chalfont, the minister responsible for Britain’s negotiations with the EEC, allegedly told journalists that in case of a French veto Britain would rethink her commitment to the defence of Germany, and might consider recognising East Germany as well as the Oder-Neisse line as Germany’s border to the East. 78 British policy „became crudely threatening”. 79 On 13 November Wilson mounted a last effort to avert a French veto. He gave a speech in London’s Guildhall, finally calling for bilateral and multilateral co-operation with France in various industries. 80 It was too late. On 27 November, de Gaulle pronounced his veto. At a press conference in Paris, the French president told journalists that he would not allow 74. UKNA: FO146/4639, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 14 July 1967. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid. 77. UKNA: FO146/4639, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 26 October 1967. 78. The Times, 28 October 1967, p.1 79. J. YOUNG, Technological Cooperation in Wilson’s Strategy for EEC Entry, in: DADDOW (ed.), op.cit., p.107. 80. The Times, 14 November 1967, p.1.
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JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HIS
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