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50 Lasse Michael Boehm Wilson and Brown’s visit to Paris in January 1967, the Foreign secretary did not want the Paris embassy to influence his strategy – and ordered Reilly not to meet de Gaulle in the run-up to the summit. 31 Reilly realised that he was increasingly marginalised within the Foreign Office in London: “If I had said to them then, ‘It’s no good, don’t bother to come to Paris. We know the answer here already’, I think it would probably have been the case that my tenure in office here would have been even shorter than it has been”. 32 Brown, Reilly wrote in his memoirs, „hated to be told that the cause for which he had fought so hard and so successfully on the home front, was doomed to defeat in France”. The Foreign secretary’s greatest mistake, Reilly claims, was that he „refused to the end to accept that the general could prevent the opening of negotiations”. 33 In his valedictory dispatch of September 1968, Reilly severely criticised Brown’s strategy to enter the EEC as quickly as possible: “One hope I would venture to express, with the utmost respect; and this is that Ministers will decide on the timing of the next major effort not with reference to any electoral calculations, but on the merits of its chances of success”. 34 Indeed, with hindsight Brown’s strategy that Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries would apply enough pressure on France for de Gaulle to refrain from using a veto seems naïve. Not only had he already once vetoed a British application in 1963, there were also abundant signals from other Foreign Office posts that an application in 1967 was unlikely to succeed. The ambassador to the EEC, Sir James Marjoribanks, wrote in his Annual Review for 1966, circulated widely in Whitehall in January 1967: “The Community lives under the shadow of General de Gaulle. […] Every step taken here is taken in the knowledge of a Head of State who cannot be pushed far with impunity. There is a clear desire to avoid provoking him unnecessarily”. 35 On 20 January 1967 the British ambassador in Bonn told the Foreign Office that the German chancellor, on whose support Wilson and Brown placed high hopes, wanted to „avoid getting drawn at this stage into an argument with General de Gaulle”. 36 31. PRP. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. UKNA: FCO33/53, Reilly to Michael Stewart, 11 September 1968. 35. UKNA: PREM13/1475, Sir James Marjoribanks: Annual Review for 1966, 10 January 1967. 36. UKNA: PREM13/1475, Roberts to FO, 20 January 1967. For the German attitude see also K. BÖHMER, ‘We Too Mean Business’: Germany and the Second British Application to the EEC, 1966-67, in: O. DADDOW (ed.), op.cit., pp.211-226.

Our Man in Paris 51 The probe: January – April 1967 Nonetheless, Wilson and Brown’s visits to the EEC member states seemed to get off to a good start. The first visit to Rome on 15 and 16 January 1967 was deemed a success. Wilson and Brown returned to London convinced that Italy would back a British application. 37 Paris, however, was to show them the obstacles on the way to a successful application. Meeting the French president on the morning of 24 January, Wilson affirmed that his government was serious about EEC entry and „meant business”. 38 But the prime minister and his Foreign secretary were left unclear about de Gaulle’s intentions. The general refused to comment whether or not he would veto a British application. Instead he mentioned an „alternative to membership”. This, he told his visitors, could take the form of an „agreement for association between Britain and the Community” or even „something entirely new”. In a remark which particularly confused Wilson and Brown, de Gaulle stated that “he had the impression of an England which now really wished to moor herself alongside the continent and was prepared in principle to pledge itself to rules in the formulation of which it had had no part, and which would involve it in definite links with the system which had grown up on the Continent”. 39 Even though de Gaulle refused to disclose his intentions, Wilson and Brown believed they had made an important step towards a successful application. Minister of Transport Barbara Castle noted in her diary: „They were convinced that they had made a considerable impression on de Gaulle”. 40 Brown in particular believed that the visit to Paris had further diminished the possibility of a French veto. On 26 January he dispatched a telegram to the British ambassador in Bonn. He could barely conceal his excitement: “The General has at last accepted that our attitude has changed, that we mean business, and that we are now just as ‘European’ as anyone else …”. 41 Foreign Office officials appeared to agree. The Paris talks, the European Economic Organisation Department concluded, were encouraging: ”We believe that the French Government cannot but have been convinced of our sincerity and determination in seeking British entry to the Community, provided the difficulties we saw could be overcome: and we made clear at all stages that, in our view, the problems discussed need represent no obstacle to our joining the Community”. 42 Con O’Neill went even further. In a letter to the British ambassador in Vienna on 3 February 1967 he wrote of having been „elated” to hear general de Gaulle speak of a Britain wishing to „moor itself alongside the continent”: 37. UKNA: PREM13/1475, Brown to Bonn, 17 January 1967. 38. UKNA: FO800/982, Record of a meeting between the Prime minister and the Foreign Secretary and the president of France and the French Foreign minister, 24 January 1967, 10 a.m. 39. UKNA: FO800/982, Record of a meeting held at the Elysée Palace, 25 January 1967, 4.15 p.m. 40. B. CASTLE, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1984, p.213. 41. UKNA: PREM13/1476, Brown to Bonn, 26 January 1967. 42. UKNA: PREM13/1476, FO (EEOD) to Bonn, 26 January 1967.

Our Man in Paris 51<br />

The probe: January – April 1967<br />

Nonetheless, Wilson and Brown’s visits to the EEC member states seemed to get <strong>of</strong>f<br />

to a good start. The first visit to Rome on 15 and 16 January 1967 was <strong>de</strong>emed a<br />

success. Wilson and Brown returned to London convinced that Italy would back a<br />

British application. 37 Paris, however, was to show them the obstacles on the way to a<br />

successful application. Meeting the French presi<strong>de</strong>nt on the morning <strong>of</strong> 24 January,<br />

Wilson affirmed that his government was serious about EEC entry and „meant<br />

business”. 38 But the prime minister and his Foreign secretary were left unclear about<br />

<strong>de</strong> Gaulle’s intentions. The general refused to comment whether or not he would veto<br />

a British application. Instead he mentioned an „alternative to membership”. This, he<br />

told his visitors, could take the form <strong>of</strong> an „agreement for association between Britain<br />

and the Community” or even „something entirely new”. In a remark which<br />

particularly confused Wilson and Brown, <strong>de</strong> Gaulle stated that<br />

“he had the impression <strong>of</strong> an England which now really wished to moor herself<br />

alongsi<strong>de</strong> the continent and was prepared in principle to pledge itself to rules in the<br />

formulation <strong>of</strong> which it had had no part, and which would involve it in <strong>de</strong>finite links<br />

with the system which had grown up on the Continent”. 39<br />

Even though <strong>de</strong> Gaulle refused to disclose his intentions, Wilson and Brown<br />

believed they had ma<strong>de</strong> an important step towards a successful application.<br />

Minister <strong>of</strong> Transport Barbara Castle noted in her diary: „They were convinced that<br />

they had ma<strong>de</strong> a consi<strong>de</strong>rable impression on <strong>de</strong> Gaulle”. 40 Brown in particular<br />

believed that the visit to Paris had further diminished the possibility <strong>of</strong> a French<br />

veto. On 26 January he dispatched a telegram to the British ambassador in Bonn.<br />

He could barely conceal his excitement:<br />

“The General has at last accepted that our attitu<strong>de</strong> has changed, that we mean<br />

business, and that we are now just as ‘European’ as anyone else …”. 41<br />

Foreign Office <strong>of</strong>ficials appeared to agree. The Paris talks, the European<br />

Economic Organisation Department conclu<strong>de</strong>d, were encouraging:<br />

”We believe that the French Government cannot but have been convinced <strong>of</strong> our sincerity<br />

and <strong>de</strong>termination in seeking British entry to the Community, provi<strong>de</strong>d the difficulties<br />

we saw could be overcome: and we ma<strong>de</strong> clear at all stages that, in our view, the<br />

problems discussed need represent no obstacle to our joining the Community”. 42<br />

Con O’Neill went even further. In a letter to the British ambassador in Vienna<br />

on 3 February 1967 he wrote <strong>of</strong> having been „elated” to hear general <strong>de</strong> Gaulle<br />

speak <strong>of</strong> a Britain wishing to „moor itself alongsi<strong>de</strong> the continent”:<br />

37. UKNA: PREM13/1475, Brown to Bonn, 17 January 1967.<br />

38. UKNA: FO800/982, Record <strong>of</strong> a meeting between the Prime minister and the Foreign Secretary<br />

and the presi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>of</strong> France and the French Foreign minister, 24 January 1967, 10 a.m.<br />

39. UKNA: FO800/982, Record <strong>of</strong> a meeting held at the Elysée Palace, 25 January 1967, 4.15 p.m.<br />

40. B. CASTLE, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, Wei<strong>de</strong>nfeld and Nicholson, London, 1984, p.213.<br />

41. UKNA: PREM13/1476, Brown to Bonn, 26 January 1967.<br />

42. UKNA: PREM13/1476, FO (EEOD) to Bonn, 26 January 1967.

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