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48 Lasse Michael Boehm ”It is perhaps conceivable that some approach by us to a more ‘European’ concept of defence […] could be worked out which would be attractive to the Germans and others of the Five, and even to the French. This might just possibly generate a European impulse, in which the French would share, sufficient to overcome the deadlock on the Community issue”. 23 Moving towards an application: October – December 1966 Towards the end of 1966, the Wilson government took a significant step towards a renewed application. On 22 October the Prime minister obtained cabinet approval for a ‘probe’, a series of bilateral summits to find out what the governments of the EEC member states were thinking of British membership in the EEC. Wilson presented this decision as a middle way: neither was it a full application, nor would he give in to the Eurosceptics and abandon consideration of an application altogether. 24 However, while Wilson and Brown succeeded in getting a divided cabinet to agree to the ‘probe’, they neglected to explore the consequences of the possibility of a French veto. Sensing that opposition in cabinet to EEC membership was declining, Brown insisted that de Gaulle would not veto Britain again. Britain, he told his colleagues, could count on support from Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries: “The French were discouraging the idea of further discussions and might well be anxious not to find themselves in opposition to the Five about [British] entry. France could not afford to withdraw from the EEC and she might therefore no longer be able to veto our membership”. 25 Such a severe underestimation of the French position was exactly what Reilly feared. Although he understood the political pressures under which Wilson and Brown were operating, he believed that the ‘probe’ would portray British policy as hesitant and half-hearted. The ambassador was convinced that Britain had to show greater initiative if she wanted de Gaulle to take her membership bid seriously: “Exploratory discussions would get us nowhere unless we could be more explicit about our requirements than hitherto. To make quick progress we must decide what our opening bid should be and what were our minimum requirements”. 26 23. UKNA: FO146/4631, Con O’Neill, ‘How to get into the Common Market’, August 1966. As head of the European Economic Organisation Department, Con O’Neill was in charge of working out the Foreign Office’s strategy towards the EEC. As ambassador to the EEC at the time of the first British application in 1962/3, O’Neill was one of the most respected officials with regard to European policy. He later led the delegation that successfully negotiated Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973. 24. H. PARR, op.cit., pp.172 ff. 25. UNKA: CAB 128, CC (66) 53, Cabinet meeting 1 November 1967. 26. PRP.
Our Man in Paris 49 The Paris embassy was concerned that the Foreign secretary did not fully grasp the likelihood of a French veto. The Foreign Office, the embassy’s head of chancery Peter Ramsbotham wrote, wanted “to put as optimistic an interpretation as they can on the Secretary of State’s talk with M. Couve [the French Foreign minister] and the General [de Gaulle]. This is no doubt tactically correct, vis-à-vis the Five and British public opinion. I hope it does not mean that H[er] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] themselves are under any illusions”. 27 Reilly warned Brown that de Gaulle presented a serious threat to a possible application. He emphasised that de Gaulle was „extremely sceptical” about British entry, and never suggested that a common solution could be found between Britain and the Six. “In fact, he laid down a series of road-blocks, economic and political, and showed little sign of either expecting or hoping that we would circumvent them”. For the moment, the ambassador conceded, de Gaulle was unlikely to stall talks with Britain completely. Parliamentary elections were due in March 1967 and the French president would not want to rebuff Britain before then. “It will incline him, I think, to try very hard to say neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’ next month, but something more like ‘perhaps, but not just yet’, which will nevertheless be sufficient to discourage a second application for negotiations”. Nevertheless, Reilly warned, the possibility of a veto would increase sharply after the elections. “After next March, providing the Gaullists and their friends retain their parliamentary majority, as seems likely, the General will be less inhibited”. 28 In another memorandum dated January 1967 Reilly argued that Britain should use three incentives to encourage de Gaulle to give up his opposition to Britain’s entry into the EEC. First, Britain should offer to share technological know-how with France – an idea which had originally been aired by Wilson himself. Second, Brown and Wilson should appeal to de Gaulle’s vision of a Europe independent of the United States, which could only be successful with British participation. 29 The most important argument concerned the question of the future organisation of the EEC, whose supranational tendencies both Britain and France rejected: “Another point you may wish to consider is to what extent it will be advisable to express agreement with the French position on supranationalism in the Communities”. 30 With his criticism of Brown’s strategy Reilly was positioning himself in conflict with the Foreign secretary’s ruling against negative reporting on the situation in Paris. As a result, Brown increasingly distrusted Reilly. During the preparations for 27. UKNA: FO146/4637, minute by Ramsbotham, 21 December 1966. 28. UKNA: FO146/4637, Reilly to Brown, 22 December 1966. 29. UKNA: PREM13/1475, Reilly to Brown, 4 January 1967. 30. Ibid.
Page 1 and 2: JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HIS
Page 7 and 8: 5 Introduction Anne Deighton This v
Page 9 and 10: 7 Poland’s Road to the European U
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