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Our Man in Paris 49
The Paris embassy was concerned that the Foreign secretary did not fully grasp
the likelihood of a French veto. The Foreign Office, the embassy’s head of
chancery Peter Ramsbotham wrote, wanted
“to put as optimistic an interpretation as they can on the Secretary of State’s talk with
M. Couve [the French Foreign minister] and the General [de Gaulle]. This is no
doubt tactically correct, vis-à-vis the Five and British public opinion. I hope it does
not mean that H[er] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] themselves are under any illusions”. 27
Reilly warned Brown that de Gaulle presented a serious threat to a possible
application. He emphasised that de Gaulle was „extremely sceptical” about British
entry, and never suggested that a common solution could be found between Britain
and the Six.
“In fact, he laid down a series of road-blocks, economic and political, and showed
little sign of either expecting or hoping that we would circumvent them”.
For the moment, the ambassador conceded, de Gaulle was unlikely to stall talks
with Britain completely. Parliamentary elections were due in March 1967 and the
French president would not want to rebuff Britain before then.
“It will incline him, I think, to try very hard to say neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’ next month,
but something more like ‘perhaps, but not just yet’, which will nevertheless be sufficient
to discourage a second application for negotiations”.
Nevertheless, Reilly warned, the possibility of a veto would increase sharply
after the elections.
“After next March, providing the Gaullists and their friends retain their parliamentary
majority, as seems likely, the General will be less inhibited”. 28
In another memorandum dated January 1967 Reilly argued that Britain should
use three incentives to encourage de Gaulle to give up his opposition to Britain’s
entry into the EEC. First, Britain should offer to share technological know-how
with France – an idea which had originally been aired by Wilson himself. Second,
Brown and Wilson should appeal to de Gaulle’s vision of a Europe independent of
the United States, which could only be successful with British participation. 29 The
most important argument concerned the question of the future organisation of the
EEC, whose supranational tendencies both Britain and France rejected:
“Another point you may wish to consider is to what extent it will be advisable to express
agreement with the French position on supranationalism in the Communities”. 30
With his criticism of Brown’s strategy Reilly was positioning himself in conflict
with the Foreign secretary’s ruling against negative reporting on the situation in
Paris. As a result, Brown increasingly distrusted Reilly. During the preparations for
27. UKNA: FO146/4637, minute by Ramsbotham, 21 December 1966.
28. UKNA: FO146/4637, Reilly to Brown, 22 December 1966.
29. UKNA: PREM13/1475, Reilly to Brown, 4 January 1967.
30. Ibid.