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134<br />

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen<br />

Esther KRAMER – Europäisches o<strong>de</strong>r atlantisches Europa? Kontinuität und Wan<strong>de</strong>l in<br />

<strong>de</strong>n Verhandlungen über eine politische Union 1958-1970, Nomos, Ba<strong>de</strong>n-Ba<strong>de</strong>n, 2003,<br />

332 S. – ISBN 3-8329-0366-6 – 64,00 €.<br />

European <strong>integration</strong> has always been a political project. Geopolitical and security<br />

consi<strong>de</strong>rations, together with economic motives, have been essential driving forces behind<br />

European unity. And yet, throughout the Cold War, the member states <strong>of</strong> the European<br />

Community did not succeed in transforming their relations into a political union, <strong>de</strong>spite<br />

several rounds <strong>of</strong> negotiations. Europe gradually became a key economic actor, but it failed<br />

to establish a coherent power base in the realm <strong>of</strong> foreign and security policy. Even today,<br />

the European Union in its core has remained an economic entity, its foreign and security<br />

cooperation being organized in a separate, much less integrated pillar.<br />

While political scientists for many years have been engaged in theorizing why European<br />

<strong>integration</strong> has been much slower and more limited in the political field, historians after the<br />

opening <strong>of</strong> archives have begun to analyze individual efforts at political unification in their<br />

contextual and temporal particularities. Historical accounts are available today on the<br />

post-war Third Force Europe plans, the negotiations on a European Defence Community<br />

and a European Political Community in the early 1950s, and the Fouchet negotiations in<br />

1961/62. Several <strong>of</strong> these studies are particularly valuable in that they approach their subject<br />

from a multilateral perspective, which allows for comprehensive interpretations <strong>of</strong> the<br />

1<br />

respective negotiations. 8<br />

Esther Kramer with her remarkable Ph.D. thesis makes an important contribution to this<br />

field <strong>of</strong> research in two major ways. By investigating into the <strong>de</strong>bates on political union<br />

between 1958 and 1970, she <strong>of</strong>fers a pioneering analysis <strong>of</strong> the post-Fouchet period and<br />

covers much new archival ground. And, as she links her research on the later 1960s with a<br />

fresh look at the preceding Fouchet negotiations, she is able to put her findings into a bigger<br />

framework and to point to both continuities and evolutions in the national perceptions <strong>of</strong> the<br />

need, feasibility, and purpose <strong>of</strong> European political unity.<br />

Kramer starts <strong>of</strong>f with an evaluation <strong>of</strong> unification efforts prior to 1958. She rightly<br />

points out the significance <strong>of</strong> security and <strong>de</strong>fence issues in those early <strong>de</strong>liberations and<br />

negotiations. Given the importance <strong>of</strong> nuclear weapons and the uncertainties that the<br />

bipolarity <strong>of</strong> the Cold War international system implied for European security, there was a<br />

nexus between the notion <strong>of</strong> a European political entity and the question <strong>of</strong> NATO reform<br />

and nuclear control from early on. Kramer then proceeds to discuss the international<br />

constellation <strong>of</strong> the late 1950s and the political <strong>de</strong>sign <strong>of</strong> Charles <strong>de</strong> Gaulle as new French<br />

presi<strong>de</strong>nt. She convincingly argues that <strong>de</strong> Gaulle was a far less erratic lea<strong>de</strong>r and his<br />

foreign policy conception much more coherent than many analysts have maintained. On the<br />

global level, tripartism promised France a lea<strong>de</strong>rship role in Europe. On the European level,<br />

<strong>de</strong> Gaulle pursued two complementary and consecutive policies: a political confe<strong>de</strong>ration <strong>of</strong><br />

Western Europe primarily based on security and <strong>de</strong>fence cooperation and autonomous from<br />

the US; and, an all-European scheme “from the Atlantic to the Urals”, with a view to<br />

overcoming the bipolarity and division <strong>of</strong> Europe. In the mid-1960s, Kramer argues, <strong>de</strong><br />

Gaulle after the failure <strong>of</strong> the Fouchet Plans reversed his priorities and first pursued a policy<br />

<strong>of</strong> détente with the East, without however losing sight <strong>of</strong> his blueprint for Western Europe.<br />

As regards the Fouchet negotiations, Kramer notes that talks in a first phase between<br />

February and December 1961 went surprisingly well. This was largely because <strong>de</strong> Gaulle<br />

initially did not disclose to the Five just how radically different from Jean Monnet’s Europe<br />

18.<br />

See, for instance, J. GIAUQUE, Grand Designs and Visions <strong>of</strong> Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the<br />

Reorganization <strong>of</strong> Western Europe, 1955-1963, The University <strong>of</strong> North Carolina Press, Chapel<br />

Hill, 2002; T. CABALO, Politische Union Europas 1956-1963, PapyRossa, Cologne,1999.

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