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Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen
a solid research of relevant sources and interviews with relevant experts and policy actors.
Henning Tewes’s book is a great and indispensable read as it provides both: an inspiring
theoretical debate about assessing foreign policy as well as a truly detailed, elegantly written
inquiry into the nature of German policy vis-à-vis the East Central European states.
How much change?
The analytical thrust of Tewes is further developed in the book written by a broader circle
of fellows and partners (including Tewes) of the Chair for Foreign Policy and International
Relations, University of Trier, headed by Professor Hanns W.Maull. The book continues the
discussion about the nature of German foreign policy post-1990 where Tewes concluded his
analysis. It offers a preliminary assessment of German policy after the “historical” change
from conservative-liberal coalition to the SPD and the Green Party. The collection
encompasses a wide spectrum of sectors of German foreign policy: security issues
(contributions by Martin Wagener and Marco Overhaus), EU policy (Sebastian Harnisch/
Siegfried Schieder), EU-enlargement (Henning Tewes), development policy (Peter Molt),
human rights policy (Florian Pfeil), external economic policy (by Florian Lütticken/
Bernhard Stahl), relations with the USA (Nicholas Busse), France (Christoph Neßhöver),
the Far East (Jörn-Carsten Gottwald) and two studies into regional conflicts: Balkans
(Constantin Grund) and the Middle East (Hanns W. Maull).
The individual contributions represent a thorough, well-informed political analysis and
do not focus on theoretical reasoning. Generally, they point at a growing ambivalence of the
German Red-Green coalition. On the institutional side (Hanns Maull’s editorial underlines
the “primacy of institutional innovation”, p.15), a number of the individual studies
emphasise the growing role of the chancellor and his office. Minister Joschka Fischer often
followed or implemented rather than defined the policy course. The exceptions were the EU
constitutional reform and the search for an active Middle East policy. In some areas,
enhancement of the institutional structure has taken place and there have been also examples
of success and foreign policy achievements. Against the background of the original ambition
of Red-Green to redefine some areas of German policy, the preliminary outcome reveals
little change in substance. Quite to the contrary, the overall verdict is that German policy,
suffering from little attention and scarce resources, has been becoming less relevant and
retreats into seclusion.
On normalisation and learning
The reader’s impression is that not only the chapter dealing with the use of force in
international relations (Wagener), but also most of the other contributions could have been
written under the “normalisation” heading. The second prominent feature of German policy
since 1998 is the government’s “learning process” (Harnisch, Schieder, Neßhöver). Both
resulted in different kinds of “normalisation” exercises in a number of areas. The Red-Green
have adjusted to the international constellation, domestic political interests and economic –
particularly budgetary – constraints. Berlin has taken national and particular interests on
board, thus responding to a variety of domestic pressures. As a result, the conceptual focus
and long term political priorities have too often been subordinated to short-term preferences
and solutions. In a sense, the impression is that in a number of areas the Red-Green policy
has been on its way “back to the Realpolitik”. Most of the contributions offer examples of
the discrepancy between the original intentions and political performance. In some cases,
however, such as the EU-enlargement (so Tewes), the “learning process” brought Berlin
from attempted assertion of ‘national interests’ back to a more flexible attitude. Studies on
regional conflicts, such as the Balkans or the Middle East show that German policy
attempted to initiate political solutions. The reality of “hard-power”, however, limited
Berlin’s room for manoeuvre. As was to be expected, the pressure of the German-American
rupture and the ongoing disagreement elevated the issue of the Red-Green policy towards
the USA to the ‘cover-story’ of the book. Many authors indicate a critical and reserved view