journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

44 Lasse Michael Boehm backing of the „Five”: Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Paris embassy on the other hand insisted on the possibility of another French veto unless a rapprochement with de Gaulle could be achieved. There was, embassy officers believed, a chance to come to an agreement with France. As they repeatedly pointed out, both countries, for example, resented the supranational tendencies of the European Commission. 2 Because of its focus on the Five, the Foreign Office was unwilling to establish closer relations with the French. Assistant under-secretary of State Patrick Hancock was deeply sceptical of de Gaulle’s intentions: “It seems to be inconceivable that [de Gaulle] would be interested in British membership except on terms which would involve our abandonment of a close political and defence relationship with the United States”. 3 In March 1966, the Foreign Office saw its view reinforced by the French withdrawal from NATO’s military command structure, and placed new hopes on the Five: “The effective withdrawal of France from the integrated military work of the alliance creates a gap which the Five, and certain sections of public opinion in France, will hope to see filled by a stronger British influence in Europe”. 4 Britain, a memorandum argued, should keep bilateral relations with France to a minimum. The purchase of military equipment from France and the sharing of sensitive nuclear information was to be restricted, while officials should „adopt an attitude of reserve to bilateral meetings with the French”. 5 Despite the Foreign Office’s strategy of focussing on the Five, ambassador Reilly argued for an understanding with de Gaulle. He questioned London’s assumption that the French withdrawal from NATO gave Britain a free hand in the EEC, arguing: “there is no evidence that the NATO crisis has affected the Brussels situation. In fact there may well be a tendency by the Five to avoid a new crisis in Brussels in case this would help to drive France out of the Alliance”. 6 Reilly warned the Foreign Office that offering to base SHAPE, NATO’s European headquarters, in London, could only have a negative effect on Britain’s policy towards Europe: “The transfer of SHAPE to Britain would make it easier for Gaullist propaganda to portray it as an Anglo-Saxon dominated organisation on which the EEC countries could not wholly rely”. 7 2. This point was repeatedly communicated to the embassy by several advisers to de Gaulle, see UK- NA: FO371/188327, Ramsbotham to Campbell, 13 January 1966. 3. UKNA: FO371/188327, Hancock to Reilly, 14 January 1966. 4. UKNA: FO146/4632, memorandum ‘The international consequences of General de Gaulle’s policy’, 13 April 1966. 5. Ibid. 6. UKNA: FO146/4632, Mansfield to Ramsbotham, Ledwidge, Logan, James and Tickell, 21 April 1966. 7. UKNA: FO146/4632, Reilly to Hood, 3 March 1966.
Our Man in Paris 45 The Pompidou visit: July 1966 In July 1966, French Prime minister Georges Pompidou and Foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville visited London. Prime minister Harold Wilson wanted to use the visit to sound out the French attitude towards a possible second British application. 8 One of his reasons for this view was that he increasingly regarded EEC membership as a possible cure for the severe economic and financial difficulties which haunted Britain in 1966. 9 Reilly was keen to support Wilson in his first cautious steps towards a second application: “I knew that negative reporting from Paris could only hinder the decision by HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] in favour of British membership which I myself hoped they would take”. 10 Nevertheless, he suspected that London did not assign the right priority to the issue. „I cannot feel confident”, he wrote to George Thomson, the Cabinet minister with special responsibility for Europe, “that the kind of probing which is all we can contemplate for the present – i.e. getting the Six to give us their views on timing and tactics, without disclosing our own position – will do much to influence the Six towards making the sort of concessions which we must have”. 11 Reilly knew that de Gaulle had not given up his opposition to British membership in the EEC. He realised that a renewed application could only be successful if Britain demonstrated her willingness to move closer to Europe, and urged the Foreign Office’s permanent under-secretary of State, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, to use the Pompidou visit to resume closer bilateral contacts with the French. “I suggest that the general objective should be to convince the French of Ministers’ desire and determination to pursue technical and industrial cooperation with France and with ‘Europe’ in as many fields as possible”. 12 By demonstrating her willingness to co-operate with France, Reilly hoped, it would be impossible, or at least more difficult, for de Gaulle to veto Britain once again. He told Foreign secretary Michael Stewart: “I submit that the most hopeful course is to concentrate on convincing the Governments of the Six that the economic terms for which we must ask are reasonable and acceptable, and that the state of the British economy and the position of sterling will in no way disqualify Britain from membership. If this can be done, pressures should build up, both outside and inside France, which the General may perhaps be unable to resist”. 13 8. UKNA: PREM13/1509, FO to certain missions, 4 July 1966. 9. On the political fallout of the July 1966 crisis see H. PARR, Harold Wilson, Whitehall and British Policy Towards the European Community, 1964-1967, PhD thesis, Queen Mary University of London, London, 2002, p.123. 10. UKNA: FCO33/53, Sir Patrick Reilly’s valedictory despatch, Reilly to Stewart, 11 September 1968. 11. UKNA: PREM13/892, Reilly to Thomson, 3 June 1966. 12. UKNA: PREM13/892, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 14 June 1966. 13. UKNA: PREM13/1509, Reilly to Stewart, ‘French Foreign Policy’, 22 June 1966.
Page 1 and 2: JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HIS
Page 7 and 8: 5 Introduction Anne Deighton This v
Page 9 and 10: 7 Poland’s Road to the European U
Page 11 and 12: Poland’s Road to the European Uni
Page 27 and 28: Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic a
Page 45: Our Man in Paris: The British Embas
Page 49 and 50: Our Man in Paris 47 Brown’s desir
Page 51 and 52: Our Man in Paris 49 The Paris embas
Page 53 and 54: Our Man in Paris 51 The probe: Janu
Page 55 and 56: Our Man in Paris 53 the best the Ge
Page 57 and 58: Our Man in Paris 55 “Our informat
Page 59 and 60: Our Man in Paris 57 “I would gues
Page 61 and 62: British Personal Diplomacy and Publ
Page 63 and 64: The Soames Affair 61 However, recen
Page 65 and 66: The Soames Affair 63 reiterated old
Page 67 and 68: The Soames Affair 65 hours left bef
Page 69 and 70: The Soames Affair 67 Divided Counse
Page 71 and 72: The Soames Affair 69 Spreading the
Page 73 and 74: The Soames Affair 71 Relations with
Page 75 and 76: The Soames Affair 73 However, the a
Page 77 and 78: The Soames Affair 75 After effects
Page 79 and 80: A propos des archives Emile Noël:
Page 81 and 82: A propos des archives Emile Noël 7
Page 95 and 96: 93 Das Post- und Fernmeldewesen im
Page 97 and 98:
Das Post- und Fernmeldewesen im eur
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
115 Book reviews - Comptes rendus -
Page 119 and 120:
Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buc
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
139 Abstracts - Résumés - Zusamme
Page 143 and 144:
Abstracts - Résumés - Zusammenfas
Page 145 and 146:
Abstracts - Résumés - Zusammenfas
Page 147 and 148:
145 Contributors - Auteurs - Autore
Page 149 and 150:
Books received - Livres reçus - Ei
Page 151 and 152:
Annual subscription: 47,- € inclu
show all

journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?