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18 Ania Krok-Paszkowska and Jan Zielonka self-image. Nevertheless, Poland is by far the largest country joining the Union in this wave of enlargement. In terms of population it is larger than the total of the other nine acceding member states and its total GDP is higher than that of the other seven CEE states that joined the Union on 1st May 2004. Moreover, and more important, Poland has a very central geo-strategic position. It not only borders Germany, the Union’s most powerful member state, but also unstable Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (via Kaliningrad). 42 This EU enlargement was not only about adopting the acquis communautaire; it was also if not primarily about filling the enormous power vacuum that emerged in Europe after the fall of communism. Poland’s geo-strategic position had been a source of weakness during the two world wars, and the definition of her borders remained problematic. Now, Poland was using her position in the centre of Europe as a positive negotiating asset. This is why Poland could negotiate harder with the EU than other candidate states even though its progress in meeting the Copenhagen criteria has often been questioned. 43 During the final stage of accession negotiations in Copenhagen the Danish presidency negotiated only with Poland keeping all other delegations in a waiting room. 44 Poland’s geo-strategic importance and size could prove nevertheless once again to be a liability rather than an asset. Poland’s geo-strategic position exposes it to instabilities in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. It has the largest number of potential (labour) migrants wanting to enter Western Europe. The country also has a very large and rather inefficient agricultural sector. During the accession process, Western European leaders showed that they clearly understood Poland’s difficult position and frequently granted it special treatment either in economic or political terms. However, Poland’s special road to the Union was characterised not only by its toughness. Poland introduced politics and geo-politics to otherwise legal and procedural aspects of the accession process. Three features of Poland’s policy vis-à-vis the Union can be mentioned in this context: the special relations with Germany, NATO, and Eastern Europe. Poland’s special relations with Germany allowed it to influence the accession process through Berlin rather than solely through Brussels. While most of other candidates from the region prioritised the Commission in negotiations, Poland was 42. T. PASZEWSKI (ed), Polska granica wschodnią granicą Unii Europejskiej, Raporty i Analizy, Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, Center for International Relations, no.7(2000). 43. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Regular Report[s] from the Commission on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession (1998-2002). At http://europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/Poland/index.htm. 44. This has been revealed to the authors by chief negotiators from Hungary, Lithuania and Poland during a meeting organised at the European University Institute in Florence on 20-21 December 2002, a few days after the successful completion of accession negotiations.
Poland’s Road to the European Union 19 also able to shape the EU stance through state-to-state channels. Warsaw tried to develop close bilateral ties with several EU member states, not only Germany. 45 Nevertheless, the latter proved most attentive and important. 46 As neighbours and rivals, Germany and Poland have had a difficult and complex history of frequent conflict and occasional cooperation. In the late 18th and 19th centuries Poland was caught between Germany and Russia, disappearing as an independent state for almost 150 years. Interwar Poland was again a victim of these powers. In the 1970s Bonn and Warsaw took limited steps to improve relations starting with chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, but the turning point came with the end of communism. Poland supported German re-unification and the signing of agreements on borders and good neighbourliness resulted in a commitment by Germany to support Poland’s bid for EU membership. In the 1990s, the policies of chancellor Helmut Kohl were clearly guided by a geo-strategic rationale that appreciated the special place of Poland in the new European architecture. 47 When the SPD/Green coalition came to power in 1998, Germany began to place more emphasis on Poland’s progress in meeting specific EU conditions for accession. A number of issues at the time, such as property rights of former German landowners, the sale of land to foreigners and the length of transition periods on the free movement of labour led to emotional reactions on both sides. 48 Nevertheless, Poland was able to finalise accession negotiations in Copenhagen only after German chancellor Gerhard 45. Initially Poland had also hoped to involve France, next to Germany in closer co-operation on European issues. In August 1991, the Polish, German and French foreign ministers met informally in Weimar to discuss the role of Poland in Europe and the possibility of co-operation between the three countries. The Polish government saw the so-called Weimar Triangle as the “backbone” of the future and expanded EU, firmly anchoring Poland in Western institutions. However, the Weimar Triangle failed to deliver any tangible results. See for instance, B. GEREMEK, The Weimar Triangle, in: Przegląd Środkowoeuropejski, Central European Review, vol.VI, no.20-21(February 1998). Also available at www.medianet.pl?~ceurorev/numer21/23.htm. R. KUŹNIAR, (first printed in Polish in: Tygodnik Powszechny, no.21(25 May 1995), A Common Calling on the Path to European Unity, in: Przegląd Środkowoeuropejski, op.cit., February 1998. Also available at www.medianet.pl/~ceurorev/numer21/27 A number of other commentaries are available in English, French and German at www.medianet.pl/~ceurorev. See also A. KRZEMIŃSKI, R.VON THADDEN and D. VERNET, Weimarer Dreieck. Polens Weg nach Europa führt über Deutschland und Frankreich, in: Die Zeit, February 10 th 1998, p.26; B. KLICH, Stosunki polsko-francuskie – partnerstwo 2000, Polska w Europie, Ośrodek Studiów Międzynarodowych i Fundacja “Polska w Europie”, March 31 st 2000, pp.20-33. 46. R. FREUDENSTEIN, Poland, Germany and the EU, in: International Affairs, 74 (January 1 st 1998), pp.41-54; M. ZABOROWSKI, Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement: The Rising Prominence of Domestic Politics, ZEI Discussion Paper, C 51, 1999; A. HYDE-PRICE, Building a Stable Peace in Mitteleuropa: The German-Polish Hinge, The University of Birmingham Institute for German Studies, Institute Discussion Papers, 2000/18, available at www.igs.bham.ac.uk/research/discussion.htm; H. TEWES, Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe: Enlarging NATO and the European Union, Palgrave, New York, 2002. 47. D. BINGEN, Polityka Republiki Bońskiej wobec Polski, Od Adenauera do Kohla 1949-1991, Kwadrat, Kraków, 1997. 48. M. ZABOROWSKI, op.cit.
Page 1 and 2: JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HIS
Page 7 and 8: 5 Introduction Anne Deighton This v
Page 9 and 10: 7 Poland’s Road to the European U
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