journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

46
Lasse Michael Boehm
Above all, Britain had to demonstrate her willingness to co-operate fully not
only with the Five, but also the French:
“On technical co-operation I would respectfully suggest that we need to have constantly
in mind the relevance of what we do throughout this field to our European
policy generally: to demonstrate our interest in co-operation with Europe and with
France by giving preference whenever we possibly can”. 14
If Britain was not taking the initiative in suggesting bilateral projects with
France, this would have a disastrous impact on France’s perception of Britain:
“As the French saw it there was a persistent contradiction between our professed
desire [to get into the EEC] and our practice [of cooperating with other countries]”. 15
A new Foreign Secretary: August – September 1966
Although Pompidou refused to disclose the French position during his July visit,
Wilson moved further towards a renewed British application. On 10 August 1966
he appointed George Brown, an outspoken pro-European, as his Foreign secretary.
For Reilly, Brown’s appointment heralded an even more difficult relationship with
the Foreign Office. Brown, a former trade unionist who had left school at the age of
15, had a deep-seated distrust of his officials whose privileged background he
deeply resented. 16 On a professional level, the differences between Brown and
Reilly were the differences between the politician and the diplomat. Although both
agreed that Britain should join the EEC, they quarrelled over the timing and nature
of a second application. While Reilly warned that an early application was likely to
result in a French veto, with all the international embarrassment that this would
bring, Brown wanted Britain to join the EEC as soon as possible, partly out of
personal conviction, but partly also in order to deprive the Conservative Party (then
in favour of British membership) of electoral ammunition. He hoped for a quick
entry into the EEC which would help secure the next general election, which was
anticipated to take place in 1970. As cabinet minister Richard Crossman noted in
his diary,
“Their [Wilson and Brown’s] idea is to get in by 1969. […] There would certainly
have to be one devaluation or two […]. On the other hand, would that matter politically?
We would have completely outbid the Tories and we would be able to confirm
our success in 1969 before there was any hard evidence of the hardships we were
due to suffer as the result of the devaluation”. 17
14. Ibid.
15. Sir Patrick Reilly Papers, unpublished and uncatalogued, Bodleian Library, Oxford (henceforth:
PRP). The documents are not yet fully sorted, making full references impossible.
16. P. PATERSON, The Life of Lord George Brown: Tired and Emotional, Chatto and Windus, London,
1993, p.207.
17. R. CROSSMAN, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol.2, Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape,
London, 1976, p.191.