journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
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134<br />
Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen<br />
Esther KRAMER – Europäisches o<strong>de</strong>r atlantisches Europa? Kontinuität und Wan<strong>de</strong>l in<br />
<strong>de</strong>n Verhandlungen über eine politische Union 1958-1970, Nomos, Ba<strong>de</strong>n-Ba<strong>de</strong>n, 2003,<br />
332 S. – ISBN 3-8329-0366-6 – 64,00 €.<br />
European <strong>integration</strong> has always been a political project. Geopolitical and security<br />
consi<strong>de</strong>rations, together with economic motives, have been essential driving forces behind<br />
European unity. And yet, throughout the Cold War, the member states <strong>of</strong> the European<br />
Community did not succeed in transforming their relations into a political union, <strong>de</strong>spite<br />
several rounds <strong>of</strong> negotiations. Europe gradually became a key economic actor, but it failed<br />
to establish a coherent power base in the realm <strong>of</strong> foreign and security policy. Even today,<br />
the European Union in its core has remained an economic entity, its foreign and security<br />
cooperation being organized in a separate, much less integrated pillar.<br />
While political scientists for many years have been engaged in theorizing why European<br />
<strong>integration</strong> has been much slower and more limited in the political field, historians after the<br />
opening <strong>of</strong> archives have begun to analyze individual efforts at political unification in their<br />
contextual and temporal particularities. Historical accounts are available today on the<br />
post-war Third Force Europe plans, the negotiations on a European Defence Community<br />
and a European Political Community in the early 1950s, and the Fouchet negotiations in<br />
1961/62. Several <strong>of</strong> these studies are particularly valuable in that they approach their subject<br />
from a multilateral perspective, which allows for comprehensive interpretations <strong>of</strong> the<br />
1<br />
respective negotiations. 8<br />
Esther Kramer with her remarkable Ph.D. thesis makes an important contribution to this<br />
field <strong>of</strong> research in two major ways. By investigating into the <strong>de</strong>bates on political union<br />
between 1958 and 1970, she <strong>of</strong>fers a pioneering analysis <strong>of</strong> the post-Fouchet period and<br />
covers much new archival ground. And, as she links her research on the later 1960s with a<br />
fresh look at the preceding Fouchet negotiations, she is able to put her findings into a bigger<br />
framework and to point to both continuities and evolutions in the national perceptions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
need, feasibility, and purpose <strong>of</strong> European political unity.<br />
Kramer starts <strong>of</strong>f with an evaluation <strong>of</strong> unification efforts prior to 1958. She rightly<br />
points out the significance <strong>of</strong> security and <strong>de</strong>fence issues in those early <strong>de</strong>liberations and<br />
negotiations. Given the importance <strong>of</strong> nuclear weapons and the uncertainties that the<br />
bipolarity <strong>of</strong> the Cold War international system implied for European security, there was a<br />
nexus between the notion <strong>of</strong> a European political entity and the question <strong>of</strong> NATO reform<br />
and nuclear control from early on. Kramer then proceeds to discuss the international<br />
constellation <strong>of</strong> the late 1950s and the political <strong>de</strong>sign <strong>of</strong> Charles <strong>de</strong> Gaulle as new French<br />
presi<strong>de</strong>nt. She convincingly argues that <strong>de</strong> Gaulle was a far less erratic lea<strong>de</strong>r and his<br />
foreign policy conception much more coherent than many analysts have maintained. On the<br />
global level, tripartism promised France a lea<strong>de</strong>rship role in Europe. On the European level,<br />
<strong>de</strong> Gaulle pursued two complementary and consecutive policies: a political confe<strong>de</strong>ration <strong>of</strong><br />
Western Europe primarily based on security and <strong>de</strong>fence cooperation and autonomous from<br />
the US; and, an all-European scheme “from the Atlantic to the Urals”, with a view to<br />
overcoming the bipolarity and division <strong>of</strong> Europe. In the mid-1960s, Kramer argues, <strong>de</strong><br />
Gaulle after the failure <strong>of</strong> the Fouchet Plans reversed his priorities and first pursued a policy<br />
<strong>of</strong> détente with the East, without however losing sight <strong>of</strong> his blueprint for Western Europe.<br />
As regards the Fouchet negotiations, Kramer notes that talks in a first phase between<br />
February and December 1961 went surprisingly well. This was largely because <strong>de</strong> Gaulle<br />
initially did not disclose to the Five just how radically different from Jean Monnet’s Europe<br />
18.<br />
See, for instance, J. GIAUQUE, Grand Designs and Visions <strong>of</strong> Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the<br />
Reorganization <strong>of</strong> Western Europe, 1955-1963, The University <strong>of</strong> North Carolina Press, Chapel<br />
Hill, 2002; T. CABALO, Politische Union Europas 1956-1963, PapyRossa, Cologne,1999.