journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

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Ania Krok-Paszkowska and Jan Zielonka
self-image. Nevertheless, Poland is by far the largest country joining the Union in this
wave of enlargement. In terms of population it is larger than the total of the other nine
acceding member states and its total GDP is higher than that of the other seven CEE
states that joined the Union on 1st May 2004. Moreover, and more important, Poland
has a very central geo-strategic position. It not only borders Germany, the Union’s
most powerful member state, but also unstable Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (via
Kaliningrad). 42 This EU enlargement was not only about adopting the acquis
communautaire; it was also if not primarily about filling the enormous power vacuum
that emerged in Europe after the fall of communism. Poland’s geo-strategic position
had been a source of weakness during the two world wars, and the definition of her
borders remained problematic. Now, Poland was using her position in the centre of
Europe as a positive negotiating asset. This is why Poland could negotiate harder with
the EU than other candidate states even though its progress in meeting the
Copenhagen criteria has often been questioned. 43 During the final stage of accession
negotiations in Copenhagen the Danish presidency negotiated only with Poland
keeping all other delegations in a waiting room. 44
Poland’s geo-strategic importance and size could prove nevertheless once again to
be a liability rather than an asset. Poland’s geo-strategic position exposes it to
instabilities in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. It has the largest number of potential
(labour) migrants wanting to enter Western Europe. The country also has a very large
and rather inefficient agricultural sector. During the accession process, Western
European leaders showed that they clearly understood Poland’s difficult position and
frequently granted it special treatment either in economic or political terms.
However, Poland’s special road to the Union was characterised not only by its
toughness. Poland introduced politics and geo-politics to otherwise legal and
procedural aspects of the accession process. Three features of Poland’s policy
vis-à-vis the Union can be mentioned in this context: the special relations with
Germany, NATO, and Eastern Europe.
Poland’s special relations with Germany allowed it to influence the accession
process through Berlin rather than solely through Brussels. While most of other
candidates from the region prioritised the Commission in negotiations, Poland was
42. T. PASZEWSKI (ed), Polska granica wschodnią granicą Unii Europejskiej, Raporty i Analizy,
Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, Center for International Relations, no.7(2000).
43. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Regular Report[s] from the Commission on Poland’s Progress
Towards Accession (1998-2002). At http://europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/Poland/index.htm.
44. This has been revealed to the authors by chief negotiators from Hungary, Lithuania and Poland
during a meeting organised at the European University Institute in Florence on 20-21 December
2002, a few days after the successful completion of accession negotiations.