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130 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen During the association process, Germany sought political inclusion of the ECE countries and their economic exclusion at the same time. Germany faced a role conflict, one between the traditional role of the integration deepener on the one hand and the role of integration widener on the other. During the second phase, since 1994, Germany attempted to escape the role conflict by merging the deepening and widening through flexibilisation of the integration (”hard core”). The attempt failed and Germany sought to prevent that deepening and EU reform could obstruct enlargement. The Civilian Power ideal type, Tewes argues, can not answer the question of the way to reconcile the deepening and widening of the EU since individually, they are both compatible with it (p.139). Also, strong domestic institutions, one of the pillars of any Civilian Power, generated divergent interests in Germany and thus hampered the application of German Civilian Power abroad (p.133). In regard to the NATO enlargement, several roles were compatible with the Civilian Power, Warsavist (support for enlargement), Atlanticist (preservation of NATO as it was), Muscovite (prioritising understanding with the USSR/Russia) and Gaullist (Euro-centric attitude). They stood, understandably, in tension towards each other in the early 1990s. Since 1994, integration (of the ECE) and co-operation (with Russia and others) has represented the bottom line of German security policy vis-à-vis East of Central Europe (p.178). As civilianisation has been described as a “demand-led strategy” (p.174), it is only logical that external expectations co-shaped the outcome: the enlargement became the priority. The German government sought to conciliate Russian interests by elaborating on strengthened partnership ties at the same time – a move, which Tewes describes as a role merger (p.177). Germany can hardly be viewed as a hegemon of the double enlargement. Tewes shows, however, that it pushed the two enlargement processes in their decisive phase by gaining the support of other Western partners. Germany attempted to play the role of an advocate of both the candidate states as well as of Russia/CIS countries. Germany until 2002 – still a Civilian Power Germany is not portrayed as a Civilian Power ideal type, although Tewes finds its record largely compatible with it. Domestic constraints (the shadows of the past, the legalist nature of German policy, sectoral interests) and realist considerations (German attitude to the Baltic republics’ interest to access NATO) conflicted with the Civilian Power ethos. Germany has been successful in its international activities not only thanks to the nature of its policy (seeking compromises, developing multilateral frameworks). Tewes sees the effectiveness of German Civilian Power in terms of the “soft power” of Joseph Nye or the “three-dimensional power” of Steven Lukes. He makes clear that German success is linked with the realist power potential as well, though. Precisely the most successful German political action since the unification – the NATO and EU enlargement – would be hardly possible without the international respect for the “material capabilities” (p.201) of a united Germany. Indeed, we agree that the factors of realist power do matter in international relations. With a certain qualification, we might view the pre-war Czechoslovakia – using Henning Tewes’s concept – as a “pre-war Civilian Power” of the 1920s-1930s: Prague seriously sought to develop a normative and institutional basis of international relations. Nonetheless, its relative unimportance and lack of realist power potential – plus the fatal miscalculation on the part of France and Great Britain – sealed its fate in Munich, 1938. Thus material power capabilities facilitate the pursuit of normative objectives. Nonetheless, Tewes is clear in his emphasis that normative principles remain the basis of Civilian Power (p.201). In addition, he shows that nonmaterial resources of Germany (‘trust capital’ and ‘assumed benevolent intentions’) empower the weak by equipping them with
Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 131 powerful argumentative leverage. Thus, Central Europe influenced German foreign policy by underlining its role of an integration widener (p.203). Civilian Power between academia and policy Henning Tewes makes clear that Civilian Power is not a political concept but an ideal policy type. Not a design but a template or vision, which policy and public may (or may not) aim at. Civilian Power is – to quote Tewes – “a normatively biased form of foreign policy advice” (p.204). We are less convinced, though, when the author seems to project the Civilian Power conception into the way foreign actors may view Germany (see for example his assumption regarding the position of the Baltic states, which may conclude that Germany “… choose not to apply its Civilian power ethos in its policies…” of NATO enlargement, p.206). As if two different levels of thinking about German policy got blurred: the theoretical analytical approach on the one hand, constructing an ideal political model designed to offer “normative advice”; and diverse perceptions of, and expectations from Germany as an international actor, on the other. Surely, while evaluating German policy, the countries of Eastern Central Europe tend to look at criteria that may in one way or another match Civilian Power as defined by Tewes. However, the complex notion of Civilian Power has received only marginal attention of the classe politique and the public in these countries. In fact, Civilian Power is usually misunderstood as a pacifist concept and therefore treated with a certain caution. We wonder to what extent the Civilian Power concept was consciously emulated by German policy itself. As far as we know, only the SPD refers to Germany as to a Zivilmacht, Civilian Power. 4 The Greens avoid the “power”-part and refer to a Zivilgesellschaft, Civilian (Civic) Society. 5 Thanks to the Greens, Civilian Power found no place in the Red-Green coalition agreement of 2002. 6 Liberals and conservatives avoid mentioning the concept as such altogether, even if – as Tewes proves – their policy has been so far mostly compatible with the notion of Civilian Power. Henning Tewes’s assessment of German policy and of its individual actors is painstakingly balanced. We agree with his opinion that Helmut Kohl may be viewed as “an incarnation of Civilian Power” (p.209) as well as with his criticism of the ‘Kohl system’ (p.211). Indeed, the chancellor was perceived as the “European” German leader in 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, undoubtedly, his name was linked to pragmatism and prioritising domestic concerns over foreign policy, not to mention the Civilian Power ethos. The electoral support from the side of the conservative and völkisch (if not nationalist) oriented expellee organisations was too valuable an asset even for Kohl, not to mention the CSU. Both conservative parties had integrated the expellee element and thus stabilised the German political scene. However, as a part of the equation, they carefully avoided exposing the expellees to a critical reassessment of the past and of their programmatic demands. Not surprisingly, the ‘anti-Civilian Power’ ethos of the expellee organisations influenced the standing of the conservative parties themselves: the mismanaged debate about the Centre for Expulsion or the vote of the CSU in the EU Parliament against the Czech EU-accession are just two of the more recent examples. Coming to terms with the past may well be regarded as one of the key preconditions for a credible Civilian Power role. Tewes proves that the Civilian Power ideal type and role theory are inspiring when contemplating principles and norms in international relations. He also shows that comparing actual policy with an ideal policy type can offer a very insightful picture of the political reality. The precondition is that the evaluation is not predominantly speculative but based on 4. Der SPD Parteitag in Bochum, 17.-19.11.2003. Beschlüsse. http://www.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/ 1031670/2004-01-16-SPD-Beschluesse-Bochum03.pdf, p.248. 5. Europa grün gestalten. Europawahlprogram 2004 von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 6. See Koalitionsvertrag 2002, www.gruene-fraktion.de/rsvgn/rs_rubrik/0,,67,00.htm.
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5 Introduction Anne Deighton This v
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7 Poland’s Road to the European U
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Our Man in Paris: The British Embas
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Our Man in Paris 45 The Pompidou vi
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Our Man in Paris 47 Brown’s desir
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Our Man in Paris 51 The probe: Janu
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Our Man in Paris 53 the best the Ge
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British Personal Diplomacy and Publ
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The Soames Affair 61 However, recen
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A propos des archives Emile Noël:
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