journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN 

INTEGRATION HISTORY 

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE 

L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE 

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER 

EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION 

edited by the 

Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine 

auprès de la Commission européenne 

2004, Volume 10, Number 2 

NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft 

Baden-Baden

Editors 

Published twice a year by the 

Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire 

contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. 

This publication is part of a Thematic Network 

European Integration History financed within the key 

action improving the socio-economic knowledge base. 

Editorial Board 

LOTH, Wilfried (chairman) 

Universität Essen 

Jean Monnet Chair 

BITSCH, Marie-Thérèse 

Université de Strasbourg III Robert Schuman 


BOSSUAT, Gérard 

Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 


DEIGHTON, Anne 

Wolfson College, Oxford 


DUMOULIN, Michel 

Université catholique de Louvain 


GUIRAO, Fernando 

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona 


LAURSEN, Johnny 

University of Aarhus 

MILWARD, Alan S. 

European University Institute, Florence 

SCHWABE, Klaus 

Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen 


TRAUSCH, Gilbert 

Centre Robert Schuman, Université de Liège 

VAN der HARST, Jan 

University of Groningen 


VARSORI, Antonio 

Università di Padova 








Editorial Secretariat 

Charles Barthel, director 

Address: 

Centre d’études et de recherches européennes 

Robert Schuman 

4 Rue Jules Wilhelm 

L-2728 Luxembourg 

Tel.: (3 52) 4 78 22 90/4 78 22 91 

Fax.: (3 52) 42 27 97

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY 

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE 

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION 

edited by the 

Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine 

auprès de la Commission européenne 

2004, Volume 10, Number 2

The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international 

symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on European 

integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries 

who work on contemporary history. 

The Liaison Committee: 

– gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War; 

– advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history. 

Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the 

Community institutions; 

– enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources; 

– promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research: 

seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published. 

The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für 

Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being 

the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the 

increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum. 

The Liaison Committee is supported by the European Commission, but works completely independently 

and according to historians’ critical method. 

❋ 

Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des 

Communautés européennes s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commission 

avait organisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction 

européenne. Il regroupe des professeurs d’université des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spécialistes 

d’histoire contemporaine. 

Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission: 

– de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre 

mondiale; 

– de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi 

le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archives 

des institutions communautaires; 

– d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition 

(archives, sources orales...); 

– d’encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et 

de susciter de nouvelles recherches: sept grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés. 

L’édition du Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne 

– Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations 

du Groupe de liaison. Première revue d’histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l’histoire de la 

construction européenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant 

de jeunes historiens vouant leurs recherches à l’Europe contemporaine. 

Le Groupe de liaison bénéficie du soutien de la Commission européenne. Ses colloques et publications 

se font en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.



ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION 


Anne DEIGHTON, coordinator 

Anne DEIGHTON 

Introduction ...................................................................................................... 5 

Ania KROK-PASZKOWSKA and Jan ZIELONKA 

Poland’s Road to the European Union ............................................................. 7 

Jan KARLAS and Petr KRATOCHVÍL 

Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic and European Integration: 

During and After the Cold War ..................................................................... 25 

Lasse Michael BOEHM 

Our Man in Paris: The British Embassy in Paris and 

the Second UK Application to Join the EEC, 1966-67 ................................. 43 

Melissa PINE 

British Personal Diplomacy and Public Policy: The Soames Affair...............59 

Catherine PREVITI ALLAIRE 

A propos des archives Emile Noël: aux origines d’une carrière 

européenne (1922-1958) .................................................................................77 

Christian FRANKE 

Das Post- und Fernmeldewesen im europäischen Integrationsprozess 

der 1950/60er Jahre ........................................................................................ 93 

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen.............................. 115 

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen............................................... 139 

Contributors – Auteurs – Autoren ............................................................... 145 

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher .............................. 146

Editorial notice 

Articles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will then 

arrange for the article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotes 

included. They may be in English, French or German. 

Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to any 

other publication at the same time as to the Journal of European Integration History. Authors 

should retain a copy of their article. The publisher and editors cannot accept responsibility for 

loss of or damage to authors’ typescripts or disks. 

The accuracy of, and views expressed in articles and reviews are the sole responsibility of the 

authors. 

Authors should ensure that typescripts conform with the journal style. Prospective contributors 

should obtain further guidelines from the Editorial Secretariat. 

Articles, reviews, communications relating to articles and books for review should be sent to the 

Editorial Secretariat. 

Citation 

The Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows: 

JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page). 

ISSN 0947-9511 

© 2004 NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden and the Groupe de liaison des professeurs 

d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. Printed in Germany. 

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or 

transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, 

without prior permission of the publishers.

5 

Introduction 

Anne Deighton 

This volume of the Journal of European Integration History is an open one. The 

articles in it, however, fall into three groups. The first two articles are published to 

coincide with the accession of ten new member states to the European Union in 

May 2004. This massive expansion of the Union is of enormous significance to all 

those with an interest in the roots and development of European integration. It 

opens a new and wider field of research for historians, both of the international 

relations of Cold War Europe, and also of the national histories of the new member 

states. It has always been argued that enlargement could weaken the Union. 

However, thus far, this has not proved to be the case. Both the Journal of European 

Integration History, and a number of the edited volumes published by our Groupe 

de Liaison have examined the politics and economics of integration since the first 

enlargement to Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973. The two 

articles in this volume of the Journal are on Poland by Ania Krok-Paszkowska and 

Jan Zielonka, and on the Czech Republic by Jan Karlas and Petr Kratochvíl. They 

provide historically based accounts of the attitudes and policies of these two 

countries towards the European Communities, from the Cold War period to the 

present day. They also both give an account of the major secondary works that have 

appeared on this subject, as well as describing the accessibility of Polish and Czech 

national archives for historians of these topics. They are thus contributions to the 

historiography of enlargement, and to the histories of two of the new 

member-states. More publications are anticipated in the near future on this same 

theme, both relating to the earlier enlargements of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and 

to the latest round of this controversial process. 

The second pair of articles reflects another theme of interest to historians: the 

role of individuals in the making and implementation of policy. In this case, both 

look at the role of British Ambassadors to France during periods of high tension in 

Anglo-French relations over the European Communities, and thus offer insights 

into the complexities of policy-making within one applicant state. The first of these 

articles, by Lasse Boehm, examines the role of Sir Patrick Reilly, whose term of 

office coincided with the second attempt by the Labour government of Harold 

Wilson to apply to join the EC. Using recently released private papers, it exposes 

the difficulties of decision-making in 1966-67, when the political and economic 

stakes were so high, and when there were also profound disagreements between 

British decision-makers about the intentions of French president Charles de Gaulle 

towards the British application. Melissa Pine looks at the so-called ‘Soames affair’ 

of 1969. Here once again, both the British ambassador to France, Sir Christopher 

Soames, British officials in Whitehall, and government ministers all found 

themselves trying to second-guess the intentions of the French president, and to 

work with the other five members of the EC during the bleak years between the

6 

Anne Deighton 

rejection of the British application in 1967, and the final conclusion of the 

successful negotiations in 1972. 

The third pair of articles turns to historical questions relating to the functioning 

of the European Communities. The first of these, by Catherine Previti Allaire also 

develops the theme mentioned above: that of the importance of the individual. Her 

article is based upon research on the early life of Emile Noël, who was secretary 

general of the European Commission from 1958 to 1987. She identifies the formative 

influences upon a man whom she sees as a pragmatic idealist and a socialist, 

and who was to declare on taking office, that the ‘Common Market will be what we 

make of it’. The second article of this pair is by Christian Franke, and is on postal 

and telecommunication services. His research is part of the new stream of research 

initiatives that examine the development of specific policy areas of the Communities. 

He shows how the role of other institutions, including the Council of Europe, 

that were often in competition with the EC, must be factored in to create a more 

comprehensive understanding of specific policy areas of European policy. Both 

articles throw new light upon priorities, perceptions and policies in the European 

Economic Community during its early history, and like the two articles on British 

policy, are based upon archival material that has only recently come into the public 

domain.

7 

Poland’s Road to the European Union 

Ania Krok-Paszkowska and Jan Zielonka 

This article examines Poland’s developing attitudes and policies towards the EEC/ 

EU from the 1960s onwards. Within this approach we will make reference to the 

available literature and to the accessible documents. Our article starts with a short 

historical outline that sets out Poland’s European credentials and that tries to give 

some insights into the Poles’ attitudes towards Europe and their role therein. 

Poland has consciously brought its own historical experiences to the negotiating 

table. This section is followed by an outline of the EEC-CMEA (Council for 

Mutual Economic Assistance) relations in the late 1970s and Poland’s role therein, 

which shows the practical limit of its relations with the EEC/EC during the cold 

war period. We then examine how the debate on “Europeanization” has shifted 

from the early 1990s to the present day and review the arguments of 

Euro-enthusiasts and Euro-sceptics. We go on to describe and analyse how Poland 

has dealt with accession negotiations in the light of its role as the largest and most 

strategically crucial candidate. In this section we point to Poland’s role in Europe 

and its special relations with Germany and the United States (US). The final section 

deals with Poland as a new EU member state and discusses what kind of EU policy 

one may expect from Poland on the basis of the historical record. 

Historical Associations 

For Poland’s political elite, joining the EU is primarily about returning to Europe. 

Since the tenth century, the myth of Poland’s state and nation (under the first 

“Polish” King Mieszko I) has dominated the Polish discourse on Europe, and the 

adoption of Christianity from Rome in 966 is the symbol of Poland’s long-standing 

“Europeanness”. During this period of ten centuries there are many historic events 

symbolising Poland’s European credentials: the Union of Lublin in 1569 setting up 

a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, King 

Sobieski’s victory over the Turks near Vienna in 1683, the first written European 

democratic constitution of 3 May 1791, the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939, the 

Gdańsk Agreement in 1980 leading to Solidarność. 1 Many such events are referred 

to in the present discourse on Poland’s role in the European Union. 

1. See especially N. DAVIES, Heart of Europe: the Past in Poland's Present, Oxford University 

Press, Oxford/New York, 2001. See also N. DAVIES, God’s Playground: a History of Poland in 

two volumes, Clarendon, Oxford, 1981; K. GERNER, Piast, Jagiełło or Jadwiga? Poland and 

Europe at the End of the 20 th Century, Working Papers 42, Uppsala Universitet, Uppsala, 1998; J. 

JEDLICKI, A Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization, 

Central European University Press, Budapest/New York, 1999.

8 


Poland is an old state and an old nation. Both notions can of course be 

questioned. One may argue that the rise of a Polish state and nation is a late 

eighteenth century phenomenon and that during the past two centuries Poland 

hardly had an independent state and if it had one, it was very multi-ethnic. 

Nevertheless, some form of a Polish state has existed between 966 and 1795, 1918 

and 1939, and since 1944/45, although its form, size and geographical location has 

varied. 2 Poland’s history has been marked by change and fluidity, affecting 

Poland’s economic and demographic character up to the present day. 

The distinction between nation and state has been a particularly salient one in 

Poland’s history. A nation requires some sort of internal identification or a sense of 

collective identity on the part of people who comprise it, but it does not necessarily 

require the organisational characteristics of a state. 3 A nation is thus not necessarily 

congruent with the boundaries of a state. Moreover, concepts of nation had been 

muddied by the fact that in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (16th to 18th 

centuries) different ethnic groups, differentiated by both language and religion, 

were often distributed and distinguished according to social roles and status rather 

than compact territory, i.e., Poles and polonised Lithuanians were landowning 

nobility and gentry, Germans and Jews were burghers and merchants, 

Byelorussians and Ukrainians were peasants. Thus the nation during the 

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was defined on the basis of social standing; the 

szlachta (gentry) rather than ethno-linguistic groups formed the nation. However, 

following the partitions of Poland (1772/95 and 1918), and much influenced by the 

Romantic Movement, a strong Polish ethno-cultural identity emerged. The binding 

factor was a keen sense of common ethnic identity based on common memories, 

myths, language and religion. 

The problems of reconciling nationalism with federalism in a newly 

independent Poland had already been a subject of debate during the partitions. 4 In 

some cases, the coexistence of different cultures and multilingualism were seen as 

enriching and even defining the particularities of a nation. For instance, in interwar 

Poland, Józef Piłsudski’s vision of a multi-ethnic spiritual community united by 

culture and history drawing on an admittedly idealised memory of the former 

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth contrasted sharply with Roman Dmowski’s 

ideal of an ethnic Polish nation-state. In interwar Poland, national minorities 

formed a third of the total population. In the five Eastern provinces they actually 

formed the majority. 

Poland indeed has various pasts to choose from. To this day, attitudes to the 

European Union are coloured by two enduring myths about Poland’s place in 

2. M. TYMOWSKI, J. KIENIEWICZ and J. HOLZER, Historia Polski, Editions spotkania, 

Warszawa, 1991. 

3. K. POMIAN, Europa i jej narody, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa, 1992; also 

published in French as K. POMIAN, L’Europe et ses nations, Collection “le Débat”, Gallimard, 

Paris, 1990. 

4. P. WANDYCZ, The Polish Precursors of Federalism, in: Journal of Central European Affairs, 

12(1952/53), pp.346-355.

Poland’s Road to the European Union 9 

Europe. Kristian Gerner 5 has referred to the dichotomy between a Piastian 

alternative (from the early medieval Piast state with boundaries largely similar to 

that of present-day Poland) influenced by Western Europe and West Christian 

civilization and a multinational Jagiellonian alternative (from the 16th century 

union between Poland and Lithuania, a pagan state three times its size) facing 

eastwards, with Polish hegemony over non-Poles and non-Catholics. Throughout 

Poland’s existence, historical consciousness and identity has vacillated between a 

conviction that Poland should take on foreign, “enlightened” European models and 

a desire to adhere to the traditional home-grown customs and values of the gentry 

nation. 6 Polish traditionalism and sense of a divine mission were strongest in the 

periods following the partitions (1772, 1792 and 1794) and the November 1830 and 

January 1863 uprisings. 

While the 19th century Polish discourse was very much about re-gaining 

Poland’s role among the family of European states and nations, the 20th century 

discourse was also linked to the notion of modernity: Europe as a symbol of it. 7 

This latter aspect is present today in the enlargement discourse among so-called 

EU-specialists (negotiators with the EU, officials responsible for implementing the 

acquis, professors specialised in European integration). 

The present Polish state, the Third Republic, continues from the interwar Second 

Republic, but with boundaries based on the post-war 1945-1989 Polish People’s 

Republic (PRL). The thrust of PRL interpretations of history was to underline the 

centuries-old “Polishness” of the Ziemie Odzyskane [the regained territories] to the 

West and to ignore the fact that they had not been part of a Polish state since the late 

14th century. Mass resettlements in 1945 turned Poland into an ethnically 

homogeneous state. The recent historical Polish role in the Eastern borderlands 

[Kresy] of interwar Poland (1918-1939), and especially the cities of Lviv [Lwów] 

and Vilnius [Wilno] was overlooked. In the years since 1989 there has been greater 

recognition by the Poles of the long German history of the Western territories and a 

reassessment of Poland’s relationship with Germany. Germany is now seen as one of 

Poland’s main supporters in its efforts to rejoin Europe. 

At the same time, there have been efforts by Poland to play a similarly 

supportive role with respect to its former Eastern territories. Poland supported 

Lithuania’s application for EU membership and has been an advocate of closer 

relations between Ukraine and the European Union and NATO. 

Leszek Kołakowski 8 points to the political crisis of March 1968 as finally 

liberating Polish culture from ties with the Communist system and its ideology. The 

violence and repression that followed student protests against censorship was 

5. K. GERNER, op.cit. 

6. J. JEDLICKI, op.cit. 

7. In particular: J. KUROŃ, Polityka i odpowiedzialność, Aneks, Londyn, 1984. See also A. 

MICHNIK, Z dziejów honoru w Polsce, Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza, Warszawa, 1991 and 

A.MICHNIK, Polskie Pytania, Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza, Warszawa, 1993. 

8. L. KOŁAKOWSKI, The Intelligentsia, in: A. BRUMBERG (ed.), Poland: Genesis of a 

Revolution, Vintage Books, New York, 1983, pp.54-67.

10 


compounded by an “anti-Zionist” and anti-intellectual campaign. The revisionist, 

Marxist, anti-clerical movement among the left-wing intelligentsia collapsed, and 

for the first time they sought to form an alliance with the independent Catholic 

intellectual movement. 9 The opposition no longer had any illusions about the 

possibility of liberal reform within the system. The gap between the Polish ruling 

elite and Polish intellectuals widened and in 1975 fifty-nine prominent intellectuals 

signed an open letter protesting against amendments to the constitution that would 

reinforce the leading role of the communist party, arguing that this would be an 

infringement of basic freedoms and civil rights. In the following years various 

independent oppositional groups emerged. They aimed at defending human and 

political rights. Concepts such as individual responsibility and legality as well as 

human rights were revived. Clandestine independent publishing houses documented 

abuses of power and corruption by party functionaries. The emerging opposition 

movements were shielded by the Catholic Church which had considerable 

institutional resources as well as moral authority. The Church had been a 

self-appointed guardian of the Polish national tradition throughout the entire 

post-war period. 10 Its political influence increased following the election of a Polish 

pope in 1978. Moreover, from the mid-1970s onwards, the institutional and 

ideological decline of the party-state was accompanied by increasing reliance on 

Western assistance and credits. The authorities devised a policy of “repressive 

toleration”, meaning that informal political opposition was tolerated in an attempt to 

gain greater access to foreign credits. 11 This, together with the Helsinki process 

allowed the West to put increasing economic and some political pressure on the 

authorities. It also opened the way to the birth of Solidarity in August 1980, which 

signalled the creation of an independent civil society. 12 

These groups and later social movements were all influenced by “European” 

values. 13 In other words, one cannot understand Poland’s entry to the EU only by 

considering the economic or legal aspects of this entry. Historic and cultural 

symbols are extremely important in shaping the thinking and behaviour of Poland’s 

political elite vis-à-vis the EU. Europeanization was a process that long predated 

both the fall of the iron curtain, and indeed it also predates World War II and the 

division of Europe that followed. In the next section we trace the political 

developments relating to Poland’s foreign policy and the EEC. 

9. A. MICHNIK, Kościół, lewica, dialog, Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1997. 

10. J. TISCHNER, Polska jest Ojczyzna, Éditions du Dialogue, Société d’Éditions Internationales/ 

Znaki Czasu, Paris, 1985 and J. ZARIN, Kościół a władza w Polsce (1945-1950), “DIG” TSS, 

Towarzystwo im. Stanisława ze Skarbimierza, Warszawa, 1997. 

11. See J. STANISZKIS, Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 

1984, p.166. 

12. D. GAWIN (ed.), Lekcja Sierpnia: dziedzictwo “Solidarności” po dwudziestu latach, 

Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa, 2002. See also J. ZIELONKA, Political Ideas in 

Contemporary Poland, Avebury, Aldershot, 1989. 

13. See for instance A. MICHNIK, Letters from Prison, California University Press, Berkeley/Los 

Angeles, 1998.


Relations with the EEC 

During the final stages of World War II the various segments of Poland’s political 

and military elite tried to prevent their country falling under the Soviet Union’s 

sphere of influence. 14 Their efforts failed, however. Poland was restored as a state 

within new borders and under a new name: the Polish People’s Republic. Its 

sovereignty was severely constrained by the power holders in the Kremlin and 

initially almost all of Poland’s links with the West were severed. 15 However, after 

1956, some economic, cultural, and human links with Western Europe were 

gradually renewed although, politically, Poland remained in the Soviet sphere of 

influence. 16 While relations with the EEC were desirable for political and trade 

reasons, progress was structurally inhibited given Poland’s place in the Soviet 

security and defence architecture, in particular the Warsaw Pact. 

Very little literature is available specifically on Poland’s relationship with the 

EEC in the 1960s and 1970s, although there are some more general works on the 

EEC and the Eastern bloc. 17 Poland, as well as Hungary and Romania, took a 

pragmatic attitude towards relations with the EEC. The first contacts between 

Poland and the EEC or Common Market, took place in November 1964. These 

were unofficial contacts of a “technical” nature at the level of “experts”. 

Subsequent meetings took place within the GATT framework in which the EEC 

was represented as a single entity. The Poles were principally interested in the 

lifting of export quotas on certain goods, the lowering of customs tariffs and 

14. N. DAVIES, op.cit.; and W. DOBRZYCKI, Historia stosunków międzynarodowych w czasach 

nowożytnych 1815-1945, Fundacja Studiów Międzynarodowych, “Scholar”, Warszawa, 2002. 

15. Poland and Czechoslovakia initially expressed an interest in participating in the Marshall Plan but the 

Soviet Union objected, calling it American economic imperialism. See www.marshallfoundation.org/ 

about_gcm/marshall_plan.htm. 

16. N. ASCHERSON, Polish August, what has Happened in Poland, Penguin Books, Suffolk/New 

York, 1981. 

17. For instance, J. DE GARA, Trade Relations Between the Common Market and the Eastern Bloc, 

in: Cahiers de Bruges, no.7, De Tempel, Bruges, 1964; H. SCHAEFER, East Europe’s New Look 

at the Common Market, in: East Europe, 20.3(1971), pp.12-17; J. ŁUKASZEWSKI, The 

European Community and Eastern Europe. Some Geopolitical Perspectives, Round Table, 249, 

1973, pp.41-50; C. RANSOM, The European Community and Eastern Europe, Rowman and 

Littlefield, Totowa, NJ, 1974; A. FONTAINE and J.P. QUENTIN, Les relations entre la CEE et 

l'Europe de l'Est: Aspects politiques et juridiques, in: Problèmes politiques et sociaux, no.254, 

Paris, 1975; J. PINDER and P. PINDER, The European Community’s policy towards Eastern 

Europe, in: European series, no.25, Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 

London, 1975; D. CORNELSEN, H. MACHOWSKI, and K. SCHENK, Perspektiven und 

Probleme wirtschaftlicher Zusammenarbeit zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa [Sonderheft], 

Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1976; A. SHLAIM and 

G. YANNOPOULOS, The EEC and Eastern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 

1979. Data bases of state archives are available at www.archiwa.gov.pl/index.eng.html. Opening 

hours, conditions of accessibility to archival material in Poland as well as in institutions of Polish 

communities abroad are contained in “Archiwa w Polsce. Informator adresowy” (newest version 

2002). The Archival Information Centre is at 6 Długa Street, 00-950 Warsaw, tel. +48 22 635 68 

22, fax +48 22 831 75 63. E-mail address for enquiries is coia-info@archiwa.gov.pl.

12 


payments levied on Polish food exports to the six EEC member states. Poland also 

wanted to maintain its traditional markets for agricultural products, but the main 

reason for seeking relations with the Common Market was to gain access to the 

technology and machinery essential for the creation of a more modern industrial 

base. 18 At this stage, given the geo-political context, the emphasis was very much 

on economic and technical rather than political cooperation. 

By 1972, Poland was maintaining regular unofficial contacts with the EEC and 

14% of total Polish exports went to the EEC. (In 1998, when accession negotiations 

with the EU were launched, 68.3% of Poland’s exports went to the EU). At a 

meeting in Prague in June 1973, the CMEA decided to authorise its secretary 

general to establish preliminary contacts with the EEC. However, since neither side 

was willing to recognise the other as a supranational institution, it was not until 

September 1986 that the EEC and CMEA actually held a first round of talks about 

the possibility of establishing official relations. 19 In June 1987 official contacts 

between the CMEA and the EEC were established and new possibilities for 

cooperation were created. However, Poland had concluded bilateral agreements 

with the EEC in specific sectors such as pork and poultry exports well before 

official relations between the CMEA and the EEC had been established. It also 

entered into agreements on trade and economic cooperation aimed at facilitating 

access of Polish exports to Community’s markets and to enhance joint production 

ventures and scientific and technological cooperation. 

In September 1987 Poland applied to establish diplomatic relations with the 

EEC and it became the second socialist country after Hungary to be recognised by 

the EEC. 20 In 1988 a framework agreement between the CMEA and the EEC was 

concluded in the form of a joint declaration on mutual recognition. Within a year 

Poland then became the first Central and East European country to start its 

transition to democracy with the signing of the Roundtable Agreements between 

the Solidarity opposition and the PZPR [Polish United Workers’ Party] and its 

allies. 21 Transitional, partially free elections were held in June 1989. Solidarity 

candidates won all 35% of seats open to free competition in the lower house of 

parliament, the Sejm, and 99 out of 100 seats in the newly-created Senate. Two 

months later, a Solidarity prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, formed a coalition 

government made up of eleven Solidarity ministers, seven ministers from the 

satellite peasant and democratic parties, with four portfolios reserved for the 

communists. Full and rapid integration into Western political, economic and 

security structures such as the EU and NATO became the foreign policy priority for 

18. J. KROK-PASZKOWSKI, Między Brukselą a Moskwą. Procesy integracyjne w Europie, Polonia 

Book Fund Limited, London, 1975. 

19. For aspects of EEC-CMEA relations until the 1980s, see W. BIEŃKOWSKI and M. HAKOGI, 

Poland's Economic Relations with the West in the 1980's – the Impact of Political and Economic 

Factors, in: Coexistence, 25:3(1998), pp.299-318. 

20. Warsaw Voice, 3 May 1988. 

21. J. BROWN, Surge to Freedom: the End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe, Adamantine, 

Twickenham, 1991.


successive Polish governments. Diplomatic relations were established between 

Poland and the European Community and an Agreement on Trade and Economic 

Cooperation was signed in September 1989. 

Friends and foes of European Integration 

For the majority of Polish political elites the post-1989 efforts to re-install 

democracy and market economy went hand in hand with “Europeanisation”, 

meaning (re)integration with the Western part of Europe and its values and 

institutions. 22 This was the case even if the particular institutional solutions chosen 

reflected more the American than a European model of economy and government. 

However, especially in the first years of independence, Polish political discourse 

tended to operate with the notion of a Euro-Atlantic community, i.e. without 

drawing a sharp line between the EU and the US. Poland’s elite wanted first of all 

to return to the Western civilisation composed of democratic, capitalist and some 

would add Christian countries. Membership in Western institutional structures was 

about systemic reforms, historical justice and cultural affinity. It was not about 

meeting a detailed set of technical conditions. The return to Europe represented a 

return to normalcy; to something that Poland naturally belonged to. 23 Poland’s 

minister for European integration put it as follows: “Our country is returning to the 

family of European states because Europe is our home”. 24 The public clearly 

endorsed this reasoning. Opinion surveys in the early 1990s showed that over 80% 

of Poles were in favour of EU membership and associated the EU with democracy, 

prosperity and Western culture. They showed considerable emotional involvement 

in European affairs with 

“a relatively strong belief in Poland’s culturally and historically European identity, in 

its ‘right’ to a place in Europe […], but also expectations that unloved neighbours 

have to help us because that it is their moral duty”. 25 

A large segment of the public simply assumed that joining the EU would give 

access to Western Europe’s wealth without the need to adapt or make any 

22. Somewhat more narrowly, “Europeanization” is also taken to mean the shift of emphasis among 

national institutions and actors towards EU decision-making. See W. JABLOŃSKI, The 

Europeanisation of Government in Poland in the 1990s, in: K. CORDELL (ed.), Poland and the 

European Union, Routledge, London/New York, 2000, pp.127-141. See also D. PYSZNA and K. 

VIDA, The Management of Accession to the European Union in Poland and Hungary, Working 

Paper no.128, Institute for World Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 2002. 

23. A. SMOLAR, From Opposition to Atomization, in: Journal of Democracy, 7(January 1996), 

pp.24-38. 

24. R. CZARNECKI, A Europe Understood as Unity and Diversity, Poland’s Committee for European 

Integration Materials and Documents, Warsaw, 8:2(1998), p.1655. 

25. J. GOŁĘBIOWSKI, Social and Political Background of Poland’s Integration with the European 

Union, in: P.-C. MÜLLER-GRAFF and A. STĘPNIAK (eds.), Poland and the European Union: 

Between Association and Membership, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997, pp.91-106 (99).

14 


concessions on the part of the state and society. This reflected a general lack of 

understanding and appreciation of the political agenda of European integration, and 

perhaps even the failure of EC institutions and member states to project a clear 

message to Eastern European publics. 

However, with the passage of years public perceptions began to change under 

pressure from various internal and external factors. First, post cold war democratic 

and economic reforms have left large segments of the population disadvantaged 

and frustrated. For instance, real wages fell more than 25 per cent in the first years 

of transition. 26 Unemployment rose 16 per cent between 1990-1994 and nearly half 

of those unemployed were young people. 27 This could not but undermine the public 

enthusiasm concerning the return to a Europe of capitalist and democratic nations. 

And although successive governments supported European integration, they often 

blamed the EU for imposing painful reforms on Poland. For instance, the parallel 

introduction of four major reforms by the Buzek government in 1999 was justified 

on the grounds that it was a prerequisite for EU accession. 28 This was only part of 

the story. In reality, the reforms were needed for domestic reasons: the existing 

welfare system in particular was simply unsustainable. 

Nevertheless the Union has confronted Poland with a long list of conditions, 

among them some 80,000 pages of detailed procedures and regulations comprising 

the so-called acquis communautaire. Adopting the acquis was not only costly, but 

also tarnished the idealised vision of the EU as an agent of Western civilisation and 

prosperity. The contrast between the EU and NATO became apparent: NATO has 

handled its enlargement in a political rather than technical fashion, and so the US 

and EU have increasingly been contrasted. 29 The EU has been portrayed by its 

critics as a bureaucratic, selfish and not very democratic entity. As Andrzej Lepper, 

a radical Polish politician argued: 

“The EU is another kolhoz, one had its headquarters in Moscow, the other has its 

headquarters in Brussels. Nothing has changed.” 30 

The EU and Western Europe also became an object of criticism on ideological 

grounds. The most severe criticism came from Catholic and nationalist circles 

associated with Radio Maria and the daily Polish Thought (Polska Myśl). Radical 

conservative or populist parties such as the League of Polish Families (Liga 

26. D. VAUGHAN-WHITEHEAD (ed.), Paying the Price. The Wage Crisis in Central and Eastern 

Europe, Macmillan, London, 1997, p.22 and chapter 7. 

27. (GUS) GŁÓWNY URZĄD STATYSTYCZNY (Polish Official Statistics) at www.stat.gov.pl. 

28. The four reforms were: local government and administrative reform, education system reform, 

healthcare reform, and pension system reform. See J. HAUSNER and M. MARODY, et al. (eds.), 

Trzy Polski: potencjał i bariery integracji z Unia Europejska. EU-monitoring 3, Fundacja Ericha 

Brosta przy Fundacji im. Friedricha Eberta, Warszawa, 1999. See also L. KOLARSKA-BOBIŃSKA 

(ed.), Cztery reformy. Od Koncepcji do realizacji, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa, 2000. 

29. J. KUCHARCZYK (ed.), Europa - Ameryka. Transatlantycki wymiar reform Unii Europejskiej, 

Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa, 2002; C. LEWANOWICZ, Kategorie członkowstwa w 

elastycznej Europie, in: Polska w Europie, Ośrodek Studiów Międzynarodowych i Fundacja 

“Polska w Europie”, 37(September 2001), pp.27-38. 

30. PAP [Polska Agencja Prasowa], 14/02/2000.


Polskich Rodzin) and Self-Defence (Samoobrona) also adopted an anti-EU 

stance. 31 Less radical parties such as the Polish Peasants Party (Polskie 

Stronnictwo Ludowe) and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) also openly 

expressed negative views on Poland’s accession to the EU. 32 They challenged the 

initial assumption that joining the Union and re-building the Polish state were 

compatible if not mutually reinforcing processes. They argued that Poland’s 

sovereignty would be curbed by joining the Union. Western Europe has been 

accused of being too liberal, cosmopolitan and secular. It was fiercely argued that 

entering the Union and reuniting the two halves of Europe would prevent Poland 

from cultivating its national and religious traditions. 33 An editorial in ‘Polish 

Thought’ put it as follows: 

“An understanding of Europe as a [cultural] space rooted in antique civilization and in 

Christianity, whose symbols were Aachen and Rome - this Europe is simply 

non-existent. Our contemporary Europe is a Europe of legal homosexual marriages and 

pornography, [the practice of legal] killing of unborn children, and defending murderers 

against capital punishment, the [Europe of] rap-music and hamburgers, the cult of 

earning money at any cost and empty churches, contempt for national traditions and 

developing preferences for the New Age, for sects and Judaism in Christianity, ‘children's 

rights’ and parents deprived of power over their own children”. 34 

The above-mentioned factors clearly had an impact on Polish public opinion: 

public support for joining the EU fell from over 80 per cent in the early 1990s to no 

more than 50-55 per cent in the year 2000. 35 Lower support was said to reflect very 

diffuse motivations from more realistic cost-benefit analyses of membership, fear 

of economic costs of enlargement, fear of loss of identity or national sovereignty, to 

a rejection of the political elites in Poland who were consistently in favour of 

membership. 36 With the prospect of enlargement getting closer, people gradually 

31. H. KUBIAK, La rhétorique anti-européenne des partis politiques polonais. Le cas de Samoobrona 

(Autodéfense) et de la Ligue des familles polonaises (LPR), in: J.-M. DE WAELE (ed.), La 

Pologne et l'intégration européenne, éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2003. 

32. E. NALEWAJKO, Le débat polonais sur l'intégration. Les partis politiques anti-européens et 

leurs dirigeants, in: J.-M. DE WAELE (ed.), op.cit. 

33. It should be mentioned that the threat of foreign models and ideas to weaken Polish traditions and 

morals, leading to apostasy and a loss of national identity has been a recurring theme among 

broader sectors of Poland’s population. J. JEDLICKI, op.cit. 

34. Quoted in I. KRZEMIŃSKI, The National Identity and European Consciousness of Poles, in: P. 

DRULAK (ed.), National and European Identities in EU Enlargement. Views from Central and 

Eastern Europe, Institute of International Relations, Prague, p.64. 

Such are the views of the religious right associated with the radical Catholic nationalist broadcaster 

Radio Maryja. However, the Polish Catholic Church hierarchy has broadly endorsed EU 

membership and in the run-up to the accession referendum exerted considerable pressure upon 

Radio Maryja to tone down its rhetoric. The pope’s support for Polish accession was also made 

clear on a number of occasions. 

35. See CBOS opinion polls at www.cbos.pl/ENGLISH/cbos_en.htm. 

36. L. KOLARSKA-BOBIŃSKA (ed.), Before the Great Change. Polish Public Opinion and EU 

Enlargement, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw, 2001; A. SZCZERBIAK, Polish Public 

Opinion: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership, in: Journal of Common Market 

Studies, 39:1(2001), pp.105-122.

16 


became aware of the less attractive conditions of EU membership and the price 

they may have to pay for it. They worried about the cost of the rapid adoption of 

EU technical, social and environmental standards. Voters wanted to know the 

concrete reasons why they should join and what they would get out of it. The elites 

in favour of joining the Union were faced with a tough test of their policy: on June 

7-8th, 2003 the Poles were asked to support the EU accession in a referendum. The 

results of the referendum represented an enormous and largely unexpected victory 

for the friends of Europeanization: 77.45 per cent voted in favour of EU 

membership and only 22.55 per cent against, with a relatively high turnout of 58.85 

per cent. How can one explain these rather surprising results? 

On the eve of the accession referendum there was a massive and determined 

pro-European campaign led by a broad coalition of political parties from centre-left 

to centre-right. Poland’s widely respected president Alexander Kwaśniewski 

campaigned vigorously in favour of the “yes” vote and helped the embattled 

coalition-government led by Leszek Miller to present the case in terms of national 

rather than merely party interests. 

However, weaknesses in the anti-European campaign have probably shaped the 

outcome of the referendum in a crucial manner. Parties engaged in the “no” 

campaign clearly failed to receive significant backing from their own electorate. A 

large proportion of people who voted for Eurosceptic parties such as the League of 

Polish Families and Self-Defence in the 2001 parliamentary elections, voted in 

favour of accession in the EU referendum (35% and 50% of supporters 

respectively). 37 The problem lay not in the lack of political mobilisation. In fact, 

the “no” campaign was well-organised and quite vocal. The problem was in the 

credibility and legitimacy of its claim. For instance, references to Christian values 

were often used in the anti-European rhetoric. However, the greatest authority 

among the Christian electorate, pope John Paul II, has strongly supported Poland’s 

membership in the EU. In a speech a few weeks before the accession referendum 

was held, the pope stressed that Poland had always been an important part of 

Europe. He acknowledged that many people were concerned that the country’s 

religious and cultural identity could be compromised, and that the economic 

disparity was large, but he argued that Poland could not abandon the EU which 

constituted a family of nations based on a common Christian heritage. 38 

37. The Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych) gives a Polish view on various aspects 

of Poland’s accession to the EU, the shape of an enlarged EU as well as publishing analyses on 

specific aspects of EU policy. Most are in Polish, but some have been written in English or have 

English-language summaries. See www.isp.org.pl/indexEN.htm. 

38. The pope has called on political leaders and citizens in the EU to place greater emphasis on the 

spiritual dimension of Europe. Political parties such as Law and Justice (PiS) share this view and 

are unhappy about the lack of any reference to Christianity or Christian values in the preamble of 

the draft EU constitution. See also H. SUCHOCKA, Jaka konstytucja dla rozszerzającej się 

Europy, in: E. POPŁAWSKA (ed.), Konstytucja dla rozszerzającej się Europy, Instytut Spraw 

Publicznych, Warszawa, 2000.


Anti-European rhetoric also frequently referred to the United States of America 

as an alternative and supposedly better model of politics, economics and society. 

However, the United States has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of 

Poland’s entry to the EU, both under presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton. 

This last point also shows that critics of the EU had problems in spelling out any 

plausible alternative to enlargement. Public opinion surveys show that the trust put 

in European institutions is generally higher than that in Polish institutions. In 2002 

over half of the respondents considered that membership of the EU will have a 

positive effect on the functioning of Polish public institutions. 39 

Finally, the “no” campaign was unable to convince public opinion that the EU 

accession deal reached in Copenhagen in December 2002 was detrimental to 

Poland’s overall interests. This leads us to the next important issue: the EU 

accession process and its outcome. 

Accession Process: Economics and Geopolitics 

Poland signed an association agreement with the EC/EU in 1991. This so-called 

Europe Agreement provided the legal framework for bilateral relations and 

included a gradual introduction of a free trade area in goods, the liberalisation of 

the service sector, financial and technical assistance and approximation of 

legislation with that of the European Community and political dialogue. In 1993 

the Copenhagen European council opened up the perspective of enlargement and in 

1994 Poland submitted its application for EU membership. Official negotiations 

with the EU were opened in 1998 and successfully completed in December 2002 in 

Copenhagen. 40 

Poland has been a tough negotiator and at times a difficult partner for the EU. Of 

course, the economic asymmetry between Poland and the 15 EU-members was 

enormous. 41 One can also question Poland’s historical and somewhat idealised 

39. See Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (2002). European Commission, DG Press and 

Communication, Public Opinion Analysis at www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion. 

40. Accession Negotiations – Poland on the Road to the European Union. Government Plenipotentiary 

for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union 2000. English language version 

available at www.negocjacje.gov.pl/neg/publ/pdf/isgnp_b1.pdf (also available in German). 

Poland’s position papers for the Accession Negotiations with the European Union. Government 

Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union 2000. Available in 

English at www.negocjacje.gov.pl/neg/publ/pdf/isgnp_c2.pdf (also available in German). 

European Commission (1998-2002). Regular Report(s) from the Commission on Poland’s 

Progress Towards Accession. At http://europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/Poland/index.htm. For 

an in-depth analysis of the role of the Commission in the enlargement of the EU, see G. AVERY 

and F. CAMERON, The Enlargement of the European Union, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield 

1998. See also D. PYSZNA and K. VIDA, op.cit. 

41. E. KAWECKA-WYRZYKOWSKA (ed.), Stosunki Polski z Unią Europejską, Katedra Integracji 

Europejskiej im. J. Monneta, Szkoła Główna Handlowa, Warszawa, 2002.

18 


self-image. Nevertheless, Poland is by far the largest country joining the Union in this 

wave of enlargement. In terms of population it is larger than the total of the other nine 

acceding member states and its total GDP is higher than that of the other seven CEE 

states that joined the Union on 1st May 2004. Moreover, and more important, Poland 

has a very central geo-strategic position. It not only borders Germany, the Union’s 

most powerful member state, but also unstable Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (via 

Kaliningrad). 42 This EU enlargement was not only about adopting the acquis 

communautaire; it was also if not primarily about filling the enormous power vacuum 

that emerged in Europe after the fall of communism. Poland’s geo-strategic position 

had been a source of weakness during the two world wars, and the definition of her 

borders remained problematic. Now, Poland was using her position in the centre of 

Europe as a positive negotiating asset. This is why Poland could negotiate harder with 

the EU than other candidate states even though its progress in meeting the 

Copenhagen criteria has often been questioned. 43 During the final stage of accession 

negotiations in Copenhagen the Danish presidency negotiated only with Poland 

keeping all other delegations in a waiting room. 44 

Poland’s geo-strategic importance and size could prove nevertheless once again to 

be a liability rather than an asset. Poland’s geo-strategic position exposes it to 

instabilities in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. It has the largest number of potential 

(labour) migrants wanting to enter Western Europe. The country also has a very large 

and rather inefficient agricultural sector. During the accession process, Western 

European leaders showed that they clearly understood Poland’s difficult position and 

frequently granted it special treatment either in economic or political terms. 

However, Poland’s special road to the Union was characterised not only by its 

toughness. Poland introduced politics and geo-politics to otherwise legal and 

procedural aspects of the accession process. Three features of Poland’s policy 

vis-à-vis the Union can be mentioned in this context: the special relations with 

Germany, NATO, and Eastern Europe. 

Poland’s special relations with Germany allowed it to influence the accession 

process through Berlin rather than solely through Brussels. While most of other 

candidates from the region prioritised the Commission in negotiations, Poland was 

42. T. PASZEWSKI (ed), Polska granica wschodnią granicą Unii Europejskiej, Raporty i Analizy, 

Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, Center for International Relations, no.7(2000). 

43. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Regular Report[s] from the Commission on Poland’s Progress 

Towards Accession (1998-2002). At http://europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/Poland/index.htm. 

44. This has been revealed to the authors by chief negotiators from Hungary, Lithuania and Poland 

during a meeting organised at the European University Institute in Florence on 20-21 December 

2002, a few days after the successful completion of accession negotiations.


also able to shape the EU stance through state-to-state channels. Warsaw tried to 

develop close bilateral ties with several EU member states, not only Germany. 45 

Nevertheless, the latter proved most attentive and important. 46 As neighbours and 

rivals, Germany and Poland have had a difficult and complex history of frequent 

conflict and occasional cooperation. In the late 18th and 19th centuries Poland was 

caught between Germany and Russia, disappearing as an independent state for 

almost 150 years. Interwar Poland was again a victim of these powers. In the 1970s 

Bonn and Warsaw took limited steps to improve relations starting with chancellor 

Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, but the turning point came with the end of communism. 

Poland supported German re-unification and the signing of agreements on borders 

and good neighbourliness resulted in a commitment by Germany to support 

Poland’s bid for EU membership. In the 1990s, the policies of chancellor Helmut 

Kohl were clearly guided by a geo-strategic rationale that appreciated the special 

place of Poland in the new European architecture. 47 When the SPD/Green coalition 

came to power in 1998, Germany began to place more emphasis on Poland’s 

progress in meeting specific EU conditions for accession. A number of issues at the 

time, such as property rights of former German landowners, the sale of land to 

foreigners and the length of transition periods on the free movement of labour led 

to emotional reactions on both sides. 48 Nevertheless, Poland was able to finalise 

accession negotiations in Copenhagen only after German chancellor Gerhard 

45. Initially Poland had also hoped to involve France, next to Germany in closer co-operation on 

European issues. In August 1991, the Polish, German and French foreign ministers met informally 

in Weimar to discuss the role of Poland in Europe and the possibility of co-operation between the 

three countries. The Polish government saw the so-called Weimar Triangle as the “backbone” of 

the future and expanded EU, firmly anchoring Poland in Western institutions. However, the 

Weimar Triangle failed to deliver any tangible results. See for instance, B. GEREMEK, The 

Weimar Triangle, in: Przegląd Środkowoeuropejski, Central European Review, vol.VI, 

no.20-21(February 1998). Also available at www.medianet.pl?~ceurorev/numer21/23.htm. R. 

KUŹNIAR, (first printed in Polish in: Tygodnik Powszechny, no.21(25 May 1995), A Common 

Calling on the Path to European Unity, in: Przegląd Środkowoeuropejski, op.cit., February 1998. 

Also available at www.medianet.pl/~ceurorev/numer21/27 A number of other commentaries are 

available in English, French and German at www.medianet.pl/~ceurorev. See also A. KRZEMIŃSKI, 

R.VON THADDEN and D. VERNET, Weimarer Dreieck. Polens Weg nach Europa führt über 

Deutschland und Frankreich, in: Die Zeit, February 10 th 1998, p.26; B. KLICH, Stosunki 

polsko-francuskie – partnerstwo 2000, Polska w Europie, Ośrodek Studiów Międzynarodowych i 

Fundacja “Polska w Europie”, March 31 st 2000, pp.20-33. 

46. R. FREUDENSTEIN, Poland, Germany and the EU, in: International Affairs, 74 (January 1 st 

1998), pp.41-54; M. ZABOROWSKI, Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement: The Rising 

Prominence of Domestic Politics, ZEI Discussion Paper, C 51, 1999; A. HYDE-PRICE, Building 

a Stable Peace in Mitteleuropa: The German-Polish Hinge, The University of Birmingham 

Institute for German Studies, Institute Discussion Papers, 2000/18, available at 

www.igs.bham.ac.uk/research/discussion.htm; H. TEWES, Germany, Civilian Power and the New 

Europe: Enlarging NATO and the European Union, Palgrave, New York, 2002. 

47. D. BINGEN, Polityka Republiki Bońskiej wobec Polski, Od Adenauera do Kohla 1949-1991, 

Kwadrat, Kraków, 1997. 

48. M. ZABOROWSKI, op.cit.

20 


Schroeder unexpectedly supported Poland’s request for additional funding after his 

meeting with Poland’s prime minister Leszek Miller. 49 

NATO was important in Poland’s relations with the Union because of its 

perceived role in securing the continent and in anchoring the United States in 

Europe. Successive Polish governments saw NATO and EU enlargements as 

closely linked and mutually reinforcing. 50 Economic prosperity and democracy 

were seen as possible only in a secure environment. As early as December 1991, 

Polish prime minister Jan Olszewski stressed that NATO was a pillar of European 

security and the presence of the US army in Europe was a factor of stability. The 

worry was that without inclusion in NATO, Poland would become part of a “grey 

zone” in which other states would retain the right to decide on its political future. 51 

In its statement on the opening of EU accession negotiations, the Polish 

government again underlined that 

“EU membership […], in combination with membership in NATO, will be 

conducive to the consolidation of the democratic order and security in this part of the 

continent”. 52 

Poland’s initial overtures to NATO were met with even more cautious reaction in 

the West than its overtures to the EU. Western governments, including the 

American one, were anxious not to antagonise the Soviet Union, and later Russia. 53 

With the passage of time, however, these attitudes changed. In 1994, the presidents 

of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia met with president Clinton 

in Prague and pushed hard for admission to NATO. Instead, they were offered 

collaboration with NATO within the Partnership for Peace framework. However, in 

1997, in Madrid, NATO invited Poland to join its ranks as a full member. Even 

before it joined in 1999, Poland’s enthusiasm about NATO was seen as problematic 

in some countries of the Union because of its American rather than Russian 

49. Schroeder gives Poles the cream, in: Financial Times-Observer-Europe, December 15 th 2002. 

50. H. SUCHOCKA, Poland's European perspective, in: NATO-review, 41:3(June 1993), p.3; W. 

CIMOSZEWICZ, Building Poland’s security: membership of NATO as a key objective, NATO 

Review, 4:3(May 1996), pp.3-7; B. GEREMEK, Europäische Politik zwischen Ost und West. 

Polens geostrategischen Chancen, in: Internationale-Politik, 54:11(November 1999), pp.35-40. 

51. W. CIMOSZEWICZ, The Eastern Dimension of the European Union. The Polish View, Speech at 

the Conference “The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy”, Warsaw, February 20 th 2003. 

52. Statement on the opening of Poland’s negotiations on membership in the European Union, 

Brussels, March 31 st 1998, Yearbook of Polish European Studies, vol.2. 

53. A. MICHTA, Poland. A Linchpin of Regional Security, in: A. MICHTA (ed.), America's new 

allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO, University of Washington Press, 

Seattle/London, 1999, pp.40-73.


dimension. In the late 1990s the main issue at stake was Poland’s criticism of the 

EU’s efforts to foster closer co-operation in the field of defence as a way of gaining 

independence from NATO. 54 

Polish concern about Eastern Europe in its relations with the EU was guided by 

security concerns, but cultural and economic ties with Poland’s Eastern neighbours 

have always been important too. Large parts of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania 

belonged to Poland in the past, and many Poles still feel attached to these countries 

despite a rather complex history of inter-ethnic and inter-state relations. 55 There 

have been suggestions that Poland should replicate the role of Germany towards 

Poland in its relations with Lithuania, Ukraine and eventually Belarus. In 1997, 

prime minister Jerzy Buzek declared that it was Poland’s moral duty and in its 

political interest to support democracy and market reforms in these countries. 56 

In his April 1990 speech to parliament on the priorities of Polish foreign policy, 

foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski stressed Poland’s desire for an 

intensification of political, economic and cultural ties with Western countries, but 

he also underlined that this did not exclude an active Eastern policy. 57 Even before 

acceding, Poland has already quietly launched the idea of an “Eastern Dimension” 

to the EU’s external policy. 58 The Eastern dimension of the European integration 

process was also highlighted by John Paul II. When speaking about accession to the 

EU the pope made historical reference to the Union of Lublin and Queen Jadwiga 

54. R. KUŻNIAR (ed.), Polska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa 1989-2000, Wydawnictwo Naukowe 

Scholar, Fundacja Studiów Międzynarodowych, Warszawa, 2001; T. CHABIERA, Rozszerzenie 

– element strategii NATO, Polska w Europie, Ośrodek Studiów Międzynarodowych i Fundacja 

“Polska w Europie”, 32(June 2000), pp.106-118; S. PARZYMIES and I. POPIUK-RYSINSKA 

(eds.), Polska w organizacjach międzynarodowych, Fundacja Studiów Międzynarodowych, 

“Scholar”, Warszawa, 2002. 

The 2003 Iraq crisis further underlined Poland’s pro-American and pro-NATO position in contrast 

to the position of such EU member states as Germany and France. French president Jacques Chirac 

openly criticised Poland’s stance and some European media began to talk about Poland as the 

future “American Trojan Horse” within the Union. See J. REED, Poland seeks postwar role for 

companies. Reconstruction Dividend, in: Financial Times, March 5 th 2003; A. BEUVE-MERY 

and S. MARTI, Pourquoi l’Europe de l’Est vote George W. Bush: Le soutien des pays candidats 

aux Etats-Unis sur l’Iraq traduit leur adhésion au modèle anglosaxon, in: Le Monde, March 4 th 

2003; Elargissement, in: Le Monde-editorial, June 17 th 2003. 

55. A. LIEBICH, Les minorités nationales en Europe centrale et orientale, Institut européen de 

l’Université de Genève, Genève, 1997; R.WAPIŃSKI (ed.), Polacy i sąsiedzi – dystanse i 

przenikanie kultur: zbiór studiów, Prace Zakładu Historii Myśli i Kultury Politycznej Instytutu 

Historii Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego ‘Stepan Design’, Ostaszewo [Gdańskie], 2000; S. BURANT, 

Problematyka wschodnia: studium porównawcze stosunków Polski z Litwą, Białorusią i Ukrainą, 

Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Seria Studia i Materiały, PISM, Warszawa, 1993. 

56. Prime minister Buzek’s declaration to the Sejm (parliament) of 10 November 1997, quoted in K. 

GERNER, op.cit. 

57. A. PODRAZA, Central Europe in the process of European integration: a comparative study of 

strategies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia towards deepening and widening 

of the European Union, Research Support Scheme, Prague, 2000. 

58. P. KOWAL (ed.), The EU’s “Eastern Dimension” – An Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland’s 

Policy?, Centre for International Relations, Warsaw, 2002; W. CIMOSZEWICZ (2003), op.cit.

22 


whose marriage to the Lithuanian Prince Jagiełło opened the way to union between 

Poland and Lithuania. 59 The prime minister, Leszek Miller took up the pope’s 

theme “from the Union of Lublin to the European Union” and drew the analogy of 

the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth: a great empire in which Poles remained 

Poles, Lithuanians remained Lithuanians and Ruthenes remained Ruthenes. 60 

Poland’s Eastern dimension acquired practical meaning with the EU request to 

harden Poland’s Eastern border as required by the so-called Schengen acquis. 

Poland agreed to increase border controls and introduce visas for citizens of 

Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, but at the same time called for a more open policy of 

the Union towards its new “near abroad”. 61 Poland has especially been concerned 

about the possible negative economic and political implications of an increasingly 

isolated Ukraine. President Kwaśniewski has emphasised the special place of 

Ukraine in Europe 62 and he assured Ukraine that Poland would support its efforts 

to join the EU if in the future it decided to apply for membership. 63 

Poland’s special road to the EU has not only been confined to geo-politics. 

Economics also played an important role. 64 In this context the special position of 

Poland’s agricultural sector needs to be mentioned. Poland has 14.3 million ha. 

arable area and 26.9 per cent of Poland’s labour force is employed in agriculture. 65 

Negotiations between the EU and Poland in this field have been conflict ridden and 

complex. On the one hand, Polish peasants feared that the EU accession would 

expose them to damaging and allegedly unfair competition from Western European 

farmers. On the other hand, the EU feared that Poland’s agriculture would represent 

an excessive burden on its budget. Moreover, the sector has had a strong grip on 

Polish politics, with the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) being 

part of various successive coalition governments. One of the main problems in 

negotiations was that of agriculture and the levels of direct payments to farmers, 

which were to be phased in over ten years starting at 25% of the full EU rate upon 

59. JOHN PAUL II, Od Unii Lubelskiej do Unii Europejskiej, Address on May 19 th 2003 to the 

pilgrims who had come for the canonization of Ursula Ledochowska and Josef Sebastian Pelczar. 

In English at www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2003/may/index.htm. 

60. KANCELARIA PREZESA RADY MINISTRÓW, Od piątego do piątego – Zakończenie 

Kampanii Informacyjnej Rządu, 2003 at www.kprm.gov.pl/print.php?id=/402_9557.htm. 

61. K. WOLCZUK and R. WOLCZUK, Poland and Ukraine. A strategic partnership in a changing 

Europe?, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, European Programme, London, 2002; 

R.WAPIŃSKI (ed.), op.cit. 

62. KANCELARIA PREZYDENTA RP, Strategia dla Polski po wejściu do Unii Europejskiej na lata 

2004-2015: Polska w Unii Europejskiej: konferencja u Prezydenta RP Aleksandra 

Kwaśniewskiego w dniach 25-26 czerwca 2002 r. [Strategy for Poland after the accession to the 

European Union in the years 2004-2015], Komitet Prognoz “Polska 2000 Plus” przy Prezydium 

Polskiej Akademii Nauk, “Elipsa”, Warszawa, 2002. 

63. See series of speeches during the conference “Ukraine in Europe” at http://www.prezydent.pl/se/ 

index.php3?tem_ID=48. 

64. L. BALCEROWICZ, Socialism, capitalism, transformation, Central European University Press, 

Budapest, 1995. 

65. M. MARODY, et al., Meandry instytucjonalizacji: dostosowanie Polski do Unii Europejskiej. 

EU-Monitoring VI, Fundacja Ericha Brosta przy Fundacji im. Friedricha Eberta, Warszawa, 2002.


accession in 2004. This was seen as being detrimental to Poland’s agricultural 

interests and difficult to sell at home in view of the forthcoming accession 

referendum. At the Copenhagen summit in 2002 Polish prime minister Miller made 

a last minute stand on direct payments to farmers, milk quotas and other issues. 66 

As mentioned earlier, the EU made some concessions to Poland after chancellor 

Schroeder’s intervention. 

The final deal reached in Copenhagen pleased not only peasants but also larger 

sectors of Poland’s public opinion, helping the government to win the accession 

referendum a few months later. However, there was so much haggling and talk 

about money at the Copenhagen summit, that a number of prominent former 

dissidents and intellectuals were prompted to remind European leaders that 

“the original idea of solidarity in a united and democratic Europe should not be 

buried under the negotiations and group and local lobby interests”. 67 

Conclusions: Poland as a New EU Member 

If Poland’s history shaped the character of its application to the EU, it is also true 

that the application process may well shape the nature of its future membership. 

Due to its size, 38.6 million inhabitants and larger than all the other nine acceding 

countries put together, Poland sees itself as a leading player in the current 

enlargement and it has ambitions to take up a strong position in the EU 

decision-making process. It would like to form part of a group of the largest (six) 

countries. In the run up to the 2003 IGC (Intergovernmental Conference) it sought 

the support of Spain to lobby for maintaining the Nice Treaty distribution of votes 

which grants the two countries 27 votes each in the council of ministers, thus 

putting them within the reach of the largest countries with 29 votes each. 68 

Polish politicians have repeatedly stated that the new members must be treated 

equally in the enlarged EU. Poland would be likely to try to counter any attempt at 

forming a “core” EU of the original six members around a French-German axis. 

Although the creation of the Weimar Triangle in 1991 had appeared to point to 

intensive trilateral contacts, the division into the so-called old and new Europe has 

left Poland in the much looser coalition of London-Madrid-Rome. The distance 

between Paris and Warsaw is getting greater and even the much vaunted 

relationship with Germany appears to be weakening. Nevertheless, as the largest 

and geo-strategically most important of the new members, Poland is eager to be 

included in what it perceives as the “core” of the wider European structure. One of 

the underlying reasons for Poland’s attitude is the conviction that, had it not been 

66. M. KACZOROWSKA, EU Negotiations: Milking an Issue, in: The Warsaw Voice, December 15 th 

2002, p.5. 

67. Letter, in: Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 December 2002. 

68. W. CIMOSZEWICZ and ANA PALACIO, How to keep the balance in Europe’s new treaty, in: 

Financial Times, September 26 th 2003, p.23.

24 


constrained by its inclusion in the Soviet bloc, it would have taken part in European 

integration processes from the very beginning. 

There is little enthusiasm in Poland for any “European” military structures that 

could form the basis of an alternative to NATO. The choice between Europe and 

America is a difficult one for Poland, and one it would rather not have to make. 

Public opinion surveys show larger numbers of respondents think that Poland’s 

interests are better served by the EU (51%) than by the United States (12%), 

although 20% thought both are of equal importance. However, most Polish 

politicians would be loath to see any challenge to or weakening of the role of 

NATO in Europe. 69 

President Kwaśniewski argues that Poland can contribute to the EU in three 

specific ways: first, it has 1,000 years of history as a European nation; second, 

together with other ex-Communist states it has experience of economic, political 

and social transformation; and third, it will bring with it greater awareness and 

knowledge of states to the East that are not joining the Union but which will 

become new neighbours. 70 Poland is thus likely to place greater emphasis on good 

relations with neighbours to the East and to urge for a more pro-active policy, 

especially towards Ukraine and Belarus. It is in its interests to have stable and 

prosperous neighbours on its Eastern border, and this traditionally geo-strategic 

approach to European and institutional politics will surely find a resonance in an 

enlargement process of such significance. 

69. The Economist, August 30 th -September 5 th 2003. 

70. S. WAGSTYL and J. CIEŃSKI, Poland not interested in being junior partner in enlarged EU, in: 

Financial Times, August 22 nd , 2003.


During and After the Cold War 

25 

Jan Karlas and Petr Kratochvíl 

There are virtually no publications that cover Czech policy towards European 

integration both before and after the fall of the communism. Yet this is a subject 

which deserves attention, not least as it is of both historical and contemporary 

political importance. This article will examine the main features and turning points 

of this complex relationship before and after the end of the Cold War. 1 

The article begins at the moment the European Economic Community was 

created in 1958, and then follows the development of Czech attitudes to this 

process, up to the beginning of the negotiations for the Czech Republic's (CR) 

accession to the EU in 1998. Given the period that needs to be covered, we only 

focus on Czech behaviour towards European integration, and do not discuss the 

country’s approach to any other Western organisation such as NATO. We do not 

discuss the bilateral relations between Czechoslovakia/the CR and the member 

states of the EC/EU unless this is particularly germaine to our central topic. Finally, 

it is necessary to point out that while analysing the development after the break-up 

of Czechoslovakia in 1993 we limit our attention to the relations of the CR with the 

EU and, thus, do not include the relations of Slovakia in our analysis. 

The question that the article addresses is what the main features of Czech policy 

towards the EC/EU were in this period. We also seek to examine when the main 

changes in Czech behaviour towards European integration took place. At first 

glance, it appears that during the communist regime, European integration was 

perceived as a project of countries that belonged to an enemy alliance. By contrast, 

after the fall of the communist regime, cooperation with the EC/EU and, what is 

more, accession to this organisation became a main priority of Czechoslovakia (and 

later also of the CR). Thus, the transformation of Czech policy in relation to 

European integration from hostility to a quest for participation in the integration 

process appears to have been a sudden one, reflecting regime change. However, one 

of our main findings is that whereas the shift to political cooperation and accession 

efforts was indeed abrupt, economic or, more precisely, trade cooperation predates 

the fall of communism. The transformation from ‘non-existent’ relations to 

cooperation was, therefore, more gradual in this particular field than might have 

been expected. 

The article is divided into two parts: the first part concentrates on the Cold War, 

and the second analyses how policy evolved in the 1990s. Both the Cold War and 

1. We deal with the attitude of Czechoslovakia and subsequently the Czech Republic (which we will 

call CR) towards the European Economic Community and then the European Community (both of 

which we will refer to as the EC) and the European Union (EU). For stylistic reasons we also use 

the term ’Czech’ instead of alternating ‘Czechoslovak’ and ‘Czech’ or using a rather complicated 

expression ‘Czechoslovak/Czech’.

26 


post-Cold War sections begin by setting out the main sources that are currently 

available to scholars and policymakers who wish to explore further the areas that 

we cover. Inevitably, the number of sources covering the 1990s contrasts with the 

lack of literature on the 1958-1989 period, although a number of primary sources 

are now available. Then attention turns to the substantive issues, although, not 

surprisingly, relations developed much more intensively during the relatively short 

period of the 1990s than during the entire Cold War period. In the conclusion, our 

main findings are summarised and discussed. 

1. During the Cold War 

1.1.Sources 

We use three categories to classify the sources. The first category is the archival 

sources that are available in the CR; the second is secondary literature published 

outside the CR (in English or any other internationally used language); and the third 

is secondary literature published in Czechoslovakia/the CR (including translations). 

There are, however, two publications of considerable general utility. The first is 

Brom’s survey of documents available in Czech archives that are related to the 

international economic relations during the Cold War. 2 Although the importance of 

this study is somewhat limited by the fact that it was published in Czech, it 

provides relatively detailed and valuable information on what particular areas of 

the respective field the files of individual Czech archives cover. Brom’s research 

also indicates in which archives and files documents directly devoted to Czech 

policy towards the EC can be found (see below). Second is another publication by 

Simmons that provides an overview of Czech archives. 3 This is written in English 

and focuses on the technical aspects of archival research, and provides information 

on the accessibility of files in individual archives. However, Simmons’s overview 

was written a decade ago and the conditions in some of the archives may have 

changed since. 

As far as the archives themselves are concerned, it should be pointed out that 

according to the current law only documents that were issued more than 30 years 

ago may be accessed. However, it is sometimes also possible to work with more 

recent documents with the permission of the archivist. With regard to the approach 

of Czechoslovakia towards the EC in the course of the Cold War, the following two 

archives are the most important: Státní ústřední archív (Central State Archive) and 

2. B. BROM, Dokumenty z českých archívů k historii mezinárodních hospodářských vztahů v období 

studené války: studie o pramenech [Documents from Czech Archives to the History of International 

Economic Relations in the Time of the Cold War: A Study About Archive Sources], Karolinum, 

Prague, 2002. 

3. P.J. SIMMONS, Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague, and 

Warsaw. Cold War International History Project, Working Paper n° 2, The Woodrow Wilson 

Center, Washington, 1992, pp.15-29.

Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic and European Integration 27 

Archív Ministerstva zahraničních věcí (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive). 

According to the Brom’s research, particular files of both archives contain 

documents specifically on the foreign policy of the communist Czechoslovakia in 

relation to European integration. To give an example, one of the files of Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs Archive includes documents on Czech trade strategies towards the 

EC and EFTA. 4 The importance of the Central State Archive is underlined by the 

fact that it took over the files of the former Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 

which perhaps constituted the most important foreign-policy making institution in 

the country in the time of the communist rule. 

Concerning the secondary sources on the attitude of Czechoslovakia during the 

Cold War towards European integration, there is an almost total gap in the literature 

dealing directly with this subject and published outside Czechoslovakia. The only 

exception is a chapter in a volume by Marescau on trade relations between 

Czechoslovakia and the EC. 5 However, it was written by a state representative (and, 

moreover, by a representative of the communist government) and it is concerned 

with some rather practical issues. It cannot be considered an academic contribution. 

What is more, this lack of sources on the subject is not compensated by a strong 

literature that focuses on Czech foreign policy more generally during the Cold War. 

There are only a limited number of books that touch on this within a general 

context. 6 Similarly, on the basis of our research in the most prominent historical 

and political science journals we did not find more than one article devoted to the 

foreign policy of the communist Czechoslovakia. 7 Nevertheless, several studies on 

the relations of the EC towards the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 

(CMEA) countries are a useful starting point. 8 

The literature published in Czechoslovakia/the CR does not offer much more. 

To our knowledge, there is no book or journal number concerned primarily with 

Czech foreign policy and European integration during the Cold War. Even issues of 

the specialist international relations journal, Mezinárodní vztahy (International 

Relations), do not include such contributions. As will be explained below, the 

4. B. BROM, op.cit, p.71. 

5. M. ČERNOHUBÝ, Trade Relations between Czechoslovakia and the European Community, in: 

M. MARESCAU (ed.), The Political and Legal Framework of Trade Relations between the European 

Community and Eastern Europe, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 

1989, pp.51-54. 

6. J. KALVODA, Czechoslovakia’s Role in Soviet Strategy, University Press of America, Washington, 

1978; G. SKILLING, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, Princeton University Press, 

Princeton, 1976. 

7. P. A. KUBRICHT, United States-Czechoslovak Relations during the Kennedy Administration, in: 

East European Quarterly, vol.23, 3(1989). 

8. J. MASLEN, European Community – CMEA: Institutional Relations, in: M. MARESCAU (ed.), 

The Political and Legal Framework of Trade Relations between the European Community and 

Eastern Europe, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1989, pp.85-92; S. 

NELLO, Recent Developments in Relations Between the EC and Eastern Europe, EUI Working 

Paper n°.89/381, European University Institute, Florence, 1989; J. and P. PINDER, The European 

Community’s Policy towards Eastern Europe, European Series n° 25, Chatham House, London, 

1975; J. PINDER, The European Community and Eastern Europe, Pinter, London, 1991.

28 


absence of works on this topic in the journal’s issues can be explained by the fact 

that Czechoslovakia rejected the EC as a political and legal entity. All more general 

books published on foreign policy were written by scholars working in research 

institutions controlled by the communist government and are largely based on the 

clichés of the ruling ideology. 9 It was only two years ago that a book covering 

Czech foreign policy in the second half of the last century appeared. 10 

1.2. The 1960s and 1970s: the absence of official relations 

During the Cold War the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia was primarily dependent 

on the decisions of the Soviet Union as the dominant state of the communist bloc. 

Essentially, the foreign policy of communist Czechoslovakia followed and reflected 

Soviet actions. Although a more subtle view might reveal variations in the 

dependence on the initiative and steps of the Soviets over different issues or 

periods, it is possible to say that the conformity with the Soviet Union in foreign 

policy was an overall constant. 11 

Hence, while analysing the main features and periods of the Czech policy 

towards the EC during the Cold War decades, it is not only useful but almost 

unavoidable that the nature of and changes in the Soviet policy are taken into 

account. At the same time, similar attention should be paid to the policy of the 

Council of the Mutual Economic Aid towards the EC. The focus on the CMEA is 

required by the fact that as an international economic institution of communist 

states, it actually was, in some way, a counterpart of the EC on the side of the 

communist bloc. However, although the CMEA represented an organization of, at 

least formally, independent countries, it was mostly shaped by the will of the Soviet 

Union. Drawing on the works that deal with the evolution of the attitude of the 

Soviet Union and the CMEA towards the EC in the Cold War years, it is possible to 

recognize the three following periods in the policy of the two towards the EC: 1) 

1958-1972 (non-recognition and hostility), 2) 1972-1984 (growing but constrained 

interest in cooperation), and 3) 1984-1989 (limited cooperation). 12 

Since the outset of the European Economic Community at the end of the 1950s 

to the beginning of the 1970s, no official relations between the Soviet Union and 

the CMEA on the one side and the EC on the other side existed. Moreover, the 

9. E.g., I. BROŽ and S. SUJA, Zahraničná politika ČSSR: Príspevok k boju za socializmus, mier a 

uvolnovanie [Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia: A Contribution to the Fight for Socialism, Peace, 

and Détente], Pravda, Bratislava, 1981; M. ŠTEFAŇÁK et al., Zahraniční politika ČSSR [Foreign 

Policy of CSSR], Svoboda, Praha, 1983. 

10. J. DEJMEK, Československo, jeho sousedé a velmoci ve 20. století – 1918 až 1992 [Czechoslovakia, 

its Neighbours and the Great Powers in the 20 th Century – 1918 to 1992], Centrum pro politiku 

a ekonomiku, Prague, 2002. 

11. E.g., J. DEJMEK, op.cit., pp.30-39; J. KALVODA, op.cit., pp.218-278; G. SKILLING, op.cit., 

pp.82-90. 

12. See J. MASLEN, op.cit.; J. and P. PINDER, The European Community’s Policy towards Eastern 

Europe, op.cit.; J. PINDER, The European Community and Eastern Europe, op.cit., who divide 

the years 1958-1972 into two periods.


Soviets and the other CMEA countries refused to acknowledge the EC in legal 

terms. The communist states also sought to bloc the participation of the EC in 

international institutions. In its statements on the European integration process, the 

Soviet Union considered the EC to be a tool of the capitalist class and a means of 

imperialist aggression. The approach of the CMEA countries towards the EC was 

hostile and connected with intensive anti-Western European propaganda 

campaigns. 13 

In the case of Czechoslovakia, the non-existence of official relations with the 

EC during the 1950s and 1960s stands out when compared to several other CMEA 

countries. More explicitly, in the course of the 1960s some of CMEA states 

established informal relations with the European Commission in order to cope with 

problems in trade. More concretely, four communist countries (Poland, Bulgaria, 

Hungary and Romania) managed to conclude limited trade agreements on 

agricultural products with the EC in the same decade. 14 As will be demonstrated 

below, a relatively reluctant attitude of Czechoslovakia towards the EC was not 

limited to the 1960s, but was also apparent at least during the 1980s. 15 

Interestingly, even the short period of the reform leadership and the process of 

the so-called Prague Spring of the year 1968 did not lead to a change in the Czech 

attitude towards the EC. Above all, it must be pointed out that new efforts in the 

field of foreign policy were in principle limited to reforming the relationship with 

the Soviet Union and other communist states, and did not aim at any reorientation 

of foreign policy as such. 16 Essentially, the intention of the Czech leaders was to 

gain more autonomy and independence in foreign policy, while preserving the 

alliance, and cooperation with other communist countries. Thus, military and 

economic cooperation within the communist bloc and its institutions continued to 

be declared as the basis of foreign policy. More detailed examination of the official 

declarations and discussions among experts show, however, that the development 

of economic cooperation with the Western European countries was one of the 

frequent and most emphasised points in the area of Czech foreign policy at that 

time. 17 Still, it was pan-European economic projects and the role of the Economic 

Commission for Europe and not cooperation with the EC that were emphasized. 

13. See J. MASLEN, op.cit., p.85. 

14. J. PINDER, The European Community and Eastern Europe, op.cit., p.10. 

15. Given the above outlined absence of the secondary literature on the foreign policy of the communist 

Czechoslovakia towards European integration, the analysis of the relatively reluctant attitude 

of Czechoslovakia towards the EC during the Cold War would require a detailed inquiry based on 

primary research that lies beyond the scope of this article, and which would need to take into account 

not only the motivations on the Czechoslovak side, but those on the side of the EC as well 

(especially in the 1980s). 

16. G. SKILLING, op.cit., pp.617-658; J. DEJMEK, op.cit., p.35. 

17. G. SKILLING, op.cit., pp.617-658; see also P. DRULÁK, Záblesk v totalitní temnotě – pokus o 

výzkum mezinárodních vztahů v období reformního komunismu [A Glimmer of Darkness of Totalitarianism 

– The Attempt to Research IR in the Period of Reform Communism], in: Mezinárodní 

vztahy, vol. 37, 1(2002), pp.50-55.

30 


Even though the focus of this article is on the policy of Czechoslovakia towards 

the EC as such, it is still useful to pay attention also to the level of bilateral relations 

with individual Western European countries, and to their development in the 1950s 

and 1960s. The reason is that this field was marked by some, albeit very limited, 

aspects of cooperation (whether it was the same in the case of other communist 

countries must, however, remain beyond our remit.) Trade relations with some EC 

members developed from the middle of the 1950s. This is not surprising, as, before 

the communist take over, Western European countries were Czech's main trading 

partners. In 1948, trade with the West constituted 80% of the country's total turnover, 

but was only 21.5% in 1953 after a considerable trade reorganization towards the 

Soviet Union and other CMEA member states. Nevertheless, the share of the trade 

with the West reached 34.2% in 1956 and 29.4% in 1969. 18 

At the same time, the first years of the existence of the EC coincided with a 

period of a relatively less hostile attitude in Czechoslovakia towards the West, in 

comparison with the previous Stalinist period. It was also, but only relatively 

speaking, a time of greater autonomy for Czech foreign policy. To be sure, this 

resulted largely from the change of the Soviet position and, more concretely, from 

the Soviet declaration of the policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with non-communist 

countries. It is necessary to underline that the most distinctive feature of Czech 

foreign policy was still conformity with Soviet decisions. Still, after the absolute 

subordination to the Soviet Union in the first half of the 1950s, relations between 

Czechoslovakia and Western European countries were then partially re-established. 

Czechoslovakia concentrated on official state visits, at first with France and later 

also with Britain, Benelux, and Scandinavian countries. Relations with the Federal 

Republic of Germany remained tense, due to the unresolved issues related to the 

past of the mutual relations (mainly the nullity of the Munich Treaty). 19 

1.3. The 1970s and 1980s: towards limited cooperation 

At the beginning of the 1970s, the attitude of the Soviet Union and the CMEA 

towards the European integration underwent a slight change. As a starting point of 

this change is often considered to be the statement by the Soviet leader Leonid 

Brezhnev of 1972, in which he suggested that cooperation between the CMEA and 

EC could be established under certain circumstances. As a consequence, several 

initiatives in this respect were launched by both the EC and the CMEA. However, 

none of these efforts led to the institutionalisation of mutual political relations due to 

the different perspectives of the both. The EC rejected negotiations on trade issues 

with the CMEA as an organisation, while the communist bloc insisted that 

institutional relations would have to be established between the EC and the CMEA. 20 

18. A.A. BROWN and P. MARER, Foreign Trade in the East European Reform, IDRC Report n° 

5(1972), IDRC, Bloomington, 1972. 

19. J. DEJMEK, op.cit., pp.33-34; G. SKILLING, op.cit., pp.82-83. 

20. J. MASLEN, op.cit., pp.85-87; J. PINDER, The European Community and Eastern Europe, op.cit., 

pp.11-14. See also S. NELLO, op.cit.


Similarly, no official relations were established between Czechoslovakia and 

the EC during the 1970s. Moreover, mutual relations actually became more 

complicated than before as in 1975 bilateral trade agreements between EC member 

states and Czechoslovakia (as well as between the EC and other communist 

countries) expired. At the same time, EC member-states delegated their authority in 

the area of trade with the CMEA countries to the EC. Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia 

continued to develop limited bilateral relations with individual Western European 

countries and maintained some political relations with all EC member states. Most 

importantly, a treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany was concluded and 

diplomatic relations were re-established in 1973. 21 

In the first half of the 1980s, Czechoslovakia, like several other communist 

countries, developed a certain limited cooperation with the EC. This development 

took place in spite of the fact that at that time the CMEA as such was not, as 

outlined above, able to establish relations with the EC. At first, Czechoslovakia 

concluded an agreement on the import of goat and sheep meat in 1981. 22 There 

were also annual negotiations on quotas regarding steel, and negotiations between 

the EC and the communist countries on quotas for textiles. Czechoslovakia 

participated in both of those processes. In 1982, another agreement was reached – 

this time on quotas for textiles. In 1983, Czechoslovakia (as well as Hungary) 

actually started negotiations with the EC about a possible extension of mutual 

cooperation from arrangements limited to sectors to a full-fledged trade agreement. 

In 1984, the CMEA dramatically changed tack, when it declared a willingness 

to conclude a political declaration with the EC. In other words, the communist bloc 

eventually admitted that a common declaration of both organizations could be only 

political and trade agreements would have to be managed only between the EC and 

individual countries of the CMEA. 

As a consequence, relations between Czechoslovakia and the EC shifted from 

limited cooperation in trade to a more substantial institutionalisation of trade 

relations. More concretely, an agreement concerning trade with industrial goods 

was concluded between Czechoslovakia and the EC in December 1988 (again, 

similar agreements were concluded between the EC and other countries of the 

CMEA). It should however be pointed out that in comparison with a similar treaty 

that the EC concluded with Hungary, the treaty with Czechoslovakia was limited. 23 

Whereas the agreement with Czechoslovakia was only concerned with trade in 

21. E.g. J. HŘÍCH, Společná obchodní politika Evropské unie jako příklad supranacionálního 

přístupu k integraci [The Common Trade Policy of the European Union as a Case of Supranational 

Approach to Integration], in: Mezinárodní vztahy, vol. 36, 4 (2001), 9; J. DEJMEK, op.cit., 

PP.36-38. 

22. L. MÁLKOVÁ, Vývoj spolupráce mezi Evropskými společenstvími a Československem do roku 

1992 [The Evolution of Relations between the European Communities and Czechoslovakia to 

1992], unpublished MA thesis, University of Economics, Prague, 1999, pp.23-28; J. PINDER, The 

European Community and Eastern Europe, op.cit., pp.21-22. 

23. L. MÁLKOVÁ, op.cit., pp.36-38; J. PINDER, The European Community and Eastern Europe, 

op.cit., pp.32-33.

32 


industrial goods, the one with Hungary covered both trade and political relations. 

Hence, one must conclude that even by the very end of the communist regime, 

political relations between Czechoslovakia and the EC were not, in comparison, for 

example, with Hungary, very far advanced. 

2. After the Cold War 

2.1.Sources 

This section discusses the secondary literature published both outside and in 

Czechoslovakia/the CR (primary sources are not, given a short time distance from the 

1990s, discussed, although increasing numbers of official documents are now available 

on the web). Four observations are in order. First, the vast majority of works dealing 

with this issue do not focus primarily upon CR’s accession as their main topic, and the 

country is usually seen as part of the general process of Eastern enlargement. Thus the 

CR usually only merits a chapter in a broader book. This approach is clearly more 

prevalent in non-Czech literature, whereas Czech authors are, quite naturally, more 

inclined to a one-country analysis. Yet, even those authors who do prefer to look 

specifically at the CR are usually tempted to extend their horizon to a comparative 

approach of at least two countries, such as the CR and Slovakia or Poland. 24 In addition, 

some of the very good analyses of the Czech accession process can be found in writings 

which do not deal principally with enlargement, but in which an analysis of 

enlargement is a by-product of a different research focus. 25 

Second, it is also possible to observe a geographic imbalance in regard to the 

place of origin of the literature on Eastern enlargement. In this respect, the 

unquestioned leader is, apart from the CR itself, Germany, followed at a 

considerable distance by the Anglo-Saxons. 26 There are also some works from the 

24. J. RUPNIK and J. ZIELONKA (eds.), The Way to the European Union: The Czech and Slovak 

Republics, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003. 

25. C. LEFF SKALNIK, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, Westview, Boulder, 

1998; H. TEWES, Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe. Enlarging NATO and the 

European Union, Palgrave, Houndmills, 2002. 

26. On German literature, see R. J. LANGHAMMER, Die Assoziierungsabkommen mit der CSFR, Polen 

und Ungarn: wegweisend oder abweisend?, in: Kiel Discussion Papers, March 1992, Institut 

für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel, 1992; W. WEIDENFELD (ed.), Mittel- und Osteuropa auf dem Weg in 

die Europäische Union. Bericht zum Stand der Integrationsfähigkeit. Strategien für Europa, 

Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, 1995; W. WEIDENFELD (ed.), A New Ostpolitik – Strategies 

for a United Europe. Strategies for Europe. Short version, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, 1996; 

B. LIPPERT (ed.), Towards EU-Membership. Transformation and Integration in Poland and the 

Czech Republic, Europa Union und Institut für Europäische Politik, Bonn, 1998. On Anglo-Saxon 

literature, H. WALLACE and A. MICHALSKI, European Community: The Challenge of Enlargement, 

RIIA, London, 1993; K. HUGHES, Eastward Enlargement of the EU: EU Strategy and 

Future Challenges, Working Paper n° 2(September 1996), RIIA, London, 1996; H. GRABBE and 

K. HUGHES, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, 2 nd edition, RIIA, London, 2000.


CR’s neighbouring countries but their quality is unfortunately usually not up to 

Western standards. 27 Surprisingly, French literature is very poorly represented as it 

concentrates rather on the Mediterranean and its prospect for EU membership. 

Third, the literature about the Eastern enlargement in general and about the 

Czech accession in particular does not deal with the whole time period with equal 

attention. While the early 1990s are covered rather poorly, the period since 1996 

has witnessed a steep rise in the number of publications. This growth applies to 

both Czech and foreign literature which is, however, not to suggest that there are 

dozens of high-quality works published in the last years but rather that the starting 

base just right after the collapse of communism was extremely low. Only after 

enlargement had become a real possibility in the second half of the 1990s, did more 

Western scholars dealing with European integration turn to Eastern Europe. The 

reason for Czech negligence of the topic – which could be seen as one of the 

natural top priorities for academia and politicians alike – is somewhat different. It 

lies in the virtual absence of any objective Czech analytical writings about the EC 

before the Velvet Revolution. In most cases, academic writings focused first of all 

on trying to understand the EC/EU as such, and only stumbled in the footsteps of 

the quickly changing reality). 28 

Fourth, it is important not to overestimate the analytical value of many of these 

works. Unfortunately, a large number of the publications, especially those of Czech 

origin, content themselves with simple descriptions of the historical evolution since 

the fall of Eastern bloc. 29 This might have been useful in the early post-Cold War 

years, but not after Czech accession became more likely. Even the latest Czech 

publications have difficulties in eluding the trap of imbalance between description 

and analysis. Yet, this is not the only danger to repel; there are twin perils that each 

serious attempt at writing a good book on Eastern enlargement encounters: those, 

mostly foreign, works which escape the danger of Scylla of description may, 

nonetheless, encounter the Charybdis of ignoring Czech domestic factors. 

Consequently, many works analyse enlargement-induced changes within the EU 

which reveals a one-sided or, indeed, distorted picture of the process. 30 

2.2. The beginning of the 1990s: the Association Agreement 

The re-emergence of democratic Czechoslovakia was only possible due to changes 

in Soviet foreign policy during the time of perestroika in the second half of the 

1980s. Thus, the first question to be answered by the new Czech foreign policy elite 

in the 1990s, was how far-reaching the changes in the communist bloc and in the 

Soviet Union itself actually were. On the one hand, the new Czech leadership tried 

27. A. PODRAZA, Central Europe in the Process of European Integration: A Comparative Study of 

Strategies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Towards Deepening and Widening 

of the European Union, Research Support Scheme, Prague, 2000. 

28. J. JAKŠ, Quo vadis. Evropská unie [Quo Vadis. The European Union], ETC Publishing, Praha, 

1998. 

29. P. FIALA and M. PITROVÁ, Evropská unie [European Union], CDK, Brno, 2003. 

30. See, for example, K. HUGHES, op.cit.; W. WEIDENFELD, A New Ostpolitik …, op. cit.

34 


hard to assure the total independence of the country from Soviet influence but, on 

the other hand, its proposals in regard to the post cold war architecture of Europe 

and the place of former communist countries in it, remained surprisingly modest. 

Early proposals aimed to maintain economic relations with other Central and 

Eastern European (CEE) countries, including the Soviet Union. However, this was 

in contrast to military affairs, where Czechoslovakia used the sensitivity of Soviet 

leadership – the clear sign of which was Michael Gorbachev’s apology for the 

Soviet invasion of 1968 – and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its 

territory. 31 

Political and economic integration into the framework of the EC was 

nevertheless considered a top foreign policy priority. 32 After some initial trials at 

creating viable relations to the East such as the Dienstbier Plan, the East-oriented 

efforts were abandoned, the CMEA was dissolved in 1991, and joining the EC 

became the only viable option. 33 At this early stage, the EC were, however, not 

enthusiastic about membership of the post-communist countries, since it was clear 

how complicated the enlargement could be. Indeed, the EC were not prepared for 

such tremendous change in Eastern Europe which came à la surprise générale. 34 

Some member states also feared that the enlargement might postpone the hotly 

debated deepening of the EC or even render any reform altogether impossible for 

the foreseeable future. 35 This was a particularly acute dilemma for Germany, since 

German foreign policy tried to pursue both apparently contradictory objectives 

simultaneously. 36 

31. C. LEFF SKALNIK, op.cit., pp.216-219. 

32. On the “fixation on eventual accession to the EU”, see R. BIDELEUX and R. TAYLOR (eds.), 

European Integration and Disintegration, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, pp.245-246. 

33. The Dienstbier plan was a plan analogous to Marshall Plan and its aim was to provide the Soviet 

Union with a credit of sixteen billion dollars which would be used for financing exports of industrial 

goods from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary to the Soviet Union. Instead of debt repayment, 

the Soviet Union would use the financial means to conversion of its own industry. Similarly, 

the three Central European countries would use a part of the received money to modernise their 

own enterprises. The modernisation in all these countries would be supervised by the European 

Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). See J. DIENSTBIER, Od snění k realitě. 

Vzpomínky z let 1989-1999 [From Dreams to Reality. Memoirs from the years 1989-1999], Lidové 

noviny, Prague, 1999, pp.112-115. 

34. For a discussion of the unique nature of the Eastern enlargement see J. EATWELL et al., Not „Just 

Another Accession”. The Political Economy of EU enlargement to the East, IPPR, London, 1997; 

Les Nouvelles Frontières de l´Europe, Economica, Paris, 1993, p.185; W. WEIDENFELD, A New 

Ostpolitik …, op.cit., p.5. 

35. Cf. L. CRAM, D. DINAN and N. NUGENT (eds.), Developments in the European Union, Macmillan, 

Houndmills, 1999; A. MAYHEW, Enlargement of the European Union. An Analysis of the Negotiations 

with the Central and Eastern European Countries, SEI Working Paper n° 30 (December 2000); 

M. BAUN, A Wider Europe. The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement, Rowman and 

Littlefield, Lanham, 2000; B. STEUNENBERG (ed.), Widening the European Union. The Politics of 

Institutional Change and Reform, Routledge, London, 2002, pp.183-201. 

36. For the debate enlarging vs. deepening in German foreign policy discourse see H. TEWES, op.cit., 

pp.81-139.


Although clarity about enlargement was still absent, the EC offered aid. The 

first instrument set up after the changes in Central and Eastern Europe was Phare. 

The programme was created in 1989 to help Poland and Hungary to restructure 

their economies (Phare stands for “Pologne-Hongrie: Actions pour la Reconversion 

Economique”) but soon Czechoslovakia became another recipient of help. Czech 

policy-makers, especially the then minister of Finance Václav Klaus, did not 

appreciate this kind of financial help to the same extent as the Polish or Hungarian 

governments did, and this sceptical stance toward financial injections from the 

West was reflected in the per capita level of payments from Phare which was 

among the lowest in Czechoslovakia/the CR. 37 

Although generally being a useful tool, Phare could not replace more 

comprehensive legislative instruments that would provide for both economic 

cooperation and political dialogue. But in reality, virtually all CEE post-communist 

countries wanted to hear a clear promise of membership, ideally accompanied by a 

precise timetable of steps to be taken by both sides before the enlargement. All 

these hopes seemed to be pinned on the Association Agreements (AA) which were 

supposed to elevate the relations substantially. The decision about negotiating a 

new kind of AA (the Europe Agreements) was taken in Dublin in spring of 1990. 38 

The negotiations about the AA with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were the 

first direct longer-term encounter of these countries with the EC at the negotiating table. 

Unfortunately the Czech negotiators were left with a bitter aftertaste since the negotiations 

revealed that the EC was a tough negotiator which uncompromisingly pursued its own 

interests, sometimes even to the detriment of the prospective associated countries. 39 

However, before the agreement with Czechoslovakia could be ratified, the country was 

split, and two new AA had to be signed with the successor states (with the CR the new 

agreement was signed in October 1993). Thus, the Czech situation changed both 

geopolitically and economically which allowed it a more focused approach. The structure 

of the AA was seemingly all-encompassing: it started with a relatively long preamble, 

followed by chapters on political dialogue; general provisions; free movement of goods; 

free movement of persons; law harmonisation; capital movement; economic, financial, 

and cultural cooperation; and institutional provisions and conclusion. 40 

For Czechoslovakia and, after the break-up of the country, for the CR, the AA 

harboured several unambiguous benefits, for it allowed for a stable framework for 

mutual cooperation of the EC and the country in most key areas at a time when the 

membership was still only a dubious possibility. Despite the objections raised 

37. C. LEFF SKALNIK, op.cit., p.281. 

38. C. PRESTON, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union, Routledge, London and New 

York, 1997, p.198; B. LIPPERT (ed.), op.cit., p.170; P. FIALA and M. PITROVÁ, op.cit., p.152. 

39. D. DINAN, Ever Closer Union. An Introduction to European Integration, Macmillan, Houndmills, 

1999, p.189; P. ČERNOCH, Cesta do EU. Východní rozšíření Evropské unie a Česká republika v 

období 1990-2004 [The Way to the EU: EU Eastern Enlargement and the Czech Republic in 1990 – 

2004], Linde, Praha, 2003, pp.26-28. 

40. http://www.euroskop.cz/cze/file_list.asp?fcat=316&cat=5078&ts=10ec16; Accession Partnership. 

Czech Republic, 13 October 1999.

36 


about the unsatisfactorily low level of willingness to trade concessions on the part 

of the EC, the AA was asymmetric in favour of the post-communist countries in 

that it declared that the EC member states would remove their tariffs earlier than 

the associated countries. The AA thus followed on the path of liberalisation of 

mutual trade that started with earlier trade agreements such as that between 

Czechoslovakia and the EC of May 1990. 41 

The failure of the EC to acknowledge in the AA that the associated countries 

would become member states provoked growing pressure from these countries. 

After some discussions during 1992-1993 (summits in Lisbon and in Edinburgh), 

the definite answer came at the Copenhagen summit in June 1993. Here, the 

accession criteria were first formulated that had to be fulfilled by the candidates. 

These include both political (democracy, rule of law, human rights, protection of 

minorities) and economic conditions (functioning market economy, ability to take 

on obligations connected with the membership, competitive ability). Later, several 

new items were added, such as creation of necessary administrative capacity for 

adoption of the acquis communautaire. 42 

No matter how satisfactory it was for the associated countries to hear a promise of 

membership, the practical impact of the criteria was dubious. Not only were the criteria 

so vague that it was almost impossible to ascertain when a candidate country qualified 

for membership but the Copenhagen summit failed to deliver an approximate timetable 

for enlargement. The criterion of assuming obligations of membership implied the 

adoption of the acquis before enlargement, a task that had never been fulfilled entirely 

in any of the past enlargement rounds. 43 The perception of the Copenhagen criteria in 

CEE was further complicated when politicians realized that the unprecedented 

imposition of very vague conditions on membership could not be only a guide to 

membership but also an instrument to slow down the pace of accession. 44 

The CR was not so critical about the accession criteria for several reasons all of 

which were related to its allegedly exceptional position. First, the CR’s economic 

performance was, if not stellar, then at least very favourable by mid 1990s. 

Unemployment remained surprisingly low compared to other CEE countries; 

liberalisation was completed in most sectors up to 1991; inflation was curbed quite 

early; and the Czech government was especially proud of the coupon-based 

privatisation it carried out. 45 Quite naturally, the Czech government was not in 

favour of a group negotiation since it believed that other countries would slow 

41. C. PRESTON, op.cit., p.198. 

42. K. HUGHES, op.cit., p.3; L. FRIIS (ed.), An Ever Larger Union? EU Enlargement and European 

Integration, DUPI, Copenhagen, 1999, p.101; C. PRESTON, op.cit., p.201; P. ČERNOCH, op.cit., 

pp.38-39; P. FIALA and M. PITROVÁ, op.cit., pp.153-154. 

43. K. HUGHES, op.cit., p.3; H. GRABBE and K. HUGHES, op.cit., p.30. 

44. J. REDMOND, and G.G. ROSENTHAL (eds.), The Expanding European Union. Past, Present, 

Future, Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London, 1998, pp.159-160. 

45. J. STANKOWSKY, F. PLASSER and P.A. ULRAM, On the Eve of the EU Enlargement. Economic 

Developments and Democratic Attitudes in East Central Europe, Signum, Wien, 1998, 

pp.169-171.


down the expectedly quick pace of Czech negotiations. More demanding criteria 

were, therefore, interpreted mainly as barriers for other countries. 

Similarly, in the mid 1990s, many leading Czech politicians believed that the 

time of transition was already over in the CR and that it would have no difficulty in 

meeting all the requirements set by the EU. Indeed, the very popular minister for 

Industry and Trade Vladimír Dlouhý showed almost unbelievable confidence in 

1994 when he stated that 

“[A]s far as the Czech Republic is concerned, these conditions have already been 

met, and, from this viewpoint – although we are aware of the political importance of 

the Copenhagen statement and the circumstances accompanying its acceptance – we 

find it difficult to understand why it must be emphasized that our full membership is 

still to be envisaged”. 

This excessive optimism about the CR, which was then dampened during the 

economic crisis in the second half of the 1990, was reflected in the often-cited Czech 

critical remarks on behalf of and recommendations for the European Union in regard to 

reforms which should be, in the view of Czech politicians, undertaken. 46 

The economic questions connected with the accession gradually took on 

importance, but they cannot be separated from the overall domestic transformation 

and increasing cooperation with West. While services have undoubtedly belonged 

to the fastest expanding sector of Czech economy ever since the beginning of the 

1990s, some other areas have suffered heavy losses. Particularly hit has been Czech 

agriculture that competed with difficulties with subsidized agricultural products 

imported from the Union. The overall agricultural output fell by 30% during the 

1990s. 47 The shift from East to West accompanied by thorough liberalisation was 

lethal for some industrial sectors too. For instance, steel industry has never really 

recovered from the loss of Eastern markets. Most of other sectors where old 

machinery and technological equipment was used, such as textile industry, also 

shrank considerably during the first decade after the fall of communists. 

On the other hand, those companies, and indeed whole sectors of economy, that 

were capable of finding new markets in the West, have not only survived but also 

blossomed. Among them, machine-building industry or chemical and rubber 

industries have shown the ability to catch up with their Western competitors. The 

revival of these industries has been usually connected with foreign investments 

46. Z. ZHELEV, H. SUCHOCKA, H. van den BROEK, F. PIECH, V. DLOUHÝ, M. CRNOBRNJA, 

Is the West Doing Enough for Eastern Europe?, The Philip Morris Institute of Public Policy 

Research, Brussels, 1994, p.64. 

47. P. PAVLÍK, The Czech Republic, in: H. TANG (ed.), Winners and Losers of EU Integration. 

Policy Issues for Central and European Europe, World Bank, Washington, 2002, pp.135-136.

38 


from Germany and other European countries, the most well-known example being 

the Volkswagen investment in Czech automobile industry. 48 

2.3. The mid-1990s: Membership application 

Logically, the next step after the successful signature of the AA and the 

announcement of membership criteria would be to submit the application for 

membership. Indeed, both Hungary and Poland did so already in spring of 1994 but 

the CR chose a different approach. 49 The main reason for this was the Czech 

scepticism towards the current shape of the EU, combined with a perceived Czech 

distinctiveness compared to other potential candidate countries. It was chiefly 

prime minister Václav Klaus who was very plain speaking as far as the European 

Union was concerned. He quite often castigated the EU for being too bureaucratic 

and overregulated. 50 Klaus then delayed submission of the CR’s application until 

17 January 1996, as a symbolic gesture showing his reservations about accession. 

It would be, nevertheless, misleading to suppose that this euroscepticism was 

not widespread in the CR. A negative attitude towards the EU was growing steadily 

among the Czech population in the course of the 1990s. Whereas in February 1993, 

84% of the respondents were in favour of Czech membership, 51 four years later, in 

1997, the CR belonged to the most eurosceptic among associated countries with 

only 33% expressing a positive attitude to the EU. The support for membership 

decreased by more than 20% during the same period. 52 This may be due to 

increasing awareness of the EU and the fears about the economic and social costs 

of enlargement. 53 

However, the situation in Europe was now also changing. The cloud of 

uncertainty about the future course of the integration process which overshadowed 

the negotiations about the AA was at least partially dispersed after the ratification 

of the Maastricht Treaty. In a similar vein, the completion of negotiations with 

Austria, Finland, and Sweden permitted a more focused preparation of the Eastern 

enlargement. Thus, in 1994 a new pre-accession strategy was agreed. The 

48. In this article, we do not tackle the issue of the European single currency since a real discussion 

about the accession of the CR to the Euro zone started only shortly before the Czech EU entry. Although 

the CR was proud during the 1990s that it fulfilled most of the required criteria, it has not 

been able to tame its excessive budget deficits and the Euro introduction does not seem probable 

sooner than in the last years of this decade. 

49. Dauderstädt in B. LIPPERT (ed.), op.cit., p.169. 

50. Cf. e.g. Společná politiku pro Evropu [Common Policy fir Europe], Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 

Praha, 1994. For a thorough elaboration of a similar position see P. MACH, Úskalí Evropské 

integrace [The Reefs of European Integration], 2 nd edition, CEP, Praha, 2003. 

51. C. LEFF SKALNIK, op.cit., p.255. 

52. A. PODRAZA, op.cit., p.17. 

53. R. VINTROVÁ et al., Sociální a ekonomické dopady integrace ČR do Evropské unie. Nové 

příležitosti, možná rizika [Social and Economic Consequences of the Integration of CR to the 

European Union. New Opportunities, Possible Risks], VŠE, Praha, 2001; P. ZAHRADNÍK, Vstup 

do Evropské unie – přínosy a náklady konvergence [EU Accession – the Benefits and Costs of 

Convergence], C.H.Beck, Praha, 2003.


discussion about the new strategy included four main parts: structured dialogue, 

acceleration of economic growth in candidate countries, adoption of acquis 

communautaire, and EU institutional reform. Whereas the structured dialogue was 

welcomed in the CR as a useful tool for exchange of views of political 

representatives from both sides, the measures taken to boost faster growth were 

seen as inappropriate since the EU still resented greater market openness in 

sensitive areas. 54 The initial positive assessment of the structured dialogue changed 

gradually because a substantial part of the meetings remained rather superficial 

and, in most cases, it did not tackle issues of real importance for the acceding 

countries. 55 

To promote acquis adoption, the Essen summit recommended preparing a White 

Paper on the Single Market. This document was made public the following year. 

Though not being part of the negotiation process, the White Paper was extremely 

helpful in identifying those areas where approximation of legislation should start. 

As early as 1991, the CR developed its own strategy of law approximation which 

was further strengthened by establishing a coordination group affiliated to the 

Czech Foreign ministry. 56 A government Committee for European Integration was 

formed one year later too. At approximately the same time, Czech ministries 

created their European integration departments and the Working Group for Law 

Approximation at the ministry of Justice set to work as well. 

Despite the early start of law adjustment in the CR, the results were rather poor. 

The whole structure was not very comprehensive and it underwent frequent 

changes which made it difficult even for Czech bureaucrats themselves to follow 

the ongoing transformation of the organizational structure. To make things worse, 

the adjustment that started in the early 1990s was not entirely in line with the 

requirements of the White Paper and the harmonization of the old strategy with the 

White Paper caused further delays in the approximation timetable. Another reason, 

beyond these organisational problems, was the general attitude in the Klaus 

government towards law adjustment that seemed rather reserved since priority was 

given to economic reforms. 57 

A watershed in the preparation for membership was Agenda 2000, which not 

only assessed the impact of Eastern enlargement but it also identified those 

candidate countries capable of joining the EU first. The European Commission, 

authorised by the European Council of Madrid, distributed questionnaires to the 

candidate states in April 1996, i.e. only several months after the Czech application. 

Having processed the returned questionnaires, the European Commission 

published the opinions on the candidate countries’ membership in July 1997. 58 As 

54. P. ČERNOCH, op.cit. 

55. V. CURZON PRICE, A. LANDAU, R. WHITMAN, The Enlargement of the European Union. 

Issues and Strategies, Routledge, New York and London, 1999, p.74. 

56. P. DESNÝ, The Harmonization of the Legislation of the Czech Republic with European Union 

Law, in: Perspectives, Summer 1997, pp.45-54. 

57. A. PODRAZA, op.cit., p.17. 

58. Agenda 2000, 1997.

40 


the economic situation in the CR deteriorated in 1997, Czech politicians were now 

just glad that the country had not dropped out of the first group of applicants. 

Indeed, the wording of the opinion was quite positive even though it registered 

some deficiencies. In political criteria, the problems related chiefly to inefficiency 

of judiciary and police work; another major issue was the ongoing discrimination 

of the Roma minority. In economic terms, the outstanding problems as seen by 

Commission experts were insufficient price liberalisation in several sectors and a 

formidable trade deficit with the EU. In the third area, the ability to take on the 

obligations of membership, the CR adopted ’significant elements’ of the acquis and 

the European Commission was convinced that the country would be able to 

transpose all legal norms relating to the Single Market in medium term. 59 

Agenda 2000 also elaborated on changes of the pre-accession strategy which 

was to be streamlined to emphasise its focus on concrete measures leading to 

membership. The cornerstone of this was the Accession Partnership (AP), tailored 

individually to fit the requirements of each country. The AP with the CR was 

approved by the European commission in March 1998 while the CR prepared a 

mirror document summarising the required changes entitled National Programme 

of the Preparation of the CR for the Membership in the EU. Yet, the structure of the 

original version of the National Programme was, unlike the later revised version, 

not comprehensive and its chapters’ quality varied significantly. Nevertheless, the 

AP and the National Programme taken together provided a detailed roadmap for 

the accession preparation, especially considering their updated and improved 

versions published in 1999 and in 2000 or 2001. 60 The European commission 

succeeded in coupling further financial help with the reform progress which, in 

fact, offered the EU an effective instrument for promotion of the desired results 

mentioned in the AP. The commission was, in addition, going to publish regular 

reports on the progress made by candidate countries and this further strengthened 

its position. All the necessary documents being available, the negotiation process 

could start at the end of March 1998. 

59. V. NACHTIGAL, and V. TOMŠÍK, Konvergence zemí střední a východní Evropy k Evropské unii 

[Convergence of the Central and Eastern European Countries with the EU], Linde, Praha, 2002, 

pp.154-163. 

60. Národní program přípravy ČR na členství v Evropské unii [National Programme of Preparation of the 

CR for the membership in the European Union], 1 st January 1998 and 1 st January 1999: http://www.euroskop.cz/cze/file_list.asp?fcat=317&cat=5162&ts=8ec5; 

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/czech/index.htm#; 

http://www.euroskop.cz/cze/file_list.asp?fcat=317&cat=5162&ts=8ec5. 

Overview of key documents related to enlargement; Accession Partnership: Czech Republic, 13 

November 2001, is at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/czech/index.htm#.


3. Conclusion 

This article has outlined the development of the policy of Czechoslovakia/the CR 

towards European integration while also reviewing the sources that are currently 

available. 

With regard to the sources, the following four conclusions are of the utmost 

importance. First, there is a lack of literature on the European integration process in 

relation to Czechoslovakia/the CR. There is no such publication on the communist 

period, and even the relevant literature devoted to the post-communist time has 

usually broader focus than solely on Czechoslovakia/the CR. Second, there are still 

more secondary sources on the 1990s than on the earlier period. In effect, those 

who are interested in the policy of the communist Czechoslovakia towards the EC 

must rely on the works dealing with the attitude of the EC towards the CEE 

communist countries as a bloc. Third, most of the literature on the post-Cold war 

period was published in Germany (apart from the CR) and concentrates on the 

second half of the 1990s. Last, it should be pointed out that, in at least two of the 

main Czech archives, there are files that deal with this issue during the Cold War. 

Czech policy towards European integration evolved substantially from the 

absence of mutual relations and from hostility to cooperation and even to accession 

efforts. We have shown that, until the 1980s, no relations between Czechoslovakia 

and the EC were established. Since the beginning of the 1980s, a limited trade 

cooperation began to develop, at first in individual sectors and later in the trade 

with industrial goods as such. The real turning point in the nature of mutual 

relations came with the end of the Cold War and was anchored by the Association 

Agreement concluded in 1991. However, since the beginning of the 1990s 

Czechoslovakia and then the CR expressed their desire to join the European 

integration process as a full participant. Since the mid-1990s, the external relations 

with the EU were complemented with the process of domestic preparations for 

membership. With the submission of EU membership application in 1996 and the 

opening of accession negotiations in 1998, the CR’s shift from cooperation to 

accession as the ultimate goal was completed. 

One of our main findings is that the economic relations between 

Czechoslovakia and the EC were established earlier than the political relations. In 

1981 the first sectoral trade agreement between Czechoslovakia and the EC was 

concluded and in 1988 a more full-fledged trade agreement was signed up. 

Although Czechoslovakia as CMEA member also concluded a political declaration 

with the EC at that time, this was an act of the entire bloc and not of the Czech 

diplomacy. By contrast, the 1988 trade agreement did not include political aspects 

and in this respect, Czechoslovakia found itself in a different situation than, for 

instance, Hungary (the institutional relations of Hungary with the EC at that time 

covered the political field as well). Related to this is a preliminary thesis that the 

relations between Czechoslovakia and the EC tended to be, relatively speaking, 

somewhat less developed that in the case of some other CMEA members. In 

addition to the above indications connected with the late 1980s, it is possible to

42 


recall the trade cooperation of some CMEA members (but not Czechoslovakia) 

with the EC that was launched in the 1960s. 

It is not our ambition to suggest here any more specific lines of inquiry into the 

history of the policy of Czechoslovakia or the CR towards European integration. 

Nevertheless, our findings suggest that a comparison of Czech approach with the 

approaches of some other CMEA countries in particular periods of the Cold War 

(especially the 1980s, also the 1960s) would address a very interesting topic. As 

pointed out, the existing publications on the policies of CEE countries towards the 

EC during the Cold War treat those countries as a bloc and largely do not explore 

potential divergences in their behaviour. Thus, such an analysis could help us to 

determine to what extent the relations of the communist Czechoslovakia toward the 

EC were, indeed, more negative or less intensive than in the case of the other 

CMEA member states and to specify the sources of those possible divergences. In 

addition, the 1990s also witnessed some variations in Czech attitudes when 

compared with other post-communist CEE countries both at the formal level (e.g. 

the timing of membership applications) as well as at the substantive level (e.g. the 

euroscepticism of Czech population). Hence, in-depth comparisons that would 

focus on the 1990s and go beyond the existing comparative work could again 

deepen the current knowledge about Czech attitude to the European integration 

process.

Our Man in Paris: The British Embassy in Paris and the Second 

UK Application to Join the EEC, 1966-67 

43 

Lasse Michael Boehm 

The article draws upon the uncompleted memoirs of Sir Patrick Reilly who was the 

British Ambassador to Paris between 1965 and 1968. These memoirs are held in 

the Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford. It also uses the files of the British 

embassy in Paris and the ambassador’s correspondence with the Foreign Office 

(FO), which have recently been released, and are stored in the National Archives in 

London. 

The British embassy in Paris was, and remains, one of Britain’s most important 

embassies. The prestige in which this post was held is reflected in the earlier career 

of Sir Patrick Reilly: a former fellow of All Souls College Oxford, he had 

previously been ambassador to Moscow from 1957 to 1960, and deputy 

under-secretary of State from 1960 to 1965. Before coming to Paris, Reilly could 

look back on one of the more distinguished careers in the Foreign Office. In the 

mid-1960s, the post of ambassador to France was the more significant because of 

Gaullist opposition to British membership in the EEC. The debacle of 1963 had 

been mortifying for the then British ambassador, Sir Pierson Dixon, whose own 

views on negotiating tactics had not always dovetailed with those of the other 

negotiators. 

Only two years after Reilly took up his post, British policy towards France was 

once again in disarray. In November 1967 French president Charles de Gaulle 

pronounced his second veto on Britain’s attempt to join the EEC. The Wilson 

government had ignored vital advice on de Gaulle’s views, and when it did finally 

recognise the French government’s unwillingness to let Britain into the EEC, it was 

too late. Was this failure to anticipate a French veto a failure of diplomacy, or the 

result of political miscalculations? And what was the role of Reilly in these events? 

The first moves: January – June 1966 

For two years after the first French veto in 1963, Britain did not take any new 

initiatives in its policy towards the EEC. Only with the „empty chair crisis” in late 

1965 did the Foreign Office begin to consider the possibility of a renewed British 

application. 1 France’s absence from the EEC’s institutions led to a rift regarding 

tactics between the embassy in Paris and the Foreign Office in London. The 

Foreign Office argued that EEC entry would only be possible by securing the 

1. United Kingdom National Archives, formerly Public Record Office, Kew, London, (henceforth 

UKNA): FO371/188327, Note by Sir Con O’Neill, 13 January 1966; UKNA: FO371/188328, 

‘Britain and Europe: Possible Approach by the Five’, January 1966.

44 


backing of the „Five”: Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 

The Paris embassy on the other hand insisted on the possibility of another French 

veto unless a rapprochement with de Gaulle could be achieved. There was, 

embassy officers believed, a chance to come to an agreement with France. As they 

repeatedly pointed out, both countries, for example, resented the supranational 

tendencies of the European Commission. 2 

Because of its focus on the Five, the Foreign Office was unwilling to establish 

closer relations with the French. Assistant under-secretary of State Patrick Hancock 

was deeply sceptical of de Gaulle’s intentions: 

“It seems to be inconceivable that [de Gaulle] would be interested in British membership 

except on terms which would involve our abandonment of a close political 

and defence relationship with the United States”. 3 

In March 1966, the Foreign Office saw its view reinforced by the French 

withdrawal from NATO’s military command structure, and placed new hopes on 

the Five: 

“The effective withdrawal of France from the integrated military work of the alliance 

creates a gap which the Five, and certain sections of public opinion in France, will 

hope to see filled by a stronger British influence in Europe”. 4 

Britain, a memorandum argued, should keep bilateral relations with France to a 

minimum. The purchase of military equipment from France and the sharing of 

sensitive nuclear information was to be restricted, while officials should „adopt an 

attitude of reserve to bilateral meetings with the French”. 5 

Despite the Foreign Office’s strategy of focussing on the Five, ambassador 

Reilly argued for an understanding with de Gaulle. He questioned London’s 

assumption that the French withdrawal from NATO gave Britain a free hand in the 

EEC, arguing: 

“there is no evidence that the NATO crisis has affected the Brussels situation. In fact 

there may well be a tendency by the Five to avoid a new crisis in Brussels in case this 

would help to drive France out of the Alliance”. 6 

Reilly warned the Foreign Office that offering to base SHAPE, NATO’s 

European headquarters, in London, could only have a negative effect on Britain’s 

policy towards Europe: 

“The transfer of SHAPE to Britain would make it easier for Gaullist propaganda to 

portray it as an Anglo-Saxon dominated organisation on which the EEC countries 

could not wholly rely”. 7 

2. This point was repeatedly communicated to the embassy by several advisers to de Gaulle, see UK- 

NA: FO371/188327, Ramsbotham to Campbell, 13 January 1966. 

3. UKNA: FO371/188327, Hancock to Reilly, 14 January 1966. 

4. UKNA: FO146/4632, memorandum ‘The international consequences of General de Gaulle’s policy’, 

13 April 1966. 

5. Ibid. 

6. UKNA: FO146/4632, Mansfield to Ramsbotham, Ledwidge, Logan, James and Tickell, 21 April 

1966. 

7. UKNA: FO146/4632, Reilly to Hood, 3 March 1966.

Our Man in Paris 45 

The Pompidou visit: July 1966 

In July 1966, French Prime minister Georges Pompidou and Foreign minister 

Maurice Couve de Murville visited London. Prime minister Harold Wilson wanted 

to use the visit to sound out the French attitude towards a possible second British 

application. 8 One of his reasons for this view was that he increasingly regarded 

EEC membership as a possible cure for the severe economic and financial 

difficulties which haunted Britain in 1966. 9 

Reilly was keen to support Wilson in his first cautious steps towards a second 

application: 

“I knew that negative reporting from Paris could only hinder the decision by HMG 

[Her Majesty’s Government] in favour of British membership which I myself hoped 

they would take”. 10 

Nevertheless, he suspected that London did not assign the right priority to the 

issue. „I cannot feel confident”, he wrote to George Thomson, the Cabinet minister 

with special responsibility for Europe, 

“that the kind of probing which is all we can contemplate for the present – i.e. getting 

the Six to give us their views on timing and tactics, without disclosing our own 

position – will do much to influence the Six towards making the sort of concessions 

which we must have”. 11 

Reilly knew that de Gaulle had not given up his opposition to British membership in 

the EEC. He realised that a renewed application could only be successful if Britain 

demonstrated her willingness to move closer to Europe, and urged the Foreign Office’s 

permanent under-secretary of State, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, to use the Pompidou visit to 

resume closer bilateral contacts with the French. 

“I suggest that the general objective should be to convince the French of Ministers’ 

desire and determination to pursue technical and industrial cooperation with France 

and with ‘Europe’ in as many fields as possible”. 12 

By demonstrating her willingness to co-operate with France, Reilly hoped, it 

would be impossible, or at least more difficult, for de Gaulle to veto Britain once 

again. He told Foreign secretary Michael Stewart: 

“I submit that the most hopeful course is to concentrate on convincing the Governments 

of the Six that the economic terms for which we must ask are reasonable and acceptable, 

and that the state of the British economy and the position of sterling will in no way disqualify 

Britain from membership. If this can be done, pressures should build up, both 

outside and inside France, which the General may perhaps be unable to resist”. 13 

8. UKNA: PREM13/1509, FO to certain missions, 4 July 1966. 

9. On the political fallout of the July 1966 crisis see H. PARR, Harold Wilson, Whitehall and British 

Policy Towards the European Community, 1964-1967, PhD thesis, Queen Mary University of 

London, London, 2002, p.123. 

10. UKNA: FCO33/53, Sir Patrick Reilly’s valedictory despatch, Reilly to Stewart, 11 September 1968. 

11. UKNA: PREM13/892, Reilly to Thomson, 3 June 1966. 

12. UKNA: PREM13/892, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 14 June 1966. 

13. UKNA: PREM13/1509, Reilly to Stewart, ‘French Foreign Policy’, 22 June 1966.

46 


Above all, Britain had to demonstrate her willingness to co-operate fully not 

only with the Five, but also the French: 

“On technical co-operation I would respectfully suggest that we need to have constantly 

in mind the relevance of what we do throughout this field to our European 

policy generally: to demonstrate our interest in co-operation with Europe and with 

France by giving preference whenever we possibly can”. 14 

If Britain was not taking the initiative in suggesting bilateral projects with 

France, this would have a disastrous impact on France’s perception of Britain: 

“As the French saw it there was a persistent contradiction between our professed 

desire [to get into the EEC] and our practice [of cooperating with other countries]”. 15 

A new Foreign Secretary: August – September 1966 

Although Pompidou refused to disclose the French position during his July visit, 

Wilson moved further towards a renewed British application. On 10 August 1966 

he appointed George Brown, an outspoken pro-European, as his Foreign secretary. 

For Reilly, Brown’s appointment heralded an even more difficult relationship with 

the Foreign Office. Brown, a former trade unionist who had left school at the age of 

15, had a deep-seated distrust of his officials whose privileged background he 

deeply resented. 16 On a professional level, the differences between Brown and 

Reilly were the differences between the politician and the diplomat. Although both 

agreed that Britain should join the EEC, they quarrelled over the timing and nature 

of a second application. While Reilly warned that an early application was likely to 

result in a French veto, with all the international embarrassment that this would 

bring, Brown wanted Britain to join the EEC as soon as possible, partly out of 

personal conviction, but partly also in order to deprive the Conservative Party (then 

in favour of British membership) of electoral ammunition. He hoped for a quick 

entry into the EEC which would help secure the next general election, which was 

anticipated to take place in 1970. As cabinet minister Richard Crossman noted in 

his diary, 

“Their [Wilson and Brown’s] idea is to get in by 1969. […] There would certainly 

have to be one devaluation or two […]. On the other hand, would that matter politically? 

We would have completely outbid the Tories and we would be able to confirm 

our success in 1969 before there was any hard evidence of the hardships we were 

due to suffer as the result of the devaluation”. 17 

14. Ibid. 

15. Sir Patrick Reilly Papers, unpublished and uncatalogued, Bodleian Library, Oxford (henceforth: 

PRP). The documents are not yet fully sorted, making full references impossible. 

16. P. PATERSON, The Life of Lord George Brown: Tired and Emotional, Chatto and Windus, London, 

1993, p.207. 

17. R. CROSSMAN, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol.2, Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 

London, 1976, p.191.


Brown’s desire to submit an early application put Reilly in a considerable 

dilemma, and this would ultimately lead to a complete break-down of trust between 

the ambassador and the Foreign secretary. Brown’s political problem was that half 

the cabinet was hostile to the idea of EEC membership. Amongst the doubters were 

such Labour heavyweights as Denis Healey, minister of Defence, Barbara Castle, 

minister of Transport and James Callaghan, chancellor of the exchequer. 18 In order 

to win over his opponents in cabinet, Brown insisted that the Foreign Office should 

report as positively as possible on the prospects of an application. He ordered 

Reilly not to send negative signals from Paris. „Brown asked me,” Reilly recalled in 

his memoirs, 

”in what amounted to an instruction, to avoid as much as I could being negative in 

my reports about the prospects for British entry. He said that he was bound to have 

trouble with some of his Labour colleagues and it would not help him if I was reporting 

that the prospects were bad”. 19 

This request put immense pressure on Reilly. He knew that de Gaulle was 

unlikely to agree to British entry into the EEC under existing circumstances. Now 

Reilly had a choice to make. Either he could omit information on the likelihood of 

a French veto, as Brown had requested, or he could report objectively and risk 

incurring the Foreign Secretary’s anger. Reilly chose the latter. „Naturally,” he 

wrote in his memoirs, 

”I had it in mind in everything I wrote about Britain and the EEC while Brown was 

Foreign Secretary: and it created a real problem for me. I was sincerely anxious to 

give Brown all the support I could: but it was my duty to report objectively. I did not 

find it easy to resolve this dilemma: but I did my best to report what I believed to be 

the truth, without being too discouraging”. 20 

Reilly was convinced that improving relations with France were essential if an 

application was to be successful. Only then might de Gaulle abstain from using 

another veto. „As late as May 1967,” he wrote later, 

”it did not seem to me certain that the General would not in any circumstances agree 

to our entry, nor a fortiori certain that he would refuse negotiations”. 21 

Brown, however, was unwilling to develop a clear and coherent policy towards 

France. Instead, he concentrated his efforts on the Five, hoping to ‘outflank’ de 

Gaulle, as he called it, by getting the other EEC members to put pressure on the 

French. 22 Brown’s strategy was supported by the Foreign Office’s influential 

European Economic Organisation Department (EEOD) under Con O’Neill. Only 

closer co-operation with the Five, O’Neill wrote in an internal memorandum, could 

persuade de Gaulle to give up his opposition to British membership: 

18. A. DEIGHTON, The Labour Party, Public Opinion and the ‘Second Try’ in 1967, in: O. DAD- 

DOW (ed.), Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s Second Application to Join the 

EEC, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p.44. 

19. PRP. 

20. Ibid. 

21. UKNA: PREM33/53, Reilly to Stewart, 11 September 1968. 

22. H. PARR, op.cit., pp.177-180.

48 


”It is perhaps conceivable that some approach by us to a more ‘European’ concept of 

defence […] could be worked out which would be attractive to the Germans and others 

of the Five, and even to the French. This might just possibly generate a European 

impulse, in which the French would share, sufficient to overcome the deadlock on 

the Community issue”. 23 

Moving towards an application: October – December 1966 

Towards the end of 1966, the Wilson government took a significant step towards a 

renewed application. On 22 October the Prime minister obtained cabinet approval for 

a ‘probe’, a series of bilateral summits to find out what the governments of the EEC 

member states were thinking of British membership in the EEC. Wilson presented 

this decision as a middle way: neither was it a full application, nor would he give in to 

the Eurosceptics and abandon consideration of an application altogether. 24 

However, while Wilson and Brown succeeded in getting a divided cabinet to 

agree to the ‘probe’, they neglected to explore the consequences of the possibility 

of a French veto. Sensing that opposition in cabinet to EEC membership was 

declining, Brown insisted that de Gaulle would not veto Britain again. Britain, he 

told his colleagues, could count on support from Germany, Italy, and the Benelux 

countries: 

“The French were discouraging the idea of further discussions and might well be 

anxious not to find themselves in opposition to the Five about [British] entry. France 

could not afford to withdraw from the EEC and she might therefore no longer be 

able to veto our membership”. 25 

Such a severe underestimation of the French position was exactly what Reilly 

feared. Although he understood the political pressures under which Wilson and 

Brown were operating, he believed that the ‘probe’ would portray British policy as 

hesitant and half-hearted. The ambassador was convinced that Britain had to show 

greater initiative if she wanted de Gaulle to take her membership bid seriously: 

“Exploratory discussions would get us nowhere unless we could be more explicit 

about our requirements than hitherto. To make quick progress we must decide what 

our opening bid should be and what were our minimum requirements”. 26 

23. UKNA: FO146/4631, Con O’Neill, ‘How to get into the Common Market’, August 1966. As head 

of the European Economic Organisation Department, Con O’Neill was in charge of working out 

the Foreign Office’s strategy towards the EEC. As ambassador to the EEC at the time of the first 

British application in 1962/3, O’Neill was one of the most respected officials with regard to European 

policy. He later led the delegation that successfully negotiated Britain’s entry into the EEC in 

1973. 

24. H. PARR, op.cit., pp.172 ff. 

25. UNKA: CAB 128, CC (66) 53, Cabinet meeting 1 November 1967. 

26. PRP.


The Paris embassy was concerned that the Foreign secretary did not fully grasp 

the likelihood of a French veto. The Foreign Office, the embassy’s head of 

chancery Peter Ramsbotham wrote, wanted 

“to put as optimistic an interpretation as they can on the Secretary of State’s talk with 

M. Couve [the French Foreign minister] and the General [de Gaulle]. This is no 

doubt tactically correct, vis-à-vis the Five and British public opinion. I hope it does 

not mean that H[er] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] themselves are under any illusions”. 27 

Reilly warned Brown that de Gaulle presented a serious threat to a possible 

application. He emphasised that de Gaulle was „extremely sceptical” about British 

entry, and never suggested that a common solution could be found between Britain 

and the Six. 

“In fact, he laid down a series of road-blocks, economic and political, and showed 

little sign of either expecting or hoping that we would circumvent them”. 

For the moment, the ambassador conceded, de Gaulle was unlikely to stall talks 

with Britain completely. Parliamentary elections were due in March 1967 and the 

French president would not want to rebuff Britain before then. 

“It will incline him, I think, to try very hard to say neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’ next month, 

but something more like ‘perhaps, but not just yet’, which will nevertheless be sufficient 

to discourage a second application for negotiations”. 

Nevertheless, Reilly warned, the possibility of a veto would increase sharply 

after the elections. 

“After next March, providing the Gaullists and their friends retain their parliamentary 

majority, as seems likely, the General will be less inhibited”. 28 

In another memorandum dated January 1967 Reilly argued that Britain should 

use three incentives to encourage de Gaulle to give up his opposition to Britain’s 

entry into the EEC. First, Britain should offer to share technological know-how 

with France – an idea which had originally been aired by Wilson himself. Second, 

Brown and Wilson should appeal to de Gaulle’s vision of a Europe independent of 

the United States, which could only be successful with British participation. 29 The 

most important argument concerned the question of the future organisation of the 

EEC, whose supranational tendencies both Britain and France rejected: 

“Another point you may wish to consider is to what extent it will be advisable to express 

agreement with the French position on supranationalism in the Communities”. 30 

With his criticism of Brown’s strategy Reilly was positioning himself in conflict 

with the Foreign secretary’s ruling against negative reporting on the situation in 

Paris. As a result, Brown increasingly distrusted Reilly. During the preparations for 

27. UKNA: FO146/4637, minute by Ramsbotham, 21 December 1966. 

28. UKNA: FO146/4637, Reilly to Brown, 22 December 1966. 

29. UKNA: PREM13/1475, Reilly to Brown, 4 January 1967. 

30. Ibid.

50 


Wilson and Brown’s visit to Paris in January 1967, the Foreign secretary did not 

want the Paris embassy to influence his strategy – and ordered Reilly not to meet de 

Gaulle in the run-up to the summit. 31 

Reilly realised that he was increasingly marginalised within the Foreign Office 

in London: 

“If I had said to them then, ‘It’s no good, don’t bother to come to Paris. We know the 

answer here already’, I think it would probably have been the case that my tenure in 

office here would have been even shorter than it has been”. 32 

Brown, Reilly wrote in his memoirs, „hated to be told that the cause for which 

he had fought so hard and so successfully on the home front, was doomed to defeat 

in France”. The Foreign secretary’s greatest mistake, Reilly claims, was that he 

„refused to the end to accept that the general could prevent the opening of 

negotiations”. 33 In his valedictory dispatch of September 1968, Reilly severely 

criticised Brown’s strategy to enter the EEC as quickly as possible: 

“One hope I would venture to express, with the utmost respect; and this is that Ministers 

will decide on the timing of the next major effort not with reference to any 

electoral calculations, but on the merits of its chances of success”. 34 

Indeed, with hindsight Brown’s strategy that Germany, Italy and the Benelux 

countries would apply enough pressure on France for de Gaulle to refrain from 

using a veto seems naïve. Not only had he already once vetoed a British application 

in 1963, there were also abundant signals from other Foreign Office posts that an 

application in 1967 was unlikely to succeed. The ambassador to the EEC, Sir James 

Marjoribanks, wrote in his Annual Review for 1966, circulated widely in Whitehall 

in January 1967: 

“The Community lives under the shadow of General de Gaulle. […] Every step taken 

here is taken in the knowledge of a Head of State who cannot be pushed far with 

impunity. There is a clear desire to avoid provoking him unnecessarily”. 35 

On 20 January 1967 the British ambassador in Bonn told the Foreign Office that the 

German chancellor, on whose support Wilson and Brown placed high hopes, wanted to 

„avoid getting drawn at this stage into an argument with General de Gaulle”. 36 

31. PRP. 

32. Ibid. 

33. Ibid. 

34. UKNA: FCO33/53, Reilly to Michael Stewart, 11 September 1968. 

35. UKNA: PREM13/1475, Sir James Marjoribanks: Annual Review for 1966, 10 January 1967. 

36. UKNA: PREM13/1475, Roberts to FO, 20 January 1967. For the German attitude see also K. 

BÖHMER, ‘We Too Mean Business’: Germany and the Second British Application to the EEC, 

1966-67, in: O. DADDOW (ed.), op.cit., pp.211-226.


The probe: January – April 1967 

Nonetheless, Wilson and Brown’s visits to the EEC member states seemed to get off 

to a good start. The first visit to Rome on 15 and 16 January 1967 was deemed a 

success. Wilson and Brown returned to London convinced that Italy would back a 

British application. 37 Paris, however, was to show them the obstacles on the way to a 

successful application. Meeting the French president on the morning of 24 January, 

Wilson affirmed that his government was serious about EEC entry and „meant 

business”. 38 But the prime minister and his Foreign secretary were left unclear about 

de Gaulle’s intentions. The general refused to comment whether or not he would veto 

a British application. Instead he mentioned an „alternative to membership”. This, he 

told his visitors, could take the form of an „agreement for association between Britain 

and the Community” or even „something entirely new”. In a remark which 

particularly confused Wilson and Brown, de Gaulle stated that 

“he had the impression of an England which now really wished to moor herself 

alongside the continent and was prepared in principle to pledge itself to rules in the 

formulation of which it had had no part, and which would involve it in definite links 

with the system which had grown up on the Continent”. 39 

Even though de Gaulle refused to disclose his intentions, Wilson and Brown 

believed they had made an important step towards a successful application. 

Minister of Transport Barbara Castle noted in her diary: „They were convinced that 

they had made a considerable impression on de Gaulle”. 40 Brown in particular 

believed that the visit to Paris had further diminished the possibility of a French 

veto. On 26 January he dispatched a telegram to the British ambassador in Bonn. 

He could barely conceal his excitement: 

“The General has at last accepted that our attitude has changed, that we mean 

business, and that we are now just as ‘European’ as anyone else …”. 41 

Foreign Office officials appeared to agree. The Paris talks, the European 

Economic Organisation Department concluded, were encouraging: 

”We believe that the French Government cannot but have been convinced of our sincerity 

and determination in seeking British entry to the Community, provided the difficulties 

we saw could be overcome: and we made clear at all stages that, in our view, the 

problems discussed need represent no obstacle to our joining the Community”. 42 

Con O’Neill went even further. In a letter to the British ambassador in Vienna 

on 3 February 1967 he wrote of having been „elated” to hear general de Gaulle 

speak of a Britain wishing to „moor itself alongside the continent”: 

37. UKNA: PREM13/1475, Brown to Bonn, 17 January 1967. 

38. UKNA: FO800/982, Record of a meeting between the Prime minister and the Foreign Secretary 

and the president of France and the French Foreign minister, 24 January 1967, 10 a.m. 

39. UKNA: FO800/982, Record of a meeting held at the Elysée Palace, 25 January 1967, 4.15 p.m. 

40. B. CASTLE, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1984, p.213. 

41. UKNA: PREM13/1476, Brown to Bonn, 26 January 1967. 

42. UKNA: PREM13/1476, FO (EEOD) to Bonn, 26 January 1967.

52 


“It is […] I think, rather remarkable that the General should now – a mere four years 

later [after the first veto 1963] – say that he had the impression that ‘England’ is [sic] 

now prepared to moor itself alongside the Continent. I feel that this echo of an 

almost classical phrase was of real significance: indeed to my mind it was the most 

significant thing that happened during the Paris visit. I am therefore sending copies 

of this letter – in case any of them overlooked the point – to the Heads of Mission in 

all other posts which are receiving the accounts of each of the visits in our tour”. 43 

This was not all. It seems that Brown was so confident of the success of an 

eventual British application that he sought to terminate plans on the establishment 

of closer technological and political co-operation between Britain and the EEC for 

fear that these would delay the start of negotiations: 

“We should deprecate any initiative to search for new methods of political consultation 

which could have the effect of delaying, perhaps for a long time, our entry into the 

EEC […]. We should therefore be unwise to give the suggestion too fair a wind …”. 44 

Brown’s assumptions deeply worried Reilly. In a letter to the Foreign Office, the 

ambassador conceded that Wilson and Brown had indeed made „a very 

considerable impression on General de Gaulle”. Nevertheless, he warned, the 

current attitude of the French could be attributed to the upcoming French 

parliamentary elections – de Gaulle would not wish a French veto to become an 

issue in the election campaign. 45 Instead, the French objective was 

“to stimulate doubts and uncertainties among the Five about the consequences 

of British entry while carefully avoiding any suggestion that they themselves are, in 

principle, opposed to it”. 46 

Reilly repeated his advice that it should be British policy to build up trust in 

Europe by demonstrating Britain’s willingness to co-operate with the Six on terms 

acceptable to them: 

“While the French are adept at shifting their hurdles and traps around from one area 

to another, […] their main and most dangerous political argument at present is that 

our entry will radically change the nature of the Community. As seen from here, 

therefore, it would be valuable if in your remaining visits you could make a point of 

refuting this general argument and of showing, in particular, that it is not the case 

that ‘economic union’ would be impossible in a Community of Ten or Twelve”. 47 

Reilly’s judgement of the necessity of concentrating on de Gaulle rather than 

the Five was bolstered by German chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, whom Wilson 

and Brown visited in February 1967. The Prime minister and the Foreign secretary 

had hoped the German government would apply pressure on the French. Kiesinger 

however made clear that Germany was unwilling to support Britain if France chose 

to veto her entry yet again. There was, Kiesinger said, nothing he could do to 

change the French position except lend Britain token support in public: „This was 

43. UKNA: PREM13/1477, O’Neill to Pilcher, 3 February 1967. 

44. UKNA: PREM13/1477, FO to Brussels, 14 February 1967. 

45. UKNA: PREM13/1476, Reilly to FO, 26 January 1967. 

46. UKNA: PREM13/1477, Reilly to FO, 9 February 1967. 

47. Ibid.


the best the German Government could do in the circumstances and Britain should 

realise this”. 48 

Getting more and more uneasy about Brown’s fundamental miscalculation of 

counting on the Five, Reilly now openly warned of the likelihood of a French veto. 

In March 1967 he wrote to the Foreign Office: 

“Everything he [de Gaulle] said about British entry into the EEC confirmed the view 

that he is deeply reluctant to accept it at the present time. It was also clear that he 

does not want to see an early application by H.M. Government”. 49 

His warnings, however, were ignored. Sensing growing domestic approval for 

an application, Wilson and Brown were unwilling to review their strategy. 

Confident that support from the other EEC members would eventually overcome 

French opposition, Wilson told the cabinet in March that „it might well be difficult 

for him [de Gaulle] to veto the United Kingdom”. 50 By then, opposition in cabinet 

to an application had largely eroded. Wilson had avoided prolonged debate about 

the chances of success by drawing attention to its details. Barbara Castle recalls in 

her diary: 

“I thought Harold had manoeuvred brilliantly. […] He had succeeded in guiding us 

into a discussion of details which is more effective than anything else in making 

principles look less important”. 51 

The cabinet merely discussed under what conditions Britain should join, not 

whether it was possible to do so. 

Technology and a nuclear deal? Spring 1967 

The formal decision to apply for EEC membership for a second time was taken 

on 2 May 1967. 52 Brown had insisted that an application had to be made quickly to 

retain the support of the Five. Otherwise, he told the cabinet, 

“those EEC countries which most keenly supported our entry would be discouraged 

and the momentum generated by the tour [the probe] would be dissipated”. 

While he acknowledged that the attitude of president de Gaulle was important 

for an application to succeed, Brown argued that „the choice of the right tactics 

should help us neutralise French opposition”. 53 

De Gaulle responded on 16 May at a press conference in Paris, declaring his 

opposition to British entry into the Common Market. The UK, he said, „is not a 

continental country”. British accession would tear the EEC apart: 

48. UKNA: FO800/982, record of meeting, 16 February 1967, 10 a.m. 

49. UKNA: PREM13/1478, Reilly to FO, 21 March 1967. 

50. UNKA: CAB 128, CC (67) 14, Cabinet meeting 21 March 1967. 

51. B. CASTLE, op.cit., p.236. 

52. UNKA: CAB 128, CC (67) 27, Cabinet meeting 2 May 1967. 

53. UNKA: CAB 128, CC (67) 26, Cabinet meeting 30 April 1967, 2.45 p.m.

54 


“At this point to introduce new massive elements among those which have been so 

painfully agreed upon, would clearly mean putting into question the whole structure 

and its components”. 54 

Despite de Gaulle’s now public opposition, Wilson still hoped he could win 

over the French president. His strategy was „not take ‘No’ for an answer”, 55 hoping 

to convince de Gaulle of the benefits of British EEC membership during a summit 

meeting at the Trianon palace in Versailles on 19 and 20 June 1967. 56 

Reilly warned again that increased pressure on the French president would only 

result in an early veto. On 7 June he sent a brief to the Foreign Office’s permanent 

under-secretary, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, asking for it to be passed on to the Prime 

minister: 57 

“I entirely understand that there are strong and diverse reasons going much beyond 

my competence for pressing on with all possible speed and for seeking to get negotiations 

started at the earliest possible moment and carried through quickly. I [would] 

however suggest, purely as seen from Paris, [that] we may find that if the French 

Government succeed in delaying and drawing out negotiations, in the end this might 

not after all be wholly to our disadvantage. […] The General is old and working 

against the tide. Her Majesty’s Government are working with it, and great as may be 

the disadvantages of delay, in the last resort Britain can surely afford to wait. […] 

From the point of view of overcoming the obstacle of the General’s opposition, I 

would suggest that it is not in our interest to insist, in the face of French delaying 

tactics, on a pace which may bring us quickly to a point where the General can 

plausibly break the negotiations off”. 58 

Reilly was aware that this advice was not what Wilson and Brown wanted to 

hear. He knew the Prime minister and his Foreign secretary wanted Britain join the 

EEC as quickly as possible: 

“I wish I could say that the (if I am right) favourable time factor is likely to coincide 

with the time-scale considered essential by British Ministers. I fear that it is more 

likely that it will not: and that if present processes do in fact work themselves out in 

a political crisis leading to a change of government and perhaps even to the General’s 

disappearance, this is unlikely to happen before late 1968 or more probably 

1969”. 59 

Given that neither Wilson nor Brown showed any indication of altering their 

strategy of early entry, Reilly advised that perhaps the only way to avert a French 

veto was to offer de Gaulle something he could not refuse: an offer for joint 

Franco-British development of thermonuclear weapons, a technology that French 

scientists had not yet discovered but which de Gaulle was keen to possess. 

54. The Times, 17 May 1967, p. 13. 

55. H. WILSON, The Labour Government 1964-1970, Weidenfeld and Nicholson and Michael 

Joseph, London, 1971, p.394. 

56. H. PARR, op.cit., pp.274 and 279. 

57. UKNA: PREM13/1521, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 7 June 1967. 

58. UKNA: PREM13/1521, Reilly memorandum, 7 June 1967. 

59. Ibid.


“Our information is that the French do not yet know how to make a thermo-nuclear 

bomb. If this is correct, the General faces the humiliating prospect of having a completely 

useless nuclear submarine force on his hands in a few years’ time, unless the 

French have made the breakthrough by then. In this situation, the General might be 

tempted if we could offer to tell him how to make a thermo-nuclear bomb as soon as 

we are safely in the E.E.C. with his help”. 60 

Even though Reilly was supported by the government’s chief scientific 

adviser, 61 the Foreign Office once again ignored his advice. Instead, deputy 

under-secretary of state Roger Jackling wanted to hold out technological 

co-operation as a bait until Britain had actually joined the EEC: 

“It is an essential part of our present position that European countries, including 

France, cannot expect full technological co-operation with us unless they take the 

steps required to make such co-operation fully effective, by letting us into the 

E.E.C.”. 62 

There were three reasons for the Foreign Office’s hesitation about offering 

technological collaboration with France. First, Foreign secretary Brown did not 

want to alienate the Five by proposing a bilateral deal with France. 63 Second, 

Foreign Office officials feared that the French could insist that establishing bilateral 

technological co-operation was possible outside the EEC and had nothing to do 

with the British application. 64 Third, the Foreign Office and the ministry of 

Technology feared that technological collaboration with other European countries 

would result in Britain having to share valuable information with her economic 

competitors in fields where Britain enjoyed a considerable technological lead. 65 

The Foreign Office and the ministry of Defence also regarded Reilly’s proposal 

as a threat to Britain’s special relationship with the US. „It is essential,” an internal 

FO paper argued, 

“that any European defence arrangements should be within the framework of the 

Atlantic alliance and should not weaken the commitment of the American nuclear 

deterrent to the defence of Europe, on which our security rests. Nor must we weaken 

our own links with the Americans in respect of nuclear know-how”. 66 

Reilly’s views, one Foreign Office official wrote, were „not in accordance with 

Whitehall thinking”. 67 

60. UKNA: PREM13/1479, Reilly to Mulley, 20 April 1967. 

61. See UKNA: PREM13/1521, Zuckerman to Wilson, 14 June 1967. 

62. UKNA: HF2/21, Jackling to Reilly, 7 April 1967. 

63. UKNA: PREM13/1850, Brown to Wilson, 24 November 1967. 

64. UKNA: HF2/21, Jackling to Reilly, 7 April 1967. 

65. Britain was ahead of most other European countries in computer technology and the nuclear and 

aviation industries. See T. KAJIWARA, Britain’s Second Application for membership of the European 

Economic Community (EEC) in 1966-7, M.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, Oxford, 

2001, p.78. On the position of the ministry of Trade see UKNA: FCO55/41, ministry of Technology 

paper ‘Technological Collaboration with Europe’, draft, December 1966. 

66. UKNA: PREM13/1998, FO paper on European defence, May 1967. 

67. UKNA: FCO33/57, Lush to Morgan, 23 August 1967.

56 


The extent to which Reilly was sidelined by the Foreign Office is demonstrated 

by the fact that the Foreign Office withheld Reilly’s letter of 20 April and did not 

inform Wilson of his recommendation of a nuclear deal with France. The Prime 

minister’s private secretary, Michael Palliser, discovered it only by chance, and told 

Wilson: 

“I cannot avoid the feeling that in certain important matters the Foreign Office are 

being less than frank with us”. 68 

Personal diplomacy: the Trianon talks, June 1967 

Wilson went to Paris in June 1967 for a summit meeting with de Gaulle, but 

without specific proposals for closer Franco-British co-operation. The so-called 

Trianon talks reflect the lack of initiatives on the British side. The Prime minister 

expected the talks „to be devoted as much to the world situation after the events of 

early June [The Arab-Israeli conflict] as to anything else”. 69 There was no clear 

focus on how the differences over Britain’s application could be resolved. When 

the conversation finally turned to the subject of Europe, Wilson did refer to 

technological co-operation, but remained vague on details. Britain and France, he 

said, „must work to create a united Europe so powerful that the two super Powers 

[sic] would have to take account of it”. He proposed collaboration in the 

development of military aircraft and the civilian use of nuclear power, but did not 

mention a nuclear weapons deal. 70 Predictably, de Gaulle remained unconvinced. 

He doubted that Britain was willing to enter the EEC unequivocally. „The fact 

remained”, he told Wilson, „that British entry would introduce to the Communities 

an element broadly favourable to the ‘Atlantic’ concept”. 71 

Despite the French president’s continued unwillingness to accept Britain’s 

application, and Reilly’s repeated warnings of a veto, Wilson was still optimistic. 

He told Reilly: 

“I return more convinced than ever that we are right to maintain the pressure, to go 

on refusing to take ‘no’ for an answer”. 72 

De Gaulle, he wrote to American president Lyndon Johnson, was still opposed 

to British entry but this should not influence British policy: 

”if we keep firmly beating at the door (as I told him unequivocally we should) and do 

not falter in our purpose or our resolve I am not sure that he any longer has the 

strength finally to keep us out”. 73 

Reilly acknowledged that de Gaulle’s position was significantly weakened: 

68. UKNA: PREM13/1482, Palliser to Prime minister, 13 May 1967. 

69. H. WILSON, op.cit., p.402. 

70. UKNA: PREM13/1731, record of discussion, 19 June 1967, 4 p.m. 

71. Ibid. 

72. UKNA: FO146/4639, Wilson to Reilly, 21 June 1967. 

73. UKNA: PREM13/1521, FO to Washington, message for Johnson, 23 June 1967.


“I would guess that in the country as a whole his position, already eroded by successive 

elections, has been too much shaken for him now to be able to restore it by any 

spectacular manoeuvre such as a referendum on a constitutional or other suitable 

issue”. 74 

Nevertheless, he warned the Foreign Office, this would not lessen the French 

president’s opposition to British entry: „We must therefore expect all his present 

policies to be maintained and indeed accentuated”. 75 Applying even more pressure 

on France would be nothing but counter-productive: 

“As I understand it, our present policy is to do everything possible to secure an early 

decision accepting the opening of negotiations. […] This, however, seems to me a 

considerable gamble. […] Purely seen from here, and unless it is definitely considered 

that a quick No to negotiations is better than long uncertainty, there is advantage 

in playing this hand with great patience. […] The tactics on our part which the 

French would find most difficult to deal with would be polite, steady inexorable persistence. 

– ‘fermeté’ if you like – and absence of drama. I think that there would be 

real risks in forcing an early confrontation”. 76 

The veto: November 1967 

In late October, Reilly was bluntly warning of an imminent French veto: 

“I think that we should now be wise to assume that the General’s objective is to 

ensure not only that we do not enter the Communities, but also that we are not able 

to influence their decisions through our participation in negotiations for our entry, 

until at least 1970”. 77 

The absence of any positive signals from the French government changed the 

mood in the Foreign Office. On 26 October 1967 Alun Chalfont, the minister 

responsible for Britain’s negotiations with the EEC, allegedly told journalists that 

in case of a French veto Britain would rethink her commitment to the defence of 

Germany, and might consider recognising East Germany as well as the 

Oder-Neisse line as Germany’s border to the East. 78 British policy „became crudely 

threatening”. 79 On 13 November Wilson mounted a last effort to avert a French 

veto. He gave a speech in London’s Guildhall, finally calling for bilateral and 

multilateral co-operation with France in various industries. 80 

It was too late. On 27 November, de Gaulle pronounced his veto. At a press 

conference in Paris, the French president told journalists that he would not allow 

74. UKNA: FO146/4639, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 14 July 1967. 

75. Ibid. 

76. Ibid. 

77. UKNA: FO146/4639, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 26 October 1967. 

78. The Times, 28 October 1967, p.1 

79. J. YOUNG, Technological Cooperation in Wilson’s Strategy for EEC Entry, in: DADDOW (ed.), 

op.cit., p.107. 

80. The Times, 14 November 1967, p.1.

58 


Britain to enter the EEC. The devaluation of the pound, which Wilson had 

announced on 19 November, had provided de Gaulle with a suitable opportunity. 

Nevertheless, he left public opinion in no doubt that the underlying reasons for the 

French veto were political. British entry into EEC, he said, 

“would lead to the break-up of a community which could not absorb so monumental 

an exception, which could not accept that among its leading members there was a 

state which through its politics, its economy, its currency was not at present a part of 

Europe”. 81 

Conclusion 

An analysis of foreign policy-making in Whitehall from the perspective of the 

British embassy in Paris leads to the conclusion that Wilson and Brown ignored 

important warnings on the possibility of a French veto. Brown in particular, an 

outspoken ‘pro-European’, pressed ahead with an early application in 1967, largely 

for political reasons. 

Brown’s focus on domestic political issues, however, led him to disregard 

ambassador Reilly’s advice on the French reaction to a British application. From 

the very beginning, Reilly had insisted that de Gaulle was prepared to veto British 

entry for a second time. Instead, Brown thought that the Five, Germany, Italy and 

the Benelux countries, would apply enough pressure on France to let Britain join 

the EEC. It was a fatal misjudgement, which prevented Brown from forging a 

better relationship with the French president. The extent of the neglect of de Gaulle 

can be seen in Brown’s personal decision to prevent his ambassador from meeting 

the French president in the run-up to Wilson and Brown’s important January 1967 

visit to Paris. What could have been a chance to establish a new understanding with 

France was yet another missed opportunity. 

When the decision to apply for a second time was taken, Wilson and Brown 

ignored Reilly’s warnings not to press ahead with negotiations too quickly. Moreover, 

the Foreign secretary tried to silence his ambassador in France by requesting Reilly 

not to report negatively from Paris. Reilly, realising Brown’s strategic mistake of 

focussing on the Five, disregarded this order and argued repeatedly for a new 

rapprochement with France. Yet, he was ignored by the Prime minister and the 

Foreign secretary, and his arguments were challenged by combined opposition from 

the Foreign Office, the ministry of Technology and the ministry of Defence. 

For his disobedience towards London, Reilly paid with an unhappy ending to 

his otherwise distinguished career. In 1968, Brown prematurely relieved him of his 

post in Paris and forced him to take early retirement. Neither the Foreign secretary 

nor the Prime minister had made sufficient use of the best tools the Foreign Office 

provided them with: an embassy only a few hundred yards from the Elysée Palace. 

81. The Times, 28 November 1967, p.1.

British Personal Diplomacy and Public Policy: The Soames Affair 

59 

Melissa Pine 

At the end of the 1960s, Anglo-French relations were very strained. The French had 

blocked Britain’s second application to join the European Communities (EC) by 

vetoing the opening of negotiations in late 1967. In early 1969, however, relations 

took a turn for the worse over a diplomatic incident that became known as the 

‘Soames affair’. On 4 February 1969, French president Charles de Gaulle presented 

the British ambassador in Paris, Christopher Soames, with ‘dramatic ideas’ for the 

future of European integration. It was unclear if the proposals were genuine, or if 

de Gaulle was setting a trap for the British. In any case, the British informed the 

German government (partly because of the pressure imposed by a coincidental visit 

by British Prime minister Harold Wilson to the German chancellor, Kurt-Georg 

Kiesinger), the other members of the European Communities and the Americans, 

and, finally, the press. The result was a deterioration of Anglo-French relations that 

ended only after the resignation of de Gaulle. Wilson publicly blamed the Foreign 

and Commonwealth Office (FCO) for pushing him into revealing the talks to Kiesinger, 

and several commentators have accepted this assertion. As a result, the FCO 

has been judged harshly for its conduct in the episode. Only Philip Zeigler, Wilson’s 

official biographer, argued that Wilson had agreed to the course suggested by 

the FCO, and criticised him for attempting to disassociate himself from the decision-making 

process afterwards. The consensus, however, has been that in the final 

outcome, the ‘Soames affair’ was a foreign policy ‘loss’ for the British government 

and for Wilson in particular: it was mishandled, and led to a nadir in Anglo-French 

relations with no appreciable gains elsewhere. 1 

This article describes how the ‘Soames affair’ played out in the diplomatic and 

public spheres. It is based on British public and private archival sources, including 

official papers in the National Archive (formerly known as the Public Record Office, 

Kew London), and the private papers of Lord Wilson of Rivaulx, Lord George-Brown, 

Lord Stewart of Fulham and Sir Patrick Riley (British ambassador to Paris 1965-68). 

The Wilson papers were not wholly open, while access to the papers of Lord 

1. See generally, S. GEORGE, The Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, Oxford 

University Press, Oxford, 1990, p.55; J. YOUNG, Britain and European Unity, 1945-1992, Macmillan, 

Basingstoke, 1993, pp.103-104; C. LORD, British Entry to the European Community under 

the Heath Government of 1970-4, Dartmouth Publishing Group, Aldershot, 1993, pp.60-61; R. 

BROAD, Labour’s European Dilemmas from Bevin to Blair, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, 

pp.70-71; H. YOUNG, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, Macmillan, 

London, 1998, pp.200-208; J. LACOUTURE, De Gaulle the ruler: 1945-1970, Harvill, London, 

1991, tr. A. SHERIDAN, pp.474-477; B. LEDWIDGE, De Gaulle, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 

London, 1982, pp.363-367; H. WILSON, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal 

Record, Weidenfeld and Nicholson and Michael Joseph, London, 1971, pp.611-612; P. ZEIGLER, 

Wilson: The authorised life of Lord Wilson of Rivaulx, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1993, 

pp.336-377.

60 

Melissa Pine 

Christopher Soames in the archives of Churchill College, Cambridge, was denied. 

Wilson’s cabinet played a minimal role, not discussed here. 2 

The article addresses several questions. What was said between de Gaulle and 

Soames? How did the British interpret the general’s offer? Who were the key 

decision-makers domestically, and in what context did they act? How did Britain, and 

particularly Wilson, try to turn the resulting fracas to their advantage? The article does 

not attempt an international history of the incident, but concentrates on the British 

perspective, which was one thread of a complex issue. It concludes that the ‘Soames 

affair’ represents a significant moment in the difficult years that Wilson faced after 

1967, and was, in fact, a multiple success for his European policy. 

The context 

The difficulty with the accepted assessment of the ‘Soames affair’ is that it is taken 

out of context. There is a hiatus in the historiography of Britain’s European policy 

between the second British application to join the EC, made by Wilson in 1967 and 

vetoed by de Gaulle in the same year, to the opening of negotiations for British 

entry under Edward Heath’s Conservative government in 1970. 3 Uwe Kitzinger 

acknowledges the continuing efforts by Wilson’s government between 1967 and 

1970, but he is elliptical on British policy in the period of 1968-1970. 4 John Young 

is alone in noting that de Gaulle was ‘upset at this time by efforts of Britain and the 

Friendly Five [that is, the Six members of the EC minus France] to consult on foreign 

policy through the Western European Union’, but this comment is not linked 

explicitly with the general’s proposals to Soames. 5 With the exception of the above 

references to the ‘Soames affair’ itself, and a few allusions to the groundbreaking 

summit at The Hague in December 1969, Wilson’s post-veto European policy has, 

until recently, been largely ignored. 6 

2. See United Kingdom National Archive, (formerly Public Record Office), henceforth UKNA, 

CAB/128/44/CC(69)9, 20 February 1969 and CC(69)10, 27 February 1969; B. CASTLE, The 

Castle Diaries 1964-70, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1984, pp.604-605; R. CROSSMAN, 

The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister Volume III, Secretary of State for Social Services, 1968-70, 

Hamish Hamilton, London, 1977, p.374. For cabinet politics see H. PARR and M. PINE, Policy 

towards the EEC, in: P. DOREY (ed.), The 1964-70 Labour Governments, forthcoming. 

3. J. FRANKEL, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute 

of International Affairs, London, 1975, p.212; P.M.H. BELL, France and Britain 1940-1994: The 

Long Separation, Longman, London and New York, 1997, pp.210-217; S. GEORGE, op.cit., p.48; 

D.BUTLER and M. PINTO-DUSCHINSKY, The British General Election of 1970, Macmillan, 

London, 1971, p.45. 

4. U. KITZINGER, Diplomacy and Persuasion, Thames and Hudson, London, 1973, pp.68-76. 

5. J. YOUNG, op.cit., pp.103-104. 

6. See especially the biographies: P. ZEIGLER, op.cit., p.336; P. FOOT, The Politics of Harold Wilson, 

Penguin, London, 1968, p.237; B. PIMLOTT, Harold Wilson, BCA, London, 1992, pp.434-442; A. 

MORGAN, Harold Wilson, Pluto Press, London, 1992, pp.297 and 396.

The Soames Affair 61 

However, recent archival research has demonstrated that de Gaulle’s proposals 

to Soames came in the midst of an increasingly successful period for Wilson’s 

European policy. 7 The French veto led Wilson to follow an aggressive, 

multi-faceted European policy. He and the then foreign secretary George Brown 

retained the ultimate aim of full membership of the Community. In the meantime, 

however, they directed their efforts towards preventing Community developments 

that might endanger long term British membership, and at securing some kind of 

‘interim solution’ involving meaningful co-operation with the Five. They would 

also focus on strengthening the British economy, thus dealing with some of the 

criticisms that de Gaulle had made in his veto speech. 

Leaving the application ‘on the table’, as Wilson put it, was therefore positive 

rather than resigned. Wilson and Brown (and his successor Michael Stewart) 

ensured through allies among the Five that the British application dominated the 

Community agenda. This domination of the agenda was supplemented when allies, 

notably Italy and the Netherlands, held up Community business in explicit protest 

at the French veto. Although the Six made some progress in integration during the 

veto period, such as the completion of the Common External Tariff in July 1968, 

the Dutch repeatedly refused to participate in – and thus effectively blocked – 

discussions on technology co-operation, while they and the Italians held up talks on 

political co-operation. Ultimately, the Five refused to concede French demands on 

the Common Agricultural Policy without reciprocal movement on British 

membership. It is clear that the British, both by continuing to press the application 

after the veto, and by enlisting the assistance of Community allies, delayed 

progress towards further integration within the Community itself. Given that such 

progress, particularly in the technology, foreign policy and agricultural policy 

fields, could have placed significant barriers in the way of eventual British 

membership, such forestalling can be seen as a foreign policy success for Her 

Majesty's Government (HMG). 

Negotiating any kind of pre-membership ‘interim arrangement’ proved 

considerably more difficult. In order to preclude any possible French charge of 

attempting to sabotage or circumvent the Community itself, and to avoid the 

possibility of another French veto of British ideas, HMG again worked through 

friendly states. All members of the Community made proposals for short-term 

arrangements. The French themselves co-sponsored with Germany proposals for a 

‘trading arrangement’ with limited agricultural content in January 1968, although 

they then rejected subsequent German efforts to turn those proposals into anything 

more concrete. Likewise, the French rejected suggestions from the three Benelux 

states for significant advances in, inter alia, foreign policy co-operation. As it 

became increasingly clear that the French were both isolated and recalcitrant, the 

others began consideration of proposals that could proceed without France. Easing 

7. M. PINE, Application on the Table: the Second British Application to the European Communities, 

1967-1970, unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. The following paragraphs are 

drawn from this work.

62 

Melissa Pine 

Germany away from its traditionally close relations with France and towards more 

meaningful support of Britain became a key policy aim. Fortunately for the British, 

the successive French rejections of German efforts at compromise did much of the 

work for them. 

By late autumn 1968, Britain and the Five were increasingly determined to put 

pressure on France. Attention was now focused on a scheme from Belgian Foreign 

minister Pierre Harmel, to pursue foreign policy co-operation using an existing 

institution. Western European Union (WEU) presented obvious advantages in that 

its membership encompassed the UK and the Six, and discussion of foreign policy 

was already within its remit. Despite – or perhaps even because of – French 

obstruction, the UK and the Five took steps towards new co-operation. In October 

their Foreign ministers met without the French for the first time since 1963, and 

agreed to work towards an accord. In November, they agreed to proceed towards 

new integration without France if necessary. In December, they accepted an Italian 

paper detailing proposals as the basis for further discussion, and Stewart was 

deputed to work on an agreement – which he did throughout January 1969. As will 

be seen, Stewart’s work formed a basis for substantive discussion of foreign policy 

between Britain and the Five. He felt strongly that Britain was running out of time: 

‘I would not go so far as to say that Europe has lost its last chance to make a go of 

unity, but I do believe that unless we can show progress in 1969/70 a great chance 

may have been lost’. 8 

So, in making his proposals to Soames, de Gaulle was reacting in part to the 

success of British European policy and to his own increasing inability to direct or 

bully the Five into acting in accordance with French interests. Moreover, the British 

response to de Gaulle’s proposals must be seen first in the light of French 

stonewalling of efforts at compromise, and second in the context of the increasing 

likelihood of meaningful collaboration between Britain and the Five in WEU. 

Whatever the longer-term pattern of relations between the two states, the 

immediate context for the Soames affair was one of mutual frustration and distrust. 

The general’s proposals 

De Gaulle and Soames met for lunch on 4 February 1969, and Soames wrote his 

report back at the British embassy afterwards. Recalling the details of a conversation 

was not Soames’ greatest skill: he himself likened the process to ‘trying to 

tickle bits of garlic out from behind his teeth’. 9 According to his account, however, 

de Gaulle suggested ‘far-reaching bilateral talks’ to see whether Britain and France 

could ‘co-operate “in a way which our two countries have never done before”. 10 He 

8. Minute, Stewart to Wilson, 7 February 1969, PM/69/13, UKNA/PREM/13/2673. 

9. Cited in H. YOUNG, op.cit., p.202. 

10. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 4 February 1969, No.121, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.


reiterated old opinions on Anglo-European and Anglo-American relations, and 

castigated Britain for failing to achieve a ‘totally independent position’ in the world 

as France had. The ‘whole essence’ of a ‘European entity’ must be ‘an independent 

position in world terms’. ‘Independence’ did not mean leaving NATO, but eventually 

there would be no need for that institution, ‘with its American dominance’. 11 

De Gaulle continued that he had no particular faith in the EC. He would like to 

see it change 

‘into a looser form of free trade association with arrangements by each country to 

exchange agricultural produce’. 

He would gladly talk to HMG about this idea, and was ‘anxious to have 

political discussions with us’. There should be ‘a large European economic 

association, but with a smaller inner council of a European political association 

consisting of France and Britain, Germany and Italy’. First he wanted to build a 

‘specifically Franco-British bond’, based on ‘a genuine desire to build something in 

Europe together’. HMG should suggest talks, which he would welcome. Pressed by 

Soames, de Gaulle conceded that he might issue an invitation to bilateral talks, but 

he must first know if the British were interested. He hoped that 

‘his proposition would be secret until we decide to have talks. If we did decide to do 

so, the fact would then of course be public’. 

He hoped to meet Wilson soon to discuss Europe. 12 All the factors that later led 

to controversy are therefore present in Soames’ account: the replacement of the EC 

by a looser association and disappearance of NATO, the creation of a political 

‘inner council’ and the request for secrecy. 

What was de Gaulle trying to achieve? Maurice Vaïsse noted that both de Gaulle 

and the French Foreign minister, Michel Debré, stressed that Soames had pressed 

for a meeting: they saw him as being keen to effect an Anglo-French reconciliation. 

At the same time, however, French freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy had 

been tightly restricted by both its domestic and its international circumstances. At 

home, the repercussions of May 1968 were still playing out and the value of the 

franc was continually threatened. Internationally, France was isolated in Europe. 

French policy towards the Soviet Union had been discredited by the Warsaw Pact 

invasion of Czechoslovakia, while relations with the United States were still 

chilly. 13 Debré, himself unusually anglophile for a French Foreign minister (and 

especially in comparison to his predecessor, Maurice Couve de Murville), 

suggested that the general’s proposals were the beginning of a French attempt to 

forestall an impasse in the forthcoming Community discussions on a definitive 

common agricultural policy. Opening the door to British accession and seeking 

issues on which the French and British might take similar positions, such as 

‘l’organisation d’une Europe sans supranationalité’, might be a way to end the 

11. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 5 February 1969, No.123, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 


13. M. VAÏSSE, La grandeur: Politique étrangère du géneral de Gaulle 1958-1969, Fayard, Paris, 

1998, p.613.

64 

Melissa Pine 

existing deadlock in the Community. 14 Jean Lacouture emphasised French anxiety 

over growing West German strength as a motivating factor for an approach to 

Britain. 15 Charles Williams suggested that the proposals formed ‘one more attempt 

at asserting France’s international prestige’. 16 The consensus is clearly that the 

French were operating from a position of weakness. 

Vaïsse presented a detailed account of the de Gaulle-Soames talks. He argued 

that, according to a French record made on 7 February, the general welcomed the 

opportunity of Anglo-French talks not in order to discuss the British application for 

membership of the EC, but in two perspectives: 

‘sur le plan économique, il s’agirait d’échanger des vues sur une entente européenne 

pour le cas où, dans l’avenir, le Marché commun lui-même s’effacerait pour faire 

place á un autre régime; [et] sur le plan politique, d’envisager une concertation 

organisée des Etats européennes sur la base d’une indépendance de l’Europe à 

l’égard des Etats-Unis’. 

He concluded that, ‘l’esprit des deux comptes rendus [that is, the French and the 

English] est bien le même et on y retrouve des idées propres au Général’. 

Difficulties would come only later, over the way in which the proposals were 

presented in the press. 17 

The British reaction 

However, the British found themselves perplexed. Soames ‘had the impression’ 

that de Gaulle was taking a new line, perhaps similar ‘to the abortive proposals he 

made to Mr Churchill in Paris in November 1944 for a far-reaching Anglo-French 

entente’. It could be a tactical attempt to undermine German resolve to fight for the 

British application. Or it might be sincere: his awareness of the growing strength of 

Germany might be inclining him to ‘look to the West’. This uncertainty led Soames 

to request only to seek more information. He would make the point that the government’s 

application to the EC stood, and that HMG would consider a new proposal 

only if all six member states were on board, and if it were made clear that the initiative 

came from France. Soames concluded that de Gaulle had made the proposals 

with an open mind. 18 His desire for more information is understandable, but there 

is no recognition in his initial telegrams of a need for haste necessitated by 

Wilson’s forthcoming visit to Kiesinger, just days away. 

In response, Stewart immediately took a hard line, working from Luxembourg 

(where he was attending a meeting of WEU) to advise Wilson in the forty-eight 

14. M. DEBRÉ, Trois Républiques pour une France, Albin Michel, Paris, 1993, p.266. 

15. J. LACOUTURE, op.cit., p.474. 

16. C. WILLIAMS, The Last Great Frenchman: a Life of General de Gaulle, Abacus, London, 1995, 

p.478. 

17. M. VAÏSSE, op.cit., pp.607-608. 



hours left before Soames’ next meeting with Debré. 19 He stressed that the matter 

must not leak, and asked 

‘what sort of relationship can we have with a man whose concept of Europe and Europe’s 

relations with the United States is so different from our own? Secondly, what can de 

Gaulle’s motive be in making this offer to us: and why at this particular moment’? 

For de Gaulle had always been ‘implacably opposed’ to British interests and 

objectives, and he had given no sign of readiness to change his position on basic 

issues. The problem was that he could now use either a rejection or an acceptance 

to harm British interests. If rejected, he could say that he suggested a settling of 

differences with Britain but was refused, proving that Britain was not yet ready for 

Europe. But if the offer were accepted, he could misrepresent British readiness to 

do a deal with the French and to build something new in place of the Communities. 

Accepting bilateral talks would mean abandoning the multilateral approach – a 

risky move when the issues affected other countries. Stewart concluded that it 

would be dangerous to make any positive response to de Gaulle: his terms were 

utterly unacceptable and the UK should go on the record as rejecting them. Wilson 

should therefore tell Kiesinger of the approach, suggesting that they try to deal with 

de Gaulle together and thus avoiding the risk of de Gaulle presenting the British 

refusal to the Five in his own terms. 20 The FCO added to the urgency by suggesting 

that the French might leak the proposals themselves. 21 Vaïsse accused the FCO and 

Stewart himself of being blinded by their animosity to the general. He suggested 

also that Stewart, a Labour minister, placed little credibility on the opinions stated 

by Soames, a former Conservative minister appointed to the Paris embassy by his 

predecessor. 22 Yet while the FCO later confessed to ‘Degaullophobia’, assigning 

such motivation to Stewart is simplistic. 23 

Wilson, who had already noted his own suspicions to his private secretary 

Michael Palliser the day after the Soames-de Gaulle meeting, 

‘greatly welcomed this advice and he particularly welcome[d] the conclusion […] that [he] 

should speak to Kiesinger about this in the terms which the Foreign Secretary proposes’. 

His own initial reactions coincided closely with Stewart’s, 

‘particularly the possibility that de Gaulle may be hoping to condition Kiesinger and 

even Nixon. What we must clearly avoid is falling into a trap’. 24 

19. Telegrams, Stewart (in Luxembourg) to Paris via FCO, 6 February 1969, No.1 and 7 February 

1969, No.2; Paris to Stewart (in Luxembourg) via FCO, 6 February 1969, No.131, all UKNA/ 

PREM/13/2628. 

20. Telegrams, Stewart (in Luxembourg) to Wilson, 6 February 1969, Nos.35 and 37 (Prime Minister’s 

Personal Message Serial No.T16/69), UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

21. Minute, Morgan to Hood, 7 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/416. 

22. M. VAÏSSE, op.cit., p.610. 

23. Minute and draft paper, ‘Allegations of Francophobia in the Foreign Office’, Robinson to Tait, 28 

April 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/421. 

24. Minutes, Palliser to Wilson and Wilson’s note thereon, 5 February 1969; Andrews to Barrington, 

7 February 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. The fear that de Gaulle hoped to court Nixon was, 

ironically, mirrored by Debré, who suspected that the subsequent British actions were directed at 

preventing a Franco-American rapprochement: see M. DEBRÉ, op.cit., p.269.

66 

Melissa Pine 

Two other incidents raised the stakes as Wilson prepared to leave for Germany. 

First a French Foreign affairs minister asserted that de Gaulle wanted to ‘discuss 

seriously the possibility of nuclear weapons co-operation’. 25 Second, the British 

ambassador in Rome, who saw de Gaulle’s proposals as an effort to ‘relieve the 

pressure’ caused by British persistence with the Harmel proposals, began pressing 

for authority to tell the Italian government of de Gaulle’s proposals. 26 Although 

Wilson never seriously contemplated the nuclear option – as far as can be told from 

the official record – these moves added to the diplomatic strain. 

The Western European Union setting 

On the same day that de Gaulle and Soames met, the seven WEU Foreign ministers 

gathered to discuss the Italian paper mentioned above. It was already clear that 

France would not participate in this new foreign policy initiative, and others feared 

that the Germans would therefore back out. 27 However, in a long and acrimonious 

discussion, the isolation of the French became apparent. 28 While all seven agreed 

that foreign policy consultations should be improved, Britain and the Five supported 

a Benelux commitment to draw up a list of foreign policy topics on which 

they would consult in WEU, in order to ‘further the adoption of positions agreed 

and harmonised to the fullest possible extent’. 29 The French reserved their position, 

and at first implied that there had been no acute conflict. 30 In contrast, Stewart told 

cabinet that the meeting had both emphasised French isolation and 

‘established that our not being members of [EEC] did not exclude us from consultation 

with those EEC powers who wished to consult with us, and that the EEC was 

not the only forum for consultation’. 31 

As work among Britain and the Five proceeded, this division in WEU became 

more apparent. 32 

25. ‘Record of Conversation between Lord Chalfont and M. de Lipowski, French Minister of State for 

Foreign Affairs, at Luxembourg on 6 February 1969’, UKNA/FCO/30/414. 

26. Telegrams, Rome to FCO, 7 February 1969, Nos.132-133, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

27. Telegrams, Luxembourg to FCO, No.33, UKNA/FCO/30/537; Paris to FCO, No.122; Rome to 

FCO, No.123, all 4 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/357. 

28. Telegram, Stewart (in Luxembourg) to FCO, 7 February 1969, No.42, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

29. Telegram, Stewart (in Luxembourg) to FCO, 7 February 1969, No.43, UKNA/FCO/30/537. 

30. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 7 February 1969, No.136, UKNA/FCO/30/537. 

31. CC(69)8, 11 February 1969, UKNA/CAB/128/44. 

32. ‘Note of a Meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Italian Foreign 

Minister at the Kirchberg at 11.30am on 7 February 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.


Divided Counsel 

During this small but real step towards new co-operation in WEU, HMG continued 

to deliberate over de Gaulle’s proposals. On 7 February Stewart returned to the 

offensive, pressing the case for concentrating on building relations with the FRG. 33 

Palliser increasingly shared Stewart’s suspicions but feared the consequences of 

rejecting talks, while the British ambassador in Rome again warned of the dangers 

of accepting talks in an appraisal that Wilson described as ‘quite good. 34 Soames, 

who had taken the precaution of having the French check his record of the original 

talk, took the opposite view. When he met with Debré on 8 February, the latter continued 

to press for bilateral talks on Europe, ‘in the strictest secrecy until we knew 

whether or not we could see the seeds of agreement’. Soames now concluded that 

the idea for bilateral talks had originally been Debré’s and should be taken seriously. 

He asked to return to London for immediate consultations before Wilson 

went to Bonn. 35 

Faced with such contradictory counsel but already leaning towards his foreign 

secretary’s position, Wilson met Stewart on 10 February to discuss tactics. They 

agreed that ‘in the spirit of consultation’ just agreed at WEU, they should inform 

Kiesinger and the others of the French approach, and should tell the French that 

this action was being taken. They would say that they would not return a flat 

negative to the French: any talks must be in consultation with the Germans and 

others, while they would not accept de Gaulle’s approach to NATO and the EEC. 

The FCO would prepare a brief for Wilson with ‘particular emphasis on “the 

disruptive approach to [the] EEC inherent in General de Gaulle’s approach”’. 36 The 

harmony between Wilson and Stewart on this matter was evident, and the FCO 

brief reflected it despite Soames’ protests that the government had taken ‘a too 

clear-cut and too dramatic’ picture of his talk with de Gaulle from his original 

telegrams. He suggested that Wilson give only a highly sanitised version of events 

to Kiesinger. 37 Palliser too advised Wilson to consider very carefully whether he 

really wished to speak as fully to Kiesinger and the rest and, if he did, whether his 

own relationship with de Gaulle could stand the strain. 38 The debate went on, with 

Stewart taking a hard line, Soames urging a more careful approach and Palliser 

falling somewhere in between. 

33. Minute, Stewart to Wilson and Wilson’s notes thereon, 7 February 1969, PM/69/13, UKNA/ 

PREM/13/2673. 

34. Minute, Palliser to Wilson; telegram, Rome to FCO, No.133, and Wilson’s note thereon, both 9 

February 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2628; see also letter, Garran to Hood, 11 February 1969, 

UKNA/FCO/30/414. 


36. Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary 

and 10 Downing Street at 11.40am on Monday, February 10, 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

37. Report of visit to Soames and attached paper, Hancock to Maitland, 10 February 1969; Telegram, 

Paris to FCO, 10 February 1969, No.143, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

38. Minutes, Palliser to Wilson, 10 February 1969 and Wilson’s note thereon; 11 February 1969, both 

UKNA/PREM/13/2628.

68 

Melissa Pine 

The debate continued after Wilson arrived in Bonn. Stewart entirely rejected 

both Soames’ and Palliser’s positions. If Wilson gave Kiesinger only a partial 

account, the Germans would surely elicit the rest from the British advisers or the 

French. He recommended that Wilson give a fairly full account, and did not want 

the French to have advance warning of the denouement. 39 The British ambassadors 

to the Five supported this advice, and the speaking note prepared for Wilson 

reflected almost word for word Soames’ original telegrams of 4-5 February. 40 

Wilson appeased Soames by promising to ‘test the atmosphere in Bonn’ and 

consult again with Stewart before deciding what to do, but he told Stewart that his 

object in Bonn would be to turn the traditional four-two combination in Europe 

(where Germany typically sided with France) into a five-one combination (with 

France isolated). He would open by reminding Kiesinger that HMG was 100% 

determined to join the EEC. Stewart reiterated that Wilson ‘should not leave Bonn 

without telling Kiesinger the whole story’. The risks that the French would leak 

and that the Five would see any British consideration of de Gaulle’s ideas as a 

breach of confidence were too great. Soames should tell Debré that Wilson 

accepted the idea of bilateral talks only on the basis of current British policy, and 

tell him that he was informing Kiesinger of the general’s proposals. 41 

Stewart sent telegrams to Community posts instructing ambassadors to prepare 

to tell their host governments about the ‘Soames affair’ before Wilson met 

Kiesinger, so he clearly expected that Wilson would follow his advice. 42 He was 

correct: Wilson telegrammed on 12 February to say that 

‘I intend to put Kiesinger fully in the picture about what de Gaulle has said to 

Soames […] on the condition that the implications of the communication are pressed 

to their logical conclusion’. 

In other words, if Kiesinger did not react ‘in the right way’, Wilson wanted both 

the original proposals (showing de Gaulle’s disloyalty to the EC) and, potentially, 

Kiesinger’s ‘unsatisfactory reaction’ (showing his subservience to de Gaulle) to be 

made public. 43 Wilson took this decision himself, choosing between different 

strategies suggested by Soames, Palliser and Stewart. His later account in The 

Labour Government, in which he blamed the FCO for effectively forcing him to 

tell Kiesinger about de Gaulle’s proposals, is therefore deeply misleading. 44 

39. Minute, Maitland to Palliser, 11 February 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

40. For example, letter, Garran to Hood, 11 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/414; Speaking Note, 

‘Prime Minister’s visit to Bonn, February 1969: General de Gaulle’s Approach to HM Ambassador, 

Paris: Talking Points’, Maitland to Palliser, 11 February 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

41. Telegrams, FCO to Paris, No 77; FCO to Wilson (in Bonn), No.118, both 11 February 1969, 

UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

42. Telegrams, FCO to Brussels etc, 11 February 1969, Nos.32-33, UKNA/FCO/30/414. 

43. Telegram, Wilson (in Bonn) to FCO, 12 February 1969, No 145, Prime Minister’s Personal Message 

Serial No.T19/69. 

44. H. WILSON, op.cit., pp.610-611.


Spreading the word 

Wilson therefore reviewed the Soames-de Gaulle talk with Kiesinger ‘as per the 

telegrams’, and outlined the British response. Kiesinger was surprised: while de 

Gaulle had often said that British entry would change the Communities, he had 

never said that they should disappear. Kiesinger concluded that he 

‘would welcome talks between Britain and France, provided that there was first 

agreement between Britain and the Five on the maintenance and strengthening of 

NATO, on the development of the EEC and on its enlargement to include Britain’. 

In other words, Kiesinger rejected the very basis of the proposals – as the 

British had expected. He agreed with Wilson that the British and Germans should 

exchange information and co-ordinate their views, and undertook to keep Wilson 

informed of his own talks with de Gaulle. Germany would not accept a free trade 

area and four-power directorate: it would be very dangerous if the EC were to be 

undermined. Instead, ‘we should all show patience and determination to see Britain 

as a member of the EEC’. 45 Kiesinger’s was ‘obviously shaken’, and his response 

indicated that Wilson had chosen the correct course. 46 Wilson’s revelations seemed 

to have pushed the Germans towards greater support of the principal British aim, 

admission into the EC, an aim that ‘Her Majesty’s Government intended to advance 

[…] with all the means in their power’. 47 

The other member states were informed of the whole affair the same day, 12 

February, and the Commission the following day. Ambassadors were instructed to 

say that Soames would seek an interview with Debré that evening to say that HMG 

regarded the proposals as significant and far-reaching, but that it was too much to 

expect Wilson not to say anything in Bonn when the UK had just committed to 

increased consultation in WEU. HMG rejected de Gaulle’s ideas about NATO and 

the EC, but were willing to have bilateral discussions, provided that their partners 

were kept in the picture. 48 The governments of the Benelux states and Italy felt that 

the British had responded correctly to de Gaulle’s proposals, appreciated being 

informed and wondered, often suspiciously, at de Gaulle’s motives. 49 

In a move almost designed to infuriate the French, and in the knowledge that 

Nixon was soon to visit Paris, the British also informed the Americans of the 

‘Soames affair’. Although they were sworn to secrecy, efforts at discretion were 

destroyed when the Italians, who asked specifically who had been told, were 

45. ‘Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Federal German Chancellor at the 

Federal Chancellery, Bonn, at 4pm on Wednesday, February 12, 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

46. Draft telegram, Greenhill (in Bonn) to FCO, 12 February 1969, No.159, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

47. ‘Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Federal German Chancellor at the Federal 

Chancellery, Bonn, at 5.15pm on Wednesday, February 12, 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

48. Telegrams, FCO to Brussels etc, 12 February 1969, No.35, UKNA/FCO/30/414; FCO to UKDel 

Brussels, 13 February 1969, No.14, UKNA/FCO/73/32. 

49. Telegrams, Brussels to FCO, No.48; Luxembourg to FCO, No.49; Hague to FCO, No.80, all 13 

February 1969; Rome to FCO, 15 February 1969, No.167, UKNA/FCO/30/414; minute, Robinson 

to Hancock, 17 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/415.

70 

Melissa Pine 

informed that the Americans knew. 50 Moreover, the FCO had begun to prepare for 

the possibility of a French leak on 12 February, when comments by the Swedish 

ambassador in London indicated to them that the French were already up to 

something, perhaps by stirring up trouble for Britain in the European Free Trade 

Association (EFTA). 51 

Meanwhile, Wilson was still in Bonn. Foreign minister Willy Brandt warned 

him that de Gaulle would be ‘highly resentful’ that the British had revealed the 

content of the talk, but recognised the force of Wilson’s argument that he would be 

left in a difficult position if Kiesinger heard of the proposal and realised that Wilson 

had kept it from him. They speculated about de Gaulle’s motives, concluding that it 

was extremely important to continue the closest consultation. Palliser, who was 

keeping the record, noted 

‘a strong current of hostility on Herr Brandt’s part towards France and the General, 

such as had also been perceptible in Dr Kiesinger’s comments. This was patent and 

obviously sincere’. 

While Brandt did not see anything particularly new in de Gaulle’s proposals, he 

expressed himself ‘strongly’ about German difficulties when having to deal with him. 52 

The Anglo-German declaration issued that evening, 13 February, affirmed the two 

countries’ ‘determination to go forward in partnership’. It said that ‘a united Europe is 

inconceivable without Britain’ and that both governments pledged themselves to further 

the aim of British membership. They agreed ‘to work out together with other European 

Governments, the means by which a new impetus can be given to the political unity of 

Europe’ – a reference to the work in WEU. Concluding with a mention of the 

‘continuation and strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance’, the declaration was a 

powerful reaffirmation of Anglo-German entente – and a total rejection of de Gaulle’s 

conception of Europe. 53 Wilson hoped to be able to use the declaration to ensure a 

German commitment that they would keep Britain informed of any developments in the 

EC which could affect British interests as potential members: 

‘this should enable us to have something of a say in the deliberations on these matters 

that take place within the EEC’. 54 

Wilson did ‘not like guff for guff’s sake’, Palliser noted, so that the declaration 

‘represent[ed] a useful step forward’. 55 Wilson’s handling of the ‘Soames affair’ 

therefore seemed to have succeeded in strengthening German support of the British 

position. 

50. Telegrams, Washington to FCO, 12 February 1969, No.422; Rome to FCO, 13 February 1969, No 

158, both UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

51. Telegram, FCO to Bonn, 12 February 1969, No.136, UKNA/FCO/30/414; minute, Killick to 

Morland and Robinson, 12 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/417. 

52. ‘Extract from Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and Herr Willy Brandt, Federal 

German Foreign Minister in Bonn, on Thursday February 13, 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

53. ‘Joint Declaration by the British Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic’, Bonn, 

13 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/418. 

54. Minute, Palliser to Barrington and Wilson’s note thereon, 10 March 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2629. 

55. Telegram, FCO to Washington, 18 February 1969, No.378, UKNA/PREM/13/3217


Relations with the French, in contrast, descended to icy depths. Instructions 

were sent to Paris late on 12 February – explicitly mentioning progress in WEU 

alongside the Soames affair. 56 However, by the time Soames received them it was 

too late to see Debré, and instead he told the secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay, 

Hervé Alphand, of the British actions. Alphand ‘reacted badly’: he feared that the 

news would ‘deeply anger’ both de Gaulle and Debré. 57 Debré was indeed 

distressed that Wilson had seen fit to discuss the affair with Kiesinger, but said that 

he would give the matter more thought, and talk to Soames again in a few days. 

Although the British were still trying to handle the matter discreetly – indeed, 

Soames emphasised to Debré that there had ‘not even been the whiff of a rumour’ 

about the affair in the press – indications that it would soon leak catalysed the FCO 

to send a detailed account to EFTA, Commonwealth and other missions, putting 

them on ‘leak-watch’ at the same time. 58 Later, the British decision to inform the 

Five was validated when it became clear that the French themselves had told at 

least the Austrians before the matter leaked. 59 

In the midst of these diplomatic manoeuvres and before the extent of the French 

reaction became clear, the WEU meeting that had been proposed by Stewart in 

Luxembourg went ahead: the permanent representatives (PRs) of Britain and the 

Five met in London to discuss the Middle East. 60 The French did not attend and 

tabled a protest, arguing that ‘cette réunion, qui c’est tenue en violation des règles 

statutaires, ne peut être considérée comme une réunion du Conseil de notre 

organisation’. De Gaulle described the meeting as ‘nulle et non avenue’. 61 Shortly 

afterwards the French announced a boycott on WEU activities, causing great 

anxiety, no doubt as intended, in Germany. 62 Stewart believed that the French were 

‘deliberately trying to block the political consultations which we were trying to 

promote’. 63 

56. Telegrams, FCO to Paris, 12 February 1969, No.81, UKNA/FCO/30/414 and No.82, UKNA/ 

PREM/13/2628. 


58. Telegrams, Paris to FCO and FCO to Oslo etc, 14 February 1969, No.30, both UKNA/FCO/30/ 

414. 

59. Telegram, Vienna to FCO, 24 February 1969, No.35, UKNA/FCO/30/416. 

60. Keesings Contemporary Archive (henceforth KCA) 23265-6 (29 March – 5 April 1969). 

61. Brouillon au sujet de l’Union de l’Europe Occidentale, 24 février 1969, Charles de Gaulle, Lettres 

Notes et Carnets Juillet 1966-Avril 1969, Librairie Plon, Paris, 1987. 

62. Letter, French Ambassador to WEU to Secretary-General of WEU, 16 February 1969; see also 

telegram, Paris to FCO, 19 February 1969, No.175, both UKNA/PREM/13/2628; KCA23265-6 

(29 March – 5 April 1969); letters, Palliser to Maitland and Maitland to Palliser; report of German 

Press Conference; telegram, Bonn to FCO, No.203, all 19 February 1969; telegram, Bonn to FCO, 

19 February 1969, No.203, all UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

63. Telegram, FCO to Bonn, 20 February 1969, No.166, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.

72 

Melissa Pine 

Full disclosure 

Just as progress in WEU began to seem precarious, evidence of leaks about the 

‘Soames affair’ surfaced in Paris, as the French presented their own interpretation of 

de Gaulle’s remarks. 64 On 17 February the editor of Les Echoes approached the British 

embassy in Paris for comment on the story, and the next day, an editorial suggested 

that de Gaulle was considering a new tack but did not mention any proposals 

to the British. 65 Questions followed from L’Express and from the Paris correspondent 

of the Washington Post. 66 Finally on 21 February in an episode barely mentioned by 

Vaïsse, it seemed clear that the French government was responsible for the leaks: an 

article in Le Figaro reported a conversation between Soames and de Gaulle, accusing 

Britain of giving a ‘sensational version misrepresenting Mr Soames’ audience’ to the 

Five. 67 An official statement that evening confirmed that the two had met, but denied 

that the president had expressed different opinions from those that had been ‘publicly 

and steadfastly laid down by him in recent years’. It repeated that enlargement would 

change the nature of the European Communities, and that Europe could only take 

shape on the political level when it was independent. 68 

The British at first responded unofficially, as telegrams poured in with requests 

for information, comments on the different versions, and replies to the FCO’s 

enquiry as to where would be best for a ‘corrective leak’ should the French leak ‘in 

a slanted manner’. 69 Finally, the FCO arranged a leak through the Italian 

newspaper Il Messagero, underlining that their record of the talk had been agreed 

with de Gaulle’s office. 70 In view of ‘further leaks from Paris’, however, the FCO 

decided to give the press in London, unattributably, Soames’ original record. 71 

Tension was increased by British press treatment of the story. The Times initially 

stuck closely to the official record, using the phrase ‘inner council’, for example, to 

describe de Gaulle’s suggestions of a four power political association within a 

looser free trade area, and reporting the French position alongside the British. 

64. Telegrams, Paris to FCO, 17 February 1969, No.167, and reply, 17 February 1969, No.88; Paris to 

FCO, 18 February 1969, Nos.169-170; Brussels to FCO, 18 February 1969, No.52, all UKNA/ 

FCO/30/414; ‘Record of Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the 

Belgian Ambassador at 12 Noon on 19 February’, UKNA/FCO/73/32. 

65. Telegrams, Paris to FCO, 17 February 1969, No.167 and 18 February 1969, Nos.169-170, UKNA/ 

FCO/30/414. 

66. Telegrams, Paris to FCO, 20 February 1969, Nos.179 and 182, UKNA/FCO/30/415. 

67. Telegrams, Paris to FCO, 21 February 1969, Nos.184 and 187; Brussels to FCO, No.69, UKNA/ 

FCO/30/415; M. VAÏSSE, op.cit., pp.610-611. 

68. Telegrams, Paris to FCO, 21 February 1969, Nos.188-189; see also telegram, Luxembourg to FCO, 

22 February 1969, No.69, all UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

69. Telegrams, Ottawa to FCO, No 178; UKDel Brussels to FCO, No.26; Paris to FCO, Nos.179 and 

182; Rome to FCO, No.179; Luxembourg to FCO, No.60; Bonn to FCO, No.206; Hague to FCO, 

No.96; Brussels to FCO, Nos.62 and 64; FCO to Brussels etc, No.45, all 20 February 1969, all 


70. Telegrams, FCO to Rome, No.111; reply, No.183, both 21 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/415. 

71. Telegram, FCO to Oslo etc, 21 February 1969, No.36, UKNA/FCO/30/415; Robin Haydon’s 

unattributable briefing, 21 February 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.


However, the article concluded with a reference to Britain’s rejection of ‘the need 

for a four-power directorate in Europe’: this phrase became a key point of 

complaint for the French. 72 

It is impossible to discover who had leaked first: as the telegrams demonstrate, 

so many people knew about the affair, and it was being discussed in so many fora, 

that the first leak could have come from one or more of at least twenty countries. 

What is crystal clear, on the other hand, is that the British government did not 

commit the first indiscretion: all planning was for ‘corrective leaks’ in response to 

information in the French press, and the British leak in Italy was sparked by the 

article in Le Figaro on 21 February. 73 The British decision to release Soames’ 

account has been seriously criticised, but the French misreporting of the meeting, 

combined with the fact that they had agreed Soames’ own report themselves, 

created substantially mitigating circumstances for this effort at ‘spinning’ the story 

to British advantage. Moreover, Robinson in the FCO highlighted the link with 

progress in WEU: making the full story public would bring pressure on Kiesinger 

to continue the foreign policy talks that had begun without France. 74 

In response, the Quai issued a further statement, denying that de Gaulle had 

proposed a political directorate, and Debré repeated the French version on the radio, 

underlining that Britain was not ready for membership’. 75 Debré met Soames again 

the same evening, and expressed great personal sadness. Both men knew, he said, that 

Soames had come to Paris to mend fences. He understood that Wilson might have 

found it ‘right and necessary’ to tell Kiesinger something of the conversation. But he 

did not understand the ‘diffusion, déformation et sensationalisme’ that had followed. 

When Soames pointed out that HMG had accepted the offer of talks, subject to 

certain conditions, Debré’s reply made clear the glacial nature of relations. ‘How 

could we possibly talk?’ he said. ‘The book had been opened in good faith on 4 

February and it had been closed on 22 February’. 76 The Quai issued a formal protest 

to Soames, which insisted that his account 

‘n’a reçu, à aucun moment, sous aucune forme, l’approbation ni du secrétariat 

général de la présidence de la République, ni du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères’. 

Alphand said that the protest was required because of errors in the British press, 

which had said that Tricot had initialled Soames’ record (he had not), that the 

confirmation of the record had come direct from the Elysée (it had come via 

Debré), and that Soames had tried to see Debré on the evening of 12 February 

(instead he had sought Alphand). A further point of contention was the British press 

use of the word ‘directorate’ to describe the inner group described by de Gaulle. 

Putting the record straight on these matters might, Soames felt, help to calm the 

72. The Times, 22 February 1969, p.1. 

73. Telegrams, FCO to Brussels, 20 February 1969, No.45; FCO to Rome, 21 February 1969, No.111, 

both UKNA FCO 30/415. 

74. Minute, Robinson to Hancock, 21 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/415. 

75. Telegrams, Paris to FCO, 22 February 1969, Nos.191-192, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 


74 

Melissa Pine 

atmosphere. Soames added, however, that ‘the French government [were] not 

telling the truth and they know it’. 77 

Mending fences 

Following Soames’ advice, Stewart informed Debré that the British government 

had had no intention of misrepresenting de Gaulle’s views, and indeed, had not. He 

was willing to show Debré HMG’s instructions to ambassadors. He again accepted 

the invitation to bilateral talks, saying that he knew that 

‘we start with serious differences between us but I do not see why we should not 

come, together with our partners, to a common view on the structure, purpose, and 

future of Europe’. 78 

He resisted domestic attempts to get him to associate himself with more critical 

remarks about de Gaulle, and repeatedly expressed British willingness to talk to the 

French. 79 This conciliatory attitude may have had some effect: when FCO minister 

Lord Alun Chalfont met ambassador Geoffroy de Courcel the latter spoke of 

‘genuine and serious misunderstanding’ rather than anything malicious. De 

Courcel said that Wilson’s actions in informing others of the talks without warning 

the French, and the British leaks to the press were the cause of French anger. When 

Chalfont pointed out that the first leaks had appeared in Le Figaro, de Courcel said 

he could only assume that they had come from WEU, ‘a notably incontinent 

organisation’. It would be difficult to retrieve the situation, but he hoped that they 

would stay closely in touch and that the whole affair would soon be resolved. 80 

Indeed, in their relations with the Five, the French played the ‘whole affair down 

rather than up’, perhaps in the knowledge that they had not shown themselves to be 

very ‘European’ and needed to regain face. 81 Notes exchanged between the British 

and French governments indicated that it would take some time to rebuild relations, 

but Soames never gave up on the possibility. 82 

77. Telegrams, Paris to FCO, 24 February 1969, Nos.195-196 and 199, UKNA/FCO/30/415; No.201, 

UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

78. Telegrams, FCO to Paris, 24 February 1969, No.104, UKNA/PREM/13/2628, and No.110, 


79. Telegram, FCO to Paris, 24 February 1969, No.111, UKNA/FCO/30/416. 

80. Minute, Chalfont to Stewart, 24 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/416. See also telegram, FCO to 

Paris, 28 February 1969, No.121, UKNA/FCO/30/417. 


82. Telegrams, FCO to Paris, 27 February 1969, No.114; Paris to FCO, 28 February 1969, Nos.217-218 

and 1 March 1969, Nos.223-224, all UKNA/PREM/13/2628; letter, Soames to Stewart, 21 March 

1969; telegrams, Paris to FCO, 24 March 1969, Nos.312-313, all UKNA/FCO/30/418.


After effects 

The ramifications of the ‘Soames affair’ played out for the rest of the spring, and 

were mainly positive for Britain. The governments of the Five accepted the British 

account of events. 83 As people continued to debate the rights and wrongs of the 

affair, British aims in Europe were plastered across European newspapers, almost 

all of which supported the UK, and which gave the government an opportunity to 

display its European character: Chalfont characterised the application as 

‘an important and courageous task which will be crowned with success and which 

will bring great benefit to a Europe really united’. 84 

The ‘Soames affair’ therefore raised the profile of the British application in the 

Community states. More practically, the Germans provided the UK with an account 

of Debré’s first meeting with the ambassadors of the Five in Paris, despite an appeal 

from the French Foreign minister for Franco-German solidarity. This fulfilment of 

undertakings made during Wilson’s visit suggested that the Germans put increased 

priority on relations with Britain in the aftermath of the general’s proposals. 85 

Wilson was careful to reinforce that new solidarity, working to ensure that the 

French boycott of WEU did not undermine German commitment to increased 

consultation with Britain. He sent a personal message to Kiesinger, noting that they 

had agreed in Bonn that the decision taken at Luxembourg was a ‘welcome step 

forward and should be encouraged’. They must not let themselves be diverted by 

the French actions. Wilson concluded with a plea. 

‘What is at stake now is not the interpretation of a single article in the Brussels 

Treaty but the continuation of the efforts, on which we have worked together for so 

many months, to develop political consultation in the WEU as a step towards the 

development of European unity. I hope you will see this matter in terms of Anglo/ 

German relations as well as in the context of wider European policy […].This is the 

time to build on what has so far been achieved’. 86 

Wilson’s letter had the desired effect, and the Germans attended the next WEU 

meeting – in the absence of France. 87 It covered only procedural points, but the 

WEU assembly later passed a resolution welcoming political consultations and the 

Council met, again without France, on 12 March to consider the Nigerian civil 

war. 88 If it was his intention, the general’s proposals failed to distract from the real 

progress towards co-operation being made in WEU. 

83. See especially telegram, Luxembourg to FCO, 22 February 1969, No.69, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

84. Il Messagero, 22 February 1969, reported in telegram, Rome to FCO, 25 February 1969, No.1 Saving. 

For other press reports, see for example, telegrams, Brussels to FCO, No.75; Bonn to FCO, No.216; 

Hague to FCO, No.111; Rome to FCO, No.186, all 22 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/415. 


86. Telegram, FCO to Bonn, 21 February 1969, No.169, Prime Minister’s Personal Message Serial No 

T22/69, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 

87. KCA23266-7 (29 March – 5 April 1969). 

88. Intriguingly, the French WEU delegation split over the resolution: the six Gaullist deputies voted 

against, the four non-Communist left-wing deputies voted for and three others abstained; letter, Marjoribanks 

to Robinson, 5 March 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/538; KCA23266 (29 March – 5 April 1969).

76 

Melissa Pine 

Conclusions 

In an article on British policy actions, de Gaulle’s real intentions in the ‘Soames 

affair’ are less important than British perceptions of them: as noted above, the British 

side of the story is one thread in a complex diplomatic incident. For HMG, the 

proposals were placed in the context both of Wilson’s continuing pressure for entry 

into the EC, and of the signs of progress in the embryonic foreign policy co-operation 

in WEU. Britain, with the help of her allies, had succeeded not only in dominating 

the EC agenda but also in taking concrete steps towards European integration 

in a new and significant policy area. The proposals were thus seen as evidence 

of the success of British European policy since the French veto of 1967. 

Moreover, the British handling of the affair, clearly dominated by Wilson and 

Stewart, consolidated their relations with the Five and particularly with Germany, 

at a time when they were preparing to work together in the sensitive area of foreign 

policy. Over the previous eighteen months it had proved difficult to hold the 

Germans to their promises to support Britain: confiding de Gaulle’s seeming 

treachery to Kiesinger seemed to have the desired effect. Of course, there may have 

been other reasons for the strengthened German position: as noted above, by 

February 1969 their patience with French European policy had worn extremely 

thin. However, Wilson’s decision to reveal de Gaulle’s seeming perfidy may have 

been the final straw. Soames may have hoped that the whole affair could have been 

handled differently, but in the aftermath of the ‘Soames affair’ the Germans not 

only gave new commitments to consult with the British on European affairs and to 

keep them informed of EC developments: they also immediately followed through 

on these commitments. 89 

As a result of the strengthened solidarity between Britain and the Five, and despite 

traditional French tactics of attempted veto and then boycott, consultations on foreign 

policy in WEU continued. Although they were soon overshadowed by de Gaulle’s 

resignation, these consultations should not be overlooked: they are evidence of Britain’s 

real engagement with European allies, and of those allies’ reciprocal willingness to 

move towards integration in significant policy areas with Britain. 

Finally, HMG’s and particularly Wilson’s actions in February 1969 made it 

crystal clear that entry into the EC was a top priority for the UK. De Gaulle’s 

resignation two months later relegated the ‘Soames affair’ to the status of a storm 

in a teacup, but it had provided Wilson with a key opportunity to match his actions 

to his pro-European rhetoric. As a result, when de Gaulle left the political scene 

and was eventually succeeded by Georges Pompidou, the expectations of Wilson 

and the Five for a reappraisal in French policy were high. Although many factors 

were involved in Pompidou’s lifting of the French veto on British entry at The 

Hague in December, the constant British pressure for closer European relations, 

shown so clearly in the ‘Soames affair’, played a crucial part. 

89. Letter, Soames to Wilson, 11 March 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/417.

A propos des archives Emile Noël: aux origines d’une carrière 

européenne (1922-1958) 

77 

Catherine Previti Allaire 

De 1958 à 1987, c'est à dire pendant vingt-neuf ans, Emile Noël a exercé les fontions 

de secrétaire général de la Commission européenne. Tant l'importance de sa charge 

que la durée de son exercice lui ont conféré un rôle central dans le fonctionnement et 

le développement de ladite Commission depuis ses origines jusqu'à l'élaboration de 

l'Acte unique. Au sein d'une équipe relativement restreinte, notamment à ses débuts, 

la personnalité des principaux responsables a largement marqué le développement 

institutionnel. Dans ce contexte, il paraît légitime de s'interroger sur les origines 

d'Emile Noël et de tenter de cerner certains faits qui ont pu contribuer à forger ses 

idées et, par là-même, une part de l'histoire communautaire. 

La logique de recherche a été essentiellement subjective dans le sens où elle 

s'est attachée à faire revivre le personnage de l'intérieur, à redénouer le fil de sa vie 

plutôt qu'à en dresser une analyse critique. En outre, s'étant basé sur le fonds Emile 

Noël, 1 le travail a subi les aléas du 'taux documentaire': certains épisodes sont 

passés sous silence lorsqu'il n'en existe point de trace dans les papiers (par 

exemple, la position d'Emile Noël sur l'affaire de Suez en 1956). 

Somme toute, l'enquête a apporté une série de résultats qui semblent pouvoir 

constituer une première approche à la problématique. 

Les racines d'un homme engagé 

1. De l’enfance à la Résistance 

Emile Noël naît à Istanbul en 1922. Son père, de nationalité belge, a rencontré sa 

mère au retour d'une mission en Asie pour le compte de la compagnie 

internationale des Wagons-lits. La famille de la jeune femme, d’origine 

marseillaise, a rejoint à la fin du siècle passé la colonie française installée au détroit 

du Bosphore. En 1925, suite aux soubresauts de la révolution nationaliste, le couple 

rejoint la Provence et s’installe aux environs de la cité phocéenne dans le port de La 

Ciotat. Emile Noël restera cependant attaché à la Sublime porte: 

«Pendant trente ans au service de la Commission […], je me suis efforcé […] de 

contribuer à ce que la Turquie se rapproche de la Communauté. Par delà les difficultés 

circonstancielles, l’ancrage de la Turquie dans l’Europe n’est-il pas (…) la conséquence 

même de l’œuvre de modernisation et de laïcisation qu’avait entreprise le grand Kemal 

Ataturk»? 2 

1. Les archives Emile Noël sont conservées aux Archives historiques des Communautés européennes 

à l'Institut universitaire européen de Florence. Elles sont ouvertes au public depuis 1999. 

2. Conférence d’E. Noël en Turquie, 03/1988.

78 


Pour lors, le petit Emile mène une vie modeste et retirée aux côtés de ses jeunes 

sœur et frère, tandis que leur mère leur inculque une éducation poussée. Vers l’âge 

de douze ans seulement, il est scolarisé au lycée catholique d’Aix-en-Provence où 

ont déménagé ses parents. A cette période décède son père, souffrant de longue 

date. 3 Malgré les difficultés économiques, il obtient son baccalauréat à seize ans 

puis fréquente les classes préparatoires de mathématiques à Montpellier puis à 

Marseille. Il poursuit sa formation à Paris dans la section scientifique de l’Ecole 

normale supérieure (promotion 1941) avant d’obtenir les licences de sciences 

physiques et mathématiques à l'université (1942-1943). 

La guerre interrompt ses études. Son engagement dans la Résistance, 4 initié dès 1941 à 

Aix-en-Provence, se poursuit dans les locaux de la montagne Sainte-Geneviève. Il participe 

à la diffusion du journal “Résistance” et à l’organisation de départs pour le maquis avant de 

se rendre lui-même, en juin 1943, en Isère. Après l’attaque et la dissolution de son groupe, il 

intègre dès le mois suivant un groupe vauclusien qui procède à des récupérations (essence, 

équipements des Chantiers de jeunesse …). C’est là qu’opère Georges Rebattet qui a quitté 

en novembre 1942 les fonctions de second-maître des Compagnons de France pour mieux 

diriger les maquis des Mouvements unis de résistance. De retour à Paris, en décembre, 

Emile Noël reprend sa collaboration avec l’organisation Résistance dans laquelle il s'occupe 

de l’impression clandestine, de l’aide aux réfractaires, du service faux papiers, des 

renseignements, des évacuations vers le maquis et des contacts avec la résistance locale. 

L’arrestation et la déportation de ses principaux animateurs en juin 1944 marquent la fin 

tragique du réseau. Emile Noël se tourne alors vers la réorganisation du Mouvement de 

libération nationale dans la région parisienne. 

2. Compagnon et cam’lib’ 

Durant le conflit, l’étudiant adhère également au mouvement Compagnon qui finit 

par s’entrecroiser avec la Résistance. Cette association, fondée en juillet 1940 au 

lendemain de la défaite française, est placée sous l'égide du ministère de la Famille 

et de la Jeunesse. Elle vise «le rassemblement de jeunes Français désireux de participer 

au relèvement matériel et moral de leur pays […] en offrant leur concours 

[…] (à) toutes initiatives propres à associer les jeunes au service du pays». 5 

Ouverte à des adhérents de toute sensibilité politique et religieuse, elle est le promoteur 

d'une déclaration commune des mouvements de jeunesse: 

3. Ces informations sont tirées de l’intervention de la fille d’E. Noël, M. NOËL-BAUER, au colloque 

sur E. Noël organisé par le Jean-Monnet-Arbeitskreis Nordrhein-Westfalen à Bonn les 25-26/09/ 

1998. Voir également la contribution de D. LEFEBVRE, Emile Noël, le très discret Européen, in: 

Le bulletin du centre Guy Mollet, n°28, 12/1996. 

4. Cf. curriculum vitae rédigé par E. Noël en 06/1945. 

5. Statut des Compagnons de France. Cf. notamment les interventions de B. COMTE et M.-S. 

BRIANCEAU, Table ronde sur les Compagnons de France, M. Deltombe, Paris, 1991. Cette 

manifestation fut organisée le 14/12/1990 par le professeur M. Vaïsse à l’Institut de France dans le 

cadre de l'Institut d'histoire des relations internationales. La déclaration commune des 

Compagnons est professée dans la forêt de Randan (Allier) en août 1940.

A propos des archives Emile Noël 79 

«… les malheurs de la France et le désarroi de la jeunesse imposent qu’un effort 

vigoureux soit immédiatement entrepris pour: 1) Aider chaque adolescent à répondre 

à sa vocation personnelle d’homme et de Français; 2) Lui faire prendre conscience 

de la mission propre à la France; 3) L’engager dans une action enthousiaste et 

fraternelle pour le relèvement de son pays». 

Les Compagnons amorcent ainsi la réalisation d’un idéal de société communautaire 

animant différentes chapelles idéologiques depuis l’entre-deux-guerres. Ils privilégient 

l’éducation de la personne autonome au sein de la Communauté, témoignant de 

l’influence d’Emmanuel Mounier sur leurs conceptions, tout en mettant l’accent sur 

l’enracinement et l’édification du jeune au sein de la Communauté de jeunesse 6 par le 

travail et la formation professionnelle. Plus généralement, ils confluent avec les 

hétéroclites mouvements de jeunesse jaillis dans les années vingt et dont le régime de 

Vichy, qui le premier les reconnaît, marque l'apogée. Alimentés aux sources communes 

de l’aspiration à un rôle social, civique, moral et professionnel - domaines négligés par 

l'enseignement traditionnel -, ces derniers sont subventionnés comme autant d’acteurs 

potentiels de la Révolution nationale. Les rapports des Compagnons avec l’administration 

pétainiste s’érodent cependant puis se brisent quand viennent au grand jour les positions 

réciproques, mettant fin à toute ambivalence. Nombre d’entre eux passent du statut de 

‘pré-résistant’ 7 à celui de résistant. La geste de Georges Rebattet comme le parcours 

d’Emile Noël l’illustrent. Le groupement est dissous par décret en janvier 1944. 

Mais son legs n’est pas vain. A la Libération, Emile Noël choisit à la fois la jeunesse 

et l’Europe. 8 Au cœur du bouillonnement qui reprend dans les cercles de jeunesse, il est 

présent à la conférence mondiale de la jeunesse à Londres 9 en octobre 1945 puis 

devient secrétaire général des Camarades de la liberté. Né en novembre 1945 du 

croisement des organisations de jeunesse et de la clandestinité, ce mouvement 

d’éducation populaire, agréé par le ministère de l’Education nationale, se veut «laïque, 

impartial et désireux de contribuer au mieux-vivre des jeunes». Y perdure le travail 

développé par les Compagnons autour de la culture publique et notamment de la 

6. Les Compagnons mettent l’accent sur la Communauté de jeunesse. «La Communauté: 1°) Définition: le 

terme Communauté revêt pour nous un sens philosophique et un sens sociologique. - Dans son acception 

philosophique, la Communauté est le principe de constitution des groupes sociaux qui assurent l’équilibre 

entre l’autonomie des personnes et l’efficacité du groupe. Il est entendu que le groupe n’est jamais la réalité 

première ni une fin en soi. - Dans son acception sociologique, la Communauté est le groupe où se trouve 

le mieux réalisée la coïncidence de l’intérêt personnel avec le bien commun. La Communauté est un 

principe de vie sociale et politique qui tend à la plus grande unité des individus et des personnes, cette unité 

étant considérée comme le bien supérieur. 2°) Par Communauté naturelle, il faut entendre les formes 

traditionnelles de la vie humaine. […] (union conjugale, Humanité) […]. En dehors de ces Communautés 

fondamentales et permanentes, il existe des modalités temporaires de groupement qui se constituent 

spontanément […]: le clan, la tribu, la fratrie, […] la commune, la communauté de métier, le mir, la cité, 

le pays, la province, la nation, l’ordre, la classe […], une des Communautés est la Communauté de 

jeunesse». (Manifeste de la réunion du Marteray, Isère, mars 1944). Le choix du terme Compagnons 

témoigne de leur volonté d’enracinement historique comme de la valeur accordée au travail encadré. 

7. Le terme est emprunté à un exposé fait à la table ronde, op.cit. 

8. Selon la formule utilisée par le président F.-X. Ortoli dans son hommage à E. Noël, in: Bulletin du 

Centre Guy Mollet, op.cit. 

9. Cf. contribution de M. NOËL-BAUER, op.cit.

80 


jeunesse ouvrière souvent dépourvue de toute formation professionnelle. Il promeut le 

lancement du Train-exposition de la jeunesse qui «présente et illustre la condition 

sociale des jeunes, leurs aspirations, leurs besoins, leurs réalisations». Inauguré 

officiellement à la gare Saint-Lazare en juin 1947, le Train parcourt 6.000 kilomètres à 

travers la France, la Belgique, le Luxembourg et la Suisse où il reçoit l’appui des 

pouvoirs publics, de la presse et de la radio ainsi que la visite des jeunes, des parents et 

des écoles. Dans le même temps, le Train est un «témoignage de la volonté de 

redressement du pays». 10 Sur l’inspiration de Jean Moreau, un wagon est consacré à 

l’amitié franco-allemande. 11 Le tout bénéficie du soutien de Georges Rebattet, devenu 

chef de cabinet du ministre de l’Information et de la Jeunesse. 

Emile Noël n'oubliera pas l'expérience partagée avec ses compagnons et 

camarades de jeunesse. Correspondance et témoignages le confirment: 

«Il parlait rarement de cette partie de sa vie dont j’ai su par d’autres qu’il s’y était donné 

tout entier, avec le courage qu’on pouvait attendre d’un homme de cette trempe. Il n’était 

pas porté à mettre cet engagement en valeur, mais on croisait parfois dans les couloirs de 

la Commission, Emile Noël le fidèle avec un de ses camarades venus d’un autre temps, 

celui de la guerre, et dont j’ai rencontré certains». 12 

3. Mouvement européen 

En 1949, Georges Rebattet devient secrétaire général adjoint du Mouvement européen. 

Ce dernier, issu du congrès européen de La Haye (mai 1948), s’attache précisément par 

son entremise à nouer des relations avec les organisations de jeunesse pour divulguer 

son message; 13 et c’est par son intermédiaire qu’Emile Noël pénètre dans les rouages 14 

de la toute nouvelle formation et amorce son engagement européen. Il collabore quelques 

mois au secrétariat international de Paris (1949). Suite à l’'Appel à la jeunesse' 

(février 1949) est promulgué un Programme du Mouvement européen de la jeunesse 

(août 1949) 15 auquel le jeune homme est appelé à s’intéresser. Le document énumère: 

10. Ces informations sont tirées du prospectus publicitaire sur le Train. Les Cam’Lib’ organisent 

également des camps de vacances populaires. 

11. Cf. intervention de M. NOËL-BAUER, op.cit. J. Moreau, ancien Compagnon, est un haut 

responsable des mouvements de jeunesse dans le gouvernement de Vichy puis à la Libération. En 

août 1945, il est envoyé à Baden-Baden dans l’Allemagne occupée pour participer à la mise en 

place d’un service Jeunesse et Education populaire. 

12. Hommage de F.-X. Ortoli à E. Noël, op.cit. En outre, E. Noël restera en relation notamment avec 

les camarades de la liberté R. Basdevant et J.-M. Despinette. 

13. G. Rebattet participe à l’organisation du congès européen de La Haye (mai 1948). Sur son rôle 

d’intermédiaire avec les organisations de jeunesse, cf. la table ronde sur le rapprochement 

franco-allemand en politique de jeunesse et d’éducation populaire tenue en octobre 1990 à 

l’Institut universitaire européen et plus particulièrement le témoignage de Jean Moreau. 

14. Intervention d’E. Noël en 06/1989 à la table ronde sur 'Les socialistes et l'Europe' publiée in: 

Bulletin du Centre Guy Mollet, n°16, 06/1990. 

15. Ces deux documents existent dans le fonds ‘Mouvement européen’ (ME) conservé aux AHCE. Le 

second porte des annotations manuscrites d’E. Noël (ME 1920).


«I) Formation d’un mouvement européen de la jeunesse dans l’idée d’une union 

européenne avec la participation de tous les groupements de la jeunesse quelle que soit 

leur tendance politique ou religieuse dans tous les pays formant l’Europe unie. II) 

Education de la jeunesse dans l’esprit de coordination dans le sens économique, politique 

et culturel pour la sauvegarde de la paix et des droits de l’homme. [Sa réalisation requiert 

l’emploi de] tous les moyens (conférences, causeries, meetings et presse) pour que [la 

jeunesse] soit le point d’appui d’une base solide pour la propagation et la réalisation 

voir[e] même le maintien de l’idée d’une Europe unie dans les temps futurs». 

L’organisation de congrès et de camps de la jeunesse européenne «pour développer 

l’esprit de coordination et de fraternité entre les jeunes» est cependant mise en exergue. A 

valeurs anciennes, souffle nouveau. Ce zèle se conjugue notamment aux échanges culturels 

franco-allemands qui se développent depuis le rétablissement de la paix et dont l’esprit 

éducatif vise la «découverte mutuelle des réalités françaises et allemandes». 16 Ensemble ils 

constituent le prélude au camp de la Lorelei (dont la participation est internationalisée grâce 

aux efforts fédéralistes) et à la Campagne européenne de la jeunesse. 17 

Au cours de ces activités, Emile Noël côtoie des «maîtres à penser». 18 Les 

dirigeants de l’Union européenne des fédéralistes Alexandre Marc 19 et Henri Brugmans 

le marquent profondément. Tous deux contribuent à lui révéler l’horizon européen, eux 

qui participent depuis l’entre-deux-guerres au façonnement d’une Europe outrepassant 

la dimension culturelle - née de la familiarité de pensée - et la dimension autoritaire - 

sinistrement expérimentée sous le joug de conquérants ou de traités arbitraires. 20 Emile 

Noël n’oubliera pas l’enseignement du premier sur les fondements spirituels du 

fédéralisme communautaire et sa contribution à la libération de l’homme, faisant 

preuve d’un respect permanent pour le militant et son œuvre. 21 Mais il se rangera le 

plus souvent à la tactique du second, tête de proue du courant pragmatique. Au 

crépuscule de sa vie, Emile Noël se qualifiera encore de «militant européen» devant le 

Mouvement européen 22 et rédigera un hommage posthume à Henri Brugmans: 

«Ses disciples, connus et inconnus […], par fidélité à Henri Brugmans […] sauront 

faire leur la fière devise d’Orange: ‘Je maintiendrai’». 23 

16. Note sur la réunion franco-allemande de Spire des 16/08-16/09/1949 (ME 1920). Pour le reste, cf. 

la table ronde sur le rapprochement franco-allemand, op.cit. 

17. Sur l’intervention du fédéraliste A. Marc venu représenter les mouvements européens à la Lorelei, cf. le 

témoignage de J. MOREAU, in: table ronde sur le rapprochement franco-allemand, op.cit. La 

Campagne européenne de la jeunesse, lancée en 1951, sera dirigée par J. Moreau lui-même. Enfin, M. 

Noël-Bauer mentionne la participation de son père à une rencontre de jeunes en Allemagne dès 01/1947. 

18. Projet d'hommage d'E. Noël à H. Brugmans, 02/1993. 

19. E. Noël a fait la connaissance d'A. Marc à Aix-en-Provence dans les milieux de la Résistance. Cela 

l'a-t-il amené, à l'époque, à entrer en contact avec la pensée fédéraliste dont A. Marc est l'un des 

principaux chantres? Les documents présents dans le fonds ne permettent pas une réponse certaine. 

20. Cette allusion à l’histoire européenne s’inspire des réflexions d’E. Noël, in: Chronique européenne 

des pays de la Loire, 08/1994. 

21. A. Marc trouvera toujours en E. Noël une oreille attentionnée notamment sur la question du 

financement du Centre international de formation européenne. 

22. Dans son intervention lors d'un colloque du Mouvement européen en 09/1990, E. Noël s'interroge: 

«Que pouvons-nous faire, nous, militants européens?». 

23. Hommage d'E. Noël à H. Brugmans, op.cit.

82 


Premières expériences dans les institutions européennes 

1. Conseil de l'Europe 

«J'ai rencontré pour la première fois Guy Mollet au début de 1949. Comme jeune 

universitaire […], j'avais déjà eu l'occasion de travailler pour la Cité Malesherbes 

(documentation, éléments pour des articles). J'étais alors engagé dans le Mouvement 

européen et Guy Mollet cherchait qu'un jeune camarade l'aide à suivre ce dossier 

auquel il attachait une très grande importance. […] Mes rapports ont été au début 

ceux d'un jeune collaborateur à l'égard d'un 'patron' leader d'un grand parti politique. 

Ils se sont ensuite approfondis dans le travail pour devenir des rapports d'amitié 

véritable et de confiance mutuelle». 24 

Cette rencontre est fondamentale dans le parcours intellectuel et professionnel 

d'Emile Noël. Européiste, mais aussi socialiste, il met sa plume et ses convictions 

au service du secrétaire général de la Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière 

(SFIO). Ce dernier, devenu rapporteur de la commission des Affaires générales de 

l’Assemblée consultative, le veut à ses côtés et le fait nommer secrétaire de ladite 

commission (1949). Le jeune homme ne débarque pas en terre inconnue. Il a déjà 

coopéré, en tant qu'externe, 25 aux travaux de la nouvelle institution dont la 

naissance doit beaucoup aux efforts du Mouvement européen. Avec son maître et 

nouveau camarade, c'est le début d'une longue collaboration et d'un rapport auquel 

il restera, encore une fois, fidèle. 

Tel est le portrait admiratif laissé par Emile Noël: 

«Je relève d’abord les qualités pédagogiques de Guy Mollet. […] Cela correspondait à sa 

formation de professeur, mais c’était aussi l’expression de son respect pour 

l’interlocuteur, camarade du parti comme adversaire. […] Je pense aussi à la simplicité et 

à l’humanité de Guy Mollet. […] Guy Mollet avait aussi une grande sensibilité, qu'il 

dissimulait sous une froideur apparente, mais qui était réelle et profonde. Elle se 

traduisait par la fidélité dans l'amitié […]. Enfin, Guy Mollet apparaît comme un militant 

exemplaire. Il garde le contact avec la ‘base’, même appelé aux plus hautes fonctions. 

[…] C’est un exemple pour tous ceux qui assument un engagement politique». 26 

On ne peut s'empêcher de noter les reflets de cette description dans les portraits 

d'Emile Noël: 

«Tout d’abord, une courtoisie d’une autre époque […]. Une réserve et parfois une 

pudeur, qui n’étaient pas de la timidité, et qui contrastaient avec sa forte 

personnalité. Contraste aussi entre la rigueur et la sévérité dont il pouvait faire 

preuve et la disponibilité à écouter tout un chacun […], entre la froideur cartésienne 

- et normalienne - et un humanisme profond». 27 

24. Lettre d'E. Noël à l'historien B. Vanneste, 13/05/1986. 

25. Cf. contribution de M. Noël-Bauer, op.cit. 

26. Intervention d'E. Noël, in: Bulletin de la fondation Guy Mollet, n°15, 11/1989. 

27. Tous les témoignages concordent. Ici sont rapportés les propos d'un collaborateur d'E. Noël au secrétariat 

général de la Commission, G. Ciavarini Azzi (in: Bulletin du Centre Guy Mollet, n°28, op.cit.).


Au Conseil de l’Europe, né d’un «compromis tiède» 28 entre unionistes et 

fédéralistes, Emile Noël débute donc sa carrière dans les institutions européennes. Son 

poste lui permet de nouer de nombreux contacts et d'affirmer ses capacités discrètes 

mais essentielles de grand commis: coordinateur, conseiller en coulisse, conciliateur, en 

un mot, pivot. Guy Mollet est animé par une forte vocation européenne que partage son 

assistant. 29 Marqué par Léon Blum, il a «transposé l’idéal internationaliste du Parti 

socialiste sur la construction européenne». De même qu'il défend les principes de la 

sécurité collective et de l’arbitrage international, c'est-à-dire la mise en place d'une 

«autorité supérieure à celle de chaque nation comme élément de régulation mondiale», 

il privilégie la formation d’une autorité politique européenne. 30 

Devenu secrétaire exécutif de la Commission, Emile Noël fournira les paroles à 

Guy Mollet pour exprimer cette position: 

«Les socialistes […] veulent une transformation profonde de la société qui conduise 

à la démocratie sociale et, finalement, à la démocratie socialiste par une libre 

adhésion des citoyens. Une telle révolution est-elle concevable isolément dans un de 

nos pays […]? [S]’ils restaient cantonnés dans le cadre étroit de leur nation, les 

socialistes risqueraient d’être limités à un réformisme prudent; ils pourraient 

améliorer les structures du monde capitaliste mais seraient condamnés à en rester les 

gestionnaires. Ainsi, le socialisme est-il international par essence. Aujourd’hui il 

trouve dans l’Europe unie des possibilités d’action au niveau de son idéal». 31 

Renforcer les liens avec les Britanniques, raffermir les structures, renoncer à la 

règle de l'unanimité …, Emile Noël est de tous les combats menés par Guy Mollet. Il 

dresse pourtant un bilan mitigé de son passage au Conseil de l'Europe. La première 

expérience de parlementarisme européen se trouve placée sous l’étouffante tutelle du 

Comité des ministres. Ce dernier entrave toute tentative de l'Assemblée consultative 

visant la création d’une autorité politique européenne aux compétences limitées mais 

réelles. Le Conseil de l'Europe s'avère ainsi un organisme «sans grand pouvoir». En 

permettant d'«accueillir, dans la famille européenne, l’Allemagne occidentale, dotée 

d'institutions démocratiques», il remplit sa mission la plus importante. 32 D’autre part, 

si l’engagement européen des socialistes du Benelux semble raffermi, les blocages 

scandinave et britannique sont drastiques. Les Travaillistes notamment accentuent 

leurs réserves: paradoxalement, le succès de Churchill dans le Conseil augmente leur 

28. Hommage d'E. Noël à H. Brugmans, op.cit. 

29. Lettre d'E. Noël à l'historien B. Vanneste, op.cit.: E. Noël parle d'un «accord fondamental avec Guy 

Mollet sur la nécessité de la construction de l'Europe et l'action à engager en la matière». 

30. Intervention d’E. Noël en 06/1989 à la table ronde sur 'Les socialistes et l'Europe', op.cit. Position, 

précise E. Noël, qui s’apparente aux thèses fédéralistes mais sans s’y rallier. Aux considérations 

politiques et tactiques s’ajoutent les motivations économiques. Cf. l'allocution de G. Mollet lors de 

l’inauguration de la place Léon Blum à Paris le 31/03/1957: «Dans l’état présent de l’évolution 

économique, aucun grand problème ne peut être résolu d’une façon satisfaisante dans le cadre des 

frontières, aucun peuple ne peut plus prospérer, ni même subsister, sans une solidarité vitale avec 

les autres. Il faut se grouper, se fédérer, s’unir - ou périr». (G. Mollet cite là une déclaration de L. 

Blum en date du 21/11/1947). 

31. Article transmis par E. Noël à G. Mollet en 1959 sous le titre L’Europe: faisons le point. 

32. Intervention d’E. Noël en 06/1989 à la table ronde sur 'Les socialistes et l'Europe', op.cit.

84 


défiance envers l’Europe! Là commence la «tragédie» 33 de Guy Mollet qui convoite 

l’appui du prestigieux Labour. 

Cette attention à la question britannique, sous une forme dédramatisée, se retrouvera 

clairement chez Emile Noël qui, depuis Bruxelles, écrira à Guy Mollet au sujet des 

candidatures d'adhésion du Royaume-Uni à la Communauté 34 et tentera de contenir les 

effets des manœuvres gaullistes. Face à ce qu'il ressentira comme des excès de zèle 

britanniques, une tactique dilatoire - refus déguisé - de la France et un attentisme des 

autres gouvernements, Emile Noël, le modérateur, recherchera «ce qui, dans la position 

française, peut être considéré comme raisonnable ou, à la rigueur, acceptable». Il 

préconisera de faire prévaloir les arguments concrets sur les déclarations d’intention, 

c’est-à-dire de ne pas politiser la chose, en faisant ressortir la réalité de l’engagement 

européen de la Grande-Bretagne sur les questions économiques et monétaires, 

scientifiques et technologiques. 35 

Quant au rôle d'éducateur à la démocratie parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe, Emile 

Noël continuera à en apprécier la portée. Suite aux bouleversements de l'Europe de l'Est à 

la fin des années 1980, alors que «la structure finale de la plus grande Europe reste à 

inventer» 36 , il se déclarera favorable aux «formules intermédiaires pour assurer la 

cohésion des années 90», 37 c'est-à-dire à la revalorisation de relais avec le noyau dur 

communautaire, tels la CSCE, l'OCDE et, plus encore, le Conseil de l’Europe. Le berceau 

de sa carrière aura fini par donner, à ses yeux, sa pleine mesure dans le seul domaine qui 

lui a été concédé, en apportant la première pierre à la 'maison commune'. En outre, 

l’adhésion à la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme est le «passage obligé» 

pour sceller la reconnaissance du retour d’un pays à la démocratie. 38 

2. Assemblée ad hoc 

Tandis qu'Emile Noël œuvre aux côtés de Guy Mollet au Conseil de l'Europe, une 

initiative française partie du Commissariat général du plan et relayée par le gouvernement 

donne lieu au lancement de l'Europe communautaire; c'est vers elle 

qu'Emile Noël va bientôt bifurquer. Comme lui-même le rappelle, «la France sait 

qu’elle ne peut opposer un simple refus» à la pression des Etats-Unis, de la 

Grande-Bretagne et du Benelux en faveur de la libéralisation de la production 

d’acier germanique ainsi que de la restitution du contrôle sur l’extraction 

charbonnière passée entre ses mains. Dépassant le marchandage de la diplomatie 

traditionnelle, elle insuffle ingénieusement un nouvel état d’esprit entre les peuples 

réunis en une «zone d’amitié à l’ouest de l’Europe». Dès 1950, elle formule la 

Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier: le mérite de Robert Schuman et 

33. Ibid. 

34. Note d'E. Noël à G. Mollet, 1967. 

35. Voir aussi lettre d'E. Noël au professeur J. Mitchell, 08/11/1967. 

36. Conférence d’E. Noël à Gorizia, 04/1990. 

37. Contribution d'E. Noël intitulée Quelques réflexions sur la nouvelle architecture de l’Europe, in: 

Liber amicorum dédié à H. von Verschuer, 07/1991. 

38. Conférence d'E. Noël à Gorizia, op.cit.


de Jean Monnet est d'avoir proposé «une réponse politique à un problème qui était 

essentiellement politique». 39 

Elle ouvre de surcroît une «vaste perspective d’avenir, celle d’une Fédération 

européenne». 40 «Le tournant de l’histoire était pris. Paix et démocratie, c’étaient 

donc les deux ‘bonnes fées’ qui présidaient à la naissance de la Communauté 

européenne». 41 La réticence initiale de Guy Mollet à l’égard de l’initiative, boudée 

par la Grande-Bretagne, tombe avec l’assurance qu’il s’agit d’un projet ouvert. Et 

au fond, «c’est la mise en œuvre des idées mêmes de Léon Blum et de Guy 

Mollet». Ainsi le socialiste Emile Noël considère avec faveur le projet. 

Dès octobre 1950, Jean Monnet est amené à esquisser en hâte un projet de 

Communauté européenne de défense (CED) sur le modèle sectoriel de la CECA 

pour parer à tout réarmement incontrôlé outre-Rhin (octobre 1950). La question est 

d'autant plus importante que la guerre de Corée et la tension croissante Est/Ouest 

sont en toile de fond. Emile Noël prête assurément une attention particulière à 

l'entreprise car les socialistes sont sensibles aux problèmes de la sécurité 

internationale. D'autre part, «intégrer les armées, c'était, dans l'esprit sinon dans les 

faits, s'engager définitivement dans un système fédéral ou quasi-fédéral». 42 

Cependant, à la clarté politique et institutionnelle de la CECA, succèdent de 

«difficiles marchandages» sur les structures militaires, les questions économiques 

et les rapports inter-institutionnels. 

En septembre 1952, sur la base de l’article 38 du traité, les Six chargent une 

Assemblée ad hoc d’élaborer un projet de Communauté politique européenne 

(CPE). Une commission constitutionnelle est mise en place. Emile Noël est nommé 

directeur de son secrétariat après avoir obtenu un détachement du Conseil de 

l'Europe. C'est son premier contact direct avec la sphère communautaire. «J’ai eu 

en particulier à coordonner la mise en forme du projet de traité de Communauté 

politique avec le concours d’un groupe européen de juristes». 43 

L’absence des sociaux-démocrates allemands, hostiles aux projets de CED et de 

CPE, ainsi que le retrait des socialistes français constituent les vraies déceptions. 

Guy Mollet craint que le trop ambitieux projet de CPE ne complique l’acceptation 

de la CED en général et le rapprochement avec la Grande-Bretagne plus 

particulièrement; souci fondé car l’un des motifs d’échec de la CED sera 

finalement la réticence britannique à l’égard du projet «qu’ils soutenaient 

officiellement, mais vraiment comme la corde soutient le pendu». 44 Un projet de 

traité est approuvé par l’Assemblée ad hoc à une écrasante majorité (mars 1953). 

39. Toutes les citations depuis le début du paragraphe sont tirées de l'interview accordée par E. Noël 

au professeur Guidi, 21/09/1989. Le texte original est en italien. 

40. Conférence d’E. Noël à Madrid, 04/11/1987. 

41. Conférence d’E. Noël à Londres, 20/06/1988. 

42. Conférence d'E. Noël à Rome, 09/05/1989. 

43. Curriculum vitae adressé à la Ritsumeikan University (14/07/1989). 

44. Intervention d’E. Noël en 06/1989 à la table ronde sur 'Les socialistes et l'Europe', op. cit. En avril 1954, la 

France obtient la signature d'une convention de coopération entre la Grande-Bretagne et la CED.

86 


Emile Noël, un temps malade, écrit au président du groupe de travail de la 

Commission constitutionnelle: 

«Brand [le secrétaire intérimaire de la Commission] me tient au courant des 

machines de guerre que vous montez contre les forteresses nationales. J'espère être 

de retour pour leur écroulement». 45 

De fait, «jamais une union politique n'a paru plus proche et plus nécessaire. [Mais] la 

déception devait être à la mesure de ces espoirs»: 46 la ligne politique du gouvernement 

français se modifie avec la passation des pouvoirs, au Quai d'Orsay, entre Robert 

Schuman et Georges Bidault. Cette dernière se traduit par un «raidissement» 47 de la 

situation. Le rejet du projet de traité de CED par l’Assemblée nationale française ouvre la 

première grande crise européenne (août 1954). Elle provoque également la division des 

socialistes qui, contrairement à Guy Mollet, avaient été jusque là exempts de 

l’engouement européen et se sont finalement déchirés sur le vote: 

«Guy Mollet était sans doute plus réticent que moi au début des années 50 sur 

l'opportunité d'accélérer la construction européenne au-delà de la CECA et de la CED. 

Le vote négatif de l'Assemblée nationale en août 1954 devait montrer que sa prudence 

correspondait à une bonne appréciation de la situation intérieure de l'époque». 48 

Emile Noël retourne au secrétariat général du Conseil de l’Europe où il devient chef 

de cabinet de Guy Mollet, alors président de l’Assemblée consultative. C’est à cette 

époque que se resserrent les rapports, ébauchés autour de l’affaire CED, entre ce dernier 

et Jean Monnet de retour à la vie politique française et au militantisme européen. Un 

«lien personnel» 49 et un «incontestable rapport de confiance» se nouent car 

«Mollet avait de l’estime pour Monnet. Je crois que c’était réciproque […], 1) parce 

qu’il le jugeait désintéressé, ne cherchant aucun avantage personnel pour lui-même, 2) 

parce qu’il le jugeait fiable, constant dans ses opinions et 3) parce qu’il le jugeait clair 

et précis. […] Guy Mollet n’aimait pas les prestidigitateurs. C’est peut-être parce qu’il 

était un homme d’appareil, un homme assez rigide, un homme de principes». 50 

La SFIO adhère naturellement au Comité d’action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe fondé 

par Jean Monnet pour coordonner les forces politiques européennes au lendemain de la 

défaite et redéfinir une stratégie qui règle la question allemande dans un cadre 

démocratique et laisse ouverte la porte au dialogue avec la Grande-Bretagne. En poste à la 

Commission, Emile Noël ne rompra jamais le contact avec les membres dudit Comité qui 

«a littéralement piloté la construction politique de l’Europe pendant une quinzaine 

d’années». 51 Il entretiendra des contacts notamment avec Jacques van Helmont jusqu'à la 

fin des années 1980 abordant les thèmes les plus variés, tels la politique agricole 

45. Lettre d'E. Noël à F. Dehousse, 03/1953. Ce document se trouve dans le fonds Fernand Dehousse 

conservé aux AHCE. 

46. Conférence d'E. Noël à Madrid, op.cit. 

47. Intervention d’E. Noël en 06/1989 à la table ronde sur 'Les socialistes et l'Europe', op. cit. 

48. Lettre d'E. Noël à l'historien B. Vanneste, op.cit. 

49. Ibid. 

50. Interview d'E. Noël par le professeur Duchêne, 10/1988. 

51. Cf. article d’E. Noël dans le journal Il Messagero, 01/1993.


commune, l'élargissement à la Grande-Bretagne, les relations transatlantiques, le conseil 

européen de Fontainebleau. 

Les consultations sur l’Europe sont rapidement relancées sur la base 

économique et aboutissent à la conférence de Messine (juin 1955). La SFIO ne fait 

pas partie du gouvernement. Elle campe dans le «soutien-opposition», ses voix 

étant indispensables pour la survie du gouvernement d’Edgard Faure. Emile Noël 

ne se souvient pas qu'elle ait été «extraordinairement sensible» à la conférence. 

Cette dernière est d'ailleurs passée «largement inaperçue» dans l’opinion publique: 

«Le communiqué […] était de la bouillie pour les chats. Il fallait vraiment regarder 

de très près pour le décrypter». 52 

Dans le gouvernement Mollet 

1. Les socialistes à la barre 

En février 1956, Guy Mollet devient président du Conseil avec l’avènement du 

Front républicain. 53 Il s’applique à réconcilier le Parti socialiste et tient peu compte 

des affaires européennes dans la formation gouvernementale; la seule exception 

notable est le refus du portefeuille des Affaires étrangères à Pierre Mendès-France, 

chef de file des anti-cédistes. Emile Noël fait partie de la petite équipe constituée 

par Guy Mollet. Il est nommé successivement chef, puis directeur adjoint du cabinet. 

Il s'inspirera d'ailleurs de l'expérience acquise dans ces fonctions, qui comportent 

de fréquents contacts avec le Cabinet Office britannique, pour remodeler le 

secrétariat exécutif de la Commission européenne à son arrivée. Dans une administration 

communautaire déjà structurée par le président Walter Hallstein selon le 

système hiérarchisé de l’Auswärtiges Amt, Emile Noël sera le promoteur d'un 

secrétariat exécutif assumant les trois fonctions d'«assurer la bonne marche du Collège 

[…]; participer à la coordination des services […]; assurer les relations entre 

la Commission et les autres institutions». 54 

A Matignon, Emile Noël voit son rôle d'éminence grise se renforcer. 55 Il suit 

plus particulièrement le dossier européen sur lequel lui, comme le gouvernement, 

sont bien décidés à agir. «Cet engagement avait été formulé avec beaucoup de 

vigueur, dès la déclaration d'investiture avant même la constitution du 

gouvernement, le 31 janvier 1956». 56 Or c'est précisément Emile Noël qui a rédigé 

le texte. 57 La construction européenne connaît d'ailleurs un moment crucial 

52. Cette citation et la précédente sont tirées de l’interview accordée au professeur Duchêne, op.cit. 

53. Pour sa succession à la tête de l'Assemblée consultative, G. Mollet avec E. Noël prépare, puis 

appuie la candidature du socialiste belge F. Dehousse, ancien président du groupe de travail de la 

Commission constitutionnelle. 

54. Cf. article rédigé par E. Noël dans le Courrier du personnel de la Commission des CE, 03/1990; 

interview accordée par E. Noël au Courrier du personnel …, n°488, 09/1987; interview accordée par E. 

Noël au professeur Morgan et publiée au Jahrbuch für Europäische Verwaltungsgeschichte, 1992. 

55. On trouve quelques traces de ce rôle in: D. LEFEBVRE, Guy Mollet, le mal aimé, Plon, Paris, 1992. 

56. Témoignage d'E. Noël in: FONDATION GUY MOLLET, Témoignages et débats sur Guy Mollet, Paris, 1986.

88 


puisqu'ont lieu les travaux du comité Spaak à Bruxelles, travaux suivis, à partir de 

juin, par les négociations des Six à Val Duchesse. Il échoit au nouveau 

gouvernement la tâche de conforter la position française après, de l'avis d'Emile 

Noël, l'attentisme démontré par ses prédécesseurs. 58 L'échec de la CED 

«avait aussi jeté, chez nos partenaires […], de grands doutes sur la volonté véritable de la 

majorité du Parlement français dans le domaine européen. Il fallait donc, à la fois, 

reprendre en main l'opinion, relancer les administrations sur une ligne définie, convaincre 

les partenaires de la France de la réalité des intentions du gouvernement». 59 

C’est à cette époque que Jean Monnet parvient à «recentrer» 60 Guy Mollet, 

tenant obstiné de l’Internationale et porteur invétéré de «l’illusion» 61 d’un 

retournement travailliste. La responsabilité de la Grande-Bretagne dans le rejet de 

la CED puis son engagement dans les accords de Londres comme le succès de la 

CECA lui font «ouvrir les yeux». 62 Il se range à l’avis «qu’il est préférable de 

commencer et que la Grande-Bretagne suivra». 63 La collaboration s’intensifie entre 

Jean Monnet et Emile Noël qui devient «l’agent de liaison» entre Matignon et la 

rue Foch, siège du Comité d'action pour les Etats Unis d'Europe:«Des liens de 

travail et des rapports personnels de plus en plus suivis s’établissent avec M. Jean 

Monnet et seront maintenus jusqu’aux derniers moments de celui-ci». 64 «Il 

s’agissait le plus souvent de déjeuners de travail (frugaux) à son bureau de l’avenue 

Foch». 65 Emile Noël a laissé le portrait de son interlocuteur: 

«Jean Monnet alliait de très fermes convictions à une approche pragmatique des 

affaires. Appréhender la réalité des faits, sans aucune complaisance, était pour lui la 

base de toute action […]. Il n’y avait rien de dogmatique en lui, mais bien la 

combinaison de réalisme, de la lucidité et de la volonté. […] Ce sont plutôt quelques 

principes ou règles qui l’ont guidé». 66 

Selon l'appréciation de Jean Monnet, «l’équipe française était constituée avec 

un exceptionnel bonheur [sur le front européen]: Marjolin auprès de Pineau, Vedel 

et Jean François-Poncet auprès de Maurice Faure, et, directement auprès de Guy 

Mollet, un jeune normalien de grande valeur […]: Emile Noël fut à Matignon un 

intermédiaire précieux»; et «ne pas laisser un instant de répit à Mollet et à 

Adenauer, harceler leurs ministres […], faire appel à l’influence de Noël, d’Etzel et 

de bien d’autres, fut ma préoccupation constante». 67 

57. Cf. interview d'E. Noël par le professeur Duchêne, op.cit. 

58. E. Noël réfute à cet égard le témoignage de l’ancien président du Conseil, E. Faure, lors du colloque 

tenu à Rome en 03/1987 à l’occasion du trentième anniversaire des traités de Rome. 

59. Témoignage d'E. Noël in: Témoignages et débats sur Guy Mollet, op.cit. 

60. Interview d'E. Noël par le professeur Duchêne, op.cit. 


62. Interview d'E. Noël par le professeur Duchêne, op.cit. 


64. Notice biographique rédigée par E. Noël, 07/1991. 

65. Article d’E. Noël pour l’association des Amis de Jean Monnet, 09/1988. E. Roussel situe E. Noël dans le 

troisième cercle des proches de J. Monnet: cf.E. ROUSSEL, Jean Monnet: 1988-1975, Paris, Fayard, 1996. 

66. Intervention d’E. Noël à Bruxelles, 10/1988. 

67. Cf. les Mémoires de Jean Monnet, Fayard, Paris, 1976, pp.617 et 625.


2. Sur le front des négociations 

«Le gouvernement, disait Guy Mollet, est décidé à faire aboutir le marché commun 

général dans des conditions qui assurent les transitions et les adaptations 

nécessaires. Le gouvernement entend obtenir avant l'été (c'était optimiste) la conclusion 

d'un traité instituant l'Euratom. Et il appelait l'Assemblée à ne plus faire de 

l'idée européenne un sujet de mésentente mais, au contraire, un trait d'union. 

Réaliser un tel objectif était difficile au début de 1956». 68 Aux prises avec la dialectique 

Euratom/Marché commun, Guy Mollet est partisan d’un 'Euratom avant tout', 

moins épineux sous l’angle politique et moins risqué sous l’angle économique. Il 

s'inspire essentiellement de son dialogue avec Jean Monnet -toujours soucieux du 

soutien américain «dans des conditions d’égalité et de non-subordination». 69 Emile 

Noël rappelle l'idée suivant laquelle 

«dans ce domaine quasi vierge, une opération authentiquement européenne pouvait 

être engagée et, comme la France y avait pris une large avance sur ses partenaires 

européens, il semblait plus facile d’exorciser, par un succès de ce futur traité, le 

fantôme de la Communauté de défense, qui continuait de hanter les couloirs de la 

politique française». 70 

La déclaration d’investiture, rédigée par Emile Noël, reflète cette situation: «La 

fiche Marché commun et Euratom a été directement ‘pompée’ des papiers du 

Comité d’action». Mais elle est prudemment formulée, puisque «non négative» 71 

sur l'option économique. 

A Val Duchesse, les rôles principaux du côté français sont tenus par Maurice 

Faure et Robert Marjolin. L'influence d'Emile Noël est décisive dans le choix du 

secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères comme chef de la délégation française par 

Guy Mollet: il le pousse, au lieu de reconduire le sortant ou de désigner un haut 

fonctionnaire, à choisir un homme d’obédience qui symbolise en même temps 

l'engagement politique de la France. Au cours des négociations, Emile Noël 

constitue un véritable «nœud de communication» 72 entre Matignon, la rue Foch et 

Bruxelles. Au commencement des travaux (juin 1956), l’équipe française est 

encore sur ses gardes. Animée par la prudence, elle désire éviter une remouture de 

la superbe Haute Autorité. Par la voix d’Emile Noël, elle imprime aux tractations 

un pli fonctionnaliste, plus modeste mais plus sûr, aligné sur les objectifs 

économiques davantage que sur les questions institutionnelles reléguées en 

conclusion des négociations (contrairement au déroulement des discussions sur la 

CECA). Eclaircie et éclaircissement politiques n’interviennent qu’en juillet avec le 

vote de l’Assemblée nationale sur le traité Euratom qui lève le préalable politique 

sur la relance européenne en se prononçant massivement en sa faveur. 

68. Témoignage d'E. Noël, in: Témoignages et débats sur Guy Mollet, op.cit. 

69. Article d'E. Noël pour l’association des Amis de Jean Monnet, op.cit. 

70. Ibid. 

71. Cette citation et la précédente sont tirées de l’interview d'E. Noël par le professeur Duchêne, op.cit. 

72. Formule utilisée par le professeur Duchêne.

90 


Emile Noël contribue à faire aboutir l'effort particulier déployé par la France sur 

trois sujets-clés: l’agriculture, les institutions et les territoires d’outre-mer. Il retracera le 

rôle fondamental de son pays dans l'engagement des Six à réaliser un marché commun 

agricole: ce qui revient à «dégager un accord commun sur la procédure par laquelle ce 

marché commun serait réalisé, c'est-à-dire en donnant une délégation de pouvoirs aux 

futures institutions de la Communauté économique […] pour [le] réaliser par des 

décisions majoritaires». «L'attachement de la délégation française dans toute la 

négociation à faire prévaloir les décisions majoritaires dans le système institutionnel du 

traité» est d'ailleurs notable. Pour Guy Mollet comme pour ses collaborateurs sur le 

plan européen, le veto équivaut à l'immobilisme. 73 

Il importe en outre d’établir des rapports organiques entre la future Communauté 

et les Pays d’outre-Mer qui dépendent encore de la France: «Guy Mollet était 

pleinement conscient que le régime d’autonomie interne qu’avait introduit la ‘loi 

cadre’ préparée par son gouvernement devait conduire à plus ou moins court terme à 

l’indépendance de ces pays. Il était convaincu de la valeur politique qu’un lien solide 

avec l’Europe aurait pour leur évolution future». 74 L’établissement de ce lien devait 

être facilité par le fait qu’il n’était plus bilatéral ni colonial. En février 1957, Guy 

Mollet organise à Paris la réunion décisive entre Etats membres de la Communauté 

qui permet d'aboutir à un compromis sur la création d'un fonds européen d'aide aux 

pays africains et malgache (précurseur du fonds européen de développement). 75 

Emile Noël écrira encore sur ce sujet pour Guy Mollet lorsqu'il sera à Bruxelles: 

«Tout rapprochement librement consenti entre un Etat africain et l’Europe signifie le 

renforcement des liens avec la France en même temps que la consolidation du 

monde libre. En leur ouvrant les perspectives de l’Eurafrique, la France réalise 

pleinement les engagements de libération politique et […] économique qu’elle a pris 

à l’égard de ses anciens territoires d’outre-mer». 76 

A tous égards, Emile Noël joue un rôle indéniable. Dans ses Mémoires, son ami 

Robert Marjolin résume ce rôle de manière éloquente: 

«Un homme joua un rôle très important dans le combat que se livrèrent pendant cet 

été de 1956 les partisans et les adversaires du Marché commun, je veux parler 

d’Emile Noël, qui était alors chef de cabinet de Guy Mollet et en était écouté. 

Européen de la première heure, ardent dans ses convictions malgré un extérieur 

amène et tolérant, d’un esprit lucide et pénétrant, il contribua, d’une façon décisive, à 

faire prendre par le Président du Conseil les décisions qui permirent aux 

négociateurs de Bruxelles de poursuivre efficacement leur tâche». 77 

Les traités de Rome sont finalement entérinés. L'attribution à Alain Savary, jadis 

farouche opposant à la CED, des fonctions de rapporteur du traité de la Communauté 

économique européenne à l'Assemblée nationale symbolise la réconciliation 

73. Témoignages et débats sur Guy Mollet, op.cit. 

74. Article d'E. Noël pour le journal El País, 28/03/1987. 

75. Témoignages et débats sur Guy Mollet, op.cit. 

76. Note d’E. Noël à G. Mollet intitulée “Politique européenne”, 15/04/1959. 

77. R. MARJOLIN, Le Travail d’une vie. Mémoires 1911-1986, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1986, 

pp.294-295.


socialiste. 78 Quant à l’esprit qui anime les traités, il «sauvegarde l’essentiel» y compris 

sous l'angle du futur développement de l’unité politique; même s'«il est vrai que, dans 

la version finale, il n’est plus fait mention du terme ‘fédération’ qui avait été prévu dans 

la déclaration Schuman de 1950». 79 Le «profil bas» et prudent des institutions 

n'empêche pas de ménager des possibilités. Une «modeste Commission est substituée à 

la fière Haute Autorité» mais ses membres - nommés par commun accord des 

gouvernements - sont indépendants. Dans cette «grisaille» 80 de façade, les négociateurs 

ont donc sauvegardé les acquis. La mise en place d’un processus législatif 

communautaire est également fondamental (on retrouve l’idée de base du projet de 

CPE). Ces mesures consentent potentiellement de «pouss[er] l’ensemble des 

institutions communautaires dans la direction d’une effective souveraineté». 81 

Dès l'heure, Guy Mollet a la conviction qu'il y a «une chance historique à saisir» et 

qu'une fois posés les fondements économiques de l’Europe, une «communauté 

politique véritable pourra être établie». 82 Emile Noël la partage. A Bruxelles, il ne se 

contentera pas de figurer dans le bataillon de tête qui opèrera pour conforter la 

Commission dans son rôle de gardienne des traités. Favorable à la mission Tindemans 

de 1975 mais dubitatif sur ses chances d'aboutir, il mènera pour sa part une action 

hardie avec le commissaire Altiero Spinelli. Il présidera en effet le groupe de réflexion 

interne de la Commission sur l'Union européenne dont le rapporteur sera un proche du 

«prophète» 83 fédéraliste. Le document final, «très engag[é]», 84 proposera la mise en 

place d’un gouvernement européen, l’octroi du pouvoir législatif au Parlement 

européen, l’extension à terme du domaine communautaire à la politique extérieure et à 

la sécurité. Emile Noël se rappelle qu'Altiero Spinelli lui «avait envoyé un petit mot 

pendant les discussions (difficiles) avec ses collègues: ‘Il arrive que les fonctionnaires 

soient plus audacieux que les commissaires’». 85 

Conclusion 

En juin 1957, le gouvernement Mollet tombe. Retourné au Conseil de l'Europe, Emile 

Noël confirme sa stature européenne. A l'automne, il rédige notamment le document de 

travail destiné à guider les réflexions de la table ronde des sages de l'Europe organisée 

par le président de l'Assemblée consultative. A la veille de l'entrée en vigueur des traités 

de Rome, l'objectif est de préparer la mise en place des institutions nouvelles, de rationaliser 

le travail des différentes Communautés, notamment au niveau des assemblées 

européennes, et d'assurer la liaison entre Europe des Six, Conseil de l'Europe, Organisation 

européenne de coopération économique et Union européenne occidentale. A long 

78. Interview d'E. Noël par le professeur Duchêne. 

79. Interview d'E. Noël par le professeur Guidi, op.cit. 

80. Cette citation et les deux précédentes sont tirées de la conférence d'E. Noël à Madrid, op.cit. 

81. Interview d'E. Noël par le professeur Guidi, op.cit. 

82. Déclaration de G. Mollet au journal Demain, 27/03/1956. 

83. Hommage d’E. Noël à A. Spinelli à Modène, 09/09/1988. 

84. Conférence à Madrid, op.cit. 

85. Pour cette citation et la précédente, cf. l'hommage rendu à A. Spinelli par E. Noël à Modène, op.cit.

92 


terme, le document préconise la mise en œuvre du suffrage universel de l'Assemblée 

des Communautés, prévu par les traités («une telle élection aurait une portée politique 

qui dépasserait de loin la compétence principalement économique de l'Assemblée commune»). 

Il recommande également «une coordination plus effective des politiques 

étrangères par un système de consultations périodiques» et le développement d'une 

organisation syndicale européenne. 86 

Peu après l'installation de la Commission des Communautés européennes à 

Bruxelles, Robert Marjolin obtient la nomination d'Emile Noël comme secrétaire 

exécutif de ladite Commission en avril 1958. 87 Emile Noël sait les difficultés qui 

l'attendent et sa responsabilité car «le Marché commun sera ce que nous le ferons». 88 

Avec ce poste-clé se profile pour lui la possibilité de mettre en pratique ses idéaux et 

ceux de ses maîtres afin d’«accroître les chances de la paix mondiale» 89 par la 

construction d’une communauté librement consentie 90 et incarnant la «solidarité des 

peuples libres». 91 Fédéraliste dans l'âme, socialiste de cœur, il cherchera à faire 

progresser efficacement l'Europe, celant un authentique engagement sous une 

apparente modération. Il lui arrivera cependant de faire partager à ses camarades - pour 

mieux nourrir leurs revendications -, à la fin des années soixante, «le regret […] que 

[…] si peu de progrès aient été jusqu’ici réalisés dans le sens d’une Europe 

socialiste»; 92 tout en se réjouissant que «malgré les à-coups […], la Communauté 

‘tien[ne] le coup’ et continue même à appliquer avec quelque succès la méthode des 

‘petits pas’. […] Cela aide […] à garder un peu d’optimisme». 93 Sa patience, car «nous 

avons appris la patience depuis que cette aventure a commencé», 94 le portera au faîte de 

son action au travers de sa contribution fondamentale à l'Acte unique européen: 

c'est-à-dire au premier changement qualitatif de la Communauté avec l'introduction de 

la dimension sociale. 

Emile Noël, idéaliste pragmatique, démontrera d'avoir fait sien le mot de Jean 

Jaurès, érigé en devise par Henri Brugmans: «Aller à l'idéal et comprendre le réel». 

86. Table ronde des Sages de l'Europe (Paris, 4, 5 et 6 octobre 1957). Thèmes possibles des 

discussions. Document imprimé consultable dans le fonds Dehousse, op.cit. 

87. R. MARJOLIN, Le Travail d’une vie …, op.cit., p.295. 

88. Discours de G. Mollet lors du débat à l’Assemblée nationale sur le Marché commun, 22/01/1957. 

89. Note d’E. Noël à G. Mollet intitulée «Politique européenne», 15/04/1959. 

90. Cette liberté est fondamentale pour les socialistes évoluant dans le sillage de J. Jaurès selon lequel 

l’organisation de la collectivité humaine ne doit pas relever de la contrainte. L’axiome du consentement 

caractérisait déjà les théories communautaires de l’entre-deux-guerres (au contraire de l’embrigadement 

forcé pratiqué par les régimes autoritaires). Il évoque l’accueil des chrétiens librement convertis comme, 

sur le versant laïque et démocratique, certains aspects du ‘contrat’ rousseauiste. 

91. Projet d’interview de G. Mollet par le journal Démocratie 60 préparé par E. Noël, 04/11/1960. 

92. Projet de discours rédigé par E. Noël à l’intention de G. Mollet en vue de la manifestation du 

Bureau de liaison des partis socialistes pour le 10 e anniversaire des traités de Rome le 23/03/1967. 

93. Lettre d’E. Noël au professeur Mitchell, 15/04/1969. 

94. Lettre d’E. Noël au professeur Mitchell, 22/05/1968.

93 

Das Post- und Fernmeldewesen im europäischen 

Integrationsprozess der 1950/60er Jahre 

Christian Franke 

1. Einleitung 1 

„Und gewiß werden Sie jetzt verstehen, wie sehr das Post- und Fernmeldewesen 

unmittelbar verknüpft ist mit der Wirtschaft, mit den Konjunkturen, den Krisen, den 

ökonomischen Bedürfnissen der einzelnen Länder und Erdteile, mit den strukturellen 

wirtschaftlichen Wandlungen und mittelbar mit der Entwicklung der verschiedenen 

Verkehrstechniken“. 2 

Mit diesen Worten fasste Bundespostminister Hans Schuberth auf einer Konferenz 

anlässlich der Vereinigung der drei ehemaligen Länderposten in der französischen 

Besatzungszone mit der Deutschen Bundespost am 24. Juni 1950 in Konstanz seine 

Ausführungen über die zentrale Bedeutung des Post- und Fernmeldewesens 

(PTT-Wesen) 3 für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, insbesondere Europas, 

zusammen. Der Versuch, eine organisierte europäische Zusammenarbeit im 

speziellen Bereich des PTT-Wesens zu etablieren, musste sich demzufolge aus der 

wirtschaftlichen Integration Europas ergeben. 

Im Folgenden soll den Fragen nachgegangen werden, welche Integrationsmaßnahmen 

in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren im PTT-Wesen diskutiert wurden, welche 

Ziele die an den Diskussionen beteiligten Akteure verfolgten, mit welchen Strategien 

sie versuchten ihre Ziele durchzusetzen und welche konkreten Integrationsmaßnahmen 

umgesetzt wurden. Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen werden die inhaltlichen Ziele und 

organisatorischen Leitbilder der Akteure in den Blick genommen. 

Integration wird dabei verstanden als die formelle Institutionalisierung von Entscheidungsprozessen 

auf europäischer Ebene in einem bestimmten Politikbereich. 

Sie soll die Ausbildung sämtlicher europäischer Organe umfassen und sich nicht auf 

die intergouvernementale Institutionalisierung der Entscheidungsfindung beschränken. 

An den Diskussionen und Entscheidungen über Integrationsmaßnahmen 

beteiligten sich ausschließlich vier Akteursgruppen, von denen die ersten drei aus der 

Perspektive innerstaatlicher Verhandlungsprozesse eine Einheit bilden: Nationale 

Regierungen, nationale PTT-Ministerien, nationale (Monopol-) PTT-Verwaltungen 

1. Ein Dank gilt Gerold Ambrosius, Sibylle Hambloch, Friedrich Küppersbusch und Cornelius 

Neutsch für kritische Anmerkungen und Kommentare. 

2. Vgl.: o.V., Rede des Bundesministers für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen auf der Präsidentenkonferenz 

in Konstanz am 24. Juni 1950, in: Archiv für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen [APF], 

1950, S.773-790. 

3. Im Folgenden wird für „Post- und Fernmelde”-Wesen die international gebräuchlich Abkürzung 

„PTT”-Wesen (Post, Telegraph, Telephone) verwendet.

94 


sowie die Organe und Gremien von EGKS/EWG und Europarat. Unter inhaltlichen 

Zielen werden die konkreten Aufgabenbereiche und angestrebten Kooperationsziele 

zusammengefasst, die in die gemeinsame Entscheidungsfindung überführt werden 

sollen. Sie lassen sich in zwei Gruppen unterteilen: 

1) Wirtschaftliche Ziele: Als wirtschaftliche Ziele werden solche erfasst, die 

technische und tarifäre Handelshemmnisse im Bereich des europäischen 

Binnenmarktes abbauen und auf diese Weise direkte wie indirekte Behinderungen 

des Warenverkehrs minimieren. Hierzu zählten Aufgaben wie die Einführung 

einheitlicher Gewichtsklassen bei Briefen und Paketen sowie einheitliche Postoder 

Telefongebühren. Derartige Gebühren beeinflussten maßgeblich die Kosten 

des innereuropäischen Warenverkehrs und konnten Standortvorteile erzeugen. 

Effiziente, kostengünstige und grenzüberschreitende Telekommunikationsnetze 

sind zudem die Voraussetzung, um Informationen auszutauschen und damit 

separate Märkte in einem gemeinsamen Markt zu verschmelzen. Das PTT-Wesen 

wird von Akteuren, die wirtschaftliche Ziele verfolgen, in der Regel als ein Mittel 

auf dem Weg zur wirtschaftlichen Einigung Europas angesehen. 

2) Verwaltungstechnische Ziele: Verwaltungstechnische Ziele lassen sich unter dem 

Dach der Effektivisierung der innereuropäischen Kooperation nationaler Verwaltungen 

subsumieren. Hierzu zählten Aufgaben wie die Verbesserung des grenzüberschreitenden 

Posttransports, die Errichtung europäischer Telekommunikationsnetze, 

die Koordinierung der Nutzung von Funkfrequenz oder ein koordiniertes Auftreten bei 

globalen Fragen des PTT-Wesens. Als zentrale Maßnahme zur Erreichung dieser Ziele 

galt die Angleichung der verwaltungsinternen Strukturen. Die Integration im 

PTT-Wesen wird als ein eigenständiges Ziel bewertet. 

Unter organisatorischen Leitbildern sind (Ideal-)Typen des organisatorischen 

Rahmens zu verstehen. Mit ihnen hoffen die Akteure, die angestrebten inhaltlichen 

Ziele am effektivsten umzusetzen. Für das PTT-Wesen lassen sich drei Integrationsleitbilder 

ausmachen. Erstens. „Institutionell-gouvernementale“ Integration: 

Die Entscheidungsfindung soll im Rahmen einer intergouvernementalen 

Zusammenarbeit erfolgen, einen klar definierten organisatorischen Rahmen 

besitzen und bindende Beschlüsse europäischer Gremien beinhalten. Hinter diesem 

Leitbild steckte die politische Idee, das PTT-Wesen in ein Geflecht europäischer 

Institutionen einzubinden. Zweitens. „Funktionell-administrative“ Integration: Die 

Entscheidungsfindung soll durch kooperierende Verwaltungseinheiten erfolgen, 

unabhängig von politischen Richtlinien erfolgen und nur so weit in einen größeren 

organisatorischen Rahmen eingebunden sein, wie die praktische Zusammenarbeit 

der Verwaltungen dadurch nicht behindert wird. Drittens. „Institutionell-ministerielle“ 

Integration: Die Entscheidungsfindung wird auf intergouvernementaler Ebene 

angestrebt, allerdings insofern eingeschränkt, dass die PTT-Ministerien bindende 

Beschlüsse in den europäischen Gremien fällen dürfen, ohne ihre Regierungen 

oder andere Ministerien konsultieren zu müssen. Hinter diesem Leitbild verbarg 

sich das politische Interesse, die Vorteile der Einbindung in ein europäisches 

Organisationsgeflecht mit denen der weitgehend unabhängigen, funktionellen verwaltungstechnischen 

Zusammenarbeit zu verbinden.

Das Post- und Fernmeldewesen im europäischen Integrationsprozess 95 

2. Rahmenbedingungen der Integration 

Mit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs kam es zu einer grundsätzlichen Neuordnung 

der globalen PTT-Zusammenarbeit. Die beiden bis dato existierenden 

Weltorganisationen „Union Internationale des Télécommunications“ (Fernmeldeunion) 

und „Union Postale Universelle“ (Weltpostverein), deren Aufgaben in der Koordination 

der grenzüberschreitenden Nachrichtenübermittlung lagen, formierten sich als 

Sonderorganisationen der UNO. Sie brachen dabei ihre eurozentristische Struktur auf, 

die sich vorher in einem Stimmenungleichgewicht zu Gunsten Europas manifestiert 

hatte und nun abgeschafft wurde. Die internationale PTT-Zusammenarbeit konnte nicht 

mehr derart beeinflusst werden, dass europäische Interessen Vorrang genossen, wie 

beispielsweise die Zuteilung der günstigsten Frequenzen an die Staaten Europas oder 

die Erhebung europäischer Telekommunikationstechnik zu globalen Standards. Als 

Folge hieraus waren die europäischen PTT-Verwaltungen gezwungen, Formen der 

Zusammenarbeit zu entwickeln, 4 die den Verlust der globalen Organisationen als 

europäisches Forum kompensieren konnten: Einerseits galt es, innereuropäische 

Angelegenheiten vermehrt untereinander zu regeln und andererseits im Weltpostverein 

und der Fernmeldeunion geschlossen aufzutreten. 5 Die Verwaltungen hofften, so die 

traditionelle Vormachtstellung in den globalen Organisationen nicht gänzlich aufgeben 

zu müssen. 6 

Die Intensivierung des innereuropäischen PTT-Verkehrs hatte nach dem Zweiten 

Weltkrieg zu einer Vielzahl von Konferenzen und Abkommen auf bi- und 

multilateraler Basis geführt. 7 Festere Formen der Zusammenarbeit bildeten sich 

hingegen nur in der Nordischen Postunion zwischen Dänemark, Finnland, Island, 

Norwegen und Schweden 8 und einer Verwaltungskooperation der BeNeLux-Staaten. 9 

Eine niederländisch-deutsche Initiative zur Gründung einer europäischen 

Postorganisation im Rahmen des Europarates scheiterte, 10 da einzelne Staaten den 

4. Vgl.: Rede des Bundesministers für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen auf der Präsidentenkonferenz 

in Konstanz am 24.6.1950, in: APF, Nr.10 1950, S.773-791. 

5. Zur Begründung hieß es, „bei der vorigen Konferenz (waren) mehrfach gute Vorschläge 

europäischer Länder verworfen oder in weniger guter Fassung angenommen worden, weil sich die 

europäischen Länder nicht frühzeitig auf eine bestimmte, einheitlich zu vertretende Fassung 

geeinigt hatten.“ Vgl.: Geheimes Memorandum der Post an den Postminister vom 22.12.1955. 

Bundesarchiv Koblenz [BArch], B257/342. 

6. Vgl.: BArch Koblenz, B257/7811. 

7. Vgl.: A. GEERLING, Das Post- und Fernmeldewesen in der europäischen Integration, in: Jahrbuch 

des Postwesens, Heidecker, Berlin, 1958, S.183. 

8. Die Vorgängerorganisation lässt sich bis ins das Jahr 1869 zurückverfolgen. 

9. Vgl.: E. BURN, La Conférence Européenne des Administrations des Postes et des 

Télécommunications: son but, sa structure, son développement et ses possibilités futures, Bern, 

1970. (Bericht für höhere PTT-Funktionäre), CEPT-Archiv Kopenhagen. 

10. Vgl.: Dienststelle für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten des Bundeskanzleramtes: 021-10 II/12275/50. 

BArch Koblenz, B257/5517.

96 


geplanten Transfer von Souveränitätsrechten scheuten. 11 Nach langen Verhandlungen 

in den Gremien des Europarates 12 hatte sich die notwendige Einstimmigkeit nicht 

herstellen lassen, so dass am 5. Mai 1953 alle Vorbereitungsarbeiten im Rahmen des 

Europarats eingestellt wurden. 13 

Der Stand der europäischen Integration im PTT-Wesen wirkte Mitte der 1950er 

Jahre sehr heterogen: Zwischen den nationalen Verwaltungen hatte sich ein ganzes 

Netz von formellen, bi- und multilateralen Kooperationsformen herausgebildet, das 

von einer ausgeprägten informellen Zusammenarbeit ergänzt wurde. Eine 

europäische PTT-Organisation, in der diese Arbeit gebündelt und koordiniert werden 

konnte, scheitere aber an den divergenten Vorstellungen im Ministerkomitee des 

Europarats. 

3. Französische Doppelinitiative 

Der Integrationsprozess im europäischen PTT-Wesen wurde nachhaltig in Gang 

gesetzt, als der französische Postminister Edouard Bonnefous die PTT-Minister 

und Verwaltungsvertreter der EGKS-Staaten und Großbritanniens am 1. Juli 1955 

zu einer Tagung nach Paris einlud, die sich mit den Vorarbeiten zur EWG 

auseinandersetzen sollte. Bonnefous, der davon überzeugt gewesen war, dass sich 

die praktische Zusammenarbeit im PTT-Wesen zwangsläufig in der Folge einer 

formellen Organisationsgründung ergeben würde, schlug im Anschluss zwei Wege 

zur Erreichung der Integration im PTT-Wesen ein. Er verfasste ein Memorandum 

über einen engeren Zusammenschluss im PTT-Wesen, das er sowohl dem von der 

Konferenz von Messina eingesetzten Regierungsausschuss zur Untersuchung von 

Problemen bei der Schaffung eines Gemeinsamen Marktes (EWG) wie auch der 

Beratenden Versammlung des Europarats vorlegte. 

3.1 Spaak-Ausschuss (EWG) 

Der in Brüssel unter dem Vorsitz des belgischen Außenministers Paul-Henri Spaak 

tagende Regierungsausschuss der sechs EGKS-Staaten reagierte auf die 

französische Anregung, indem innerhalb des Verkehrsausschusses ein spezieller 

Unterausschuss „Post“ eingerichtet wurde, der die Bedeutung des PTT-Wesens für 

11. Vgl.: L. KÄMMERER, Der Integrationsgedanke und das europäische Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 

in: Archiv für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 1963, S.39-50. 

12. Die Beratende Versammlung hatte bereits am 5.12.1951 die Empfehlung Nr.9 ausgesprochen: 

„recognising that, apart from the considerable psychological effect which might be expected, the 

reduction of charges to the lowest possible figure, the speedy conveyance of mail by widespread 

use of air transport free from surtax, the improvement of the postal and telecommunication services 

and the introduction of new facilities for users, would be a measure of incalculable value to intra-european 

trade …”. Vgl.: BArch Koblenz, B257/342. 

13. Vgl.: BArch Koblenz, B257/10566, bzw. BArch Koblenz, B257/5517.


den Gemeinsamen Markt analysierte und eine Stellungnahme zum französischen 

Memorandum verfasste. Der Regierungsausschuss übernahm in seinem Abschlussbericht 

vom April 1956, dem „Spaak-Bericht“, die Stellungnahme und empfahl die 

baldige Gründung eines engeren Postvereins. In der Empfehlung lassen sich deutliche 

Spuren der Integrationsvorstellungen der Verwaltungen ausmachen: Prinzipiell 

sollte der Postverein allen europäischen Verwaltungen offen stehen und 

autonom arbeitende Verwaltungsorgane besitzen, deren Aufgabenbereiche die 

Vereinheitlichung und Vereinfachung der PTT-Dienste umfassen sollte. 14 Der 

belgische PTT-Minister hatte hingegen im Unterausschuss die sofortige Gründung 

eines engeren Postvereins unter den Mitgliedstaaten der EGKS vorgeschlagen, 

stieß aber auf eine mehrheitliche Ablehnung von Seiten der Verwaltungen. 15 

3.2 Europarat 

In seinem an die Beratende Versammlung des Europarats gerichteten Memorandum 

regte Bonnefous im Juli 1955 die Gründung einer intergouvernementalen 

PTT-Organisation nach dem Vorbild der „Europäischen Konferenz der Verkehrsminister“ 

(CEMT) an. 16 Nach eingehender Prüfung durch den Wirtschaftsausschuss, 

die Beratende Versammlung und das Ministerkomitee wurde am 4. Mai 

1957 das Memorandum Bonnefous’ als Empfehlung Nr.143 ausgesprochen. In den 

folgenden Monaten demonstrierte der Europarat mehrfach sein Interesse, indem er 

die Mitgliedstaaten aufforderte, konkrete Maßnahmen zu ergreifen und die 

Gründung der „Europäischen Konferenz der Minister für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen“ 

zu forcieren. 17 

Für den Meinungsumschwung im Ministerkomitee seit 1953 sind im Wesentlichen 

zwei Gründe anzuführen. Einerseits nahm der Europarat die eigenen Integrationsbestrebungen 

im PTT-Wesen und die der sechs EGKS-Staaten als einen 

innereuropäischen institutionellen Wettbewerb wahr, bei dem er sich behaupten 

wollte. Andererseits brauchten die integrationsunwilligen Mitgliedsregierungen des 

Europarats nicht länger von ihrem Vetorecht im Ministerkomitee Gebrauch zu 

machen, da die angestrebte PTT-Konferenz keine Mitgliedschaft der Europaratsländer 

einforderte. 

3.3Inhaltliche Ziele und organisatorische Leitbilder der zentralen Akteure 

Die Regierungen der sechs EWG-Staaten forderten eine im organisatorischen 

Rahmen der EWG verankerte „institutionell-gouvernementale“ Integration, deren 

Ziel ein Beitrag zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung des Gemeinsamen Marktes sein 

14. Ibid. 


16. Vgl.: Europarat Doc. AS (7) PV 9. bzw. A GEERLING, op.cit., S.174-217. 

17. Vgl.: BArch Koblenz, B257/25188.

98 


sollte. Ihre zuständigen Fachministerien für das PTT-Wesen orientierten sich 

hingegen am Leitbild einer „institutionell-ministeriellen“ Integration unter den 

EWG-Staaten, bei der eine „funktionelle Autonomie“ von den Organen der EWG 

gewahrt bleiben sollte. Sie wollten über konkrete inhaltliche Ziele in letzter Instanz 

unabhängig von den Regierungen und Gemeinschaftsgremien entscheiden. 

Wirtschaftliche Aspekte sollten dabei zwar berücksichtigt werden, sich aber aus der 

verwaltungstechnischen Zusammenarbeit ergeben und die Unterschiede von Post 

und Fernmeldewesen besonders beachten. Zugleich strebten sie eine Stärkung der 

europäischen Position im Weltpostverein und der Fernmeldeunion an. 

Die Verwaltungen, die um ihre traditionelle Autonomie in der internationalen 

PTT-Zusammenarbeit fürchteten, verfolgten eine Doppelstrategie, die sich aus 

unterschiedlichen inhaltlichen Zielen ergab: 18 Soweit es Ziele wie 

Gebührenangleichungen und Transportverbesserungen betraf, versprachen sich die 

Verwaltungen bzw. Abteilungen für die Post eine erleichterte Verwirklichung durch 

eine „institutionell-ministerielle“ Integration unter den EWG-Staaten. Für den 

Bereich des Fernmeldewesen wurde stattdessen die „funktionell-administrative“ 

Integration auf breiter Mitgliederbasis befürwortet. 

Innerhalb der Akteursgruppen gab es trotz der scheinbaren Homogenität teilweise 

erhebliche nationale Unterschiede darin, auf welche Art und Weise die Leitbilder 

und Ziele verwirklicht werden sollten bzw. mit welcher Intensität diese vertreten 

wurden: Die Regierungen und PTT-Minister aus Frankreich und Belgien 

forderten schnellstmöglich eine „institutionell-gouvernementale“ Integration. Sie 

waren davon überzeugt, dass nur in der Folge einer formellen Organisationsgründung 

auf gouvernementaler Ebene die inhaltliche Zusammenarbeit nachhaltig 

in Gang gesetzt würde. Die anderen EWG-Mitglieder wollten jedoch erst die praktischen 

Aufgabenbereiche sorgfältig prüfen und dann die organisatorischen Strukturen 

an diesen ausrichten. 

In Deutschland schloss sich das PTT-Ministerium der Doppelstrategie seiner 

Verwaltung an. Es erhoffte sich über eine „funktionell-administrative“ 

Organisation mit vielen Mitgliedern im Weltpostverein und der Fernmeldeunion 

indirekt mehr Einfluss zu gewinnen, insbesondere da Deutschland dort vorerst 

keine einflussreiche Position in Aussicht stand. 

Von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Intensität, mit der die Akteure ihre Ziele 

und Leitbilder vertraten, waren die nationalen Ministeriums- und 

Verwaltungsstrukturen. Die größten Unterschiede wiesen in diesem Punkt 

Deutschland und Belgien auf: In der Bundesrepublik war das PTT-Wesen in einem 

eigenständigen Ministerium organisiert, während in Belgien das PTT- und das 

Verkehrswesen im „Départment des Communications“ vereint war. Der belgische 

Postminister konnte deshalb sein Leitbild einer „institutionell-ministeriellen“ 

Integration mit mehr Nachdruck verfolgen, als sein deutscher Kollege. Dieser 

musste sich innerhalb der Regierung noch mit einem Verkehrsminister 

auseinandersetzen, der aufgrund des Posttransports mit der Bahn, Flugzeugen etc. 

18. Ibid.


direkt von Beschlüssen einer PTT-Organisation betroffen gewesen wäre und daher 

nach Mitsprachemöglichkeiten suchte. Zusätzlich waren in Belgien die Post und 

das Fernmeldewesen in zwei getrennten Verwaltungen organisiert, deren Arbeit das 

Ministerium koordinierte. In Deutschland umfasste eine Verwaltung beide Bereiche 

des PTT-Wesens, so dass die Koordination zwischen ihnen von einer 

verwaltungsinternen Zentralabteilung übernommen wurde. Dies sicherte der 

deutschen PTT-Verwaltung eine stärkere Position gegenüber dem Ministerium als 

sie die getrennten belgischen Verwaltungen innehatten. 

In Großbritannien und der Schweiz sprachen sich die Regierungen, 

PTT-Ministerien und Verwaltungen einheitlich für eine „funktionell-administrative“ 

Integration aus. Während die Regierungen Großbritanniens und der Schweiz wegen 

ihrer Reservation gegenüber der westeuropäische Integration bzw. wegen der strikten 

Schweizer Neutralitätspolitik die intergouvernementale Zusammenarbeit meiden 

wollten, verfolgten deren PTT-Ministerien und Verwaltungen die gleichen inhaltlichen 

Ziele wie die Verwaltungen der EWG-Staaten. 19 Ähnliche Positionen vertrat man in 

Griechenland, Irland und Österreich. 20 In den Mitgliedstaaten der Nordischen 

Postunion stießen die Integrationsbestrebungen dagegen bei allen Akteuren auf 

grundsätzliche Ablehnung. Eine intergouvernementale Zusammenarbeit scheiterte an 

der politischen Neutralität von Finnland und Schweden sowie der fehlenden 

Bereitschaft, sich am europäischen Integrationsprozess zu beteiligen. Zusätzlich 

sprachen sich die PTT-Verwaltungen auch gegen eine „funktionell-administrative“ 

Integration aus. Sie waren überzeugt, dass diese nur in einer unnötigen und 

kostenintensiven Doppelarbeit zum Weltpostverein und der Fernmeldeunion münden 

würde. 21 Bei Fragen der Funkfrequenzverteilung erwarteten sie sogar eine 

kontraproduktive Wirkung, indem die bereits vorhandenen Gegensätze zwischen 

westeuropäischen, osteuropäischen und außereuropäischen Staaten weiter intensiviert 

würden. 22 Notwendige und über die Arbeit der globalen Organisationen hinausgehende 

Probleme empfahlen sie weiterhin bilateral zu verhandeln. Die nordischen Länder 

verzichteten auf eine aktive Teilnahme an den Diskussionen und Verhandlungen über 

mögliche Integrationsmaßnahmen. 23 

Die Beratende Versammlung des Europarats strebte eine „institutionell-gouvernementale“ 

Integration auf einer breiten Mitgliederbasis an. Diese sollte nach dem 

Vorbild der CEMT eine Organisation mit formeller Anknüpfung an den Europarat 

sein und ihr inhaltliches Ziel in einem Beitrag zur wirtschaftlichen Integration 

Europas sehen. Die Beratende Versammlung war davon überzeugt, dass sich die 




22. Vgl.: Geheimes Memorandum des Leiters der schwedischen Telekommunikationsverwaltung 

Håkan Sterky an das Außenministerium. Sveriges Riksarkiv (Arninge), Televerket, Ekonomibyrån 

1916-1967, F VI bg:1. 

23. Vgl.: H. HEIMBÜRGER, Nordisk samarbete på telekommunikationsområdet under 50 år, Egnell, 

Stockholm, 1969.

100 


„funktionell-administrative“ Zusammenarbeit zwangsläufig aus der Gründung 

einer formellen Organisation ergeben würde. 

4. Der Integrationsprozess bis zur Gründung der CEPT 

4.1 Die Verhandlungen im Rahmen der EWG 

Bereits vor der Veröffentlichung des Spaak-Berichts hatte der französische Postminister 

im Januar 1956 zu einer Ministerkonferenz nach Paris eingeladen, um die 

Vorarbeiten zur Gründung einer europäischen Postgemeinschaft voranzutreiben. 24 

Auf dieser Konferenz wurden mehrere weitreichende Beschlüsse gefasst, u.a. die 

Bildung permanenter Arbeitsgruppen der Verwaltungen für die Bereiche Post und 

Fernmeldewesen sowie die Herausgabe einer „Europa-Briefmarke”. Eine 

europäische Briefmarke sollte ein Symbol darstellen, um die „Europäische Idee“ 

dem Bürger in einem ihm greifbaren Erfahrungsraum nahezubringen. Die Beratungen 

in Paris ergaben, dass Integrationsschritte in erster Linie im Bereich der Post 

erwünscht waren. Die konkreten Aufgabenbereiche sollten Abstimmungen des 

Posttransports oder gemeinsame Tarife umfassen. Hingegen übten sich die Vertreter 

des Fernmeldewesens in Zurückhaltung. 25 

In der Folgezeit ergriffen die PTT-Ministerien aus Frankreich und Belgien 

wiederholt die Initiative, um die Gründung einer PTT-Organisation der EWG-Staaten 

zu forcieren, was schließlich im Februar 1957 in der Einrichtung eines gemeinsames 

Sekretariat der sechs EGKS-Staaten in Brüssel gipfelte und den ersten Schritt in 

Richtung fester organisatorischer Strukturen vollzog. Von den Gemeinschaftsorganen 

der EWG konnten keine Impulse erwartet werden, nachdem das PTT-Wesen in den 

Römischen Verträgen nicht explizit erwähnt worden war, obwohl der Spaak-Bericht 

noch die Gründung eines engeren Postvereins empfohlen hatte. In einem intensiven 

Brief- und Konferenzkontakt zwischen den zuständigen Ministern und 

Verwaltungsangestellten wurden die Vorstellungen von einer europäischen 

PTT-Organisation konkretisiert und erste Entwürfe über eine Organisation mit 

supranationalen Gremien entworfen. Dabei achtete man darauf, dass 

„ihre Befugnisse durch Art.90 des Vertrags über die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 

nicht geschmälert werden und die Post- und Fernmeldeverwaltungen aus dem 

Geltungsbereich der Wettbewerbsregeln ausgenommen werden“. 26 

24. Zu allen Tagungen der PTT-Minister der EGKS waren vorerst Beobachter aus Großbritannien und 

der Schweiz eingeladen. 

25. Vgl.: o.V., Erste europäische Postkonferenz der PTT-Minister in Paris. Arbeitsbeginn im Geiste 

einer umfassenden Postintegration, in: Zeitschrift für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 4(1956), 

S.118-119. 

26. Vgl.: Information der ZA der Post an die Abteilungen vom 18.4.1957. BArch Koblenz, B257/15309.


Bei der Deutschen Bundespost und dem Ministerium stießen sowohl das Tempo 

als auch der Inhalt der Integrationsschritte auf Kritik. Im Anschluss an eine 

Vorbereitungskonferenz im November 1956 resümierte die Zentralabteilung: 

„Sie [Belgien und Frankreich] sehen die nächste Aufgabe offenbar überwiegend in 

der Bildung einer Organisation, über deren Nutzeffekt und politische Auswirkungen 

aber Zweifel bestehen müssen, …“. 27 

Die PTT-Verwaltungen der EWG-Staaten übten zwar deutliche Kritik, unterstützten 

aber zumindest für den Bereich der Post vermehrt die Integrationsbestrebungen im 

Rahmen der EWG. Nur dort sahen sie die Voraussetzungen für eine handlungsfähige 

Gemeinschaft mit eigener Willensbildung und Mehrheitsbeschlüssen, die „eine 

fachliche und aktive gemeinsame Führung des europäischen PTT-Wesens“ 

übernehmen könnte. 28 

Zwischen den PTT-Ministern der EWG blieb vorerst noch die Frage offen, ob 

ausschließlich ein Integrationsschritt unter den sechs EWG-Staaten erfolgen oder 

ob parallel dazu eine erweiterte Union unter den Mitgliedern des Europarates 

angestrebt werden sollte. Für eine Doppelstrategie argumentierten die Niederlande, 

Luxemburg und Deutschland, da sich eine Teilung Europas nachteilig auf die 

Zusammenarbeit in den globalen PTT-Organisationen auswirken würde und „sie 

einem engeren Zusammenschluss im Rahmen der EWG nicht im Wege steht”. 29 

Die PTT-Minister Belgiens, Frankreichs und Italiens plädierten gegen zwei parallel 

arbeitende Organisationen und stellten stattdessen eine sukzessive Erweiterung der 

EWG-Organisation in Aussicht. 30 

Ein Kompromiss fand sich auf einem informellen Treffen zwischen dem 

Generaldirektor der französischen Post und dem Staatssekretär im 

Bundespostministerium: Das gemeinsame Sekretariat in Brüssel sollte für den 8. bis 12. 

September 1958 die PTT-Verwaltungen und Minister der EWG-Staaten nach Brüssel 

einladen, um ein Statut für die Gründung einer „Europäischen Gemeinschaft für das 

Post- und Fernmeldewesen“ (EGPF) zwischen den EWG-Staaten zu beschließen. 

Anschließend sollte es zu einer gemeinsamen Tagung mit den Verwaltungen der im 

Europarat und in der Organisation für europäische wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 

(OEEC) vertretenen Länder plus Spanien einladen, auf der die Europaratsempfehlung 

erörtert werden könnte. Die EWG-Staaten demonstrierten somit nach außen ihre 

prinzipielle Offenheit für eine intergouvernementale Konferenz der PTT-Minister des 

Europarats. 31 


28. Vgl.: BArch Koblenz, B257/343 und B257/25188. 

29. Ibid. 



102 


Die Konferenz der EWG-Minister in Brüssel beschloss ein Statut für die EGPF 32 

und einigte sich darauf, sie formell durch den Art.235 33 des EWG-Vertrages zu 

gründen, laut dem der Rat der EWG zur Verwirklichung der Ziele des Gemeinsamen 

Marktes die „geeigneten Vorschriften“ erlässt. 34 Das Statut setzte die 

Integrationsleitbilder der Verwaltungen und PTT-Ministerien gleichermaßen um: Das 

„funktionell-administrative”, indem verwaltungstechnische Ziele unabhängig von der 

Vorgabe wirtschaftlicher Ziele durch die Verwaltungen ausgehandelt werden sollten. 

Das „institutionell-ministerielle", indem die Organe der EGPF (ein Rat der 

PTT-Minister, ein Ausschuss der Verwaltungen und ein Generalsekretariat) eine 

„funktionelle Autonomie“ von der EWG erhalten sollten, um die interministerielle 

Unabhängigkeit der nationalen Fachministerien von ihren Außen- und 

Wirtschaftsministerien zu wahren. Gleichzeitig unterstrichen die Vertreter der sechs 

Mitgliedstaaten die Absicht zusätzlich eine erweiterte Zusammenarbeit anzustreben. 35 

4.2 Europaratsinitiative 

Die erweiterte Konferenz (13.9.1958) sollte die Empfehlung Nr.143 des Europarats 

aufgreifen und die Gründung einer „Europäischen Konferenz der Minister für das 

Post- und Fernmeldewesen“ diskutieren. Erwartungsgemäß erhielt die Empfehlung 

wenig Unterstützung, da eine „institutionell-gouvernementale“ Integration mit 

Anlehnung an den Europarat und einer wirtschaftlichen Zielsetzung nur vom 

Europarat selber gewünscht war. Stattdessen gelang es dem Schweizer 

PTT-Generaldirektor Eduard Weber in einer richtungsweisenden Rede, der Idee 

einer „funktionell-administrativen“ Interessengemeinschaft Rückenwind zu 

verschaffen: Diese sollte unter Beiseitelassung aller politischer Erwägungen ihre 

Angelegenheiten intern regeln können und den europäischen Ländern die 

Möglichkeit eröffnen, durch ein kompaktes Auftreten in den globalen 

Organisationen die traditionelle Vormachtstellung nicht vollends aufgeben zu 

müssen. 36 

Neben Großbritannien, mit dessen Ministerium und Verwaltung sich die 

Schweizer bereits vorher auf informellem Weg in wesentlichen Punkten geeinigt 

hatten, unterstützten auch die PTT-Verwaltungen der EWG-Staaten diese Idee. 

Gegen den Widerstand der belgischen, französischen und italienischen 

32. Vgl.: Entwurf eines Statuts der „Europäischen Gemeinschaft für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen”. 

BArch Koblenz, B257/343. 

33. Vgl.: Art.235 des Vertrags über die Gründung der EWG vom 25.3.1957: „Erscheint ein Tätigwerden 

der Gemeinschaft erforderlich, um im Rahmen des Gemeinsamen Marktes eines ihrer 

Ziele zu verwirklichen, und sind in diesem Vertrag die hierfür erforderlichen Befugnisse nicht vorgesehen, 

so erläßt der Rat einstimmig auf Vorschlag der Kommission und nach Anhörung der Versammlung 

die geeigneten Vorschriften”. 

34. Vgl.: H. STEINMETZ, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, in: 

Zeitschrift für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 19(1958), S.737-739. 

35. Vgl.: Tagungsprotokoll (Compte rendu des réunions plénières), BArch Koblenz, B257/6877. 



Ministeriumsvertreter, die weitere Verhandlungen ausschließlich auf Ministerebene 

forderten, setzten die Konferenzteilnehmer die Bildung einer paritätisch aus 

Mitgliedern und Nicht-Mitgliedern der EWG zusammengesetzten achtköpfigen 

Studiengruppe der Verwaltungen durch. 37 Diese erhielt den Auftrag, die 

Grundlagen und Verfahren für eine flexible, weitreichende und politisch 

ungebundene Organisation zu überprüfen und geeignete Vorschläge für deren 

Institutionalisierung zu erarbeiten, die die nationalen Verwaltungen nicht mit hohen 

finanziellen Kosten belasten und allen Verwaltungen Europas offen stehen sollte. 38 

Somit wurde erstmals seit Beginn der europäischen Integrationsbemühungen im 

PTT-Wesen die Option einer „funktionell-administrativen“ Organisation ohne 

politische Verankerung durch ein europäisches Forum in Erwägung gezogen. 

Die Verwaltungen und Ministerien aus der Schweiz und Großbritannien 

versuchten, unter den geänderten Vorzeichen, die Mitglieder der Nordischen Union 

für die Mitarbeit in der Studienkommission gewinnen zu können, die für ihre 

Konzeption eine Schlüsselposition einnahmen: Erstens konnte mit ihnen ein 

Gegengewicht zu den befürchteten weitgehenden Forderungen einzelner 

EWG-Mitglieder gebildet werden, zweitens waren sie für ein kompaktes 

europäisches Auftreten in den globalen Organisationen notwendig und drittens 

konnte nur eine mitgliederstarke europäische Organisation eine Alternative zur 

EGPF bilden. 39 

Die Regierungen der nordischen Staaten kalkulierten ihre Position neu, da sie aus 

politischen Überlegungen heraus, den Willen zur Mitarbeit in einer europäischen 

Organisation demonstrieren mussten, an der sich sogar die Schweiz beteiligen wollte. 

Sie wiesen deshalb ihre Verwaltungen an, einen Beobachter der Nordischen Postunion 

in die Studiengruppe zu entsenden. 40 Großbritannien und die Schweiz, die ebenfalls in 

der Studiengruppe vertreten waren, begrüßten diesen Entschluss, übten aber Kritik am 

geplanten Beobachterstatus. Sie benötigten im Falle einer kontroversen 

Abstimmungssituation die nordischen Stimmen für eine politisch ungebundene und 

ausschließlich „funktionell-administrative“ Organisation. Schließlich ließen sich die 

Nordischen Verwaltungen nach informellen Gesprächen in London auf einen 

Kompromiss ein: Sie schickten eine stimmberechtigte Delegation, die aber keine 

verbindlichen Zusagen abgeben durfte. Die nordischen Länder fürchteten weiterhin 

politische Hintergründe und vermuteten, dass die Bildung einer PTT-Organisation nur 

ein Puzzelstück auf dem Weg zur Gründung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa sei. 41 


38. Vgl.: F. KOLLER, Die Entstehungsgeschichte der Europäischen Konferenz der Verwaltungen für 

das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, in: Archiv für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 4 (1960), 

S.237-275. 

39. Vgl.: Sveriges Riksarkiv (Arninge), Televerket, Ekonomibyrån 1916-1967, F VI bg:1. 

40. Vgl.: H. HEIMBÜRGER, op.cit. 

41. Vgl.: Geheimes Tagungsprotokoll eines außerordentlichen Treffens der Mitgliedsverwaltungen 

der Nordischen Postunion am 22.4.1959 in Stockholm. Sveriges Riksarkiv (Arninge), Televerket, 

Ekonomibyrån 1916-1967, F VI bg:2.

104 


Die Anfang 1959 in St. Moritz tagende Studiengruppe, die die Schweizer 

PTT-Verwaltung inzwischen eigenmächtig in Vorbereitende Kommission umbenannt 

hatte, plante mehrheitlich die PTT-Organisation als Verwaltungsabkommen zu gründen 

und so auf die vorhandenen Rechtsgrundlagen des Weltpostvereins und der 

Fernmeldeunion zu stellen. 42 Sie bekannte sich eindeutig zum Leitbild der 

„funktionell-administrativen“ Integration und nannte als inhaltliche Ziele 

ausschließlich verwaltungstechnische wie die Erlangung fachlicher Vorteile für die 

PTT-Verwaltungen und ein größeres Stimmengewicht im Weltpostverein wie der 

Fernmeldeunion. Die Vorbereitende Kommission hatte sich damit sowohl vom 

„institutionell-gouvernementalen“ Integrationsleitbild der Europaratsempfehlung als 

auch von deren Ziel, einen Beitrag zur wirtschaftlichen Integration Europas zu leisten, 

grundsätzlich verabschiedet. Intensive Diskussionen rief allerdings die Frage der 

Mitgliedschaft hervor. Der französische Postminister versuchte vehement über die 

Mitgliederfrage eine minimale politische Anknüpfung an eine der europäischen 

Institutionen zu sichern, ohne die er einer PTT-Organisation die Bedeutungslosigkeit 

prognostizierte. 43 Sein Vorhaben scheiterte schließlich, da es Spanien und Finnland den 

Weg in eine europäische PTT-Organisation versperrt hätte. Ohne Finnland hätten 

sämtliche Verwaltungen der Nordischen Postunion auf eine Mitgliedschaft verzichtet 

und das Projekt einer erweiterten PTT-Organisation hätte enorm an Attraktivität 

verloren. Mit Hilfe des Kompromisses, die Mitgliedschaft im Weltpostverein und der 

Fernmeldeunion als Beitrittsvoraussetzung festzusetzen, konnte der Konflikt beigelegt 

werden. 44 

Im Laufe der Konferenz gelang es den Kommissionsmitgliedern sich auf einen 

Statutsentwurf zur Gründung der „Conférence Européenne des Administrations des 

Postes et des Télécommunications“ (CEPT) zu einigen, der auf einer 

konstituierenden Tagung im Juni 1959 abschließend diskutiert und beschlossen 

werden sollte. Einen entscheidenden Beitrag zum Erfolg der Konferenz hatte die 

unerwartet große Bereitschaft der europäischen Verwaltungen geleistet, sich an der 

CEPT zu beteiligen, von der die EWG-Verwaltungen überrascht waren. 45 

4.3 Die Statutsentwürfe im Vergleich 

Die Statutsentwürfe für die EGPF und die CEPT spiegelten beide vorwiegend das 

Leitbild der „funktionell-administrativen“ Integration wider. Die von den 

42. Vgl.: F. KOLLER, Tagung der Vorbereitenden Kommission der Europäischen Konferenz der 

Post- und Fernmeldeverwaltungen, in: Zeitschrift für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 6(1959), 

S.185. 


44. Indem die Mitgliedschaft in den globalen PTT-Organisationen als Beitrittsklausel festgeschrieben 

werden sollte, entsprach die Kommission v.a. der deutschen Forderung, eine Mitgliedschaft der 

DDR, so unwahrscheinlich diese auch gewesen wäre, von vorneherein auszuschließen, da die Mitgliedschaftsgesuche 

der DDR in den globalen PTT-Organisationen bisher erfolglos geblieben 

waren. Vgl.: BArch Koblenz, B257/25189. 

45. Vgl.: F. KOLLER, Die Entstehungsgeschichte …, op.cit., S.243.


PTT-Ministern eingeforderten bindenden Entscheidungen durch ein 

Ministergremium waren in beiden Entwürfen nicht beachtet worden. Stattdessen 

sollten die jeweiligen Gremien nur Stellungnahmen und Empfehlungen 

aussprechen können. Dafür sahen die Entwürfe aber Mehrheitsentscheidungen vor, 

die bei der EGPF auf Ministerebene und bei der CEPT auf Verwaltungsebene 

erfolgen sollten. Auch die in den Entwürfen angeführten inhaltlichen Ziele der 

Zusammenarbeit wiesen nur geringe Unterschiede auf. Einzig die Einführung von 

Vorzugstarifen, d.h. Porto- und Gebührenermäßigungen im Bereich des 

europäischen Binnenmarktes, und die technische Zusammenarbeit waren Bereiche, 

in denen das EGPF-Statut weiterreichende Ziele formulierte. 

Deutliche Unterschiede zeigten sich bei den geplanten organisatorischen 

Strukturen: Während die EGPF permanent arbeitende und mit klar definierten 

Aufgabenbereichen versehene Organe erhalten sollte, zeichneten sich im 

CEPT-Entwurf sehr lokkere Strukturen mit wechselnder Geschäftsverantwortung ab. 

4.4 Scheitern der EWG-Initiative 

Für die Mitgliedstaaten der EWG hatte der nächste Schritt zur Gründung der EGPF 

darin bestanden, das Statut von den nationalen Regierungen beschließen zu lassen, 

um es danach dem Rat der EWG zur Beschlussfassung und Inkraftsetzung 

zuzuleiten. Das Statut stieß jedoch auf den Widerstand der Regierungen, der 

exemplarisch an der Reaktion der deutschen Bundesregierung skizziert werden soll. 

Als Postminister Richard Stücklen im November 1958 dem Kabinett das Statut 

vorlegte, stieß er auf heftigen Widerstand gegen die „funktionale Autonomie“ der 

EGPF, die seinen Ministerkollegen praktisch jegliches Mitspracherecht in 

PTT-Angelegenheiten der EWG untersagte. Sie kritisierten die gewählte 

Organisationsform, das geplante Inkrafttreten durch eine Verordnung der EWG und 

die fehlenden Entscheidungskompetenzen der Gemeinschaftsorgane. Nach Ansicht 

der Regierungsvertreter sollte das Statut das PTT-Wesen nur scheinbar in die EWG 

eingliedern, tatsächlich aber eine autonome Organisation mit eigener 

Willensbildung schaffen. In einer solchen Organisation sahen sie einen 

Widerspruch zur Grundidee der EWG, für die es nur integrierte Sachgebiete geben 

könne, die alle primär einen Beitrag zur Wirtschaftsintegration leisten würden. Das 

Kabinett forderte, die EGPF erkennbar in den organisatorischen Rahmen der EWG 

einzugliedern, da sie „ein Mittel zur Verwirklichung der Ziele der EWG sein 

muss”. 46 Es war nicht gewillt das Statut zu verabschieden, und fällte am 21. Januar 

1959 den Prinzipbeschluss, der Gründung einer EGPF nur „auf der Grundlage und 

in den Grenzen des Art.235“ zuzustimmen. 47 

Ein Alternativvorschlag der niederländischen Regierung, die EGPF ohne 

formelle Anknüpfung an die EWG auf der Basis eines Staatsabkommens zu 

gründen, scheiterte am Widerstand der Verwaltungen und PTT-Minister. Die 


47. Vgl.: Kabinettsprotokoll vom 21.1.1959. BArch Koblenz, B257/10566.

106 


Verwaltungen hatten kein Interesse daran, mit den nationalen Regierungen einen 

Kompromiss zu erarbeiten, da die Gründung der CEPT ihnen die Verwirklichung 

ihrer ursprünglichen Integrationsvorstellung in Aussicht stellte. Auch die 

PTT-Minister sahen keinen Anlass zur weiteren Kompromisssuche. Sie waren nicht 

bereit ihre innerstaatliche ministerielle Souveränität in PTT-Angelegenheiten 

zugunsten einer „institutionell-gouvernementalen“ Lösung aufzugeben und 

begnügten sich vorerst mit der „funktionell-administrativen“ Alternative der CEPT. 

Die Ministerien und Verwaltungen verständigten sich deshalb darauf, auf weitere 

Gründungsbestrebungen zu verzichten und sich nach der konstituierenden Tagung 

erneut zusammen zu setzen. 48 

4.5 Die Gründung der CEPT 

Auf Beschluss der Vorbereitenden Kommission hin hatte die Schweizer 

PTT-Verwaltung zur konstituierenden Tagung der CEPT samt einer anschließenden 

ersten Arbeitstagung die Vertreter von 24 Verwaltungen aus 20 Ländern 49 nach 

Montreux (Juni 1959) eingeladen. Vor der eigentlichen Konstituierung 

beratschlagten die Verwaltungen abschließend das Gründungsabkommen der 

CEPT. Die Ministeriumsvertreter der EWG-Staaten Italien, Frankreich und Belgien 

versuchten noch nachträglich intensivere Kooperationsformen umzusetzen, 50 

scheiterten damit allerdings und gaben sich mit dem Kompromiss zufrieden, dass 

die angestrebte flexible Abkommensform einer späteren Revision der 

Organisationsstruktur nicht im Weg stand. 51 Ihr Versuch änderte hingegen nichts an 

der prinzipiellen Einigkeit, so dass bereits am 26. Juni in einem feierlichen Akt das 

Gründungsabkommen der „Conférence Européenne des Administrations des Postes 

et des Télécommunications“ (CEPT) von 22 Verwaltungen aus 18 europäischen 

Ländern unterschrieben werden konnte. 52 

Das Abkommen nannte ausschließlich verwaltungstechnische Ziele 53 und 

versah die CEPT mit einer flexiblen Organisationsstruktur. 54 Wirtschaftliche Ziele, 

die im Spaak-Bericht und der Empfehlung Nr. 143 des Europarats noch im 

Vordergrund gestanden hatten, verwarf das Gründungsabkommen. In seiner 

Präambel schrieb es die Unabhängigkeit der CEPT von jeder wirtschaftlichen und 

48. Vgl.: F. KOLLER, Europäische Tagung im Haag, in: Zeitschrift für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 

8(1959), S.269. 

49. Die Differenz zwischen der Anzahl von Verwaltungen und Staaten ergab sich daraus, dass einige 

Staaten das Post- und das Fernmeldewesen in jeweils unterschiedlichen Verwaltungen organisiert 

hatten. 

50. Vgl.: F. KOLLER, Die Entstehungsgeschichte …, op.cit. 

51. Vgl.: Réunion constitutive: Procès-verbaux des séances plénières. CEPT-Archiv Kopenhagen. 

52. Noch während der ersten Arbeitstagung der CEPT am 1.7. unterzeichnete auch die österreichische 

Verwaltung das Gründungsabkommen der CEPT. 

53. Vgl.: Art.4 des Abkommens zur Gründung der Europäischen Konferenz der Verwaltungen des 

Post- und Fernmeldewesens vom 26.6.1959, in: Amtsblatt des Bundesministers für das Post- und 

Fernmeldewesen, 5(1960), S.21-31. 

54. Vgl.: E. BURN, op.cit.


politischen Organisation explizit fest. Es beschränkte die Zusammenarbeit auf die 

Verwaltungsebene, auf der ein zweites großes Ziel, die Errichtung eines 

supranationalen Gremiums und weitgehende Kompetenzübertragungen, langfristig 

nicht verwirklicht werden konnte. 55 Die CEPT konstituierte sich zweifellos als 

Komplement zum Weltpostverein und zur Fernmeldeunion, aber nicht zur EWG 

oder zum Europarat. 56 

4.6 Die Reaktionen der EWG-Staaten und des Europarats 

Die PTT-Ministerien der EWG-Staaten verständigten sich im Anschluss an die 

konstituierende Tagung der CEPT darauf, die eigenen Integrationsbemühungen 

vorerst auszusetzen und nur dann wieder aufzunehmen, wenn die CEPT keinen 

zufriedenstellenden Beitrag zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung des Gemeinsamen 

Marktes liefern würde. 

Die Organe des Europarats, die eine „institutionell-gouvernementale“ 

Integration gewünscht hatten, übten erwartungsgemäß starke Kritik sowohl an der 

politisch unabhängigen Organisationsform wie an den inhaltlichen Zielen der 

CEPT. Auf der Basis einer Empfehlung des Wirtschaftskomitees 57 beschloss die 

Beratende Versammlung am die Resolution Nr.171, in der jeder Mitgliedstaat des 

Europarats aufgefordert wurde, die CEPT nur als vorbereitend zu betrachten und 

schnellstmöglich eine Ministerkonferenz einzuberufen. 58 Die Aufforderung des 

Europarats verhallte allerdings ebenso ungehört wie die zaghaften Versuche der 

Beratenden Versammlung, nach 1963 einheitliche Post- und Fernsprechtarife 

zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten durchzusetzen. 59 

5. Weitere Integrationsschritte in den 1960er Jahren 

5.1 Die Gründung der CETS 

Im Frühjahr 1963 stieß die „funktionell-administrative“ Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen 

der CEPT erstmals an die Grenzen ihrer Kompetenzen. Schon im August des 

Vorjahres hatte die Frage im Raum gestanden, ob und in welcher Art sich die europäischen 

Staaten an einem Plan der USA beteiligen wollten, ein kommerzielles 

weltweites Fernmeldesatellitensystem aufzubauen. Die Mitgliedsverwaltungen der 

CEPT sahen nur eine gemeinsame europäische Mitarbeit in einem solchen System 

55. Vgl.: Kabinettsvorlage I K (H) 2203-7 vom 28.7.1959. BArch Koblenz, B257/25189. 

56. Vgl.: A. LANGENBERGER, De la position des télécommunications dans la nouvelle organisation 

européenne des PTT, in: Revue des PTT, 6(1959), S.175-176. 

57. Vgl.: Consultative Assembly Recommendation 206, 1959. 

58. Vgl.: Consultative Assembly Resolution 171, 1959. 


108 


als sinnvoll an und bildeten eine achtköpfige Arbeitsgruppe, 60 um die dafür notwendigen 

Schritte zu prüfen. 61 Diese resümierte, dass für eine Entscheidung über 

eine europäische Beteiligung oder ein eigenes europäisches Fernmeldesatellitenprojekt 

aufgrund der notwendigen hohen Investitionen das Mandat der nationalen 

Verwaltungen und somit auch der CEPT nicht ausreiche und dass deshalb eine Entscheidung 

auf Regierungsebene gefällt werden müsse. 62 

Die Außenminister, Fernmeldeminister und Verwaltungschefs aller CEPT-Staaten 

gründeten deshalb auf einer Konferenz in Paris die „Conférence Européenne des 

Télécommunications par Satellites“ (CETS). 63 Diese intergouvernementale Organisation 

übernahm in enger Kooperation mit den Arbeitsgruppen der CEPT 64 die 

Aufgaben, die europäischen Interessen bei den Verhandlungen über ein weltweites 

kommerzielles Satellitensystem zu koordinieren und ein gemeinsames europäisches 

Programm für Fernmeldeversuchssatelliten durchzuführen. 65 

5.2 Erneute Initiativen im Rahmen der EWG 

Unbeeindruckt von der Gründung der CEPT wurden zu Beginn der 1960er Jahre 

die Gemeinschaftsorgane der EWG aktiv, indem sie einheitliche Portogebühren 

innerhalb des Gemeinsamen Marktes diskutierten: Auf Initiative der Generaldirektion 

‚Wettbewerb’ mündete dies am im Abschluss von bilateralen Abkommen 

zwischen Deutschland, Frankreich und Belgien (Januar 1963), 66 die eine Anwendung 

von Inlandsgebühren im gegenseitigen Postverkehr zum Inhalt hatten. 67 

Die nationalen PTT-Ministerien und Verwaltungen werteten dieses Abkommen 

als ein Signal für eine Unzufriedenheit der EWG mit den Ergebnissen der 

CEPT-Arbeit 68 und bereiteten sich darauf vor, bei erneuten Vorstößen und 

eventuellen Integrationsversuchen der EWG-Organe selber die Initiative zu 

ergreifen, um die Entwicklungen steuern zu können. Diese Gelegenheit bot sich, 

als 1964 die bereits im EWG-Vertrag festgeschriebene Fusion der Europäischen 

60. Vgl.: J. PRESSLER, Tagung der Kommission „Fernmeldewesen“ der CEPT in Köln vom 4. bis 

14. Dezember 1962, in: Zeitschrift für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 4(1963), S.115-117. 

61. Vgl.: Sveriges Riksarkiv (Arninge), Televerket, Ekonomibyrån 1916-1967, F VI bg:9. 

62. Vgl.: W. FLORIAN, (u.a.), Die III. Ordentliche Vollversammlung der CEPT in München, in: Zeitschrift 

für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 20(1963), S.769-786. 

63. Vgl.: Sveriges Riksarkiv (Arninge), Televerket, Ekonomibyrån 1916-1967, F IV bj:1-25. 


65. Vgl.: G. LEHMANN, (u.a.), Europäische Fernmeldesatellitenprojekte, in: Zeitschrift für das Postund 

Fernmeldewesen, 20(1968), S.786-792. 


67. Vgl.: E. KUHN, Europapolitik im Post- und Fernmeldewesen, in: Archiv für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, 

3(1980), S.257-301. 

68. Bundespostminister Stücklen bemerkte hierzu am 8.3.1963 in der Zeitschrift „Europa”, „dass eine 

Form der europäischen Gebührenpolitik gefunden werden muss, die sowohl den Bestrebungen 

nach einer Harmonisierung der Postgebühren innerhalb der EWG Rechnung trägt, als auch den anderen 

europäischen Ländern ohne Schwierigkeiten den Weg zu einer Beteiligung eröffnet”. Vgl.: 

Manuskript des Artikels. BArch Koblenz, B257/6877.


Gemeinschaften ins Auge gefasst wurde. Im Rückgriff auf das alte Konzept von 

1958 strebten die PTT-Minister eine „institutionell-ministerielle“ Integration an, 

indem sie einen Rat der PTT-Minister in das Institutionengefüge der EWG 

eingliedern wollten. Im konkreten Fall beschlossen sie, eine Postgebührenrichtlinie 

durchzusetzen, die bereits 1963 von der CEPT empfohlen, aber aus Kostengründen 

von vielen Mitgliedern abgelehnt worden war. Ihren Beschluss stellten sie 

allerdings unter den Vorbehalt, dass er durch einen Rat der PTT-Minister zu 

bestätigen sei. Zudem riefen sie den Präsident der EWG-Kommission Walter 

Hallstein an, um zu klären welche Befugnisse der EWG in PTT-Angelegenheiten 

zustehen; welche Themen sinnvollerweise von ihr behandelt werden und ob im 

EWG-Vertrag eine juristische Basis für die Verschmelzung des Rats der 

PTT-Minister mit dem Rat der EWG vorhanden war. 

Die PTT-Minister aus Luxemburg, den Niederlanden und Deutschland 69 

meldeten starke Vorbehalte gegen eine „institutionell-gouvernementale“ Integration 

im Rahmen der EWG an und plädierten stattdessen für einen Ministerzusammenschluss 

im Rahmen der CEPT. Sie befürchteten negative Auswirkungen 

auf die Verwaltungszusammenarbeit der CEPT, wenn deren Organe 

feststellen müssten, dass ein engerer Kreis ihrer Mitglieder einen Teil ihrer 

Arbeit vorwegnehmen und in einer vielleicht nicht mehr änderbaren Weise 

vorab fixieren würde. 70 Explizit klammerten alle Minister die Behandlung von 

Satelliten-Fernmeldethemen aus ihren EWG-Planungen aus und betonten, dass 

in derartigen Angelegenheiten „die sechs Länder der EWG einen Kristallisierungspunkt 

im weiteren Rahmen der CEPT bilden sollten”. 71 Bereits am 5. 

Oktober 1964 legte der Kommissionspräsident Hallstein den von der Generaldirektion 

‚Wettbewerb’ ausgearbeiteten juristischen Prüfbericht über die Verschmelzung 

eines Rats der PTT-Minister mit dem Rat der EWG vor, in dem 

keine institutionellen Hindernisse gesehen wurden. Zusätzlich führte der 

Bericht eine Reihe von Zuständigkeitsbestimmungen des EWG-Vertrages auf, 

die es den Gemeinschaftsorganen erlauben würden, auf die Ausgestaltung des 

PTT-Wesens Einfluss zu nehmen. 

Der Rat fasste diesen Zusatz als eine Aufforderung zum aktiven Handeln auf 

und beauftragte die Kommission damit, die „Durchführung eines Aktionsprogramms 

der Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des Post- und Fernmeldewesen“ zu 

untersuchen und herauszufinden, ob im Konkreten auf der Grundlage der Art.100 72 


70. Vgl.: Sitzungsbericht: Réunion des six Ministres des PTT de la Communauté Economique 

Européenne Bruxelles. BArch Koblenz, B257/10566. 

71. Ibid., Bericht der deutschen Delegation. 

72. Art.100 im EWG-Vertrag vom 25. März 1957 [Richtlinien zur Angleichung gewisser Rechtsvorschriften]: 

(1) Der Rat erlässt einstimmig auf Vorschlag der Kommission Richtlinien für die Angleichung 

derjenigen Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten, die sich unmittelbar 

auf die Errichtung oder das Funktionieren des Gemeinsamen Marktes auswirken. (2) Die 

Versammlung und der Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuß werden zu den Richtlinien gehört, deren 

Durchführung in einem oder mehreren Mitgliedstaaten eine Änderung von gesetzlichen Vorschriften 

zur Folge hätte.

110 


und 101 73 des EWG-Vertrages der Rat eine Postgebührenrichtlinie zu erlassen 

befugt sei. Die Kommission ging diese Aufgaben zügig an, erhoffte sie sich doch 

eine langfristige Sicherung von Richtlinienkompetenzen im Bereich des 

PTT-Wesens. Bereits im April 1965 legte eine Sachverständigengruppe 74 der Generaldirektion 

Wettbewerb den Entwurf einer Postgebührenrichtlinie (Briefporto für 

kleinere Sendungen) vor, in der sich die langfristigen Kompetenzbestrebungen der 

Kommission deutlich wiederspiegeln: So sollte bei veränderten Kostenstrukturen 

der Rat auf Vorschlag der Kommission mit qualifizierter Mehrheit eine neue Richtlinie 

zur Anpassung der Gebühren erlassen können. Zwei Monate später wurde 

dem Rat der Richtlinienvorschlag offiziell vorgelegt. 

Unter allen Mitgliedstaaten lösten der Prüfbericht und die Postgebührenrichtlinie 

eine umfassende Diskussion aus, bei der die beteiligten Akteure unterschiedliche 

Positionen einnahmen. Prinzipiell befürworteten die Regierungen die Aktivitäten der 

EWG, solange deren inhaltliche Ziele ein Beitrag zum Gemeinsamen Markt sein 

sollten und sie die Idee der europäischen Integration stärkten. Sie sprachen sich 

jedoch gegen eine Anwendung des Artikels 100 aus, da sie dem Rat und der Kommission 

unerwünschte Richtlinienkompetenzen zugesprochen hätte. Nur die PTT-Minister 

aus Frankreich, Belgien und Italien unterstützten weitere Integrationsmaßnahmen 

der EWG, betonten aber sehr nachdrücklich ihre Forderung nach deren 

„institutionell-ministeriellem“ Charakter. Sie wollten weder eine Beteiligung anderer 

Ministerien noch der Kommission bei Entscheidungen akzeptieren. In Deutschland, 

den Niederlanden und Luxemburg hingegen begrüßten die zuständigen Minister die 

Integrationsbemühungen im Rahmen der EWG nur bedingt. Sie erkannten durchaus, 

dass sich das PTT-Wesen aus einer „harmonischen Entwicklung des Wirtschaftslebens 

innerhalb der Gemeinschaft” 75 nicht ausklammern lasse. Gleichzeitig wiesen 

sie aber darauf hin, dass „das PTT-Wesen heutzutage weltweiter Natur ist und mit der 

CEPT bereits ein engerer Verein für den Gesamtbereich Westeuropa“ bestünde. 76 Sie 

empfahlen daher den Rat der PTT-Minister der EWG nur dann aktiv werden zu 

lassen, wenn Regelungen auf breiter Basis nicht erforderlich oder erreichbar wären. 

Schließlich hatten die Verwaltungen die Notwendigkeit einer „institutionell-ministeriellen“ 

Weiterentwicklung ihrer Zusammenarbeit erkannt, wollten diese aber als ein 

73. Art.101 im EWG-Vertrag vom 25. März 1957 [Behandlung von den Wettbewerb verfälschenden Vorschriften]: 

(1) Ist zu befürchten, daß der Erlaß oder die Änderung einer Rechts- oder Verwaltungsvorschrift 

eine Verzerrung im Sinne des Artikels 100 verursacht, so setzt sich der Mitgliedstaat, der diese 

Maßnahme beabsichtigt, mit der Kommission ins Benehmen. Diese empfiehlt nach Beratung mit den 

Mitgliedstaaten den beteiligten Staaten die zur Vermeidung dieser Verzerrung geeigneten Maßnahmen. 

(2) Kommt der Staat, der innerstaatliche Vorschriften erlassen oder ändern will, der an ihn gerichteten 

Empfehlung der Kommission nicht nach, so kann nicht gemäß Artikel 100 verlangt werden, daß die anderen 

Mitgliedstaaten ihre innerstaatlichen Vorschriften ändern, um die Verzerrung zu beseitigen. Verursacht 

ein Mitgliedstaat, der die Empfehlung der Kommission außer acht läßt, eine Verzerrung lediglich 

zu seinem eigenen Nachteil, so findet Artikel 100 keine Anwendung. 

74. Vgl.: Sitzungsberichte der Sachverständigengruppe. BArch Koblenz, B257/34482. 

75. Vgl.: Art.2 Vertrag über die Gründung der EWG vom 25.3.1957. 

76. Bundespostminister Stücklen in einem Brief an seine Kabinettskollegen im Januar 1965. Vgl.: 

BArch Koblenz, B257/10566.


Komplement zur CEPT realisiert sehen. Sofern überhaupt Absprachen zwischen den 

sechs Ministern notwendig seien, bevorzugten die Verwaltungen es, diese außerhalb 

der EWG-Institutionen durchzuführen. Insbesondere sollten dem Rat und der Kommission 

keinerlei Kompetenzen in PTT-Angelegenheiten zufallen. 

Hinsichtlich der Postgebührenrichtlinie scheiterten die Bemühungen der 

Generaldirektion ‚Wettbewerb’ und der nationalen PTT-Ministerien nach über 

zweieinhalbjähriger Diskussion am einheitlichen Widerstand der Verwaltungen. 

Diese bewerteten Beschlüsse über Einheitsgebühren als verfrüht und verwiesen auf 

Arbeiten der CEPT, 77 nach denen vor einer umfassenden Gebührenangleichung 

zuerst eine Harmonisierung der nationalen Dienstleistungen und Kostenstrukturen, 

d.h. eine einheitliche Posthaushaltspolitik, erfolgen müsse. 78 Im Rahmen einer 

gemischten Studiengruppe mit der Kommission über die wirtschaftlichen Folgen 

einer Postgebührenrichtlinie verzögerten die Verwaltungen die Beratungen 

hierüber bis in den November 1967, indem sie sehr langsam und nur separat mit 

der Generaldirektion ‚Wettbewerb’ die Richtlinien diskutierten, sich untereinander 

aber zügig und permanent über ihr Vorgehen absprachen. 79 Die Verwaltungen 

beriefen sich bei ihrer Argumentation geschickt auf den EWG-Vertrag. Sie 

bezweifelten zunächst die Zuständigkeit der Gemeinschaft nach Art.100 und 101, 

da die von ihnen erbrachten Leistungen in den Bereichen der Post und des 

Fernmeldewesens untereinander nicht vergleichbar wären. Zudem sahen sie es als 

nicht hinreichend geklärt an, ob die Leistungen der PTT-Dienste überhaupt eine 

Dienstleistung nach Art.3 wären. Der Generaldirektion ‚Wettbewerb’ fehlten die 

notwendigen Sachkenntnisse, um der Argumentation der Verwaltungen begegnen 

zu können und so ergab die Studie, dass die Postgebührenrichtlinie ohne eine 

einheitliche Posthaushaltspolitik zu Wettbewerbsverzerrungen führen würde. 

In der allgemeinen Frage weiterer Integrationsschritte sah sich die Kommission 

einer breiten Front aus Verwaltungen, Ministerien und Regierungen gegenüber 

gestellt, die weder der Kommission noch dem Rat weitreichende 

Richtlinienkompetenzen zusprechen wollte. Die PTT-Minister hatten weitere 

Integrationsschritte ohnehin von deren inhaltlicher Schwerpunktsetzung abhängig 

gemacht und als einzigen Inhalt die einheitliche Gebührenpolitik genannt. Ohne 

konkrete Fortschritte in dieser Frage waren weitere Integrationsmaßnahmen für sie 

ausgeschlossen. Angesichts der politischen EWG-Krise wünschten die 

Regierungen jedoch keine Diskussion um Rechtsangleichungsproblematiken, so 

dass weitere Integrationsbestrebungen der EWG vorerst scheiterten. 80 

77. Vgl.: E. KUHN, S.261. 

78. Vgl.: CEPT (Hrsg.), 25 ème Anniversaire 1984, Montreux, 1984. 


80. Vgl.: Ressortbesprechung vom 16.1.1965. BArch Koblenz, B257/6879.

112 


5.3 Die CEPT-Ministerkonferenz 

Der italienische Fernmeldeminister Giovanni Spagnolli schlug im Rahmen einer 

Konferenz des „British Council of the European Movement“ in London (14./ 

15.6.1967) vor, eine Konferenz der Fernmeldeminister der CEPT-Mitgliedsländer 

einzuberufen. Mit diesem Vorschlag entsprach er einer von den CEPT-Verwaltungen 

bereits mehrfach in Vollversammlungen geäußerten Forderung nach einer 

„institutionell-ministeriellen“ Integration zur Unterstützung ihrer Arbeit. 81 Der 

inhaltliche Kernpunkt sollte darin bestehen, die Empfehlungen der CEPT in verpflichtende 

nationale Bestimmungen umzuwandeln und eine gemeinsame 

europäische PTT-Politik zu formulieren. 82 

Auf einer ersten Konferenz der PTT-Minister der CEPT-Staaten in Rom betonten 

die Minister die Notwendigkeit einer „institutionell-ministeriellen“ Erweiterung 

der CEPT, da 83 – erstens - die Entscheidungsbefugnisse der CEPT bei Fragen 

der Fernmeldesatelliten zu gering seien und sie deshalb zu passiv agiere, – 

zweitens – die Umsetzung der CEPT-Empfehlungen in die Praxis „zu wünschen 

übrig lässt”, 84 – drittens - die Verwaltungen vielfach nicht gewillt seien, ihre Partikularinteressen 

dem Gemeinschaftsinteresse unterzuordnen und eine nationale 

Umsetzung ungeliebter Gemeinschaftsbeschlüsse blockierten, 85 und- viertens – 

ansonsten langfristig eine „institutionell-gouvernementale“ Integration im Rahmen 

der EWG zu erwarten sei. Durch koordinierte europäische Entscheidungen sollte 

die CEPT klare Richtlinien für ihre Arbeit erhalten. 86 Die fruchtbaren Ansätze der 

CEPT, in der die Minister ein brauchbares Instrument sahen, um die europäischen 

Interessen nach außen zu vertreten, sollten genutzt und weiterentwickelt werden. 87 

Als typisches Beispiel solcher Ansätze bezeichnete die Ministerkonferenz das seit 

1963 bestehende CEPT-Clearing, ein System der multilateralen Verrechnung von 

finanziellen Forderungen, das sogar großen Wirtschaftsunternehmen offen stand. 

Hieran hatten sich einige Länder noch nicht beteiligt, weil es zu Abstimmungsproblemen 

zwischen Verwaltung und Ministerium gekommen war. 88 

Uneinigkeit herrschte noch in der Frage, auf welcher rechtlichen Grundlage 

sich die Ministerkonferenz organisieren sollte. Während der belgische 

PTT-Minister die Gründung einer formellen Organisation befürwortete, plädierte 

die Mehrheit der anwesenden Minister, insbesondere diejenigen aus 


82. Vgl.: Gesprächsmitschrift eines informellen Treffen zwischen Spagnolli und Postminister Dollinger. 

BArch Koblenz, B257/1402. 


84. Vgl.: Mitschrift des Protokollanten. CEPT-Archiv Kopenhagen. 


86. Vgl.: Protokoll der Tagung der Europäischen Minister des Post und Fernmeldewesens in Rom. 

CEPT-Archiv Kopenhagen. 

87. Vgl.: H. FICKEL, Europäische Konferenz der Verwaltungen für Post und Fernmeldewesen, in: 

H. STEINMETZ (Hrsg.), Handwörterbuch des Postwesens, Bundesdruckerei, Berlin, 1971, 

S.651-659. 

88. Vgl.: Protokoll der Brüsseler Ministerkonferenz. CEPT-Archiv Kopenhagen.


Großbritannien, Schweden und Deutschland, für regelmäßig einzuberufende, 

informelle Tagungen. 89 Die Konferenzteilnehmer einigten sich schließlich mit 

großer Mehrheit auf die informelle Variante, u.a. um ihre „funktionelle Autonomie“ 

zu wahren. 90 Die Tagungsinhalte sollten in enger Kooperation mit dem 

CEPT-Sekretariat erarbeitet werden und in erster Linie 

“die nicht vollumfänglich angewandten CEPT-Empfehlungen sowie auch andere 

Themata enthalten, welche ein jedes Land zu diskutieren wünscht”. 91 

6. Schlussfolgerung 

Die europäischen Integrationsbestrebungen im PTT-Wesen in den 1950er und 

1960er Jahren wurden von zwei unterschiedlichen inhaltlichen Zielen der beteiligten 

Akteure bestimmt: Das erste, einen Beitrag zur harmonischen Entwicklung des 

Wirtschaftslebens und zur Beseitigung von Wettbewerbshemmnissen im gemeinsamen 

Wirtschaftsraum Europa bzw. dem Gemeinsamen Markt zu leisten, gehörte 

in den Kontext der Europäischen Einigungsbestrebungen und wurde von außen an 

das PTT-Wesen herangetragen. Das zweite, die Zusammenarbeit der europäischen 

PTT-Verwaltungen effektiver zu gestalten, resultierte aus der Notwendigkeit einer 

intensiveren Kooperation der Verwaltungen in praktischen Aufgabenbereichen wie 

Fragen des innereuropäischen Posttransports, der Planung von europäischen Telekommunikationsnetzen 

oder der Zusammenarbeit in den globalen Organisationen. 

Für dieses Ziel war eine breitere Mitgliederbasis als die der EWG wünschenswert. 

Zwischen den Akteuren, die diese unterschiedlichen inhaltlichen Ziele umzusetzen 

wünschten, ließ sich in einem Punkt ein Konsens herstellen: Sie wollten eine Integration 

im PTT-Wesen, notfalls indem beide Ziele gleichzeitig umgesetzt würden. 

Unterschiedliche Auffassungen herrschten allerdings über deren organisatorische 

Struktur: Die nationalen Regierungen der EWG-Staaten und die Organe des 

Europarats forderten die „institutionell-gouvernementale“ Integration, da sie in ihr 

den besten Weg zur Umsetzung ihrer wirtschaftlichen Ziele sahen. Die Verwaltungen 

wollten hingegen ihre praktische Zusammenarbeit effektiver gestalten und 

schlugen eine „funktionell-administrative“ Integration vor. Sie waren überzeugt, 

dass sich aus ihr zwangsläufig ein Beitrag zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Europas 

ergeben würde. Die PTT-Minister versuchten, mit der „institutionell-ministeriellen“ 

Integration einen Mittelweg einzuschlagen, der die Umsetzung beider Ziele 

ermöglichen würde. 

Die entscheidende Interessenkoalition bildeten die Verwaltungen und Ministerien 

der EWG-Staaten, die sich zwar an unterschiedlichen Integrationsleitbildern 

orientierten, jedoch beide eine „institutionell-gouvernementale“ Integration grund- 

89. Vgl.: Gesprächsnotiz des Bundespostministers Dollinger. BArch Koblenz, B257/23575. 

90. Vgl.: Mitschrift des Protokollanten. CEPT-Archiv Kopenhagen. 

91. Vgl.: Abschlusskommuniqué der Tagung der europäischen Minister des Post- und Fernmeldewesens 

in Rom. CEPT-Archiv Kopenhagen.

114 


sätzlich ablehnten. Diese kam für sie einem Souveränitätsverlust nach innen wie 

außen gleich: nach außen, weil das Initiativ- und Beschlussrecht für Gemeinschaftsprojekte 

an Organisationen übertragen worden wäre, deren Entscheidungsträger 

nicht originär dem PTT-Wesen zugerechnet werden konnten und die 

ausschließlich wirtschaftliche Ziele verfolgten; nach innen, weil die ministeriellen 

Kompetenzabgrenzungen zu Ungunsten der jeweiligen PTT-Minister aufgeweicht 

worden wären. 

Die Gründung der EGPF im Rahmen der EWG, gegenüber der keine 

Akteursgruppe prinzipiell abgeneigt war, scheiterte 1959 letztlich an innerstaatlichen 

Kompetenzstreitigkeiten und weil die EWG sich noch nicht als eigenständiger Akteur 

artikulieren konnte. Die Integrationsbemühungen des Europarates, die parallel zu denen 

der EWG verliefen, standen nie wirklich zur Diskussion. Stattdessen nahm die 

„funktionell-administrative“ Integration auf breiter Mitgliederbasis immer deutlichere 

Konturen an. Die CEPT war schließlich eine Kompromisslösung, die die nationalen 

Regierungen akzeptieren konnten: Sie versprach, die harmonische Entwicklung des 

Gemeinsamen Marktes zu unterstützen und stand einer vertieften Zusammenarbeit der 

EWG-Staaten langfristig nicht im Weg. Nur der Europarat übte Kritik, doch die 

verhallte ungehört. 

Eine ähnliche Entwicklung wie bei der Gründung der CEPT zeigte sich auch 

bei den weiteren Integrationsbemühungen in den 1960er Jahren: Die 

PTT-Verwaltungen und mit Einschränkungen auch die Ministerien setzten ihre 

Integrationsvorstellungen durch, diesmal auch gegen die EWG-Organe als neue 

Akteursgruppe im Ringen um die europäische PTT-Zusammenarbeit. Insofern 

lassen sich die CETS und die CEPT-Ministerkonferenz als funktionelle 

Erweiterungen der CEPT ansehen, die sich auf diese Weise als geeignetes 

Fundament für eine intergouvernementale Zusammenarbeit erwies. Die zentrale 

Stellung der Verwaltungen verdeutlichte sich auch bei den Versuchen der 

EWG-Organe, in PTT-Angelegenheiten eigene Richtlinienkompetenzen zu 

erlangen. Die Verwaltungen nutzten ihre traditionellen Informationsmonopole und 

ihre formellen wie informellen Netzwerke, um die Integrationsbestrebungen in 

ihrem Sinne zu lenken. Bemerkenswert war dabei das Selbstverständnis, mit dem 

sie in internationalen PTT-Angelegenheiten souverän agierten. Der EWG und dem 

Europarat kamen insofern zentrale Bedeutung zu, als dass sie den 

Integrationsprozess im PTT-Wesen in den 1950er Jahren in Gang gesetzt hatten, 

ihm permanent neue Impulse gaben, wichtige Rahmenbedingungen schufen und 

wirtschaftliche Aspekte nicht von der Tagesordnung verschwinden ließen. Das 

Post- und Fernmeldewesen war einer der wenigen Politikbereiche überhaupt, in 

denen in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren eine europäische Entscheidungsfindung auf 

breiter Mitgliederbasis institutionalisiert wurde.

115 

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 

Anne-Marie SAINT-GILLE – La «Paneurope». Un débat d’idées dans l’entre-deux-guerres, 

Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, 2003, 389 p. – ISBN 2-84050-286-0 – 22,00 €. 

L’ouvrage d’Anne-Marie Saint-Gille – professeur de littérature et de civilisation germanique 

à l’Université Lumière-Lyon II – ne porte pas tant sur l’histoire du mouvement paneuropéen 

dans l’entre-deux-guerres, que sur la genèse du programme élaboré en 1923 par la figure 

emblématique du comte Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi et sur la réception du message paneuropéen 

dans les milieux intellectuels germanophones. 

L’auteur fournit ici un remarquable travail de synthèse, ne manquant pas de rappeler 

l’importance de la figure de Coudenhove-Kalergi et de son mouvement – l’histoire de ce 

dernier tendant à se confondre avec celle de son promoteur (p.10) – dans les débats européistes 

qui suivent la grande déflagration de 14-18. Mais, sans verser dans le travers de certains 

hagiographes du «prophète de l’Europe», Anne-Marie Saint-Gille commente rapidement les 

éléments biographiques mis en avant par Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi lui-même. 

Recadrant intelligemment la problématique de l’européisme dans l’entre-deux-guerres, 

l’auteur aborde, dans une première partie, la genèse du message paneuropéen qu’élabore R. 

Coudenhove-Kalergi en 1923. Non contente d’analyser, en profondeur, le livre-programme 

Pan-Europe – avec la publication de cet ouvrage Coudenhove se proposait de faire naître un 

grand mouvement politique pour l’unification de l’Europe – elle décrit, avec succès, 

l’environnement culturel dans lequel évolue le jeune R. Coudenhove-Kalergi. Aussi 

explore-t-elle les travaux philosophiques du comte – études qui préfigurent les fondements 

idéologiques de sa pensée politique – et établit, pour la première fois, les filiations intellectuelles 

avec d’autres penseurs précurseurs tels qu’Albert Demangeon, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, 

Maximilian Harden, Thomas Masaryk, Kurt Hiller, Alfred Hermann Fried, etc. L’auteur peut 

alors démontrer que, d’une part, le projet européiste élaboré par Coudenhove-Kalergi – il sert et 

de référence et de programme au mouvement paneuropéen – porte l’empreinte du contexte 

historique de la «nouvelle» Europe née de Versailles et que, d’autre part, il s’est élaboré non sans 

référence aux réflexions de plusieurs intellectuels. Par ailleurs, évoquant Oswald Spengler – le 

philosophe à avoir «pousser le plus loin la popularisation de l’idée de déclin» (p.72), l'auteur 

rebondit sur les fondements idéologiques du projet – la notion de crise, la critique partielle des 

«Lumières», le concept d’«hyperéthique», le nouvel héroïsme – pour redéfinir le projet 

paneuropéen en termes d’«idéalisme pratique». 

Se penchant ensuite sur l’histoire de l’Union Paneuropéenne et sur l’action de 

Coudenhove-Kalergi sur la scène politique et diplomatique – l’objectif du leader 

paneuropéen étant de faire passer par ses écrits et ses conférences la notion d’unification 

européenne – l’auteur analyse la stratégie européiste mise alors en place. Anne-Marie 

Saint-Gille montre comment l’Union Paneuropéenne – après avoir connu une phase 

d’ascension dans les années vingt – s’adapte aux nouvelles réalités de l’entre-deux-guerres – 

celles issues de la crise économique mondiale et d’un contexte politique de plus en plus 

hostile à l’européisme. Cependant, omettant de faire référence à divers travaux récents – 

français, allemands et belges –, l’analyse livrée ici ne tient manifestement pas compte de la 

dimension des relations internationales – notamment dans le cadre de «l’initiative Briand» 

(pp.177-185 et 188-191). De plus, on peut aussi regretter que l’étude ne se base pas plus 

précisément sur les archives du mouvement paneuropéen (fonds 771 et surtout 554) 

conservés aux Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv de Moscou (anciennes archives 

spéciales) dont le Centre d’archives et de recherches européennes (CARE – FAE dans 

l’ouvrage) de l’institut européen de l’Université de Genève ne possède que certaines copies.

116 


Ceci conduit l’auteur à plusieurs imprécisions – relatives notamment à l’organisation 

avortée d’un deuxième Congrès paneuropéen à Bruxelles en octobre 1927, puis à Paris en 

octobre 1928 (pp.152-154) – et à des erreurs d’analyse – concernant, par exemple, l’aspect 

économique de l’action du Comte dans les années qui suivent le Premier Congrès 

Paneuropéen de Vienne en octobre 1926. 

Dans une troisième et dernière partie, Anne-Marie Saint-Gille évoque la réception des 

idées paneuropéennes dans divers milieux intellectuels – politiques et littéraires – 

germanophones. Des différents débats qui naissent alors surgit une réflexion multiforme sur 

les fondements culturels de la civilisation européenne, sur l’identité européenne (Europe et 

Occident, modernité politique et européisme) et sur le sens même de la crise que traverse 

l’Europe d’entre-deux-guerres. Particulièrement dense, cette troisième partie, dans laquelle 

l’auteur privilégie une démarche thématique, dresse un tableau intellectuel d’une très grande 

richesse, évoquant les points communs mais surtout les différences entre Richard 

Coudenhove-Kalergi et les intellectuels allemands tels que Wilhelm Heile, Karl Anton von 

Rohan, Thomas Mann, Klaus Mann, etc. 

L’ouvrage d’Anne-Marie Saint-Gille, s’il accuse certaines faiblesses dans la seconde 

partie, contribue très certainement à «recadrer» la figure du comte Coudenhove-Kalergi et 

de son mouvement qui – bien qu’il ne soit pas parvenu à l’idéal qu’il s’était fixé, n’en 

demeure pas moins essentiel pour l’histoire de l’idée d’Europe unie. 

Geneviève Duchenne 

Institut d’études européennes, 

Université catholique de Louvain 

Catherine GUISAN – Un sens à l’Europe. Gagner la paix (1950-2003), Odile Jacob, 

Paris, 2003, 291 p. – ISBN 2-7381-1356-7 – 27,5 €. 

Dans l’historiographie de la construction européenne, comme partout, la tendance, en dehors 

des cercles initiés, est à la renationalisation. Beaucoup d’ouvrages de ces dernières années tentent 

à expliquer l’unification européenne uniquement ou presque par de multiples combinaison 

des intérêts nationaux (p.ex. Gerhard Brunn, Die europäische Einigung von 1945 bis heute, 

Stuttgart, 2002) ou par des conjugaisons d’intérêts économiques (p.ex. John Gillingham, 

Superstate or New Market Economy? European integration 1950-2003, Cambridge, 2003). 

Rares sont ceux qui prennent au sérieux soit le caractère trans- et supranational de la construction 

européenne (comme p.ex. Johnny Laursen, Towards a Supranational History?, Journal of 

European Integration History, 1(2002), pp. 5-10), soit les idées, convictions, motifs et visions 

des acteurs: C’est justement l’approche de Catherine Guisan qui oppose ainsi, sans se référer 

au débat théorique, aux interprétations «réalistes» de la construction européenne une histoire 

«constructiviste». En effet, ce n’est qu’ainsi que l’on peut rendre à l’œuvre européen son 

«sens» – en le retrouvant là où il a été conçu, à la source, à l’esprit des pères fondateurs et de 

leurs successeurs, jusqu’aux conventionnels des années 2002/03. 

Catherine Guisan identifie quatre «principes d’action» qui ont inspiré et guidé les 

acteurs: la réconciliation, l’action concertée-puissance, la reconnaissance de l’autre, le 

parler vrai et juste, quatre principes qui ont donné des impulsions décisives à la construction 

européenne. Elle les subdivise en «pratiques» afin d’opérationnaliser ces critères, à l'instar, 

p.ex., de la réconciliation: ce principe implique d’assumer une part de responsabilité pour le 

mal fait; implique la disposition de pardonner; une promesse, un projet d’avenir; une 

organisation matérielle de la solidarité; suppose que ce processus sensible se passe sous 

l’égide d’une puissance extérieure, un «ange gardien» (les Etats-Unis dans les premiers pas 

de la construction européenne). C’est par ces moyens que l’auteur échappe à la gratuité

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 117 

d’une simple analyse des belles convictions des acteurs et arrive à jeter le pont entre les 

idées et les réalisations politiques, économiques et sociales. 

Tout en restant fidèle á la méthode du récit historique – elle parle du «fablier» de la 

construction européenne -, Catherine Guisan est hautement consciente des fondements 

théoriques de son approche. Tour à tour, elle relie les principes d’actions qu’elle retrouve 

dans ses sources historiques à des considérations théoriques de Hannah Arendt, de Juergen 

Habermas, de Charles Taylor et d’autres encore. Le tandem conceptuel de «pardon et de 

promesse» par exemple est emprunté à Hannah Arendt et sert d’instrument d’analyse, de 

grille de lecture notamment des premières étapes de la création des communautés 

européennes, tandis que les idées de Habermas sur une démocratie basée sur une 

communication entre égaux, sans domination, susceptibles de faire surgir et prévaloir le 

meilleur argument (au lieu de l’opinion de celui qui dispose du pouvoir) sert à saisir une part 

de la méthode de concertation chère à Jean Monnet ou encore les délibérations de la 

Convention constitutionnelle. Le communautarisme de Taylor, par contre, est utilisable pour 

comprendre la nécessité, sinon la réalité, de la reconnaissance de l’autre, dans le sens 

individuel et personnel – cet autre qui était ennemi et devient partenaire -, mais aussi dans le 

sens politique et actuel, dans la perspective de l’élargissement qui lui aussi demande un 

effort de reconnaissance de l’égalité, de la dignité des peuples européens qui étaient 

jusqu’alors exclus de la construction européenne. 

Il est parfaitement conséquent, dans une telle approche, de se baser sur une masse de 

sources historiques composée essentiellement de mémoires, interviews, entretiens, plutôt 

que sur des documents diplomatiques ou des données chiffrées. Catherine Guisan a affaire à 

un «objet subjectif», et elle n’y accède que par des sources des sujets impliqués, des 

personnes concrètes, de leurs pensées. C’est ce fond de sources et leur exploitation qui rend 

le livre en même temps très vivant, très proche de la vie humaine, fascinant aussi par les 

multiples expériences personnelles qu’elle raconte – ce qui, qu’il soit dit encore une fois, 

n’est pas une déviation mais scientifiquement nécessaire si on choisi l’approche esquissé. 

En effet, Catherine Guisan réussit à relever un «trésor» (son premier chapitre est intitulé «Un 

trésor perdu»), dont l’Europe doit s’assurer pour faire son chemin dans l’avenir. Ce trésor n’est 

pas un fantasme de quelques idéalistes. Catherine Guisan met sur la table les preuves de l’impact 

de la pensée sur la réalité: Sans les «principes d’action», sans le pardon et la promesse, sans la 

reconnaissance de l’autre etc., l’Europe unifiée n’aurait pas vu le jour. Il ne suffit décidément pas 

d’invoquer les intérêts des Etats et les intérêts économiques pour expliquer ce phénomène. 

L’Union européenne, comme les européens dans leurs Etats, ont tout intérêt à se rendre à cette 

évidence, à l’heure de la réunification et de la constitution de l’Europe … 

Hartmut Marhold 

Directeur général du Centre international de formation européenne, Nice 

Martin P.C. SCHAAD – Bullying Bonn: Anglo-German Diplomacy on European 

Integration, 1955-61, Macmillan, London, 2000, viii + 243 p.- ISBN 0-333-69231-4. – 

47,50 £. 

Is ‘bullying Bonn’ fair comment on British policy towards Germany about European 

integration in the second half of the Fifties? Martin Schaad makes a good case that it is, 

indeed, fair comment. He charts a rather depressing episode in Britain's attempt to come to 

terms with, and be part of the process of European integration. Although Schaad does not 

make the point, and he might have, what he is describing is the management of decline on 

Britain's part and the politics of rebirth on the part of Germany and the embryonic European 

Union. Britain has not always managed decline with grace and the EEC-EFTA debate and 

policy confrontation is a case in point.

118 


Schaad’s central theme is how the British government developed a profound antipathy 

towards the EEC which it saw as a major threat which could only be contained in a larger free 

trade area. ‘Little Europe’ was an expression of contempt on the British part. But what could 

be done to parry this potential threat? France and the Benelux countries had gone beyond the 

pale in their steadfast commitment to the EEC so Germany became the target. If Germany 

could be persuaded to support a wider free trade area then the circle could be squared with 

‘little Europe’ firmly enveloped in a wide British-conceived free trade area. And there were 

voices in Germany that embraced such a concept, notably that of Ludwig Erhard. But Konrad 

Adenauer and his Foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano would have nothing of it. The battle 

was therefore Anglo-German and intra-German and it became quite vicious. 

I had always thought that the classic statement of British arrogance and misjudgement on 

European matters was the closing (and departing) statement of the relatively lower-level 

British official as he took Britain out of the Messina talks in 1955. But consider Harold 

Macmillan's rage against France and Germany in 1958 as he realised that the game was up 

(Schaad pp.91-92): 

”I feel we ought to make it quite clear to our European friends that if little Europe is 

formed without a parallel development of a Free Trade Area we shall have to reconsider the 

whole of our political and economic attitude towards Europe. I doubt if we could remain in 

NATO. We should certainly put on highly protective tariffs and quotas to counteract what 

Little Europe was doing to us. In other words, we should not allow ourselves to be destroyed 

little by little. We would fight back with every weapon in our armoury. We would take our 

troops out of Europe. We would withdraw from NATO. We would adopt a policy of 

isolationism. We would surround ourselves with rockets and we would say to the Germans, 

the French and all the rest of them: ‘Look after yourselves with your own forces. Look after 

yourselves when the Russians overrun your countries’”. 

One wonders if the archives will have similar outbursts from Tony Blair, Alastair 

Campbell et al regarding France and Germany over Iraq. In the end, then as now, France and 

Germany stood firm. Adenauer kept faith with France and put the French-German 

relationship first and weathered the internal and British pressure and the British eventually 

had to compose with Little Europe. 

Unfortunately the quotation cited from Schaad’s work is out of character with the rest of 

his monograph in the sense that his is essentially a bloodless account of a bloody episode. 

Bullying Bonn is part of the highly eclectic St Anthony's Series published by Macmillan. It 

is a version of Dr. Schaad’s doctoral thesis and its provenance shows. There are 173 pages of 

text and 50 pages of notes. The monograph is a study of the archives and little beyond the 

archives. This is a pity since the real world does not get fully into the archives. Where is 

Parliament, the press, pressure groups and the people? But perhaps this is a political 

scientist’s view of an historian’s work and it must be acknowledged that the archives seem to 

be well and truly rummaged. On the other hand there are no interviews with participants of 

whom some might still have been available when Dr. Schaad was undertaking his research. 

An opportunity has also been missed to look at relevant conceptual literature in 

decision-making theory and international political economy. What would Graham Allison 

have made of it all? Surprisingly many French names are mis-spelled and principal is 

confused with principle. Bad marks to the author and publisher! 

On the more empirical side the concentration on Britain and Germany leads to France 

and the United States being black-boxed, while Italy is not even mentioned in the index. 

Moreover, outside events are missing. Suez seared Britain both internationally and 

throughout society, but it has barely a mention. The 0EEC played an important role but there 

is little analysis of its impact as an organisation and not just as a neutral forum. Britain's 

relations with the ECSC could have been more sympathetically treated since the ECSC 

came at a difficult moment for Britain following nationalisation of coal and steel. The huge


size of the British industry in relation to the smaller industries of the Six created problems 

and there were philosophical issues on cartels. Nevertheless the British did become an 

associate member. But by the time Schaad brings us to the preparations for the British 

request for membership of ‘Little Europe’, the atmosphere had changed and only Germany 

really supported British membership. Britain was to pay a high price for its arrogance and 

gratuitously anti-Six attitude. 

This review should not detract from the interesting, important and not terribly 

well-known tale that Dr. Schaad has to tell. But in truth in such a short book it does seem to 

be a rather long read or is this simply a political scientist's prejudice? 

A.J.R. Groom 

University of Kent 

Gisela MÜLLER-BRANDECK-BOQUET (Hrsg.) – Europäische Außenpolitik. GASP- und 

ESVP-Konzeptionen ausgewählter EU-Mitgliedstaaten, Würzburger Universitätsschriften zu 

Geschichte und Politik, Bd.3, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2002, 149 S. – ISBN 

3-7890-7743-7 – 25,00 Ä. 

Die GASP/ESVP ist in ständiger Bewegung. Dieses Buch analysiert in acht Kapiteln die 

Entwicklung und Zukunftsperspektiven der GASP/ESVP – unter Berücksichtigung der 

Positionen Deutschlands, Großbritanniens, Finnlands, Österreichs, der Niederlande, Italiens 

und Frankreichs. 

Der erste Beitrag – von Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet verfasst – widmet sich dem 

Thema „Das neue Entscheidungssystem in der GASP”. Für die GASP bedeutete die 

Einführung des Amtes des Hohen Vertreters (HV) Mitte Oktober 1999 erst „eine Verbesserung 

ihrer Kohärenz und Sichtbarkeit, die die internationale Rolle der EU beträchtlich aufwertet” 

(S.25). Dadurch erfolgte, so die Autorin, auch eine „Brüsselisierung der GASP”, der „Mr. 

GASP” wurde „supreme manager” des Brüsseler GASP-Entscheidungssystems: „auch seine 

neuen Dienste tragen eine entnationalisierte, eben „brüsselisierte” Rationalität in die 

Kompetenz und Implementation der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik hinein, die die EU erst zu 

geschlossenem außenpolitischen Auftreten befähigt. Die Entfaltung einer gemeinsamen ESVP 

schließlich verschafft der GASP die Glaubwürdigkeit, die ihr bislang fehlte” (ebd.). 

Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet sieht „Schritte in Richtung einer Überwindung der 

Säulenkonstruktion durch Überführung der GASP in den Gemeinschaftsbereich das 

langfristige Ziel europäischer außenpolitischer Ambitionen”. 

Elfriede Regelsberger betont in ihrem Artikel zum Thema „Deutschland und die GASP – 

ein Mix aus Vision und Pragmatismus”, dass für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als 

politischer Akteur der europäische Integrationsprozess von Beginn an von vitalem Interesse 

war und ist. Begründet wird dieses Faktum mit dem Wunsch Deutschlands nach enger 

Einbindung in ein europäisches Integrationssystems nach der Isolation kurz nach dem 

Zweiten Weltkrieg. Deutschland sollte dadurch die Rückkehr in die europäische 

Staatengemeinschaft ermöglicht werden, verbunden mit der Rückgewinnung internationalen 

Ansehens und der Unterstützung des Zieles der Wiedervereinigung. Deutschland war und ist 

ein starker Befürworter einer europäischen Außen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 

„aus Gründen der eigenen begrenzten Handlungsmöglichkeiten wie integrationspolitische 

Erwägungen”. Für Deutschland verspricht demnach der europäische Integrationsprozess 

„hohe Nutzenvorteile bei vertretbaren Kosten”. 

Emil J. Kirchner schreibt über „British Perspectives on CFSP and ESDP” und 

unterstreicht die britische Einstellung zur GASP/ESVP wie folgt: „The legacy of an empire, 

the role as a balancer in the 19 th century, its role in the second world war, and the special

120 


relationship with the United States are amongst the main factors which have prevented 

Britain so far from fully engaging with its continental counterparts on CFSP matters, or 

from embracing thoroughly the integrationist aims and ethos many continental countries 

associate with CFSP” (S.41). Großbritannien agiert nach dem Prinzip: “Wir haben keine 

dauerhaften Freunde, nur dauerhafte Interessen” (ebd.). Aufgrund der Insellage 

Großbritanniens und der geografischen Trennung vom europäischen Kontinent sehen sich 

viele Briten auf dem halben Weg zwischen Europa und den USA (S.41). Erstmals 

verkündete der britische Premier Tony Blair auf dem informellen Gipfel der EU-Staats- und 

Regierungschefs in Pörtschach/Kärnten im Herbst 1998, dass Großbritannien bereit ist, die 

Entwicklung der ESVP zu unterstützen – unter folgenden Bedingungen: Ausbau der 

militärischen als der institutionellen Fähigkeiten, Bewahrung der Zwischenstaatlichkeit der 

GASP/ESVP und keine Duplizierung zur NATO. Im November 1998 waren sich in Saint 

Malo Frankreichs Staatspräsident Jacques Chirac und Tony Blair einig, autonome 

militärische Fähigkeiten für die EU zu entwickeln. 

Paul Luif verfasste seinen Beitrag über „Die Bündnisfreien und neutralen Mitgliedstaaten 

der EU: Ihre Position in der Außen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik”. Mit der 

Einführung der GASP mussten Finnland, Österreich und Schweden ihre Außen- und 

Sicherheitspolitik den rechtlichen Bestimmungen, aber auch schon der Politik der EU vor 

ihrem Beitritt anpassen. Die neutralen/bündnisfreien wurden dabei nicht zur Übernahme 

einer militärischen Beistandsklausel gezwungen. Diese wiederum akzeptierten die sich 

entwickelnde militärische Zusammenarbeit der EU-Staaten. Die Regierungen der neutralen/ 

bündnisfreien Staaten stecken jedoch „in einem Dilemma. Sie haben versprochen, den 

Aufbau der Krisenreaktionskräfte im Rahmen der militärischen Zusammenarbeit der EU 

mitzutragen, auch im Hinblick auf ein glaubwürdiges Auftreten gegenüber der NATO 

(sprich der USA) und sonstiger Drittstaaten. Gegenüber der eigenen Bevölkerung müssen 

sie die neuen Aktionsmöglichkeiten als eine Fortsetzung der bekannten peacekeeping 

Einsätze der UNO darstellen. Ob damit die EU ein handlungsfähiger Akteur im 

Krisenmanagement sein wird, sei dahin gestellt” (S.75). 

Ben Soetendorp und Rob de Wijk behandelten den niederländischen Standpunkt über die 

GASP/ESVP in ihrem Beitrag „A Dutch policy reversal towards the ESDP”. Die außen- und 

Sicherheitspolitik der Niederlande stützt sich weiterhin auf die NATO als das wesentliche 

Instrument für Frieden, Sicherheit und Stabilität. Die Niederlande unterstützen einen 

Ausbau der militärischen Fähigkeiten innerhalb der ESVP. Niederländische Politiker 

schließen derzeit aus, dass sich die ESVP als Alternative zur NATO entwickeln wird, beide 

Autoren sind jedoch der Meinung, „that in the long term the EU will almost certainly 

replace NATO as the major European defence organisation. NATO will remain in place as a 

political platform for transatlantic co-operation, while its much-praised integrated military 

structure could be split in a EU and a North American part” (S.95). 

Antonio Missiroli analysierte die Rolle Italiens in der ESVP (”Italy: continuity, change, 

and adaption”). Die italienische Europapolitik hat eine Stärkung der GASP zum Ziel, auch 

eine allmähliche Vergemeinschaftung, mit der Möglichkeit der schrittweisen Einführung 

einer qualifizierten Mehrheit. Jedoch soll im Fall der Verteidigung innerhalb der ESVP die 

Einstimmigkeit beibehalten werden. Die NATO bildet den Kern gemeinsamer 

Militäraktionen und somit der Eckstein der „hard security” Italiens (S.114). Italien würde 

eine tiefere Involvierung der Europäischen Kommission in den zweiten Pfeiler begrüßen. 

Florence Deloche-Gaudez beschrieb “Frankreichs widersprüchliche Positionen in der 

GASP”. Frankreich geht davon aus, dass die Gemeinschaftsmethode im Bereich der GASP 

nicht angewendet werden kann und dass die qualifizierte Mehrheit sich dann als 

unangemessene Beschlussmethode erweist, wenn es darum geht, über den Einsatz 

menschlicher Leben zu entscheiden. Frankreich setzt auf die Herausbildung einer 

„Entscheidungskultur” und u.a. auf den Druck der Ereignisse, der im Krisenfall schnelle


Beschlüsse hervorbringen könnte, selbst wenn diese dann nicht auf das Einverständnis aller 

Mitgliedstaaten stoßen. Im Bereich der Außenpolitik geht es, so der Autor, vermehrt darum, 

die Partner zu überzeugen anstatt sein Vetorecht einzusetzen (S.132). 

Im abschließenden Kapitel analysiert Rudolf G. Adam die GASP nach den 

Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rats von Nizza. Durch die Schaffung des PSK in 

Brüssel „wird die EU künftig ohne Verzögerung, zeitnah und gezielt reagieren können” 

(S.143). Mit „Nizza”, so der Autor, kommt es zu einer Verlagerung von einer 

„deklaratorischen GASP” hin zu einer „operativen GASP”. Im Entscheidungsprozess ist die 

verstärkte Einbindung des Europäischen Parlaments in den Prozess der GASP/ESVP 

relevant. Der Ansatz, die WEU-Versammlung hier einfach fortzuführen, scheint dem Autor 

letztlich zum Scheitern verurteilt, weil sie innerhalb der EU kein Mandat und keine dem 

Europäischen Parlament vergleichbare Legitimation besitzt. Das Zusammenlegen 

militärischer Fähigkeiten zwischen einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten (Bsp. Logistik, Transport, 

Medizin- und Sanitätswesen) und der Aufbau gemeinsam betriebener Fähigkeiten 

(weltraumgestützte Aufklärung kann sich z.B. kein EU-Mitgliedstaat selbständig leisten) ist 

„denkbar, wünschbar und wahrscheinlich.” Die Perspektive einer einheitlichen europäischen 

Verteidigungsstruktur ist integrationspolitisch ein sinnvolles Ziel. Offen bleibt zur Zeit 

freilich, ob es auch verteidigungspolitisch ein sinnvolles Ziel ist. Der Autor kommt zur 

folgenden Schlussfolgerung: „Die NATO bleibt letzter Garant und Rückversicherer der 

europäischen Friedensordnung.” (S.147). „Die europäische Einigung darf nicht mit den 

vitalen transatlantischen Beziehungen in ein Konkurrenzverhältnis geraten. Wir wollen 

ESVP in Ergänzung und zur Stärkung der NATO aufbauen, nicht als potenziellen Rivalen”. 

Die Frage der Vergemeinschaftung der Verteidigung der EU stellt sich derzeit nicht: „Wir 

wollen jedoch die Perspektive einer langfristigen Entwicklung in diese Richtung jedenfalls 

nicht verbauen” (S.147). Derzeit ist die Voraussetzung für eine Beistandsgarantie innerhalb 

der EU eine vollständige Kongruenz von EU- und NATO-Mitgliedschaften. 

Diese Publikation bildet einen übersichtlichen und umfassenden Überblick über die 

Entwicklung und die Herausforderungen für die GASP/ESVP. Obwohl Ende 2001 

abgeschlossen und Anfang 2002 erschienen, ist das Buch keineswegs als historisch zu 

bezeichnen, sondern erläutert die aktuellen Herausforderungen für die von der 

Öffentlichkeit wenig beachteten Entwicklung in der Sicherheit und Verteidigung Europas. 

Dr. Gunther Hauser 

Institut für Strategie und Sicherheitspolitik, 

Landesverteidigungsakademie Wien 

Franz KNIPPING – Rom, 25. März 1957. Die Einigung Europas, dtv, München, 2004, 

365 S. – ISBN 3-423-30609-2 – 15 €. 

Die historische Erforschung des europäischen Integrationsprozesses hat in den letzten 

Jahren zahlreiche Lücken schließen können. Dabei überwogen Einzelstudien, die der 

Aktenfreigabe folgten. Gesamtdarstellungen über die Entwicklung der europäischen 

Einigung von ihren Anfängen bis in die Gegenwart sind bisher hauptsächlich in englischer 

und französischer Sprache erschienen; deutschsprachige Überblickswerke gibt es bisher 

kaum. In diese Lücke stößt Franz Knipping mit seinem Buch über die Einigung Europas, 

das in der bewährten Reihe „20 Tage im 20. Jahrhundert” erschienen ist. 

Zunächst schildert Knipping in einem knappen Anfangskapitel die historischen Wurzeln 

Europas, sowie die Entstehung europäischer Einigungspläne, um im zweiten Kapitel die 

Bedeutung der Katastrophe des Zweiten Weltkriegs für die Umsetzung der Europapläne und 

-projekte hervorzuheben. Im Hauptteil steht dann die politische und wirtschaftliche

122 


Einigung Europas entlang der Entwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften im 

Vordergrund. Knipping schildert den Integrationsprozess chronologisch von der 

„Gründerzeit” (S.59) der drei Europäischen Gemeinschaften EGKS, EWG und EURATOM 

bis zur letzten EU-Osterweiterung. Nicht mehr berücksichtigt wird die aktuelle Verfassung, 

deren Ratifizierung durch die Mitgliedstaaten noch aussteht. Abgerundet wird das Werk von 

einer Übersicht über die Entwicklung der Stimmengewichtung bei Entscheidungen im 

Ministerrat, einer Literaturauswahl und einem Personenregister. 

Insgesamt gelingt es dem Verfasser, den Integrationsprozess in klarer und prägnanter 

Weise darzustellen. Es wird deutlich, wie eng sich die europäischen Länder in den rund 

fünfzig Jahren seit der Gründung der ersten europäischen Gemeinschaft bereits verflochten 

haben und wie erfolgreich sich das europäische Projekt trotz zahlreicher Rückschläge 

entwickelt hat. Man kann Knipping daher nur zustimmen, dass die Erwartungen der 

Gründungsväter übertroffen worden seien. Überraschend pessimistisch fällt Knippings 

Ausblick auf die Zukunft der EU aus. Er kritisiert das Ausblenden der ökonomischen 

Belastungen bei der Osterweiterung und warnt vor der in vielen Bereichen erkennbaren 

Zunahme nationaler Egoismen. Hoffnungen setzt Knipping vor allem auf die Herausbildung 

einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. 

Auffällig ist die starke Herausstellung einzelner Persönlichkeiten, deren Einfluss auf den 

Integrationsprozess von dem Verfasser offensichtlich sehr hoch veranschlagt wird. So sind 

die 1950er Jahre unter anderem geprägt von den Vorstellungen Robert Schumans, Jean 

Monnets und Paul-Henri Spaaks. Der Integrationsprozess in den 1960er Jahren wird 

eindeutig von Charles de Gaulle dominiert. Für die späteren Jahre betont Knipping die 

Bedeutung der deutsch-französischen Tandems Valéry Giscard d’Estaing / Helmut Schmidt 

sowie François Mitterrand / Helmut Kohl. Das führt automatisch zu einer Vernachlässigung 

der Rolle der Parteien und Verbände im Integrationsprozess, die bei der Politikformulierung 

in einzelnen Bereichen, beispielhaft sei hier die Agrarpolitik genannt, doch eine nicht 

unerhebliche Rolle spielen. 

Für die vertiefte Beschäftigung würde man sich an manchen Stellen eindeutigere 

Hinweise auf die entsprechende Forschungsliteratur wünschen. Beispielsweise erwähnt 

Knipping im Zusammenhang mit den Fouchet-Plänen zwar, dass bis heute strittig ist, warum 

de Gaulle den Fouchet I-Entwurf verschärfte (S.133). Über die in der Forschung 

diskutierten Gründe erfährt man aber nichts. Auch über die umstrittenen Motive für das 

überraschende Angebot de Gaulles an die Briten vom Februar 1969, gemeinsam die Zukunft 

der europäischen Einigung zu diskutieren, wird der Leser im Unklaren gelassen (S.155). Da 

sich das Buch aber offensichtlich nicht nur an ein Fachpublikum richtet, ist dieser Punkt 

sicherlich zu verschmerzen. 

Henning Türk 

Universität Duisburg-Essen, Standort Essen 

Louk HAGENDOORN, György CSEPELI, Henk DEKKER, Russel FARNEN (eds.) – 

European Nations and Nationalism. Theoretical and historical aspects, Ashgate, Aldershot, 

2000, xviii + 526 p. – ISBN 0-7546-1136-1 – 57,50 £. 

One of the surprises following the collapse of Soviet rule over Eastern Europe was the 

resurgence of a new nationalism that was sufficiently violent to disrupt existing states like 

Yugoslavia and to change the political map of Europe for the first time after the Second 

World War. The collection of articles under review, using as it does methods developed by 

the social sciences, and those of social psychology in particular, attempts to come to terms 

with this new phenomenon. It goes back to a conference dealing with nationalism, ethnic 

conflicts, and conceptions of citizenship and democracy that was held in Utrecht in 1995.


Due to a lack of funds the original objective of an integrated comparative as well as 

cross-national survey, proved over-ambitious. Instead, the editors have published a series of 

separate articles, each devoted to the national profile of a single country and each written by 

a scholar coming from the country in question. The selection of the national political 

communities is not complete: It comprises old established nation-states like France, Great 

Britain, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands. In addition it deals with nations that attained 

national independence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, like Belgium, Italy, 

Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. Finally the collection examines some of 

the new separate national entities that came into being as a result of the big turn-over of 

1989/1990, like the Czech and the Slovak republics as well as the Ukraine. The new Russian 

federation, the heir of the centuries’ old Czarist Monarchy, but still with shaky popular 

national consciousness and unstable modes of political behaviour, is treated as a case sui 

generis, defying categorization. 

Louk Hagendoorn, the book’s main editor, asked each contributor to evaluate four aspects of 

the selected national communities: their historical roots, their politico-economic accomplishments 

and failures, the influence, which popular and populist nationalist emotions exercise 

within them, and, finally, the ways how the nation state is regarded as a model by their inhabitants. 

The treatment of ethnic or immigrant minorities was to be taken as an indicator of the stage 

of national development and self-awareness reached in each sample country. 

Given the vast differences prevailing between the various individual national profiles, the 

editor concedes that it was impossible for the contributors to adhere to a rigorously identical 

structure for their articles. So inevitably, this publication suffers from a certain unevenness. 

The historical sections, each between five to roughly ten pages long, are no more than “crash 

courses”, some reaching well into prehistoric times, others like the ones on France and 

Germany more or less skipping even the Middle Age, presumably in part because in these 

cases this period proved too complicated for easy generalizations. Naturally, these sketches 

contain a number of factual errors (e.g. on pp.220, 226, 399, 463). 

Taken as a whole, this collection abounds with judgements that are more based on 

intelligent guesswork than on hard evidence. On the other hand, there are passages and 

sections, which are decidedly helpful for the contemporary historian. This is true of the 

analyses of the present-day political situation to be found in most articles (governance, 

parties, election results; the French case seems particularly well presented). The same can be 

said of those sections that submit informative statistical data which illustrate popular 

attitudes towards other nationalities, towards minorities – the Roma universally faring worst 

-, and towards immigrants. 

Seen from the angle of European integration history the volume is disappointing. 

Attempts to adopt a wider European perspective as a factor that can help to defuse narrow 

minded nationalisms are only mentioned in passing for some Western European countries 

like France, Belgium, and Spain, but hardly at all for East Central Europe. In the German 

case, reference to popular griping about the loss of the good old Deutsche Mark appeared to 

suffice. This is not to say that the editors and contributors indiscriminately praise today’s 

neo-nationalism and its repercussions. On the contrary, they are keenly aware of how, as in 

the case of the Ukraine (Yugoslavia remains unmentioned), ethnic emotions can be 

exploited by “nationalist entrepreneurs” for personal self-aggrandizement and thereby lead 

to destabilization and conflict. 

This volume undoubtedly presents a rich array of useful data and insightful observations, and, 

not the least because of an excellent index, commends itself to the contemporary historian as a 

sort of compendium. Still, it embodies no more than a first and highly tentative step in the 

direction of a comprehensive and comparative treatment – let alone a theory – of its subject. 

Klaus Schwabe 

RWTH Aachen

124 

Elke BRUCK – François Mitterrands Deutschlandbild. Perzeption und Politik im Spannungsfeld 

deutschland-, europa- und sicherheitspolitischer Entscheidungen 1989-1992, Peter 

Lang, Frankfurt a/Main, Berlin, Bern, …, 2003, 361 S. – ISBN 3-631-50202-8 – 50,10 €. 

Dans l’avant-propos de ses Mémoires à deux voix, 1 François Mitterrand écrit que «l’homme 

politique s’exprime d’abord par ses actes; c’est d’eux dont il comptable». Mais ces actes 

sont moins le résultat d’un choix rationnel qu’ils sont influencés par des perceptions subjectives 

et des images souvent profondément ancrées dans la mémoire collective d’une nation. 

Ces perceptions et ces images jouent en particulier dans la relation franco-allemande, au 

regard de la charge affective («réconciliation», «amitié», etc.) qui lui est généralement associée, 

un rôle d’autant plus important que les liens préférentiels établis entre dirigeants politiques 

de part et d’autre du Rhin y sont prépondérants. 

L’intérêt de la thèse de doctorat d’Elke Bruck, présentée en 2001 à l’université 

Ludwig-Maximilian de Munich est justement de démonter, à l’exemple de l’image de 

l’Allemagne chez Mitterrand durant cette intense phase de bouleversement européen et 

stratégique que sont les années 1989-1992, les mécanismes subtils de l’interaction entre 

perceptions et décisions politiques. Opérant à la frontière entre science politique et 

psychologie, elle s’attache à reconstruire les processus inconscients fondateurs d’une 

certaine image de la réalité. Il s’agit donc d’identifier, notamment à l’aide des résultats de la 

recherche en psychologie sociale, les structures de pensées et les représentations du 

président français puis, en les resituant dans leur contexte historique, de déterminer leur 

influence sur le processus de prise de décision présidentiel. 

Bruck fonde son analyse sur une riche bibliographie qui comprend, en premier lieu et à 

juste titre, l’abondante production littéraire de Mitterrand. Ce dernier ne se concevait en 

effet pas seulement comme un homme politique mais aussi comme un homme de lettre. 

Dans l’esprit de Mitterrand, cette œuvre littéraire était également destinée à modeler la 

figure historique que le président entendait laisser à la postérité. Par ailleurs, l’auteur a 

exploité une importante littérature secondaire, dont les mémoires de nombre des anciens 

collaborateurs à l’Elysée, et dépouillé plusieurs publications journalistiques. Elle a en outre 

conduit toute une série d’interviews avec des proches collaborateurs, conseillers et amis 

politiques de Mitterrand. Bien que le recours aux archives historiques ne soit pas obligatoire 

pour un doctorat de science politique, il aurait sans été enrichissant de consulter les comptes 

rendus des entretiens entre Mitterrand et Helmut Kohl que contiennent les archives du 

septennat, conservées aux Archives Nationales à Paris et qui sont, depuis plusieurs années 

déjà, accessibles aux chercheurs. 2 

Comme chez Charles de Gaulle, l’Allemagne est, chez François Mitterrand, un thème 

récurrent et il s’est, à de nombreuses reprises aussi bien dans ses livres, ses discours et ses 

prises de positions, exprimé à son sujet. Selon Elke Bruck, l’image que Mitterrand a de 

l’Allemagne est typiquement celle d’un intellectuel français, c’est-à-dire partagée entre, 

d’une part la vision romantique d’une Madame de Staël, et d’autre part une méfiance 

vis-à-vis du voisin germanique toujours présente, mais à des degrés divers selon le contexte 

méfiance. La position du chef de l’Etat reflète donc les ambiguïtés traditionnelles des 

milieux intellectuels et politiques français (p.60). Cependant, l’importance que Mitterrand 

accorde à l’Allemagne varie selon les étapes de son parcours politique. 

Après une rapide présentation de l’évolution de l’image de l’Allemagne de la jeunesse de 

Mitterrand à ses deux septennats, Bruck prend trois cas d’études pour mettre en lumière les 

interférences entre perceptions subjectives et décisions politiques du président: la 

réunification allemande, la politique européenne de la France de l’été 1989 au référendum 

1. F. MITTERRAND, E. WIESEL, Mémoires à deux voix, Odile Jacob, Paris, 1995. 

2. Cf. Archives nationales, Archives du Septennat de François Mitterrand, 5 AG 4.


français sur le traité de Maastricht en septembre 1992, puis la réponse du président français 

aux défis sécuritaires posés par l’effondrement du bloc soviétique. 

Bruck voit dans l’attitude hésitante, sinon négative, de François Mitterrand vis-à-vis de la 

réunification allemande – elle emploie plutôt le terme d’union (Vereinigung) – le souci du 

président français de préserver à tout prix la stabilité et l’équilibre européen tel qu’il était 

issu de la guerre froide. Outre sa crainte des bouleversements géopolitiques internationaux 

que la réunification ne manquerait pas, de son point de vue, de provoquer, Mitterrand 

s’inscrivait tout à fait dans la lignée du général de Gaulle et cherchait, en priorité, à 

préserver les intérêts de la France. Or, l’indécision mitterrandienne vis-à-vis de la 

réunification allemande met en lumière le conflit latent entre ses conceptions sécuritaires et 

son soutien de principe à la liberté et à la démocratie (p.125). 

Pour sortir de cette indétermination, une seule issue s’imposait à ses yeux: promouvoir la 

poursuite de l’intégration européenne, notamment en posant les jalons de l’union monétaire, 

afin d’ancrer fermement l’Allemagne réunifiée en Europe et de stabiliser les pays de l’Est. A 

cet égard, la position de Mitterrand fait preuve d’une constance remarquable, car il voyait 

dans l’intégration européenne un moyen de rappeler l’Allemagne à ses devoirs européens, 

sinon de «diluer» la réunification allemande dans l’union européenne (p.173). L’intégration 

européenne était donc autant un «filtre de perception» qu’un instrument de sa politique 

allemande (pp.177-178). Néanmoins, la volonté affichée par le président français d’utiliser 

la coopération franco-allemande comme moteur de la construction européenne était parfois 

moins évidente qu’il ne l’aurait voulu, car Mitterrand éprouvait un certain embarras 

vis-à-vis de la nouvelle «égalité» entre les deux pays, résultante de la réunification 

allemande. Face à cette remise en question radicale de l’équilibre antérieur, fondé sur une 

asymétrie entre la force politico-militaire de la France et la force économique de 

l’Allemagne, Mitterrand réagissait selon un schéma «partenaire/adversaire» (p.196). 

En matière sécuritaire, c’était surtout le développement d’un vide stratégique au cœur du 

continent européen suite à une éventuelle neutralisation de l’Allemagne et un Sonderweg 

allemand qui alimentaient les craintes mitterrandiennes. La perception de l’Allemagne de 

l’ancien président était donc, dans ce cas précis, directement liée à la question de l’équilibre 

européen, et par conséquent, à celle de la sécurité européenne (p.227). C’était toutefois la 

notion de partenariat franco-allemand qui dominait nettement, en particulier du fait de 

l’adéquation entre la perception mitterrandienne de l’Allemagne et les intérêts sécuritaires 

de la France tels que le chef de l’Etat les concevait (p.264). Les débuts du conflit yougoslave 

et les positions divergentes que les deux pays adoptaient, venaient rompre cette relative 

harmonie. 

Pour l’auteur, les trois études mettent en évidence, chez Mitterrand, une image de 

l’Allemagne qui reflètent, d’une manière générale, les «traditionnelles» ambivalences françaises 

à l’égard de l’Allemagne dans toutes leurs facettes. Elle identifie également plusieurs catégories 

de perceptions qui agissent à divers niveaux politiques et acquièrent, selon les périodes, une 

importance variable, c’est-à-dire qu’elles ont une influence plus ou moins prononcée sur la 

pensée et les décisions du président français. Elle constate que différentes catégories sont 

activées parallèlement et sont actives avant et au-delà de la période 1989-1992 (p.310). Il y a 

donc une relative continuité, au moins dans les grandes lignes, des schémas de pensée 

mitterrandiens. Le caractère ambivalent voire contradictoire de la politique de Mitterrand à 

certaines époques résulterait principalement du conflit entre différents modèles de perceptions, 

d’où son impuissance à prendre, à l’occasion, une décision dite «rationnelle». 

Cette étude montre l’influence, souvent sous-estimée, des processus inconscients qui 

influencent, chez les dirigeants politiques, la prise de décision de politique étrangère. Sans 

être naturellement le seul, c’est un schéma d’explication qui devrait intéresser historiens et 

politologues analysant le processus de prise de décision politique. 

Carine Germond 

Université Robert Schuman, Srasbourg III 

Universität Duisburg-Essen

126 


Jacques LE GOFF – L’Europe est-elle née au Moyen Age?, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 

2003, 341p. – ISBN 2-02-056341-X – 22,00 Ä. 

This book is conceived as an essay inviting reflection. Although the work contains no direct 

answer to the question posed by the title, its narrative suggests that what we now consider to 

be, in socio-cultural terms, Europe, first emerged in the Middle Ages, more specifically in the 

13th and 14th centuries. The technical appendix contains two maps, extensive chronological 

tables, a detailed thematic bibliography as well as an index of names and places. 

The book is most interesting in its interpretive evaluations, which cover a wide range of 

related subjects. The narrative outlines six stages of development. The first four hundred 

years are a dramatic mix of various waves of Völkerwanderungen and of strenuous efforts to 

build up the Latin Christian infrastructure of society; then come two hundred years of 

abortive attempts by the Carolingians and Ottonians to unite the core of Europe under one 

rule. The author identifies a tension, about 1000 AD, between “l’Europe rêvée” and 

“l’Europe potentielle” (p.61). In the next two centuries as it extends to the East and the 

North East, Europe starts to take shape with various modifications to its feudal structure. 

This development culminates in the “beautiful” Europe of the cities and universities 

(p.135) of the 13 th century when arts, philosophy and commerce flourished magnificently, 

and in the balance of spiritual and temporal, “the values of Heaven descended upon the 

Earth” (pp.198–203). Even technical know-how makes remarkable progress. The 

achievement of mendicant orders is also praised, while the seamy side, the Inquisition and 

the Crusades against the heretics, is glossed over. 

The marks of crisis are perceived only in the 14 th century. Apart from the Black Death 

and peasant revolts, etc., it is mainly the Papal schism that matters most for the question 

embodied in the title. This paved the way for the establishment of national churches and for 

concordats in which the Holy See had to safeguard its ecclesiastical jurisdiction by 

agreement with individual states (p.226). New heresies and the rise of national 

consciousness are seen as further marks of a new epoch, in which the socio-cultural profile 

of Europe underwent substantial changes. 

The build-up of Medieval Europe, with Western Christianity acting as an integrative force 

within society, was confronted by two opposing poles, the Byzantine and the Islamic (p.41). 

The latter interfered twice: first by creating an exclave in the Iberian peninsula, the last 

vestiges of which were finally swept away as late as the end of the 15 th century. The Islamic 

thrust by the Ottoman Turks into South Eastern Europe culminated in the liquidation of the 

Byzantine Empire. “Paradoxically”, as Le Goff puts it, “this abolished a potential obstacle 

to the future unification of Europe” (p.259). What in terms of geography is the European 

East, i.e. Europe of Greek and Slavic (‘Orthodox’) Christianity, is supposed to be beyond 

the pale of the legitimate concept of Europe. 

The author’s question of whether contemporary Europe was born in the Middle Ages 

deserves some more concrete indications of their imputed affinity. For instance, some 

comments on two structural or rather institutional issues of the West European Middle Ages 

would be useful: with respect to the concept of the two swords, the spiritual and the 

temporal, and within the former on the confrontation between Papal autocracy and the 

jurisdiction of the Councils. Is it not the case that the superiority of the spiritual power 

postulated by the Holy See foreshadows the universal principle of human rights that the 

European states are enjoined to implement in their legislature and to uphold in their 

administration and judiciary? And may not the Councillar movement be seen as a secondary 

element of the general historical trajectory towards a more pluralistic power structure? 

And finally, what about the period from 1500 to 2000 AD? Although this dynamic and 

eventful epoch is not covered by the title of the book under review, its author gives it some 

cursory attention, focussing on detail rather than on the overall picture. Nevertheless, even


just one additional detail may give the core idea of the book some substantial support: the 

near identity of the geographical position of Latin (West) Christian Europe around 1500 and 

the extent of the European Union in 2005. The latter lacks only three – and by no means big 

– countries of the former: Norway, Switzerland and Croatia (this last one, however, is ‘in 

waiting’). On the other hand, the European Union includes East (Orthodox) Christian 

Greece. This, however, is not so much a socio-cultural issue as a result of the Great Power 

policy that in 1945 (in Yalta) devised the border between what, in socio-cultural and 

economico-political terms, was to become the Euro-American West and the Euro-Asian 

East. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union has obliterated this dichotomy, another 

pattern of civilizational division of the world may again impinge upon our reestablishment 

of the traditional (West) European orbit. 

Jaroslav Krějcí 

Lancaster University 

Henning TEWES – Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe. Enlarging NATO and 

the European Union, Palgrave, Houndsmills, 2002, 251 p. – ISBN 0-333-96508-6 – 50,00 £. 

Hanns MAULL, Sebastian HARNISCH und Constantin GRUND (Hrsg.), Deutschland 

im Abseits? Rot-grüne Außenpolitik 1998-2003, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003, 193 S. – 

ISBN 3-8329-0180-9 – 29,00 €. 

Germany: Civilian Power concept between academia and policy 

Identification with Europe has become as important to German post-war national identity, as 

the “exaggerated multilateralism” used to be (Jeffery Anderson) a clearly distinguishable 

element of German foreign policy at least till the unification. The Eastern neighbours were 

practically absent from the German foreign policy agenda before mid 1960s, though. Since 

the era of “new Ostpolitik” of the early 1970s they have never disappeared from it. The role 

of the closest neighbours to Germany’s East has thus changed over time. Konrad Adenauer’s 

“Russia-first” policy reflected realistic recognition of the system domination and found its 

confirmation in the “Eastern treaties” of the early 1970s. Only gradually a more differentiated 

attitude to individual partners developed. 

Every German government since 1990 has also to consider Russian interest and role in 

European policy. As Tewes shows, however, Germany’s relations with its eastern neighbours 

have been much more influenced by the “legacy of Western integration” than by that of the 

“Ostpolitik” (p.5). This symbolises a change of a much greater historical importance than 

any individual move of German policy vis-à-vis its Eastern neighbours. 

German unification, naturally, confronted Germans as well as the international community 

with the question regarding the nature of the future German policy. A number of key 

co-ordinates were set in the course of the German unification itself, such as multilateralism, 

membership in NATO and the EU, the status of German borders and extent of German 

territory, limitations of German military potential and of its use. However, the way Germany 

would use its arguably increased potential has been widely considered unclear. 

About the book 

Currently the head of Konrad Adenauer Foundation (CDU) in Warsaw, Henning Tewes 

crosses the line between politics and academia in both directions with ease and confidence. 

He offers an unconventional analysis of German policy: knowing the preliminary outcomes, 

he seeks a plausible explanation for what Paterson and Jeffery call a “German puzzle”. 1 

1. Ch. JEFFREY, W.E. PATERSON, Germany’s Power in Europe, IGS and ESRC Paper, Institute 

for German Studies, Birmingham (www.bham.ac.uk/IGS/pattjeff.pdf).

128 


Germany was not (and could not be) prepared for the management of the tasks of 

unification. Similarly, in early 1990s, Bonn mostly only reacted to the changing international 

environment and growing expectations in regard to German international involvement. As was 

to be expected, the attitude towards multilateral institutions has been the most important 

criteria of continuity and change in German policy after 1990. The book under review proves 

that German attitude towards the ECE may be regarded as another such criteria. 

Tewes offers an analysis of German policy vis-à-vis its Eastern neighbours of impressive 

depth and clarity. Going beyond a meticulous account of the complex political development, 

Tewes seeks to interpret the reality by elaborating on the theoretical framework of Civilian 

Power and role theory approach. 

Civilian Power and foreign policy culture 

There are a number of analytical approaches to German foreign policy explanations. 

Gunther Hellmann identified five schools of thought in his often-quoted analysis of German 

foreign policy discourse. 2 The review of the German foreign policy debate offered by 

Sebastian Harnisch organised the approaches along the three theoretical schools: the realist, 

institutionalist, and constructivist. 3 It is mainly the constructivist discourse, which Henning 

Tewes’s book contributes to. The author locates the Civilian Power concept within the 

school of constructivist liberalism. Based on norms and values, Civilian Power reflects the 

nature of the state/society and of the international organisations at the same time (p.18). 

Civilian Power is viewed as a promoter of multilateral co-operation, its core aims being 

welfare maximisation, enhancement of supranational institutionalisation, evolution 

(development?) of international law, foreign policy based on values. The principal values of 

Civilian Power are democratic rights, justice, multilateralism and non-military pursuit of 

foreign policy objectives (p.202). Tewes argues that the basic concepts of Civilian Power are 

those of interdependence and collective or co-operative security (p.11). He employs also the 

concept of foreign policy culture as defined by Peter Katzenstein. According to Katzenstein, 

foreign policy culture is embodied in custom and law, in treaties and constitutional 

documents and is related to the “material structures of state organisation” (p.25). 

In order to operationalise his analysis of German foreign policy, Tewes elaborates on the 

role theory. The theory, he suggests, is able to trace a link between the identity of a state, its 

foreign policy culture and particular policies. The role theory can help to specify the way the 

domestic cultural-institutional context manifested itself in particular policy patterns 

described as roles. Also, as there is a whole set of roles and role conceptions, the role theory 

is presented as a tool, which can identify the hierarchy between them. According to Tewes, 

the role theory approach can lead us to more specific assumptions about German attitude to 

its Eastern neighbours (pp.26-28). 

As civilianization of domestic politics (relations between state and society) is the 

precondition for the exercise of Civilian Power, the structural conditions for such policy 

could be established only after 1945, on the basis of the democratic Basic Law and 

social-market economy. By applying his methodological approach, Tewes avoided the 

argument about the origins of German democracy and foreign policy in which one attitude 

focuses on the role of Konrad Adenauer (Arnulf Baring) and the opposite view underlines 

the dominant role of the victorious Western powers (Helga Haftendorn). The Civilian Power 

and the role theory approach as applied by Tewes is concerned rather with policy processes 

and their outcomes. Tewes makes clear, however, that without the post-war division, 

2. G. HELLMANN, Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany, in: Mershon 

International Studies Review, 40(1996), pp.1-39. 

3. S. HARNISCH, Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy, in: D. WEB- 

BER (ed.), New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Politics (Special Issue), 

1(2001), p.36.


Germany would have hardly been able to escape its Mittellage and establish its democratic 

foundation (p.38). Six principles, which Tewes spells out as distinctive features of Germany 

as a Civilian Power tie together Germany, Western integration, and civilianization. They 

include Franco-German partnership and the departure from balance-of-powers politics. 

Germany recognised the principle of shared sovereignty on the Community level, the 

process character of European integration and its progressive nature (pp.40-42). Instead of 

relative gains Germany has pursued positive gains and “transformative goals” (p.204). 

Pursuing Civilian Power principles does not mean neglecting national interest. The latter 

is not, however, perceived as individualistic but rather in the context of the growing 

interdependence in international relations. Civilian Power promotes good governance, 

democratisation and sustainable development. Preference of collective action, compromise 

and mediation, of institutional solutions, partnership and collective enforcement of 

international norms characterise its policy style. 

Relations with the ECE: a test of the Civilian Power policy 

Relations with East central Europe are highly asymmetrical, loaded with historical 

memory and with political implications from the past for the present. Has Germany become 

more assertive, seeking one-sided (national) advantage and pursuing a path of individual 

policy-making rather than developing collective, co-operative and multilateral action? The 

author’s hypothesis is that after 1990, German Civilian Power would first seek to eliminate 

all bilateral problems in relations with its partners to the East. Then, it would try to export 

Civilian Power to these countries: civilanization of the young Eastern democracies “occurs 

through stabilisation, which in turn occurs through multilateral frameworks” (p.48). 

Following his methodology Tewes defines six roles most typical for the Federal Republic’s 

foreign policy: integration deepener, integration widener, security consumer, Atlanticist, 

Gaullist and Moscovite. He seeks to clarify the conflicting inter-relationships between the 

individual role concepts by prioritising, by “role change” and “role merger”. 

Germany sought trustful relationships with the Eastern neighbours after 1989. The task 

was facilitated by the fact that Germany had no intention to revive political Mitteleuropa 

concept in any form, or to pull strings on the issue of the Oder-Neisse border. After all, 

giving up territorial expansion became one of the most important fundaments of German 

political culture after the World War 2. Tewes points out that Germany turned away from the 

territorial politics of the past with Willy Brand’s Ostpolitik. 

The unprecedented congruence of interests of Germany and its Eastern neighbours 

notwithstanding, trustful relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours (Poles and 

Czechs) had to overcome inherent tension regarding the past, mainly the post-war 

settlement. Tewes comes to the conclusion that the Civilian Power role of Germany was 

“negated” (p.62) by the influence of domestic considerations on Helmut Kohl’s treatment of 

the Oder-Neisse issue and, as we would add, the Sudeten-German issue. The impact of 

expellee organisations on German policy has been an important factor in the domestic 

balance of powers for conservative parties. The Chairwoman of the expellee organisation in 

fact tried to blackmail Poles and Czechs with the view of their interest in the EU accession. 

Germany manoeuvred itself even into an isolated position after Minister Klaus Kinkel 

denied the legal validity of the Potsdam agreement in the course of negotiation of the 

German-Czech declaration of 1997 (p.75). Tewes concludes that in its bilateral relations 

Germany failed to approximate Civilian Power ideals. The main reasons are the German 

legalistic political culture, which seeks legal solutions to political problems, reinforced by a 

particular set of domestic interests (p.78). 

The double enlargement 

Tewes finds the record of Germany in terms of the Civilian Power model rather mixed in 

the early phase of the EU enlargement to the East. Germany favoured deepening and 

defence of its domestic interests to civilanization through multilateral stabilisation (p.89).

130 


During the association process, Germany sought political inclusion of the ECE countries 

and their economic exclusion at the same time. Germany faced a role conflict, one between 

the traditional role of the integration deepener on the one hand and the role of integration 

widener on the other. During the second phase, since 1994, Germany attempted to escape 

the role conflict by merging the deepening and widening through flexibilisation of the 

integration (”hard core”). The attempt failed and Germany sought to prevent that deepening 

and EU reform could obstruct enlargement. The Civilian Power ideal type, Tewes argues, 

can not answer the question of the way to reconcile the deepening and widening of the EU 

since individually, they are both compatible with it (p.139). Also, strong domestic 

institutions, one of the pillars of any Civilian Power, generated divergent interests in 

Germany and thus hampered the application of German Civilian Power abroad (p.133). 

In regard to the NATO enlargement, several roles were compatible with the Civilian 

Power, Warsavist (support for enlargement), Atlanticist (preservation of NATO as it was), 

Muscovite (prioritising understanding with the USSR/Russia) and Gaullist (Euro-centric 

attitude). They stood, understandably, in tension towards each other in the early 1990s. 

Since 1994, integration (of the ECE) and co-operation (with Russia and others) has 

represented the bottom line of German security policy vis-à-vis East of Central Europe 

(p.178). 

As civilianisation has been described as a “demand-led strategy” (p.174), it is only 

logical that external expectations co-shaped the outcome: the enlargement became the 

priority. The German government sought to conciliate Russian interests by elaborating on 

strengthened partnership ties at the same time – a move, which Tewes describes as a role 

merger (p.177). 

Germany can hardly be viewed as a hegemon of the double enlargement. Tewes shows, 

however, that it pushed the two enlargement processes in their decisive phase by gaining the 

support of other Western partners. Germany attempted to play the role of an advocate of 

both the candidate states as well as of Russia/CIS countries. 

Germany until 2002 – still a Civilian Power 

Germany is not portrayed as a Civilian Power ideal type, although Tewes finds its record 

largely compatible with it. Domestic constraints (the shadows of the past, the legalist nature 

of German policy, sectoral interests) and realist considerations (German attitude to the 

Baltic republics’ interest to access NATO) conflicted with the Civilian Power ethos. 

Germany has been successful in its international activities not only thanks to the nature 

of its policy (seeking compromises, developing multilateral frameworks). Tewes sees the 

effectiveness of German Civilian Power in terms of the “soft power” of Joseph Nye or the 

“three-dimensional power” of Steven Lukes. He makes clear that German success is linked 

with the realist power potential as well, though. Precisely the most successful German 

political action since the unification – the NATO and EU enlargement – would be hardly 

possible without the international respect for the “material capabilities” (p.201) of a united 

Germany. 

Indeed, we agree that the factors of realist power do matter in international relations. 

With a certain qualification, we might view the pre-war Czechoslovakia – using Henning 

Tewes’s concept – as a “pre-war Civilian Power” of the 1920s-1930s: Prague seriously 

sought to develop a normative and institutional basis of international relations. Nonetheless, 

its relative unimportance and lack of realist power potential – plus the fatal miscalculation 

on the part of France and Great Britain – sealed its fate in Munich, 1938. 

Thus material power capabilities facilitate the pursuit of normative objectives. 

Nonetheless, Tewes is clear in his emphasis that normative principles remain the basis of 

Civilian Power (p.201). In addition, he shows that nonmaterial resources of Germany (‘trust 

capital’ and ‘assumed benevolent intentions’) empower the weak by equipping them with


powerful argumentative leverage. Thus, Central Europe influenced German foreign policy 

by underlining its role of an integration widener (p.203). 

Civilian Power between academia and policy 

Henning Tewes makes clear that Civilian Power is not a political concept but an ideal 

policy type. Not a design but a template or vision, which policy and public may (or may not) 

aim at. Civilian Power is – to quote Tewes – “a normatively biased form of foreign policy 

advice” (p.204). We are less convinced, though, when the author seems to project the 

Civilian Power conception into the way foreign actors may view Germany (see for example 

his assumption regarding the position of the Baltic states, which may conclude that 

Germany “… choose not to apply its Civilian power ethos in its policies…” of NATO 

enlargement, p.206). As if two different levels of thinking about German policy got blurred: 

the theoretical analytical approach on the one hand, constructing an ideal political model 

designed to offer “normative advice”; and diverse perceptions of, and expectations from 

Germany as an international actor, on the other. Surely, while evaluating German policy, the 

countries of Eastern Central Europe tend to look at criteria that may in one way or another 

match Civilian Power as defined by Tewes. However, the complex notion of Civilian Power 

has received only marginal attention of the classe politique and the public in these countries. 

In fact, Civilian Power is usually misunderstood as a pacifist concept and therefore treated 

with a certain caution. 

We wonder to what extent the Civilian Power concept was consciously emulated by 

German policy itself. As far as we know, only the SPD refers to Germany as to a Zivilmacht, 

Civilian Power. 4 The Greens avoid the “power”-part and refer to a Zivilgesellschaft, Civilian 

(Civic) Society. 5 Thanks to the Greens, Civilian Power found no place in the Red-Green 

coalition agreement of 2002. 6 Liberals and conservatives avoid mentioning the concept as 

such altogether, even if – as Tewes proves – their policy has been so far mostly compatible 

with the notion of Civilian Power. 

Henning Tewes’s assessment of German policy and of its individual actors is 

painstakingly balanced. We agree with his opinion that Helmut Kohl may be viewed as “an 

incarnation of Civilian Power” (p.209) as well as with his criticism of the ‘Kohl system’ 

(p.211). Indeed, the chancellor was perceived as the “European” German leader in 1980s 

and 1990s. At the same time, undoubtedly, his name was linked to pragmatism and 

prioritising domestic concerns over foreign policy, not to mention the Civilian Power ethos. 

The electoral support from the side of the conservative and völkisch (if not nationalist) 

oriented expellee organisations was too valuable an asset even for Kohl, not to mention the 

CSU. Both conservative parties had integrated the expellee element and thus stabilised the 

German political scene. However, as a part of the equation, they carefully avoided exposing 

the expellees to a critical reassessment of the past and of their programmatic demands. Not 

surprisingly, the ‘anti-Civilian Power’ ethos of the expellee organisations influenced the 

standing of the conservative parties themselves: the mismanaged debate about the Centre for 

Expulsion or the vote of the CSU in the EU Parliament against the Czech EU-accession are 

just two of the more recent examples. Coming to terms with the past may well be regarded 

as one of the key preconditions for a credible Civilian Power role. 

Tewes proves that the Civilian Power ideal type and role theory are inspiring when 

contemplating principles and norms in international relations. He also shows that comparing 

actual policy with an ideal policy type can offer a very insightful picture of the political 

reality. The precondition is that the evaluation is not predominantly speculative but based on 

4. Der SPD Parteitag in Bochum, 17.-19.11.2003. Beschlüsse. http://www.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/ 

1031670/2004-01-16-SPD-Beschluesse-Bochum03.pdf, p.248. 

5. Europa grün gestalten. Europawahlprogram 2004 von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 

6. See Koalitionsvertrag 2002, www.gruene-fraktion.de/rsvgn/rs_rubrik/0,,67,00.htm.

132 


a solid research of relevant sources and interviews with relevant experts and policy actors. 

Henning Tewes’s book is a great and indispensable read as it provides both: an inspiring 

theoretical debate about assessing foreign policy as well as a truly detailed, elegantly written 

inquiry into the nature of German policy vis-à-vis the East Central European states. 

How much change? 

The analytical thrust of Tewes is further developed in the book written by a broader circle 

of fellows and partners (including Tewes) of the Chair for Foreign Policy and International 

Relations, University of Trier, headed by Professor Hanns W.Maull. The book continues the 

discussion about the nature of German foreign policy post-1990 where Tewes concluded his 

analysis. It offers a preliminary assessment of German policy after the “historical” change 

from conservative-liberal coalition to the SPD and the Green Party. The collection 

encompasses a wide spectrum of sectors of German foreign policy: security issues 

(contributions by Martin Wagener and Marco Overhaus), EU policy (Sebastian Harnisch/ 

Siegfried Schieder), EU-enlargement (Henning Tewes), development policy (Peter Molt), 

human rights policy (Florian Pfeil), external economic policy (by Florian Lütticken/ 

Bernhard Stahl), relations with the USA (Nicholas Busse), France (Christoph Neßhöver), 

the Far East (Jörn-Carsten Gottwald) and two studies into regional conflicts: Balkans 

(Constantin Grund) and the Middle East (Hanns W. Maull). 

The individual contributions represent a thorough, well-informed political analysis and 

do not focus on theoretical reasoning. Generally, they point at a growing ambivalence of the 

German Red-Green coalition. On the institutional side (Hanns Maull’s editorial underlines 

the “primacy of institutional innovation”, p.15), a number of the individual studies 

emphasise the growing role of the chancellor and his office. Minister Joschka Fischer often 

followed or implemented rather than defined the policy course. The exceptions were the EU 

constitutional reform and the search for an active Middle East policy. In some areas, 

enhancement of the institutional structure has taken place and there have been also examples 

of success and foreign policy achievements. Against the background of the original ambition 

of Red-Green to redefine some areas of German policy, the preliminary outcome reveals 

little change in substance. Quite to the contrary, the overall verdict is that German policy, 

suffering from little attention and scarce resources, has been becoming less relevant and 

retreats into seclusion. 

On normalisation and learning 

The reader’s impression is that not only the chapter dealing with the use of force in 

international relations (Wagener), but also most of the other contributions could have been 

written under the “normalisation” heading. The second prominent feature of German policy 

since 1998 is the government’s “learning process” (Harnisch, Schieder, Neßhöver). Both 

resulted in different kinds of “normalisation” exercises in a number of areas. The Red-Green 

have adjusted to the international constellation, domestic political interests and economic – 

particularly budgetary – constraints. Berlin has taken national and particular interests on 

board, thus responding to a variety of domestic pressures. As a result, the conceptual focus 

and long term political priorities have too often been subordinated to short-term preferences 

and solutions. In a sense, the impression is that in a number of areas the Red-Green policy 

has been on its way “back to the Realpolitik”. Most of the contributions offer examples of 

the discrepancy between the original intentions and political performance. In some cases, 

however, such as the EU-enlargement (so Tewes), the “learning process” brought Berlin 

from attempted assertion of ‘national interests’ back to a more flexible attitude. Studies on 

regional conflicts, such as the Balkans or the Middle East show that German policy 

attempted to initiate political solutions. The reality of “hard-power”, however, limited 

Berlin’s room for manoeuvre. As was to be expected, the pressure of the German-American 

rupture and the ongoing disagreement elevated the issue of the Red-Green policy towards 

the USA to the ‘cover-story’ of the book. Many authors indicate a critical and reserved view


as regards American attitude to multilateralism and/or invasion in Iraq; but they clearly 

regard the discord with the USA as a failure of German policy (Maull, Busse). Not less 

significantly, the German-French relations are viewed with concern. Should the present 

close co-ordination translate into a renewed leading role, German and French policy has to 

“think in a broader scale” in the EU of twenty-five member states (Neßhöver). 

Of course, a number of questions will have to be discussed further. So, we agree that 

Germany has played a vital, or indispensable, but perhaps not a “leading role” in the 

development of the European security and defence policy (Overhaus, p.52). Also, 

subsuming Germany’s relations with her Eastern neighbours and partners under the 

EU-enlargement process correctly reflects the nature of German policy. However, it would 

be interesting to discuss the question, whether the double enlargement has upgraded 

political relations between Germany and the accession countries. As for now, we would 

argue there is little specific closeness, only a weak consultation and no co-ordination reflex 

between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. Both Berlin and East Central Europe look for 

co-ordination further to the West – particularly since chancellor Gerhard Schröder and 

partly also Joschka Fischer used the Iraq issue for election purposes. 

In search for a new strategy and public support 

The book represents a rather dramatic call for more strategic thinking, more focused 

political activity both in the multilateral and bilateral dimension of German policy. Unlike 

Henning Tewes’s book, the volume has not been written about the ‘Trier’s pedigree’ – the 

‘Civilian Power’. It is in fact only the critical review of Red-Green policy in Hanns 

W.Maull’s analytical editorial, which raises the issue at all. Maull concludes that the 

German government’s attitude towards the Iraq-crisis – its unilateral approach in particular – 

marked a departure from the German role of a ‘Civilian Power’. It is not the Red-Green 

government’s programme and its normative stipulations, but its performance, which makes 

the ‘Civilian Power’ record of Germany not convincing enough. 

While Tewes could take a step back from the current political dynamic and contemplate 

the record of the last two Kohl’s governments, the edited volume is a stocktaking exercise 

written in amid an intense debate about the current and future German policy. The Trier 

research team has published a number of books, research papers and articles, which make a 

principal contribution to the deliberation about the alleged ‘crisis of German foreign policy’ 

(so Maull or Hellmann). 7 

There are a number of areas where the two books complement each other. Most 

importantly, both testify to the principal importance of multilateral institutions for German 

policy. Also, both show how the German attitude has been shifting towards a more 

instrumental use of multilateralism, with a growing emphasis on national interests. The 

Civilian Power ethos has survived in the minds of the German public, many policymakers 

and academicians. However, given the dramatic change of the general political and 

economic constellation – both external and domestic – the ethos has been increasingly 

confronted with pragmatic policy-making. Do we witness a gradual change of German 

political culture? We do not know yet. But one thing seems to be rather clear. Unless foreign 

policy attracts more public attention and secures adequate resources, the indisputable 

achievements of German foreign policy during the unification and NATO/EU enlargement 

process may wither away thanks to the lack of strategic guidance, an only halfway satisfying 

performance, interest particularism and ad hoc activism. 

Vladimir Handl 

Institute of International Relations, Prague 

7. For the broad scope of the activities of the Trier research team see its website project www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de.

134 


Esther KRAMER – Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa? Kontinuität und Wandel in 

den Verhandlungen über eine politische Union 1958-1970, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003, 

332 S. – ISBN 3-8329-0366-6 – 64,00 €. 

European integration has always been a political project. Geopolitical and security 

considerations, together with economic motives, have been essential driving forces behind 

European unity. And yet, throughout the Cold War, the member states of the European 

Community did not succeed in transforming their relations into a political union, despite 

several rounds of negotiations. Europe gradually became a key economic actor, but it failed 

to establish a coherent power base in the realm of foreign and security policy. Even today, 

the European Union in its core has remained an economic entity, its foreign and security 

cooperation being organized in a separate, much less integrated pillar. 

While political scientists for many years have been engaged in theorizing why European 

integration has been much slower and more limited in the political field, historians after the 

opening of archives have begun to analyze individual efforts at political unification in their 

contextual and temporal particularities. Historical accounts are available today on the 

post-war Third Force Europe plans, the negotiations on a European Defence Community 

and a European Political Community in the early 1950s, and the Fouchet negotiations in 

1961/62. Several of these studies are particularly valuable in that they approach their subject 

from a multilateral perspective, which allows for comprehensive interpretations of the 

1 

respective negotiations. 8 

Esther Kramer with her remarkable Ph.D. thesis makes an important contribution to this 

field of research in two major ways. By investigating into the debates on political union 

between 1958 and 1970, she offers a pioneering analysis of the post-Fouchet period and 

covers much new archival ground. And, as she links her research on the later 1960s with a 

fresh look at the preceding Fouchet negotiations, she is able to put her findings into a bigger 

framework and to point to both continuities and evolutions in the national perceptions of the 

need, feasibility, and purpose of European political unity. 

Kramer starts off with an evaluation of unification efforts prior to 1958. She rightly 

points out the significance of security and defence issues in those early deliberations and 

negotiations. Given the importance of nuclear weapons and the uncertainties that the 

bipolarity of the Cold War international system implied for European security, there was a 

nexus between the notion of a European political entity and the question of NATO reform 

and nuclear control from early on. Kramer then proceeds to discuss the international 

constellation of the late 1950s and the political design of Charles de Gaulle as new French 

president. She convincingly argues that de Gaulle was a far less erratic leader and his 

foreign policy conception much more coherent than many analysts have maintained. On the 

global level, tripartism promised France a leadership role in Europe. On the European level, 

de Gaulle pursued two complementary and consecutive policies: a political confederation of 

Western Europe primarily based on security and defence cooperation and autonomous from 

the US; and, an all-European scheme “from the Atlantic to the Urals”, with a view to 

overcoming the bipolarity and division of Europe. In the mid-1960s, Kramer argues, de 

Gaulle after the failure of the Fouchet Plans reversed his priorities and first pursued a policy 

of détente with the East, without however losing sight of his blueprint for Western Europe. 

As regards the Fouchet negotiations, Kramer notes that talks in a first phase between 

February and December 1961 went surprisingly well. This was largely because de Gaulle 

initially did not disclose to the Five just how radically different from Jean Monnet’s Europe 

18. 

See, for instance, J. GIAUQUE, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the 

Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955-1963, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel 

Hill, 2002; T. CABALO, Politische Union Europas 1956-1963, PapyRossa, Cologne,1999.


his own design was. The first Fouchet Plan and a revised draft with additional concessions 

by the Quai d’Orsay consequently came close to a compromise solution. Only when the 

French President in early 1962 presented a second Fouchet Plan and proposed to end 

integration in the Common Market, subordinate the European Commission to the political 

union of states, and eliminate any reference to the Atlantic Alliance did the atmosphere turn 

sour, and did the disparity between the different conceptions of Europe become 

unbridgeable. Kramer emphasizes, however, that de Gaulle did not provoke the end of the 

negotiations, as he in February 1962 after bilateral talks with Konrad Adenauer accepted in 

his draft a parallelism between the Common Market and the political union and a new 

reference to NATO. Rather, Kramer maintains, it was the insurmountable differences on the 

“British question” that caused the talks to be eventually stalled. While Adenauer tended to 

support de Gaulle’s political union of the Six, the Dutch and the Belgians were worried 

about a Franco-German double hegemony in Europe and by April 1962 had come to insist 

on British participation in the Fouchet negotiations. 

In the second half of her book, Kramer shows how in the context of a radicalization of 

Gaullist policies in the later 1960s and the ensuing growing polarization between divergent 

conceptions of European unity no further negotiations on a political union took place. With 

de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO, any European 

defence solution became illusionary. With his continuing veto on British accession to the 

EEC and his empty chair policy in Brussels in 1965/66, the struggle over the role of both 

Europe in the world and the nation state within the Community became increasingly bitter. 

While there were several attempts at re-launching the debate on political unity – by the 

Germans, the Italians, the Belgians, and the European Commission, for instance –, Kramer 

indicates how these proposals were doomed to failure. One of the most interesting 

observations in her book is that all these reactivation efforts occurred in 1963/64, and that 

the years thereafter witnessed a gradual shift from comprehensive designs for political union 

to much more modest proposals of intergovernmental European foreign policy cooperation 

outside the Community structures. 

It is indicative of the paralysis of Europe in the later 1960s that the Six failed to agree on 

even such modest cooperative schemes. Kramer shows how both the Dutch and the Belgians 

blocked a Franco-German initiative at the summit of Rome in 1967 for fear of weakened 

Community institutions and because Britain was excluded again. The divisive issue of 

enlargement of the Common Market did indeed block any progress in foreign policy 

cooperation for the rest of the decade. Only with de Gaulle gone and his successor Georges 

Pompidou approving British accession to the Community did the Europeans in 1970 finally 

launch their political consultations. The fact that with European Political Cooperation (EPC) 

a mechanism was set up to harmonize policies in designated issues raised great hopes at the 

time that Europe would finally become a political power commensurate with its economic 

weight. Yet, as Kramer points out in her conclusion, EPC was a very loose and non-binding 

scheme, which simply papered over the neuralgic issues that had haunted Europe in the 

1960s – and that are partly still with us today. 

Kramer’s account of this important period in European integration history is well written 

and concise. As all books, it is not without weaknesses. It is unfortunate that the introduction 

is the least convincing part of the book, with many goals but no clear research objective 

stated. Furthermore, not all would agree with Kramer’s argument that the key issue in the 

formation of a European political union has been the role of the nation state rather than the 

question of Europe’s relations to the US (as reflected in the disputes on European defence 

and British membership in the Community). And while her multilateral perspective is very 

laudable, her choice of complementing French and German archives with sources from 

Belgium and the European Commission seems random rather than driven by her subject of 

analysis. The roles of both the Dutch as the most virulent opponents of political unity of the

136 


Six and the British as the key outside “veto player” deserve further investigation, at any rate. 

Overall, however, this is a most recommendable book, which expounds with admirable skill 

how Europe within a few years after the late 1950s moved from a period of grand 

expectations and visions of unity to a period of distrust and sober realism. 

Daniel Möckli 

Center for Security Studies 

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich 

Franz KERNIC, Jean CALLAGHAN, Philippe MANIGART – Public Opinion on 

European Security and Defense. A Survey on European Trends and Public Attitudes 

toward CFSP and ESDP, Peter Lang, Bern, 2002 – ISBN 3-631-39173-0 – 23,40 €. 

Die vorzustellende Studie zur öffentlichen Meinung über die europäische Sicherheits- und 

Verteidigungspolitik wurde vor dem 11. September 2001 erstellt. Dies erkennt der Leser 

sehr schnell an einer Grundaussage des Bandes 7 der interessanten Reihe „Studien zur 

Verteidigungspädagogik, Militärwissenschaft und Sicherheitspolitik”, herausgegeben von 

Hermann Jung und Wolfgang Royl. Demnach ist das öffentliche Interesse an 

sicherheitspolitischen Themen in den meisten EU-Staaten ebenso gering wie das Interesse 

der europäischen Entscheidungsträger an der diesbezüglichen öffentlichen Meinung. Nicht 

verwunderlich sind für die Autoren auch die mangelnden Kenntnisse der EU-Bürger über 

die Gemeinsame Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsinitiative (ESDI) der NATO 

und der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESDP) der EU. 

Seit dem ungeheuerlichen Terroranschlag auf das World Trade Center und dem daraufhin 

erfolgten multinationalen und weltweiten Anti-Terror-Kampf hat sich dies wohl 

grundlegend geändert. Die tägliche Berichterstattung von den Krisenregionen dieses 

Kampfes brennt der Öffentlichkeit die Bedeutung der Begriffe Verteidigung und Sicherheit 

ins Bewusstsein. Und die Entscheidungsträger kommen auch nicht mehr an der Haltung der 

interessierten Öffentlichkeit zu diesen Themen vorbei, wie die wahlbeeinflussenden 

Entwicklungen zum Beispiel in Spanien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hinsichtlich 

des Engagements der jeweiligen Regierungen im Irak-Krieg zeigten. 

Trotz oder gerade wegen dieser offensichtlichen Veränderungen bietet die Studie 

interessante Einblicke in das Wechselverhältnis zwischen öffentlicher Meinung und Europas 

neuer Sicherheitspolitik. Bevor die verfügbaren statistischen Daten der „Eurobarometer 

Surveys” der EU und nationaler Umfragen ausgewertet und analysiert werden, erläutern die 

Autoren den Wandel der sicherheitspolitischen Rahmenbedingungen in Europa seit dem 

Ende des Kalten Krieges, den Stand der Forschung und die Entwicklung der Gemeinsamen 

Europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (CFSP) seit Maastricht. 

Die sich daran anschließende Auswertung des „Eurobarometer Survey 54.1“ vom Herbst 

2000 durch Philippe Manigart zeigt, dass die meisten der in 15 Staaten befragten Einwohner 

weniger die Angst vor einem Krieg als die Angst vor organisiertem Verbrechen, Unfällen in 

Atomkraftwerken, Terrorismus und ethnischen Konflikten in Europa umtreibt. 

Interessanterweise hält hingegen die Mehrheit weiterhin die Landesverteidigung und die 

Katastrophenhilfe für die vordringlichsten Aufgaben von Streitkräften. Erst an vierter Stelle 

findet sich der militärische Einsatz für den Weltfrieden. Auf die Frage, ob die Regierungen, 

die NATO oder die EU verteidigungspolitisch relevante Entscheidungen in Europa treffen 

sollten, stimmten immerhin 43 Prozent für Brüssel. Allerdings zeigt die 

Länderaufschlüsselung, dass vor allem die Einwohner der europaskeptischen Staaten eher 

ihre Regierungen in der Pflicht sehen. Dem Leser stellt sich dabei allerdings die Frage, ob 

die Antworten von 65.000 Einwohnern aus 15 verschiedenen europäischen Staaten auf acht


Fragen zur Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik aussagekräftig, geschweige 

denn repräsentativ sind. Zumindest stellt auch Manigart fest, dass von einer einhelligen 

europäischen Stimme nicht gesprochen werden kann. Vielmehr ist eine Korrelation 

zwischen öffentlicher Meinung und Regierungsauffassung zu erkennen. 

Franz Kernic und Jean Callaghan kritisieren zu Recht die Ergebnisse des Eurobarometers 

54.1 ob des fehlenden theoretischen Rahmens und der teils unpräzisen Fragestellungen. 

Zudem empfehlen die Autoren, die Ergebnisse solcher Befragungen bei der politischen 

Planungsarbeit und der Entscheidungsfindung zu berücksichtigen. In ihrem Kapitel über 

nationale Meinungsumfragen zur europäischen Sicherheit werden die unterschiedlichsten 

Statistiken aus 10 verschiedenen Staaten ausgewertet und, soweit überhaupt möglich, 

miteinander verglichen. Dabei wurden mit Schweden, Irland und Österreich auch neutrale 

Staaten berücksichtigt. Die allgemeine Zustimmung zu Streitkräften, zur CFSP und ESDP 

ist dabei durchaus feststellbar, auch wenn der Bereich der Verteidigung noch immer eher 

dem nationalen Regierungshandeln zugeordnet wird. Unbeständigkeit und Ambivalenz 

zeichnen die nationalen Antworten aus, die teilweise deutlich von den europäischen 

Statistiken abweichen. Die Autoren erkennen insgesamt eine „Umfragen-Lücke“ auf dem 

Feld der Sicherheit und Verteidigung, die es im Interesse der EU zu schließen gilt. Nur 

europaweit standardisierte Fragebögen könnten den Entscheidungsträgern nach einer 

zentralen Auswertung für ihre Entscheidungsfindung nützlich sein. 

In ihrer Zusammenfassung betonen die Autoren deshalb ausdrücklich die Möglichkeiten 

der Sozialwissenschaften, die öffentliche Meinung über die Bereiche Sicherheit und 

Verteidigung europaweit zu erfassen, auszuwerten und für die Politikberatung „dingfest” zu 

machen. Dazu bedarf es auf der einen Seite weiterer intensiver europaweiter Studien, die 

standardisiert eine eng definierte Zielgruppe erfassen sollten. Auf der anderen Seite muss 

die Öffentlichkeit besser über CFSP/ESDP informiert und von deren Bedeutung überzeugt 

werden. Institutionalisierte Forschung zum Beispiel durch die zukünftige EU Security 

Studies Agency könne damit auch zu einer gemeinsamen europäischen Identitätsstiftung 

beitragen. Dieses Ansinnen der Autoren wird zumindest von „Mr. CFSP“, Javier Solana, 

geteilt, der ebenfalls längst die wachsende Bedeutung der Öffentlichkeit für die Umsetzung 

einer gemeinsamen europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik erkannt hat. 

Eine hilfreiche Chronologie von 1990 bis Mitte 2001, die besagten Fragen (Q.52 – Q.59 

des Eurobarometers 54.1) und eine nützliche Auswahlbibliographie runden den 

informativen und in seiner Botschaft sehr deutlichen Band ab. Der Leser erwartet nach der 

Fülle guter Ratschläge und angesichts der hochgesteckten Ziele allerdings auch eine aktive 

Beteiligung der Autoren an der weiteren Erforschung der öffentlichen Meinung im Bereich 

der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik in Europa. 

Dr. Helmut R. Hammerich 

Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt Potsdam 

Claudia BECKER-DÖRING – Die Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 

für Kohle und Stahl von 1952-1960: Die Anfänge einer europäischen Außenpolitik? Die 

Beziehungen der Hohen Behörde zu Drittstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 

Großbritanniens, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2003, 387 S. – ISBN 3-515-08319-7 – 

68,00 €. 

With her substantial and instructive book, a University of Hamburg doctoral thesis written 

under the supervision of Gabriele Clemens, Becker-Döring enters a new field of research: 

the international relations of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) during the 

1950s. Was there, she asks, a foreign policy of the ECSC? As far as the ambitions of the

138 


High Authority are concerned, there could be no doubt that “du fait du caractère 

supranational de la Communauté et de la souveraineté propre déléguée à celle-ci, ses 

relations extérieures sont analogues à celles d’un Etat” (p.19), as J. van Helmont stated in 

October 1952. But were both member and non-member countries really willing to accept 

such a role? 

Due to her “supranational” approach, Becker-Döring used as primary sources “only” 

records from the archives of the High Authority of the ECSC, or rather from the microfiche 

edition. In addition, she went through lots of published documents and the important 

publications on the ECSC, including not only historical but also legal works. Yet, although it 

may be justified by various reasons to concentrate the archival research on the ECSC, this 

decision might have repercussions on the assessment of the responses of member 

governments to the High Authority’s foreign policy ambitions and activities. 

The book is divided into three parts. The first and shortest deals with the administrative 

structure of the ECSC, especially with those related to foreign policy issues. Becker-Döring 

distinguishes between three stages: the first one, 1952-1954, was characterized by Jean 

Monnet’s ideas of administration and his foreign policy activities vis-à-vis the United 

Kingdom and the United States of America. The second, 1954-1958, was characterized by 

the bureaucratization of the administration and, therefore, by an increase of its activities: 

Most of the ECSC’s agreements fell into this period. The third stage, 1958-1960, showed a 

stepping up of efforts to cooperate with the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 

European Atomic Energy Community and a gradual decline of the ECSC’s foreign policy 

importance in favour of “Brussels”. The second chapter of the book analyses the High 

Authority’s diplomatic relations and instruments, whereas the last part deals with the 

contractual agreements between the High Authority and non-member countries, including 

an extensive case study of the association agreement with the United Kingdom. Although 

the importance of the ECSC’s foreign relations diminished after the Treaties of Rome, its 

experience served as a model for the foreign policy activities especially of the EEC. 

Becker-Döring’s book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the origins of a 

“European” foreign policy. Her answer to the question in the title is clear: Yes, there was a 

foreign policy of the ECSC, although the member countries tried – more or less successfully 

– to limit its ambitions. Perhaps Becker-Döring should have tried to give a precise definition 

of her understanding of the term “foreign policy”. It seems, that the High Authority’s 

“foreign policy” was rather “technical”. But maybe that is typical of a supranational body 

like the ECSC. 

Priv.Doz. Dr. Werner Bührer 

Technische Universität München

139 

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 


Poland’s Road to the European Union 

The article examines Poland’s attitudes and policies towards the EEC/EU from the 1960s 

until its recent accession to the Union. Our analysis will show that Poland’s geo-strategic 

importance and size have been somewhat of a mixed blessing as far as enlargement is 

concerned. Poland was often able to receive special treatment on political grounds, but there 

were worries about its readiness to take on the obligations of membership: the costs of 

restructuring its large and inefficient agricultural sector, and fears about its (labour) 

migration potential. Poland has often acted in an inter-governmental rather than 

communitarian spirit, emphasised security rather than economic aspects of cooperation, and 

insisted on close ties with the United States. But Poland has never questioned the integration 

project and has seen itself as part of it since the early days of regained independence. It 

entered the Union as a relatively stable, reformed and increasingly prosperous state that is 

able and willing to make a valuable contribution to European endeavours. 

L'accession de la Pologne à l'UE 

La contribution examine les attitudes et les politiques de la Pologne face à la CEE/UE depuis les 

années soixante jusqu'à la récente accession à l'Union. L'analyse révèle combien la position 

géostratégique et l'importance du pays se sont avérées constituer un certain atout dans le contexte 

de l'élargissement. La Pologne est souvent parvenue à bénéficier d'un traitement spécial en 

matière de politique, tandis que le doute continuait à entourer sa capacité d'assumer les 

obligations à charge des Etats-membres, en l'occurrence la maîtrise du problème des migrations 

de travailleurs et du coût de la restructuration d'un secteur agricole inefficace. La Pologne a en 

fait souvent agi dans un esprit intergouvernemental plutôt que communautaire. Au lieu de se 

préoccuper des aspects économiques de la coopération, elle a préféré mettre l'accent sur les 

questions de sécurité, tout en insistant sur ses liens étroits avec les Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Bref, 

la Pologne ne s'est jamais interrogée au sujet du projet d'intégration dont elle estimait faire partie 

et ce, dès les lendemains de son indépendance retrouvée. Elle est entrée dans l'Union en tant 

qu'Etat relativement stable, réformé et en train de s'enrichir. Partant, elle a la volonté, et la 

capacité, de fournir une contribution valable à la construction européenne. 

Polens EU-Beitritt 

Der Aufsatz behandelt Polens Haltung und politisches Verhältnis zur EWG/EU von den 

Sechzigerjahren bis zur kürzlich vollzogenen Aufnahme in die Union. Die Analyse zeigt in 

welchem Masse sich die geostrategische Lage und die Bedeutung des Landes als äußerst 

hilfreich im Rahmen des Erweiterungsprozesses erwiesen. So ist es Polen auf dem 

politischen Felde oft gelungen eine Sonderbehandlung herauszuholen, obwohl Zweifel an 

seiner Fähigkeit den Verpflichtungen als Mitgliedstaat nachzukommen bestanden 

(vornehmlich mit Blick auf die immensen Sanierungskosten der unrentablen Landwirtschaft 

oder die Zügelung des Problems der Auswanderung billiger Arbeitskräfte). Polens Taktik 

inspirierte sich hauptsächlich an den klassischen Prinzipien der zwischenstaatlichen 

Regierungspolitik, statt sich vom gemeinschaftlichen Geist beflügeln zu lassen. Als Beispiel 

hierfür gilt die Vernachlässigung der wirtschaftlichen Aspekte der zukünftigen Kooperation

140 


zugunsten der Sicherheitsfragen bei denen man besonders gerne auf die engen Beziehungen 

zu den USA pochte. Polen hat das Integrationsprojekt eigentlich nie in Frage gestellt und 

sich selbst – und zwar seit der wiedergewonnenen Unabhängigkeit –, stets als festes 

Bestandteil davon gesehen. Das Land trat der Union als verhältnismäßig stabiler, 

reformierter und zunehmend reicher werdender Staat bei, der den Willen und die Fähigkeit 

besitzt einen vernünftigen Beitrag zur europäischen Einigung zu leisten. 

Jan KARLAS, Petr KRATOCHVÍL 


During and After the Cold War 

This article deals with the attitude of Czechoslovakia and subsequently the Czech Republic (CR) 

towards the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Community (EC) and then 

the European Union (EU). The purpose of the article is two-fold. First, it analyses the main 

features as well as turning points of Czechoslovak/Czech foreign policy in relation to European 

integration. Second, it provides an overview of existing sources on this subject. Our main finding 

is that the transformation of Czechoslovak/Czech policy in relation to European integration from 

hostility to a quest for membership was in principle a sudden one and reflected the fall of the 

communist regime. Still, whereas the shift to political cooperation and accession efforts was 

indeed abrupt, economic or, more precisely, trade cooperation predates the fall of communism. 

With regard to existing sources, there is a lack of the secondary literature on the specific subject 

of Czechoslovak/Czech foreign policy in relation to the European integration process, especially 

in the communist period. Those who are interested in the policy of the communist 

Czechoslovakia towards the EEC/EC must rely on the works dealing with the attitude of the 

EEC/EC towards the Central and Eastern European communist countries as a bloc. 

La Tchécoslovaquie/Tchéquie et l'intégration européenne: 

pendant et après la Guerre Froide 

L'article est consacré à l'attitude de la Tchécoslovaquie/République tchèque face à la 

Communauté Economique Européenne (CEE), puis, plus tard, face à la Communauté 

Européenne (CE) et à l'Union Européenne (UE). Deux aspects sont examinés de près, à 

savoir, les caractéristiques et les tournants de la politique extérieure de la Tchécoslovaquie/ 

Tchéquie au regard de l'intégration européenne d'une part, et d'autre part la littérature 

secondaire y relative. Le principal constat consiste en la nature subite du changement 

d'attitude de la Tchécoslovaquie/Tchéquie vis-à-vis du processus d'intégration européenne 

qui, d'une hostilité ouverte, tourne en une demande d'adhésion. Le bouleversement rapide 

reflète l'effondrement du régime communiste. Il s'applique toutefois essentiellement au 

domaine politique car, au niveau des relations économiques et commerciales, les origines 

lointaines du rapprochement remontent au temps de la démocratie populaire. Concernant les 

sources, il convient de signaler le manque de littérature secondaire, surtout pour la période 

antérieure à la révolution de velours. Partant, les chercheurs intéressés en la matière doivent 

bon gré mal gré se contenter des travaux consacrés aux relations de la CEE/CE avec les 

Etats d'Europe centrale et orientale en tant que bloc communiste.

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 141 

Die Tschechoslowakei/Tschechische Republik und die europäische Integration: 

während und nach dem Kalten Krieg 

Der Artikel befasst sich mit der Einstellung der Tschechoslowakei, bzw. der Tschechischen 

Republik gegenüber der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG), später der Europäischen 

Gemeinschaft (EG) und der Europäischen Union. Zwei Ziele werden dabei verfolgt: Erstens, die 

Analyse der Hauptmerkmale und Drehpunkte der tschechoslowakischen/tschechischen 

Außenpolitik in Bezug auf die europäische Integration; Zweitens, die Aufstellung einer Übersicht 

von existierendem Quellenmaterial zum Thema. Der zentrale Befund besteht in der, im Prinzip, 

plötzlichen Wende von einer feindlichen Haltung gegenüber der Europäischen Integration hin zur 

Bewerbung um eine Mitgliedschaft. Der rasche politische Wandel – er spiegelte den Fall des 

kommunistischen Regimes wider – war aber bereits seit längerer Zeit auf dem Felde der 

Wirtschafts- und Handelskooperation sichtbar. Betreffs die zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen 

verzeichneten wir einen Mangel an Sekundarliteratur zum Thema tschechoslowakische/ 

tschechische Außenpolitik und europäischer Integrationsprozess. Dies gilt allen voran für die 

kommunistische Zeit. Forscher, die an der EG/EWG-Politik der kommunistischen 

Tschechoslowakei interessiert sind, müssen sich mit jenen Arbeiten zufrieden geben, welche die 

Beziehungen zwischen der europäischen Gemeinschaft zu den mittel- und osteuropäischen 

kommunistischen Blockländern als Ganzes gewidmet sind.Lasse Michael Boehm 

Lasse BOEHM 

Our Man in Paris: The British Embassy in Paris 

and the Second UK Application to Join the EEC, 1966-67 

This article deals with an often overlooked dimension of Britain’s post-war foreign policy: 

the role of embassies and individual diplomats. It analyses the influence of the British 

embassy in Paris, and in particular that of its ambassador, on the second British application 

to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1966 and 1967. This perspective helps 

to illuminate three issues: first, it sheds new light on the British government’s shortcomings 

and mistakes in its policy towards France. Second, it gives an insight into the diverging 

interests within the Foreign Office. Third, it reveals the potential for disagreement and 

conflict between professional diplomats and politicians. While this article does not give a 

full explanation of Britain’s failure to enter the EEC, it seeks to identify the mechanisms of 

policy-making in the formulation of Britain’s policy towards France. 

Notre homme à Paris: L'ambassade du Royaume-Uni à Paris et la seconde demande 

d'adhésion britannique à la CEE. 1966-1967 

Cet article aborde une dimension souvent négligée par les analyses de la politique étrangère 

britannique d’après-guerre: le rôle des ambassades et des diplomates. Aussi la présente 

contribution examine-t-elle l’influence de l’ambassade britannique à Paris et, en particulier, 

celle de son ambassadeur, à propos de la seconde candidature de la Grande-Bretagne à la 

Communauté Economique Européenne (CEE) en 1966 et 1967. Cette perspective permet 

d’élucider trois questions. D'abord elle jette la lumière sur les lacunes et les erreurs de la 

politique britannique relative à la France. Elle donne ensuite un aperçu des intérêts 

divergents au sein du Foreign Office. Enfin, elle révèle le potentiel des désaccords et des 

conflits entre diplomates de carrière et politiciens. Cet article n’a pas pour objet d’apporter 

une explication complète de l’échec de la demande d'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne à la 

CEE; son but est plutôt d’identifier les mécanismes politiques qui entrèrent en jeu dans la 

formulation de la stratégie britannique concernant la France.

142 


Unser Mann in Paris: Die britische Botschaft in Paris und Großbritanniens zweite 

Beitrittskandidatur zur EWG (1966-1967) 

Dieser Artikel behandelt eine meist kaum beachtete Dimension der Außenpolitikforschung: 

die Rolle von Botschaften und Diplomaten. Der Aufsatz analysiert den Einfluss der 

britischen Botschaft in Paris auf die Entscheidung der Wilson Regierung, sich 1966 und 

1967 ein zweites Mal um die Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 

(EWG) zu bewerben. Eine solche Perspektive zeigt nicht nur die Fehler und die 

Versäumnisse der Regierung Seiner Majestät auf, sondern beleuchtet auch die 

Machtverhältnisse innerhalb des britischen Foreign Office sowie die grundsätzlichen 

Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen Politikern und Karrierediplomaten. Dies ist kein 

vollständiger Bericht über das Scheitern der zweiten britischen Bewerbung um eine 

Mitgliedschaft in der EWG; dennoch kann der Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der 

Formulierung von Außenpolitik innerhalb der britischen Regierung seinerzeit beitragen. 

Melissa PINE 

British Personal Diplomacy and Public Policy: The Soames Affair 

The ‘Soames affair’ of February 1969 is well-known, and is usually portrayed as an example of 

the blundering European policy of the government under Labour Party prime minister Harold 

Wilson. This article argues that the British perspective on the affair can only be understood in the 

context of a broader European policy that was in fact achieving success. Seen in this framework, 

the government’s handling of the ‘Soames affair’ was not a blunder. It allowed Wilson to build on 

ties with key European allies, it facilitated new co-operation in Western European Union, and 

ultimately it was to strengthen the British application to join the European Communities. 

Diplomatie personnelle et politique publique: l'affaire Soames 

L'«affaire Soames» de février 1969 est largement connue. Elle est d'ordinaire présentée 

comme étant l'expression des maladresses accumulées en matière de politique européenne 

par le gouvernement du Labour Party sous la houlette de son Premier ministre, Harold 

Wilson. Cet article démontre que la perception britannique de l'affaire doit être envisagée 

dans le contexte plus large d'une politique européenne en train de porter ses premiers fruits. 

La façon dont le cabinet de Sa Majesté traita le dossier n'a en effet rien d'une bévue; elle a au 

contraire permis à Wilson de renforcer ses liens avec les principaux partenaires des 

communautés européennes, tout en facilitant une nouvelle coopération au sein de l'Union de 

l'Europe Occidentale. En dernier examen, l'incident diplomatique a finalement même 

renforcé la position des Britanniques quant à leur demande d'adhésion. 

Persönliche Diplomatie und öffentliche Politik: die Soames Affäre 

Die «Soames Affäre» vom Februar 1969 ist bestens bekannt. Sie wird Gemeinehrhand als 

Ungeschicktheit der Labour-Regierung unter Premierminister Harold Wilson dargestellt. 

Der vorliegende Aufsatz beweist allerdings, dass die Affäre, aus der britischen Perspektive 

heraus, in dem erweiterten Umfeld einer gesamteuropäischen Politik gesehen werden muss, 

die eigentlich bereits begann erste Früchte zu tragen. Die Art und Weise wie die Regierung 

Seiner Majestät den diplomatischen Zwischenfall behandelte hat in der Tat nichts gemein 

mit mangelnder Feinfühligkeit. Sie erlaubte Wilson vielmehr seine Beziehungen zu den 

wichtigsten europäischen Partnern auszubauen und eine neue Kooperation im Rahmen der

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 143 

Westeuropäischen Union zu erleichtern. So gesehen, hat die Affäre die britische Position in 

Sachen Beitritt zur europäischen Gemeinschaft sogar gestärkt. 

Catherine PREVITI ALLAIRE 

The Origins of a European Career (1922–1958). 

New Evidence from the Emile Noël Archives 

Emile Noel was secretary general of the European Commission between 1958 and 1987. His 

significance is thus well known. This article examines the ideas and experiences that may have 

influenced his training and development before he came to Brussels, and which may also have 

left a lasting influence upon him. His roles both in the Resistance movement, and in youth 

movements during and after the war are explored. This article also examines his contact with 

federalist theories, his influence in the evolution of the SFIO (the French branch of the 

International Socialist Organization) in as far as this affected the European question in the 1950s, 

and the part he played in drawing up the Treaties of Rome. The article concludes that, with Emile 

Noel, a strategic position in the Commission was occupied by a ‘pragmatic idealist’. 

A propos des archives Emile Noël: 

aux origines d’une carrière européenne (1922-1958) 

Emile Noël a occupé une place significative dans l'administration communautaire dans la mesure 

où il a été le secrétaire général de la Commission européenne de 1958 à 1987. L'auteur tente de 

cerner les idées et les expériences qui ont pu contribuer à sa formation et à sa progression avant 

son arrivée à Bruxelles et qui ont pu exercer leur influence après cette date. On remonte ainsi à sa 

participation à la Résistance ainsi qu'aux mouvements de jeunesse pendant et après la guerre, à sa 

découverte des théories fédéralistes, à sa présence dans l'évolution de la Section française de 

l'Internationale Ouvrière face à la question européenne dans les années cinquante et à son rôle 

dans la rédaction des traités de Rome. Ces faits font conclure à l'arrivée d'un 'idéaliste 

pragmatique' à un poste stratégique au sein de la Commission. 

Aus den Archiven von Emile Noël: 

Die Anfänge einer europäischen Karriere. 1922-1958 

Emile Noël fiel innerhalb der gemeinschaftlichen Verwaltung eine überaus wichtige Rolle zu 

insofern er von 1958 bis 1987 die Stelle des Generalsekretärs der Europäischen Kommission 

besetzte. Der Autor dieses Beitrags versucht daher Noëls Gedanken und Erfahrungen 

nachzuzeichnen die seine Ausbildung und seine Entwicklung prägten noch bevor er nach Brüssel 

kam und die, im Nachhinein, seine weitere berufliche Laufahn beeinflussen konnten. Behandelt 

werden insbesondere seine Aktivitäten in der Résistance, seine Mitgliedschaft in den 

Jugendbewegungen während und nach dem Krieg, seine ersten Kontakte mit den 

föderalistischen Theorien, seine Zeit als Mitglied der Section française de l'internationale 

ouvrière [Sozialistische Partei] und die damit verbundene Konfrontation mit den europäischen 

Fragen der Fünfzigerjahre, sowie seine Beteiligung an der Redaktion der Romverträge von 1957. 

Aus alledem lässt sich ableiten, dass mit Emile Noël ein „pragmatischer Idealist” auf einen 

strategisch wichtigen Posten in der Kommission gelangte.

144 


Christian FRANKE 

The European Integration Process and Postal & Telecommunication 

services during the 1950s and 1960s 

The paper deals with the effects the European integration process had on the specific area of 

postal and telecommunication services during the 1950s and 1960s. In a first step the competing 

integration efforts of the Council of Europe on the one hand and the European Economic 

Community on the other hand are portrayed. Furthermore an explanation is given for the 

founding of the CEPT (Conférence Européenne des Administrations des Postes et des 

Télécommunications) in 1959, an NGO acting outside the sphere of influence of both European 

organisations. Secondly, the paper analyses the renewed discussion on attempts towards 

integration in the 1960s that had come up against the background of practical cooperation within 

the CEPT. The main concern is an in-depth look at the actors being involved in the discussion 

about integrative attempts, their guiding principles and their overall aims. 

Les Postes et Télécommunications au sein du processus d'intégration européenne 

des années cinquante et soixante 

La contribution examine les retombées du processus d'intégration européenne dans le domaine 

spécifique des Postes et Télécommunications au cours des années 1950 et 1960. L'article met 

d'abord en exergue les projets d'intégration concurrents jadis initiés par le Conseil de l'Europe et 

la CEE en exposant les facteurs qui, dans la foulée de la Conférence Européenne des 

Administrations des Postes et des Télécommunications (CEPT) de 1959, conditionnèrent 

finalement la création d'un organisme non-gouvernemental dont le contrôle échappait aux deux 

organisations européennes susmentionnées. Ensuite, dans un second temps, l'analyse porte sur 

les nouvelles tentatives d'intégration lancées pendant les années 1960 et fondées sur l'expérience 

pratique dégagée de la coopération au sein de la CEPT. Les discussions autour des mesures 

concrètes à adopter, les acteurs du débat et leurs conceptions organisatrices ainsi que les buts 

qu'ils poursuivirent, occupent une place privilégiée au centre de l'exposé. 

Das Post- und Fernmeldewesen im europäischen Integrationsprozess 

der 1950/60er Jahre 

Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit den Auswirkungen des europäischen Integrationsprozesses 

im spezifischen Bereich des Post- und Fernmeldewesens in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren. 

Im ersten Schritt werden die konkurrierenden Integrationsbestrebungen im Rahmen des 

Europarates und der EWG nachgezeichnet und erklärt, welche Faktoren schließlich dazu 

führten, dass mit der CEPT (Conférence Européenne des Administrations des Postes et des 

Télécommunications) 1959 eine nichtgouvernementale Organisation gegründet wurde, die 

außerhalb der Einflusssphäre beider europäischer Organisationen stand. Anschließend wird 

im zweiten Schritt die erneute Diskussion über integrative Maßnahmen in den 1960er 

Jahren beleuchtet, die vor dem Hintergrund der durch die CEPT-Gründung geschaffenen 

Praxis der Zusammenarbeit geführt wurde. Im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtungen stehen die an 

den Diskussionen um konkrete Integrationsmaßnahmen beteiligten Akteure, ihre 

handlungssteuernden organisatorischen Leitbilder sowie ihre Ziele.

145 

Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren 

BOEHM Lasse Michael, MPhil degree in European Politics from St Antony’s 

College, University of Oxford 

Private Address: Esslinger Str. 44, 73760 Ostfildern, Germany 

Tel.: (+) 49 711 348 26 27 

e-mai: lasseboehm@hotmail.com 

FRANKE Christian, Department of Economic and Social History, University of Siegen 

Private Address: Eichlingsborn 7, 57076 Siegen 

Tel.: (+) 49 271 74 12 076 

e-mail: franke@geschichte.uni-siegen.de 

KARLAS Jan, Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, Prague; 

Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Institute of Political Studies, 

Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague 

Address: Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1, 

Czech Republic 

e-mail: karlas@iir.cz 

KRATOCHVÍL Petr, Deputy Director, Institute of International Relations, Prague; 

Lecturer, Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics, Prague 

Address: Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1, 

Czech Republic 

e-mail: kratochvil@iir.cz 

KROK-PASZKOWSKA Ania, Visiting Lecturer on Central and Eastern European 

Countries in the European Studies Program, Cyprus College 

Address: Cyprus College, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 

6 Diogenes Street, Engomi, P.O. Box 22006, 1516 Nicosia, Cyprus 

e-mail: aniakp@yahoo.co.uk 

PINE Melissa MA, MPhil, DPhil (Oxon), Lecturer in European History, University of 

Plymouth 

Address: Faculty of Arts, University of Plymouth, 4 Endsleigh Place, Plymouth, 

PL1, Tel: 44 1752 238125 

e-mail: melissa.pine@plymouth.ac.uk 

PREVITI ALLAIRE Catherine, archiviste paléographe, conservateur du 

patrimoine, archiviste aux Archives historiques de l'Union européenne 

Adresse: Institut universitaire européen, Piazza Edison, 11, 50133, Firenze, Italie 

e-mail: Catherine.Previti@IUE.it 

ZIELONKA Jan, Ralf Dahrendorf Fellow in European Politics, St. Antony’s 

College, University of Oxford 

Address: Centre of European Studies, 70 Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6JF, tel: 

44(0)1865-274532 

e-mail: jan.zielonka@sant.ox.ac.uk

146 

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher 

BETZ Albrecht, MARTENS Stefan – Les intellectuels et l’Occupation 1940– 

1944. Collaborer, partir, résister, Autrement, Paris, 2004, 342 p. – ISBN 

2-7467-0540-0 – 19,95 €. 

BONIN Hubert – Un Outre-Mer Bancaire Méditerranéen. Histoire du crédit 

Foncier d’Algérie et de Tunisie (1880–1997), Publications de la Société 

d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer, Paris, 2004, 369 p. – ISBN 2-85970-030-7 – 24,00 €. 

BRAND CRÉMIEUX Marie-Noëlle – Les Français face à la réunification 

Allemande, automne 1989–automne 1990, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2004, 345 

p. - ISBN 2-7475-6638-2 – 30,00 €. 

CAUTRÈS Bruno – La citoyenneté européenne, La documentation Française, 

Paris, 2004, 116 p. – ISSN 0015 9743 – 9,00 €. 

DUMOULIN Michel (éd.) – Réseaux économiques et construction européenne. 

Economic Networks and European Integration, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 

2004, 499 p. – ISBN 90-5201-234-2 – 52,50 €. 

DÜLFER Jost – Europa im Ost-West-Konflikt, 1945–1990, Oldenbourg, 

München, 2004, 304 S. – ISBN 3-486-49105-9 – 24,80 €. 

ENDRES Ulrich, FILTHAUT Jörg (Hrsg.) – Die Kabinettsprotokolle der 

Bundesregierung, Bd.14: 1961, Oldenbourg, München, 2004, 429 S. – 

ISBN 3-486-57584-8 – 49,80 €. 

FEVRIER Jean-Marc, TERPAN Fabien – Le mots de l’Union européenne. 

Droit, institution, politique, Presses universitaires du Mirail, Toulouse, 

2004, 123 p. – ISBN 2-85816-687-0 – 10,00 €. 

GEHLER Michael, KAISER Wolfram – Transnationale Parteienkooperation 

der europäischen Christdemokraten. Dokumente 1945–1965. Coopération 

transnationale des partis démocrates-chrétiens en Europe, Documents 

1945–1965, K.G. Saur, München, 2004, 728 S. – ISBN 3-598-11655-1 – 

148,00 €. 

GRUNER Wolf, G. WOYKE Wichard – Europa-Lexikon. Länder, Politik, 

Institutionen, Verlag C.H. Beck, München, 2004, 503 S. – ISBN 

3-406-49425-0 – 19.90 €. 

HAUSER Gunther – Die Sicherheit Europas im Wandel transatlantischer 

Beziehungen, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, Wien, 

2004, 182 p. – ISBN 3-902456-05-1

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher 147 

HAUSER Gunther – Der Parlamentarismus während der ÖVP-Alleinregierung 

1966-1970, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2004, 340 p. – ISBN 3-631-30830-2 – 

48,60 €. 

HAUSER Gunther – Sicherheitspolitik und Völkerrecht, Peter Lang, Frankfurt 

am Main, 2004, 476 p. – ISBN 3-631-52480-3 – 69,60 €. 

KAISER Wolfram, ELVERT Jürgen – European Union Enlargement. A 

Comparative History, Routledge, 2004, 245 p. – ISBN 0-415-33137-4 – 

65.00 €. 

KNIPPING Franz, SCHÖNWALD Matthias (Hrsg.) – Aufbruch zum Europa 

der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung, 1969-1984, 

Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Trier, 2004, 502 S. – ISBN 3-88476-652-X – 

48,50 €. 

KRAMER Esther – Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa? Kontinuität und 

Wandel in den Verhandlungen über eine politische Union. 1958–1970, 

Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003, 331 S. – ISBN 3-8329-0366-6 – 64,00 €. 

LEGOLL Paul – Charles de Gaulle et Konrad Adenauer. La cordiale entente, 

L’Harmattan, Paris, 2004, 372 p. – ISBN 2-7475-6301-4 – 30,00 €. 

MAHANT Edelgard – Birthmarks of Europe. The origins of the European 

community reconsidered, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004, 205 p. – ISBN 

0-7546-1487-5 – 47,50 £. 

MAIR Peter, MÜLLER, Wolfgang C., PLASSER Fritz – Political parties & 

electoral change, SAGE, London, 2004, 280 p. – ISBN 0-7619-4719-1 – 

24,99 £. 

MARTENS Stephan (dir.) – L’Allemagne et la France. Une entente unique pour 

l’Europe, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2004, 149 p. – ISBN 2-7475-6462-6 – 14,00 €. 

PORTEVIN Jacques – Pour connaître et comprendre la vie et l’œuvre de Robert 

Schuman. Catalogue raisonné des sources archivistiques et 

bibliographiques, Fondation Robert Schuman, Paris, 2004, 41 p. 

ROTHIOT Jean-Paul – L’effort de guerre. Approvisionnement, mobilisation 

matérielle et armement (XIVe-XXe siècles), CTHS, Paris, 2004, 224 p. – 

ISBN 2-7255-0562-6 – 18,00 €. 

SCHILMAR Boris – Der Europadiskurs im deutschen Exil. 1933-1945, 

Oldenbourg–Akademie Verlag, München, 2004, 406 S. – ISBN 

3-486-56829-9 – 49,80 €. 

SKOGMAR Gunnar – The United States and the Nuclear Dimension of 

European Integration, Macmillan-Plagrave, Hampshire, 2004, 331 p. – 

ISBN 1-4039-3899-7 – 45,00 £.

148 

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher 

STARK Hans – Kohl, l’Allemagne et l’Europe. La politique d’intégration 

européenne de la République fédérale. 1982–1998, L’Harmattan, Paris, 

2004, 487 p. – ISBN 2-7475-6040-6 – 39,50 €. 

WEINACHTER Michèle – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et l’Allemagne. Le double 

rêve inachevé, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2004, 427 p. – ISBN 2-7475-6655-2 – 

33,00 €. 

WILDE d’ESTMAEL Tanguy de, SPETSCHINSKY Laetitia (dir.) – La 

politique étrangère de la Russie et l’Europe, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 

2004, 263 p. – ISBN 90-5201-230-X – 29,00 €. 

WILKENS Andreas (dir.) – Le Plan Schuman dans l’Histoire. Intérêts 

nationaux et projet européen, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2004. 466 p. – ISBN 

2-8027-1862-2 – 45,00 €.

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EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION


The purpose of The Journal of European Integration History is to encourage the 

analysis and understanding of different aspects of European integration, especially 

since 1945, in as wide a perspective as possible. The Journal publishes the 

conclusions of research on diplomatic, military, economic, technological, social 

and cultural aspects of integration. Numbers devoted to single themes as well as 

to diverse subjects are published in English, French or German. Each number 

includes reviews of important, relevant publications. 


L’objectif de la Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne est de promouvoir l’analyse 

et la compréhension des différents aspects de l’intégration européenne 

particulièrement depuis 1945, mais sans exclusive. La Revue publie les résultats des 

recherches sur les aspects diplomatiques, militaires, économiques, technologiques, 

sociaux et culturels de l’intégration. Les numéros à thème ou ceux ouverts à diverses 

perspectives sont publiés dans l’une des langues suivantes: anglais, français, allemand. 

Chaque numéro comprend des comptes rendus d’ouvrages importants. 



Die Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration bietet ein Forum zur 

Erforschung des europäischen Integrationsprozesses in allen Aspekten: den politischen, 

militärischen, wirtschaftlichen, technologischen, sozialen und kulturellen. 

Ihren Schwerpunkt bilden Beiträge zu den konkreten Einigungsprojekten seit 

1945, doch werden auch Arbeiten zu den Vorläufern und Vorbereitungen 

publiziert. Die Zeitschrift erscheint zweimal im Jahr. Neben Themenheften stehen 

„offene“ Ausgaben, und jedesmal werden auch Besprechungen wichtiger Neuerscheinungen 

veröffentlicht. Die Beiträge eines internationalen Autorenkreises 

erscheinen in englischer, französischer oder deutscher Sprache. 


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