journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

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Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen
During the association process, Germany sought political inclusion of the ECE countries
and their economic exclusion at the same time. Germany faced a role conflict, one between
the traditional role of the integration deepener on the one hand and the role of integration
widener on the other. During the second phase, since 1994, Germany attempted to escape
the role conflict by merging the deepening and widening through flexibilisation of the
integration (”hard core”). The attempt failed and Germany sought to prevent that deepening
and EU reform could obstruct enlargement. The Civilian Power ideal type, Tewes argues,
can not answer the question of the way to reconcile the deepening and widening of the EU
since individually, they are both compatible with it (p.139). Also, strong domestic
institutions, one of the pillars of any Civilian Power, generated divergent interests in
Germany and thus hampered the application of German Civilian Power abroad (p.133).
In regard to the NATO enlargement, several roles were compatible with the Civilian
Power, Warsavist (support for enlargement), Atlanticist (preservation of NATO as it was),
Muscovite (prioritising understanding with the USSR/Russia) and Gaullist (Euro-centric
attitude). They stood, understandably, in tension towards each other in the early 1990s.
Since 1994, integration (of the ECE) and co-operation (with Russia and others) has
represented the bottom line of German security policy vis-à-vis East of Central Europe
(p.178).
As civilianisation has been described as a “demand-led strategy” (p.174), it is only
logical that external expectations co-shaped the outcome: the enlargement became the
priority. The German government sought to conciliate Russian interests by elaborating on
strengthened partnership ties at the same time – a move, which Tewes describes as a role
merger (p.177).
Germany can hardly be viewed as a hegemon of the double enlargement. Tewes shows,
however, that it pushed the two enlargement processes in their decisive phase by gaining the
support of other Western partners. Germany attempted to play the role of an advocate of
both the candidate states as well as of Russia/CIS countries.
Germany until 2002 – still a Civilian Power
Germany is not portrayed as a Civilian Power ideal type, although Tewes finds its record
largely compatible with it. Domestic constraints (the shadows of the past, the legalist nature
of German policy, sectoral interests) and realist considerations (German attitude to the
Baltic republics’ interest to access NATO) conflicted with the Civilian Power ethos.
Germany has been successful in its international activities not only thanks to the nature
of its policy (seeking compromises, developing multilateral frameworks). Tewes sees the
effectiveness of German Civilian Power in terms of the “soft power” of Joseph Nye or the
“three-dimensional power” of Steven Lukes. He makes clear that German success is linked
with the realist power potential as well, though. Precisely the most successful German
political action since the unification – the NATO and EU enlargement – would be hardly
possible without the international respect for the “material capabilities” (p.201) of a united
Germany.
Indeed, we agree that the factors of realist power do matter in international relations.
With a certain qualification, we might view the pre-war Czechoslovakia – using Henning
Tewes’s concept – as a “pre-war Civilian Power” of the 1920s-1930s: Prague seriously
sought to develop a normative and institutional basis of international relations. Nonetheless,
its relative unimportance and lack of realist power potential – plus the fatal miscalculation
on the part of France and Great Britain – sealed its fate in Munich, 1938.
Thus material power capabilities facilitate the pursuit of normative objectives.
Nonetheless, Tewes is clear in his emphasis that normative principles remain the basis of
Civilian Power (p.201). In addition, he shows that nonmaterial resources of Germany (‘trust
capital’ and ‘assumed benevolent intentions’) empower the weak by equipping them with