journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

52
Lasse Michael Boehm
“It is […] I think, rather remarkable that the General should now – a mere four years
later [after the first veto 1963] – say that he had the impression that ‘England’ is [sic]
now prepared to moor itself alongside the Continent. I feel that this echo of an
almost classical phrase was of real significance: indeed to my mind it was the most
significant thing that happened during the Paris visit. I am therefore sending copies
of this letter – in case any of them overlooked the point – to the Heads of Mission in
all other posts which are receiving the accounts of each of the visits in our tour”. 43
This was not all. It seems that Brown was so confident of the success of an
eventual British application that he sought to terminate plans on the establishment
of closer technological and political co-operation between Britain and the EEC for
fear that these would delay the start of negotiations:
“We should deprecate any initiative to search for new methods of political consultation
which could have the effect of delaying, perhaps for a long time, our entry into the
EEC […]. We should therefore be unwise to give the suggestion too fair a wind …”. 44
Brown’s assumptions deeply worried Reilly. In a letter to the Foreign Office, the
ambassador conceded that Wilson and Brown had indeed made „a very
considerable impression on General de Gaulle”. Nevertheless, he warned, the
current attitude of the French could be attributed to the upcoming French
parliamentary elections – de Gaulle would not wish a French veto to become an
issue in the election campaign. 45 Instead, the French objective was
“to stimulate doubts and uncertainties among the Five about the consequences
of British entry while carefully avoiding any suggestion that they themselves are, in
principle, opposed to it”. 46
Reilly repeated his advice that it should be British policy to build up trust in
Europe by demonstrating Britain’s willingness to co-operate with the Six on terms
acceptable to them:
“While the French are adept at shifting their hurdles and traps around from one area
to another, […] their main and most dangerous political argument at present is that
our entry will radically change the nature of the Community. As seen from here,
therefore, it would be valuable if in your remaining visits you could make a point of
refuting this general argument and of showing, in particular, that it is not the case
that ‘economic union’ would be impossible in a Community of Ten or Twelve”. 47
Reilly’s judgement of the necessity of concentrating on de Gaulle rather than
the Five was bolstered by German chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, whom Wilson
and Brown visited in February 1967. The Prime minister and the Foreign secretary
had hoped the German government would apply pressure on the French. Kiesinger
however made clear that Germany was unwilling to support Britain if France chose
to veto her entry yet again. There was, Kiesinger said, nothing he could do to
change the French position except lend Britain token support in public: „This was
43. UKNA: PREM13/1477, O’Neill to Pilcher, 3 February 1967.
44. UKNA: PREM13/1477, FO to Brussels, 14 February 1967.
45. UKNA: PREM13/1476, Reilly to FO, 26 January 1967.
46. UKNA: PREM13/1477, Reilly to FO, 9 February 1967.
47. Ibid.