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Our Man in Paris 53
the best the German Government could do in the circumstances and Britain should
realise this”. 48
Getting more and more uneasy about Brown’s fundamental miscalculation of
counting on the Five, Reilly now openly warned of the likelihood of a French veto.
In March 1967 he wrote to the Foreign Office:
“Everything he [de Gaulle] said about British entry into the EEC confirmed the view
that he is deeply reluctant to accept it at the present time. It was also clear that he
does not want to see an early application by H.M. Government”. 49
His warnings, however, were ignored. Sensing growing domestic approval for
an application, Wilson and Brown were unwilling to review their strategy.
Confident that support from the other EEC members would eventually overcome
French opposition, Wilson told the cabinet in March that „it might well be difficult
for him [de Gaulle] to veto the United Kingdom”. 50 By then, opposition in cabinet
to an application had largely eroded. Wilson had avoided prolonged debate about
the chances of success by drawing attention to its details. Barbara Castle recalls in
her diary:
“I thought Harold had manoeuvred brilliantly. […] He had succeeded in guiding us
into a discussion of details which is more effective than anything else in making
principles look less important”. 51
The cabinet merely discussed under what conditions Britain should join, not
whether it was possible to do so.
Technology and a nuclear deal? Spring 1967
The formal decision to apply for EEC membership for a second time was taken
on 2 May 1967. 52 Brown had insisted that an application had to be made quickly to
retain the support of the Five. Otherwise, he told the cabinet,
“those EEC countries which most keenly supported our entry would be discouraged
and the momentum generated by the tour [the probe] would be dissipated”.
While he acknowledged that the attitude of president de Gaulle was important
for an application to succeed, Brown argued that „the choice of the right tactics
should help us neutralise French opposition”. 53
De Gaulle responded on 16 May at a press conference in Paris, declaring his
opposition to British entry into the Common Market. The UK, he said, „is not a
continental country”. British accession would tear the EEC apart:
48. UKNA: FO800/982, record of meeting, 16 February 1967, 10 a.m.
49. UKNA: PREM13/1478, Reilly to FO, 21 March 1967.
50. UNKA: CAB 128, CC (67) 14, Cabinet meeting 21 March 1967.
51. B. CASTLE, op.cit., p.236.
52. UNKA: CAB 128, CC (67) 27, Cabinet meeting 2 May 1967.
53. UNKA: CAB 128, CC (67) 26, Cabinet meeting 30 April 1967, 2.45 p.m.