number 2 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION HISTORY
REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE
L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER
EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION
edited by the
Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine
auprès de la Commission européenne
2000, Volume 6, Number 2
NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft
Baden-Baden

Editors
Published twice a year by the
Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire
contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne
in cooperation with the
Jean Monnet Chairs in History of European Integration
with the support of the
European Commission, DG X University Information
Editorial Board
BITSCH, Marie-Thérèse
Institut des Hautes Etudes Européennes
Université de Strasbourg III Robert Schuman
BOSSUAT, Gérard
Université de Cergy-Pontoise,
Jean Monnet Chair
DEIGHTON, Anne
Wolfson College, Oxford
DUMOULIN, Michel
Université catholique de Louvain
Jean Monnet Chair
GUIRAO, Fernando
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
Jean Monnet Chair
LAURSEN, Johnny
University of Aarhus
LOTH, Wilfried
Universität-Gesamthochschule Essen
Jean Monnet Chair
MILWARD, Alan S.
European University Institute, Florence
SCHWABE, Klaus
Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen
Jean Monnet Chair
TRAUSCH, Gilbert
Centre Robert Schuman, Université de Liège
VAN der HARST Jan
University of Groningen
VARSORI, Antonio
Università degli Studi di Firenze
Jean Monnet Chair
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION HISTORY
REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE
L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER
EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION
Editorial Secretariat
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JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY
REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION
edited by the
Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine
auprès de la Commission européenne
2000, Volume 6, Number 2

The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international
symposium, that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg in order to launch historical research
on European integration. It consists of historians of the European Union member countries, who have
specialized in contemporary history.
The Liaison Committee:
– gathers and conveys information about works on European history after the Second World War;
– advises the European Union in the matter of scientific projects to be carried through. Thus, the
Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community
institutions;
– enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources;
– promotes scientific meetings in order to get an update of the acquired knowledge and to stimulate
new research: six research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published, a
seventh conference will take place in Essen (Germany).
The Journal of European History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für
Geschichte der europäischen Integration is totally in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee.
Being the first journal of history to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration,
the Journal intends to offer the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary
Europe, a permanent forum.
At the same time, the Liaison Committee publishes the Newsletter of the European Community Liaison
Committee of Historians and of the Jean Monnet Chairs in History of European Integration. The
Newsletter publishes in particular an important current bibliography of theses and dissertations, books
and articles dealing with European integration and presents the syllabuses of research institutes and
centres in the field of European history.
The Liaison Committee is supported by the European Commission and works completely independently
and according to the historians’ critical method.
❋
Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire auprès de la Commission des Communautés
européennes s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commission avait organisé
à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupe
des professeurs d’université des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spécialistes d’histoire contemporaine.
Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission:
– de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre
mondiale;
– de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi
le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archives
des institutions communautaires;
– d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition
(archives, sources orales...);
– d’encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et
de susciter de nouvelles recherches: six grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés,
un septième colloque aura lieu à Essen (RFA).
L’édition du Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne –
Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations du
Groupe de liaison. Première revue d’histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l’histoire de la construction
européenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant de jeunes
historiens vouant leurs recherches à l’Europe contemporaine.
Parallèlement le Groupe de liaison édite la Lettre d’information du Groupe de liaison des professeurs
d’histoire auprès de la Commission européenne et du réseau des Chaires Jean Monnet en
histoire de l’Intégration. La Lettre d’information publie notamment une importante bibliographie courante
des thèses et mémoires, livres et articles consacrés à la construction européenne et présente les
programmes des instituts et centres de recherche en matière d’histoire européenne.
Le Groupe de liaison bénéficie du soutien de la Commission européenne. Ses colloques et publications
se font en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY
REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION
2000, Volume 6, Number 2
Marc TRACHTENBERG, coordinator
Hommage à Raymond Poidevin (1928 – 2000) .................................... 5
Marc TRACHTENBERG
America and Europe, 1950-1974........................................................ 7
Marc TRACHTENBERG, Christopher GEHRZ
America, Europe, and German Rearmament,
August-September 1950 ..................................................................... 9
Paul M. PITMAN
«Un Général qui s’appelle Eisenhower»:
Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic
Community ....................................................................................... 37
Francis J. GAVIN, Erin MAHAN
Hegemony or Vulnerability?
Giscard, Ball, and the 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal ...................... 61
Hubert ZIMMERMANN
Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict and
Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy, 1965-1973 ........ 85
Georges-Henri SOUTOU
Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre
les Etats-Unis et l'Europe............................................................... 111
Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen................ 147
Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen ................................. 167
Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren.................................................... 175
Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher................. 177

Beilagenhinweis: Dieser Ausgabe liegt ein Prospekt der Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft bei.
Wir bitten freundlichst um Beachtung.
Editorial notice
Articles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will then
arrange for the article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotes
included. They may be in English, French or German.
Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to any
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The accuracy of, and views expressed in articles and reviews are the sole responsibility of the
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Authors should ensure that typescripts conform with the journal style. Prospective contributors
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Articles, reviews, communications relating to articles and books for review should be sent to the
Editorial Secretariat.
Citation
The Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows:
JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page).
ISSN 0947-9511
© 2000 NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden and the Groupe de liaison des professeurs
d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. Printed in Germany.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
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without prior permission of the publishers.

5
Hommage à Raymond Poidevin (1928 – 2000)
La Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne est en deuil: Raymond Poidevin,
l'un des membres les plus éminents de son comité de rédaction, nous a quittés en
juin dernier. La communauté des historiens spécialistes des relations internationales
reconnaissait en lui une personnalité particulièrement attachante, par l'étendue
de ses connaissances, l'ampleur de ses travaux, sa rigueur scientifique, ses grandes
qualités humaines, son autorité morale, son sens des responsabilités, sa conscience
professionnelle jamais en défaut, dans son enseignement, dans le suivi des jeunes
chercheurs travaillant sous sa direction, dans la conception et l'animation de programmes
de recherche, dans ses activités au sein de nombreux comités, commissions,
institutions qui avaient sollicité son concours.
Raymond Poidevin faisait partie du groupe d'historiens rassemblés depuis 1973
par Jean-Baptiste Duroselle et Jacques Freymond, autour de la revue Relations internationales,
pour développer et approfondir les conceptions de Pierre Renouvin sur le
renouvellement de l'histoire des relations internationales. Par ses recherches, ses
publications, les colloques qu'il organisait, ceux auxquels il participait activement,
par la place qu'il tenait dans de nombreuses instances scientifiques, Raymond Poidevin
s'était imposé comme une autorité incontournable pour l'histoire contemporaine
de l'Allemagne, des relations franco-allemandes, de la construction européenne.
Né en 1928 dans une commune du Haut-Rhin, il doit avec sa famille se réfugier
en 1940 dans la région parisienne, et poursuit des études d'histoire à la Sorbonne. Il
occupe plusieurs postes dans l'enseignement secondaire, passe en 1957 l'agrégation
d'histoire. Attaché de recherche au CNRS puis assistant à la Faculté des Lettres de
Strasbourg, il se consacre à la préparation, sous la direction de Pierre Renouvin,
d'une thèse de doctorat ès-lettres sur Les relations économiques et financières entre
la France et l'Allemagne de 1898 à 1914, soutenue en Sorbonne et publiée en 1969
chez Armand Colin, travail monumental qui demeure aujourd'hui un ouvrage de
référence indispensable. C'est aux Archives de Potsdam, où nous travaillions l'un et
l'autre pour préparer notre thèse, thèses dirigées par Pierre Renouvin, que nous
avons fait connaissance, en août 1961, et de ce moment date une amitié qui n'a fait
que se renforcer au fil des années.
Sa thèse soutenue, Raymond Poidevin est nommé à l'Université de Metz, où il
est l'un des fondateurs et le premier doyen de la Faculté des Lettres; il y exerce
jusqu'en 1980 les fonctions de professeur d'histoire contemporaine et de directeur
du Centre de Recherches Relations internationales, centre qu'il a créé en 1971 et
qui acquiert vite la notoriété par ses activités et ses publications (actes de colloques,
thèses de doctorat, collection Travaux et Recherches).
A partir de 1980, Raymond Poidevin professe à l'Université de Strasbourg III; il
y dirige le Centre de recherches d'histoire des relations internationales et le troisième
cycle Histoire contemporaine, anime de nombreux séminaires. Année après
année il forme une longue cohorte de jeunes historiens qui resteront marqués par

6
l'ampleur de ses connaissances, ses dons pédagogiques, sa rigueur scientifique,
l'attention qu'il leur portait dans le suivi de leurs travaux.
Comme le montrent ses nombreuses publications - la liste en figure dans son
dernier ouvrage, Péripéties franco-allemandes (Euroclio; Peter Lang, 1995), qui
rassemble vingt-six de ses principaux articles - ainsi que les recherches collectives
et manifestations scientifiques qu'il a suscitées ou auxquelles il participait activement,
Raymond Poidevin était un grand spécialiste de l'Allemagne contemporaine
et des relations franco-allemandes. Son apport est reconnu comme essentiel, car en
dépouillant une quantité impressionnante de fonds d'archives en France et en Allemagne,
il a exploré de nouveaux domaines, renouvelé nos connaissances, ouvert
des perspectives neuves.
Mais la relation franco-allemande s'inscrit dans le cadre plus vaste de l'Europe
occidentale. Dans les années 1970, Raymond Poidevin avait organisé des colloques
sur les relations de la France avec la Belgique, le Luxembourg, la Suisse. En entreprenant
sa grande biographie de Robert Schuman, homme d'Etat, publiée en 1986,
il avait placé l'étude des rapports franco-allemands au cœur de l'histoire de la construction
européenne qui est devenue, à côté du franco-allemand, son autre domaine
de prédilection. Son enseignement et les recherches qu'il dirigeait à l'Université de
Strasbourg III avaient d'ailleurs pour cadre l'Institut des hautes études européennes
de cette université. Parmi ses œuvres majeures, citons son Histoire de la Haute
Autorité de la CECA, publiée chez Bruylant en 1993, et écrite en collaboration
avec Dirk Spierenburg.
Une grande leçon que nous lègue Raymond Poidevin, c'est que la recherche scientifique
est inséparable des contacts humains, de la constitution de réseaux rassemblant
des historiens de divers pays, lieux d'échanges, de discussions, de confrontations
de points de vue, d'enrichissement mutuel. Il est l'un des fondateurs du Groupe
de liaison des historiens auprès des Communautés, créé en 1982, et l'organisateur, à
Strasbourg en 1984, du premier de la série des colloques internationaux de ce groupe.
Un autre projet qui lui tenait à cœur, était de rassembler dans un organisme permanent
des professeurs et chercheurs français et allemands, pour une meilleurs connaissance
et compréhension réciproques de l'histoire contemporaine des deux pays. Sa
ténacité, jointe à celle du professeur Josef Becker, a été récompensée: en 1987 s'est
constitué le Comité franco-allemand de recherches sur l'histoire de la France et de
l'Allemagne aux XIXe et XXe siècles, dont il suivait de près les activités.
Raymond Poidevin est devenu professeur émérite en octobre 1993. Cela ne
signifiait pas pour lui la retraite, car il a continué de diriger de jeunes chercheurs,
d'animer des recherches collectives, de participer aux réunions et colloques des instances
dont il était membre, un membre actif, respecté, et dont les avis faisaient
autorité. En France comme à l'étranger, il avait tissé un dense réseau d'amitiés et de
relations. Tous seront durablement marqués par son magistère scientifique, ses qualités
morales, son sens des responsabilités.
Pierre Guillen
Professeur émérite à l'Université de Grenoble II

7
America and Europe
1950 – 1974
Marc Trachtenberg
The five articles appearing in this issue of the Journal deal with U.S.-European
relations in the quarter-century from 1950 to 1974. For the Europeans at that time,
the relationship with America was obviously of fundamental importance: the
“America factor” played a far-reaching role in shaping their policies, and indeed in
shaping their relations with each other. The United States was the protector of
Western Europe; the freedom of Europe, it was generally believed, depended on
American military power. But a relationship of dependence was always a source of
unease: how could Europe depend so heavily on a non-European power, no matter
how well-intentioned, for the defense of its most vital interests? Wouldn’t it make
sense for the European countries to come together as a political unit – for Europe to
organize itself, so that Europe would not be so dependent on America? This problem
was of absolutely fundamental importance; the “America factor” was thus
bound to play a major role in the history of European integration.
But the particular role it played turned on the specific policies the U.S. government
pursued, and those policies, it turns out, had a profound effect on what was
going on within Europe. The articles presented here were all written independently
of each other; there was no overall agenda that laid out the themes the various authors
were to develop. It is therefore striking that practically all the authors stress
the way dissatisfaction with America affected – one is tempted to say, lay at the
heart of – the European integration process. Paul Pitman, for example, stresses the
way dissatisfaction with the United States had been building up in many areas – political,
economic and strategic – in the mid-1950s; he argues that those feelings
played a key role in the process that led to the Treaties of Rome. Hubert Zimmermann
and Georges-Henri Soutou both emphasize the impact of America’s rather
cavalier monetary policy during the Nixon period on the European integration
process at that time. And the article Christopher Gehrz and I wrote discusses the
way in which a bare-knuckled American policy in late 1950 led the French and the
Germans to see that they had major interests in common, interests somewhat distinct
from those of the United States; what this episode suggested was that by coming
together, the Europeans might be able to provide something of a counterweight
to American power within the Western alliance.
Perhaps the most fundamental point to emerge from this series of articles is that
there is a real story to U.S.-European relations during this period: the basic structure
of U.S.-European relations was not set in concrete in the late 1940s; what we
think of as fundamental policies were by no means sacrosanct; attitudes could shift
dramatically, and far-reaching changes of policies could rarely be ruled out. As
Francis Gavin and Erin Mahan show, for example, the Kennedy administration was

8
Marc Trachtenberg
by no means committed to the Bretton Woods monetary regime as a fundamental
element of a U.S.-dominated system, but was instead inclined to view Bretton
Woods as a kind of albatross; it was far more open to fundamental change in this
key area than people have generally recognized. They also show how, during the
Kennedy period, the French government (or at least the French minister of finance)
was not out to destroy this dollar-based monetary system, this supposed symbol of
American hegemony, but was instead quite interested in shoring up the system and
pursuing a policy of monetary cooperation with the United States.
And Soutou, in an article drawing on new French and American archival sources,
shows how different both the Pompidou and the Nixon-Kissinger policies were
from the policies that had preceded them. Perhaps the most remarkable finding here
was how far things had moved during the Pompidou-Nixon period in the area of
nuclear weapons cooperation – a very important development that reflected fundamental
shifts in basic political thinking in both countries.
One might think, given the many books and articles that have been published on
U.S.-European relations during the Cold War period, that not much remains to be
said on the subject. But taken as a whole, what these articles show is how misleading
that sort of assumption can be. Archival research, even on the early Cold War,
can still yield important new insights; and work on the later period, especially the
early 1970s, can profoundly reshape our understanding of what was going on. And
with the opening in recent years of important new archival sources on both sides of
the Atlantic, one can safely predict that we will be learning a good deal more about
the subject in the near future.

9
America, Europe and German Rearmament,
August-September 1950
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
In September 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson met in New York with the British
foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman. Acheson
had an important announcement to make. The United States, he declared, was prepared to
“take a step never before taken in history”. The American government was willing to send
“substantial forces” to Europe. The American combat force would be part of a collective force
with a unified command structure, a force which would ultimately be capable of defending
Western Europe on the ground. But the Americans were willing to take this step only if the
European allies, for their part, were prepared to do what was necessary to “make this defense of
Europe a success”. And his government, he said, had come to the conclusion that the whole
effort could not succeed without a German military contribution. So if the NATO allies wanted
the American troops, they would have to accept the idea of German rearmament – and they
would have to accept it right away. The U.S. government, he insisted, needed to “have an
answer now on the possible use of German forces” in the defense of Western Europe. 1
The position Acheson took at the New York Conference was of quite extraordinary historical
importance. The American government was finally committing itself to building an effective
defense of Western Europe and to playing a central role in the military system that was to
be set up. But the Americans were also trying to lay down the law to their European allies: the
U.S. government wanted to force them to go along with a policy that made them very uneasy.
It was not, of course, that the Europeans disliked the whole package Acheson was now proposing.
They knew that an effective defense of Western Europe would have to be based on American
power and therefore welcomed much of the American plan. The offer of a major American
troop presence in Europe, the proposal to set up a strong NATO military system, the suggestion
that an American general would be sent over as NATO commander – all this was in itself music to
their ears. The problem lay with the final part of Acheson's proposal, the part relating to German
rearmament, and even here the issue had more to do with timing than with ultimate objectives.
The allied governments were not against the very idea of German rearmament. Of all the
NATO allies, the French were the most reluctant at this point to accede to Acheson's demands.
But Schuman was not dead set against German rearmament as a matter of principle. 2 He in fact
now admitted that it was “illogical for us to defend Western Europe, including Germany, without
contributions from Germany”. 3 The French government, he told Acheson, was “not irrevo-
1. Minutes of foreign ministers' meetings, September 12-13, 1950, U.S. Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, vol.3, Washington: GPO, 1977, pp.1192, 1208.
2. This claim is somewhat at variance with the conventional wisdom on this point. See, for example,
L. MARTIN, The American Decision to Rearm Germany, in: H. STEIN (ed.), American
Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, University of Alabama Press, Birmingham,
1963, p.658: “To the end of the New York meetings, however, the French representative refused
to accept even the principle of German rearmament”. But the real story is not nearly that simple.
3. Foreign ministers' private meeting, September 12, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:1200.

10
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
cably opposed to German participation” in the NATO army. Indeed, he thought it was likely
that “some day” Germany would join the Western defense force. 4
The problem from Schuman's point of view was that Acheson wanted to move too
quickly. The Americans were insisting on immediate and open acceptance of the principle of
German rearmament. But Schuman could go along with the U.S. plan, he said, only if this
were kept secret. It was politically impossible for him to accept the plan publicly at that
point. 5 Only a minority in France, he pointed out, appreciated “the importance of Germany
in Western defense”. 6 The French public could probably be brought along and would ultimately
accept the idea of a German defense contribution, but only if the West moved ahead
more cautiously – only if a strong European defense system had been built up first.
Domestic politics was not the only reason why Schuman took this line. The
east-west military balance was perhaps an even more fundamental factor. In late
1950 the Western powers were just beginning to rearm. In military terms, they felt
they could scarcely hold their own in a war with Russia. General Omar Bradley, the
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], for example, thought in November
1950 that if war broke out, the United States might well lose. The Soviets, on
the other hand, seemed to be getting ready for a war: the sense was that they were
poised on the brink and might be tempted to strike before the West built up its power.
In such circumstances, people like Schuman asked, was it wise to move ahead
with the rearmament of Germany, something the Russians were bound to find highly
provocative? Rather than risk war now, at a time of Western weakness, didn't it
make sense to put off the decision until after the West had rearmed itself and would
thus be better able to withstand the shock? 7
4. Acheson to Truman and Acting Secretary, September 16, 1950, ibid., pp.312-313.
5. Acheson-Schuman meeting, September 12, 1950, and meeting of British, French and American
foreign ministers and high commissioners, September 14, 1950, ibid., pp.287, 299-300.
6. Acheson-Schuman meeting, September 12, 1950, ibid., pp.287-288.
7. Schuman and Bevin in meeting of British, French and American foreign ministers and high commissioners,
September 14, 1950, ibid., pp.296-297. This fear of provoking a Soviet attack had been
an important element in French policy since early 1948. The concern at that time was that the
Russians would interpret movement toward the establishment of a West German state as a major
step toward German rearmament, which, it was felt, might provoke preventive military action. See,
for example, Chauvel to Bonnet, March 18 and May 19, 1948, Bonnet Papers, vol.1, and Massigli
to Foreign Ministry, May 3, 1948, Massigli Papers, vol.67, both French Foreign Ministry Archives
[FFMA], Paris. In 1950, this factor continued to play a fundamental role in French policy on the
issue, even before the German rearmament question was pushed to the top of the agenda by the
events in Korea in June. See, for example, a Quai d'Orsay memorandum from April 1950, published
in H. MÖLLER and K. HILDEBRAND, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich:
Dokumente 1949-1963, vol.1, K.G. Saur, Munich, 1997, p.376: “Nous pouvons nous attendre à ce
que les Américains posent le problème d'une contribution allemande éventuelle à l'armement des
puissances occidentales. Un programme de ce genre ne pourra être accepté par nous que dans la
mesure où il ne constituerait pas une provocation vis-à-vis de l'U.R.S.S”. On these issues in
general, and for the Bradley quotation in particular, see the discussion in M. TRACHTENBERG,
A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1999, pp.96-100, 111-112; and in M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, pp.118-127, 130-131.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 11
These were perfectly reasonable arguments, and were in fact supported by the
U.S. government's own assessments of the risk of war with Russia at the time. The
U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, John McCloy, thought, for example, in June
1950 that “the rearmament of Germany would undoubtedly speed up any Soviet
schedule for any possible future action in Germany and would, no doubt, be regarded
by [the Soviets] as sufficiently provocative to warrant extreme countermeasures”.
8 In December, the CIA concluded that the USSR would “seriously
consider going to war whenever it becomes convinced that progress toward complete
Western German rearmament”, along with the rearmament of NATO as a
whole, had reached the point where it could not be “arrested by other methods”. 9 It
was of course possible that the Soviets might choose to live with a rearmed Germany,
especially if there continued to be major limits on German power, but certain
groups within the U.S. government – Army intelligence, for example – believed
that if the West moved ahead in this area, it was more likely “that the Soviets would
decide on resort to military action rather than make the required adjustment”. 10
So if even American officials were worried about what a decision to rearm
Germany might lead to, it is not hard to understand why the Europeans, and
especially the French, were so disturbed by the U.S. proposal. The NATO allies
would have to accept the whole package, Acheson told them. They would have to
agree, publicly and immediately, to the rearmament of Germany. They would have
to go along with what they honestly viewed as a very provocative policy vis-à-vis
Russia and risk war at a time when no effective defense was in place – either that,
Acheson said, or the Americans would simply not defend them.
The fact that the U.S. government had chosen to deal so roughly with its allies had
one very important effect: it helped bring France and Germany together. It helped
bring about a certain change in perspective – a change in the way the Europeans
viewed America and thus in the way they viewed each other. Up to this point, the
French, for example, had tended to think of the policy of “building Europe” in essentially
manipulative and instrumental terms. It was, to use Raymond Poidevin's phrase,
a way “to seduce and to control” Germany. 11 But now the idea was beginning to take
hold that the Europeans – that is, the continental West Europeans – were all in the
same boat in strategic terms. The Europeans had interests of their own – interests that
overlapped with, but which were in important ways distinct from those of the United
States. The fact that the Americans could adopt a highly provocative policy toward
Russia, with scant regard for European interests, meant that the Europeans could not
afford to be too dependent on the United States. Yes, there had to be a strong counterweight
to Soviet power in Europe, and yes, that counterweight had to rest largely on
8. McCloy to Acheson, June 13, 1950, President's Secretary's Files [PSF], box 178, Germany, folder
2, Harry S Truman Library [HSTL], Independence, Missouri.
9. “Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitarization of Western Germany”, NIE 17, December 27,
1950, both in PSF/253/HSTL.
10. “Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany”, NIE 4, January 29, 1951, PSF/253/HSTL.
11. R. POIDEVIN, Robert Schuman, Homme d'État: 1886-1963, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1986,
p.220.

12
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
American power. The American presence in Europe was obviously essential and an
American combat force would have to be the heart of an effective NATO defense
system. But there needed to be some counterweight to American power within the
Atlantic alliance. And given the fact that Britain held herself aloof from Europe, that
counterweight had to be built on a real understanding between France and Germany.
We do not want to overstate the argument here. This sort of thinking was just
beginning to take shape in 1950 and things obviously had a long way to go. 12 But
the importance of what was going on at the time should not be underestimated
either. The line Acheson took at the New York Conference was quite extraordinary,
and what was at stake was of enormous importance. The events of late 1950 were
therefore bound to make a profound impression. They were bound to lead many
Europeans to begin thinking more seriously about the importance of coming
together as a unit in order to give Europe more of a voice in setting the policy of the
West as a whole.
Consider, for example, the reaction of the German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, to
the American plan. Shortly after the New York Conference, Adenauer had his top advisor,
Herbert Blankenhorn, tell Armand Bérard, the French deputy high commissioner in
Germany, that he did not want Germany to simply provide forces for an American army –
that is, an army in which the Americans would have all the power. The two men soon met
again and Blankenhorn returned to the charge. “With great emphasis”, Bérard wrote,
Blankenhorn “repeated what he had already told me a couple of weeks ago, namely, how
desirable it was that an initiative come from the French side. Germany did not want to
take her place in an American army”. “If France”, Blankenhorn continued, “proposed the
creation of a European army under allied command, an army whose supreme commander
might even be a Frenchman”, his government “would support that solution”. 13
Bérard's comment on this is worth quoting at length:
“The chancellor is being honest when he says he is worried that what the German
[military] contribution will boil down to is simply German forces in an American
army. He is afraid that his country will end up providing foot soldiers and shock
troops for an anti-Communist offensive force that the United States might build in
Europe. People in our own country are worried about the same sort of thing. Adenauer
is asking for a French initiative that would head off this American solution,
which he fears. I think he is sincere in all this, just as sincere as he was, and still is, in
12. For the best study of the subject, see G.-H. SOUTOU, L'Alliance incertaine: Les rapports
politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996, Fayard, Paris, 1996. Soutou begins his story
in 1954, which, as he points out (for example, on p.22), is when a real bilateral Franco-German
strategic relationship began. This is true enough; the point here is simply that the thinking had
begun to take shape a number of years earlier.
13. “Puis, avec beaucoup d’insistance, il [Blankenhorn] m’a répété ce qu’il m’avait dit il y a une
quinzaine de jours déjà, combien il paraissait désirable au Chancelier qu’une initiative vînt du côté
français. L’Allemagne ne voulait pas prendre sa place dans une armée américaine. Si la France
proposait la création d’une armée européenne sous commandement allié, dont le chef suprême
pourrait même être un Français, le gouvernement fédéral se rallierait à cette solution”. Bérard to
Foreign Ministry, mid-October 1950, series “Europe 1949-55”, subseries “Allemagne”, volume
70, folio 7, French Foreign Ministry Archives, Paris.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 13
his support for the Schuman Plan [for a coal and steel community in Western
Europe]. He believes that the problems of Western Europe have to be resolved on a
Franco-German basis, the military problem as well as the economic problems”. 14
The important point here was that France and Germany had major interests in common,
not just vis-à-vis Russia, but vis-à-vis America as well. There was, Bérard noted,
“a certain parallelism between the position of France and that of West Germany with
regard to the defense of the West. Both of them are concerned above all with making
sure that they are not invaded and that their territory does not serve as a battleground;
they both feel very strongly that the West should hold back from provoking the
Soviets, before a Western force, worthy of the name, has been set up”. 15
To go from that point to the conclusion that the Europeans had to act more as a strategic
unit – that European integration had to be real, and not just a device to keep Germany
from becoming a problem – did not require any great leap of the imagination.
Reading these and related documents, one thus has the sense of a new way of thinking
beginning to take shape – of French leaders rubbing their eyes and waking up to the
fact that they and the Germans had more in common than they had perhaps realized, of
an important threshold being crossed, of France and Germany just starting to think of
themselves as a strategic unit. And if this kind of thinking was beginning to emerge, it
was in large part in reaction to the heavy-handed way in which the U.S. government
had chosen to deal with its European allies in September 1950.
But had the American government, in any real sense, actually chosen to deal with the
allies in that way? It is commonly argued that the policy that Acheson pursued in September
14. “Le Chancelier dit vrai quand il affirme son souci d’éviter que la contribution allemande se traduise par
une participation à une armée américaine. Il redoute que son pays n’ait à fournir l’infanterie et les troupes
de choc d’une force offensive anti-communiste que les Etats-Unis mettraient sur pied en Europe. Les
mêmes préoccupations existent dans notre opinion en ce qui concerne notre pays. M. Adenauer sollicite
une initiative française qui écarte la menace de cette solution américaine qu’il redoute. Je considère qu’il
est sincère dans l’expression de ce souhait, comme il l’a été et comme il le reste dans son adhésion au Plan
Schuman. Il croit à une solution franco-allemande des problèmes qui se posent à l’Europe Occidentale, du
problème militaire comme des problèmes économiques”. Bérard’s next sentence is also worth noting, because
it shows how French officials were already thinking in terms of balancing between Germany and
America within the Western alliance: “Ce n’est pas à dire que l’on doive concevoir une armée occidentale
dont les Américains seraient exclus et dont Français et Allemands fourniraient les forces principales.
Pareille solution risquerait un jour de nous contraindre à nous battre, sinon pour le roi de Prusse, du moins
pour la reconquête de la Prusse”. Bérard to Foreign Ministry, October 17, 1950, Europe 1949-55, Allemagne,
vol.70, ff.16-17, French Foreign Ministry archives. These documents shed light not only on the
beginnings of European integration (and on the origins of the EDC project in particular), but also on the
evolution of Franco-German relations. Adenauer, for example, is often portrayed as pursuing a very
pro-American policy at this point; the standard view is that his attitude toward France at this time was
relatively cool. Note the tone, for example, of the discussion in H.-P. SCHWARZ, Adenauer: Der Aufstieg,
1876-1952, 3rd ed., Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1986, p.836. But it is clear from these
French sources that the roots of his later policy were already in place in 1950.
15. “Il existe une analogie certaine entre la position de la France et celle de l’Allemagne Fédérale concernant
la défense de l’Occident. L’une et l’autre ont le souci d’écarter à tout prix de leur territoire la possibilité
d’une invasion et d’éviter de servir de champ de bataille; elles sont préoccupées de s’abstenir de toute provocation
à l’égard des Soviétiques, avant que ne soit constituée une force occidentale véritablement digne
de ce nom”. Bérard to Foreign Ministry, October 17, 1950 (as in n. 14).

14
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
1950 is not to be understood as a choice freely made at the top political level, but is rather to
be seen as the outcome of a bureaucratic dispute in which Acheson ultimately had to give
way to pressure from the Pentagon. 16 The State Department, according to this argument,
understood the need for an effective defense of Western Europe; now, following the outbreak
of the Korean War in June, the need for action was obvious. It therefore wanted to begin
building an effective defense by sending an American combat force over to Europe. But this
gave the military authorities the leverage they needed to achieve their “long-standing objective
of German rearmament”. 17 They were willing, they now said, to go along with the plan
to send over the U.S. combat divisions, but only as part of a “package": the JCS “wanted
categorical assurances that they could count on German assistance in the shape they desired
and that they would be able to make an immediate start on raising and equipping the
German units"; they insisted that the offer to deploy the U.S. force “be made strictly
conditional upon iron-clad commitments by the Europeans to their own contributions, and in
particular, upon unequivocal acceptance of an immediate start on German rearmament in a
form technically acceptable to American strategists”. 18
The State Department, the argument runs, resisted the Pentagon's efforts to bring the
German rearmament question to a head in such a blunt and high-handed way. The two
sides debated the issue for about two weeks in late August, but the “Pentagon stood
united and unmovable”. Acheson, according to his own widely-accepted account,
“agreed with their strategic purpose”, but “thought their tactics murderous”. 19 At the
end of August, however, Acheson had reluctantly decided that he had to give way. He
had earlier felt that insisting on the inclusion of Germany at the outset “would delay and
complicate the whole enterprise”, and that a more flexible approach made more sense,
but, by his own account, he was almost totally isolated within the government and
therefore had no choice but to back off from that position. “I was right”, he said, “but I
was nearly alone”. 20 Most of the State Department, and even the president himself,
seemed to be on the other side. So somewhat against his better judgment, he accepted
what he later recognized as a mistaken policy. 21 He accepted not only the “package”
approach – that is, as one scholar put it, a formula which “tied German rearmament to
the State Department package much more rigidly than the State Department had
16. See, for example, MARTIN, Decision to Rearm Germany, pp.656-657; R. McGEEHAN, The
German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II,
University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1971, pp.41, 47; D. McLELLAN, Dean Acheson: The State
Department Years, Dodd, Mead, New York, 1976, pp.328-329; J. CHACE, Acheson: The
Secretary of State Who Created the American World, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1998, p.324;
D. C. LARGE, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era, University
of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1996, pp.84-85; S. DOCKRILL, Britain's Policy for West
German Rearmament, 1950-1955, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.32-33.
17. McLELLAN, Acheson, p.328.
18. MARTIN, American Decision to Rearm Germany, p.656.
19. D. ACHESON, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, Norton, New York,
1969, p.438; McLELLAN, Acheson, p.329; McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, p.41.
20. D. ACHESON, Present at the Creation, p.438.
21. Ibid., p.440; D. ACHESON, Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known, Harper, New York, 1961,
pp.26, 41; McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, p.41.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 15
intended” 22 – but a plan that would allow Germany to rearm on a national basis, which
was also very much at variance with what the State Department had originally wanted.
23 But this was the only way he could get the Pentagon to accept the rest of the plan.
If all this is true – if the American government just stumbled into the policy it
pursued in September 1950, if the policy, that is, is to be understood essentially as
the outcome of a bureaucratic process – then the episode might not tell us much
about how the American government, at the top political level, dealt with its European
allies. But if that standard interpretation is not accurate, then the story might
tell us something fundamental about the nature of America’s European policy, and
indeed about the nature of U.S.-European relations in general.
The goal here, therefore, is to examine this interpretation of what happened in
August and September 1950 in the light of the evidence. But is there any point, one
might wonder, to conducting an analysis of this sort? If so many scholars who
looked into the issue all reached essentially the same conclusion, that conclusion,
one might reasonably assume, is probably correct. There is, however, a basic problem
with this assumption: the standard interpretation rests on a very narrow evidentiary
base. It rests, to a quite extraordinary extent, on Acheson's own account and
on scholarly accounts that depend heavily on Acheson's story. 24 A self-serving
account, however, should never be taken at face value; given the importance of the
issue, the standard interpretation really needs to be tested against the evidence. And
a good deal of archival evidence has become available since Acheson's memoirs
and the first scholarly accounts were published. But what light does this new
material throw on the issue?
22. MARTIN, American Decision to Rearm Germany, p.657.
23. McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, p.41. This aspect of the argument is emphasized in
T. SCHWARTZ, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p.134.
24. The two published accounts Acheson gave – Present at the Creation, pp.437-440, and Sketches
from Life, pp.25-27, 41-43 -are cited frequently in the historical literature relating to this issue.
Scholars sometimes also relied on information Acheson provided in personal interviews. See
Martin, Decision to Rearm Germany, p.665, and McLELLAN, Acheson, p.viii. Other sources are
sometimes cited, but this additional evidence turns out upon examination to be quite weak. McLellan,
for example, cites a memorandum of a conversation between Acheson and JCS Chairman
Bradley on August 30 from the Acheson Papers at the Truman Library as supporting his contention
that Acheson had at this point “given in to the military point of view” (p. 329). But according to
the archivists at the Truman Library, no such document exists in that collection. The press accounts
cited in n. 41 in the Martin article also do not prove the point they are meant to support. They are
cited to back up the claim that the JCS was insisting on including German rearmament in the package,
but the picture they give is that the German rearmament issue was a relatively minor issue
(“only an incidental part of a much larger American program”) and that the U.S. government had
not embraced the package concept (“Acheson has not definitely made it a condition without which
the United States would refuse to send troops to Europe”). Western Europe (editorial), in: Washington
Post, August 31, 1950, p.8, and Schuman Got Little Warning on U.S. Plans, in: Washington
Post, September 17, 1950, p.10.

16
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
German Rearmament: On What Basis?
The State and Defense departments did not see eye-to-eye on the German rearmament
question in mid-1950. On that point, the standard interpretation is indeed
correct. But the differences between the two departments were not nearly as great
as they sometimes seemed, and the area of disagreement had virtually disappeared
by the time the New York Conference met in early September.
The military authorities had favored German rearmament since 1947. On May
2, 1950, they had officially called for the “early rearming of Western Germany”,
and had formally reiterated this call on June 8. But the State Department had taken
a very different line and on July 3 had flatly rejected the idea that the time had
come to press for German rearmament. 25 It was not that top State Department officials
felt that Germany could never be rearmed. Acheson himself had noted, even in
1949, that one could not “have any sort of security in Western Europe without using
German power”. 26 But until mid-1950, it was thought for a variety of reasons that it
would be unwise to press the issue.
In July 1950, however, a major shift took place in State Department thinking.
Acheson told President Truman at the end of that month that the issue now was not
whether Germany should be “brought into the general defensive plan”, but rather
how this could be done without undermining America's other basic policy goals in
Europe. He pointed out that the State Department was thinking in terms of a “European
army or a North Atlantic army"; that force would include German troops, but
the German units “would not be subject to the orders of Bonn.” 27 A whole series of
key State Department officials, both in Washington and in the major embassies
abroad, had, in fact, come to the conclusion at about this time that some kind of
international army that included German troops would have to be created, and
Acheson's own thinking was fully in line with this emerging consensus. 28
This shift in State Department thinking is not to be viewed in bureaucratic politics
terms as an attempt by the State Department to reach some kind of compromise with
the JCS on the German rearmament issue. It was instead a quite straightforward consequence
of the outbreak of the Korean War in June. As Acheson later noted, after the
North Korean attack:
25. "Extracts of Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Respect to Western Policy toward Germany,”
NSC 71, June 8, 1950, and “Views of the Department of State on the Rearmament of Western Germany,”
NSC 71/1, July 3, 1950, in FRUS 1950, 4:686-687, 691-695.
26. Policy Planning Staff meeting, October 18, 1949, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-53,
box 32, RG 59, U.S. National Archives [USNA], College Park, Maryland.
27. Acheson memo of meeting with Truman, July 31, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:702-703. President Truman
had earlier opposed the JCS call for German rearmament. See Truman to Acheson, June 16, 1950,
ibid., pp.688-689.
28. Bruce to Acheson, July 28, 1950; Acheson-Truman meeting, July 31, 1950; McCloy to Acheson,
August 3, 1950; Douglas to Acheson, August 8, 1950; Kirk to Acheson, August 9, 1950; in FRUS
1950, 3:157, 167-168, 181-182, 190-193.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 17
“We and everybody else in Europe and the United States took a new look at the German
problem. It seemed to us that it was now clear that Germany had to take a part in
the defense of Europe; it seemed clear that the idea that we had had before that this
would work out through a process of evolution wasn't adequate – there wasn't time,
the evolution had to be helped along by action. It was quite clear by this time, as a
result of the staff talks in NATO, that the Western Union idea of defense on the
Rhine was quite impractical and foolish, and that if you were going to have any
defense at all, it had to be in the realm of forward strategy, which was as far east in
Germany as possible. This made it absolutely clear that Germany had to be connected
with defense, not merely through military formations, but emotionally and
politically, because if the battle was going to be fought in Germany it meant that the
German people had to be on our side, and enthusiastically so”.
The U.S. government “immediately went to work” on “this German matter” – at
least as soon as it could, given the need to deal, in July especially, with even more
urgent problems relating to the Korean War. 29
So there was now a certain sense of urgency: an effective defense of Western
Europe had to be put in place and, indeed, put in place rather quickly. It was obvious
from the start that this would “require real contributions of German resources
and men”. But the German contribution could not take the form of a German
national army; the Germans could not be allowed to build a military force able to
operate independently. The only way the Germans could make their defense contribution
was thus to create some kind of international army that included German
forces – but forces not able to conduct military operations on their own. 30
A plan based on this fundamental concept was worked out by a key State
Department official, Henry Byroade, at the beginning of August. Byroade, the
Director of the State Department's Bureau of German Affairs, discussed his ideas
with the Army staff officers most directly concerned with these issues on August 3.
(The Army, for obvious reasons, took the lead in setting policy on this issue for the
military establishment as a whole). Those officers were pleased by the fact that the
State Department now appeared “to be looking with favor toward the controlled rearmament
of Western Germany”; they “felt that great progress had been achieved
on the question of German rearmament, since both the State Department and the
Department of Defense are now attempting to work out a suitable plan which
would make possible a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe”.
29. Princeton Seminar, pp.910-911, 921, Acheson Papers, HSTL. Soon after he left office, Acheson
and some of his former collaborators got together at Princeton to discuss what had happened during
the Truman administration; tapes were made of those discussions and a transcript was prepared.
Microfilm copies of the transcript of this “Princeton Seminar”, as it was called, are available at a
number of university libraries in the United States. But the microfilm is often illegible and the best
source is the original transcript at the Truman Library. All the references from this source cited
here come from the transcript of October 11, 1953 discussion.
30. See the sources cited in n. 28 above, esp. pp.157, 181 (for the quotation), 190, 193.

18
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
These Army officers had in fact just come up with their own plan for a “controlled
rearmament of Germany”. 31
There were, however, major differences between the two plans, or so it seemed to
both sides at the time. The Byroade plan called for the establishment of a highly integrated
“European Army”; that army would include practically all the Western military
forces – American and German as well as West European – stationed in Europe; it
would have a “General Staff of truly international character”, and a single commander,
an American general, with “complete jurisdiction” over the whole army. The force
would have as much of an international flavor as possible. The goal, Byroade said, was
to apply the Schuman Plan concept to the military field; the aim was to enable the
Germans to contribute to the defense of the West, without at the same time becoming
too independent – that is, without getting a national army of their own. 32
The Army, on the other hand, was not in favor of setting up a highly integrated
“European Army”. The Army staff did not call explicitly for a “German national army”,
but key officers did seem to feel that any plan the U.S. government came up
with would need to “appeal to the nationalistic tendencies of the German people”.
The Army plan, moreover, called for “controlled rearmament”, but the officers who
drafted it were reluctant to state formally what the “nature of the controls” would
be. In short, the State Department called for a truly international force, while the
military authorities, it seemed, wanted a less highly integrated force composed of
national armies. The two plans, in Byroade's view, were “miles apart”. Or as the
Army staff put it: the State Department proposal would reduce the “military sovereignty
status” of the European countries down “to the level of Germany in order to
secure her contribution”, while the Army proposed “to raise Germany's status” to
the level of the NATO allies. 33
So there was clearly a major difference of opinion on this issue at this point – at
least at the level of rhetoric. But in practical terms were the two sides really so far
apart? The great goal of the State Department was to make sure that there was no
new German national army – that is, an army capable of independent action, and
31. The Byroade Plan, “An Approach to the Formation of a 'European Army'”, was drafted on August
3; the text is included in Byroade to McCloy, August 4, 1950, 740.5/8-350, Department of State
Central Files [DSCF], RG 59, USNA. For the record of Byroade's talks with the Army officers on
August 3, see Memorandum for General Schuyler, August 5, 1950, Army Operations General Decimal
File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.
For the Army plan, see “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950, and
Bolté Memorandum for General Gruenther on Rearmament of Germany, August 10, 1950 (containing
a systematic comparison of the State and Army plans), both in same file in RG 319.
32. Byroade meeting with Army staff officers, August 3, 1950, in: Memorandum for General
Schuyler, August 5, 1950, and Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2,
1950, both in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS,
Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. “An Approach to the Formation of a ‘European Army’”,
in Byroade to McCloy, August 3, 1950, 740.5/8-350, DSCF, RG 59, USNA.
33. Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950; Byroade meeting with
Army staff officers, August 3, 1950 (document dated August 5); Bolté to Gruenther, August 10,
1950 (with attached “Comparison of Plans”); all in Army Operations General Decimal File
1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 19
thus able to support an independent foreign policy. The military authorities understood
the point, and it was for this reason that they, from the start, favored the “controlled”
rearmament of Germany. And when one examines the sorts of controls they
had in mind, and when one notes that certain key military controls in their plan
would apply to Germany alone, it becomes obvious – the rhetoric notwithstanding
– that military leaders had no intention of giving the Federal Republic the same
“military sovereignty status” as the NATO allies. In the Byroade plan, not just
allied headquarters, but also field army and corps headquarters were to be “international";
in the plan worked out by the officers in the Pentagon, “Army and Corps
should be national”, except that the Germans would be “allowed none”. In both
plans, the Germans would contribute only ground forces, and not air or naval forces;
in both plans there would be German divisions, but no larger purely German
units; in both plans, the German forces would be under allied control; in both plans,
the Germans would not be allowed to manufacture certain kinds of weapons
(“heavy ordnance, etc.”); and both plans implied German participation in NATO. 34
The real difference thus had to do not with Germany but with how the NATO
forces were to be treated. Byroade was not too explicit about this part of the proposal,
but his plan called for virtually all the allied forces in Europe to be integrated
into the proposed European defense force. There would be no distinct British,
French or even American army on the continent, only an international army with a
single commander served by an integrated international staff. The U.S. military
authorities did not like this proposal at all, even though the whole force would have
an American general as its commander. Byroade, it seemed to them, wanted to go
too far in pushing the allies down to the German level; the Chiefs also felt that
something that radical was not essential, and that instead of creating an entirely
new institution, the “European Defense Force”, it made more sense to build on the
one basic institution that had already been created: the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Both NATO and the Western Union military organization set up by
the Brussels Treaty of 1948 were already in existence; to create a new international
force would “tend to complicate an already confusing structure”. 35 And there was
no point in doing so, because NATO itself could provide the necessary degree of
integration; a German force integrated into the NATO system – especially a
strengthened NATO system--would be incapable of independent action.
34. Bolté to Gruenther, August 10, 1950 (with attached “Comparison of Plans”), Army Operations
General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG
319, USNA. See also Byroade meeting with Army staff officers, August 3, 1950, Memorandum
for General Schuyler, August 5, same file in RG 319, and, for the Byroade plan, see Byroade to
McCloy, August 3, 1950, 740.5/8-350, DSCF, RG 59, USNA.
35. Byroade meeting with Army staff officers, August 3, 1950, in Memorandum for General Schuyler,
August 5, 1950, and Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950, both
in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c,
Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.

20
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
This logic was quite compelling. It did not matter if the international force was
called EDF or NATO. The name was not important. What really mattered was
whether you had an international structure within which the Germans could make
their contribution, but which at the same time would prevent them from becoming
too independent. And if an institution that had already been created – that is, NATO
– could achieve that result, then so much the better. 36
Even Byroade himself, who by his own account was quite conservative on these
issues in comparison with other State Department officials, was quick to see the
point. His original plan, in any event, had not really been put forward as a practical
proposal; his aim there had been to sketch out a “theoretical solution from which
one could work backwards” with an eye to working out a “compromise between
the theoretical and what is already in existence”. So when a top Army officer
explained to him on August 10 how NATO could do the trick, he at least temporarily
dropped his objections and basically accepted their approach: he agreed that
“German divisions, organized as such, might well be integrated into the NATO
forces as now planned, provided only an American commander for these forces
were set up in the near future”. The differences between the two departments were
clearly narrowing. Indeed, it turned out that Byroade's earlier objection to the Army
plan had “stemmed entirely from a misunderstanding of terms”. Byroade had
thought that when Army officers referred to “controlled rearmament”, they had in
mind only a “limitation on numbers and types of divisions”. When he was told that
the Army “also contemplated as part of the control a very definite limit as to the
types and quantities of materiel and equipment which Germany should manufacture,
Byroade said he was in complete accord”. 37
By the end of the month, it seemed that a full consensus had been reached. For
Acheson, far more than for Byroade, only the core issue was really important. For
him, it was not a problem that the Germans would have a national army in an
administrative sense – that is, that they would recruit their own troops, pay them,
provide them with uniforms, and so on. The only important thing was to make sure
that things did not go too far – that the “old German power”, as Acheson put it, was
36. The idea that NATO could do it – that one did not need to create a new institution but could rely
on a strong NATO structure to solve this whole complex of problems – reemerged in 1954 as the
European Defense Community project was collapsing and people were looking for alternatives.
The military authorities, especially the NATO commander, General Alfred Gruenther, played a
key role at that point in pushing for the NATO solution; see M. TRACHTENBERG, Constructed
Peace, p.127. But they were drawing on basic thinking that had taken shape in 1950. At that time,
both Gruenther – then Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Plans – and General Schuyler, another top
Army officer who would end up as Gruenther's Chief of Staff in 1954, were already pressing for
the NATO solution.
37. Byroade to McCloy, August 4, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:183-184; Bolté to Gruenther, July 25, 1950
(account of Byroade's meeting with Schuyler the previous day), and memorandum of
Byroade-Schuyler-Gerhardt meeting, August 10, 1950, in Army Operations General Decimal File
1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Books I and II, RG 319, USNA.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 21
not resurrected. 38 If an arrangement could guarantee that, he was prepared to be
quite flexible on the secondary issues. Acheson was certainly not going to go to the
wall to defend those parts of the Byroade concept that would tend to strip the
NATO forces, including the American force in Europe, of their national character.
Acheson had an important meeting with JCS Chairman Bradley on August 30 to
work things out, and he discussed that meeting with his principal advisors later that
morning. He did not complain that the military wanted to go too far toward creating a
German national army; his real complaint was that the JCS was “confused” and had
somehow gotten the idea that the State Department position was more extreme than it
really was. The Pentagon's own position, Acheson thought, was just not clear enough:
“he did not know what was meant by 'national basis' and 'controlled status'”. 39
But the military authorities were now willing to be more accommodating on
this point and were prepared to state more explicitly what they meant by those
terms. This represented a certain shift from the line they had taken at the beginning
of the month. In early August, they had preferred not to outline formally the sorts
of controls they had in mind. 40 But by the end of the month, the Army leadership
had concluded that it needed to be more forthcoming.
This was because President Truman had intervened in these discussions on
August 26. On that day, he had asked the two departments to come up with a common
policy on the whole complex of issues relating to European defense and West
German rearmament. Given the president's action, a simple rejection of the
Byroade plan was no longer a viable option. Leading military officers now felt that
they needed to come up with a more “positive approach” to the problem. A “Plan
for the Development of West German Security Forces” was quickly worked out and
approved by the Army leadership at the beginning of September. That plan spelled
out the controls the military had long favored: the NATO organization would be
strengthened; Germany would not be allowed to have an air force or a navy; the
largest German unit would be the division; there would be no German general staff;
German industry would be permitted to provide only light weapons and equipment.
The military authorities were thus not pressing for the creation of a German national
force that would have the same status as the British army or the French army or
38. Acheson-Nitze-Byroade-Perkins meeting, August 30, 1950, Official Conversations and Meetings
of Dean Acheson (1949-1953), University Publications of America microfilm, reel 3.
39. Ibid. The references are probably to various JCS documents from this period that contained these
terms. See, for example, JCS 2124/18 of September 1, 1950, p.162, in CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49),
JCS Geographic File for 1948-50, RG 218, USNA.
40. See the Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950, paragraph 8,
Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case
12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.

22
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
the American army. Indeed, by the beginning of September, there was no fundamental
difference between their position and that of Acheson on this issue. 41
The Origins of the Package Plan
So the State Department and the Pentagon had clashed in August 1950 on the
question of German rearmament. That conflict had focused on the question of the
extent to which the German force would be organized on a “national” basis – or, to
look at the issue from the other side, the degree of military integration needed to
keep Germany from having a capability for independent action. But by the end of
the month that conflict had essentially been resolved. Misunderstandings had been
cleared up and differences had been ironed out. There would be a German military
contribution, both departments agreed, but no German national army. The German
force would be fully integrated into the NATO force; the German force would not
be able to operate independently. This was all Acheson really required, and the JCS
had never really asked for anything more by way of a German national force.
But even if the conflict had been sharper, even if the Pentagon had been intransigent
on this issue, and even if the State Department had capitulated to the JCS on
this question, all this would in itself tell us very little about the most important issue
we are concerned with here: the question of the origins of the “package plan”.
This was essentially a separate issue. The American government, at the New York
Conference in mid-September, demanded that the NATO allies agree, immediately
and publicly, to the rearmament of West Germany; if they refused to accept that demand,
the Americans would not send over the combat divisions and would not send
over an American general as NATO commander. Everything was tied together into
a single package, and it was presented to the allies on a “take it or leave it” basis. It
was this policy, this tactic, that created the whole problem in September 1950.
41. Gruenther to Davis, Duncan and Edwards, September 1, 1950, enclosing the “Plan for the Development
of West German Security Forces”. The plan had been worked out “pursuant to verbal instructions”
Gruenther had given General Schuyler on August 31; the feeling in military circles was
that after the president's letter, the JCS needed to take a more accommodating line in their discussions
with the State Department than they had taken thus far. Gruenther, Bolté and Army Chief of
Staff Collins were briefed on the plan on September 1, Collins approved it, and it was officially
presented to the JCS that same day. Miller memorandum for record, September 1, 1950, Bolté to
Collins on Rearmament of Western Germany, August 31, 1950, and Ware to JCS Secretary, September
1, 1950. All in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany
TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. The old conventional argument – laid out, for
example, in McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, p. 41 – was that the U.S. government,
by early September, had decided to press for a German national army “with no particular control
arrangement other than that which would have resulted simply by virtue of the German troops being
under NATO command and without their own general staff”. But this, it turns out, was incorrect:
the controls the Army was now calling for were quite far-reaching.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 23
How exactly did the issue of German rearmament get tied to the question of sending
over American combat divisions and to appointing an American general as NATO commander?
The standard view is that the JCS was responsible for the package plan. The
military authorities, it is commonly argued, simply refused to accept the deployment of
the American combat force unless the Europeans, for their part, agreed to the rearmament
of West Germany. Acheson supposedly thought these tactics “murderous” and
tried hard to get the Pentagon to change its mind. But the JCS was intransigent, this
argument runs, and to get the troops sent, Acheson gave way in the end and reluctantly
accepted the tactic the military leadership had insisted on. 42 But does this basic interpretation
hold up in the light of the archival evidence now available?
First of all, did the military push throughout August for the package approach?
The military leaders certainly felt that a German military contribution was essential.
The West European NATO allies, in their view, could not generate enough
military force by themselves to provide for an effective defense; German troops
were obviously necessary for that purpose; German rearmament was therefore seen
as a “vital element” of an effective defense policy. 43 The military authorities also
supported the idea of beefing up the U.S. military presence in Europe and of sending
over an American general as NATO commander. 44 But the key point to note
here is that these were treated as essentially separate issues. Military leaders did not
say (at least not in any of the documents that we have seen) that U.S. troops should
be sent only if the allies accepted German rearmament. They did not say that the
way to press for German rearmament was to tell the allies that unless they went
along with the American plan, the U.S. combat divisions would be kept at home.
Indeed, in the formal policy documents on the defense of Europe, the JCS did
not make the German rearmament issue its top priority. The Chiefs instead tended
to play it down. The basic JCS view in those documents was that NATO Europe –
the “European signatories” of the North Atlantic Treaty – needed to “provide the
balance of the forces required for the initial defense” over and above what the United
States was prepared to supply. 45 West Germany, which at this time, of course, was
not a member of NATO, was not even mentioned in this context. What this suggests
42. See especially McLELLAN, Acheson, pp.328-330; MARTIN, Decision to Rearm Germany,
pp.656-657; and ACHESON, Present at the Creation, pp.437-438, 440
43. See, for example, Joint Strategic Survey Committee report on Rearmament of Western Germany, July
27, 1950, JCS 2124/11, JCS Geographic File for 1948-50, 092 Germany (5-4-49), RG 218, USNA.
44. Bolté to Collins, August 28, 1950, Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 20, file G-3 091
Germany TS, Sec 1, RG 319, USNA. Note also the initial draft that the military had prepared of a joint reply
to the president's “Eight Questions” letter, given in JCS 2116/28 of September 6, 1950. The original draft,
according to another document, was given to the State Department on September 1. See Bolté to Collins,
September 2, 1950. Both documents are in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3
091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Books II and (for the September 6 document) III, RG 319, USNA.
45. This key phrase found its way into a whole series of major documents in early September. See appendix
to memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “United States Views on Measures for the
Defense of Western Europe”, JCS 2073/61, September 3, 1950, JCS Geographic File for 1948-50,
Box 25, RG 218, USNA. The same document, after being approved by the Secretary of Defense,
was forwarded to the State Department on September 12 and appears in FRUS 1950 3:291-293. A
very similar phrase was included in NSC 82; see FRUS 1950 3:274.

24
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
is that the military leadership was not pounding its fist on the table on the German
rearmament question. The German issue was important, of course, but the choice of
this kind of phrasing suggests that the Chiefs were prepared to deal with it in a
relatively reasonable, gradual, businesslike way.
What about the State Department? How did it feel about the package approach?
Did it agree to the inclusion of German rearmament in the package because this
was the only way to get the Pentagon to go along with its plan to send additional
troops to Europe? Some scholars suggest that this was the case, but the real picture
is rather different. 46
The outbreak of the Korean War was the key development here, and State Department
officials understood from the start that if Europe was to be defended, a German force of
some sort would be required. As McCloy wrote Acheson on August 3: “to defend Western
Europe effectively will obviously require real contributions of German resources and
men”. 47 This was simply the conventional wisdom at the time: neither McCloy nor anyone
else in the State Department needed the JCS to remind them that an effective defense meant
a German military contribution. But they were also dead set against the idea of allowing the
Germans to build up an army of their own – a national army, able to operate independently
and thus capable of supporting an independent foreign policy. It followed that some kind of
international force would have to be created: the Germans could make their contribution, an
effective force could be built up, but there would be no risk of a German national army. The
whole concept of a multinational force – of military integration, of a unified command
structure, of a single supreme commander supported by an international staff – was thus
rooted in an attempt to deal with the question of German rearmament. It was not as though
the thinking about the defense of Western Europe and the shape of the NATO military
system had developed on its own, and that it was only later that the German rearmament
issue had been linked to it by the JCS for bargaining purposes.
The fundamental idea that the different elements in the equation – the U.S. divisions,
the unified command structure, the forces provided by NATO Europe, and
the German contribution – were all closely interrelated and needed to be dealt with
as parts of a unified policy thus developed naturally and organically as the basic
thinking about the defense of Europe took shape in mid-1950. This idea – in a
sense, the basic idea behind the package concept – took hold quite early in August
1950, and it was the State Department that took the lead in pressing for this kind of
approach. The Byroade plan, for example, explicitly tied all these different elements
together: in this plan, which in mid-August became a kind of official State
Department plan, German units could be created if and only if they were integrated
into an allied force with an American commander. 48
46. See, for example, McLELLAN, Acheson, p.328.
47. McCloy to Acheson, August 3, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:181.
48. Byroade-Schuyler-Gerhardt meeting, August 10, 1950, Army Operations General Decimal File
1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. For the
final Byroade plan, and for its adoption as the official State Department position, see Matthews to
Burns, August 16, 1950, with enclosure, FRUS 1950, 3:211-219.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 25
The State Department was thus the driving force behind this kind of approach. For the
entire month of August, its officials pressed for a unified policy. But the military authorities,
because of their dislike for the Byroade plan, tended to drag their feet in this area. 49
The State Department, in frustration, and aware that a policy needed to be worked out before
the NATO ministers met in mid-September, then got the president to intervene. On
August 26 (as noted above), Truman asked the two departments, State and Defense, to
come up with a common policy. He laid out a series of eight questions that the two departments
were to answer by September 1, a deadline that was later extended to September
6. 50 The “Eight Questions” document was actually drafted in the State Department by two
of Acheson's closest advisors. The State Department goal, in getting Truman to sign it,
was to prod the Pentagon into accepting a common plan. 51
The tactic worked. Military leaders understood that the Eight Questions document
was based on the State Department plan. 52 Given the president's intervention
(again, as noted above), they now felt they could no longer simply “disregard” that
plan, but instead needed to take a more accommodating and “positive” line. 53
The military authorities now drafted a document which, they felt, might serve as
a basis for a joint reply to the president. That draft was given to the State Depart-
49. See, for example, P. NITZE, with A. SMITH and S. REARDEN, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the
Center of Decision, Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1989, p.123; and Princeton Seminar, p.914. Note
also the tone of Secretary of Defense Johnson's initial reply to State Department letter asking for comments
on the August 16 Byroade plan: Johnson to Acheson, August 17, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:226-227.
50. Truman to Acheson and Johnson, August 26, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:250-251.
51. Draft memo by Nitze and Byroade, August 25, 1950, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Country and
Area File, Box 28, RG 59, USNA. Some scholars – Martin, for example, in The Decision to Rearm
Germany, p.659 – portray the JCS as “prodding” the State Department to take “prompt diplomatic action”.
And Acheson, in Present at the Creation (p.428), also portrays himself as having been pushed forward,
especially by pressure from the president, and actually cites the “Eight Questions” document in this context.
But in reality – and not just at this point, but throughout this episode – it was the State Department
that was pushing things forward, and it was Truman who followed Acheson's lead. The president, for example,
had been against German rearmament when the JCS had pressed for it in June. But when Acheson
told him on July 31 that it no longer was a question of whether Germany should be rearmed, that the real
issue now was how it was to be done, and that the State Department was thinking in terms of creating “a
European army or a North Atlantic army”, Truman immediately “expressed his strong approval” of this
whole line of thought. Truman to Acheson, June 16, 1950 (two documents), and Acheson-Truman meeting,
July 31, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:688, 702.
52. Bolté to Collins, August 28, 1950: “The questions listed in the President's letter are apparently
based upon the State Department's proposal for the establishment of a European defense force”.
Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 20, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1, RG
319, USNA. The point was clear from the text of the letter. The two departments were not simply
asked, for example, to consider what, if anything, should be done on the German rearmament question;
they were asked instead to consider whether the U.S. government was prepared to support
“the concept of a European defense force, including German participation on other than a national
basis” – which was not exactly a neutral way of putting the issue. Truman to Acheson and Johnson,
August 26, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:250.
53. Bolté to Collins, August 31, 1950, and Gruenther to Davis, Duncan and Edwards, September 1,
1950, enclosing the “Plan for the Development of West German Security Forces”, both in Army
Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12,
Book II, RG 319, USNA.

26
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
ment on September 1; Acheson had been shown a preliminary version a couple of
days earlier. 54 Events now moved quickly. In a few days of intensive talks, a joint
reply acceptable to both departments was worked out. The final document was
approved by the president and circulated to top officials as NSC 82 on September
11, a day before the New York Conference was due to begin. 55
This period from August 26 through September 8 – from the Eight Questions
letter to the joint reply – is thus the most important phase of this whole episode, and
the evidence relating to this period needs to be examined with particular care. Does
it support the view that the military insisted on the package approach and that the
State Department opposed it, but gave in reluctantly at the end?
By far the most important document bearing on these issues is the record of a
meeting Acheson had on August 30 with his three top advisors in this area, the
three officials who, in fact, were conducting the negotiations with the Defense Department:
Byroade, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Perkins, and Paul
Nitze, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Acheson (as noted in
the previous section) had just met with JCS Chairman Bradley earlier that morning.
He had also just seen the draft reply the JCS had prepared to the president's Eight
Questions letter. At the meeting with his advisors, Acheson discussed the JCS draft
section by section and found most of it acceptable. The few small problems he had
with it did not involve any issue of principle. At no point did Acheson complain
about, or even comment on, any insistence on the part of the military that all the
elements in the program were to be tied together in a single package. The conclusion
to be drawn from this is absolutely fundamental for the purposes of the analysis
here: if the JCS had been insisting on the package concept and if Acheson and
the State Department had been opposed to that concept, it is scarcely conceivable
that the issue would not have come up at this meeting.
Nor is it very likely that a conflict over the package issue developed suddenly over
the next few days. Nitze's recollection (in 1953) was that following the
Acheson-Bradley meeting things moved very quickly. 56 He says nothing about a
dispute over the package question suddenly emerging at that point, and it is in fact
highly unlikely that things could have moved so quickly if a serious dispute had developed.
Indeed, Perkins and Nitze spoke in those 1953 discussions of the common
policy document – the document that later became NSC 82 – as though it essentially
reflected their views, and which, through great efforts on their part, they had finally
managed to get the military authorities to accept. “We had great difficulty”, Perkins
recalled, “in finally getting the Pentagon to sign on to the common policy”. 57 Nitze
agreed: he remembered going over to the Pentagon after Acheson had worked “this
thing” out with General Bradley on August 30, and “we trotted out the specific
54. Bolté to Collins, September 2, 1950, Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file
G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA; Acheson-Nitze-Byroade-Perkins
meeting, August 30, 1950, cited in n. 38 above.
55. Acheson and Johnson to Truman, September 8, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:273-278.
56. Princeton Seminar, pp.920-921.
57. Princeton Seminar, p.914.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 27
piece of paper which spelled out the package proposal with the Pentagon people
and got their agreement to this document”. 58 It was scarcely as though the State
Department was going along with the package plan reluctantly or against its better
judgment.
An analysis of the drafting history points to the same general conclusion. The
passage in NSC 82 that served as the basis for the package policy – indeed, the only
passage in the document that called for such a policy – was part of the answer to the
sixth question:
“We recommend that an American national be appointed now as Chief of Staff and
eventually as a Supreme Commander for the European defense force but only upon
the request of the European nations and upon their assurance that they will provide
sufficient forces, including adequate German units, to constitute a command reasonably
capable of fulfilling its responsibilities”. 59
That final document was based on the draft the JCS had turned over on September 1;
the key phrase “including adequate German units” did not appear in the original
JCS draft. 60 It scarcely stands to reason that the military authorities, having decided
to be cooperative, would harden their position in the course of their talks with State
Department representatives, above all if State Department officials had argued
strongly against an intransigent policy.
None of this means, of course, that the JCS was opposed to including a call for
German rearmament in the package. This was in their view a goal that the U.S.
government obviously had to pursue. But this does not mean that the Chiefs were
going to try to dictate negotiating tactics to the State Department – that they were
going to insist on a diplomatic strategy that Acheson and his top advisors rejected.
State Department officials, in fact, did not really blame the JCS for what had happened
at the New York Conference. Nitze, for example, although he said in 1953 that
the Chiefs would not agree to send additional forces until they got assurances from the
British and the French about a German military contribution, did not actually hold them
primarily responsible for the confrontation with the Europeans in mid-September. 61 He
pointed out at that time that the German rearmament issue could have been dealt with
very differently. The issue, he said, could have been presented “to the British and
French in a way which emphasized the supreme commander and the American commitment”;
the “question of German participation” could have been “put in a lower category
and kind of weaved in gradually”. 62 Nitze did not blame the JCS for vetoing that
approach. In his view, the real responsibility lay elsewhere. “We were fouled up on
58. Princeton Seminar, p.914.
59. NSC 82, FRUS 1950, 3:276.
60. See JCS 2116/28, September 6, 1950, which gives the final draft and shows changes from the
earlier draft; Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS,
Sec 1c, Case 12, Book III, RG 319, USNA. For another copy, see JCS to Johnson, September 5,
1950, Records of the Administrative Secretary, Correspondence Control Section Decimal File:
July to Dec 1950, CD 091.7 (Europe), box 175, RG 330, USNA.
61. Princeton Seminar, p. 915.
62. Princeton Seminar, p. 916.

28
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
this”, he said, by press leaks primarily coming from McCloy, “who agreed entirely with
the tactical importance of doing it the other way” – that is, of dealing with the German
rearmament issue head on. 63
But Acheson was not fundamentally opposed to the blunt approach, and
(contrary to his later disclaimers) he himself, on balance, thought that the U.S.
government had chosen the right course of action at the time. Would it have been
better, he asked in that same discussion, to have opted for quiet talks with the
British and the French, when a plan had just been worked out, when a NATO foreign
ministers' meeting was about to be held, and when the issue was being “talked
about everywhere”? “It seemed to me then”, he said, “and it seems to me now, that
we did the right thing”. 64
And indeed, in his reports to Truman from the New York Conference, Acheson
gave no sign that he was pursuing the package plan strategy reluctantly or against
his better judgment. He gave no sign that he was looking for a way to soften the
general line and deal with the allies in a more conciliatory manner. He explained to
the president on September 15 how he had laid out the American demands, how he
had discussed the issue “with the gloves off”, how he had “blown” some of the
allies' objections to the American plan “out of the water”, and how it might well be
a question of “whose nerve lasts longer”. He was clearly pleased with his own
performance and was not at all unhappy about the line he had taken. 65
As one of its top officials pointed out at the time, the State Department was conducting
a “hard-hitting kind of operation” in this area – and was proud of it. 66
63. Princeton Seminar, p. 916; see also p.912. The archival evidence confirms the point that McCloy
favored a very tough line at this time. See especially the handwritten letter from McCloy to Acheson,
September 20, 1950, in the Acheson Papers, Memoranda of Conversations, September 1950,
HSTL. A high French official, McCloy reported, had just “referred again to the delicacy of French
opinion” on the German rearmament issue. “I think the time has come”, he wrote, “to tell these
people that there is other opinion to deal with and that U.S. opinion is getting damn delicate itself.
If there should be an incursion in January and U.S. troops should get pushed around without German
troops to help them because of a French reluctance to face facts, I shudder to think how indelicate
U.S. opinion would suddenly become”.
64. Princeton Seminar, p.913.
65. Acheson to Truman, September 15, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:1229-31. For more information relating
to the part of the story from the New York Conference on, see C. GEHRZ, Dean Acheson, the JCS,
and the 'Single Package': American Policy on German Rearmament, 1950. Diplomacy and Statecraft
(forthcoming).
66. Under Secretary Webb, in telephone conversation with Acheson, September 27, 1950, Acheson
Papers (Lot File 53D 444), box 13, RG 59, USNA. Webb was comparing the State Department
“operation” with the way the Defense Department under Marshall was handling the issue.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 29
Dean Acheson: The Man and the Statesman
There is one final set of considerations that needs to be taken into account in an
assessment of U.S. policy in September 1950, and this has to do with what we
know about Acheson in general – about the sort of person he was and the kind of
policy he favored throughout his career. Was he the type of leader who believed in
compromise, especially with America's most important allies, and was inclined to
take a relatively moderate and cautious line? Or was he, as General Bradley later
called him, an “uncompromising hawk”, aggressive both in terms of his goals and
his tactics? 67
The great bulk of the evidence points in the latter direction. 68 In 1950 in particular,
he tended to take a very hard line. He was in favor of a rollback policy at that time. This
was the real meaning of NSC 68, an important policy document with which Acheson
was closely associated. 69 American scholars generally tend to portray U.S. policy as essentially
defensive and status quo-oriented, and NSC 68 is commonly interpreted as
simply a “strategy of containment”. 70 But the aggressive thrust of this document is clear
from its own text: NSC 68 called explicitly for a “policy of calculated and gradual coercion”;
the aim of that policy was to “check and roll back the Kremlin's drive for world
domination”. The whole goal at that time, as Nitze recalled in 1954, was to “lay the
basis”, through massive rearmament, for a policy of “taking increased risks of general
war” in order to achieve “a satisfactory solution” of America's problems with Russia
while the Soviet nuclear stockpile “was still small”. 71
This extraordinary aggressiveness was not out of character for Acheson, and its
wellspring was not simply anti-Communism or extreme distrust of the Soviet Union.
His general hawkishness can in fact be traced back to the summer of 1941,
when, as a mid-level State Department official, he played a major role in shaping
the policy that put the United States on a collision course with Japan. Acheson was
one of a handful of officials who helped engineer the oil embargo in mid-1941 – a
67. O. BRADLEY and C. BLAIR, A General's Life, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, p.519.
68. The idea that Acheson was an exceptionally aggressive statesman is scarcely the consensus view.
American writers tend to treat Acheson rather gently, but this, we think, is to be understood in
essentially political terms. Acheson's reputation profited enormously from the fact that during his
period in office he had been the target of a great deal of ill-informed criticism from right-wing
Republicans; Richard Nixon's famous reference at the time to the “Acheson College of Cowardly
Communist Containment” is a good case in point. And with enemies like that, it was not hard to
find friends--among liberal academics, at any rate.
69. M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, pp.109-110.
70. See, for example, E. MAY (ed.), American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, St. Martin's, New
York, 1993, and J. L. GADDIS, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American
National Security Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1982, chapter 4.
71. NSC 68, April 7, 1950, FRUS 1950, 1:253, 255, 284; Nitze quoted in M. TRACHTENBERG,
History and Strategy, p.112n. Nitze, the principal author of NSC 68, was quite close to Acheson
throughout this period. See, for example, D. CALLAHAN, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze
and the Cold War, HarperCollins, New York, 1990, pp.95-96, 155, and S. TALBOTT, The Master
of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace, Knopf, New York, 1988, p.51.

30
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
development that led directly to a sharp crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations and
ultimately to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December. 72
His aggressiveness was also apparent in the early 1960s. During the Berlin and
Cuban missile crises especially, he pushed for very tough policies. In 1963, he even
called (in a talk to the Institute for Strategic Studies) for what amounted to a policy of
armed intervention in East Germany. 73 When he was attacked for taking this line, he
lashed out at his critics: “Call me anything you like, but don't call me a fool; everybody
knows I'm not a fool”. “I will not say that Mr. Acheson is a fool”, one of his critics
replied. “I will only say that he is completely and utterly reckless”. 74
Acheson often sneered at those he viewed as soft and indecisive. After Eisenhower
took office in 1953, Acheson complained repeatedly to Truman about the
“weakness” of the new administration. 75 After the Democrats returned to power in
1961, President Kennedy allowed Acheson to play a major role in the making of
American policy, but Acheson viewed the young president with barely-concealed
contempt. The Kennedy administration, in his view, was weak, indecisive, and obsessed
with appearances. 76 He even criticized the administration in public, going so
far at one point that he was virtually forced to apologize. 77
72. See J. UTLEY, Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940-41, in: Prologue,
vol.8 (Spring 1976), pp.17-28; J. UTLEY, Going to War with Japan, University of Tennessee
Press, Knoxville, 1985, pp.153-156, 180; I. ANDERSON, The 1941 de facto Embargo on Oil
to Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex, in: Pacific Historical Review, vol.44 (1975), pp.201-231; and I.
ANDERSON, The Standard Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy,
1933-1941, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975.
73. Acheson speech at annual meeting of the Institute of Strategic Studies, September 1963, in Adelphi
Paper No. 5, The Evolution of NATO. See also D. BRINKLEY, Dean Acheson: The Cold War
Years, 1953-71, New Haven: Yale University Press, p.153. Note also Acheson's comment in 1961
about the need for the sort of forces which would enable the western powers to intervene in the
event, for example, of a new uprising in Hungary: Acheson-de Gaulle meeting, April 20, 1961,
Documents diplomatiques français, 1961, vol.1, p.494.
74. B. BRODIE, War and Politics, Macmillan, New York, 1973, p.402. The critic in question was the
former Defense Minister in the Macmillan government, Harold Watkinson.
75. See, for example, Acheson to Truman, May 28, 1953, box 30, folder 391, and Acheson memorandum
of conversation, June 23, 1953, box 68, folder 172, in Acheson Papers, Sterling Library, Yale
University, New Haven, Connecticut. Note also Nitze's complaint at the very end of the Truman
period that the U.S. government had adopted for a purely defensive policy. America, he was afraid,
was in danger of becoming “a sort of hedge-hog, unattractive to attack, but basically not very worrisome
over a period of time beyond our immediate position”. Nitze to Acheson, January 12, 1953,
FRUS 1952-54, 2:59.
76. See especially Acheson to Truman, June 24, July 14, August 4, and September 21, 1961, Acheson
Papers, Box 166, Acheson-Truman Correspondence, 1961, Sterling Library, Yale University;
some extracts are quoted in M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, p.230. See also M. BE-
SCHLOSS, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963, Edward Burlingame, New
York, 1991, p.410; and H. CATUDAL, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Study in U.S. Decision-Making,
Berlin-Verlag, Berlin, 1980, p.182n.
77. W. ISAACSON and E. THOMAS, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made, Simon
and Schuster, New York, 1986, pp.612-613; see also BRINKLEY, Acheson, pp.138.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 31
At another point, he practically told the president to his face that he was indecisive.
Kennedy had asked Acheson to look into the balance of payments problem,
and in early 1963 he presented his report to the president. It was a
“very strong, vivid, Achesonian presentation. And the President thanked him and said,
‘Well, we have to think about that'. Acheson said, 'There's nothing to think about, Mr.
President. All you have to do is decide. Here it is, and why don't you decide’”?
Kennedy turned red, and then broke up the meeting. He was furious. “It's a long time
before Dean Acheson's going to be here again,” he remarked to an aide. 78 As for Acheson,
he continued to criticize Kennedy as weak and indecisive, even after Kennedy's death. 79
Acheson treated President Johnson the same way he had treated President
Kennedy. When he met with Johnson in 1965, he was so irritated by the president's
whining and indecisiveness that he “blew [his] top” and told him to his face that all
the trouble America was having in Europe “came about because under him and
Kennedy there had been no American leadership at all. The idea that the Europeans
could come to their own conclusion had led to an unchallenged de Gaulle”. 80
These stories reveal a lot about Acheson. A man who could deal with presidents
that way was not the type of person who would allow himself to be pushed around
by mere military officers on an issue of central political importance – above all at a
time when he was at the height of his power and had the full confidence of
President Truman. Nor was he the type who would be understanding if he thought
allied leaders were reluctant to face up to fundamental problems and make the
really tough decisions.
Acheson, in fact, did not believe in taking a soft line with the allies or in treating
them as full partners. In 1961, he played the key role in shaping the new Kennedy
administration's policy on NATO issues; the goal of that policy was to get the Europeans
“out of the nuclear business” (as people said at the time) – that is, to concentrate
power, and especially nuclear power, in American hands. 81
Acheson, moreover, was not the sort of statesman who viewed consultation and
compromise as ends in themselves. At one point during the Berlin crisis in 1961, he
complained that the U.S. had been trying too hard to reach agreement with the
Europeans. The U.S. government did not need to coordinate policy with the allies,
he said, “we need to tell them”. 82 “We must not be too delicate”, he said at another
point, “about being vigorous in our leadership”. It was America’s job, practically
78. Carl Kaysen oral history interview, July 11, 1966, p. 85, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston. We are
grateful to Frank Gavin for providing this reference.
79. See, for example, BRINKLEY, Acheson, pp.174, 202.
80. Acheson to Truman, July 10, 1965, in D. ACHESON, Among Friends: Personal Letters of Dean
Acheson, ed. D. McLELLAN and D. ACHESON, Dodd, Mead, New York, 1980, p.273.
81. See M. TRACHTENBERG, Constructed Peace, pp.304-311. Acheson, however, deliberately
gave the Europeans a very different impression. Note especially his discussion of the issue in an
April 20, 1961, meeting with de Gaulle, and especially his reference to a system which “permettrait
à l'Europe de prendre sa décision en matière nucléaire”. Documents diplomatiques français, 1961,
vol.1, p.495.
82. White House meeting, October 20, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:518-519. Emphasis in original.

32
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
America's duty, to lay down the law to the allies. The United States – and he actually
used this phrase – was “the greatest imperial power the world has ever seen”. 83
“In the final analysis” he told McGeorge Bundy, “the United States [is] the locomotive
at the head of mankind, and the rest of the world is the caboose”. 84
American interests were fundamental; European concerns were of purely
secondary importance. Paul Nitze, who was very close to Acheson throughout this
period, made the point quite explicitly in 1954. The “primary goal”, he said, was
the “preservation of the United States and the continuation of a 'salutary' world
environment"; the “avoidance of war” was of secondary importance. “Even if war
were to destroy the world as we know it today, still the US must win that war decisively”.
He then again stressed the point that “the preservation of the US” was “the
overriding goal, not the fate of our allies”. 85
People like Nitze and Acheson were thus not inclined to take European interests
too seriously or to deal with the Europeans on a basis of mutual respect. And Acheson
himself was clearly not the kind of person who would have found it difficult to
deal roughly with the allies in September 1950.
The Meaning of the Story
The goal here was to test a particular interpretation of what happened in the late
summer of 1950. According to that interpretation, the military authorities had
essentially forced the package plan on Acheson, who had accepted it reluctantly,
and only after a struggle. The basic conclusion here is that that interpretation simply
does not stand up in the light of the evidence from late 1950 and in the light of
what we know about Acheson in general. The policy the U.S. government pursued
at the New York Conference is not to be understood as a more or less accidental
by-product of a bureaucratic dispute in Washington. The way Acheson dealt with
the allies at the New York conference – the bare-knuckled tactics he pursued, the
way he tried to lay down the law to the Europeans, the way he dismissed their most
fundamental concerns out of hand – has to be seen as deliberate: he knew what he
was doing, and he had not been forced by the Pentagon to proceed in that way.
There is certainly no evidence that he thought those tactics were “murderous”: he
did not give way on this point after a long battle; he never complained at the time
83. Quoted in F. COSTGIOLA, LBJ, Germany and the 'End of the Cold War', in: W. COHEN and N.
TUCKER (eds.), Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968,
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, p.195. Acheson was complaining about what he
viewed as Johnson's weak response to de Gaulle's decision in 1966 to take France out of the NATO
military organization.
84. BRINKLEY, Acheson, p.133.
85. Notes of Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Foreign Policy,
November 8, 1954, meeting, p.12, Hanson Baldwin Papers, box 125, folder 23, Yale University
Library. Emphasis in original.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 33
about the military's (alleged) insistence on this strategy; he never raised the issue
with Truman or expressed misgivings about the policy as he was carrying it out.
Does this mean that the Acheson interpretation was a complete fabrication? The
truth is probably not quite that simple. For Acheson, as for many people in public
life, honesty was not the top priority, and he was fully capable of deliberately
misleading the public on these issues. 86 But that in itself does not mean that the
Acheson story about the package plan was manufactured out of whole cloth.
Indeed, in a certain sense at least, there was probably some basis to the story. After all,
the military authorities were willing to send over the American troops only if the European
allies agreed to provide the balance of the forces needed to make an effective defense
possible, and the JCS did believe that German forces would be needed for that purpose.
So in that sense, from the military point of view, German rearmament was certainly a vital
part of the package. But this was at the level of fundamental objectives, not at the level of
tactics, and the basic JCS view was consistent with a relatively soft negotiating strategy: if
the State Department (to paraphrase Nitze) had called for emphasizing the U.S. troop
commitment and only then gradually “weaving in” the question of a German defense
contribution, it is hard to believe that the JCS would have objected. But an agreement on
the part of the JCS that all the elements of the problem were interconnected could be interpreted
as a call for presenting the allies with a single package: the basic policy could be
interpreted as translating directly into a particular negotiating strategy. The basic military
point of view, in other words, could serve as cover – that is, as a kind of license for pursuing
the sort of negotiating policy State Department officials considered essential at this
point. 87 The fact that the military view could be interpreted (or misinterpreted) in this way
– whether deliberately or not is not the issue here – made it easier for Acheson and his
advisors to do what they probably really wanted to do in any case.
This is all quite speculative, of course, and there is really not enough evidence
to get to the bottom of this particular issue. But these uncertainties should not be
allowed to obscure the facts that the documents are able to establish. And one thing,
at least, is very clear: the State Department did not fight the military over the package
plan. If Acheson actually thought the tactics the U.S. government adopted were
“murderous”, he certainly had a very odd way of showing it.
Why is this story important? Partly because it shows how easy it is for scholars to
get taken in by self-serving memoir accounts, and thus how crucial it is to test claims
against the archival evidence; partly because of what it tells us about civil-military rela-
86. An account Acheson gave in 1952, implying that the issue emerged only in the course of the New
York meeting, was particularly misleading. For the quotation and a discussion pointing out how
inaccurate that account was, see McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, pp.48-49.
87. This point is suggested by the structure of the discussion of this issue in the Princeton Seminar:
after establishing the basic point that the Pentagon had insisted on the package plan and was thus
responsible for what happened in September (pp. 911, 915), Acheson and Nitze then felt free to
ease up and talk about how the real reason why the German rearmament issue could not have been
played down and “kind of weaved in gradually” had to do not with the JCS but rather with what
McCloy was doing (p.916). They then went on to say that McCloy, in fact, probably performed a
service in forcing people to face the issue then and there (pp.922-925).

34
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
tions in the United States, about the willingness and ability of the military leadership to
impose its views on issues of great political importance, and about the validity of the
bureaucratic politics theory of policy-making in general; but mainly because of the light
it throws on the political meaning of what happened in September 1950. The American
government did not just stumble along and adopt a policy against its better judgment
because of pressure from the military; the package policy was adopted quite deliberately;
and that fact has a certain bearing on how American policy toward Europe during the
early Cold War period is to be interpreted.
There has been a certain tendency in recent years to idealize U.S.-European
relations during the Cold War period. The argument is that the NATO system worked
because, no matter how lopsided power relations were, the Americans did not simply
insist on running the show. Instinctively the democratic countries dealt with the problems
that arose in their relations with each other the same way they dealt with domestic
issues: not through coercion, but through persuasion and compromise, “by cutting deals
instead of imposing wills”. 88 The democratic habit of compromise, of give and take,
was the bedrock upon which the Atlantic Alliance was built. The Americans treated
their allies with respect, and this, it is said, was one major reason why the Europeans
were able to live with a system that rested so heavily on American power. 89
The story of how the U.S. government managed the German rearmament issue
in late 1950 suggests that things were not quite so simple. The Americans were
capable of dealing rather roughly with their European allies, even on issues of absolutely
central political importance. If the package plan story tells us nothing else,
it certainly tells us that. And the fact that the Americans were capable of treating
their allies that way had a certain bearing on how many people, especially in
Europe, thought about core political issues.
In 1880, after a remarkable electoral campaign, William Gladstone was swept
back into office as prime minister of Great Britain. Gladstone, in that campaign,
had laid out a series of principles on which British foreign policy was to be based;
one fundamental aim was “to cultivate to the utmost the concert of Europe”. Five
years later, Gladstone's policy lay in ruins. He had managed to alienate every other
major power in Europe – even France and Germany had come together in 1884 in a
short-lived anti-British entente – and in 1885 his government fell from power. The
Gladstone government had achieved its “long desired 'Concert of Europe'” all right,
Lord Salisbury noted bitterly at the time. It had succeeded in “uniting the continent
of Europe – against England”. 90
The parallel with American policy during the early Cold War period is striking. The
U.S. government very much wanted the European countries to come together as a political
unit, and support for European unification was one of the basic tenets of American
88. J. L. GADDIS, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Clarendon, Oxford, 1997, p.201.
89. GADDIS, We Now Know, pp.199-203, 288-289.
90. R.W. SETON-WATSON, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1938, p.547; Lady G. CECIL, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, vol.3, Hodder and
Stoughton, London, 1931, p.136.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 35
foreign policy in this period. 91 But it was not American preaching that led the Europeans
to cooperate with each other and begin to form themselves into a bloc. The United
States played an important role in the European integration process, but America had an
impact mainly because of the kind of policy she pursued – a policy which, on occasion,
did not pay due regard to the most basic interests of the European allies.
Acheson's policy in late 1950 is perhaps the most important case in point. Acheson
was pressing for a course of action that would have greatly increased the risk of war at a
time when Western Europe was particularly vulnerable. The U.S. government could
treat its allies like that – it could pursue a policy that might well have led to total disaster
for Europe – only because the United States was so much stronger than any single
European country. It followed that there had to be a counterweight to American power
within the Western alliance, a counterweight based on the sense that the Europeans had
major strategic interests in common and that those interests were distinct from those of
the United States. The events of late 1950 helped push the Europeans – especially the
French and the Germans – to that conclusion: it helped get them to see why they had to
put their differences aside and come together as a kind of strategic unit. This episode
thus plays an important role in the history of European integration, and indeed in the
history of the Western alliance as a whole.
Marc Trachtenberg
University of Pennsylvania
Christopher Gehrz
Yale University
91. See especially G. LUNDESTAD, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration,
1945-1997, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, and P. MELANDRI, Les Etats-Unis
face à l'unification de l'Europe, 1945-1954, A. Pedone, Paris, 1980. Note also an important series
of interpretative articles on the subject by K. SCHWABE: Die Vereinigten Staaten und die europäische
Integration: Alternativen der amerikanischen Außenpolitik, in: G. TRAUSCH (ed.), Die
europäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom, Nomos, Baden-Baden,
1993; The United States and European Integration, in: C. WURM (ed.), Western Europe and Germany:
The Beginnings of European Integration, 1945-1969, Berg, Oxford, 1995; and Atlantic
Partnership and European Integration: American-European Policies and the German Problem,
1947-1969, in: G. LUNDESTAD (ed.), No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe:
Past, Present and Future, St. Martin's, New York, 1998.

The Challenges of
Pluriculturality in Europe
European integration has primarily been driven by rational
thinking and a functional dynamic. In this process of
uniting Europe politically and economically the question of
how this unity can be sustained beyond functionalism has
gained increasing importance given the cultural diversity
of an enlarging Europe.
Schriften des
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Susanne Baier-Allen/Ljubomir Čučić (eds.)
The Challenges of
Pluriculturality in Europe
The authors assembled in this volume are addressing this
question from the perspective of EU member states,
aspiring member countries, and European organisations.
The common thread that runs throughout this book is the
recognition that the unity of Europe does not lie simply in
the further deepening of existing structures, but in the
diversity of identities and cultural pluralism.
Published in the series Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische
Integrationsforschung (ZEI), this book is a timely
contribution to the ongoing debate on European identity
and the challenges cultural diversity throws forth.
Table of Contents
Introduction: Pluriculturality – Concepts and Challenges •
Pluriculturality and the Challenges for Europe • Pluriculturality
– Dealing with Diversity • Pluriculturality and
the Danger of Social Pathology • Pluriculturality and its
Educational Consequences • Conclusion: Pluriculturality –
New Directions
NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft
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in cooperation with Europe House Zagreb
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
Baden-Baden
Susanne Baier-Allen/
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The Challenges of
Pluriculturality in Europe
in cooperation with Europe House
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2000, 212 Seiten, geb.,
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(Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische
Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Bd. 24)
http://www.nomos.de

37
“Un Général qui s’appelle Eisenhower”:
1
Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community Paul M. Pitman
In January 1957 the French government staged a parliamentary debate to build
support for its conduct of the negotiations on the common market (or European
Economic Community [EEC]). Referring to the Suez Crisis, which had unfolded
over the previous months, one speaker who favored the common market sardonically
thanked Egyptian Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser and Soviet Marshal Nikolai
Bulganin for helping the West Europeans understand need for unity. In response, a
leftist deputy shouted “is there not also a General named Eisenhower” (N’y a-t-il
pas aussi un général qui s’appelle Eisenhower)? Indeed, in the winter of 1956-57,
many in France felt that tensions with the country’s allies had contributed more
than conflicts with its enemies to the impetus behind economic integration. 2
Already during the summer and fall of 1956, observers of the European scene had
noted that dissatisfaction with Atlantic ties had helped revive the European movement.
In October, Janet Flanner, Paris correspondent for the New Yorker, had written
in her diary that the Europeans appeared to be moving together not only
because of the challenge from Egypt but also because of frustration with America:
“Secretary Dulles’ … semi-idealistic press remarks that good might even come of
the Suez difficulties if they stimulated European federation brought a grim smile
from French politicians. It is true that lately there has been revived talk on the continent
about a united Europe, but the feeling of union unfortunately seems to be
founded largely on a common dislike of Mr. Dulles”. 3
Then in early November, the spectacular climax of the Suez Crisis, along with the
bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolution, highlighted Europe’s weakness in a
world dominated by the two superpowers and demonstrated the unreliability of the British
and the Americans. Publicists and politicians alike argued that one of the main lessons
of Suez was that the European governments should unite their forces in the EEC.
But did Suez really tip the balance towards the formation of a six-country customs
union instead of alternate designs for the European economic order? For decades,
the idea that one of the results of the Suez Crisis was the establishment of the
common market has been received wisdom. First expounded in authoritative contemporary
analyses, the link between the Suez Crisis and the common market has
1. This article originated as a presentation at the June 1996 meeting of the Society for Historians of
American Foreign Relations in Boulder, Colorado. I thank James Ellison, Douglas Forsyth,
Lawrence Kaplan, Lorenza Sebesta, Hubert Zimmermann, and two anonymous reviewers for
helpful suggestions.
2. Journal officiel, Assemblée nationale, Débats, 17 January 1957, p.107.
3. J. FLANNER, Paris Journal, 1944-1965, Atheneum, New York, 1965, p.324.

38
Paul M. Pitman
become a regular element in general histories of postwar international relations. 4
And in the first archive-based account of the negotiation of the EEC treaty, which
was based primarily on the papers of the German delegation to the EEC talks as
well as oral history interviews, Hanns Jürgen Küsters claims that, by prompting the
French government’s realization that geopolitical imperatives required that it drop
its long-standing objections to the common market, the Suez Crisis opened the way
for the conclusion of the EEC Treaty. 5 A more recent contribution by Küsters baldly
states that “the successful outcome of the EEC negotiations was an historical accident,
initiated by Nasser’s Suez crisis in November 1956”. 6
In the most fruitful challenge to such views, Alan Milward and his students have
argued that Suez hardly mattered for the EEC negotiations. This was not to say that
geopolitics was always irrelevant to the evolution of the European economic order.
French efforts to contain West Germany’s industrial potential and military revival had
shaped earlier integration schemes such as the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) and the European Defense Community (EDC). 7 But Europe’s security problems
had mostly been settled in October 1954, when the Paris Accords sanctioned
German rearmament within an Atlantic framework. From this point on, the only remaining
“security” concern relevant to European integration was how to guide West
Germany’s industrial exports into channels that would benefit social and economic
advance throughout Western Europe. According to Milward and his associates, after
the winter of 1954-55 it was not geopolitical factors but the political and economic
imperatives of the postwar social settlements that accounted for decisions to pursue
economic integration. They have traced the process by which the customs union treaty
emerged logically (but not inevitably) from debates on the future of the European
economic order that began in the early postwar years and came to focus on a customs
union in the early 1950s. Decisions about economic integration did not result from
mere historical accidents. Rather, national negotiating positions reflected long-term
economic choices made by top elected officials and high-level bureaucrats, who
sought export-led growth, technical modernization, full employment, and social
4. See for example A. GROSSER, Suez, Hungary and European Integration, International Organization,
11(1957), pp.470-480; D. REYNOLDS, One World Indivisible: A Global History Since
1945, The Global Century, Paul Kennedy (ed.), Norton, New York, 2000, pp.128-129.
5. See H. J. KÜSTERS, Fondements de la communauté économique europénne, Office des publications
officielles des Communautés européennes and Ed. Labor, Brussels, 1990, esp. pp.211-216,
356; this is an updated edition of Küsters’ original study, Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,
Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1982. In a parallel study on Euratom, Peter Weilemann
also underlined the importance of the Suez Crisis for French policy. See P. WEILEMANN,
Die Anfänge der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft: Zur Gründungsgeschichte von EURATOM.
1955-57, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1983, p.131.
6. H. J. KÜSTERS, West Germany’s Foreign Policy in Western Europe, 1949-1957: The Art of the
Possible, in: C. WURM (ed.) Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration,
Berg, Providence, 1995, p.69.
7. See A. S. MILWARD, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, University of California
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984, ch.12; F. LYNCH, Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet
Plan: National and International Planning in French Reconstruction, in: Economic History Review,
2nd ser., 37, no.2 (May 1984), pp.229-243.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 39
welfare through controlled trade liberalization. More fundamentally, foreign economic
policy-making reflected the new postwar determination to pursue economic and
social goals that would strengthen political coalitions that included the organized
working class, farmers, and the lower middle class. 8 As for the supposed influence of
the Suez Crisis on French policy, Frances Lynch’s trenchant account shows that Paris’s
crucial decision to endorse the common market came in early September 1956 –
at a time when the French were still formulating the plan to seize the Suez Canal with
their British and Israeli partners, two months before the humiliations that supposedly
swung France’s governing class behind the European cause. Instead of Suez, Lynch
points to the British proposal for a Free Trade Area, which strengthened the view in
France that the country could not depend on existing arrangements to protect French
interests. 9 Recent work in political science has likewise tended to de-emphasize geopolitics.
Andrew Moravcsik, for example, argues that commercial interest, as articulated
by major producer groups, was the main factor that drove the integration process
in the 1950s; in his analysis, “geopolitical ideology” and “security externalities”
were only influential at the margin. 10
What role did geopolitical considerations in fact play in the process leading to
the establishment of the EEC? This article deals with the question by examining the
long-term policy developments that shaped the French and German decisions to establish
the common market. Instead of arguing that either economic goals or strategic
ambitions were the primary drivers of foreign economic policy in the
mid-1950s, it attempts to show how both sets of concerns acted together to shape
policy-making in both France and Germany. The first section sets the stage: it analyzes
the politics of European trading and monetary arrangements, surveying the
forces behind alternative regional designs. The basic point here is that as late as the
summer of 1956, the future of the common market plan, and more generally, the
form that European integration was likely to take, remained anything but certain.
The second section analyzes the role of geopolitical considerations well before Suez.
The focus in that section will be on continental responses to Atlantic strategic developments
in the mid-1950s, especially on the implications of the nuclearization of
Atlantic strategy. The basic point here is that the security issue had by no means
been resolved by late 1954: policy-makers in France and Germany began to explore
the possibility of a European nuclear force, independent of the United States, very
8. A. S. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2d. ed., Routledge, London and New
York, 2000; idem, The Springs of Integration, and The Social Bases of Monetary Union?, in: P.
GOWAN and P. ANDERSON (ed.), The Question of Europe, Verso, London and New York,
1997, pp.5-20, 149-161; A. S. MILWARD, et al., The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History
and Theory, 1945-1992, Routledge, London and New York, 1993.
9. F. LYNCH, Restoring France: The Road to Integration, in: A.S. MILWARD (et al.), The Frontier
of National Sovereignty, esp. pp.59-60, 86. For another argument that Suez had little effect on the
negotiation of the Rome Treaties, see W. LOTH, Vertragsverhandlungen bei abklingender Europabegeisterung:
eine zeitgeschichtliche Einordnung, in: Integration, 3(1987), esp. pp.110-111, 113.
10. See A. MORAVCSIK, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998, ch.2; cf. H. ZIMMERMANN’S review of The
Choice for Europe, in: Journal of European Integration History, 2(1999), pp.142-145.

40
Paul M. Pitman
early on. The third section retraces the French and German decisions to establish
the common market in the fall and winter of 1956. It argues that the Suez Crisis,
which both symbolized and deepened tensions between the continental powers and
the “Anglo-Saxons”, triggered the establishment of the common market; but the
key decisions were not taken in a vacuum: long-term policy goals played a fundamental
role in determining what happened during this crucial phase of the European
integration process.
The Politics of European Trade
Until January 1959, when the common market treaty came into effect, Europe’s
trade was regulated through intergovernmental cooperative arrangements, the most
important of which were sponsored by the Organisation for European Economic
Co-operation (OEEC). The OEEC trading system rested on two main pillars, gradual
trade “liberalization”, i.e., the removal of quantitative restrictions (but not
tariffs) on imports from other OEEC countries, and the more important European
Payments Union (EPU), which arranged multilateral settlement of bilateral payments
imbalances between the same countries. By making trade with the rest of the
world, especially the United States, less attractive, the OEEC countries had constructed
a discriminatory trading system that embraced more than half of the free
world’s trade, including that of the West European countries, the members of the
Sterling Area, and the various elements of the Franc Zone. This framework had
nurtured Western Europe’s economic miracle, the trade-driven growth that had lowered
unemployment while accommodating increases in both wages and workplace
democracy. But the solidarities and disputes that emerged in this structure would
shape the debate over Europe’s economic future. 11
Starting in early 1950s, as the European economy emerged from the rearmament
boom sparked by the Korean War, discontent with the perceived shortcomings
of the OEEC system stimulated discussions of the future of the region’s economic
order. While existing structures continued to provide an indispensable framework
for the European political economy, many on both sides of the Atlantic saw them as
temporary expedients whose continued functioning threatened the realization of
their long-term goals. On the continent, the Dutch government put forward plans
for a customs union that would give the smaller countries access to the markets in
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which were still shielded by high tariffs.
At the same time, the British government began to campaign vigorously for the
restoration of currency convertibility, as a way not only to revive Sterling’s prewar
11. For the OEEC background to the process of European integration, see especially R. T. GRIF-
FITHS, The European Integration Experience, 1945-58, in: K. MIDDLEMAS (et al.), Orchestrating
Europe: the Informal Politics of European Union, 1973-95, Fontana, London, 1995, ch.1;
idem, ed., Explorations in OEEC History, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Paris, 1997.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 41
role as a reserve currency, in particular for the Commonwealth countries, but also
to block the emergence of a customs union on the Continent. In contrast, the French
cabinets of this period opposed both regional tariff reductions and convertibility,
favoring instead a customs union with the Franc zone buttressed by bilateral
commercial agreements with France’s major trading partners, especially West
Germany. 12
The West European governments faced choices between three contending
visions of the future of the region’s economic order: the further consolidation of the
European market centered on the six ECSC countries; a liberalized free-world market
in which currencies would be freely convertible; or a reconstitution of the
French and British colonial economic blocs. As a result of the teleological bias in
the academic literature, accounts of these debates have focused almost exclusively
on the emergence of the common market and ignored support for Atlantic or imperial
alternatives. Although there have been attempts to argue that the Free Trade Area
stood some chance of adoption, no study has attempted to weigh political support
across Europe for the other main alternatives under discussion. For the purposes of this
article, it suffices to note that all three alternatives were taken seriously enough to
influence policy in both France and Germany.
In the 1950s European policy-makers still paid special attention to signals from
Washington. Like its Democratic predecessor, the Eisenhower Administration,
which took office in January 1953, stoutly backed the formation of a West European
political and economic bloc capable of anchoring Germany to the West and
countering Soviet influence on the continent. 13 But the new administration sought
to cut military spending and foreign aid in order to protect America’s long-term
economic health and civic vitality, which it identified with decentralized government
and a competitive market order. The administration also sought to direct a
greater share of US aid to the Third World, where Soviet economic initiatives increasingly
appeared to threaten Western influence. These considerations, which inspired
the famous “New Look” in military strategy, also drove efforts to take a new
approach to economic relations with the Allies. But just as the Eisenhower administration
would end up maintaining its ground forces in Europe, it would also continue
to give European economic unification priority over a world-wide liberal mar-
12. See P. M. PITMAN III, France’s European Choices: The Political Economy of European Integration
in the 1950s, Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1997, ch.1; W. ASBEEK
BRUSSE, Tariffs, Trade and European Integration, 1947-1957: From Study Group to Common
Market, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1997.
13. G. LUNDESTAD, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration,
1945-1997, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, ch.4-5.

42
Paul M. Pitman
ket order. 14 However, the mixed messages that emerged from the Washington
policy process cast serious doubt on America’s willingness to tolerate continued
European discrimination against imports from the dollar zone. Ironically, the impact
of rumors about political battles in the administration and Congress may have
been more significant than the United States government’s steadfast policies.
In the summer of 1953 Eisenhower sponsored the first serious review of foreign
economic policy since the debate on the Marshall Plan. Published in early 1954, the report
of the bipartisan Commission on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP) declared that it
was time to end the Marshall Plan settlement – which had always been seen as a temporary
expedient – under which the Europeans had come to trade more intensively with
each other but systematically discriminated against imports from the United States despite
receiving substantial economic aid. The CFEP called for a return to something like
the Bretton Woods program of multilateral trade and currency convertibility. Logically
enough, it also accepted that in order to overcome the world-wide dollar shortage which
had blocked progress towards liberalizing international trade and payments, the American
market should be opened to imports from the rest of the free world economies.
Likewise, the government should encourage increased private direct investment instead
of continuing to provide foreign aid. 15
The Eisenhower Administration endorsed the CFEP’s call for “Trade, not Aid”.
But the American government failed to follow through either at home or abroad.
The President made considerable efforts to convince Congress to reduce quota and
tariff barriers that excluded European products from the American market, but the
victorious commander on the European Front in World War II was no match for
home-grown protectionism. And despite public endorsements of convertibility,
Washington repeatedly put off the magic day when currencies would be exchanged
freely. 16 Likewise, although much aid was redirected towards developing countries,
the Administration continued to provide massive amounts of military and economic
assistance to the Europeans – it seemed necessary, inter alia, to push the Germans
to rearm quickly and to encourage the French to meet their NATO obligations
despite the drain imposed by the war in Algeria.
14. On the Eisenhower Administration’s grand strategy and its domestic rationales, see especially M.
TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp.147-156; J. L. GADDIS, Strategies of Containment:
A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1982, ch.5; R. GRIFFITH, Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth,
in: American Historical Review, 87(1982), pp.87-122; A. L. FRIEDBERG, In the Shadow
of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and its Cold War Strategy, Princeton Studies in International
History and Politics and Princeton Studies in American Politics: Historical, International,
and Comparative Perspectives, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000, ch.2-3.
15. F. ROMERO, Interdependence and Integration in American Eyes: From the Marshall Plan to
Currency Convertibility, in: A.S. MILWARD (et al.), The Frontier of National Sovereignty,
op.cit., pp.155-181; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, Report to the President
and Congress, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1954.
16. See B. I. KAUFMAN, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961, Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1982, ch.2-3; F. ROMERO, Interdependence and Integration
…, op.cit., pp.160-165.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 43
Although its policy came under fire from the Treasury, Congress, and the public,
the Eisenhower Administration was clearly willing to live with European trade
preferences in the interest of achieving the greater strategic goal of building a
second great power mass within the West capable of resisting the Soviet threat. In
1955 and 1956 American diplomacy focused on supporting the proposal for a
six-power European Atomic Energy Community (or Euratom), which appeared to
offer a way to channel continental nuclear ambitions into a supranational framework.
It paid relatively little attention to the common market negotiations, presumably
because most observers expected protectionist forces in France to block economic
integration. Still, Washington quietly backed the formation of a six-member
customs union, hoping it would adopt a liberal external policy. American analysts
did note the danger that the common market might form a protectionist trade bloc,
especially if French preferences determined its external stance, but many hoped
that increased intra-European trade would allow the weaker economies to modernize
and eventually drop their opposition to freer trade with North America. Certainly
the common market offered a better way to tie German industry to the West than
an OEEC-wide Free Trade Area such as that proposed by the British. For the
British scheme would have lead to even greater losses for American exporters without
deepening Europe’s political integration.
Thus, although American policy-makers often declared their interest in a more
liberal world economic system, this had no real effect on Washington’s actual policy
towards further economic integration on the Continent. But America’s continued
diplomatic support for European unification did not carry as much weight on the
Continent as the mixed signals that regularly emerged from Washington policy debates.
There is room here for just one example, drawn from the realm of monetary
politics. The Americans repeatedly declined to pony up the cash needed to back
British plans to make the pound convertible. Such an action would have set off a
chain reaction leading to the dissolution of the EPU and thus a cut in credits to
France that would force the Fourth Republic to choose between improvements in
social welfare, investments in industry and paying for the war in Algeria. 17
Although French policy-makers were no doubt relieved each time a convertibility
plan was vetoed, they continued to hear rumors of secret negotiations between British
and American Treasury officials. 18 Given that the Americans had frozen aid
payments to the French as a punishment for the rejection of the European Defense
Community, who could say what they might do in some later fight? 19
17. See MILWARD, European Rescue of the Nation-State, op.cit., pp.383-420; P. M. PITMAN, The
French Crisis and the Dissolution of the European Payments Union, 1956-58, in: R. T.
GRIFFITHS (ed.), Explorations in OEEC History, pp.219-27.
18. Cf. O. Wormser, Note a.s. convertibilité de la livre, 19 January 1953, Ministère des affaires
étrangères [MAE], Paris, Direction économique, Service de coopération économique [DECE] 197;
idem, Note pour l’Ambassadeur, Secrétaire général, a.s. nouvelles perspectives dans le domaine
de la coopération économique et financière internationale, 4 May 1954, DECE 197.
19. On American attempts to apply financial pressure see I. M. WALL, The United States and the
Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991,
pp.286-295.

44
Paul M. Pitman
The Eisenhower Administration’s grand strategy called for the establishment of
a six-power common market, which would provide the economic underpinnings for
a “united Europe as a third great force in the world”. 20 In contrast, successive British
governments stubbornly opposed the consolidation of “Little Europe”, because
it would threaten the United Kingdom’s economic and political standing in the
world by undermining the City of London’s role as a financial center, weakening
the Commonwealth’s already attenuated trading ties with the British Isles, and increasing
the danger that France and Germany would become America’s primary
political partners, thereby reducing the chances that Washington would continue to
aid Britain’s “independent” atomic forces. 21 However, as events would show, neither
the British nor their allies and clients on the Continent were in a position to
stop integration projects backed by Paris and Bonn. And American support and
British weakness meant that the only real question was whether the differences between
the French and German visions of the New Europe could be overcome.
The French government’s policy on economic integration reflected the requirements
of its modernization plans, its commitment to the welfare state, and its ambitions for the
reconstitution of the empire. Thus the proposal for the ECSC was designed to guarantee
the success of the Monnet Plan; the EDC met the needs of the French aircraft and electronics
industries; and the Green Pool grew out of the decision to aim for permanent agricultural
surpluses. More broadly, the policy-making community in Paris opposed the
classical view that trade should lead to further specialization in those products in which
each country enjoyed a comparative advantage. Instead, the French sought to negotiate
political agreements to fix a favorable structure for key industries before trade controls
were lifted. Given that France’s advanced social legislation put the country at a disadvantage
in export markets, French leaders also made the harmonization of regulations
on collective bargaining, paid vacations, women’s wages, and social welfare a condition
for their acceptance of a new trading system. Moreover, to compensate for the loss of
direct political control over its empire, the French sought to reformulate the trade and
monetary links between the members of the “Union française” which would then join
the European community as a unit. This arrangement promised to increase France’s
weight in Europe and, so the argument went, Europe’s role in world politics. 22
West German attitudes towards the European economic order balanced liberal
ideological preferences against the need to guarantee economic ties with Germany’s
main trading partners, France and the Benelux countries. Earlier accounts of the
Federal Republic’s policy on the common market emphasized that the country’s
trading interests extended well beyond the Six and that industry, represented by
20. Eisenhower quoted in M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace, op.cit., p.150.
21. See J.R.V ELLISON, Threatening Europe: Britain and the creation of the European Community,
Macmillan and St. Martin’s, London and New York, 2000.
22. This account of French policy follows Frances Lynch’s pathbreaking analysis, supplemented by
the results of my own research on military-industrial and imperial projects. See F. LYNCH, France
and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome, Routledge Explorations in
Economic History, 5, Routledge, London and New York, 1997; and M. PITMAN, France’s European
Choices.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 45
Professor Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of Economics, supported an OEEC-wide
Free Trade Area while waiting for the restoration of currency convertibility. However,
many business leaders remained skeptical about their prospects in the world
market, preferring the security of established trade ties with their closest neighbors.
23 A striking example of this attitude emerges in the Foreign Ministry’s refutation
of an attack on the common market issued by the Economics Ministry:
“The Foreign Ministry does not completely share the Economics Ministry’s plan for
economic conquest of the world, because such a rash … thrust in free space must
eventually reach its limits, whether in an economic downturn or another type of
shock. At that point, the only thing that will be left will be whatever has been
politically organized, namely the community of the Six (or Seven if Great Britain
joins); otherwise Germany’s economic expansion will fall in on itself”. 24
The competent German authorities, including the central bank, quietly protected the
trading arrangements that had grown up since 1949, and especially the special economic
relationship with Germany’s largest trading partner, France. 25 Of course, both industry
representatives and government officials agreed on opposing French proposals to
harmonize wages and benefits, which would eliminate what many saw as key sources
of Germany’s export competitiveness. Thus even while supporting the common market
scheme, Bonn’s negotiators fought Paris’s specific demands regarding social policy,
agricultural imports, and subsidies to France’s imperial dependencies. At the same time,
the conflicts within the German policy-making community meant that, when it came
time to decide whether to go ahead with the common market, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
would be able to impose his own preferences, which by all accounts were colored
more by geopolitical thinking than by economic arguments. 26
The first year and a half of the common market negotiations demonstrated the
conflict between French and German visions for Europe’s economic future. In the
fall and winter of 1954, the Dutch had renewed the push for a customs union, in
part out of fear of the consequences of the confidential Franco-German trade agreement
that accompanied the Paris Accords. In May 1955, once the Federal Republic
23. See T. RHEINISCH, Europäische Integration und industrielles Interesse: Die deutsche Industrie
und die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, in: Beihefte der Vierteljahrschrift
für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, no.152, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1999.
24. “Gemeinsamer Markt”, 4 October 1956, 210-225-30-01/1208/56, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen
Amts [PAAA], Bonn, Büro Staatssekretär 155, vol.2. For further explication of this document, see W.
ABELSHAUSER, “Integration à la carte”. The Primacy of Politics and the Economic Integration of
Western Europe in the 1950s, in: S. MARTIN (ed.), The Construction of Europe: Essays in Honour of
Emile Noël, Kluwer Academic Publications, Dordrecht, 1994, pp.17-18.
25. See the superb study by M. DICKHAUS, Die Bundesbank im westeuropäischen Wiederaufbau.
Die internationale Währungspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1948 bis 1958, in: Schriftenreihe
der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, , Oldenbourg, Munich, vol.72(1996).
26. On Bonn’s European policy, see H. J. KÜSTERS, Der Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionen
deutscher Europapolitik, 1949-1958, in: W. BÜHRER, L. HERBST, and H. SOWADE (ed.), Vom
Marshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt,
Oldenbourg, Munich, 1990, pp.335-370; for Adenauer’s dominant role in West German foreign policy,
see G. NIEDHART, Außenpolitik in der Ära Adenauer, in: A. SCHILDT and A. SYWOTTEK (ed.)
Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau, Dietz, Bonn, 1993, pp.805-818.

46
Paul M. Pitman
had formally joined NATO, the Dutch common market proposal, combined with a
French proposal for an atomic energy pool, kicked off a new set of negotiations on
six-power integration, the so-called relance européenne. But over the summer, the
common market initiative got off to such a rocky start that the Dutch submitted further
trade liberalization proposals to both the OEEC and the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs. 27 The main sticking point in the common market talks was
German opposition to French demands. The French delegation’s only real interest
was in Euratom – it did not even receive instructions regarding the customs union
until early October, shortly before the negotiations had to be suspended because the
Edgar Faure government decided to call new elections. 28
The Mollet government, which took power following parliamentary elections in
January 1956, supported European integration much more strongly than any cabinet
since early 1952 (when the first “Europeanist coalition” in the National Assembly collapsed).
Its leading members had impeccable Europeanist credentials, and many scholars
have accepted their later claims to have secretly planned to push through the common
market treaty from the moment they entered office. 29 But during the spring of
1956, Socialist influence in internal debates resulted in a negotiating position that
threatened to block the common market negotiations once and for all. France’s new position
did not just strengthen earlier calls for the harmonization of labor regulations and
social policy, which was only to be expected given the Mollet government’s center-left
orientation. The French now made a push for common macroeconomic policies and
long-term industrial plans. In effect, the French now sought to use the common market
to lock in expansionist Keynesian policies and sectoral planning throughout continental
Europe. 30 For the government in Bonn, Paris’s new position, which directly challenged
the principles of Germany’s soziale Marktwirtschaft, was simply unacceptable. As soon
as the French delegation presented its new position in Brussels, the common market
27. On Dutch policy see R. T. GRIFFITHS, The Beyen Plan, and The Common Market, in: R. T. GRIFFITHS
(ed.), The Netherlands and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1957, NEHA, Amsterdam, 1990, pp.165-182
and 183-208.
28. See Letter, Pinay to Félix Gaillard, chief of the French Delegation to the Intergovernmental Committee,
12 July 1955, enclosing “Instructions pour la Délégation”, Archives nationales, Paris [AN]:
Secrétariat général du comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique
européenne [SGCI], Box 121.9; O. Wormser, “Note pour le Président [Pinay],” 10 October 1955,
MAE: Office Files of Oliver Wormser, Directeur des affaires économiques et financières [DE] 11;
L’Instauration d’un marché commun en Europe, in: Le Monde, 13 October 1955.
29. For example, see Moravcsik’s accounts of the Mollet government’s European policy, which depend
almost exclusively on evidence from memoirs and interviews. See A. MORAVCSIK, Why the European
Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation, Harvard
University Center for European Studies Working Paper, no. 52, CES, Cambridge, ca. 1994, pp.30-36,
and the more cautious version in idem, The Choice for Europe, pp.103-122, 137-150.
30. Curiously enough, although the thrust of the internal French debate appeared in the press, previous
accounts have ignored the significance of the resulting negotiating position. Key archival sources
include: “Projet de mémorandum du gouvernement français sur l’établissement d’un marché commun
(deuxième rédaction)”, A. Savary Papers, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris,
SV 19; Présidence du Conseil, “Résumé des décisions du comité interministériel du lundi, 28 mai
1956”, 28 May 1956, SGCI 121.9.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 47
negotiations deadlocked. France’s new dirigist design made it less likely than ever that a
customs union would come into being.
What would have happened if the conflict between the French and German
plans for the European economy had not been overcome? It is unlikely that the
British government would have pursued the Free Trade Area seriously, because
London’s main goal was to avoid being shut out from the EEC. Trade could have
continued to expand within the OEEC framework, with whatever neo-imperial extensions
the French and the British were able to cultivate. And there probably
would have been further progress towards convertibility, presumably through
“hardening” settlement terms in the EPU. But it seems likely that the German government
would have backed emergency credits to France whenever a pinch came,
both to safeguard its main trading interests and for more general political reasons. 31
In short, without the emergence of a new understanding between the French and
German governments, it would have been unlikely that “Little Europe” would have
emerged as a defined economic bloc.
The Debate over European Defense
As noted above, recent accounts of the origins of the common market have tended to
start with the proposition that the key security issues that had divided the Western
nations during the first postwar decade were settled when West Germany joined
NATO. In fact, intra-alliance arguments remained as lively as ever after May 1955.
The Western powers were still divided over defense for one simple reason with many
complicated consequences: the nuclearization of NATO strategy. The other problems
that had troubled Atlantic relations since the late 1940s, such as burden-sharing, controls
over armament levels, or competition over the production of technologically
advanced armaments, never simply went away. They persisted, but the implications
of the various solutions proposed for them changed, often with dramatic practical
results. And all of these problems came to a head at once in the summer and fall of
1956, primarily because of a sharp controversy caused by Anglo-American plans to
substitute atomic weapons for troops stationed in Germany.
In retrospect, disputes over European defense can be seen as a long struggle to
reach a compromise around sensible Atlanticist policies that effectively meshed
NATO’s conventional “shield” and its atomic “sword”. But in the mid-1950s, Western
capitals had just begun to struggle with basic political choices imposed by the
spread of atomic weapons, and the conclusions of these debates were anything but
foregone. On the continent, it seemed that three distinct strategic options were still
open. The first option, known as “forward defense”, called for stopping any Soviet
attack in Central Europe as far east as possible, preferably along the West German
31. Compare P. PITMAN, The French Crisis and the Dissolution of the European Payments Union,
1956-58.

48
Paul M. Pitman
border. While forward defense remained official NATO doctrine, skeptical Europeans
perceived signs that the United States and the United Kingdom wished to revert
to a second option, the “peripheral strategy”, according to which the Western powers
would allow Soviet forces to overrun most of the Continent before trying to
reconquer whatever was left after a month of armored operations accompanied by
nuclear strikes. 32 The European allies tended to feel that economic concerns (for
the British, the defense of Sterling and Commonwealth economic ties; for the
Americans, the need to roll back the garrison state) drove the efforts at strategic revision
and conventional retrenchment. In response to the threat that the “maritime
powers” would withdraw their ground forces or decouple their deterrent forces
from the Central Front, some continental strategists favored a third option: the establishment
of a “Eurafrican” bloc, armed with an autonomous nuclear deterrent
and able to draw on the depth offered by France’s North African territories. 33 The
important point to note here is that the broad directions European strategy could
pursue in the mid-1950s – forward defense, peripheral strategy, or Eurafrican coalition
– roughly corresponded to the three alternate schemes for regional trade and
monetary relations that were under consideration in policy circles at the same time.
Washington’s commitment to “forward defense” was far from certain in the
mid-1950s. As part of its grand strategy, the Eisenhower administration tried to foster
the consolidation of a European power base that would allow a reduction in
America’s efforts to defend the Old World. But the main policy pursued by the
Americans, the deployment of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in Western
Europe along with schemes for “sharing” control of these weapons, ironically
made it more difficult to withdraw US troops. 34 In the end, despite the attractiveness
of British strategic proposals and the pull of isolationism, the Eisenhower
Administration did maintain established force levels in Europe. 35 At the same time,
as in economic affairs, it may have been not so much official American policy as
32. For the terms “forward defense” and “peripheral strategy,” see M. TRACHTENBERG, History
and Strategy, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1991, pp.153-160.
33. On the development of the Eurafrican idea in postwar strategic thought, see C. D’ABZAC-EPEZY
and P. VIAL, In Search of a European Consciousness: French Military Elites and the Idea of
Europe, 1947-54, in: A. DEIGHTON (ed.), Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers
and European Institutions, 1948-63, St. Martin’s Press for St. Antony’s College, London, 1995,
pp.1-19.
34. See M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, op.cit., pp.160-168.
35. The best account of Atlantic strategic affairs in the 1950s is M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed
Peace, op.cit., ch.4-6. National perspectives appear in J. MELISSEN, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership:
Britain, the United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959, Styx Publications,
Groningen, 1993; and I. CLARK, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship,
Clarendon, Oxford, 1994; G. H. SOUTOU, L’Alliance incertaine: les rapports politico-stratégiques
franco-allemands, 1954-1996, Fayard, Paris, 1996, ch.2-3; B. THOß, Der Beitritt der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland zur WEU und NATO im Spannungsfeld von Blockbildung und Entspannung
(1954-1956), in: MILITÄRGESCHICHTLICHES FORSCHUNGSAMT (ed.), Die NATO-Option,
vol.3 of Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1993, pp.1-234.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 49
continental fears based on unsubstantiated but plausible rumors about Pentagon
priorities that gave the biggest push to Franco-German understanding.
The French response to the nuclearization of Atlantic strategy was straightforward.
To defend the Metropole, to have a say in Western strategy, France needed to
field an independent nuclear force. But to build a deterrent force, the French needed
technical, industrial and financial assistance. Given that the British and the Americans
refused to help, the French turned to West Germany. In sum, the nuclearization of
NATO strategy led the French to spearhead efforts to build a European bomb. 36
Although France’s strategists had been grappling with the implications of nuclear
weapons for over a decade, it was in August and September 1954 – just before and after
the French parliament’s vote to reject the European Defense Community – that the
country’s military authorities and political leaders first drew conclusions about the need
for continental nuclear cooperation. The ideas that emerged in these months are worth
reviewing, for they provided much of the strategic impetus behind Paris’s European
policies down to the end of the Fourth Republic, if not beyond. And the development of
France’s policy towards cooperation in atomic energy shows that, rather than opposing
European integration, military leaders often pointed the way.
The debate opened in response to a draft “Possibilities Plan”, put forward by General
Alfred Gruenther, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).
The “Possibilities Plan” provided the basis for the Alliance’s new strategic doctrine,
which the NATO Council would formally adopt as MC-48 in December 1954. 37 In a
hard-hitting response to Gruenther’s plan, France’s representative in NATO’s Standing
Group, General Jean Valluy, laid down a line that appears to have swayed the
country’s political leadership. 38 Valluy first pointed out that Gruenther assumed that
any war fought in Europe would be decided quickly by a brief but intense atomic exchange.
If the Central Front could be held during the crucial early days of a conflict,
the West’s overall superiority in strategic weapons would prevail. Thus NATO’s
chances for victory depended as never before on blocking Soviet efforts to launch
rapid air strikes against tactical nuclear forces in Western Europe. To meet this challenge,
Gruenther’s new strategy called for “unconditional and instantaneous” atomic
strikes that would destroy Soviet nuclear weapons on the ground. Provided they
could be shielded from air strikes, the Central Front’s “covering forces”, armed with
tactical atomic weapons, stood a good chance of repelling a Soviet ground assault.
36. On the Fourth Republic’s atomic policy, see M. VAÏSSE, Le choix atomique de la France
(1945-1958), in: Vingtième Siècle, no.36 (December 1992), pp.21-30 and D. MONGIN, La Bombe
atomique française, 1945-1958, Bruylant and Librarie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Brussels
and Paris, 1997), esp. pt.4. An account of Paris’s quest for partners appears in P. PITMAN,
France’s European Choices,op.cit., ch.6.
37. On MC-48 see M. TRACHTENBERG, La Formation du système de défense occidentale: Les
Etats-Unis, la France, et MC-48, in: M. VAÏSSE, P. MÉLANDRI and F. BOZO (ed.), La France
et l’OTAN, Editions complexe, Brussels, 1996, pp.115-27.
38. Letter, Valluy to Guillaume, No. 542/DFGP/TS, “Plan de possibilitées”, 13 August 1954, Papers
of P. Mendès France, Institut Pierre Mendès France, Box CED 2. For further material on the “possibilities
plan”, see other documents in the same box, including H[ervé] A[lphand], “Note pour le
Président [Mendès]”, 14 August 1954.

50
Paul M. Pitman
According to Valluy, the new NATO strategy would cause a major transformation
in France’s strategic situation. Forward defense of Western Europe, previously
“affirmed somewhat academically”, had not only become a technical necessity, it
would soon be a practical possibility. But as a key staging ground for NATO’s
atomic attacks, Western Europe would also become a primary target for Soviet
nuclear strikes. France’s ground forces would have to prepare for operations in an
atomic environment, while France’s future nuclear forces would need to coordinate
operations with the United States Strategic Air Command.
Whatever the military and budgetary implications, the new strategy’s key
difficulty was political. In order to preempt Soviet atomic strikes, it would be
necessary to authorize NATO to launch attacks at the earliest possible moment. But
the predelegation of authority to initiate atomic strikes, presumably to SACEUR,
threatened to leave Europe’s defense in the hands of an American general. For
Valluy, the consequences were clear:
“The defense of the West, now concentrated around atomic weapons, will depend
entirely on America’s will. The only corrective for this subordination would be the
constitution by the European nations of an atomic arsenal that would allow them to
intervene with their own forces in such a new war and consequently resume a key
role in the leadership of the coalition”. 39
In sum, NATO’s adoption of a nuclear strategy did not simply mean that France had
to adapt its conventional forces and acquire atomic weapons. It also meant that
France, in association with its continental allies, needed to build and deploy a European
deterrent force.
During the fall of 1954, the French high command amplified Valluy’s message.
For example, in a response to a Foreign Ministry proposal for an armaments pool
that would replace the industrial side of the EDC, the top military aide to Defense
Minister Emmanuel Temple, General Jacques Faure (one of the leaders of the
coterie of military officers who had openly campaigned against the European Army
plan), argued that imposing restrictions on the German arms industry would only
benefit British and American producers. Instead, within an Atlantic framework and
preferably with British participation, France should produce atomic weapons with
Germany in “secure” zones such as French North Africa. 40
What did France’s military leaders actually have in mind? The political implications
of their proposals are clear: a European deterrent force, developed under French
control on the basis of German industrial potential, could at once improve Europe’s
standing within the Atlantic Alliance and anchor the American nuclear guarantee. But
despite their generous Europeanist rhetoric, it is unclear how far the French intended
to go in sharing control of the force with the Germans. Perhaps French leaders had
not as yet reached any firm conclusions in this fundamental area.
During the fall and winter of 1954, the French government cautiously acted on
the proposals for a European deterrent put forward by the military. In September,
39. This quotation appears on pp.5-6 in the letter cited above.
40. J. Faure, “Fiche”, ca. 12 September 1954, DE 10.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 51
the Comité de défense nationale, France’s highest authority in military matters,
debated the expense of a national deterrent force and the possibility that six-power
atomic cooperation might help France pay for atomic weapons. 41 In the spring of
1955, the government sought German assistance in constructing an isotopic separation
plant to produce the enriched uranium needed for the French bomb program.
But the Germans, still waiting to join NATO, choose not to respond to French overtures
at this time. The French then pursued the same goals as part of the Euratom
negotiations, the real focus of which was an isotopic separation plant. 42
Once again, Paris’s main problem was to overcome opposition within the Bonn government.
Although the German Foreign Ministry stood behind the Euratom initiative, the
minister responsible for atomic energy, Franz-Josef Strauß did not. Backed by industrial
interests, Strauß strongly opposed key elements of the plan such as supranational controls
and monopoly ownership of fissile materials, favoring instead direct ties with British and
American industry. 43 In July 1956 the Euratom talks became even more difficult as a result
of the debates in the French Parliament, during which the Mollet government affirmed
that Euratom would not interfere with France’s still officially unacknowledged efforts
to produce atomic weapons. In Bonn, this raised once again the fear that France’s
European policy sought to limit Germany’s military options.
Although the Germans had worried about the nuclearization of NATO strategy for
some time, the Bonn government did not directly address its political consequences until
the summer and fall of 1956. 44 In June 1956, German worries were stimulated when the
British, determined to reduce the largest drain on the balance of payments by withdrawing
troops from Germany, proposed that NATO develop a new Political Directive to endorse a
further reliance on nuclear weapons. 45 Then in July the New York Times reported plans
supposedly under consideration by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to reduce conventional forces and withdraw troops from Germany. 46
41. This account follows the version of the minutes published by Roger Wybot, one of the principals
in the “affaire des fuites”, a scandal sparked by press reports of leaks from the Comité de défense
nationale. Facsimile of “Procès-verbal du Comité de défense nationale”, 10 September 1954, in:
P. BERNERT, Roger Wybot et la bataille pour la DST, Presses de la Cité, Paris, 1975, annex.
42. P. GUILLEN, La France et la négociation du traité d’Euratom, in: Relations internationales,
44(Winter 1985), pp.391-412.
43. P. FISCHER, Atomenergie und staatliches Interesse: die Anfänge der Atompolitik in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland. 1949-1955, Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Bd.30, Nuclear History
Program, 3, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1994, pp.201-223, 274-282.
44. For the development of West German policy on atomic energy and nuclear weapons see P. FISCHER, Die
Reaktion der Bundesregierung auf die Nuklearisierung der westlichen Verteidigung (1952-1958), in: Militärgeschichtliche
Mitteilungen 52(1993), pp.105-132; idem., Atomenergie und staatliches Interesse; A.
F. GABLINK, Strategische Planungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1955-1967: Politische Kontrolle
oder militärische Notwendigkeit?, Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Bd.30, Nuclear History Program,
5, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1996; and H.-P. SCHWARZ, Der Staatsmann, vol.2 of Adenauer, Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1991; reprint, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich, 1994.
45. See Record of Dulles-Makins Talks, 29 June 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955-57, 4, pp.84-88; Record of Dulles-Makins Talks, 13 July 1956, ibid., 4, pp.89-90; Letter,
Eden to Eisenhower, 18 July 1956, ibid., 4, pp.90-92.
46. Radford Terms New Arms Vital to Service Cuts, New York Times, 14 July 1956.

52
Paul M. Pitman
News of the “Radford Plan” had tremendous repercussions in Bonn. Leading German
politicians, not least Chancellor Adenauer, expressed fears that the maritime powers might
abandon their allies on the continent. The controversy came at a particularly awkward
time, just days after the government had defended the need for eighteen months’ military
service before a skeptical Bundestag.
The so-called Radford Crisis generated huge tensions in the relations between
Bonn and Washington. It also provided a political excuse for a thoroughgoing
reconsideration of the Federal Republic’s rearmament plans. West Germany’s political
leadership acted as if it had suddenly grasped the practical implications of the
strategic situation they had accepted by joining NATO. In the cabinet discussion on
20 July 1956 ministers agreed that the Federal Republic should seek to increase its
influence in NATO in order to pressure its allies to maintain conventional force
levels. Chancellor Adenauer stated that if Western strategy continued to switch over
to nuclear weapons the Federal Republic would have to reconsider its 1954 renunciation
of the production of atomic, bacterial and chemical weapons. And Strauß
told the cabinet that “today a nation that does not produce atomic weapons itself is
déclassé”. 47 Of course, the West German government never openly admitted its interest
in atomic weapons. But during the fall of 1956, the dynamic new defense
minister, Strauß, oversaw the shift from large conscript forces towards a smaller,
more professional military capable of deploying tactical nuclear weapons. 48
The tensions between Washington and Bonn provided an opening for those within
the French government who sought backing for a “European” deterrent. The French
arranged for a high-ranking German representative, General Adolf Heusinger, to
present his government’s response to the Radford Plan at a special meeting of
NATO’s Standing Group. During the meeting, Heusinger first noted that press coverage
of the Radford Plan weakened public support for NATO and threatened his government’s
efforts to raise troops. He then discussed the importance of strong “shield”
forces, stressing the danger that NATO might lose a “small” conventional war if the
British and Americans withdrew significant forces from Germany. Supporting the
French war effort in Algeria, Heusinger also referred to the importance of holding
North Africa as NATO’s southern flank. The French member of the Standing Group,
General Valluy, strongly backed Heusinger’s criticisms of Anglo-American proposals
to depend on atomic forces to defend Europe. He also attacked the United States’
policy of withholding nuclear technology from its continental Allies. 49
47. See Gespräche über Rüstungsbeschränkungen in den USA und England, 20 July 1956, in: F. P.
KAHLENBERG (ed.), comp. U. HÜLLBÜSCH, Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung,
vol.9, 1956, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1998, pp.484-89. The passage cited from Adenauer appears on
p.486, that from Strauß on p.487. Compare the further discussion of the same themes, “Radford-Plan”,
26 July 1956, in: Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, pp.501-502.
48. For a fine survey of the Umrüstung crisis, see Ch. GREINER, Die militärische Eingliederung der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und die NATO. 1954 bis 1957, in: MILITÄR-
GESCHICHTLICHES FORSCHUNGSAMT (ed.), Die NATO-Option, vol.3 of Anfänge westdeutscher
Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1993, pp.707-786.
49. “Aufzeichnung über die Sitzung der Standing Group am Freitag, den 27.7.56, 10.30 Uhr”, Bundesarchiv
Militärarchiv (BAMA), Freiburg, BW 17/37, ff.84-87.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 53
In a subsequent private talk between Valluy and Heusinger, at which a number
of other French and German officers were present, the fundamental compatibility
between French and German views became evident. Valluy stressed that the West
European continental powers should unite their forces in order to avoid complete
dependence on the Anglo-Saxons. In particular, as the two strongest European
powers, France and Germany needed to cooperate to break the Anglo-American
nuclear monopoly. Valluy also emphasized the significance of North Africa for
Europe’s defense – a point that Heusinger had included in his presentation to the
Standing Group. In the course of their conversation, the two generals also discovered
that they shared similar views on a wide range of operational and command
problems in NATO. 50
France’s support for Germany in NATO debates, along with Valluy’s discreet
approach regarding atomic weapons, may have encouraged the Bonn authorities to
reconsider the Mollet government’s repeated efforts to revive bilateral cooperation
in the production of conventional armaments. 51 At any rate, in the summer of 1956,
just at the time when the common market talks had reached an impasse over
German opposition to French proposals regarding industrial planning, welfare policy
and labor relations, French and German strategists were discovering that they
shared not only reasonable fears regarding Anglo-American tendencies to revert to
a peripheral strategy but also an interest in establishing a Eurafrican defense bloc.
Atlantic Crisis and European Market
The Suez Crisis, which began when the Egyptian government nationalized the Suez
Canal in July 1956 and ended with a failed Anglo-French attempt to retake the
canal by force, produced intense tensions between the United States and its main
European allies. Recent historical studies have provided a detailed picture of the
crisis itself, although its effects on international and transnational relations remain
50. Heusinger, “Aufzeichnung über ein Gespräch mit General Valluy von der Standing Group und Mr.
Allan Dulles vom CIA”, BW 17/37, ff.93-96. (Note that Heusinger met Valluy and Dulles separately.)
For an account of this exchange that draws on additional classified German sources, see G.
von GERSDORFF, Westeuropäische Verteidigungskooperation und atlantische Bündnispräferenz:
Wege westdeutscher Zielsetzungen, 1949-1958, in: Aus der Ohnmacht zur Bündnismacht:
Das Machtproblem in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945-1960, F. KNIPPING and
K.-J. MÜLLER (ed.), Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zürich, 1995, p.227.
51. In April and September the Mollet government put forward memoranda calling for intensive Franco-German
collaboration in the armaments sector. See Documents diplomatiques français [DDF]
1956, 2, p.394, n.2; “Mémorandum”, 25 September 1956, DDF 1956, 3, pp.201-202.

54
Paul M. Pitman
to be explored. 52 For the purposes of this essay, it suffices to note that it was not
Moscow’s threats of atomic reprisals but Washington’s moves against Sterling that
convinced the British government to abandon its French (and Israeli) partners in the
middle of an otherwise successful military operation. French and German leaders
reacted to Soviet threats, American sabotage, and British withdrawal with bitter
anger at Great Britain’s fecklessness and dark speculations regarding the possibility
that the two superpowers might find condominium mutually beneficial. 53 As Chancellor
Adenauer reportedly said during his visit to French Premier Guy Mollet at
the turning point in the crisis on 6 November, the only way the European powers
could play a decisive role in world affairs would be to build Europe. No doubt seeking
to play on French resentment towards the English and the Americans, the Chancellor
added, “Europe will be your revenge”. 54
The German statesman’s remarks apparently hit the mark. But what did such
geopolitical perspectives have to do with mundane negotiations on European trade?
Conclusive documentary evidence shows that the basic decisions on the common
market and Euratom were taken in September and October 1956, well before the
high point of the Suez Crisis in early November. One could argue, with scholars
such as Milward, that geopolitical factors in general, and Suez in particular, did not
count for much in these decisions. I submit that a review of the full range of French
and German foreign policy-making shows that a number of overlapping disputes
over both economic and security issues, several of which came to a head as Paris
and Bonn were reformulating their European strategies, provide a better explanation
for the new diplomatic alignment that resulted in the negotiation of the common
market treaty.
Suez triggered sharp political reactions, but these reactions were not the fundamental
cause of the political shift in Europe that occurred in the fall of 1956. Policy-makers
in Paris and Bonn interpreted the perfidious behavior of the “maritime”
powers in light of years of bruising fights over international economic relations,
Atlantic strategy and policy towards the Third World. Suez certainly did not change
continental views of Atlantic ties; rather it symbolized their complaints about the
52. Unfortunately, most recent studies concentrate almost exclusively on Anglo-American relations.
While these are easy to research, they are not the only significant sides of the affair. Representative
works include K. KYLE, Suez, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1992; D. KUNZ, The Economic
Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1991; and T.
RISSE-KAPPEN, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign
Policy, in: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1995, ch.4. For efforts at broader approaches, see B. MCCAULEY, Hungary and Suez,
1956: The Limits of Soviet and American Power, in: Journal of Contemporary History,16(1981),
pp.777-800 and W. (eds.), Das internationale Krisenjahr, 1956: Polen, Ungarn, Suez, in: Beiträge
zur Militärgeschichte, 48, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1999).
53. See “Procès-verbal des entretiens franco-allemands [6 November 1956]”, DDF 1956, 3,
pp.234-237.
54. Ch. PINEAU, 1956, Suez, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1976, p.91. Compare the account of this meeting
in W. G. GREWE, Rückblenden, 1976-1951, Propyläen, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Vienna, 1979,
pp.283-290.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 55
“Anglo-Saxons” and strengthened their existing determination to lessen the continent’s
strategic and economic dependence on the United States. British and American
stalling over Suez no doubt played some role, but other developments such as
the transnational repercussions of the war in Algeria, rumors about convertibility,
the Free Trade Area proposal, and the controversy about revising NATO strategy
clearly weighed more heavily in France’s acceptance of a liberal customs union and
Germany’s support for the “European” bomb program. 55
This is not the place for a full account of the domestic and international bargains
that resulted in the formation of the European Communities. 56 But a brief
overview of the shifts in French and German policy towards Europe in the late
summer and early fall of 1956 can illustrate how the crisis in Atlantic relations
cleared the way for the consolidation of Little Europe.
The Mollet Government was run by “good Europeans”, but they failed to pursue
their designs for the regional economic order until early September 1956, when
they quietly accepted the principle of liberal trade integration and dropped their
earlier demands regarding industrial planning and demand management. In subsequent
interministerial negotiations, the French elaborated further demands regarding
subsidies for imperial development, agriculture, and safeguard clauses designed
to make the treaty acceptable to producer groups and parliament. 57 France’s negotiating
partners sometimes interpreted these new demands as fresh evidence that
Paris might never be ready to accept the common market. But in France, a page had
been turned.
What accounts for the French decision to reverse course on Europe at this
particular time? Although many factors may be adduced, the decisive cause was the
realignment in domestic politics that resulted from the war in Algeria. 58 The Socialist-led
government’s vigorous prosecution of the war destroyed the center-left
alignment that had emerged from the January 1956 elections and led to the reconstitution
of the “Europeanist coalition” in parliament, which included the main
center and right parties. 59 The Mollet government’s intransigent stand in Algeria
also fed into ongoing conflicts in NATO over policy towards the Third World and
brought new tensions with Washington. 60 Ironically, what critics termed “Nation-
55. See W. HEINEMANN, 1956 als das Krisenjahr der NATO, in: W. HEINEMANN and N.
WIGGERSHAUS, op.cit., pp.615-637.
56. Further detail appears in P. PITMAN, France’s European Choices, op.cit., ch.8.
57. This process is well-documented in SGCI 122.21.
58. For more detail, see P.PITMAN, France’s European Choices, op.cit., pp.304-320; compare the
late R. GIRAULT’S stimulating essay, La France entre l’Europe et l’Afrique, in: E. SERRA (ed.),
Il Rilancio dell’Europa e i trattati di Roma, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1989, pp.351-378.
59. For these political developments, see J. CHAPSAL, La Vie politique en France, ch.15; J.-P.
RIOUX, L’Expansion et l’impuissance, 1952-58, vol.2 of La France de la Quatrième République,
rev. ed., Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1983, pp.117-127; G. ELGEY, La République des tourmentes,
1954-1959, in: Histoire de la IVe République, pt.3 , Fayard, Paris, 1992, pp.407-456.
60. See W. HEINEMANN, 1956 als das Krisenjahr …, op.cit., p.616 and, more generally, M.
CONNELLY, Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian
War for Independence, in: American Historical Review, 105(2000), pp.739-769.

56
Paul M. Pitman
al-molletisme”, the socialist government’s play for nationalist support, opened the
way for economic liberals such as Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and economist
Robert Marjolin, acting in accord with organized business and the farming
lobby, to seize the initiative on the common market. The Mollet government’s decision
to put the empire and Europe ahead of socialism coincided with a renewed
push for military cooperation with West Germany, which won additional support
from the conservatives, including Gaullists such as Defense Minister Maurice
Bourgès-Maunoury who had earlier sponsored the Euratom proposal. 61
As always, for the pro-European government in Paris the key question was how
to line up support from Bonn. After putting forward his government’s new line in
Brussels, European Affairs Minister Maurice Faure travelled to Berlin and Bonn to
present his case to German ministers. In talks with German Foreign Minister
Heinrich von Brentano, Faure linked progress in European integration to
Franco-German armaments collaboration. He apparently surprised von Brentano
by suggesting that Euratom might also be extended to military uses of atomic energy.
Faure also noted that the French would not oppose German acquisition of tactical
nuclear weapons. 62 In short, Faure was suggesting that cooperation with France
would help, rather than hinder, German efforts to acquire atomic weapons.
Meanwhile, in the run-up to the Suez operation, Mollet apparently attempted to
reinforce ties with London before settling on rapprochement with Bonn. In a meeting
with British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, the French Premier proposed reviving
Jean Monnet’s June 1940 proposal to merge the British Commonwealth and the
French Union. 63 But during a visit to Bonn at the end of September, he agreed with
Adenauer about the need for European unification and cited the danger that the Anglo-Saxons
would return to the “peripheral strategy”. Mollet argued for Franco-German
cooperation both in completing the negotiations on the EEC and
Euratom, the success of which would encourage British participation in European
affairs, and in reviving armaments cooperation. Based on this exchange, it appears
that France’s policy-makers, long aware of London’s lack of support for French
policies in Europe and now frustrated by London’s dithering preparations for the
Suez invasion, had decided to bet on the Franco-German axis. Adenauer closed the
conversation by noting that his government would weigh France’s proposals re-
61. Although Bourgès pursued a career as a Radical party politician, he maintained significant links
with the Gaullists. See P. MARCUS, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury: un républicain indivisible,
Doctoral thesis, Ecole pratique des hautes études, 1992; Année politique, 1956, Presses universitaires
de France, Paris, 1957, pp.69, and 71.
62. Earlier accounts of these talks have followed the published French records, which censor Faure’s
key comments on atomic weapons. See “Conversation entre M. Maurice Faure et M. Erhard à Berlin,
le 16 septembre 1956”, DDF 1956, 2, pp.384-387; T, Bonn to Paris, 17 September 1956, DDF
1956, 2, pp.387-388; “Conversation entre MM. Maurice Faure, von Brentano et Hallstein, lundi
17 septembre, à 16 heures”, DDF 1956, 2, pp.392-394; “Conversation entre MM. Faure, le chancelier
Adenauer et Hallstein, lundi 17 septembre, à 17 h. 15”, DDF 1956, 2, pp.395-396; Bouverat,
“Aufzeichnung [on Faure-von Brentano-Hallstein talks, 17 September 1956]”, 19 September
1956, PAAA: Abt. 2, bd.922.
63. See the extensive documentation in Public Record Office, Kew: PREM 11/1352.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 57
garding military cooperation in deciding on the directives for its representatives to
the talks on Euratom and the common market. 64
Paris’s campaign for German support soon paid off. Chancellor Adenauer
followed the EEC and Euratom negotiations closely, staunchly supporting “Little
Europe” against those such as Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard who argued that
Germany should pursue a new economic Weltpolitik. 65 In public, the Chancellor
continued to stress the need for full British participation in European affairs, 66 but
in government deliberations on the EEC and Euratom he strongly backed entente
with France. Even scholars who argue that the common market was established
primarily as an extension of domestic economic policy or in the pursuit of commercial
advantage have acknowledged that the German stance on Europe reflected geopolitical
considerations. 67 But they have not noted that the West German discussions
of the EEC and Euratom really turned on two issues: Europe’s place in the
Atlantic Alliance and questions of nuclear strategy. First, the Europeans needed to
unite in order to maintain support from the Americans and attract participation
from the British. Thus Adenauer argued in early October that if the Europeans did
not conclude the EEC and Euratom treaties quickly, American isolationism might
gain the upper hand; when an economic downturn came, Washington might decide
it could no longer bear the burden of European defense. 68 Second, Europe rather
than NATO might be the best way for Germany to regain the right to produce atomic
weapons. As the Chancellor put it to a cabinet meeting on 19 December 1956,
64. Telegram, Paris to Représentants diplomatiques de la France à l’étranger, 2 October 1956, DDF
1956, 2, pp.493-496; Carstens, “Kurzprotokoll über die Besprechungen zwischen dem Herrn Bundeskanzler,
dem Herrn Bundesminister des Auswärtigen und dem Herrn Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen
Amtes und dem Herrn französischen Aussenminister und Staatssekretär Faure am 29.
September 1956”, 1 October 1956, PAAA: Abt.2, bd.VS-3666. I wish to take this occasion to
thank the archivists who helped process my request to declassify this document.
65. In addition to D. KOERFER’S classic account of the Adenauer-Erhard feud, Kampf ums Kanzleramt:
Erhard und Adenauer, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1988, see H. J. KÜSTERS, Adenauers
Europapolitik in der Gründungsphase der europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, in: Vierteljahreshefte
für Zeitgeschichte, 42(1994), pp.646-673 and U. ENDERS, Integration oder
Kooperation? Ludwig Erhard und Frantz Etzel im Streit über die Politik der europäischen Zusammenarbeit,
1954-1956, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 45(1997), pp.143-171; B. THOß,
Die Doppelkrise von Suez und Budapest in ihren Auswirkungen auf Adenauers Sicherheits- und
Europapolitik. 1956/57, in: Das internationale Krisenjahr, 1956, op.cit., pp.573-588.
66. Cf. Adenauer’s 25 September 1956 speech to the Grandes conférences catholiques in Brussels, in:
H.-P. SCHWARZ, (ed.), Konrad Adenauer. Reden, 1917-1967: Eine Auswahl, Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1975, pp.327-332.
67. See, e.g., A. S. MILWARD, European Rescue of the Nation-State, op.cit., p.201; F. LYNCH,
Restoring France, op.cit., p.84; A. MORAVCSIK, Choice for Europe, op.cit., pp.90-95, 136.
68. “Weiterentwicklung Europas”, 3 October 1956, Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, p.610. Adenauer’s
argument responded to the same press conference that Janet Flanner had commented on in her diary
(see note 3 above). See also Adenauer’s 19 December 1956 comments on British and American
disengagement from NATO, “Tagung des Atlantikrates in Paris”, 19 December 1956, Kabinettsprotokolle
1956, p.776.

58
Paul M. Pitman
“Europe will have a longer life than NATO. It is now necessary to push ahead with
the unification of Europe and to produce atomic weapons in the Federal Republic”. 69
The basic message was clear: the weakness of transatlantic ties required the intensification
of European economic and military cooperation. The strategic issues and
the economic issues were thus very tightly bound up with each other.
The showdown over Bonn’s European policy came on 5 October 1956. Adenauer imposed
acceptance of a negotiating position that took account of the main French demands,
overriding opposition from Economics Minister Erhard and Atomic Energy Minister
Siegfried Balke. In one of his many efforts to block the common market, Erhard suggested
that the six-power talks should be postponed pending further consultations with the
British regarding the Free Trade Area. The Chancellor, seconded by the representative of
the Foreign Ministry, opposed any delay on the grounds that the British were only interested
in the Free Trade Area because of the danger that they would be excluded from the
common market. Led by the Chancellor, the cabinet rejected Erhard’s objections one after
the other. When the discussion turned to Euratom, Balke argued that the atomic energy
community would represent more of a sacrifice than an advantage for the Germans. Adenauer’s
response, as recorded in the cabinet minutes, was unequivocal: “[The Chancellor]
wanted to use Euratom as the quickest way to gain the option to produce nuclear weapons”.
This was just the sort of possibility that the French had been hinting at since the
summer. Adenauer further argued that Euratom would be worthwhile even though Germany
would not be able to catch up with the French lead in research for some time. 70
Despite decisions by the French and Germans to favor six-power integration,
the negotiations on the EEC and Euratom continued to face difficulties. Indeed, the
October Paris Foreign Ministers conference reached an impasse because the French
and German representatives were unable to reach a workable compromise on
harmonization of social policies and ownership of fissile materials. Mollet and
Adenauer overcame this deadlock during a meeting held in Paris on 6 November, at
the high point of the Suez Crisis. The French dropped their demand that regulations
on overtime pay be harmonized in exchange for the right to invoke safeguard clauses
on behalf of industries harmed by competition from countries with longer work
weeks. And the Germans finally accepted the idea that Euratom would enjoy a
monopoly over fissile materials unless the community was unable to provide
69. Adenauer cited in Ch. GREINER, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als “Machtfaktor” in der
NATO, 1954-57, in: Aus der Ohnmacht zur Bündnismacht, op.cit., p.210. Note that a more recently
published version of the 19 December 1956 cabinet minutes replaces the reference to producing
atomic weapons with an euphemism. See “Tagung des Atlantikrates in Paris”, 19 December 1956,
Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, p.775.
70. “Gemeinsamer Markt und Euratom”, 5 October 1956, Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, pp.620-629. The
quote from Adenauer appears on page 626. Further details on the cabinet debate appear in “Ergebnisprotokoll
über die Ressortsbesprechung im Auswärtigen Amt am 6. Oktober über die Probleme
des Gemeinsamen Marktes und Euratom”, Bundesarchiv [BA], Koblenz, B 138/722.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 59
sufficient supplies, in which case member states would be authorized to make purchases
from third parties. 71 Negotiating over the heads of their European partners,
the two governments formulated a compromise settlement on the main outstanding
issues, a settlement that found its way almost unchanged into the Treaties of Rome.
At the same moment, the Germans also agreed to French proposals regarding closer
cooperation in weapons development, under WEU auspices if possible, on a bilateral
basis if necessary. 72
Conclusions
The Suez Crisis did matter for the negotiations leading to the establishment of the
European Communities, but only as a trigger, not as a fundamental cause. The special
circumstances of the Suez Crisis spurred the decision by the leaders of France
and Germany to cooperate in establishing European structures that would form an
autonomous zone of economic policy and strengthen the continent’s influence in
Atlantic Affairs. Suez also pushed public and parliamentary opinion in both Paris
and Bonn towards European integration as an alternative to Atlantic cooperation,
making it possible to strike a deal with little worry about the domestic repudiation
that had proven fatal for the EDC. But the package deal agreed by the French and
Germans in November 1956 – a liberal customs union flanked by sectoral agreements
for agriculture, imperial development and, last but not least, strategic industries
– represented a compromise between long-term French and German policy
goals. The reorganization of the European economic order was thus the result not
just of a single incident, no matter how dramatic, but of persistent tensions within
the Atlantic system acting upon domestic economic policy processes.
Continental perspectives on European integration reflected the experience of years of
disputes with the “Anglo-Saxon” powers within NATO. Fundamental questions regarding
the durability of Atlantic economic ties and the reliability of extended deterrence pushed the
French and German governments towards a new strategic and economic partnership well
before Colonel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. As part of its grand
strategy, Washington consistently supported the unification of Europe, but it was not that
policy that brought the Europeans together. If the Americans played a role in the integration
process, they did so by pursuing other national goals in ways that led to the feeling that, as
Chancellor Adenauer put it in November 1956, Europe needed to “unite against America”. 73
71. Adenauer and Mollet approved a package deal on the EEC and Euratom that had been hammered
out by Robert Marjolin and Karl Carstens. The secondary literature contains several versions of
what the deal supposedly included; for the actual text of the agreement, see Enclosure to Letter,
Adenauer to Balke, 7 November 1956, BA: B 138/723.
72. Ariane Illig, “Aufzeichnung”, 9 November 1956, PAAA: Büro Staatssekretär, Bd.278; [Jean
François-Poncet], “Note à l’attention de M. Jurgensen”, 20 November 1956, MAE: Europe,
Généralités, 1945-60, dossier 185.
73. See “Procès-verbal des entretiens franco-allemands [6 November 1956]”, DDF 1956, 3, p.235.

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61
Hegemony or Vulnerability?
Giscard, Ball, and the 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
What was the character of America’s international monetary relations with Europe
during the early 1960’s, and how were they related to the larger power political
questions of the day? There is a standard interpretation of this question. During this
pre-Vietnam war period, the argument runs, the United States strove to maintain
hegemonic power vis-à-vis Western Europe “based on the role of the dollar in the
international monetary system and on the extension of its nuclear deterrent to
include its allies”. 1 Since this economic dominance resulted from the structure and
rules of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the Americans had no interest in
reforming arrangements that were “a prerequisite for continued American global
hegemony”. 2 “Because it was interested in preserving the privileges it derived from
the operation of the Bretton Woods regime”, the United States would not “condone
a structural reform” of the system that threatened “the continued preeminence of
the dollar”. 3 And while most of “America’s allies acquiesced in a hegemonic system
that accorded the United States special privileges to act abroad unilaterally to
promote U.S. interests”, the French did not. 4 The Fifth Republic government, led
by Charles de Gaulle, deeply resented the privileges they believed the system conferred
upon the American dollar and actively exploited America’s balance of payments
position in an attempt to force the United States to abandon the Bretton
Woods system. The United States, the conventional wisdom holds, was able to
1. R. GILPIN, The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1987, p.134.
2. D. KUNZ, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy, The Free Press, New
York, 1997, p.99. For similar interpretations, see W. BORDEN, Defending Hegemony: American
Foreign Economic Policy, in: T. PATERSON (ed.), Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign
Policy, 1961-1963, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, pp.83-85; D. CALLEO, The
Imperious Economy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982, p.23; D. CALLEO, Beyond
American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, Basic Books, New York,1987, p.13,
44-52; F. COSTIGLIOLA, The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and
Berlin, in: PATERSON (ed.), pp.24-56; P. KENNEDY, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Random House, New York, 1987,
p.434. For interpretations that see Kennedy’s monetary policy as a conservative approach designed
to maintain the privileged place the dollar held in the postwar “capitalist world-system”, see Borden,
p.57-62, 84; D. CALLEO and B. ROWLAND, America and the World Political Economy:
Atlantic Dreams and National Realities, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1973, pp.88-89;
J. ODELL, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as a Source of Change,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982, p.88; S. STRANGE, International Monetary Relations,
Oxford University Press, London, 1976, p.82, 207.
3. J. GOWA, Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, 1983, p.52.
4. B. COHEN, Organizing the World’s Money: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence,
Basic Books, New York, 1977, p.97.

62
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
thwart this French effort, until the American deficit ballooned in the late 1960’s and
early 1970’s as a result of massive “guns and butter” inflation. 5
The real story is rather different. American policymakers had no great love for
the Bretton Woods system. It was associated in their minds not with American
hegemony, but with American vulnerability. The United States was running a payments
deficit; the Europeans were in effect financing that deficit and were thus
enabling the Americans to live beyond their means. But the Americans did not view
this as a source of strength: the growing European dollar balances, which, under the
rules of the system, could be cashed in for gold at any time, were a kind of sword of
Damocles hanging over their heads. The U.S. government felt vulnerable and it did
not like it. Kennedy feared that if the system was not reformed, then the Europeans
might come to the conclusion that “my God, this is the time … if everyone wants
gold we’re all going to be ruined because there is not enough gold to go around”. 6
The most surprising fact to emerge from French and American documents is
that for a brief period in 1962, the French appeared willing to help the United
States out of its monetary difficulties. Instead of hostility towards the dollar, Minister
of Finance Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, was, for a time, cooperative. Inspired by
Giscard’s hints of support, Under-secretary of State George Ball and key members
of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) crafted a monetary plan that would
have essentially ended Bretton Woods while providing the Americans with time
and protection to end their balance of payments deficits. The key provision of this
plan was a gold standstill agreement, whereby the European surplus countries
would agree to hold US deficit dollars and formally limit their gold purchases from
the American Treasury. In return, the United States would move aggressively to end
its balance of payments deficit. At the end of the agreement (likely to be two years),
a new international monetary arrangement would be negotiated with the Europeans.
Surprisingly, many within the Kennedy administration were willing to sacrifice the
central role of the dollar and its “seigneuriage” privileges in any new system, a
position that would have had much appeal for the Europeans.
While elements of the administration were enthusiastic about Giscard’s hints
and Ball’s plan, the more financially orthodox members from the Department of
5. It is quite true that by 1965, de Gaulle claimed the system allowed for “l’hégémonie américaine”.
See Press Conference, February 4, 1965, from Charles DE GAULLE, Discours et messages, vol.
4, Pour l’effort, Août 1962-Décembre 1965, Omnibus/Plon, Paris, 1993; see also R. ARON, La
République Impériale, Calmann Levy, Paris, 1973; G.H. SOUTOU, L’alliance incertaine: Les
rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996, Fayard, Paris, 1996, p.287. But the
key point that this article makes is that the views of 1965 were not the basis for French policy in
1962, which is implied in J. LACOUTURE, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970, W.W. Norton, New
York, 1992, p.380-82. Most French scholarly interpretations about de Gaulle’s criticisms against
the dollar begin with the mid-1960s. For a significant but brief exception, see H. BOURGUINAT,
Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du système monétaire international: la contestation manquée
de l’hégémonie du dollar, in: De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 3, Paris, 1992, pp.110-118.
6. Discussion between President John F. Kennedy, William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve and Theodore Sorensen – August 16, 1962, 5:50-6:32 p.m., tape 13, President’s
Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston MA.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 63
Treasury and the Federal Reserve vehemently opposed the arrangement. Given the
poor state of Franco-American political relations in the summer of 1962, the President
was himself unsure of French motives, and in the end formal negotiations never
began. Was Giscard’s offer a missed opportunity? U.S. officials at the time were
perplexed and scholars since then have neglected it entirely.
The analysis here will be broken down into three parts. The first section will
provide a brief overview of the monetary problems that plagued the Kennedy
administration and the efforts in 1961 and the first half of 1962 to solve them. It
will also explore the motivations for France’s international monetary policy in the
early 1960’s. The second section will deal with Giscard’s visit to the United States
in July 1962. The final section will explore the furious debate within the Kennedy
administration over the French finance minister’s seemingly cooperative statements
during his visit, and investigate why nothing came of Giscard’s apparent willingness
to help ease the dollar and gold outflow problem.
American and French Monetary Policy
Most historians and political scientists identify Richard Nixon as “the destroyer of
Bretton Woods”. 7 In reality, however, the Bretton Woods system was inherently
unstable and began experiencing potentially fatal difficulties as early as the late
1950’s. Economists now recognize that the system lacked an effective mechanism to
adjust and settle the inevitable payments imbalances caused by shifting real currency
values arising from differential national monetary policies and savings rates. 8 Postwar
policymakers eschewed the two most effective means of adjustment –“flexible”
exchange rates and a pure gold standard - on principle. Mindful of the competitive
devaluations during the 1930’s, they believed that flexible exchange rates - where the
relative value of currencies is determined by purchases and sales in an open market -
were erratic, allowed destabilizing capital flows, and gave far too much control over
the economy to bankers and speculators. 9 A pure gold standard, which required states
with a payments deficit to transfer gold, was seen as no better. In a country that lost
gold, the domestic monetary base would be decreased and aggregate domestic
7. KUNZ, Butter and Guns, p.192.
8. Excellent discussions of these questions can be found in R. COOPER, The International Monetary
System: Essays in World Economics, MA: The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1987, and P. de GRAUWE,
International Money: Post-War Trends and Theories, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.
9. P. VOLCKER and T. GYOHTEN, Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat to
American Leadership, Random House, New York, 1992, p.7-8.

64
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
demand would shrink. Imports would fall, exports would rise, and the payments
would balance. But the cost was deflation. 10 In an era where full employment and
robust social spending were promised, it was politically inconceivable that national
governments would accept a process that depressed national income and led to unemployment
in order to balance international payments. 11
At the time, however, American and European policymakers were less concerned
with the flaws of the Bretton Woods adjustment mechanism per se and instead focused
on the growing outflow of dollars and gold from the United States as the biggest
problem in the system. A whole series of factors – including the move to current
account convertibility by the Europeans and the foreign exchange cost of America’s
NATO commitments – had dangerously enlarged the American balance of payments
deficit in 1959 and 1960. Many observers worried that the large deficit could lead to a
crisis of confidence in the dollar and spark a mass conversion into gold, rendering the
dollar unusable as a reserve currency and in the process destroying a large portion of
the world’s liquidity. This problem had come to be known as the “Triffin Dilemma”,
after the Yale economist Robert Triffin published a book highlighting the confidence
problem in his 1960 book, Gold and the Dollar Crisis. 12
Fearing the potential dangers, political and economic, of a ballooning deficit
and gold outflow, the new Kennedy administration pursued an aggressive strategy
to correct the problem. 13 Political allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany,
were pressured to spend surplus dollars purchasing military equipment made
in the United States. Trade liberalization became a key element of the administration’s
foreign policy. The federal budget was scrutinized for ways to reduce U.S.
government expenditures abroad. Most importantly, the Undersecretary of the
Treasury for International Monetary Affairs, Robert Roosa, negotiated a whole series
of “ad hoc” arrangements to defend the dollar and limit the flow of gold from
the US Treasury. Currency swap arrangements and standby borrowing arrange-
10. See B. EICHENGREEN, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, pp.7-44. In practice, gold inflows and outflows were
often “sterilized” under the gold standard, which just meant that gold was added or subtracted from
the national treasuries without changing the domestic monetary base. But even with some sterilization,
the gold standard was nowhere near as stable as was once thought. See G. GALLAROTTI,
The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
For the economic and political volatility of the “gold standard” during the late 19 th and early 20 th
century, and the American propensity to “sterilize” gold flows, see M. FRIEDMAN and A.
SCHWARTZ, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1963, pp.89-188; see also M. FRIEDMAN, Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History,
Harcourt Brace, New York, 1994, especially the essays The Crime of 1873 and William Jennings
Bryan and the Cyanide Process.
11. See especially D.E. MOGGRIDGE, Keynes: An Economist’s Biography, Routledge, London,
1992.
12. R. TRIFFIN, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility, CT: Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1960.
13. See T. SORENSEN, Kennedy, Harper and Row, New York, 1965, p.406. See also J.K. Galbraith’s
letter to the President from October 1960, in his Letters to Kennedy, Harvard University Press, Harvard,
1998, pp.29-31.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 65
ments were implemented that allowed deficit countries to stave off attacks on their
currencies. 14 The most important currency arrangement was the gold pool, a consortium
of industrial nations who intervened in the London gold markets whenever
the price of the dollar seemed threatened.
Roosa’s efforts were quite successful in limiting the amount of gold purchased by
central bankers holding US dollars. But the administration’s efforts to reduce the overall
payments deficit were far less successful, which was a source of great frustration to
President Kennedy, as this exposed the Achilles heel of America’s international monetary
policy. If the surplus countries of Europe – namely France and West Germany – cooperated
with the United States by limiting their gold purchases, then the dollar could
be protected. But if this cooperation collapsed for either political or economic reasons,
then the countries holding surplus dollars would have enormous leverage over the United
States. “I know everyone thinks I worry about this too much” he told advisor Ted
Sorensen. But the balance of payments was like “a club that de Gaulle and all the others
hang over my head”. In a crisis, Kennedy complained, they could cash in all their
dollars, and then “where are we”? 15
This meant that France’s attitude on international monetary issues was critical.
As with all questions of French policy, the first place to look was the attitude of the
President, Charles de Gaulle. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, de Gaulle merely
posed the overall framework for French economic policy. He realized that military
power required economic strength. During this period, when the United States began
experiencing balance-of-payment difficulties, France was enjoying an economic miracle
of financial stability, industrial progress, and an annual growth rate of four and a
half percent. The Fourth Republic had already done the groundwork for the upward
surge in the economy when de Gaulle came to power, but prosperity had often been
marred by monetary crises. 16
In December 1958, de Gaulle appointed a group of economic experts under Jacques
Rueff, magistrate for the European Coal and Steel Community and a previous minister of
finance, who drew up the plans that put the French economic house in order. The successful
reforms, however, were carried out at political cost. Implemented by two successive
finance ministers, Antoine Pinay and Wilfrid Baumgartner, the program was based on a
formula of austerity and strict financial and monetary orthodoxy. Measures included higher
taxes, a devaluation of the franc by seventeen and a half percent, strict budgetary policy,
14. The swap arrangements were standby credit lines that allowed participants to draw on other
participants currencies in order to defend their own exchange rates. The increased IMF credit was
arranged through a procedure called the General Arrangements to Borrow, which were negotiated
at the end of 1961. While connected to the IMF, these arrangements were unique in that they gave
the lending countries some discretion over the size and use of the loans. For an excellent discussion
of these innovations, see H. JAMES, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp.159-165.
15. R. REEVES, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, Touchstone, New York, 1993, p.431.
16. W. HITCHCOCK, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in
Europe, 1944-1954, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1998, pp.12-71. See, also, R.
KUISEL, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in
the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981.

66
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
removal of the automatic tying of wages to a cost-of-living index, and reduced government
subsidies. Selective liberalization of trade allowed more foreign goods into the country.
The currency was replaced with a new franc, worth a hundred of the old variety. And
in the years that followed, the French government restricted the growth of credit in order
to slow inflation. This practice of encadrement du crédit, however, discouraged investment
because it limited industry’s access to capital. The finance ministry also imposed a
coefficient de trésorerie that required banks to hold thirty percent or more of their assets in
treasury bonds or medium-term re-discountable credits. 17
In the spring of 1961 Rueff began his eight-year campaign against what he saw as
the subtle and insidious effects of the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit on the French
economy. Rueff and many French officials, including French Prime Minister Michel
Debré, believed that the United States relied on “easy money” and an expansionary
monetary policy that exported inflation abroad to countries such as France. They also
believed that a major consequence of the U.S. capital outflow was encouragement of
American investment in the French economy. 18
Gaullist officials held what Robert Solomon has described as a “schizophrenic view”
toward multinational investment. On the one hand, French officials sought such investment
because they welcomed the technological advances and influx of capital. On the other hand,
they wished to see more national, and less foreign, investment in the French economy and
wanted the EEC to adopt a common policy toward multinational investment. They also
urged the United States to change its tax code to eliminate deferrals on taxation of overseas
facilities. What the French government resented was the development of U.S. monetary
“seigneuriage” that allowed the buying of European companies with dollars. 19
Rueff had little patience with U.S. complaints about bearing the burden of Cold War
security commitments. Before the Rueff plan in December 1958, many French politicians
blamed the weakness of the French franc on the draining wars in Algeria and Indochina.
Even though le fardeau algérien continued, the French franc became one of the world’s
strongest currencies after the Bank of France stopped increasing its domestic money supply.
Rueff argued that U.S. foreign economic and military aid programs were a small
proportion of GNP, hardly an intolerable burden. A practitioner of strict fiscal and monetary
orthodoxy, he believed that a sharp increase in discount rate would eliminate the U.S.
deficit overnight, as the French government did in 1958. The French government planned
to raise its discount rate to four percent and the coefficient de trésorerie to thirty-six
percent to combat its own inflationary cycle. 20
17. S. BERSTEIN, The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969, translated by P. MORRIS, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1993, pp.101-124; LORIAUX, France after Hegemony: International
Change and Financial Reform, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, pp.168-174.
18. See, generally, J. RUEFF, Balance of Payments: Proposals for the Resolution of the most Pressing
World Economic Problem of our Time, trans. by J. CLÉMENT, Macmillan Co., New York, 1967. See,
also, F. BOURRICAUD and P. SALIN, Présence de Jacques Rueff, Plon, Paris, 1989, pp.243-314.
19. R. SOLOMON, The International Monetary System, 1945-1981 (New York, 1982), p.54. J. LEE,
Kennedy, Johnson, and the Dilemma of Multinational Corporations: American Foreign Economic
Policy in the 1960s, in: Essays in Economic and Business History 14, 1996, p.322.
20. Rueff to Wilfrid Baumgartner, 26 June 1961, papers of Wilfred Baumgartner, box 3BA34, folder
DR 7, FNSP, Paris.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 67
In a series of lengthy letters to de Gaulle, published in Le Monde in early June 1961,
Rueff encouraged the French president to take measures that would end the dollar’s role as
an international reserve currency. He implored de Gaulle to bypass Parliament and invoke
the presidential emergency powers provided by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic so that
he could pursue polices which might force the devaluation of the dollar. Rueff considered
the gold exchange standard a “prodigious collective error that allowed the United States to
avoid the consequences of its economic profligacy”. His views resonated with the nationalistic
de Gaulle, who longed to abolish the privileges of the dollar and sterling as reserve
currencies within the Bretton Woods system. Rueff also began to urge conversion of
France’s dollar reserves into gold as an indication of displeasure with U.S. abuses of the
reserve-currency system, which accelerated French inflation. 21
Rueff’s views were shared by several high-ranking French officials close to de
Gaulle. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, an inspecteur des finances who had
worked with Rueff at the Ministry of Finance between 1936 and 1939, echoed his
polemic against the hegemony of the dollar. Étienne Burin des Roziers, who
became secretary general of Élysée in the spring of 1962, was also well placed to
begin shaping de Gaulle’s outlook on international monetary relations. 22 Olivier
Wormser, director general of economic affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
argued that Kennedy and Harold Macmillan’s strong desire to stabilize the pound
and the dollar was connected to Britain’s bid to join the Common Market. America’s
international monetary policy was a convenient target for France’s complaints
about the relationship between Britain’s application for the EEC and
“Anglo-Saxon” balance-of-payments difficulties. 23
The Ministry of Finance, however, did not share these views during the early
1960s. The Ministry was a bastion of “Atlanticism” that believed in cooperating with
the United States. Wilfrid Baumgartner resisted the insistence of Rueff’s coterie on
ending the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. Baumgartner had that quaint sense
of gratitude toward the United States for its help to France under the Marshall Plan
that was becoming increasingly out-of-fashion in Gaullist France. He had also
developed a close professional and personal friendship with Douglas Dillon during
his ambassadorship to France under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Baumgartner
and Dillon often began their letters with the salutation “dear friend”. 24
21. Jacques Rueff to Charles de Gaulle, 5 May 1961, papers of Wilfrid Baumgartner, box 3BA34, folder
Dr 5, Fondation des sciences politiques, Paris, France. For Rueff’s articles, see, Un danger pour l’occident:
Le Gold-Exchanges standard, in: Le Monde, 27 June 1961; Deux Pyramides du crédit sur le stock
d’or des Etats-Unis, ibid., 23 June 1961; and Comment sortir du système?, ibid., 29 June 1961.
22. On French bureaucratic schism, see, Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, interview
4, 32-33, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, Ministère de l’Économie,
des Finances, et d’Industrie, Paris France.
23. Note, Olivier Wormser, 30 May 1961, Baumgartner papers, box 3BA48, folder Dr 2. See also C.
W. Sanders (British Board of Trade), “Points for Meeting”, 26 June 1961, FO 371/158179, Public
Records Office, Kew, England.
24. See, for example, Douglas Dillon to Baumgartner, 4 May 1961, Archives de Baumgartner, box
3BA48, folder Dr 1. On Baumgartner’s attitude toward cooperating with the United States, see,
Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, number 4, 23, Comité pour l’histoire
économique et financière de la France.

68
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
During his tenure as finance minister, Baumgartner managed to mute Rueff’s influence.
Before 1962, France was one of the few European countries that did not
convert the bulk of its dollar reserves into gold. In 1961, the United States sold no
gold to France but 970 million dollars of gold to other countries. 25 And although
Baumgartner refused to capitulate to the Kennedy administration’s demands for
expanding international liquidity, he participated in Roosa’s ad hoc measures, including
swap arrangements and a gold pool, which temporarily eased the recurring
monetary crises. 26
In December 1961, shortly after the creation of the gold pool, Baumgartner
announced his resignation, effective the following month. Finance officials recall that
even though he was not forced per se to retire, he felt too old to fight the political battles
emerging within the French government over international monetary relations. To the
Americans, his retirement suggested that the halcyon days of Franco-American
financial cooperation might be over. 27
U.S. Fears and French Motives
Indeed, in May 1962, it seemed that the French might be considering a policy of putting
pressure on the dollar for political reasons. Douglas Dillon told the President that a
Bank of France official made a statement “which could indicate possible difficulties
ahead with France. He said that it must be realized that France’s dollar holdings represented
a political as well as an economic problem”. One of President Kennedy’s great
fears was that a nation or group of nations might exploit American monetary vulnerability
for their own political purposes. If the French, alone or in collaboration with other
surplus countries, decided to cash in all of their surplus dollars, they could run down the
American gold supply. Irregardless of any economic motives, a French-led bloc might
believe their larger political objectives were worth the cost. The United States might be
forced to take politically unpopular measures in order to prevent a complete monetary
meltdown, such as trade and capital controls, troop withdrawals, or an embarrassing
devaluation or even a suspension of dollar-gold convertibility. 28
A widely circulated State Department memo summarized an article that appeared in
The Statist warning of a possible attack on the dollar by the French. President de Gaulle
was “fully prepared to play [the] diplomatic trump card he holds in form of substantial
25. For Baumgartner’s reaction to Rueff’s views, see, for example, Baumgartner to Rueff, letter, 27
June 1961, papers of Baumgartner, box 3BA34, folder Dr 7. For figures on French conversion of
gold, see “Tableau des transactions en or des Etats-Unis avec les pays étrangers”, given by BOUR-
GUINAT, Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du Système monétaire international: la contestation
manquée de l’hégémonie du dollar, in: De Gaulle en son siècle, p.125.
26. R. TRIFFIN, The World Money Maze: National Currencies in International Payments, p.249. See
also, C. COOMBS, The Arena of International Finance, Wiley Press, New York, 1976, pp.61-62.
27. Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, number 4, 18-22.
28. Dillon, Memo for the President, May 25, 1962, National Security Files, Departments and
Agencies: Treasury , Box 289, JFKL.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 69
French holdings of dollars”. In other words, if U.S policy towards Europe clashed with
French interests, de Gaulle would pressure Kennedy by continuing to purchase gold
from the United States. 29 The article went on to say that unless France were accepted as
an equal power, “he would not hesitate to make himself felt by resorting to devices
liable to cause grave embarrassment to the United States”. 30
What made this scenario even more alarming was the possibility that the increasingly
strong Franco-German bloc was looking to weaken the U.S. grip on
Western policy. It was no secret that both de Gaulle and West German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer were apprehensive about elements of the Kennedy administration’s
military and political policy in Europe. If both France and Germany collaborated
on monetary policy, they could use their considerable supply of dollars to
initiate a crippling gold crisis. Without the help of the two largest surplus countries,
the U.S. might find it impossible to defend the dollar. This bloc could force the
Americans to end negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin, or bring about a
change in American military policy toward Europe. Maybe the French could bargain
for technology to advance their nuclear ambitions. A French-led bloc could
also have considerable say in designing a new international monetary mechanism
on its own terms.
Were Kennedy’s fears exaggerated? Franco-American relations had become so
strained that the president’s advisers believed the possibility of a French-inspired
monetary attack could not be ruled out. In mid-May 1962, the extent of this strain,
and the linkage between military and monetary policy, was revealed in a provocative
discussion between President Kennedy and the French Minister of State for
Cultural Affairs, André Malraux. 31 Kennedy complained that France was delaying
the United Kingdom’s entry into the Common Market. According to Kennedy, the
U.S. supported the application, despite the negative impact U.K. entry would have
on the American payments deficit, because it would serve the far more important
purpose of creating a Franco-British counterweight to the Germans in the EEC.
Kennedy declared that if the French preferred “a Europe without Great Britain and
independent of the United States”, it would create a situation in which America was
bearing the enormous costs of defending Europe without any voice. If that were the
case, Kennedy would bring the troops home and save $1.3 billion, an amount
which “would just about meet our balance of payments deficit”. 32
When de Gaulle learned the details of Kennedy’s conversations with Malraux,
the French leader dismissed the possibility that the U.S. could withdraw from
Europe, since America recognized that it would be lost if Western Europe were
29. Jones to State Department, June 13, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25.
30. Ibid., p.1
31. Memo of Meeting between the President, Ambassador Hervé Alphand, André Malraux, and
McGeorge Bundy, May 11, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.XIII, pp.695-701.
32. The whole tone of this meeting calls into question the idea that Kennedy wanted to create a Pax
Americana regardless of cost. “The goal of U.S. policy was to support and sustain nations which
desired independence. If France wanted to lead a Europe independent from the United States, then
Kennedy “like nothing better than to leave Europe”. Ibid., p.697.

70
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
conquered. 33 De Gaulle accused the U.S. of dictating to its allies a line of policy
that was undermining its leadership. He claimed that by entering into negotiations
with the Soviets over Berlin and by publicly stating that France should not have an
atomic force, the administration risked a breakdown in the alliance.
Given the climate of mistrust, U.S. officials initially suspected a veiled threat
when French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing reminded them that only
cooperation 2on a grand scale” could help the Americans with their dollar drain
and prevent a speculative attack. 34 Giscard claimed that the United States could not
handle a real run on the dollar by itself, even with the help of the IMF. Only with
the collaboration of those European central banks that held large quantities of dollars
could such a run be handled. What was Giscard proposing? He would not say,
and the Americans did not want to appear weak by asking. Although the American
deficit had decreased, gold purchases had increased, and the dollar market was
weak. Giscard’s hints fed into the administration’s suspicions of French intentions,
and combined with worsening gold outflow figures to stimulate a massive inter-governmental
effort to develop plans to meet a monetary crisis.
Responding to rumors of French blackmail over the dollar, Undersecretary of
State George Ball sent a memo to President Kennedy recommending that the administration
take preemptive action in an upcoming meeting with Giscard. “I am
seriously concerned about the tendency of our allies to view the present world
financial problem as a case solely of dollar weakness rather than as a common
problem for the Atlantic partnership …”. 35 It was time to move away from the position
that the payments deficit was a narrow, technical problem to be negotiated between
Treasury and European central bankers, whose views Ball described as
“pre-Herbert Hoover”. 36 In its efforts to move towards payments equilibrium and
arrest the gold outflow, American policy was increasingly “reminiscent of Dr.
Schacht” - that is, of the series of bilateral deals and clearing arrangements that the
Nazi government had negotiated in the mid-1930s. Unless an explicit link was
made between American military policy and the balance of payments, the U.S.
would be vulnerable to “blackmail” by the Europeans. Ball believed it was time for
fundamental multilateral systemic reform of the Bretton Woods edifice and not
simply more ad hoc measures, even if that meant overruling the objections of the
Treasury department.
Would France cooperate? Before Giscard’s July 1962 visit, contact between
Kennedy administration officials and the finance minister had sent mixed signals.
In May 1962, faced with an economic slump at home, Kennedy marveled at the
performance of the French economy and considered transposing aspects of French
dirigisme to the United States. The president sent Walter Heller and James Tobin of
33. Gavin to the State Department, May 28, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.XIII, pp.705-707.
34. Gavin to Rusk, July 12, 1962, UPA, NSF, W. Europe, France. See also Heller, Memo to the
President, July 16, 1962, UPA, POF, CEA, 9.
35. Ball, Memo for the President, “Visit of French Finance Minister”, July 18, 1962, UPA, NSF, W.
Europe, France.
36. Ibid., p.2.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 71
the Council of Economic Advisers to Paris where they met with Giscard and
finance ministry officials for a study of the French economic planning process.
Heller and Tobin concluded that France and other West European economies grew
faster than the United States for multiple reasons. These included consistently
higher levels of demand, a higher level of government investment, greater reinvestment
of business earnings, a larger body of skilled labor, higher levels of capital
formation, technology, productivity, and smaller defense expenditure. 37 To generate
interest in economic planning within the United States, Kennedy arranged for
French officials to speak to labor and business groups. The financial counselor of
the French embassy, for example, gave addresses touting his country’s economic
plan as a successful path to increased growth. 38
Heller and Tobin’s study of French economic planning was also undertaken to
convince Gaullist officials that Kennedy was serious about making the U.S. economy
sound so that they would be less worried about the devaluation of the dollar
and less inclined to convert France’s dollar reserves into gold. Bundy told Heller
before his departure for Paris that “in the current state of Franco-American
relations, any friendly contact is a good thing”. 39
Although Heller and Tobin had established a good rapport with Giscard during their
Paris trip, the finance minister’s attitude toward U.S. investment in the French economy
worried Ball. On several occasions, Giscard complained that American investment in
France was leading to the loss of control over key segments of the economy. Without
specifying what, he had implied that “measures might be taken by the French government
to establish safeguards against such a possibility”. 40 The French government
wanted to pressure the Kennedy administration to dissuade American companies from
investing in the French economy. However, the Ministry of the Economy had no intention
to exert that pressure by moving against the dollar. 41
37. Conversation between Giscard d’Estaing and James Tobin, 1 June 1962, Heller papers, reel 24: European
budget study file. For Heller’s study of French economic planning, see, e.g., Heller, “Capital Budgeting
Experience in Five European Countries”, May 1962, Walter Heller papers, reel 21: Budget (federal) file;
and memorandum, Bundy to Heller, 14 May 1962, ibid., reel 24: European budget study file.
38. Remarks by René Larre (Financial advisor at French embassy, Washington) at a meeting of the
AFL-CIO Research Directors, Washington, D.C., 15 May 1962, Fonds trésor: Tome 15, Relations
bilaterales avec les Etats-Unis, B 10917, folder: balance des paiements, Archives économiques et
financières, Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Savigny-le-Temple, France. Giscard’s own
writings extol the benefits of economic planning. See, for example, “The Management of the Economy
and Social Development” and “The New Growth” in: V. GISCARD D’ESTAING, French
Democracy, Doubleday, New York, 1977, pp.75-92.
39. Memorandum, Bundy to Heller, 14 May 1962, Heller papers, reel 24; file European budget study.
For French perception of Kennedy’s motives, see Jacques Rueff to Philip Cortney, 31 May 1962,
ibid., Ribicoff file.
40. Jacques Reinstein (Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy Paris), circular telegram, 29 June 1962, RG
84, France, box 64, folder: Investment of Capital.
41. See, for example, Larre to Giscard, “Investissements des Etats-Unis à l’étranger”, 18 May 1962,
Fonds Trésor: Vol.15, Relations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis B10915, folder: Politique financière,
1958-1965, Archives économiques et financières. See, generally, J.J. SERVAN SCHREIBER, The
American Challenge, trans. by R. Steel, New York, 1968.

72
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
The young finance minister, who combined technocratic skill with political
savvy, tried to navigate a difficult middle course between de Gaulle’s increasing
anti-Americanism and Atlantic monetary cooperation. 42 Like his predecessor,
Giscard did not share de Gaulle’s animosity toward the United States. Giscard felt
that it was in France’s national interest to stabilize the international monetary situation.
The May stock market crash in the United States had worried the French
finance minister. If the U.S. deficit persisted or worsened, the Kennedy administration
might devalue the dollar, which would decrease the value of France’s foreign
exchange reserves and make dollar exports more competitive in Europe. According
to de Lattre’s memoirs, his subordinates, namely Claude Pierre-Brossolette, André
de Lattre and Pierre Esteva, practiced guerrilla tactics to combat Rueff’s influence
on French foreign economic policies. 43
At the same time, however, Giscard was politically ambitious and dutiful towards
de Gaulle. André de Lattre, who worked closely with him at the Ministry of
Finance, recalls that “il obéissait”. For Giscard, obeying meant converting dollar
reserves into gold at the rate of seventy percent. In the first quarter of 1962, France
converted forty-five million dollars worth of gold, and in the second quarter, that
amount increased to ninety-seven and a half million dollars. He also saw to it that
France repaid its post-World War II debt of 211 million dollars. 44
Giscard recognized that de Gaulle regarded the U.S.-dominated IMF as an “alien
and objectionable organization”. The French government preferred to deal with international
monetary problems within the framework of the Organization of European
Cooperation and Development [OECD]. This preference had been evident even in
1961: the Kennedy administration had got the message that the French might not be
willing to cooperate on monetary stabilization “except perhaps through a restricted
OECD undertaking outside of the IMF”. 45
It was not that Giscard, in adopting this approach, was trying to pursue a relatively
“pro-American” policy for political reasons. He may have been willing to
cooperate with the United States, but his basic idea was that “cooperation” could
42. J.R. FEARS, France in the Giscard Presidency, London, 1981, pp.1-18. See, also, Entretien biographique
de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, interview 5, p.28.
43. For Giscard’s views on the Bretton Woods system, see, for example, Giscard, Speech before the
National Assembly, 17 May 1962, sur le projet de loi relatif au renforcement des ressources du
FMI, Direction des Affaires économiques et financières, papiers directeurs: Olivier Wormser,
vol.63: 388-404. On French concerns about the U.S. stock market crash, see Note d’information,
René Larre (Conseiller financier, Embassy in Washington), 15 June 1962, Fonds Trésor: Vol.15,
Relations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis, cote B10915, folder: Budget, 1956-1965. On Giscard’s
delicate balancing act, see de LATTRE, Servir aux finances, 150.
44. For figures on French dollar conversion, see United States Net Monetary Gold Transactions with
Foreign Countries and International Institutions, 1 January 1962-30 June 1962, Fonds Trésor: Vol.15,
Relations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis, cote B10915, folder: Budget, 1956-1965. On debt repayment,
see Note pour le ministre, 3 July 1962, Direction des Affaires économiques et financières,
papiers directeurs: Olivier Wormser, vol.119: 252.
45. Memorandum, Walter Heller to President Kennedy, 16 May 1961, Heller papers, Heller/JFK
1960-1964 series, box 5, folder: memos to JFK, 5/61, JFKL. Couve had met with Heller at the first
meeting of the expanded OECD and had conveyed de Gaulle’s disdain of the IMF.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 73
not be a one-way street. In exchange for French cooperation, the Americans would
have to accept certain limits on their freedom of action - a kind of “surveillance
multilatérale”. 46 Among other things, Giscard calculated that using Working Group 3
within the OECD instead of the IMF would give the French government a platform to
criticize an overly expansionist U.S. domestic budget, which he identified as the
primary cause of the American payments deficit. 47
Although Giscard’s visit to Washington in late July 1962 was at President
Kennedy’s request, the timing was propitious. De Gaulle was personally preoccupied
with strategic issues and strengthening the Franco-German entente. After meeting with
Adenauer in early July, de Gaulle was trying to persuade the chancellor that their two
nations should develop formal lines of cooperation, a courtship that had began in 1958
and would culminate in January 1963 with the signing of the Franco-German Treaty of
Friendship. 48 De Gaulle and Adenauer also were preoccupied with the resignation of
Supreme Allied Commander of Europe Lauris Norstad. 49
Rueff later obtained great influence on de Gaulle’s economic philosophy. But
without an official capacity to implement policy and with de Gaulle immersed in
defense issues, Giscard had a relatively free hand to negotiate with the United
States during the summer of 1962. To the Kennedy administration’s surprise,
Giscard was in a cooperative mood when he visited Washington. Furthermore, he
wanted any arrangements to be conducted with minimal publicity because it would
strengthen his hand and not draw de Gaulle’s attention. 50
On July 20 and 21, 1962, Giscard met alone with Kennedy and later with Ball,
Bundy, and Tobin. The president and these advisers conveyed their concern over
the deficit and gold outflow, and their desire to “manage” these issues on the “political”
level. Ball said the administration did not have any formal plan, but felt that in
principle some sort of political agreement should be reached to stabilize payments
46. André de Lattre, Servir aux finances (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la
France, 1999), p.150.
47. Maurice Perouse (Directeur du Trésor) to Giscard d’Estaing, Compte-rendu de la 8ème réunion du
Groupe de Travail No.3 du Comité de politique économique de l’O.C.E.D., 16-17 April at Château
de la Muette, Fonds 9: Institutions Financières Internationales, cote B54754.
48. De Gaulle to Adenauer, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, 15 July 1962, 16:
218-219. For a concise summary of the Franco-German rapprochement, see P. MAILLARD, De
Gaulle et l’Allemagne: le rêve inachevé, Plon, Paris, 1990, pp.169-202.
49. For de Gaulle’s preoccupation with Norstad’s resignation, see Le général Norstad serait démissionnaire,
in: Le Monde, 21 July 1962, p.1. De Gaulle met with Norstad’s named successor, Lyman
Lemnitzer on July 23, 1962, and criticized US nuclear policy within NATO. See, Entretien de
Gaulle-Lemnitzer, 23 July 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, 16:
206-209, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, France.
50. H. ALPHAND, L’étonnement d’être, p. 381. See, also, Entretien biographique de Alain Prate,
entretien 4, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France. Rueff’s other strong ally,
Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, was also preoccupied with strategic issues. While
Giscard was in Washington, Couve was in Geneva for talks with the Soviets on Laos and Berlin.
See, Entretien Couve-Gromyko in Geneva, 21 July 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et
messages, 1956-1966, 16: 179-181. Dinner of the four ministers of foreign affairs in Geneva, 21
July 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, 16: 190-195.

74
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
among the major industrial countries. A multilateral, political solution to this issue
would not only squelch calls for protectionism in the U.S., it would also demonstrate
the solidarity of the Atlantic partnership. What the U.S. had in mind, Ball
said, was an agreement regarding the ratio of gold to dollar holdings. 51
The administration was surprised when the French finance minister agreed with
most of what the Americans said about the problem and appeared to want little in
return. Even so, Giscard tried to explain that the President should be as irked at the
British, who, before 1962, converted more dollars into gold than France. As long as
other European countries continued to convert their reserve dollars, France would
feel compelled to follow suit. Giscard declared that the key was to avoid any unilateral
action by either side. He thought that it was important for the creditor
countries to establish a common payments policy while the U.S. reduced its payments
deficit. Such an agreement might suspend gold takings and establish fixed
reserve ratios. France was certainly willing to hold its dollars for a time, as long as
others agreed as well. He thought the U.K. might protest, but even they might cooperate,
given their desire to join the Common Market. 52
The administration was delighted that Giscard appeared to understand
American difficulties. Giscard’s statements alleviated the fear of a Franco-German
monetary bloc. A French-led initiative to reform the payments system would save
the U.S. the embarrassment of continued ad hoc measures that made the U.S. look
weak. In order to be prepared for such negotiation, the administration launched an
enormous effort to study and debate exactly what form an international monetary
agreement should take. An inter-departmental committee on the balance of payments
was created, and a “gold budget” established. 53
Giscard was hopeful that he could convince de Gaulle to accept a gold standstill
arrangement because it could potentially meet the general’s long-term objective of
curbing the hegemony of the dollar. The indications that he received from Ball
suggested that after a two-year grace period, the G-10 nations could modify or construct
a new international financial structure . Giscard did not intend to end the use
of the dollar as a reserve currency. But he hoped to give the franc a place in a
broadened monetary scheme that used additional currencies as reserves. He wished
to establish a unité de réserve composite (CRU), which would be tied to gold. The
51. No record of Giscard’s meeting with Kennedy alone has been found in either U.S. or French archives.
Kennedy mentions some of the points he discussed in a later meeting with Federal Reserve Chairman
William Martin. Discussion between President John F. Kennedy, William McChesney Martin,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve and Theodore Sorensen – August 16, 1962, 5:50-6:32 p.m., tape 13,
Presidential Recording, International Monetary Relations, Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Transcribed
by F.J. Gavin. For the meeting with multiple participants, see memcon, “Payments Arrangements
Among the Atlantic Community”, July 20, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.XIII, p.733. And memcon
(luncheon meeting), 21 July 1962, JFK NSF, reel 2: pp.154-155.
52. Ibid.
53. Memo, the President for the Secretary of the Treasury and Administrator, Aid, June 20, 1962,
UPA, POF, Treasury, 25; Memo, Bundy for the President , June 22, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury,
25; Memo, the President for the Secretary of the Treasury, June 22, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 75
creation of a CRU would address French concerns of curbing global inflation while
meeting demands for expanded international liquidity. 54
The Debate over Monetary Reform within the Kennedy Administration
From the discussions with Giscard, the Kennedy administration hoped that there
was now an opportunity to solve the gold outflow problem within a political, multilateral
context. Giscard seemed to accept the need for a standstill agreement to give
the U.S. time to bring its payments into equilibrium and begin systemic reform of
the international financial system. The Treasury held over $16 billion of gold, but
legally $12 billion was required to back domestic currency. There was much talk
about rescinding the laws behind the domestic cover, and the Federal Reserve could
take certain actions in a crisis that would release the gold without legislative action.
But Congress would want a protracted debate on the issue, and that debate might
upset the markets and might quite possibly set off another gold crisis.
More important than the gold cover issue was the supply of dollars held by
surplus countries, both officially and in private hands. These liabilities totaled over
$20 billion, which could be turned in at any time. While this was more than the
gold supply backing them, it was not, by the historical standards of gold-exchange
regimes, a dangerous ratio. Interest rate policy and central bank cooperation could
handle any run on the dollar. But if this cooperation were not forthcoming, then the
dollar liabilities were a loaded gun aimed at the American gold supply. If a
Franco-German bloc formed, these overhang dollars could be used to expose American
monetary weakness, and perhaps force political concessions. Therefore, it was
important to take the opportunity afforded by Giscard’s suggestions to create a
mechanism to prevent a large American gold outflow.
Encouraged by the French finance minister’s cooperative spirit, Kennedy’s closest
advisers began considering dramatic departures from traditional monetary policy
to solve this problem. Gold guarantees, gold standstill agreements, and raising
the dollar price of gold, either in concert with others or unilaterally, were all debated.
The Department of State even prepared a draft memo for the President’s use
should he want to end the American policy of redeeming gold on demand. 55 Carl
Kaysen sent Kennedy an essay by J. M. Keynes proposing an international payments
system that dispensed with gold altogether. Kaysen wrote the President:
54. In September 1962, Giscard began talking about a CRU, a proposal which was debated intermittently
until 1965. See, for example, LORAIX, France after Hegemony, pp.185-186. See, also, S.
COHEN and M.–C. SMOUTE, La politique de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Fondation des sciences
politiques, Paris, 1985, pp.146-148; and BOURGUINAT, Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du
système monétaire international: la contestation manquée de l’hégémonie du dollar, in: De Gaulle
en son siècle, pp.116-117.
55. Memo, Coppock to Johnson, August 1, 1962, DDC 1993.

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Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
“The great attention paid to gold is another myth ….As you said of the Alliance for
Progress, those who oppose reform may get revolution”. 56
Perhaps the most discussed proposal was from George Ball. In his memo to the
President, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem”, Ball maintained that the problem
was at heart about politics, not economics. 57 Unfortunately, claimed Ball, few
people in Europe, Wall Street, or even the U.S. Treasury department understood
this. For them, the gold outflow and payments deficit were signs of American profligacy,
correctable through deflationary policies at home and massive cuts in military
aid expenditures abroad. By pursuing Roosa’s policy of “improvised expedients”
and taking the posture of supplicants seeking credits, offsets, and debt
pre-payments, the administration created a picture of weakness that eroded America’s
authority and bargaining power with the Europeans. Ball warned “this is no
way to run the government of any nation - much less to exercise the leadership of
the Free World”. 58
Ball argued that the answer to this problem was simple. The strength of the dollar
should not be dependent on the “daily whims of private and official ‘confidence’
but to a structure of long-run reciprocal assurances by governments”. The Europeans
must be made to understand that such an agreement was in their best interest as
well as ours. The Europeans, Ball claimed, would be just as hurt by a dollar crisis
as the U.S. More importantly, they must recognize that the continued American defense
of Europe is dependent upon safeguarding the dollar. 59 Without such reforms,
President Kennedy would be forced to take aggressive, unilateral action to improve
the balance of payments, such as withdrawing American troops from Europe or imposing
controls on capital and restrictions on tourism. Ball argued that such policies
would not be in America’s interest.
Instead, Ball advocated a multilateral agreement at the political level, which
would “insulate ourselves from the danger of excessive gold losses while we are
working, by less costly measures that will, over a reasonable period of time restore
equilibrium”. If the latter policy was not pursued, the U.S. would continue to be
vulnerable to the ‘confidence’ game. More importantly, as long as the current rules
were maintained, the U.S. would remain “subject to the blackmail of any government
that wants to employ its dollar reserves as political weapons against us”. 60
Ball told the President if the United States were to “become more heavily involved
in Southeast Asia” the “West Coast of South America” or the “Congo”, the Europe-
56. Memo, Kaysen to the President, July 6, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.138.
57. Memo, Ball to the President, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem”, July 24, 1962, the Papers
of George W. Ball, Box #15b, “Memorandum to the President on the Gold Problem”, Seeley G.
Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
58. Ibid., pp.4-5.
59. Ibid., p.5. Ball argued that “what we must tell our European allies is, therefore, clear enough: if we
are to continue to carry our heavy share of the Free world burdens we can do so only under the
conditions where our exertions in the common cause do not imperil the dollar and in fact, the whole
international payments system. To create those conditions is the first and most urgent task for the
Atlantic partnership”.
60. Ibid., p.10.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 77
ans might be tempted to “exploit our own problems, NATO’s difficulties, and our
own problem with the gold flight for political purposes”. 61 A multilateral gold
standstill arrangement would limit America’s vulnerability to this kind of pressure.
Why would the Europeans agree to such a plan? Ball hinted that the United States
could exploit its own political leverage. “Central bankers may regard our expenditures
to defend the Free World as a form of sin”, he argued, “but the political leaders
of our Western allies do not”. 62
Ball provided a general outline of a temporary arrangement to stop the gold outflow.
Its provisions included a massive increase in Treasury swaps with foreign
central banks, a long-term loan with a consortium of European allies, large withdrawals
from the IMF, and fixed gold ratios for central bank portfolios. The U.S.
would have to redistribute some of its gold and perhaps guarantee dollar holdings
in gold. Ultimately, Ball believed the U.S. should seek a “thorough-going” revision
of the Bretton Woods system, “multilateralizing” responsibility for the creation of
liquidity as Giscard indicated during his visit. The Undersecretary of State was
fully prepared to sacrifice the “hegemonic” role of the dollar if a new system
reduced America’s vulnerability.
The key to any plan was getting the Europeans to maintain the same or a smaller
proportion of their reserves in gold. James Tobin of the Council of Economic Advisers
(CEA) produced a plan to accomplish this. 63 To meet Giscard’s demand for
similar conversion policies among the European nations, Tobin suggested that the
leading industrial countries determine a uniform ratio of gold to foreign exchange
to which all countries would have to adhere. This would require countries with gold
in excess of this ratio to sell a part of their gold for foreign exchange. Instead of
only using the dollar and sterling as reserve currencies, the currencies of all participating
countries (assumed to be the Paris Club) would be equally acceptable. That
provision would satisfy French demands that the franc be treated as a reserve currency
on par with the dollar. Each country would provide a gold guarantee for their
currency against devaluation. Tobin laid out several different ways this could be
done, but they would all involve the U.S. selling gold for foreign exchange and
retiring dollar liabilities. Some European countries would also have to sell or buy
gold. Over time, the non-gold component of reserves would decrease, and the currencies
of the participating countries would increasingly share the burden borne
solely by the dollar. Removing the wide variations in gold ratios would make the
international monetary mechanism more predictable and manageable.
The President was keenly interested in these plans, and commissioned a small, inter-departmental
group from State, the CEA, and Treasury to come up with an outline
of an interim international monetary agreement based on Ball’s and Tobin’s ideas. The
group produced a plan that focused on protecting the American gold supply and
61. Presidential Recording, Tape 14, August 20, 1962: 4:00-5:30, International Monetary Relations,
Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Transcribed by F.J. Gavin.
62. Ball, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem”, p.14.
63. James Tobin, “A Gold Agreement Proposal”, July 24, 1962, Acheson Papers, State Department
and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance of Payments, 2-25-63, HSTL.

78
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
strengthening the dollar. The report claimed that cyclical forces would combine with
measures already taken to bring America’s balance of payments into equilibrium within
a few years. The heart of the plan was a proposed standstill agreement between the ten
members of the Paris Club and Switzerland whereby the participants would agree not to
convert the official dollar balances they held at the start of the agreement into gold. In
order to accommodate increases in the dollar balances of the participants over the two
years of the plan, $10 billion would be mobilized from a variety of financial sources.
This would include $1 billion of American gold sales, a massive $5 billion drawing on
the IMF, $2.5 billion in swaps and direct borrowings from Europe, and up to $1.5
billion in forward exchange operations taken by the Treasury department. 64
The purpose of this agreement was two-fold: to get the countries of Western
Europe to “extend more credit to the U.S. than they might voluntarily” and to
dampen speculative attacks on the dollar. Even with the plan in place, there were all
sorts of potential difficulties. The two years had to be used to eliminate the “basic”
deficit, and there would certainly be large-scale reshuffling and uncertainty when
the arrangement ended. To make the plan work, it had to be acceptable to the Europeans,
and in fact, had to be initiated by the Europeans, so that it did not look like
an act of American weakness. The report did not suggest how the Europeans could
be brought to accept let alone propose such a plan.
Walter Heller, the CEA chair, was extremely enthusiastic about the inter-departmental
plan. It would “eliminate the whims and prejudices of currency speculators
and bankers from the making of U.S. policy”. 65 The administration could end the
basic deficit in an orderly way, without deflation or drastic cuts in programs crucial
to American foreign policy. An international interim agreement would give the U.S.
far more protection than the techniques used by the Treasury department, which
were employed on a “secret, day-to-day, piecemeal, ad hoc basis”. 66 An interim
agreement would also give world leaders time to scrap the Bretton Woods regime
and come up with a world payments system which defended all currencies against
speculative attack, internationalized the burdens of providing international money,
and provided for an orderly increase in liquidity. Carl Kaysen, the National Security
Council officer responsible for international monetary affairs, and Kermit Gordon,
a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, went so far as to argue that devaluation
could remain a potentially profitable action to the United States, even after
the guarantee was paid off. 67
Douglas Dillon was infuriated by these analyses. In a cover memo to a report
written by Henry Fowler, Dillon claimed that Ball’s interim reserve scheme was
64. Memo for the President, “An Interim International Monetary Arrangement”, August 9, 1962,
Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance of
Payments, 2-25-63, HSTL.
65. Memo, Heller to the President, “Why we need an interim international monetary agreement”,
August 9, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol.IX, p.139.
66. Ibid., p.140.
67. Carl Kaysen and Kermit Gordon, Memo for the President, “Gold Guarantees”, July 18, 1962, UPA,
POF, Treasury, 25.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 79
simply a reflection of the State Department’s “reluctance to squarely tackle the
more difficult but fundamentally necessary job of obtaining a more adequate sharing
of the burden by our European friends”. 68 The Treasury Department argued that
Ball was treating the symptom, the gold outflow, and not the disease, the continuing
balance of payments deficit. The interim reserve scheme would give a green light to
“loosen up” on all the disciplines that the administration had established to cure the
payments imbalance. Fowler agreed that international balance of payments discussions
should be raised to the highest political level, but the focus should be on
increased burden sharing within NATO, not reserve composition. The U.S. balance
of payments would never move to equilibrium until the Europeans started paying a
greater share of NATO’s military costs. 69
Dillon was even more caustic in his attack on the interim agreement, despite the
fact that a Treasury representative, John Leddy, had helped write the report. In essence,
the actions proposed would close the gold window for $7.9 billion of official
dollar balances, an abandonment of traditional gold policy similar in scope to the
U.S. devaluation of 1933. 70 The Kennedy administration would be reneging on its
promise not to change its gold policy, which would shake private financial markets
and scare those countries not participating in the agreement. Dillon believed that
using the word “stand-still”, would evoke memories of the German standstill agreement
of 1931, an event associated with the world economic collapse. A formal gold
standstill arrangement would mean that “it would no longer be sensible” to “expect
foreign monetary authorities to continue to hold dollars as an international reserve
currency”, thereby eliminating the “important substantive advantages” the United
States enjoyed under the Bretton Woods system. 71 The plan assumed that the Europeans
would agree to such a scheme, an idea Dillon found preposterous despite
Giscard’s cooperation. The Secretary of the Treasury found an ally in Federal
Reserve Board Chairman William Martin, who said the plan for a standstill monetary
agreement would “hit world financial markets as a declaration of U.S. insolvency
and a submission to receivers to salvage”. 72
68. Dillon, Memo for the President, August 7, 1962, Acheson Papers, State Department and White
Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance of Payments, 2-25-63, HSTL.
69. Fowler, Memo for Dillon, “The Need to Couple High Level Political Negotiations for more Equitable
Burden Sharing Designed to Correct the U.S. Balance of Payments with any Political Negotiations
for Interim Arrangements Designed to Defend U.S. Gold Reserves”, August 7, 1962,
Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance of
Payments, 2-25-63. These memos indicated that the Treasury department had no idea how important
the American troops stationed in West Germany were to the stability and security of Europe.
70. Appraisal of Problems in the Proposal for an ‘Interim Monetary Arrangement’, August 16, 1962,
(no author given but included with a cover letter to Ball from W, N. Turpin, Dillon’s Special
Assistant), Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on the
Balance of Payments, 2-25-63.
71. Ibid., p.4-5.
72. William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System,
“Commentary on ‘An Interim International Monetary Arrangement’, Presented by Chairman
Martin”, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25, p.1.

80
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
Dillon also forwarded a report by his Under-Secretary, Robert Roosa, to rebut
the charge that Treasury’s actions had been ad hoc. Roosa argued that the agreements
that had been reached in the past two years between the U.S. and its allies
had been very successful. It had not been a policy of ad hoc expedients, as many
had claimed, but a well thought out and innovative plan to strengthen the Bretton
Woods system. It only appeared ad hoc because many of the discussions held between
financial officials were secretive. But the global payments system was much
better prepared to absorb the shocks of any future financial disturbance. The gold
pool, swap agreements, forward exchange operations, and increased IMF borrowing
privileges prepared the U.S. to meet any attack on the dollar. According to
Roosa, some of the ideas being discussed, both inside and outside the administration,
were foolish. Devaluation, gold guarantees or a gold standstill would damage
or destroy a world payments system that had greatly benefited the U.S. and its
allies. 73 Dillon believed these policies more appropriate for the currency of a
third-world country, not the U.S. and publicly tried to sabotage the idea. Kaysen
was infuriated when Dillon testified before the Joint Economic Committee on August
17 and called gold guarantees a “dangerous experiment”. The Secretary of the
Treasury called them “a poor idea and not to be seriously considered”. Dillon also
ruled out changing the value of the dollar. McGeorge Bundy was worried that
Dillon’s public statements would preclude the changes in international monetary
policy that they were considering. 74
Surprisingly, the reformers were unconcerned about Dillon’s contention that the
United States might lose the benefits of “seigneuriage” in a new international
monetary system. During a meeting on August 20, 1962, Ball told the President
that “we’re not persuaded that it is at all vital to the United States that we do return
to a situation in which the dollar would be the principal reserve currency …. We
can see many disadvantages as well as advantages”. Kennedy appeared to agree
with Ball’s analysis. “I see the advantages to the Western world to have a reserve
currency, and therefore it’s an advantage to us as part of the Western world, but
what is the national, narrow advantage”? When Dillon tried to spell out these benefits,
Kaysen pointedly asked “you wouldn’t describe this as an advantage right
now, would you Doug”? 75
The President seemed to side with the reformers against Dillon. Kennedy argued that
now was the time to negotiate a monetary agreement with the Europeans because “we
have much more political strength with them now then we’ll probably have two years
from now”. The Europeans “are much more dependent upon us militarily than they might
be” before they “get together” to organize their own defense. 76 The administration had to
73. Roosa, “The New Convertible Gold-Dollar System”, and Roosa, “International Liquidity”.
74. Bundy to Kaysen, August 21, 1962, NSF, Departments and Agencies, Treasury, 6/62 - 4/63, 289,
JFKL. Bundy asked Kaysen “Is Doug Dillon pinning us to his position by such public statements"?
75. Presidential Recording, Tape 14, August 20, 1962: 4:00-5:30, International Monetary Relations,
Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Transcribed by F.J. Gavin.
76. Presidential Recording, Tape 11, August 10, 1962: 11:20 – 12:30 p.m., International Monetary
Relations, Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Transcribed by F.J. Gavin.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 81
get the Europeans to agree that for “a two year period that they’re not going to ask” for
gold while “our balance of payments situation improves and while we work on other
arrangements”. 77 The President concluded that the administration should “pursue” the
gold standstill arrangement, “because I think this is really the area where we may be able
to make some progress”. Kennedy wanted the Europeans to agree that “they are all going
to go easy on the taking of gold”. 78
Kennedy dispatched Assistant Secretary of State C. Griffith Johnson and Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury John Leddy to sound out the possibilities of a European initiative
to limit foreign purchases of U.S. gold and to strengthen the international monetary
system. Kennedy suggested that an acceptable arrangement would be for the Common
Market countries and the U.K. each set an absolute target for gold holdings, as opposed
to a ratio, which could be controversial and might involve increasing the amount of
gold held by certain countries. Another solution would be to limit the amount of gold
taken from the U.S. to a small percentage, perhaps thirty percent, of the overall payments
deficit. But regardless of the plan, Kennedy insisted that it should look like a voluntary
European initiative. Any evidence of U.S. pressure could shake the confidence of
financial markets and lead to a run on American gold. 79
Giscard appeared ready to negotiate. While always wary of the British and any
“deals” between les Anglo-Saxons that excluded France, he did invite the G-10
finance ministers to participate in discussions at the upcoming IMF/World Bank
meeting. Anxious to maneuver without arousing de Gaulle’s intervention, he asked
the G-10 ministers to limit accompanying officials to two persons and to conduct
their meetings without publicity. 80 But even with these precautions, Giscard and the
Americans found it hard to engage in serious negotiations. For example, when Leddy
and Johnson asked Giscard what British Chancellor of Exchequer Maudling’s
thoughts were on the subject, Giscard replied that “the two were in agreement that
there should be high level secret discussions of the subject”. 81 Giscard did not tell
Johnson and Leddy what the “subject” actually was. Was it the hoped for initiative
to limit gold takings? Giscard would not say, and the American representatives
thought it imprudent to ask. Later, British representatives asked the Americans
what Giscard had said, and after being told, observed that “the whole affair was
mysterious”. ”.The next day, French officials said the same thing!
President Kennedy was scheduled to speak to the central bankers and finance
ministers of the G-10 at the IMF/World Bank meeting. The purpose of the meeting
was to tell the Europeans that the underlying cause of the American deficit was its
disproportionate share of Western military and aid expenditures. This group had
77. Tape 14, August 20, 1962.
78. Ibid.
79. Memo, President for the Secretary of the Treasury, The Under Secretary of State, and Chairman of
the CEA, August 24, 1962, NSF, Department and Agencies, Treasury, 6/62 - 4/63/ 289, JFKL.
80. Giscard d’Estaing to the finance ministers of the Group of 10, 12 September 1962, Direction des
Affaires économiques et financières, papiers directeurs: Olivier Wormser, vol.132: 347-350.
81. Memo from Dillon and Ball to the President, September 12, 1962, with attachment, Memo for
Dillon and Ball from Johnson and Leddy, September 10, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.146.

82
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
heard this message many times before, but the meeting would give the President
the chance, as Kaysen put it, to “give them a real feeling of how central it is to your
thinking. This is something that you can convey directly in a way no one else
can”. 82 Kaysen urged the President to tell his audience that the administration
recognized the fact that “there is more than one way the system might evolve in
relation to the central role of the dollar, and we do not foreclose consideration of
alternative schemes of improvement for the payments system”. 83 In other words,
the U.S. was not wedded to the Bretton Woods system and its supposed privileges.
A better system could be created that reflected the new economic strength of the
Europeans. This new system would give the Europeans an “expanded role in the international
monetary system”. 84
But could the administration act without the hoped for French or European initiative
suggested by Giscard? Dillon thought Kaysen’s strategy was far too risky.
“A statement by you that we are prepared to study new ideas and welcome new initiatives
would in all probability be misinterpreted … as indicating a lack of confidence on your part
in our ability to handle our balance of payments problem within the framework of the existing
monetary system. This could have dangerous and immediate effects this fall”. 85
Without a formal proposal from the French, Kennedy’s speech was closer to
Dillon’s than Kaysen’s approach, hinting that the administration was open to international
monetary discussions but offering no concrete American plans. The American
team adopted this position because of the fear that “open pressure on the French
might lead them to think that political questions could be successfully interjected”. 86
The momentum for monetary reform subsided considerably after the IMF meeting.
In the weeks ahead, the Kennedy administration’s attention turned to the far
more pressing matter of Soviet missiles in Cuba. By the time Kennedy returned to
the dollar and gold outflow issue, America’s political relations with France had
deteriorated markedly. 87 It no longer seemed that monetary cooperation was in the
cards. Kennedy again feared that a Franco-German political bloc would use its
surplus dollars to compel changes in America’s political strategies in Europe. 88
82. Memo, Kaysen to the President, September 18, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.149.
83. Ibid., p.149.
84. Ibid., p.149.
85. Memo, Dillon to Kennedy, September 18, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.152.
86. Ibid., p.146-147.
87. For details of the post-Nassau Franco-German revolt, see M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed
Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1999, pp.355-379.
88. For these fears in 1963, see F. GAVIN, The Gold Battles within the Cold War: American Monetary
Policy and the Defense of Europe, 1960-1963, in: Diplomatic History, forthcoming.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 83
Conclusion
France’s international monetary policy was, at least through 1962, far more cooperative
than the conventional wisdom holds. But this cooperative spirit was not to
last. Without assurances that other European nations would restrict “hoarding” of
gold, the French government began increasing its conversion of dollars. For each of
the first two quarters of 1963, the sale of U.S. gold to France was $101.1 million
dollars. 89 More importantly, after 1962, Rueff and others who were against monetary
cooperation with the Americans increased their influence with de Gaulle. In
February 1965, de Gaulle launched his famous attack on the dollar and its privileges
within the international monetary system. By January 1966, Giscard’s
influence had waned considerably and de Gaulle, who had come to view him as
insubordinate, forced him to resign.
Ironically, during the same period official American attitudes towards American
monetary reform became less timid. In 1962, the financially orthodox members of
his administration successfully slowed any bold American move towards international
monetary reform. But by 1963 and beyond, American officials became far
more interested in a whole-scale restructuring of the system. This striking shift in
American foreign economic policy was made evident in a speech Lyndon B. Johnson’s
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Fowler, gave before the Virginia Bar Association
on July 10, 1965.
“I am privileged to tell you this evening that the President has authorized me to announce
that the United States now stands prepared to attend and participate in an international
monetary conference which would consider what steps we might jointly take to secure
substantial improvements in international monetary arrangements”. 90
The Treasury Department, which three years earlier had gone to great lengths to
suppress any program of monetary reform, now warmly embraced it.
But with France and the United States in vehement disagreement over how to change
the global payments system, meaningful change was elusive. This Franco-American
monetary dispute during the 1960’s created a legacy of bitterness between the two countries
that lasted well beyond the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in August 1971. It
is quite possible that this enmity might have been avoided if the Kennedy administration
had embraced Giscard’s cooperative suggestions during the summer of 1962, or if
Giscard had offered a less vague proposal to reform international monetary relations.
In the long run, these disagreements may not have mattered, because the Bretton
Woods system was inherently flawed and not fixable. Given the explosion of international
capital flows during the 1960’s, market determined exchange rates were probably
inevitable. But it is important to note that the Kennedy administration was not wedded
89. United States Net Monetary Gold Transactions with Foreign Countries and International Institutions,
1 Jan. 1963-30 June 1963, Fonds Trésor, Vol.19, Relations monétaires - Etats-Unis,
1962-1978, cote Z9984, folder: Transactions d’or monétaire avec l’étranger.
90. "Remarks by the Honorable Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury, before the Virginia State
Bar Association at the Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, Saturday, July 10, 1965, 6:00 p.m.”, Papers
of Francis Bator, box 7, LBJ Library, p.10.

84
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
to the Bretton Woods system and felt more vulnerable than hegemonic under its rules.
While they were not sure what they wanted exactly, key officials, including President
Kennedy, were willing to contemplate fundamental changes to the system, even if this
meant sacrificing the dollar’s central role in the global payments system. What is
perhaps even more surprising is that the French were not monolithically determined to
oppose the Americans in this area in the early 1960’s. Even de Gaulle was open to
options that went beyond a pure gold standard, as long as the “exorbitant privileges” of
the dollar were curtailed. 91 In the end, to characterize America and France’s attitudes
towards the Bretton Woods system in terms of hegemony or empire is a vast oversimplification.
There were ambiguities and contradictions in policies on both sides of
the Atlantic, as both sides struggled to understand how to pursue their narrower national
interests without precipitating a worldwide monetary calamity. The story behind the
gold standstill forces us to reconsider not just Franco-American relations, but also the
often misunderstood relationship between international monetary policy and transatlantic
political developments during the “crucial decade” of the 1960s.
91. See G. GRIN, L’évolution du système monétaire international dans les années 1960: les positions
des économistes Robert Triffin et Jacques Rueff, in Relations Internationales, no. 100, winter
1999, p.389.

Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict and
Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy, 1965-1973
85
Hubert Zimmermann
I. Disenchantment and Défi 1
During his brief presidency, John F. Kennedy spent almost as much time in Western
Europe as his two immediate successors combined. His tours through European
capitals invariably drew cheering crowds and created a lasting image in which the
American leader incorporated not only the American dream but also the inclusion
of Europe in a transatlantic community which was symbolised by modernity, technological
progress and economic prosperity. Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard
Nixon rarely went to Europe, and if they did so, the reception was often cool. Frequently
they were greeted by protesters. When Kennedy affirmed in a ringing
speech in Philadelphia on Independence Day 1962 that America was “prepared to
discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic
partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging
in Europe and the old American union founded here 173 years ago”, politicians
all over Europe (except for France) congratulated the president. 2 Henry A. Kissinger’s
grandiose pronouncement of a “Year of Europe” in 1973 was mostly met
with disbelief and scorn. 3 Certainly, personality goes a long way in explaining such
a difference; however, the contrast also denotes a dramatic change in European
attitudes towards the United States. Of course, serious European-American
conflicts also existed during the Kennedy administration, but they paled in comparison
with the mutual disenchantment of the 1970s.
How is this shift to be explained? Many analysts assume that it was a consequence
of basic structural change, that is the re-emergence of a Europe which was
more inclined and able to pursue its own interests, even if this resulted in a conflict
with the U.S. Additionally, they point to an alleged American decline. Such an interpretation
justifies Nixon’s and Kissinger’s assertive policy towards Europe as a
defensive reaction. 4 Other commentators stress the impact of more specific reasons
such as LBJ’s and Nixon’s mistakes in handling their allies, 5 the consequences of
Vietnam or the American neglect of Europe in favour of great power diplomacy
1. For comments and helpful suggestions I would like to thank M. Trachtenberg, G. Schmidt and L. Sebesta.
2. Kennedy, Public Papers (thereafter: PP), 1962, p.538.
3. Text of the speech, in: Department of State Bulletin, I/1973, pp.593-598. For the European reaction
see, R. E. POWASKI, The Entangling Alliance. The U.S. and European Security, 1950-1993,
Westport, 1994, pp.102-104.
4. C. HACKE, Die Ära Nixon-Kissinger, Stuttgart, 1983, pp.178-179.
5. J.R. SCHAETZEL, The Unhinged Alliance, New York, 1975.

86
Hubert Zimmermann
with the Soviet Union and China. 6 The argument here is not that these factors were
unimportant, but rather that such interpretations do not adequately capture the essence
of what was going on in European-American relations at that time. The early
1970s were a period of major reshuffling in the relations between the Western
countries. The cards were re-mixed and the rules of the game were reformulated.
These changes become very clear when one shifts one’s emphasis away from
the usual concentration on the ‘high politics’ of defense and grand strategy to the
supposed ‘low politics’ of monetary relations and technology. Structural change in
those two fields, and the way it was handled in Europe and the U.S., was decisive
for the shifting power relations of the 1970s and beyond. These fields are not
merely to be considered as of secondary importance, that is, as epiphenomena
which reflected what went on at the high political level 7 ; on the contrary, these
processes often led to major political reorientations, such as the Europeanisation of
French and British foreign policies in the late 1960s or the dissolution of transatlantic
cooperation at the same time. Different methods in the way monetary and
technological issues were handled and intensified cooperation in these two fields
might have led to a qualitatively different relationship between the United States
and the economically re-emerging Europe. There might even have been a direct
trade-off between the two realms, as Washington struggled with a dollar deficit and
the Europeans worried about their technological dependence. In 1966, for example,
the Italian foreign minister Fanfani presented the idea of a technological Marshall
plan in which European payments for American advanced technology would have
wiped out a substantial part of the American balance of payments deficit. 8 However,
neither transatlantic monetary nor technological cooperation advanced after
1966; things in fact moved in exactly the opposite direction.
The closing of the gold-window by Nixon in August 1971 signalled the end of the
so-called Bretton Woods monetary system. Already in the mid-1960s, the system had
balanced on the verge of collapse. European and American views on monetary affairs
diverged increasingly, and when, at the European summit in The Hague at the end of
1969, the EC-countries decided to embark on the road to a common currency, this
was a clear sign that they strove for more independence from the dollar and that the
transatlantic monetary system was about to be abolished. How and why did Americans
and Europeans allow the system to disintegrate?
The publication of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’ s best-seller Le Défi américain
(Paris 1967) was another event which stands as a symbol for a fundamental
6. ”Western Europe had to remain an ally because its safety and prosperity provided the United States
with essential trump cards in dealing with the USSR, but even this suggested that an end-in-itself
had become a tool”. S. HOFFMANN, Uneven Allies, in: D. LANDES (ed.), Critical Choices for
Americans, VIII: Western Europe, Lexington, 1977, p.64.
7. See for example: S. HERSH, The Price of Power, New York, 1985; S. BROWN, The Crises of
Power, New York, 1979; R.S. LITWAK, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, Cambridge, 1984.
8. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Meyer-Lindenberg: Italienische Initiative für internationale
Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der Technologie, 29.9.1966; Politisches Archiv – Auswärtiges
Amt (thereafter: PA-AA), I A 6/83.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 87
change in transatlantic relations. Servan-Schreiber urged European politicians to
react vigorously to American technological superiority; otherwise Europe would
soon be completely dependent on the U.S. in the most advanced fields of modern
technology. He proposed that the Europeans join their national programs in an
attempt to match American pre-eminence. However, was it not more rational for
European nations to collaborate with the powerful partner across the Atlantic and to
benefit from technological spin-off? And yet, at the end of the 1960s, all European
countries exhibited a clear preference for European programmes.
What had happened to Kennedy’s vision of transatlantic interdependence? I argue
that the lost chances in monetary and technological relations were the results of conscious
policy decisions which signalled the end of a specific framework of transatlantic
partnership based on cooperation and produced a new quality for mutual
relations, now based on competition. This had major consequences beyond the
1970s. One of the most important of those was a new impetus to European integration.
The American challenge in the monetary and technological field helped to reinforce
Europe’s identity. Or in other words, the assertive American policy in the late
1960s, culminating in the Nixon-Kissinger period, had the same kind of effect on the
European unification process as the hegemonic U.S. policy in the early 1950s. 9
II. The Erosion of the Transatlantic Partnership
a) Changing Patterns of Transatlantic Monetary Policy
The central features of the post-war monetary order in the Western world, usually
called Bretton Woods system 10 , are well-known: the core role of the dollar to the
value of which the other currencies participating in the system were pegged; the
dollar-gold link which provided a guarantee of the dollar’s value and was coupled
with the promise that other nations could cash in their surplus dollars for $35/ounce
at the U.S. treasury; institutionalised cooperation among the major industrial economies
to keep exchange rates stable and shield their domestic economies from the
impact of unexpected movements in financial markets. Less well-known is the
strongly political character of this system. It was based on an unintended ‘bargain’
between Europe and the USA. 11 Whereas in the 1950s the U.S. profited from the
9. On the latter argument, see the article by M. TRACHTENBERG and C. GEHRZ in this issue.
10. In fact, the monetary system of the post-war period differed in important aspects, particularly regarding
the core role of the dollar, from what had been agreed at Bretton Woods. See: R.I.
MCKINNON, The Rules of the Game: International Money in Historical Perspective, in: Journal
of Economic Literature, March 1993, pp.1–44.
11. On the notion of a bargain, see also: B. COHEN, The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations:
A Bargain Comes Unstuck, in: W. HANRIEDER (ed.), The U.S. and Western Europe, Cambridge,
1974, pp.116-118. A very good discussion of these links is H. van B. CLEVELAND, The Atlantic
Idea and its European Rivals, New York et al., 1966, pp.72-87.

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reserve role of the dollar insofar as it allowed the Americans to finance its huge
Cold War effort without having to worry about its external balance, Europe
acquired credit for the huge post-war investment needed to re-build its industries.
The resulting American balance of payments deficits were no problem as long as
the Europeans had an economic interest in accumulating surplus dollars. This situation
changed in the late 1950s and a serious problem emerged. If the Europeans
transferred back to the U.S. treasury the surplus dollars which accrued to them (due
to an undiminished American military presence in Europe, growing investments by
U.S. industries in the Common Market and a diminishing American trade surplus),
the American dollar gold exchange guarantee, and with it confidence in the dollar
as the world’s core currency, would soon be undermined. A real reversal of
American deficits, however, would have required from the U.S. government such
unpalatable policies as a retrenchment of the military effort in Europe, limitations
on U.S. investments or restrictive trade policies. Only very few politicians in
Europe wanted to provoke such reactions. They still agreed with the basic thrust of
American economic and security policies. Therefore, they acceded to American
requests to prolong the ‘bargain’ by continuing to hold surplus dollars. This cooperation,
however, rested on two conditions: that the Americans, as issuer of the
reserve currency, managed their domestic economy and their external commitments
in a way which would not undermine the dollar’s value, and that there was a
large degree of agreement on basic economic and political goals among the partners
on both sides of the Atlantic.
The American commitment to get their balance of payments under control
required difficult negotiations with their partners and costly interventions in currency
markets. However, the advantages of the system were considered large enough
to offset the inconvenience of regular consultation. On the burden and benefits of
having a reserve currency, Secretary of Treasury Dillon wrote to Kennedy:
“To date, foreign countries and their nationals acquired nearly $20 billion in dollar
accounts. This is, in effect, a demand loan to us of $20 billion which has allowed us
to pursue policies over the years that would have been utterly impossible had not the
dollar been a key currency”. 12
In a discussion with the president, undersecretary of Treasury Robert V. Roosa was
even more explicit when he emphasised that the role of the dollar made
“it possible for us to, year in and year out, and apart from situations that get completely
out of whack such as we’ve had year in and year out, to finance every deficit we may
run very readily, because you have the world accustomed to holding dollars. When you
run behind for a year you don’t have to negotiate a credit, they just hold dollars”. 13
Of course, the U.S. government shared with the Europeans a major interest in preserving
the dollar-consuming security commitment in Europe, though certainly not
for eternity and in a size it considered excessive. However, as long as the Europeans
supported the dollar there would be no immediate need to change this situation. This
12. Memorandum of 11.2.1963; FRUS 1961-3, IX, p.164.
13. John F. Kennedy Library, Tape No.14, Meeting on International Monetary Relations, 20.8.1962.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 89
was the background of those numerous multilateral initiatives which were taken by
the major industrial countries (including France) 14 in the early 1960s to shore up the
system. Proposals by the European Commission (1962) or by French finance minister
Giscard d’ Estaing for a European currency (1964) were either ignored or dismissed
as completely unrealistic. 15 Both the German and the French government made no
secret of their disapproval for such plans, and Giscard even lost his post in 1966.
Thus, the working of the international monetary system still rested on a basic political
understanding among the countries of the transatlantic alliance.
However, the policy of ‘peripheral defences’ for the dollar, which was devised
by the Kennedy administration, 16 did not resolve the problem. In the mid-1960s, it
became increasingly difficult to keep the balance of payments deficits under control.
The first reason for this was Vietnam. In February 1965, President Johnson ordered
the bombing of North Vietnam. In July of the same year he decided that an
additional contingent of 50.000 men would be sent to South East Asia. The War
was americanised and continued to absorb more and more of the government’s attention
in the years that followed. America’s European allies reacted with alarm to
this development. They had great doubts about the theory that the new Cold War
border lay in South East Asia and feared that the conflict diverted American energies
away from Europe which to them still was the principal theatre of the
East-West conflict. 17 Therefore they were rather dismissive when the Americans
called for direct help on the battlefield, especially since the war proved to be extremely
unpopular not only with the European governments but also with the electorate.
Even the country which publicly supported the Vietnam War most emphatically
did not react to a strong call by the Johnson government for direct help. 18
Asked by LBJ in January 1966 what contribution Germany had made, Secretary of
Defence Robert McNamara grumbled: “Not a damn thing except a hospital ship”, –
although the Americans had made strong efforts to get at least a token contingent of
combat troops. 19
The U.S. government soon realised that direct European involvement was out of
the question. However, that led them to insist with growing vigour on co-operation in
international monetary policy. The war effort had led to a sharp increase in military
expenditure abroad (which had always been a major factor in American balance of
payments deficits). 20 Even more detrimental to the external balance was Johnson’s
14. See the article by F. GAVIN and E. MAHAN in this issue.
15. K. DYSON and K. FEATHERSTONE, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic and
Monetary Union, Oxford, 1999, pp.101-102; 274-276.
16. On this policy, by one of its principal architects: R. ROOSA, The Dollar & World Liquidity, New
York, 1967.
17. A. GROSSER, The Western Alliance. European-American Relations since 1945, London, 1980,
pp.237-243.
18. U.S. Aide-Memoire to the FRG, 6.7.1964, G. McGhee Papers (Georgetown University), 1988
add., Box 1.
19. FRUS 1964-68, II, Telephone Conversation Johnson – McNamara, 17.1.1966, p.80.
20. For figures see: C.E. SHEPLER and L.G. CAMPBELL, United States Defense Expenditure
Abroad, in: Survey of Current Business, December 1969, p.44.

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unwillingness to increase taxes in order to neutralise rising public expenditure in connection
with the war and the Great Society programs. Thus, inflation started to undermine
the dollar. Paul Volcker, Nixon’s undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary
Affairs, later wrote that Vietnam “was the period when inflation really gained momentum
in the United States and threatened to spread to Europe too, and if we weren’t
willing to finance the war properly, then maybe we shouldn’t have fought it at
all”. 21 Another serious problem for the monetary system was the seed of discord the
war planted in the Atlantic Alliance at a crucial moment. Confronted with Europe’s
unwillingness to extend direct support in Vietnam, the U.S. government in private and
Congress in public increasingly questioned the continuation of America’s troop commitment
in Europe. 22 The basic common political understanding among Europeans
and Americans was coming unstuck.
Furthermore, there was the ‘de Gaulle problem’. In February 1965, the French
president in his campaign against American domination had thrown down the
gauntlet in the monetary field. He denounced the transatlantic monetary system as
an unfair deal, which allowed America to finance its external commitments and to
buy up European industries by simply printing dollars. Therefore he invited all industrial
countries to follow France and exchange all of their dollars for gold in order
to bring the system down. 23 Nobody followed his example, but the impression
that America was not doing enough to bring its own house in order and thus endangering
the international monetary system was widespread in Europe.
In 1965, the Americans realised that it was not possible to save the post-war international
monetary structure by small piecemeal steps, especially because they
knew that Vietnam was wrecking U.S. external balances for the foreseeable future
to a degree which better remained hidden to the public. 24 A comprehensive reform
was necessary. A major political issue relating to this reform was how such a new
system would accommodate the call of a resurgent Europe for a greater voice in the
creation and management of international reserves. This would have been an extremely
contested issue even in times of a perfectly working alliance. The growing
distrust about future U.S. policy in Vietnam and the suspicion voiced in many quarters
that Washington was financing the war by printing dollars made that task even
more difficult. Secretary of Treasury Henry Fowler had the ingenious idea of proposing
a standstill agreement as long as the Vietnam conflict was going on:
“I propose that we give serious consideration to asking the key dollar-holding
nations (…) to pledge not to convert dollars they presently hold and not to convert
any additional dollars [emphasis in original] that may accrue to them as long as the
Vietnam struggle continues. To accomplish this, we will have to state in the strongest
possible terms that: 1. We most emphatically do intend to bring our balance of payments
into equilibrium. 2. The Vietnam War, with its attendant direct and indirect
balance of payments costs, has made it difficult for us to do this as soon as we hoped.
21. P. VOLCKER and T. GYOOHTEN, Changing Fortunes, New York, 1992, p.62.
22. P. WILLIAMS, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe, New York, 1985.
23. C. DE GAULLE, Discours et Messages, vol. 4, Paris, 1970, p.332.
24. FRUS 1964-68, VIII, Memorandum by Fowler to Johnson, 10.5.1966, pp.269-270.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 91
But we will do it. 3. We are bearing virtually the entire burden of the Vietnam conflict.
We view this as commitment on behalf of all free nations. We do not ask others
to see it this way, but we do ask that they not act in a manner that will prevent us
from meeting our commitments and/or destroy the international financial institutions
that are such a vital part of the world we are attempting to defend”. 25
This meant that Europe would have to continue extending credit to the U.S., and
would have to forego its principal element of control over America’s management
of its reserve currency. Instead it was asked to trust to an unbinding promise that
the Americans would manage to control their deficits in a way which avoided a
breakdown of the system. There is no evidence that a formal proposal along these
lines was made in early 1966 but the Americans left no doubt that this was the
policy they expected their allies to follow.
Indeed, hardly eight months later, a core country had to decide whether it would
sign such a temporary limitation of its monetary authority. In the context of negotiations
about the cost of American troops in Germany, the U.S. side proposed that the
Federal Republic sign a pledge not to exchange dollars for gold. Since the early
1960s it had been one of the most important mechanisms of monetary help for the
U.S. that Bonn, in the so-called ‘offset’ agreements, bought American weapons to
offset the foreign exchange losses occasioned by the U.S. military presence in the
FRG. 26 When the German government decided in 1966 that it no longer needed to
buy American weapons, this practice ran into enormous difficulties. Relentless pressure
by LBJ and McNamara to continue ‘offset’ , and the serious threat of American
troop withdrawal, played a considerable role in chancellor Erhard’s fall from power
in October 1966. The trilateral negotiations at the beginning of 1967 (which included
the United Kingdom, which also had a major balance of payments problem linked
politically to the British troop presence in Germany) essentially concerned the question
of whether the transatlantic bargain in which the Americans provided military
security and the Germans monetary support would be reaffirmed once more. Due to
the overriding importance of American military protection, the German government
pressed Bundesbank president Blessing to agree to what the Americans were asking
for; he reluctantly went along with government policy, and in the so-called Blessing
letter, the Bundesbank pledged to continue supporting the dollar. 27
This episode of brinkmanship doubtlessly created deep resentment in Germany,
as later remarks by Blessing show. Blessing stated that he rather should have started
cashing in dollars for gold at that time, until the U.S. Treasury was driven to desperation.
28 The ministers in the German cabinet were unanimous in their critique of
Washington’s monetary policy; however, they also agreed that the French policy
25. Ibid., pp.274–275.
26. For a detailed history of these agreements see: H. ZIMMERMANN, Money and Security. Monetary
Policy and Troops in Germany’s Relations to the U.S. and the United Kingdom, 1955-71,
Cambridge, 2001 (forthcoming).
27. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Harkort, 6.3.1967, PA-AA, B 150/1967.
28. L. BRAWAND, Wohin steuert die deutsche Wirtschaft?, München, 1971, p.61.

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was not viable. 29 Therefore, they stuck to the transatlantic bargain in the hope that a
quiet reform of the monetary system might still be in the cards. 30 Frustrated by
American policy as well as by the rigidity of the French position, the Germans
developed an increasing penchant for unilateral action in the monetary field.
Frustration with the U.S. also ran high in other European countries but, apart from
France, cooperation with the Americans was still the preferred option. 31 The British
were completely wedded to the defence of the pound as a reserve currency and this
caused an increasing dependence on American monetary support. 32 The smaller
industrial states were closely linked either to the U.S. or to England in security or
economic terms, and in any case were too weak to advocate an alternative monetary
system.
Despite the increasingly tense situation on currency questions from late 1967
onward, the Johnson administration did not start a vigorous and acceptable programme
for international monetary reform. 33 Waiting out the Vietnam War and the
corresponding inflation was the strategy, always in the hope that the Europeans
would continue to play the game. During the trilateral negotiations, presidential advisor
Francis Bator outlined the thrust of the American policy at the end of the
Johnson-administration:
“There is no hope for any sort of new 100 % military offset deal with the Germans. However,
we may be able to get them to agree to financial steps which would be far more valuable.
Specifically: – that they will not use their dollars, old or new, to buy gold; – that
they will join us in pushing the other Europeans, ex-France, to agree to the same sort of
rules; – to support us against France in negotiations on longer-range monetary reform; –
to neutralise the military imbalance by buying and holding securities which would count
against our balance of payments deficit. If we can also get the Italians, Dutch and the Belgians,
as well as the U.K., Canada, Japan, to play by such rules we will have negotiated
the world onto a dollar standard. It will mean recognition of the fact that, for the time
being, the U.S. must necessarily play banker of the world …”. 34
The consequence of such a step was that
“… we will no longer need to worry about reasonable balance of payments deficits.
This arrangement will not give us an unlimited printing press. But as long as we run
our economy as responsible as in the past few years, it will permit us to live with
29. Auszüge aus dem Protokoll der Kabinettssitzung vom 27. März 1969, PA-AA, IIIA1/611. In early
1967, the German government discussed the possibility of supporting de Gaulle’s call for a change
in the price of gold as expressed in dollars and very guardedly informed the French that they were
not dead set against consideration of such a step. The Blessing letter prevented this policy from
being further explored. See: Wirtschaftsminister Schiller an Kanzler Kiesinger, 12.1.1967,
PA-AA, IIIA1/180.
30. AA Aufzeichnung zur Internationalen Währungspolitik, 5.2.1969, PA-AA, IIIA5/610.
31. Finanzminister Dahlgrün to Außenminister Schröder: Ergebnis des EG-Finanzministertreffens am
20./21. Juni 1966, 7.7.1966, ibid.
32. H. ZIMMERMANN, The Sour Fruits of Victory: Sterling and Security in Anglo-German Relations
during the 1950s and 1960s, in: Contemporary European History, 2/2000, pp. 225-43.
33. R.M. COLLINS, The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Waning of the American Century, in: American
Historical Review, April 1996, pp.396-422.
34. Bator to President: U.S. Position in the Trilateral Negotiations, 23.2.1967, LBJL, Bator Papers, Box 4.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 93
moderate deficits indefinitely. It will be the ideal transition arrangement until Joe
Fowler’s major liquidity reform goes into effect”. 35
The actual transformation of the system to a pure dollar standard happened in
March 1968 when, after a heavy wave of gold speculation, the major industrial
countries decided to split up the gold market in an official and a private market.
Belgium, Germany, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland agreed to no
longer demand gold from the U.S. The transatlantic system was on the brink of collapse
because the Europeans were increasingly relegated to a policy of merely
reacting to what the U.S. was doing; Europe was unable to play a major role in the
co-management of the system, a role which corresponded to its economic weight.
The hopes of saving the system concentrated on the liquidity reform which Bator
had mentioned. These talks had been initiated in 1965, and were to result in the
so-called Special Drawing Rights, a form of reserve currency which was to relieve
the pressure on the dollar. 36 However, the conflict between Europe and the U.S.
regarding decisions about the new reserve medium and voting rights in the IMF
impeded any fast progress. Washington refused to accord Europe a veto right on the
new reserve medium, fearing that this would give France the ability to block any
American initiative. 37 Essentially, the U.S. was not ready to give up the role of the
banker of the world, as long as the Europeans had no means to force them to do so.
When the SDR agreement was finally signed in 1968, the result amounted to much
less than a real overhaul of the system.
Thus in 1968, the transatlantic monetary bargain was in deep trouble and the
Europeans began to look for alternatives. Certainly, their internal divisions, and
particularly the uncompromising position of France, had played a big role in the
failure of reform. Still, the major responsibility lay with the U.S. Less by deliberate
action than by neglect and due to the inflexibility caused by the Vietnam War, the
Johnson administration had allowed the system to disintegrate almost to a point of
no return. The year 1969, however, seemed to open the prospect of a fresh start. A
new president, Nixon, was installed in January; in April, the main adversary of the
transatlantic monetary system, de Gaulle, left the stage. The core question now was
how the reform of the monetary system (or the transition to a new system) would
be managed: in a cooperative manner or in a way which was setting both sides on a
collision course?
b) A Transatlantic Technological Community?
The Grand Design of a European-American transatlantic community contained the
notion of progressiveness which in the 1960s was clearly associated with the field
of high technology. It is therefore quite striking how limited the actual extent of
35. Bator to President, 8.3.1967, LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50.
36. On these negotiations: S. COHEN, International Monetary Reform 1964-1969, London, 1977.
37. Embassy Washington to AA, 27.6.1967, PA-AA, B 150/1967.

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technological cooperation between Europe and America was at the end of the decade
and beyond. What were the reasons?
Probably the most sensitive issue in transatlantic relations of the 1960s was the
problem of European participation in American nuclear planning and its access to
advanced U.S. nuclear weapons. The debate concerned not only questions of national
power and international security. It was in its essence also a contest for access
to the most prestigious technology of the time. In the second half of the century
nuclear technology was seen as the key for the wealth of nations. America’s top
position in every aspect of this technology was a core element of its pre-eminence
in international political life. As a result, Washington’s partners depended on
American decisions on the most vital questions of their national existence. No
wonder, that this situation caused deep apprehensions, even during the honeymoon
years of the alliance. The attempt by countries such as Britain, France, Germany or
Italy to forge deals with the U.S. in order to close this yawning technological gap
was at the core of the nuclear debate in the alliance. 38
During Eisenhower’ s presidency, nuclear cooperation with the allies was encouraged
by the government. Collaboration with the United Kingdom was in any
case well developed, though beset with misunderstandings on both sides. 39 The
British attempt to preserve its nuclear autonomy led, however, to increasing dependence
on American technology, particularly regarding launchers. Nuclear sharing
with France, Germany and the smaller members of the alliance was a much
more contested issue, although the Eisenhower administration was ready in principle
to move forward in this area, too. 40 Doubts in the State Department about the
wisdom of a policy supporting several independent nuclear capabilities, particularly
if this meant German access to atomic weapons, led to the proposal of a nuclear
force assigned to NATO. Negotiations about what would later be called the Multilateral
Force (MLF) were begun in 1960; the U.S. goal was ultimately to give a
united Europe a nuclear force under its own control. The American readiness to
share know-how and resources also included the civil uses of nuclear energy.
Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program of 1953 was an ambitious proposal for the
controlled dissemination of know-how regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 41
In 1958, the U.S. signed an agreement with EURATOM (the newly founded European
organisation for collaboration in nuclear research), which ensured the supply
of American enriched uranium for European reactors. However, there was a little
snag to this deal: most of those reactors were built under American licence and depended
on American supply of uranium. For this reason France, which developed
38. On this well-covered topic: B. HEUSER, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies
& Forces for Europe, London, 1998; M. TRACHTENBERG, History & Strategy, Princeton, 1991.
39. In 1958, both countries signed an agreement for ‘Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for
Mutual Defence’. Cmnd. 537, HMSO 1958.
40. This whole story is extensively analysed by M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace, Princeton,
1999, particularly chapters V and VI.
41. J. MANZIONE, Amusing and Amazing and Practical and Military: The Legacy of Scientific Internationalism
in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1963, in: Diplomatic History, 24/2000, pp.47-49.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 95
its own line of reactors based on natural uranium, saw no use in this agreement and
soon came to consider EURATOM a failure. 42 This was an early instance of the
mix of political rivalry, commercial interest and industrial competition which was
to plague transatlantic technological cooperation all through the 1960s.
With the advent of the Kennedy administration a decisive policy change
occurred: the readiness in principle of the U.S. to share civil and military nuclear
technology was slowly reversed. The risks of nuclear proliferation, especially to
Germany which propagated an anti-Status-Quo policy towards the Eastern bloc,
were deemed too high. Initially, Kennedy and McNamara were not sure about the
wisdom of a strict non-proliferation policy because of its corrosive effect on the
alliance 43 and because the sale of hardware might bring in considerable economic
benefit, for example balance of payments gains. 44 In effect, the above-mentioned
offset agreements with Germany were to a large extent a deal trading German monetary
help for the sale of U.S. advanced military technology. Nuclear weapons were
excluded despite discreet German requests. 45 Finally, however, in 1964, non-proliferation
became official government policy. 46 What was ruled out included “exchanges
of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment,
joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial
and commercial organisations …”. 47 The shift in policy that started in 1961 had a
very negative effect on cooperation in a number of other fields, as the U.S. ambassador
in Paris, Gavin, explained in a letter to Kennedy:
“France will spend at least $700 million to build a gaseous diffusion plant which will
produce enriched uranium by 1965. We sell enriched uranium to the United Kingdom.
We have failed to give France any assistance in building a nuclear submarine
despite secretary Dulles’ offer to do so to de Gaulle in 1958. We are asking France to
help us in redressing our balance of payments by making more military purchases in
the United States, but we will not sell the very items France wants because they are
associated with modern weapons systems”. 48
Gavin cited the danger that this pattern of non-cooperation might spill over to the
whole economic field. The subsequent American decision to refuse the sale of an
42. R. GILPIN, France in the Age of the Scientific State, Princeton, 1968, p.406.
43. The famous Nassau meeting in December 1962 resulted in an offer of U.S. nuclear help to both the
U.K. and France. For the key documents see: FRUS 1961-63, XIII. However, due to deep doubts
within the American administration about this policy and de Gaulle’s press conference of 13 January
1963, in which he openly challenged the U.S., this option was not carried through.
44. See for example the discussion among JFK, McNamara, Rusk and Bundy on April 16, 1962; FRUS
1961-63, XIII, pp.377-80.
45. For German interest in advanced rocket technology and nuclear warheads: H. ZIMMERMANN,
F.J. Strauß und der deutsch-amerikanische Währungskonflikt, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte,
47/1999, pp.63-67.
46. M. TRACHTENBERG, Constructed Peace, p.307-308.
47. Declassified Documents Reference System (thereafter: DDRS), 1999, Doc. 2312, National
Security Action Memorandum 294: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to
France, 20.4.1964.
48. FRUS 1961-63, XIII, Gavin to JFK, 9.3.1962, p. 687. Gavin was promptly rebuffed by the Department
of State. See: ibid., Ball to Gavin, 14.3.1962, p.688.

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advanced computer system which might have helped France’s nuclear programme
made the new American policy very obvious. 49 Though this policy was directed
mainly against France, the other members of the Alliance received no better treatment.
In early 1965, a government committee, chaired by former Deputy Secretary
of Defense Gilpatric, recommended in a classified report to tie the strings attached
to all exports related to nuclear technology even tighter. 50 The MLF receded more
and more into the background and was kept alive only by the need to assuage
Germany. The long-term objective was to force even the British out of the nuclear
business, or at least getting a NATO cover for its atomic arsenal.
Soon the Americans started negotiations with the Soviet Union to implement
this restrictive policy on a global level. The nuclear test ban treaty of August 1963
was the first step. However, far more important was the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) of 1968. Non-nuclear members of the alliance realised that this treaty was
destined to keep them permanently out of the nuclear weapons business. But apart
from the political aspects of the possession of nuclear weapons – a key element of
the question for hard-liners in Germany not willing to give up the idea of a national
nuclear capability–another serious issue was technology. Would the NPT also inhibit
the spread of nuclear technology in the civil field? Would it endanger at some
later point the continuation of the 1958 agreement between EURATOM and the
United States which presently ran until 1975? 51 This turned out to be one of the
major worries of countries such as Germany and Italy which were completely dependent
on American deliveries of enriched uranium. Very quickly, these countries
started to look for alternatives.
Thus, in this key technological area, the NATO allies had turned away from real
collaboration during the 1960s. This situation was to spill over into other fields. An
important case in point is the development of advanced military technology. The
priority the Pentagon under McNamara accorded to the sale of military equipment
for balance of payments reasons impeded every possibility of large-scale technological
cooperation between the U.S. and Europe. The huge project of the F-104G
Starfighter, the principal fighter of the Alliance built from 1959 on under American
49. On this and other episodes illustrating the restrictive policy of the American government vis-à-vis
France, see: E.A. KOLODZIEJ, French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou. The
Politics of Grandeur, Ithaca, 1974, pp.79-82.
50. NEW YORK TIMES, 12.2.1965. This policy was emphasised in a programmatic article by the Director
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency who argued for a “more widespread, and
stricter, application of controls to the traffic in fissionable material and to the technology which
may be useful either for peaceful or military purposes”; see: W. C. FOSTER, New Directions in
Arms Control, in: Foreign Affairs, 43/1965, p.592.
51. On these doubts: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (thereafter:
AAPD) 1967, bearb, J. KLÖCKLER et.al., III, Doc. 419, Kiesinger to LBJ, 7.12.1967,
pp.1606-1607; AAPD 1968, bearb. M. LINDEMANN/M. PETER, I, Doc. 140, Aufzeichnung von
Ministerialdirektor Ruete: NPT; Belieferung von EURATOM mit spaltbarem Material, 24.4.1968,
pp.508-509; see also: AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 242, Gespräch zwischen Außenminister Brandt und
dem italienischen Außenminister Medici, 1.8.1968, p.946.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 97
licence by a group of European countries, found no successor in the 1960s. 52 On
the contrary, the American policy was to “move promptly to make sure that European
countries place orders now for U.S. manufactured equipment, rather than
make plans to meet their needs from their own production or from other foreign
sources”. 53 The sales offensive was mainly directed towards Germany, the most important
arms market of the 1960s. In effect, German armed forces became increasingly
dependent on U.S. weapons. The need to continue the offset agreements
sharply curtailed German funds for shared weapons developments with other partners.
54 Despite the enormous amounts involved in these deals, no successful joint
German-American project was agreed to. The only significant project, the joint
development of a main battle tank for the 1970s (agreed in 1964), was stopped in
1970 due to the mutual lack of funds and interest. 55 This was no exception: there
were no major American collaboration projects with other allies either. The commercial
interest of the arms industry and the Pentagon, as well as the lack of political
initiative in the U.S. government, were the major factors in the conspicuous
absence of American proposals.
Apart from nuclear weapons, space technology was the most prestigious field of
scientific exploits in the 1960s. Again, collaboration between European and American
programmes was extremely sketchy. Although the Europeans had set up a European
Space Research Organisation (ESRO) in 1962, 56 it was the Soviet Union to
which, in September 1963, in a speech before the UN General Assembly, Kennedy
proposed a joint effort in space research, – with few practical consequences. 57 In
meetings of LBJ with the German chancellor in 1965 and 1966, the desirability of
joint projects in space research was given prominent mention; however, this clearly
derived from American hopes to explore new ways of offsetting the foreign exchange
cost of American troops in Europe, and thus the idea was not pursued when
it became clear that the prospects of commercial and monetary benefit for the U.S.
were small. 58 The close links between the nuclear and the space programme limited
the available options anyway. 59 American restrictions on the export of key technol-
52. The missile systems "Hawk" (1959-1965) and "Sidewinder" (1960-1965) were further European
constructions licensed from the Americans; H.O. SEYDEL and H.G. KANNO, Die Rüstung, in:
K. CARSTENS, D. MAHNCKE (eds.), Westeuropäische Verteidigungskooperation, München,
1972, p.163.
53. Dillon to Kennedy, 13.5.1963, John F. Kennedy Library, Presidential Office Files: Treasury, Box 90.
54. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete, 15.9.1964, PA-AA, B 150/1964. This was explicitly
in U.S. interest. See: National Archives, RG 59, DEF 19US-WGER, DOS/DOD Message to Bonn
Embassy, 15.7.1963.
55. H.O. SEYDEL, H.G. KANNO, op.cit., p.205.
56. An archive-based history of the European space effort is J. KRIGE, A. RUSSO, Europe in Space,
1960-1973, Nordwijk, 1994.
57. E. SKOLNIKOFF, Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy, Cambridge 1967,
pp.23-41. For documents on the history of this initiative see: FRUS 1964-68, XXXIV, Doc. 21-62.
58. AAPD 1965, bearb. M. PETER, H. ROSENBACH, II, Doc. 466, Conversation LBJ/Erhard,
20.12.1965, pp.1925-1927; LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories, Box 51, Treasury Background Paper: Trilateral
talks, 5.11.1966.
59. FRUS 1964-68, XXXIV, Memorandum for the Record: Space Cooperation, 23.3.1966, esp. fn. 3, p.85.

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Hubert Zimmermann
ogies meant that offers by the Johnson administration to expand its cooperation
with ELDO were received rather coolly in Europe. 60
These examples are representative of the general trend. In 1966, during several
OECD meetings, the Europeans took up the question of the widening technological
gap between America and Europe. Their delegates lamented the American policy
with regard to technological exports and expressed the hope that this policy would
be revised so that a kind of transatlantic technological community might develop.
Italy took a much publicised initiative at NATO and proposed a technological Marshall
Plan. 61 However, these attempts came to naught. The Americans replied that
only “if Europe [was] prepared [to] make progress in economic integration,
Kennedy round and on monetary reform,” could progress could be made “in their
obtaining new technology”. 62 This policy was reaffirmed at the top-level of the
State Department: “… a technological subsidy would, I think, be doubtful wisdom,
since it might serve to perpetuate bad European practices. Moreover, a substantial
part of our favourable trade balance with the world depends on our technological
superiority and we should not give it away for nothing”. 63 In a 1967 memorandum
for the National Security Council this position was re-affirmed:
“We cannot afford to see our international strength reduced further through continued
deficits (…). Correction of this balance of payments gap between North America
and Western Europe is of much greater importance than a reduction of the ‘technological
gap’ which would work in the reverse direction, enlarging the existing imbalance
between the two areas (…). Thus, we should not encourage the strengthening of
Europe, and especially that of the EEC, until the EEC demonstrates that it can carry
out the responsibilities of a surplus area wisely and co-operatively”. 64
The strains in the transatlantic monetary system spilt over to the area of technological
cooperation impeding progress in this field.
An additional problem was the different relationship between state and industry
in U.S. and European society. The decade-long struggle about the organisation of
Intelsat, a world-wide regulatory regime for telecommunication by satellites, is a
good example. Founded on American initiative in 1964, Intelsat was managed in its
first years by a private American company (Comsat), created specifically for this
purpose by the U.S. government. However, the Europeans were apprehensive that
Intelsat would make the creation of European satellites very difficult because it was
so closely linked with industrial interests. In fact, Intelsat orders for the construction
of satellites and their components went almost exclusively to American firms.
60. L. SEBESTA, The Availability of American Launchers and Europe’ s Decision ‘to go it alone’ ,
in: ESA History Study Reports, 18/1996, p.21.
61. Aufzeichnung Meyer-Lindenberg, 29.9.1966; Deutsche Vertretung bei der NATO an AA,
7.12.1966, both in: PA-AA, I A 6/83. For an analysis of this initiative see: L. SEBESTA, Un Nuovo
Strumento Politico per gli Anni 60. Il Technological Gap nelle Relazioni Euro-Americane, in:
Nuova Civiltà delle Macchine, XVII, 3/1999, pp.11-23.
62. FRUS 1964-8, XXXIV, Telegram from the Embassy in France to Department of State, 14.1.1966, p.2.
63. Ibid., Ball to Rusk, 6.6.1966, p.3.
64. Memorandum on U.S.-European Relations, 23.5.1967, LBJL, National Security Files, NSC Meetings,
Box 2.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 99
This, of course, tended to enlarge the already existing technological gap in this
field. 65 The Europeans demanded that Comsat would be replaced by an intergovernmental
body in which Europeans and Americans had equal voting rights. The
Americans, however, refused to accede to this request. This reflected the American
approach to the management of high technology in which government agencies
(usually the Pentagon) provided initiative as well as start-up funds, and later on became
the main clients. However, the development, control, and marketing of high
technology products was left to private firms whereas in Europe the links between
the government and (often state-owned) firms were much closer, particularly in
high-tech sectors. American firms were not eager to strengthen potential competitors
by collaborating with them.
Thus, a mix of competitive strategies, commercial considerations, the American
balance of payments situation, and finally the feeling that the U.S. did not have
much to gain from extended cooperation with small countries was responsible for
the lack of American interest in the development of a technological community
with the Europeans. Kennedy, in his Philadelphia speech, had spoken of a United
Europe as a possible partner of the U.S. In the technological field, this possibility
seemed rather remote as long as France and Britain pursued an expensive strategy
of privileging national programmes. However, already in the mid-1960s the tide
was turning against national autonomy – but also against cooperation with the
United States. Faced by America’s unresponsiveness and by the escalating cost of
their national champions in high technology, one European country after the other
turned to an alternative solution to the technological problem: European cooperation,
directed explicitly against American superiority.
III. The American Challenge and the Reaffirmation of Europe
a) The Hague Summit 1969 and the Plan for a European Monetary Union
A sigh of relief was audible all through Europe when Richard Nixon took over
from LBJ. It was expected that the new president would end the fatal involvement
in Vietnam and that he would restore Europe to its former central place in American
diplomacy. In fact, the start of the new administration was auspicious. Right
after his inauguration, Nixon announced that he intended to improve relations with
Europe. He mentioned in particular technological questions. 66 In February 1969, he
toured European capitals with the message that the new administration would fight
against Congressional initiatives for a reduction of the American military commit-
65. W. UNGERER, Satellitenprobleme und Intelsat-Verhandlungen, in: Außenpolitik, 2/1970,
pp.78-79.
66. AAPD 1969 (bearb. F. EIBL, H. ZIMMERMANN), I, Doc. 47, Pauls (Ambassador in Washington)
to AA, 6.2.1969, p.157.

100
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ment in Europe. He also announced that he was ready to talk with the Europeans
about their complaints in the monetary area. 67
However, these positive signs were illusory. As it turned out, with the departure
of the Johnson administration the still undecided contest within the U.S. government
between advocates of the transatlantic community and those who opted for a
more unilateral policy was won by the latter. A major diplomatic effort to restore
the privileged partnership with Europe was not part of the new administration’s
strategic concept. Nixon’s core objective was to regain for America its freedom of
action in the pursuit of its national interests instead of getting entangled in a more
interdependent transatlantic community. The United States would cease to assume
unnecessary responsibilities, pursue great power diplomacy and leave it to regional
powers to sort out regional problems. 68 Europe, in particular, should concentrate on
its own internal problems. This part of Kissinger’s "Year of Europe" speech was
particularly galling for the Europeans. 69 It explains why Germany’ s Ostpolitik – in
its essence a reformulation of Germany’ s national goals and an attempt to gain
freedom of manoeuvre for the Federal Republic – was regarded very sceptically by
Washington. East-West diplomacy was the prerogative of the U.S. Other countries
were “welcome to participate” in the East-West dialogue, 70 but they should not
play the role of initiators. Already in November 1969, one month after Brandt had
been elected chancellor, the American government was telling the Germans that
“things are happening too fast” and that there was widespread disquiet in Washington
regarding the activities of the new government. 71
For Nixon, Europe was but one element in a global balance of power, and not
necessarily a privileged partner. If American interests conflicted with those of Europe,
America would use its full weight instead of embarking on long tortuous negotiations
with an often discordant chorus of Europeans. The Nixon administration
also did not receive with enthusiasm the re-affirmation of the European community
which was to be so strongly accentuated in the second half of 1969. The immediate
worry was that Europe would develop into a protectionist bloc, comprising not only
the Six but, by concluding a series of preferential agreements with African and
Asian countries, extending beyond the borders of Europe. 72 Certainly, the Europeans
were still important allies insofar as they were vital to counterbalance the
Soviets (after Nixon’s China trip this function was reduced too). Beyond East-West
politics, the Europeans were simply regarded as rivals. The Nixon doctrine’s emphasis
on the future unwillingness of America to shoulder “every burden” spilt over
67. Ibid., Doc. 81, Gespräch zwischen Nixon und Kiesinger, 26.2.1969, p.286.
68. This was the essence of the so-called Nixon doctrine, announced by the President at a news conference
on Guam on 25.7.1969. See: PP Nixon 1969, p.549.
69. Kissinger himself later doubted the wisdom of this assertion; H. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval,
London, 1982, pp.151-156.
70. H. KISSINGER, The Year of Europe, in: Department of State Bulletin, I/1973, p.598.
71. AAPD 1969/II, Doc. 377, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete, 27.11.1969, p.1339.
72. Botschaft Washington an AA: U.S. Haltung zur Entwicklung der EG, 25.11.1969, PA-AA, I A 2/
1440.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 101
to the monetary and technological field. Since Kennedy’s times the support of the
monetary system had been portrayed by American governments and the Congress
as a burden they were assuming for the benefit of the Western World. The consequence
of the new policy was that this support was to be stopped and that in case
the Europeans had a problem with the resulting dollar glut it was their responsibility
to develop remedies. Similarly, if they had a problem with their technological inferiority,
it was their task to reform their industrial structures in order to become
competitive.
The new policy was nowhere more visible than in the monetary field, a former
crown jewel of transatlantic co-operation. The core objective was to regain national autonomy
in monetary policy, if necessary by flagrant unilateral action. 73 Nixon was not
interested in multilateral negotiations in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutions.
His Secretary of Treasury Connally was fundamentally of the opinion: Foreigners
are out to screw us. Our job is to screw them first. 74 A recently declassified 1971 letter
of Connally to Nixon shows the basic outlook. He warned that “there is a strong
element of thinking within Europe that would take advantage of weakness or clumsiness
on our part to promote the Common Market not as a partner but as a rival economic
bloc, competing vigorously with the dollar and reducing or shutting out, as best
it can, U.S. economic influence from a considerable portion of the world”. 75 At the
same time he exhorted Nixon to put pressure on chancellor Brandt during his forthcoming
visit; Brandt was to be told “that the continuation of Germany’s present policy of
holding dollars and not buying gold is absolutely fundamental to US-FRG relations
…”. 76 This recommendation was particularly delicate in so far as the U.S. were already
preparing for a step which would undoubtedly reduce the European dollar reserves
quite drastically in their value:
“If things come to the pass of a U.S. suspension of gold sales and purchases, we
should do all we can – both substantively and cosmetically – to make it appear that
other governments have forced the action on us. We want to portray suspension as a
last resort and to present a public image of a cool-headed government responding to
ill-conceived, self-defeating actions of others”. 77
Things came to that pass three months later, when, on 15 August 1971, Nixon,
without any consultation with the allies, closed the dollar-gold-window and
imposed a 10% surtax on all U.S. imports. The transatlantic monetary system was
dead, and this caused growing rifts in the alliance and a rapid loss in the control of
states over financial markets. This was not inevitable; it was caused in the first
place by the absence of the political will of its core country to preserve the system
or to manage a cooperative transition to a new international financial structure, and
73. H.R. NAU, The Myth of America’s Decline, Oxford, 1990, pp.160-164.
74. H. JAMES, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, Washington, 1986,
pp.209-210.
75. The letter is dated 8.6.1971; DDRS 1999, Doc. 385.
76. Ibid., Doc. 378, Connally Memorandum for the President, 12.6.1971.
77. Ibid., Doc. 2317, Arthur F. Burns to Nixon, 19.5.1971.

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Hubert Zimmermann
maybe in the second place by the inability of Europe during the 1960s to reach a
common stance which might have forced the U.S. to reconsider its policy. 78
At that time, the Europeans had embarked on the long road towards European
monetary integration. At the Hague Summit Meeting in December 1969, the EC
member countries announced their intention to create a common European currency.
79 At the same meeting, they invited the United Kingdom to join the community.
By accepting the invitation, London also accepted the goal of monetary union. The
Hague declaration was a sensational and unexpected leap forward in the history of
European integration. It has to be recalled that in 1967/68 the UK still stuck to the
world role of sterling, France showed no signs of abandoning its policy of monetary
autonomy, and Germany was torn between the continued defence of the
dollar-gold-system and a more nationalist monetary policy. The explanation for the
rapid reorientation is to be found in the American monetary challenge. By taking an
attitude of benign neglect towards the dollar glut the U.S. was reneging on the essential
condition of the transatlantic bargain and permitted a freeing of financial
markets which turned out to be extremely disruptive to European domestic economies.
It also undermined any attempt to pursue a policy of national monetary
autonomy in Europe. The increasing mobility of capital and the absence of a political
will and activity on a world-wide level to control the corresponding effects
made autonomous policies increasingly costly for the Europeans.
The most spectacular expression of the futility of national monetary autonomy
was the Bonn monetary conference of 1968. Prior to the meeting, massive speculative
capital fled from Britain and France and moved to Germany. Faced by a drastic
loss of their reserves, employed in order to defend the exchange value of their currencies,
both France and Britain massively demanded a revaluation of the DM.
Prime minister Wilson called in the German ambassador, Herbert Blankenhorn, in
the middle of the night to impress on him the need for an immediate action by the
FRG. 80 The French were no less outspoken. In May 1968, student and workers
unrest had undermined the French currency. In November, French reserves were
reduced to about 50% of their value before the crisis. 81 Most of the speculative
money went to Germany which according to France for no legitimate reason stuck
to an undervalued currency. On 9 November 1968, prime minister Couve de
Murville, in a letter to chancellor Kiesinger, warned the German government of the
consequences of continued inactivity:
78. One of the most active participants in the monetary negotiations of these years, Bundesbank vicepresident
Emminger, said in a speech he gave in Basle on 16.6.1973: “There can be no doubt that
had all the major countries pursued appropriate policies and fully lived up to the rules of the game
the system or for that matter, any system – would have functioned well”. O. EMMINGER, Verteidigung
der DM, Frankfurt, 1980, p. 228.
79. Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung 148, 4.12.1969, pp.1262-1263.
80. AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 385, Botschafter Blankenhorn, London, an Brandt, 20.11.1968,
pp.1498-1500.
81. KOLODZIEJ, French International Policy, pp.206-207.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 103
“[La France] ne peut pas voir sans de grandes appréhensions le maintien d’ un pareil
état des choses. Les mesures extrêmes qu’ elle serait appelée à prendre si celui-ci se
perpétuait auraient naturellement de graves conséquences, notamment pour ses
partenaires immédiats. Le gouvernement français s’ est gardé de mettre en cause
dans cette grave affaire la responsabilité de la République fédérale”. 82
Despite this pressure and the fact that at the Bonn conference the U.S. joined the
chorus of the demanders, the FRG was not willing to take the requested step. By
speculating on the necessity of a French franc devaluation, finance minister Strauss
even ignited new speculation against the battered French currency. The pride of de
Gaulle rendered it impossible for him to accept defeat, and, after the conference, he
refused to devalue. However, this heroic act could hardly hide the fact that the monetary
conference had clearly demonstrated the failure of de Gaulle’ s policy. The
idea of national autonomy had been severely undermined, and the reverberations of
the austerity measures which now were adopted to enable France to sustain the
franc had a huge impact on many areas of French policy. This also included France’ s
ambitious technological programmes.
In 1969 the French balance of payments remained at the mercy of the Bonn
government which was pursuing an increasingly unilateral monetary policy. Even
cautious remarks by German politicians regarding the DM-Franc exchange rate
sparked speculation against the French currency, and the protests by the French ambassador
in Bonn had an increasing air of helplessness. 83 The French realised that
they had not only been unable to dethrone the dollar, but ended up in a situation in
which they were at the mercy of German decisions (or non-decisions), at least as
long as both countries pursued a policy of monetary autonomy. In addition, the
monetary turmoil threatened to destroy the Common Agricultural Policy, one of the
core objectives of France’s European policy. This realisation paved the way for the
acceptance of the European solution which became government policy after de
Gaulle stepped back in April 1969. It was pushed in particular by Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, who became finance minister in the new French government of Georges
Pompidou. 84 The question was whether the Germans now would finally abandon
the transatlantic system and their new unilateral strategy, and agree to the Europeanisation
of their stable currency.
Once more, the Bonn monetary conference played a central role in this context.
It made very clear that a monetary policy based mainly on narrow considerations of
the Federal Republic’s national interests would lead to an increasing alienation of
its most important partners. Furthermore, successive speculative waves in 1969 had
shown that the pursuit of an anti-inflationary policy under conditions of increased
capital mobility and rapidly decreasing political control of financial markets was
extremely difficult. And finally, the French devaluation of August 1969 and the
German revaluation two months later threatened to lead to the disintegration of one
82. AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 13, fn. 9.
83. Ibid., Doc. 147, Gespräch zwischen Kiesinger und Botschafter Seydoux, 7.5.1969, pp.559-562.
84. Von Braun (Ambassador in Paris) to AA: Zukünftige französische Währungspolitik, 24.7.1969,
PA-AA, III A 1/612.

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of the most important pillars of German foreign policy, the EC. Although the
Bundesbank and large parts of the governmental bureaucracy still hoped for a
reform of the transatlantic system, the political leadership considered the chances
for such a reform increasingly sceptically, particularly in view of the passivity of
the Nixon team in international monetary policy.
The key figure in this context is Willy Brandt. His most important project was
Ostpolitik which had been conceptualised already in detail in the Auswärtiges Amt
where Brandt had been minister until he became chancellor. The concept was based
on a long-range perspective leading to the reduction of the influence of the superpowers
in Europe. 85 However, the goal was not German unilateralism. A strengthening
of European institutions, which would be widened to include Britain, was an
essential complement to Ostpolitik. The new government in France and its proposal
for a summit of the EC heads of government in late 1969 opened a realistic chance
for a huge step forward in this field before formal talks of the Brandt government
with the Eastern countries had even started. Trading British EC-membership for
large concessions to France in the agricultural domain assured the success of the
summit and ended the long stagnation of the EC during the previous years. However,
Brandt also was looking for a project which would provide Europe with a positive
incentive for deeper integration. Virtually days before the Hague Summit began,
Brandt seized on the idea of a European monetary union which also found the
approval of Pompidou. 86 Under the chairmanship of the prime minister of Luxembourg,
Pierre Werner, a high-level committee began to work on the steps which
were necessary to achieve this ambitious project. It presented its final report already
one year later. In the form of the Werner Plan the EC countries disassociated
themselves from the reform of the transatlantic system as the final goal of their international
monetary policy. The difficulties which lay ahead on the way towards a
European currency were certainly underestimated at the time; however, the idea
was there and although almost thirty years passed until it was implemented, monetary
union was to remain the ultimate objective of European monetary policy.
It was no accident that the final declaration of the Hague summit also contained
a paragraph on technological cooperation, although it did not have the symbolic
and political significance of the monetary project. Disillusionment with the Americans
and the huge costs of the attempt to develop national capabilities in high technology
forced the Europeans to seriously consider the European road.
85. AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 207, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Bahr, 27.6.1968, pp.796-814.
86. The genesis of this step is difficult to reconstruct. The suggestion by A. WILKENS that a proposal
by Jean Monnet in November 1969 had caused this sudden initiative is hard to believe. See: Westpolitik,
Ostpolitik and the Project of Economic and Monetary Union, in: Journal of European Integration
History, 1/1999, p.81. The Economics Ministry at that time had already presented plans
for a monetary union in stages which later formed the German negotiating position. See: PA-AA,
Joint Memorandum by AA/Ministry of Economics: Preparatory Meeting for Hague Summit,
14.11.1969.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 105
b) Towards a European High-Tech Community?
We have seen how initiatives for a closer and more systematic collaboration of
European countries with the United States failed. However, by the late 1960s, it
also became clear that in most fields of advanced technology single European states
had no chance to compete successfully with America. This quickly developed into
a major political topic. On 5 July 1966, the former German defence minister
Franz-Josef Strauß wrote a long letter to chancellor Erhard in which he decried the
extent of American investment in advanced sectors of European industry. He was
also critical of the fact that the Federal Republic was buying most of its modern
weaponry in America, thus undermining any chance for successful European cooperation
in this field. According to Strauß, American technological superiority in all
important sectors, backed by a cheap dollar which allowed U.S. firms to buy up
European industries, threatened “to turn Europe into an intellectual and scientific
vacuum”. 87 It was no surprise that one year later, Strauß also wrote the foreword to
the German edition of Servan-Schreiber’ s best-seller Le Défi américain, in which
the author made a passionate call for European collaboration in the face of American
technological and managerial superiority. Otherwise, Europe would decline to
the status of an American colony. Servan-Schreiber’s major example was the fate of
the European computer industry which was about to be completely dominated by
the Americans. 88 The book was a huge success and European governments which
had been thinking along the same lines quickly took up the call.
As early as 1964, the French government had commissioned a report which
came to similar conclusions. 89 France proposed the creation of an intergovernmental
European body which was to explore possibilities for technological cooperation.
The EC Council set up a high level working group, the Maréchal group. The German
foreign ministry noted with satisfaction that with this initiative Europe had
embarked on a new field of common activity. 90 However, it soon turned out that ultimately
de Gaulle’ s France clearly preferred national strategies for the most promising
technologies. Another problem which impeded every progress in this committee
was that the conflict between France and the other five member states about
U.K. membership in the EC spilt over. Britain still had the most advanced technological
sector of all European countries and it was hard to imagine how Europe
could confront the American challenge without its potential. However, de Gaulle
did not bend. He suspected that proposals to include Britain in European technological
projects were just strategies to get it into the EC by the backdoor, and that
the British would ultimately prefer American offers if those were forthcoming. 91 In
87. PA-AA, II A 7/1191.
88. J.J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, Le Défi américain, chapter 14. Written in a similar vein, and also
very influential, was the analysis by C. LAYTON, European Advanced Technology. A Programme
for Integration, London, 1969.
89. ”Recherche Scientifique et Indépendance”, Le Progrès Scientifique, 1.9.1964.
90. AAPD 1968/I, AA Memorandum, 3.11.1967, p.277, fn.19.
91. AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 100, Conversation De Gaulle – Kiesinger, 13.3.1969, p.371.

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February 1968, the Dutch blocked further deliberations in the Maréchal group
which had achieved almost no results. 92
The British for their part had given clear signs that they were interested in European
cooperation. In November 1966, prime minister Harold Wilson proposed “to
create a new technological community to pool with Europe the enormous technological
inventiveness of Britain and other European countries, to enable Europe on
a competitive basis to become more self-reliant and neither dependent on imports
nor dominated from outside, but basing itself on the creation of competitive indigenous
European industries”. 93 He repeated this proposal, which was enthusiastically
backed by the smaller European countries, frequently in the following months,
echoing Servan-Schreiber:
“… there is no future for Europe, or for Britain, if we allow American industry, and
American business so to dominate the strategic growth industries of our individual
countries, that they, and not we, are able to determine the pace and direction of
Europe’ s industrial advance (…) this is the road not to partnership but to an industrial
helotry”. 94
Britain until then had pursued a policy which privileged national technological
independence and, if this was not possible, collaboration with the Americans (a
strategy followed by almost all European governments until 1968/69). 95 The few
projects it had undertaken with European countries such as the construction of the
supersonic aircraft ‘Concorde’ and the fighter ‘Jaguar’ with France had been rather
frustrating experiences. A series of defeats on world markets for British products
which were in competition with American developments led to a re-orientation of
this policy. Instances in which the United States for commercial reasons refused to
sell the U.K. advanced technology cast additional doubt on the special relationship.
96 Furthermore, a long series of failures with national developments of high
technology tools led the U.K. to abandon the strategy of national autarchy. In 1965,
the government approved the Plowden report on the British aircraft industry, which
recommended that Britain should abandon its attempt to pursue an independent
aeronautic programme and that it should instead collaborate with the rest of Europe
in this area. 97 The major reason for the new openness towards Europe, however,
was that the U.K. considered its technological expertise a major bargaining chip in
its campaign to enter the European Communities. 98 This strategy failed. Yet, even
after de Gaulle had made clear in late 1967 that he was not prepared to admit Britain
into the Community, the idea of intensified technological cooperation with the
92. AAPD 1968/I, Doc. 135, fn. 10, p.486.
93. See: Into Europe with Industry’s Help, in: THE TIMES, 15.11.1966, p.1.
94. Speech in the Guildhall, London, 13.11.1967, PRO, PREM 13/1851.
95. H. NAU, Collective Responses to R&D problems in Western Europe: 1955-1958 and 1968-1973,
in: International Organisation, 29/1975, pp.632-636. See also: AAPD 1967/I, Doc. 8, Conversation
of Brandt with the Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani, 5.1.1967, pp.39-40.
96. R. GILPIN, France, p.53.
97. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry, Cmnd. 2853, HMSO 1965.
98. Burke-Trend to Wilson, 27.2.1968, PRO, PREM 13/1851; S. SCHRAFSTETTER, Die dritte
Atommacht, München, 1999, pp.200-202.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 107
rest of the EC was pursued. 99 A series of important projects were initiated. Among
the most significant of those were the planned construction of a gas centrifuge for
the production of enriched uranium and the development of a Multiple Role Combat
Aircraft (MRCA).
The former project was a consequence of European doubts regarding the
long-term supply of European civil nuclear plants with enriched uranium from the
U.S. Already in April 1967, the German government had approached London for a
solution to this problem. Would the British government be interested in the construction
of a European enrichment plant? 100 Germany was particularly keen on
such a project because, first, the development of a domestic enrichment capacity
was too expensive, second, previous French offers had led to nothing because the
enrichment plant at Pierrelatte was too closely involved with the Force de Frappe
and, most importantly, the complete dependence on U.S. deliveries had to be
reduced. 101 In July 1968, the U.K. proposed a trilateral working group for the development
of a uranium enrichment plant which should also include the Netherlands.
102 In November 1969, the three countries reached an agreement. Negotiations
regarding the participation of Italy and Belgium started. All participants
considered the project as “of an economic, technological and political importance
(…) comparable to EURATOM”. 103 France was initially very critical of these proposals.
When de Gaulle was in Washington for Eisenhower’s funeral in 1969, he
explicitly referred to the project in his talks with Nixon and warned that it might
help Germany to get closer to the nuclear club. 104 This attitude changed only with
the re-orientation of French policy after the General had left the stage.
A similar pattern developed regarding the second project, the MRCA. In 1968, a
group of European countries (reduced in the end to Britain, Germany and Italy)
agreed to jointly develop a European fighter as replacement for the Starfighter. 105
The project was extremely ambitious and plagued by conflicts about the final configuration
as well as unexpected cost explosion. Nonetheless, the governments
stuck to it until completion. Once more, the French made it clear that they did not
approve of these projects, mainly because they were developing a similar aircraft
which they hoped to sell to other European countries. 106
The French mistrust of Britain, however, was not unfounded because Britain’ s
commitment to joint European projects remained ambiguous. In April 1968, for ex-
99. AAPD 1967/III, Doc. 449, Gespräch Brandt mit dem britischen Botschafter Roberts, 28.12.1967,
p.1713.
100. AAPD 1967/II, Doc. 126, Gespräch Brandt mit dem britischen Außenminister Brown, 13.4.1967,
p.584.
101. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Frank, 28.4.1967, PA-AA, I A 6/72.
102. AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 220, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten von Staden, 12.7.1968, p.868.
103. R. LOOSCH, Kernenergie und internationale Zusammenarbeit, in: Aussenpolitik, 7/1969, p.395.
104. H. KISSINGER, White House Years, p.384. French Foreign Minister Debré voiced the same suspicions
to the German ambassador in Paris, von Braun; AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 133, von Braun to
Brandt, 24.4.1969, pp.515-516.
105. AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 408, Aufzeichnung VLR I Behrends, p.1456.
106. Ibid., Doc. 69, Arnold (Ambassador to the Netherlands) to AA, 20.2.1969, p.238.

108
Hubert Zimmermann
ample, the United Kingdom suspended payments for the European Launcher
Development Organisation (ELDO), founded in the early 1960s with the aim of
developing a launcher for European satellites. 107 This was a hard blow for the European
space effort because Britain had been the most important contributor. The
whole project entered a deep crisis. After the lunar landing in 1969, the Americans
invited the Europeans to participate in the development of a reusable space transportation
system (the later Shuttle). However, they refused to guarantee the availability
of American launching facilities for satellites which were not operated within
the framework of Intelsat. 108 Again, commercial interest impeded transatlantic cooperation
from the very start. This wedded the Europeans together, and they carried
on with their own launcher development. In the mid-1970s, Britain which due to
close connections of British firms to ELDO had never been completely excluded,
officially rejoined the effort. In 1979, the first European rocket, ‘Ariane’, was
launched into the orbit, and it became a serious competitor for the American space
shuttle. The development of a European jet-liner, Airbus, also showed Britain’ s initial
ambiguity. In 1967, it had signed an agreement with France and the FRG for
the development of an alternative to the almost complete U.S. dominance on civil
aircraft markets. Already in 1968, Britain cancelled its participation. Once more,
France and Germany laboured on, carrying the project to final success (together
with Britain which re-entered in 1979).
All these projects share three characteristics. First, they were explicitly directed
against U.S. dominance. Second, they demonstrated the great difficulty of reconciling
notions of national autonomy with the necessity of collective projects, particularly
in the first years. In 1968 and early 1969, the MRCA, Airbus and ELDO were
all in deep crisis, and it is only due to the reaffirmation of European cooperation in
1969/70 that they survived despite those great difficulties. Third, all of these
projects were in the end successful. Thus, the late 1960s and early 1970s was a
decisive period for European collaboration. It was not only those intergovernmental
projects which were given a new vigour. Collaboration on community level also
received renewed impetus. The Maréchal group was reactivated and in November
1971 a programme for ‘Cooperation in Science and Technology’ (COST) was
adopted which was to coordinate joint European projects and eventually transcended
the narrow confines of the EC.
On the whole, the course of technological and monetary cooperation in the transatlantic
alliance exhibited a similar pattern. European countries had three basic options
(transatlantic cooperation, national autonomy, Europeanisation) whereas the United
States had the choice between the first two possibilities. The analysis has shown a clear
trend in American policy towards increasing autonomy in the period studied here. The
Europeans, for their part, moved away from a policy of favoring transatlantic and
national solutions toward a marked preference for European collaboration.
107. J. KRIGE, A. RUSSO, L. SEBESTA, A Brief History of the ESA, in: J. KRIGE, L. GUZZETTI
(eds), History of European Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Luxembourg, 1997,
pp.199-200.
108. Ibid., p.202.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 109
IV. The Price of Disunity
In 1973, in an edited volume on the foreign policy of the Nixon administration,
Robert Osgood predicted a process which, as this article has shown, had already
been completed:
“If the United States abandons its role, it will probably be by neglect rather than
design; and it will result in the erosion of the present structure of relationships, not in
the construction of another”. 109
What has been argued here is that in the field of monetary policy a framework of
transatlantic cooperation consisting of a series of tacit rules and common assumptions
about how mutual problems were to be tackled, came unstuck. Regarding technology,
after timid efforts during the Eisenhower period, such a framework did not
even develop and no major initiatives were undertaken in the 1960s and early 1970s
despite the fact that it was a time of enormous technological advance. Whereas
during the 1960s the Europeans gradually came to appreciate the role technological
and monetary collaboration might play in fostering a closer relationship between
their countries and in enhancing competitiveness as well as their domestic economic
welfare, the United States decided it would be better off pursuing a more independent
policy, renouncing – not in theory, but in practice – the concept of a close transatlantic
partnership. The reasons were manifold. The most important one was that the
United States, battered by Vietnam and its balance of payments deficits, perceived
itself in a kind of decline and saw in the preservation of its national autonomy to the
largest degree possible the best way to reverse this trend. Certainly, dealing with a
disunited Europe was a difficult problem for American diplomacy. Privileged relations
with single European countries such as they existed with Britain and as they
were wished by General de Gaulle, were extremely divisive for the alliance. However,
a more determined effort, particularly after de Gaulle had left, might have prevented
the mutual disenchantment of the early 1970s.
Thus, around 1969, in monetary as well as in technological matters, a transatlantic
outlook was replaced by a Europe-centered view in most European countries. The
result of the American challenge was highlighted by the decisions of the European
summit in The Hague in December 1969. European, not transatlantic, cooperation
was given top priority in the future. Of course, this was a muddy process with countless
setbacks, and numerous attempts during the 1970s to assert once more the autonomy
of national governments or to strike new bargains with the United States which
still had a lot to offer, most importantly military security. In a short-term perspective
the Europeanization of the late 1960s and early 1970s even may seem a failure, particularly
regarding the fate of the plans for monetary union. However, the ultimate
objective of European cooperation remained paramount for a huge part of the political
establishment (with the exception of the U.K.) and for public imagination. In this
sense, the years 1965 to 1973 were decisive for the future course of Europe and the
109. R.E. OSGOOD et.al, Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration, Baltimore/London,
1973, p.18.

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Hubert Zimmermann
American challenge did play a very considerable role in this process. It is probably
instructive to speculate what would have happened had the United States been more
willing to pursue real collaboration with Europe in the 1960s. Maybe the European
Union we know now would not have come into existence.
Hubert Zimmermann
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

111
Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre
les Etats-Unis et l’Europe
Georges-Henri Soutou
Depuis l’organisation de la solidarité occidentale et les débuts de la politique d’unification
européenne dans les années 1947-1950, une structure essentielle de la politique
extérieure française était déterminée par le triangle constitué entre l’Europe occidentale,
les Etats-Unis et la France. Afin de rétablir son rôle international malgré la défaite de
1940 et la rupture de la deuxième guerre mondiale, Paris devait à la fois prendre la tête
de l’Europe occidentale et maintenir des relations bilatérales étroites avec les
Etats-Unis. Il y avait un lien dialectique entre les deux orientations, dans la mesure où la
France aurait plus de poids face à l’Amérique si elle se présentait avec l’appui de
l’Europe occidentale, et dans la mesure où son leadership sur l’Europe occidentale
serait plus facile à faire accepter si elle bénéficiait d’une relation privilégiée avec les
Etats-Unis. En outre cette position, à l’intersection de l’ensemble atlantique et de
l’ensemble européen, serait celle qui permettrait le mieux à la France de maintenir son
rôle mondial et de discuter avec les Américains des problèmes hors zone OTAN qui la
concernaient particulièrement (Afrique, Moyen-Orient, Asie). Elle permettrait également
d’échapper aux inconvénients ressentis à Paris dès les années 50 d’une intégration
atlantique trop étroite (pour les dirigeants français le modèle à imiter fut longtemps la
relation spéciale anglo-américaine et le but à atteindre la constitution d’une sorte de
directoire à trois de l’Alliance). D’autre part il y avait les très importantes questions
d’armements et de hautes technologies, nucléaires et autres: c’est toujours en priorité
avec les Etats-Unis que dans ces domaines la France a souhaité coopérer, pour des raisons
d’efficacité évidentes. Cette orientation fut celle de la IVe République. 1 Ce fut
celle du Général de Gaulle jusqu’en 1962, contrairement à ce que l’on pense souvent. 2
Certes de Gaulle s’en écarta ensuite, mais son successeur Georges Pompidou devait y
revenir de façon massive. Le triangle France-Europe-Etats-Unis devait même jouer
pour lui un rôle absolument déterminant et se situe au cœur de sa politique étrangère.
Il est essentiel de comprendre que la politique extérieure du Président Pompidou,
et en particulier sa politique américaine, se trouvaient dans l’ombre portée du
général de Gaulle et soumises à une vérification constante de leur «orthodoxie»,
1. G.-H. SOUTOU, La France et l’Alliance atlantique de 1949 à 1954, in: Cahiers du Centre
d’Etudes d’Histoire de la Défense, 3(1997).
2. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’Alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands,
1954-1996, Paris, Fayard, 1996.

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Georges-Henri Soutou
jusqu’au sein de l’administration et du gouvernement. 3 C’était un domaine particulièrement
sensible, où le nouveau Président ne pouvait introduire de nouvelles
orientations qu’avec prudence; lui-même restait d’ailleurs profondément gaullien
en matière de politique extérieure, plus sans doute qu’on ne l’a cru souvent à l’époque.
Or il faut bien mesurer à quel point, à partir de 1963-1964, le général de
Gaulle avait poussé la rupture avec les Etats-Unis: la conférence de presse du 14
janvier 1963, la querelle de la MLF en 1964, la crise de la Chaise vide en 1965, le
départ du commandement intégré de l’OTAN en 1966 avaient manifesté très clairement
que pour le Général l’Europe devrait se développer sur tous les plans (économique
mais aussi politique et stratégique) indépendamment des Etats-Unis, et non
pas en coopération avec eux comme cela avait été le cas pour les dirigeants de la
IVe République. 4 On ne sait pas en général que lors de sa visite à Moscou en juin
1966 de Gaulle accepta le principe d’une conférence européenne de sécurité sans
les Etats-Unis, ce qui revenait à vouloir construire un nouveau système de sécurité
européen sur la base d’une entente franco-soviétique et sans Washington, conformément
d’ailleurs aux conceptions internationales d’ensemble du Général dans
cette période. 5 D’autre part dès le 24 janvier 1967 le Général, par une «Instruction
personnelle et secrète», fixait le cadre de la programmation militaire pour la décennie
1970-1980: alors qu’auparavant la défense de la France était conçue «dans le
cadre de l’Alliance atlantique», elle serait désormais établie en fonction du «triple
caractère d’ubiquité, d’instantanéité et de totalité» du péril, sans qu’il ne soit plus
question d’une alliance privilégiée. 6 C’était la stratégie dite «tous azimuts», qui fut
annoncée par le général Ailleret, chef d’état-major des Armées, dans un article de
la Revue de Défense Nationale de décembre 1967. Elle fut confirmée par une allocution
prononcée par le Général devant le Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires, le
27 janvier 1968. 7 C’était évidemment la fin de toute velléité de collaboration stratégique
et nucléaire franco-américaine, comme de Gaulle en avait pourtant évoqué la
possibilité à différentes reprises entre 1958 et 1962.
Avant de parvenir à la Présidence en 1969, Georges Pompidou (Premier ministre
de 1962 à 1968) était incontestablement gaulliste en matière internationale,
mais déjà avec de très sérieuses nuances, également en ce qui concernait les
Etats-Unis. On pourrait parler d’un gaullisme pragmatique, rationalisé. Certes, il
avait été très hostile aux accords de Nassau et à la MLF, deux des grandes pierres
3. Pour la politique extérieure de Georges Pompidou et ses rapports avec les Américains cf. E. ROUSSEL,
Georges Pompidou, Paris, JC Lattès, 1994; Georges Pompidou et l’Europe, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1995,
en particulier la contribution de P. MELANDRI, Une relation très spéciale: la France, les Etats-Unis et
l’Année de l’Europe, 1973-1974; sur la collaboration militaire franco-américaine à l’époque de Pompidou
cf. P. MELANDRI, Aux origines de la coopération nucléaire franco-américaine, in: La France et l’Atome,
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1994. On utilisera évidemment les mémoires essentiels de H. KISSINGER, White
House Years et Years of Upheaval, Boston, Littel, Brown and Cy, 1979 et 1982, et de M. JOBERT, Mémoires
d’avenir et L’autre regard, Paris, Grasset, 1974 et 1976.
4. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’Alliance incertaine, op.cit.
5. Ibid. et archives privées.
6. Archives nationales, 5AG2/1040.
7. Institut Charles de Gaulle, L’aventure de la Bombe, Paris, Plon, 1985, pp. 210-211.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 113
d’achoppement des relations franco-américaines dans ces années. 8 Certes, il souhaitait
que l’Europe reste indépendante des Etats-Unis et il redoutait la perspective
d’un rapprochement américano-soviétique aux dépens de l’Europe, comme il le
déclara au journaliste américain C. L. Sulzberger le 23 janvier 1968, annonçant le
thème très gaulliste qu’il reprendra souvent comme Président de la République,
celui du danger d’un «condominium américano-soviétique» sur l’Europe. 9 Mais en
même temps il se disait prêt à envisager des relations beaucoup plus positives avec
Washington, y compris sur le plan économique, et dans une conversation avec C. L.
Sulzberger le 21 octobre 1965, il exposa à propos de l’OTAN un point de vue
beaucoup plus modéré que celui que de Gaulle devait imposer en 1966. 10
En accédant à la Présidence en juin 1969, Georges Pompidou était décidé à la
fois à maintenir l’héritage de la politique gaulliste et à le faire évoluer de façon à le
débarrasser de ce qu’il considérait comme des éléments tenant trop à la personnalité
très forte et parfois impulsive du Général, et à tenir compte des moyens réels de
la France, afin de pouvoir ainsi ancrer le gaullisme dans la durée. Citons ici une
lettre du nouveau président à Philippe de Saint Robert le 10 juin 1969:
«… Mon ambition est d’essayer de fonder sur des réalités solides, économiques,
sociales, humaines, la poursuite d’une certaine politique qui ne se soutenait jusqu’ici
que grâce au prestige d’un homme». 11
D’autre part la candidature présidentielle de Georges Pompidou, qui n’avait pas
la stature historique du Général, et ensuite son action politique comme chef de
l’Etat reposaient sur la notion de «majorité présidentielle», allant au-delà des gaullistes
et comprenant les Républicains indépendants et les Centristes du CDP. Or ces
deux derniers groupes ne partageaient absolument pas l’anti-américanisme fréquent
dans les milieux gaullistes. Aussi du point de vue de la politique intérieure
(surtout après le choc des événements de mai 1968 et l’occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie
en août, qui avaient ravivé l’opposition au communisme et à l’URSS) un
recentrage par rapport à Washington était donc nécessaire. Or celui-ci fut facilité
dans la mesure où en 1969, après l’arrivée au pouvoir du Président Nixon et avant
même la démission de De Gaulle en avril, les rapports franco-américains s’étaient
subitement améliorés. La visite de Nixon en France fin février se passa bien, même
si, sur le fond, le Général n’abandonna rien de ses thèses habituelles. 12 Malgré tout
les diplomates américains à Paris, d’après leurs contacts au Quai d’Orsay, percevaient
une inflexion de la politique française, déçue par les Soviétiques et désireuse
d’améliorer les relations avec les Etats-Unis. 13 Le Président Nixon décidait même
8. A. PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle, T.I., Paris, de Fallois/Fayard, 1994, p.339, et C. L. SULZ-
BERGER, An Age of Mediocrity, New-York, Macmillan, 1993, p.133 (un témoignage particulièrement
utile).
9. SULZBERGER, op.cit., p.406.
10. Ibid., pp. 216-217.
11. P. de SAINT ROBERT, Le secret des jours, Paris, JC Lattès, 1995, p.33.
12. Cf. H. KISSINGER, White House Years, op.cit., pp.106-111.
13. Télé. de l’ambassade américaine à Paris du 3 avril 1969 et note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du
8 avril, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC [National Security Council] CF
[Country Files]/674/France vol.I.

114
Georges-Henri Soutou
le 15 avril de faire étudier tous les aspects d’une éventuelle coopération militaire
bilatérale avec la France et d’en évaluer la possibilité sans a priori si les Français le
demandaient. 14 Le Département d’Etat et Nixon s’attendaient à la poursuite de
cette amélioration à la suite de la démission du Général le 28 avril, ainsi qu’à un
rapprochement, au moins sur le plan pratique, entre la France et l’OTAN. 15 Il est
vrai que Kissinger était pour sa part moins optimiste, craignant la montée de
l’influence de la Gauche sur la politique extérieure française. 16
Les premiers contacts entre le Président Pompidou et les Etats-Unis.
Les premiers contacts de Georges Pompidou, devenu Président, avec les Américains
furent dans l’ensemble positifs. Il reçut l’ambassadeur Shriver le 23 juillet 1969 et lui
tint un langage qui tranchait nettement sur la période précédente: il reconnaissait
comme une évidence que l’Europe avait besoin de la couverture stratégique américaine
et que la France avait besoin de l’Alliance atlantique; la politique militaire française
d’indépendance nationale n’était pas tournée contre l’Amérique mais pouvait faciliter
un certain allégement des charges des Etats-Unis en Europe ainsi que favoriser leur
politique de détente avec l’Est. Une entente était également possible dans le domaine
économique, en particulier en matière agricole, le Président français laissant même
entendre qu’il serait disposé à revoir la politique agricole commune européenne pour
revenir à des prix plus compatibles avec ceux du marché mondial et plus conformes aux
intérêts américains et aux intérêts bien compris de la France (c’était en effet la RFA qui
avait exigé des prix élevés pour le blé, pas Paris). 17 D’autre part Pompidou n’était pas
par principe hostile aux investissements américains en France (grande différence par
rapport à la période précédente); il faudrait seulement attendre que l’industrie électrique
et électronique française soient d’abord restructurées. 18
Michel Jobert, secrétaire général de l’Elysée, déclara le 6 novembre à Shriver
que Georges Pompidou était très content de pouvoir améliorer les rapports
franco-américains. Il donna comme raison la crainte d’un renouveau du nationalisme
allemand et le souci d’un appui américain pour contrebalancer cette
menace. 19 Je ne suis pas du tout convaincu que le Président, dont la politique allemande
était beaucoup plus complexe, était sur ce dernier point exactement sur la
même longueur d’onde et voyait les choses de façon aussi simpliste, 20 mais les res-
14. Note de Kissinger du 15 avril approuvée par le Président et note de Kissinger pour le Secrétaire
d’Etat le 22 avril, NSC CF/674/France vol.II.
15. Note de Martin Hillenbrand (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) du 29 avril et lettre de
Kissinger du 3 mai lui transmettant les félicitations de Nixon, NSC CF/674/France vol.II.
16. Note de Kissinger pour Nixon du 28 avril, ibid.
17. Compte-rendu de l’entretien avec Shriver, le 23 juillet 1969, AN, 5AG2/1022.
18. Entretien Pompidou-Rogers le 8 décembre 1969, 5AG2/1022.
19. NPM, NSC CF/676/France, vol.IV.
20. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou face à l’Allemagne, in: Georges Pompidou et
l’Europe.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 115
ponsables américains étaient satisfaits du changement d’atmosphère dans les relations
entre les deux pays. 21
Indiquons au passage, sans pouvoir nous étendre ici, que les Français apportèrent
sous Pompidou une aide diplomatique appréciable aux Américains à propos de
la guerre du Vietnam, en particulier dans la phase finale en 1972, et se montrèrent
dans ce domaine nettement plus coopératifs que dans la période précédente, ce qui
correspondait à un changement d’attitude considérable. 22 En outre Pompidou
nomma en 1970 comme directeur du SDECE (le service secret) Alexandre de
Marenches, dont les amitiés américaines étaient connues et qui collabora étroitement
avec la CIA et les autres services occidentaux. 23
Cela dit, il y avait évidemment des désaccords entre les deux capitales, que nous
allons d’ailleurs retrouver tout au long de ce récit. Tout d’abord les questions
monétaires (eurodollars et déficit de la balance américaine des paiements) qui
allaient poser des problèmes entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe dès lors que l’on voudrait
mettre sur pied une union monétaire européenne. Egalement les négociations
stratégiques américano-soviétiques, qui risquaient de réduire la garantie nucléaire
américaine à l’Europe et de conduire Washington et Moscou à considérer les puissances
nucléaires tierces comme des facteurs de déstabilisation, à contrôler en cas
de crise. D’autre part Paris était hostile à la proposition faite par l’Alliance atlantique
fin 1969, proposition à laquelle tenait les Américains, d’une conférence sur la
réduction équilibrée des forces en Europe. Outre que la France était par principe
hostile à toute négociation «de bloc à bloc» (on retrouvait là un élément essentiel
du gaullisme) Georges Pompidou craignait que cela ne conduise à aggraver le déséquilibre
entre forces conventionnelles et n’aboutisse à une sorte de neutralisation
de l’Europe. En revanche Paris était favorable à la réunion d’une conférence sur la
sécurité en Europe (vieille proposition soviétique renouvelée en mars 1969) d’une
part parce ce que l’on ne pourrait pas toujours s’opposer à la volonté de détente de
la plupart des pays européens, d’autre part par ce que cela permettrait à des pays
comme la Pologne ou la Roumanie de retrouver une petite marge de manœuvre.
Sur ce projet de conférence les Américains étaient beaucoup plus réticents. Néanmoins
Paris était tout à fait disposée à causer, à renouer avec Washington un dialogue
approfondi sur toute ces questions. 24 D’autre part on remarquera que les réticences
françaises à l’égard de la politique américaine portaient essentiellement sur
les points qui risquaient d’affaiblir la cohésion occidentale face à l’URSS, ce qui
était évidemment nouveau. Et en particulier pour Pompidou, à la différence de De
21. Cf. par exemple la conversation entre le Secrétaire d’Etat Rogers et André Fontaine du Monde, le
15 décembre 1969, NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.IV.
22. H. FROMENT-MEURICE, Vu du Quai. Mémoires 1945-1983, Fayard, 1998, pp.321 ss; entretien
Kissinger-Maurice Schumann le 22 septembre 1972, note de Kissinger pour Nixon à propos d’un
entretien entre le général Walters et Pompidou du 30 octobre 1972, NSC CF/679/France vol.X.
23. C. OCKRENT, Comte de Marenches, Dans le secret des princes, Paris, Stock, 1986, pp.100 ss.
24. Entretien Pompidou-Rogers du 8 décembre 1969, AN 5AG2/1022 et RG59/67-69/Box 2103; notes
de Jean-Bernard Raimond, conseiller diplomatique à l’Elysée, pour le Président des 18 novembre
1969 et 21 janvier 1970, 5AG2/1041.

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Georges-Henri Soutou
Gaulle, les Etats-Unis participeraient «naturellement» à une conférence sur la sécurité
en Europe: il reconnaissait, point capital, qu’ils n’étaient pas «étrangers aux
problèmes européens». 25
C’est dans le domaine des questions de défense que le dégel par rapport à la
période parut d’emblée le plus marqué. En particulier les Français exprimèrent tout
de suite et au plus haut niveau le souhait de renouer des contacts bilatéraux avec
Washington sur les questions militaires et la coopération en matière d’armements. 26
Cela suscita immédiatement l’attention et l’intérêt du Président Nixon et de Henry
Kissinger et déclencha tout un processus de réflexion à Washington. 27 Kissinger en
résuma les conclusions pour le Président le 23 février 1970, juste avant la visite de
Pompidou. Il conseillait d’écarter d’emblée toutes les questions théologiques concernant
l’intégration atlantique, d’accepter la position particulière de la France
dans l’Alliance et de s’engager dans un rapprochement pragmatique. Les domaines
de coopération, dans la mesure où les Français seraient intéressés, pourraient concerner
une planification en commun ou coordonnée des objectifs des forces stratégiques;
une planification du même genre pour les forces nucléaires tactiques, étant
donné que la France allait disposer bientôt de telles forces; la question de la coopération
en matière d’armes nucléaires et de missiles était plus complexe, à cause du
Congrès, mais si les Français en faisaient la demande on pouvait indiquer que l’on
était prêt à l’envisager, sur des points spécifiques. 28 En revanche d’autres secteurs
de l’administration, comme par exemple le Département de la Défense, étaient
beaucoup plus réticents. 29
La visite de Pompidou aux Etats-Unis en février 1970.
On sait que la visite de Georges Pompidou aux Etats-Unis en février 1970 fut marquée
par de vifs incidents à Chicago, le 28 février, avec des manifestations protestant
contre la décision française de vendre des armes à la Libye. 30 Pourtant les avertissements
n’avaient pas manqué; 31 à mon avis l’Elysée et Georges Pompidou ont
25. Lettre de Pompidou à Nixon du 1 er juillet 1972, AN, 5AG2/1021.
26. Déclarations de Pompidou à Shriver le 23 juillet 1969, AN, 5AG2/1022, et propos de Beaumarchais,
directeur politique au Quai d’Orsay, le 29 juillet, à Shriver, National Archives, RG59, Subject-Numeric
Files 67-69/Box 2103. Déclarations de Michel Jobert, le secrétaire général de l’Elysée,
le 6 novembre, télé. de l’ambassade à Paris du 8 novembre, NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.IV.
Note de Michel Debré, ministre de la Défense, pour Pompidou en février 1970, 5AG2/1021.
27. Memorandum of conversation, 27 juin 1969, NPM, NSC CF/675/France vol.III.
28. NPM, NSC CF/916/France-Pompidou Visit February 1970.
29. Mémorandum pour le Président du Secrétaire à la Défense adjoint David Packard le 12 février
1970, conseillant de réclamer aux Français le paiement des frais occasionnés par le départ des forces
américaines en 1966-1967, le droit d’utiliser les installations réalisées par l’OTAN en France
(comme les oléoducs) en cas de crise et mettant en garde contre les transferts de technologie électronique
au profit des Français, NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.V.
30. Récit très complet du voyage dans E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.349-367.
31. Cf. le dossier du voyage, 5AG2/1022.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 117
été victimes d’abord de l’incompréhension du fait qu’aux Etats-Unis la sécurité et
l’ordre public dépendent des autorités municipales et que le voyage devait donc
aussi être préparé de ce point de vue au niveau local; or le dossier montre que si les
consuls à New York et à San Francisco furent très actifs dans ce domaine, celui de
Chicago le fut apparemment moins. D’autre part il est clair que Georges Pompidou
n’avait pas mesuré la gravité des passions soulevées dans la communauté juive
américaine par l’affaire des ventes d’armes à la Libye; il n’accepta que très peu de
demandes d’audience d’organisations ou de personnalités juives américaines, il
refusa, malgré la suggestion de l’un de ses conseillers, de prononcer une déclaration
générale rétablissant l’équilibre en faveur d’Israël; 32 en fait Pompidou, comme
il le déclara à des représentants d’organisations juives à San Francisco le 27 février,
estimait qu’il fallait distinguer soigneusement entre Israël en tant qu’Etat et la
question du judaïsme; selon lui Israël n’avait de chance de régler ses problèmes de
sécurité que lorsqu’il se considérerait comme un Etat parmi les autres Etats du
Moyen-Orient et non plus comme une «communauté religieuse». 33 Mais ce langage,
à l’époque, n’avait aucune chance d’être entendu. Or en fait Pompidou, tout
en poursuivant et même en développant la «politique arabe» de son prédécesseur,
avait fait évoluer la position française sur deux points importants par rapport à la
période antérieure: dès le 29 juin 1969 il s’était déclaré prêt à abandonner
l’embargo intégral sur les armes à destination d’Israël décidé par Paris le 1er janvier
1969 et à revenir à l’embargo sélectif proclamé en 1967, et donc à fournir à
Israël des pièces de rechange pour les armement déjà vendus, ce qui fut fait. 34
D’autre part il avait accepté (grande rupture avec le Général!) que les Etats-Unis et
l’URSS commencent à explorer de façon bilatérale la possibilité d’une solution au
Moyen-Orient, reconnaissant explicitement le rôle des Etats-Unis comme protecteur
d’Israël. 35
Il s’agissait donc en partie d’un malentendu. Les témoins et acteurs de l’époque
furent partagés sur la question de savoir si ces incidents durcirent la position de
Georges Pompidou envers les Etats-Unis et influencèrent ou non sa politique envers
eux par la suite. 36 A mon avis ce ne fut pas le cas: les rapports franco-américains
dépendaient de facteurs structurels et non pas accidentels. Les entretiens des 24 et
26 février avec Nixon en particulier furent positifs: les deux hommes tombèrent en
gros d’accord sur l’évolution des relations internationales vers un système multipolaire
(Etats-Unis, URSS, Europe occidentale, Chine, Japon), sur la prudence à
observer à l’égard de l’URSS, sur l’importance de ne pas isoler la Chine, sur la
nécessité de demander aux Allemands d’informer très exactement leurs partenaires
occidentaux de l’évolution de l’Ostpolitik. 37 Nixon reconnut la volonté française
32. Annotations sur une note de Jean-Louis Lucet du 11 février 1970, 5AG2/1022.
33. Cité par E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.362-364.
34. Annotation sur une note du 29 juin 1969 et ensemble du dossier, 5AG2/1040.
35. Entretien avec Shriver le 23 juillet 1969.
36. Cf. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.366-367.
37. Dans ses entretiens privés après la rencontre Nixon se déclarait fort satisfait, cf. SULZBERGER,
op.cit., pp.614-615.

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Georges-Henri Soutou
d’indépendance. Le plus intéressant fut que les deux hommes abordèrent carrément
les questions militaires: ils se déclarèrent d’accord pour autoriser des conversations
confidentielles bilatérales entre militaires des deux pays à propos de leur coopération
dans le cadre de l’OTAN, mais en dehors des structures intégrées, et éventuellement
pour préparer des plans en commun; Pompidou était disposé à étendre les
accords Ailleret-Lemnitzer de 1967 à toute la Ière Armée et pas seulement aux divisions
stationnées en Allemagne; il était prêt à ranimer le «comité directeur» établi
entre les deux pays en 1962 pour discuter de la coopération dans le domaine des
armements conventionnels; il suggéra que la France pourrait souhaiter deux ou
trois ans plus tard élargir cette coopération au domaine nucléaire, quand entreraient
en service ses sous-marins lanceurs d’engins et ses armes nucléaires tactiques. Les
deux hommes confirmèrent que de telles conversations ne remettraient nullement
en cause la liberté de décision des deux pays en cas de crise. Ils établirent d’autre
part des lignes de communication confidentielles entre eux: Kissinger et Jobert
pour les questions civiles, les généraux Goodpaster (commandant les forces américaines
en Europe et SACEUR) et Fourquet (Chef d’état-major des Armées) pour
les questions militaires. 38 On peut considérer que les dégâts de la période
1963-1968 étaient en voie d’être réparés; en outre, implicitement, Nixon avait
reconnu à la France le même rôle international et le même type de relation intime
avec Washington que pour la Grande-Bretagne, ce qui était une très ancienne
revendication française.
L’évolution des rapports franco-américains en 1970-1971.
On était d’accord à Paris et à Washington en 1970-1971 pour considérer que, globalement,
les relations franco-américaines évoluaient favorablement, en particulier
sur les questions européennes. 39 On était d’accord pour suivre avec vigilance l’Ostpolitik
de Willy Brandt; les craintes à ce sujet ne concernaient pas la résurgence
d’un danger allemand que l’on estimait de part et d’autre dépassé, mais l’éventualité
de concessions excessives de la RFA à l’URSS. Comme le dit Kissinger à
l’ambassadeur à Washington Charles Lucet le 13 avril 1970, on craignait que
Brandt ne lâche aux Russes «des choses essentielles»; 40 s’il devait y avoir un
accord entre l’Est et l’Ouest, poursuivait Kissinger, «il serait fait entre les
Etats-Unis et l’URSS et non pas entre les Allemands et l’URSS», ce qui rejoignait
une préoccupation constante à Paris. En effet à Paris on soutenait l’Ostpolitik dans
sa première phase, telle que Bonn l’affichait, celle qui conduisait à la signature de
traités avec les pays de l’Est reconnaissant de fait la division de l’Allemagne et les
38. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.350 ss.
39. Mémorandum de Kissinger pour le Président le 11 novembre 1970, avant la rencontre de celui-ci
avec Pompidou, à l’occasion des funérailles du général De Gaulle, et mémorandum de Kissinger
pour Nixon du 25 janvier 1971, NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VII.
40. Lettre de Lucet à Maurice Schumann du 14 avril 1970, 5AG2/1021.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 119
frontières de 1945. Mais on se méfiait beaucoup des arrière-pensées ultérieures de
Bonn, que l’on soupçonnait d’être prêt à rechercher la réunification de l’Allemagne
dans un nouveau système de sécurité européen qui aurait en fait reposé sur un
accord germano-soviétique. Car Georges Pompidou était très satisfait de voir l’Ostpolitik
conforter dans un premier temps la division de l’Allemagne. Mais il redoutait
un deuxième temps éventuel, celui d’un rapprochement en profondeur entre
l’Allemagne et Moscou en échange de la réunification, situation qui bouleverserait
les conditions de la sécurité de la France. Paris s’en tenait depuis les années 50 au
concept de la «double sécurité»: la sécurité de la France à l’égard de l’Allemagne
serait assurée par la division de cette dernière, la sécurité de la France envers
l’URSS serait assurée par l’alliance avec les Etats-Unis mais aussi par l’intégration
étroite de la RFA à l’Europe occidentale et à tout l’Occident. En 1966, à l’occasion
de son voyage à Moscou et parce qu’il était déçu du peu de suites réelles du traité
franco-allemand de janvier 1963, De Gaulle avait envisagé quelque chose de différent:
un nouvel ordre de sécurité en Europe reposant fondamentalement sur une
entente franco-soviétique pour contrôler l’Allemagne et marginalisant l’Amérique.
Pompidou était revenu sur ce point à quelque chose de plus classique et de plus
compatible, dans sa vision géopolitique de l’avenir de l’Allemagne, de l’URSS et
de l’Europe, avec de bons rapports franco-américains. 41
D’autre part au cours de son voyage en URSS en octobre 1970, le Président
Pompidou résista à Brejnev qui voulait l’amener à répéter les propos tenus à Moscou
par le Général en 1966 «en faveur d’une élimination progressive de l’influence
des Etats-Unis en Europe». Certes, l’Europe devrait pouvoir se «dégager de
l’influence des Etats-Unis» et «être pleinement l’Europe», mais l’influence de
l’Amérique sur le Continent découlait de la menace militaire soviétique et de la
nécessité de contrer celle-ci avec la puissance militaire américaine et l’Alliance
atlantique. Seule une véritable détente permettrait de sortir de cette situation, mais
la responsabilité en incombait d’abord à l’URSS. En outre il n’était pas question de
remplacer ce que Pompidou se refusait à qualifier pour son compte de «tutelle américaine»
par une «tutelle soviétique». 42 On voit que sur cette question absolument
centrale à propos du triangle Paris-Washington-Moscou la position de Pompidou
était très différente de celle de De Gaulle, même si lui aussi souhaitait l’émergence
d’une «Europe européenne». Le Président s’en expliqua dans une conversation fort
significative avec le journaliste américain Cyrus Sulzberger le 1er décembre 1970:
«La base de ma réflexion est que la France se rapproche des Etats-Unis dans la
mesure où la supériorité des Etats-Unis par rapport à la Russie diminue. C’est pourquoi
ma politique est moins anti-américaine dans son expression que celle de De
Gaulle, parce qu’il ressentait fortement la supériorité américaine sur l’Union soviétique
et d’autres pays et estimait qu’il devait s’y opposer». 43
On constate également, et là aussi c’était nouveau, que Georges Pompidou était
désireux d’un contact approfondi avec Washington à propos des points de tension
41. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou …, op.cit.
42. Compte-rendu de l’entretien Pompidou-Brejnev du 13 octobre 1970, 5AG2/1018.
43. SULZBERGER, op.cit., p.690.

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Georges-Henri Soutou
en Europe, par exemple à propos des menaces éventuelles soviétiques sur la Roumanie
et la Yougoslavie, qui préoccupaient fort les Occidentaux en 1971. 44 Les
Soviétiques s’en rendaient d’ailleurs compte, qui régulièrement soupçonnaient les
Français de s’écarter de la ligne d’"indépendance» de De Gaulle. 45
A la fin de l’année 1970, le seul véritable problème entre les deux pays était la
question monétaire internationale. En décembre la France reprit ses achats d’or et
les Français recommencèrent leurs critiques contre l’inflation américaine et la politique
monétaire et économique américaine et son impact négatif sur l’Europe. 46
En revanche sur le plan militaire les choses évoluaient favorablement. Dès le 10
mars 1970, à la suite de la visite du Président français, Nixon approuvait, sur les
conseils de Kissinger, toute une série de décisions: le général Goodpaster était
autorisé à explorer avec le général Fourquet toutes les possibilités pratiques d’améliorer
la coopération avec les forces françaises, y compris en ce qui concernait les
armes nucléaires tactiques et les forces navales, ainsi que la possibilité de coordonner
les plans de frappe des forces stratégiques respectives, tout en respectant le
refus français de revenir à l’intégration atlantique et étant entendu que la décision
finale dépendrait d’un accord entre Nixon et Pompidou; le comité franco-américain
sur les armements conventionnels créé en 1962, mais en sommeil depuis 1966,
serait réactivé; on étudierait la possibilité de venir en aide aux Français pour leurs
programmes de missiles; on mettrait entre parenthèses une décision de l’administration
Johnson en 1964 (NSAM 294) qui interdisait toute aide aux Français concernant
les armes nucléaires et les missiles. 47
Il ne faut pas penser que tout le monde à Washington était aussi prêt à renouer la
collaboration militaire avec les Français que Nixon et Kissinger. Le Secrétaire à la
Défense Melvin Laird répondit à Kissinger le 2 avril 1970 de façon apparemment
positive mais en fait très réservée à propos des programmes de missiles. Il soulignait
les difficultés possibles avec le Congrès et des répercussions possibles sur les
négociations SALT avec les Soviétiques. En outre, selon Laird, les échanges éventuels
«ne devraient fournir aucune accélération significative aux capacités françaises»,
ce qui en réduisait évidemment l’intérêt! En outre il fallait exiger en contrepartie
que les Français acceptent de participer à l’étude stratégique que l’OTAN
avait commencée à propos des années 70. 48 Or c’était ce genre de participation à
l’OTAN que les Français justement récusaient dans leur crainte constante d’être
ramenés indirectement à l’intégration qu’ils avaient quittée en 1966. Comme le
44. Annotation de Georges Pompidou sur un télégramme du 26 juillet 1971, 5AG2/1041; cf. un dossier
complet sur les possibilités d’intervention soviétique en Yougoslavie, le 21 février 1972, 5AG2/
1040.
45. Cf. par exemple l’entretien entre l’ambassadeur à Paris Zorine et Michel Debré, ministre de la Défense,
le 16 janvier 1971, 5AG2/1018.
46. Mémorandum de Fred Bergsten pour Kissinger sur les achats d’or par la France le 10 décembre
1970, et série de documents sur des entretiens d’Hervé Alphand, secrétaire général du Quai
d’Orsay, à Washington, en particulier avec Kissinger, les 10 et 11 décembre, NPM, NSC CF/677/
France vol.VII.
47. NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.V.
48. NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.VI.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 121
nota Georges Pompidou le 24 avril, Paris était prêt à s’entretenir sur un plan bilatéral
avec les Américains sur les questions de défense et de sécurité des années 70,
mais pas dans un cadre OTAN multilatéral. 49 On ne pouvait pas mieux illustrer le
souci français constant d’une situation privilégiée à Washington, d’un rôle de
charnière entre l’Amérique et l’Europe, à l’instar de la Grande-Bretagne, comme je
l’ai souligné au début de cette étude.
Kissinger préféra aller de l’avant sans trop tenir compte des restrictions de
Laird. Il décida le 24 avril 1970 d’envoyer à Paris pour des conversations exploratoires
John Foster, secrétaire adjoint à la Défense, chargé des questions d’armement.
Celui-ci reçut pour instructions de tenir certes compte des préoccupations de
Laird à l’égard du secret, du Congrès, des SALT, mais on soulignait que le
Président voulait aider les Français; en outre Foster ne devait pas laisser croire à ses
interlocuteurs que l’assistance américaine dépendrait d’un rapprochement de la
France avec l’OTAN. 50 Kissinger (et Nixon) avaient parfaitement compris qu’il
fallait écarter tout préalable théologique concernant l’Alliance.
Dès l’été 1970 les choses avaient pris tournure: le général Goodpaster avait eu
de premiers entretiens avec le général Fourquet; on avait progressé dans le domaine
de la planification de la coopération en cas de guerre avec les forces françaises en
Allemagne, même si les Français n’étaient pas encore disposés à parler de leurs
(futures) armes nucléaires tactiques; le secrétaire adjoint à la Défense John Foster
avait eu une première conversation privée avec le délégué ministériel à l’Armement
Jean Blancard sur les souhaits des Français concernant les missiles. (Parallèlement
on constatait que les échanges scientifiques de toute nature entre la France et les
Etats-Unis se multipliaient: ils dépassaient ce qui existait avec tout autre pays). 51
Le 3 août 1970, Sonnenfeldt fit remarquer à Kissinger que jusque-là on avait procédé
au coup par coup: il fallait désormais systématiser les choses, disposer d’une
doctrine présidentielle, créer à Washington un groupe de coordination pour les
échanges avec les Français, prendre d’autre part une série de décisions de fond:
voulait-on soutenir l’effort stratégique des Français et donc annuler la décision de
l’administration Johnson d’avril 1964? Quel serait alors la répercussion de cette
assistance sur les SALT? Les arguments et la présentation de ceux-ci par Sonnenfeldt
impliquaient que pour lui il était souhaitable de soutenir l’effort français, ne
serait-ce que parce qu’il serait nécessaire de coordonner entre l’OTAN et Paris
l’emploi des forces nucléaires tactiques en Europe le cas échéant, sous peine de
conséquences catastrophiques pour l’OTAN; que les forces françaises ne seraient
pas suffisamment importantes pour compromettre vraiment les SALT; que le mieux
serait sans doute que l’assistance américaine intervienne dans le cadre d’un effort
nucléaire et stratégique commun à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne, comme les
dirigeants britanniques le suggéraient. 52
49. 5AG2/1041.
50. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 23 juin 1970, NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VI.
51. Note de Sonnefeldt pour Kissinger du 11 décembre 1970, NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VII.
52. NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VI.

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Les réflexions se poursuivirent durant les mois suivants et jusqu’en mars 1971
entre le NSC et les Départements d’Etat et de la Défense dans le cadre d’un groupe
ad hoc chargé de la préparation du NSSM 100 (National Security Study Memorandum)
sur les relations militaires avec la France. Elles furent très difficiles, à cause des
réticences des militaires à toute concession à la France tant qu’elle n’aurait pas
rejoint, au moins en pratique, le commandement intégré de l’OTAN, également à
cause des réticences prévisibles du Congrès, et elles exigèrent l’engagement sans
faille de Kissinger. 53 Un souci important à Washington était d’éviter, en développant
la coopération bilatérale avec les Français, de risquer des réactions négatives de la
part d’autres membres de l’Alliance atlantique (évidemment en particulier de la RFA)
qui affaibliraient l’unité de l’OTAN. 54 Finalement on aboutit fin mars à des recommandations
assez limitées, qui furent entérinées par Nixon (NSDM 103 et 104) et
communiquées aux Français: un certain assouplissement en ce qui concernait les calculateurs
très puissants, indispensables pour l’étude des armes nucléaires; en matière
de missiles, une aide limitée aux questions liées à la fiabilité des composants des
systèmes existants et à l’exclusion des domaines qui pourraient améliorer la précision
des fusées françaises (les demandes de Paris portaient également sur ce dernier
point); en matière nucléaire, on se contenterait de reprendre les échanges interrompus
en 1963 sur la sûreté des armes nucléaires (procédures et systèmes). 55
Sur la base de ces décisions l’ambassadeur Watson remit le 5 mai 1971 aux
Français un mémorandum proposant l’ouverture de conversations pour la technologie
des missiles, la sécurité des armes nucléaires et les ordinateurs de grande
puissance. 56 En conséquence John Foster rencontra à Paris Jean Blancard, le 12
mai 1971. Ils parlèrent des missiles et Blancard fut tout à fait d’accord pour que les
échanges portent uniquement sur la fiabilité des systèmes existants: sa priorité était
en effet de faire fonctionner correctement les systèmes en cours de développement,
qui apparemment rencontraient certains problèmes, et non pas de demander aux
Américains de l’aider à mettre au point une génération de missiles plus avancés.
Sur ces bases l’accord se fit pour une nouvelle rencontre le 15 juin. 57 Au cours de
celle-ci Foster remit à Blancard un projet d’accord pour des échanges sur les missiles
et la sûreté des armes nucléaires. Le 22 juillet, Blancard fut autorisé à signer cet
accord et à commencer des discussions dans les deux domaines prévus. On remarquera
que cet accord allait en fait plus loin que ce qui avait été décidé à Washington
au départ: il concernait également les domaines du guidage et de la précision des
missiles ainsi que le durcissement des charges nucléaires (face aux défenses
anti-missiles à base d’ogives nucléaires correspondant au système ABM soviétique
Galosh), même si ces domaines étaient soumis à des conditions limitatives particu-
53. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 9 janvier 1971, NPM NSC CF/677/France vol.VII.
54. Note de Kissinger pour Nixon du 25 janvier 1970, ibid.
55. Note de Kissinger pour le Président du 25 mars 1971, ibid., et note de Kissinger pour le Secrétaire
d’Etat et le Secrétaire à la Défense du 15 avril 1971, NPM, NSC CF/678/France vol.VIII.
56. Note de Michel Debré, ministre de la Défense, pour Pompidou, début 1972, 5AG2/1040.
57. Lettre de David Packard, secrétaire d’Etat à la Défense adjoint, à Kissinger, du 25 mai 1971, NPM,
NSC CF/678/France vol.VIII.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 123
lières. 58 On a l’impression que certains à Washington voulaient aller un peu plus
loin que ce que comportait le consensus minimum réalisé au sein de l’administration.
Blancard eut de nouveaux entretiens avec Foster à Washington en novembre
1971. Le 12, celui-ci lui écrivait pour proposer l’ouverture de discussions sur la
sécurité des armes nucléaires.
Cependant le souci d’indépendance poussait Paris également à mettre de son
côté de strictes limites aux échanges: il s’agissait uniquement d’améliorer la fiabilité
et les capacités des missiles existants, en réalisant des gains de temps et
d’argent sur les programmes; mais en aucun cas il ne fallait que les conversations
permettent aux Américains de se faire une idée de la valeur opérationnelle des
engins français ni des modalités de contrôle des missiles et des têtes nucléaires et
des réseaux de commandement gouvernementaux. En outre, il ne fallait en aucun
cas que les Américains puissent dire aux Soviétiques qu’ils contrôlaient techniquement
l’effort français. En fait, la prudence américaine, quoique pour des raisons
différentes, rejoignait la prudence française, liée aux préoccupations permanentes
d’indépendance nationale. 59 D’autre part, si les conversations Goodpaster-Fourquet
sur la coordination des plans d’emploi des Forces françaises avec celles de l’OTAN
et la modernisation des accords Ailleret-Lemnitzer de 1967 se poursuivaient (une
nouvelle rencontre avait eu lieu le 27 janvier 1971) elles ne signifiaient nullement
un retour de Paris au commandement intégré et gardaient un caractère hypothétique
et non automatique: la liberté de décision de la France en cas de conflit restait
entière. Enfin on ne souhaitait pas à Paris évoquer tout de suite pour ces discussions
le passage du cadre des seules FFA à celui de l’ensemble de la Ière Armée, car cela
aurait posé de façon «prématurée» le problème du Pluton et des conditions
d’emploi des armes tactiques françaises. 60
Les limites de Paris en matière de coopération militaire:
Hardware oui, Software non!
En effet en matière stratégique et nucléaire on était disposé à Paris à parler avec les
Américains des matériels (et encore avec les réserves que nous venons de voir),
c’est-à-dire du Hardware, mais pas des conceptions d’emploi des armes nucléaires
(le Software). On n’était pas prêt non plus à remettre en cause la décision de 1966
concernant le départ de la France de l’organisation intégrée de l’OTAN. Par exemple
un conseil de Défense à l’Elysée le 26 février 1971, après une discussion approfondie
et même vive entre toutes les administrations concernées, décida d’en rester
à la décision française de 1967 concernant les oléoducs construits par l’OTAN sur
le territoire français: en temps de paix Paris acceptait que ces oléoducs continuent à
ravitailler les forces de l’OTAN en Allemagne, mais en temps de guerre, la France
58. Note de Debré à Pompidou du début 1972 déjà citée.
59. 5AG2/1040.
60. Note de Debré à Pompidou du début 1972 déjà citée.

124
Georges-Henri Soutou
réservait sa liberté de décision. Cette affaire apparemment technique posait tout le
problème de l’interprétation de l’article V du Pacte atlantique: Paris réaffirmait en
fait sa volonté de conserver sa totale liberté d’action, même pour une action
d’assistance (la mise à disposition des oléoducs) qui n’impliquait pas une participation
armée au conflit, ce qui était une lecture très restrictive de l’article V, contestée
d’ailleurs sur le plan juridique par certains diplomates français. Pompidou maintenait
donc l’interprétation française la plus stricte de la liberté d’appréciation et de
décision de la France en cas de crise. 61 Or, outre bien sûr ses implications générales
pour la position de la France envers l’OTAN (le refus maintenu de toute automaticité
dans l’engagement des forces françaises), cette affaire contrariait beaucoup les
Américains: ils considéraient en effet que cette question (ainsi que celle de la mise
à disposition de l’ensemble des moyens logistiques français en cas de guerre) était
la conséquence la plus grave du retrait français de 1966 et ils espéraient bien que le
rapprochement militaire avec Paris permettrait, dans un deuxième temps, de revenir
sur ce problème. 62
D’autre part certains responsables français (comme François de Rose, représentant
de la France auprès de l’OTAN) estimaient que l’évolution de la stratégie américaine
(de plus en plus réticente à l’égard de l’emploi des armes nucléaires stratégiques
mais aussi tactiques et de plus en plus soucieuse d’alléger la présence
militaire des Etats-Unis en Europe et de voir les Européens accroître leur effort
dans le domaine conventionnel) devrait conduire Paris à rechercher un dialogue
avec Washington sur la doctrine d’emploi des armes nucléaires et en particulier sur
les armes nucléaires tactiques françaises, comme les fusées tactiques Pluton dont
l’entrée en service était prévue pour 1973-1974 et qui poseraient un problème de
coordination avec les armes tactiques de l’OTAN. 63 Mais Georges Pompidou s’y
refusa absolument: la France devait marquer clairement son «indépendance», toute
perspective de conversations avec Washington sur les doctrines d’emploi nucléaires
éveillait sa «plus grande méfiance" 64 car les Américains «chercheraient à nous attirer
dans une discussion sur nos rapports avec eux dans le domaine de la défense et
de l’arme nucléaire». 65 Quant aux Plutons, alors qu’en 1970 on avait prévu de les
stationner avec les Forces françaises en Allemagne (le cœur fissile restant stocké en
temps normal en France), on s’orientait dès le début de 1971 vers un stationnement
en France: cela réduirait les problèmes avec les Allemands, qui commençaient à
s’inquiéter des cibles et modalités d’emploi de ces engins de 120 kilomètres de
portée seulement, et cela préserverait davantage la liberté de décision de Paris dans
l’engagement des forces françaises et retarderait la (difficile) discussion avec les
Américains sur la doctrine d’emploi de ces armes. 66
61. Cf. tout le dossier dans 5AG2/1041.
62. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 3 août 1970; NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VI.
63. Notes de François de Rose des 1 er février et 22 septembre 1971, 5AG2/1041.
64. Annotation de Pompidou sur la note de François de Rose du 22 septembre 1971, ibid.
65. Annotation sur une note de Jean-Bernard Raimond du 28 janvier 1971, ibid.
66. Note de l’état-major particulier du Président, 22 février 1971, ibid.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 125
Georges Pompidou et les perspectives de négociations militaires
avec les Soviétiques (SALT et MBFR).
Georges Pompidou maintenait donc le dogme gaulliste de l’indépendance nationale,
malgré son rapprochement militaire avec Washington. Mais nous allons voir que son
souci d’indépendance rompait avec certaines des arrière-pensées du Général et se
situait dans un contexte différent. On va voir apparaître en particulier dans le domaine
des négociations militaires avec Moscou (SALT et MBFR) des divergences de vues
avec Washington qui iraient s’aggravant surtout à partir de 1972-1973, mais dans une
perspective qui n’était que partiellement gaulliste et qui répondait d’abord au souci de
maintenir la cohésion stratégique entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unis face à l’URSS, ce
qui n’était pas la conception fondamentale du Général.
Tout d’abord à partir de 1971 Paris prit conscience du fait qu’un accord américano-soviétique
sur les armements stratégiques devenait probable. Il fallait être très
attentif quant aux conséquences d’un tel accord pour la France, en particulier quant
à la valeur politique et militaire de sa propre force nucléaire dans le nouveau contexte
stratégique et quant à d’éventuelles pressions de la part des Américains et des
Soviétiques pour la prise en compte, explicite ou implicite, des forces nucléaires
françaises dans le décompte des arsenaux en présence. 67 Mais si les SALT inspiraient
à Paris de la méfiance, les MBFR suscitaient un rejet absolu. On craignait
qu’elles ne conduisent à un retrait des troupes américaines stationnées en Europe
(crainte constante à Paris à l’époque de Pompidou) et à une neutralisation de
l’Europe centrale permettant à l’URSS d’exercer des pressions politiques permanentes
sur l’Europe, ce qui n’était pas une vue «gaulliste» des choses. 68 On craignait
qu’elle ne rende impossible une option que Pompidou ne voulait pas écarter a
priori pour l’avenir, celle d’une défense européenne. 69 Mais surtout la grande
inquiétude de Georges Pompidou était que les MBFR, à cause des tendances au
désengagement que l’on prêtait à Washington, ne conduisent à une évacuation des
forces étrangères des deux Allemagne; ce fait, couplé avec les perspectives de réunification
contenues dans l’Ostpolitik, conduirait rapidement à l’ascension d’une
Allemagne réunifiée, libre de ses mouvements et dotée sans doute de l’arme
nucléaire. 70 Pour Pompidou en effet si l’Occident, et en particulier les Américains,
ne veillaient pas à canaliser l’Ostpolitik et étaient imprudents dans les négociations
de désarmement avec l’URSS, de deux choses l’une: ou bien la RFA finirait par
tomber sous l’influence soviétique, ou bien l’Allemagne réunifiée reprendrait un
rôle international indépendant, y compris un rôle nucléaire. Dans les deux cas ce
serait désastreux pour la France. Ce n’était pas la même position, on le voit, que de
Gaulle, qui estimait que la France pourrait contrôler l’Allemagne par un accord
implicite avec l’URSS et en établissant avec elle un nouveau système de sécurité en
67. Annotation de Georges Pompidou du 13 mai 1971, 5AG2/1041.
68. Note de Jean-Bernard Raimond pour Pompidou le 8 octobre 1971, 5AG2/1018.
69. Note de Jean-Louis Lucet pour le Président du 12 janvier 1972, 5AG2/1041.
70. Conversation de Pompidou avec Brejnev le 29 octobre 1971, 5AG2/1018, et confidence de Pompidou
au journaliste André Fontaine, citée par E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., p.394.

126
Georges-Henri Soutou
Europe, dans lequel les Américains ne joueraient plus qu’un rôle périphérique. 71
Les deux hommes se rejoignaient dans le refus de la réunification de l’Allemagne
(comme la plupart des hommes politiques français), mais Pompidou concevait la
question allemande dans un contexte beaucoup plus «occidental» et méfiant à
l’égard de l’URSS que de Gaulle.
Le sommet des Açores (décembre 1971) et ses suites décevantes.
Le sommet des Açores entre Nixon et Pompidou en décembre 1971 se déroula dans
un contexte international bouleversé par le «choc Nixon": l’annonce de la visite du
Président américain à Pékin, le 15 juillet, et la suspension de la convertibilité du dollar,
le 15 août. Si Paris saluait la décision américaine concernant la Chine, qui paraissait
justifier a posteriori la reconnaissance de Pékin par la France en 1964 et dont
l’intérêt géopolitique paraissait évident, 72 si les négociations militaires se poursuivaient
efficacement, trois grands sujets de mésentente existaient alors entre les deux
capitales: les questions monétaires; la conférence sur la sécurité en Europe que souhaitait
Paris mais à laquelle Washington était toujours opposée; les MBFR, pour lesquelles
les positions étaient inverses. 73 Il n’est pas question d’entrer ici dans le détail
des conversations complexes qu’eurent Pompidou, Nixon et Kissinger les 13 et 14
décembre. 74 Le Président français avait sollicité ce sommet, auquel il se présenta un
peu comme le porte-parole de l’Europe. Toute la stratégie de Pompidou, acceptée
apparemment par Nixon et Kissinger, consista à placer le problème monétaire, essentiel
à ses yeux d’ancien banquier qui s’était fixé comme première tâche de moderniser
la France et de l’inscrire pleinement dans l’économie mondiale, dans le cadre plus
large de la solidarité politique occidentale: «la France est un pays occidental et donc,
aussi bien pour des raisons de sentiments historiques, elle est déterminée à maintenir
l’alliance et l’amitié avec les Etats-Unis». On est là au cœur de la politique extérieure
pompidolienne: la France voulait développer la Communauté économique européenne
et l’influencer de façon décisive, mais dans une collaboration raisonnable et
équilibrée avec Washington, collaboration dont elle serait d’ailleurs le point de passage
privilégié, et non pas dans une rivalité avec l’Amérique qui ne pouvait que conduire
à l’échec, car personne alors en Europe ne suivrait Paris.
On tomba d’accord assez facilement sur les questions politiques: nécessité de la
Détente, mais prudence indispensable à l’égard de l’URSS et aussi de l’Ostpolitik,
nécessité du maintien des forces américaines en Europe malgré les pressions du
Congrès, intérêt du rapprochement sino-américain. Sur le plan monétaire les négo-
71. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’Alliance incertaine, op.cit., pp.301-305.
72. Note d’Henri Froment-Meurice, directeur d’Asie au Quai d’Orsay, du 19 juillet 1971, 5AG2/1021.
73. Note de Raimond pour Pompidou le 7 décembre 1971, 5AG2/1022.
74. Les comptes-rendus s’en trouvent aux AN, 5AG2/1022; ils ont été reproduits dans E. ROUSSEL,
op.cit., pp.464 ss., et dans W. BURR (éd.), The Kissinger Transcripts, New York, The New Press,
1998, pp.33 ss.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 127
ciations furent très difficiles, mais on aboutit à un compromis: le dollar serait dévalué
(étant donné que la balance commerciale française avec les Etats-Unis était
déficitaire de 50%, c’était pour Paris une concession importante) mais on reviendrait
à un système de parités fixes entre les monnaies, dont les valeurs seraient réajustées
mais désormais défendues, ce qui était pour la France une revendication
essentielle, liée au maintien de son équilibre économique interne et également au
problème très délicat du rapport entre le franc et le mark allemand. En outre par un
accord secret les Américains s’engageaient à terme à revenir à la convertibilité du
dollar, ce qui était évidemment capital si on voulait réellement revenir définitivement
à un système de parités fixes et que les Etats-Unis contribuent effectivement
au fonctionnement du nouveau système. Mais en fait Washington ne tint que partiellement
ses engagements: l’accord dit du Smithsonian du 18 décembre 1971,
destiné à faire entrer dans les faits les décisions des Açores, décidait bien une modification
des parités (le dollar était dévalué de 7,9%, la livre et le franc conservaient
leur valeur antérieure et étaient donc de fait réévalués de 8,57% par rapport au dollar,
le mark était réévalué de 13,58% par rapport à sa parité d’avant le 5 mai et cessait
de flotter, le yen était réévalué de 16,88%). Mais le dollar restait inconvertible
et les Américains ne prenaient aucun engagement de défendre la nouvelle parité de
leur monnaie. Le maintien de celle-ci supposait donc que les autres banques centrales
fussent disposées à acquérir des quantités illimitées de dollars. L’accord du
Smithsonian était donc très fragile. Le flottement du dollar était inévitable désormais,
car à partir du moment où Washington avait proclamé l’inconvertibilité du
dollar, la dévaluation de celui-ci par rapport à l’or n’avait plus de sens. Et d’ailleurs
dès 1972, avec le flottement de la livre, l’accord du Smithsonian montrait ses limites.
Une nouvelle crise éclata en février 1973 et provoqua une dévaluation supplémentaire
de 10% du dollar, avant d’aboutir le 16 mars à la décision historique de
flottement conjoint des monnaies européennes par rapport au dollar: c’était l’abandon
de fait du système de Bretton Woods et des parités fixes (même «ajustables»
comme on essaya un temps de le dire pour tenter de réduire l’importance du désaccord
entre Français et Américains) avant leur abandon officiel à la conférence de la
Jamaïque en janvier 1976. Les Américains étaient arrivés à l’objectif que certains
de leurs responsables en tout cas s’étaient fixé depuis 1971: débarrassés des contraintes
d’un système de parités fixes, les Etats-Unis pouvaient désormais laisser
évoluer le dollar en fonction de leurs intérêts commerciaux, tout en conservant le
bénéfice d’une monnaie transnationale, c’est-à-dire la possibilité de ne pas corriger
le déficit chronique de leur balance des comptes sans même devoir limiter leurs
exportations de capitaux. 75 Les thèses monétaires égoïstes du secrétaire au Trésor
John Connally l’avaient donc emporté sur celles de Kissinger, qui estimait que le
maintien de la solidarité occidentale devait être, pour des raisons politiques, la considération
prioritaire. C’était un très profond bouleversement dans la politique suivie
par les Américains depuis 1947: désormais, sur un point essentiel, les intérêts
75. Sur ces questions le meilleur récit reste celui de J. DENIZET, Le Dollar, Paris, Fayard, 1985.

128
Georges-Henri Soutou
strictement nationaux des Etats-Unis prenaient le pas sur leurs responsabilités
comme chef de file du Monde libre. 76
L’échec en fait de la conférence des Açores était un échec pour la conception
pompidolienne d’une Europe conduite par la France et collaborant sur un pied
d’égalité avec l’Amérique, dans une bonne entente occidentale. Pompidou, qui
s’était montré plus accommodant en matière monétaire que de Gaulle, en était
conscient; il écrivit à Nixon le 4 février 1972 que les Etats-Unis ne tenaient pas les
engagements pris:
«Lors de nos entretiens des Açores, j’avais bien compris qu’il ne pouvait pas être question
de la convertibilité intégrale de votre monnaie (c’est-à-dire le retour à la convertibilité
en or, la thèse française antérieure), mais je m’étais permis de vous indiquer que
si vous acceptiez de contrôler les mouvements de capitaux, de mettre au point un système
permettant de consolider les balances dollar et aussi de défendre votre monnaie
en l’échangeant, le cas échéant, contre d’autres devises, les balances dollar mises à
part, cela signifiait pratiquement une convertibilité de monnaie à monnaie». 77
Or dans le rapport qui accompagnait le message adressé au Congrès le 27 janvier
1972 par Nixon, il «était fait état d’un accord croissant en faveur d’une plus grande
flexibilité des changes. Ceci ne paraît pas conforme aux engagements que nous avions
pris vous et moi». En outre Washington n’avait pris aucune mesure pour le contrôle
des mouvements de capitaux, question essentielle aux yeux des Français qui
reprochaient aux Américains, grâce au rôle international du dollar, de continuer à
racheter des entreprises européennes malgré le déficit de leur balance des comptes et
sans contre-valeur réelle. On remarque, point capital, que Pompidou n’exigeait pas le
retour à l’or, comme l’avait fait de Gaulle en 1965, ce qui ouvrait la voie à un compromis.
Mais Nixon répondit de façon parfaitement vague le 16 février. Revenant sur
cet échange le 28 mars 1973 et à la lumière de ce qui s’était passé ensuite, Jean-René
Bernard, qui suivait les questions financières internationales à l’Elysée, notait: «ces
documents montrent que les Américains ne considèrent pas qu’ils aient réellement
pris des engagements monétaires sérieux aux Açores». 78 Cette conviction à laquelle
Paris était parvenue devait selon moi beaucoup contribuer à la détérioration des rapports
franco-américains que l’on constate à partir de 1973.
On était en effet parfaitement conscient à Paris de ce que l’accord du Smithsonian
avait de fragile et de provisoire. Un conseil restreint eut lieu le 7 février 1972
sur les questions monétaires. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing exposa la situation: ou bien
on faisait fonctionner vaille que vaille l’accord du Smithsonian, ou bien on profiterait
de la crise pour franchir une nouvelle étape dans la voie de l’Union économique
et monétaire européenne. Pompidou exprima avec beaucoup de force sa préférence
pour la deuxième solution, car la première reviendrait à «admettre que les
76. R. S. LITWAK, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, Cambridge UP, 1984, pp.136-137; W. BUNDY,
A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, Tauris, Londres, 1998,
pp.261-269; J. DENIZET, Le Dollar. Histoire du système monétaire international depuis 1945,
Paris, Fayard, 1985, pp.109-125.
77. 5AG2/1021.
78. Ibid.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 129
Etats-Unis dirigent la politique économique et monétaire mondiale». Il faudrait
mettre les Allemands au pied du mur, ils ne pourraient pas aller contre l’Europe
malgré leur propension à suivre les Etats-Unis. 79 Mais à partir de ce moment-là
Pompidou avait franchi un pas décisif: finalement, pour résister à l’emprise du dollar,
un accord européen était plus important que de forcer la monnaie américaine à
rester dans le cadre de parités fixes. Ce retournement conceptuel ouvrait la voie à
l’accord monétaire européen de 1973 (flottement conjoint des monnaies européennes
par rapport au dollar).
D’une façon plus générale, la question monétaire allait être l’un des facteurs
essentiels du recadrage de la politique américaine de Pompidou à partir de 1973,
cherchant désormais moins à servir d’intermédiaire privilégié entre les Etats-Unis
et l’Europe et davantage à regrouper l’Europe pour contrebalancer la prépotence
américaine, ce qui était un certain retour au gaullisme. L’ambassade américaine à
Paris pour sa part constatait dès septembre 1972 les dégâts que les questions monétaires
produisaient dans les relations franco-américaines et sentait cette réorientation
européenne de la politique française. 80
Les rapports militaires et politico-stratégiques franco-américains en 1972.
Malgré la forte déception due à l’échec du sommet des Açores, sur le plan militaire
et politico-stratégique les rapports franco-américains continuèrent à se développer
en 1972. Le 11 mars, Debré écrivait à Pompidou à quel point il était satisfait des
conversations Foster-Blancard: les renseignements techniques américains étaient
du plus haut intérêt:
«Nous sommes en droit de considérer que les dirigeants américains entendent nous
fournir une aide très précieuse, c’est-à-dire qu’ils estiment de leur intérêt de soutenir
et d’améliorer le développement de notre force nucléaire. Il n’a été question, en
aucune façon, de la moindre contrepartie». 81
Il est clair que les Américains allaient en fait plus loin que ce que comportaient
les décisions officiellement arrêtées à Washington.
Les 7 et 12 juillet Debré eut une série de conversations à Washington avec Kissinger,
Laird et Nixon. 82 Ces conversations se déroulèrent de façon particulièrement
positive et dénotèrent une réelle intimité. Debré demanda des informations
sur les radars et les défenses ABM des Soviétiques, point essentiel pour la capacité
de pénétration de la Force de frappe française; Kissinger promit de les lui faire parvenir
directement si les services administratifs et les départements ministériels concernés
refusaient de le faire, ce qui confirme l’impression déjà soulignée selon
79. 5AG2/1011.
80. Télé. de Paris du 20 septembre 1972, RG 59/Num 70-73/Box 2278.
81. 5AG2/1040.
82. Compte-rendu du 11 juillet 1972, NPM, NSC CF/678/France vol.IX, et lettre de Debré à Pompidou
du 13 juillet, 5AG2/1040.

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Georges-Henri Soutou
laquelle le conseiller du Président était prêt à aller plus loin que le consensus prudent
au sein de l’administration. Laird s’engagea à interpréter de façon libérale la
loi MacMahon sur le secret atomique après la réélection de Nixon en novembre. A
la suite de ces entretiens, en septembre, le général Walters, directeur adjoint de la
CIA, devait avoir un entretien avec Debré pour lui fournir les informations demandées
sur les défenses ABM soviétiques, ce qui impliquait des renseignements extrêmement
confidentiels et hautement techniques obtenus par les services américains
et leurs moyens d’observation. 83
Paris était en revanche plus inquiet à propos des accords SALT du mois de mai 1972 et
de leurs implications possibles pour la France. Le 13 juin, le Président français se
demanda devant Gromyko, le ministre des Affaires étrangères soviétique, si les accords
SALT «ne correspondaient pas plus ou moins à une espèce de volonté d’établir un condominium
sur le reste du monde». Ce thème du condominium devait revenir fréquemment
par la suite. 84 En outre la France risquait d’être au moins indirectement impliquée pour ses
propres forces nucléaires. Le 9 juin, Nixon avait écrit à Pompidou pour lui relater son
voyage à Moscou et évoquer les SALT. Les Soviétiques avaient exigé de pouvoir augmenter
le nombre de leurs sous-marins nucléaires si la France et la Grande-Bretagne dépassaient
leur total programmé de neuf SNLE (quatre britanniques et cinq français; il était
fortement question d’un sixième SLNE français, pour pouvoir en avoir toujours au moins
deux à la mer). Nixon s’était absolument refusé à admettre cette exigence, mais il ne
cachait pas que Moscou y reviendrait lors de la prochaine phase des négociations et qu’il
faudrait que Paris et Washington se concertent à ce sujet. Pompidou répondit le 1er juillet
d’une façon qui soulignait la très grande prudence de la France sur ce point. 85
Un autre point qui préoccupait beaucoup les Français était un projet de traité,
d’origine soviétique, par lequel les Etats-Unis et l’URSS s’engageraient mutuellement
à ne pas utiliser l’un contre l’autre l’arme nucléaire. Les Américains n’étaient
évidemment pas disposés à accepter quelque chose qui contredisait totalement la
stratégie de l’OTAN, mais ils ne pensaient pas pouvoir répondre de façon purement
négative, car ils ne voulaient pas compromettre la ligne de détente que poursuivait
Brejnev malgré, à leur avis, des oppositions au sein du Politburo. 86 Cela inquiéta
beaucoup les Français, qui estimaient que l’Occident devait se réserver la possibilité
de l’emploi du nucléaire en premier, ainsi qu’un autre point du projet de traité
soviétique qui prévoyait que les deux pays «s’efforceraient de prévenir les situations
où l’action de tiers pourrait les amener à une collision nucléaire», ce qui risquait
d’impliquer indirectement la France et annonçait le thème du «condominium»
qui allait prendre une telle importance l’année suivante. 87 Pompidou devait
exprimer ces inquiétudes à l’occasion d’une visite de Henry Kissinger, le 15 septembre
1972, qui l’assura que les Etats-Unis n’accepteraient de signer qu’une
83. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 7 septembre 1972, NPM, NSC CF/HAK Office Files/24.
84. Compte-rendu de l’entretien dans 5AG2/1018.
85. 5AG2/1021.
86. Conversation de Kissinger avec l’ambassadeur de France le 7 septembre 1972 et note du 3 septembre,
NPM, NSC CF/HAK Office Files/Box 24.
87. Note de Raimond pour Pompidou du 12 septembre, 5AG2/1021.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 131
déclaration très générale visant l’interdiction de l’emploi de la force militaire contre
tout pays. 88
D’autre part Paris maintenait bien entendu son opposition résolue aux MBFR et
était préoccupée de constater que Washington, sous la pression du Congrès et de l’opinion,
était de plus en plus disposée à envisager des réductions de forces en Europe. 89
Paris continuait à refuser toute participation aux négociations, même indirectes.
Washington était début 1973 consciente du fait que si les relations bilatérales
franco-américaines étaient bonnes et les meilleures depuis longtemps, avec en particulier
une disparition de l’anti-américanisme officiel et dans les médias contrôlés par le
gouvernement, il existait d’importantes divergences de vues sur certains problèmes
multilatéraux. En particulier les négociations SALT et MBFR ainsi que la préparation
de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE), les Français,
comme nous l’avons vu, étant réticents quant aux SALT et aux MBFR et plus ardents
que les Américains pour la CSCE. Mais on avait à Washington identifié les trois grandes
zones de conflit qui allaient effectivement marquer les années 1973-1974: les questions
monétaires; la protection des intérêts économiques européens (y compris la PAC
et les accords particuliers avec l’Afrique) face aux demandes américaines de libéralisation
du commerce international; et surtout la volonté américaine de structurer les relations
entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe occidentale de façon à
«permettre de discuter de façon globale et étroitement intégrée toutes les questions -
de sécurité, politiques, monétaires, commerciales et concernant les investissements -
qui regroupent l’ensemble de nos intérêts en Europe». 90
Or c’était bien à une telle structuration transatlantique, autour d’un programme
américain, que Paris allait s’opposer avec tant de force en 1973-1974. De leur côté
les Etats-Unis étaient très décidés à résoudre en 1973 les questions internationales
pendantes: en particulier la poursuite de la détente avec les Soviétiques et l’établissement
avec eux d’une relation bilatérale stable et durable, et la nouvelle définition
de leurs rapports avec l’Europe. Ils étaient également fermement décidés à amener
la France à accepter ces objectifs, ou alors à l’empêcher de les contrecarrer. 91 Le
clash avec Paris était dès lors programmé.
88. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.524-528.
89. Entretien Debré-Kissinger du 7 juillet 1972, déjà cité, et annotation de Pompidou du 28 décembre
1972, 5AG2/1041.
90. Télé. de synthèse très important de l’ambassade américaine à Paris du 1 er janvier 1973, RG 59/
70-73/Box 2278.
91. Ibid., le télégramme du 1 er janvier étant très clair à ce sujet.

132
Georges-Henri Soutou
La conférence de Reykjavik (31 mai et 1er juin 1973).
Au printemps 1973 les choses avaient évolué comme l’envisageait Washington au
début de l’année: le 23 avril Kissinger avait annoncé «l’année de l’Europe», au
cours de laquelle les relations transatlantiques devraient être redéfinies autour
d’une nouvelle Charte de l’Atlantique. 92 Notons ici que Pompidou fut indirectement
à l’origine de cette initiative: Kissinger en eut l’idée à la suite de l’une de ses
conversations avec lui et d’une interview du Président français à James Reston du
New York Times suggérant d’instaurer des consultations occidentales «au plus haut
niveau». Mais la façon très maladroite dont Kissinger mena cette initiative, et ses
arrière-pensées, qui furent parfaitement comprises à Paris, conduisirent à une crise
majeure avec la France. 93
Pendant ce temps les Américains préparaient avec les Soviétiques l’accord «sur
la prévention d’une guerre nucléaire» que Brejnev devait venir signer en Californie
le 22 juin. D’autre part, comme il en avait été convenu entre Kissinger et les Soviétiques
en septembre 1972, des négociations sur la sécurité en Europe avaient commencé
à Helsinki le 22 novembre, tandis que les MBFR avaient commencé à
Vienne le 30 janvier 1973. En juillet les ministres des Affaires étrangères devaient
se retrouver à Helsinki pour une CSCE préparatoire. Le système international était
en pleine ébullition.
Georges Pompidou et Michel Jobert, devenu ministre des Affaires étrangères au
mois d’avril et très gaulliste d’inspiration, s’inquiétaient de cette évolution: les Américains
n’allaient-ils pas s’entendre avec l’URSS aux dépens de l’Europe? Le 23 avril,
Kissinger avait parlé de l’Europe comme «d’un ensemble régional» aux intérêts limités.
Washington ne voulait-elle pas s’octroyer un véritable leadership, sous couvert de structurer
les relations transatlantiques et de les «globaliser», en reliant par un évident marchandage
questions économiques (où Washington était demandeur) et questions de
sécurité (où c’étaient les Européens)? Jean-Bernard Raimond, le conseiller diplomatique
de Pompidou, qualifiait le discours de Kissinger de «texte impérieux, qui exprime
fondamentalement la volonté de puissance des Etats-Unis», qui rappelait le discours de
Kennedy à Philadelphie le 4 juillet 1962. Le danger était que les partenaires européens
de la France seraient tentés: «leur préférence allait à un monde atlantique à direction
américaine». 94 Quant à Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, l’ambassadeur à Washington, il
s’inquiétait de l’accord en cours de négociation entre Américains et Soviétiques sur la
guerre nucléaire: il risquait de conduire à la dénucléarisation de l’Europe, «les Américains
cherchant en fait à écarter tout usage de l’arme nucléaire, tandis que les Russes
s’appliquaient à dénucléariser et à neutraliser l’Europe occidentale, en la coupant des
Etats-Unis et en démantelant le système de l’Alliance atlantique». 95 Début mai
Jean-Bernard Raimond partageait ses craintes et allait même au-delà: le «renforcement
92. Sur la problématique de l’«Année de l’Europe» dans les rapports franco-américains, cf. P. MELANDRI,
Une relation très spéciale …, op.cit.
93. W. BUNDY, A Tangled Web, op.cit., pp.415-419.
94. Note du 3 mai 1973 pour Pompidou, 5AG2/1021.
95. Lettre de Kosciusko-Morizet à Jobert du 4 mai 1973, 5AG2/1021.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 133
de la coopération entre l’URSS et les Etats-Unis» remettait en cause «l’équilibre politique
mondial», et pouvait aboutir «au dessaisissement politique des puissances tierces».
Il conseillait au Président de prendre une initiative politique majeure en direction des
partenaires européens pour amorcer une discussion de fond avec les Etats-Unis. 96
Ces craintes au sujet de ce que l’on allait appeler de plus en plus couramment le
«condominium américano-soviétique» (expression également utilisée parfois par
Georges Pompidou, on l’a vu, mais qui dans son esprit était tournée au moins
autant contre l’URSS que contre les Etats-Unis) n’étaient pas les seules: les fonctionnaires
français relevaient les questions monétaires, le refus américain de se soumettre
à la moindre discipline dans ce domaine, et ils continuaient à croire possible
le retour à l’or; on prenait note du Nixon Round et en particulier de la volonté de
Washington de remettre en cause la PAC; d’autre part on soulignait la détermination
des Américains, évidente dès le message de Nixon sur l’énergie du 18 avril et
devant les tensions croissantes sur le marché international des hydrocarbures dès
avant la guerre du Kippour, à regrouper les pays consommateurs en face des
producteurs, ce qui paraissait très dangereux. 97 Cela dit, les responsables français
paraissaient divisés quant à la conduite à tenir sur les questions monétaires et
économiques. L’ambassade à Washington recommandait la négociation et suggérait
des compromis possibles. 98 D’autres, comme Olivier Wormser, gouverneur général
de la Banque de France, pensaient qu’il fallait rester ferme: les Etats-Unis
eux-mêmes reviendraient un jour à l’or comme base du système monétaire international.
99 On a vu que Georges Pompidou pour sa part ne partageait pas cette
illusion.
Une conversation très importante entre Kissinger et Pompidou le 18 mai allait
permettre de préciser les choses et d’éliminer certains malentendus en prévision du
sommet prévu à Reykjavik à la fin du mois. 100 Dans cet entretien, à mon avis le
plus ouvert et le plus important qui ait jamais eu lieu entre Pompidou et un responsable
américain, Pompidou se montra accommodant: à propos de «l’année de
l’Europe», il n’était pas choqué par la notion exposée par Kissinger le 23 avril de
l’Europe comme puissance régionale (en y comprenant toutefois la Méditerranée et
l’Afrique), il n’était pas contre le fait de parler de l’ensemble des problèmes entre
Européens et Américains et donc d’établir un cadre politique pour la discussion des
problèmes économiques transatlantiques (la «globalisation» des problèmes) ce qui
correspondait au projet de la nouvelle charte de l’Atlantique. Il était prêt à parler du
blé au prochain sommet franco-américain de Reykjavik et à proposer une entente
entre les pays exportateurs de céréales; il faudrait certes parler du système monétaire
international, on ne pouvait pas en rester là où on en était, mais visiblement il
serait sur ce point aussi fort pragmatique. Il fut ferme sur un point: il ne devait pas
96. Note Raimond pour Pompidou du 10 mai 1973, 5AG2/1021.
97. Dossier envoyé par Kosciusko-Morizet à Jobert le 11 mai, 5AG2/1023.
98. Ibid.
99. Note d’Olivier Wormser du 10 mai (le retour à l’or ne serait pas plus difficile pour Washington que
d’aller voir Mao!), 5AG2/1023.
100. 5AG2/1022.

134
Georges-Henri Soutou
être question de mêler le Royaume-Uni en tiers aux conversations militaires bilatérales
franco-américaines. Et il posa une excellente question à propos du prochain
accord américano-soviétique sur la guerre nucléaire: le problème n’était pas tant le
risque d’une guerre que d’une progression soviétique en-dessous du seuil d’une
guerre, comme en Tchécoslovaquie en 1968, comme peut-être en Yougoslavie à la
mort de Tito ou en Chine à la mort de Mao. «Brejnev (est) un homme sympathique
et bon vivant mais qu’il n’est pas facile d’arrêter quand il avance (…). Y a-t-il une
tactique américaine pour arrêter une avance soviétique camouflée, sans recours à la
force, mais comme un torrent progressiste"? Il mit également son interlocuteur en
garde contre une éventuelle tentation de choisir l’URSS contre la Chine.
Kissinger répondit en dévoilant la stratégie réelle des Etats-Unis: il ne s’agissait
pas du tout d’établir un condominium américano-soviétique ou de choisir Moscou
au détriment de la Chine, mais il s’agissait de soutenir Pékin contre l’URSS pour
empêcher celle-ci d’écraser la Chine, ce qui lui permettrait ensuite de «finlandiser»
l’Europe et d’isoler les Etats-Unis. Mais, pour empêcher que le rapprochement
américano-chinois qui devait aller s’approfondissant dans les années suivantes ne
serve de prétexte à une attaque soviétique contre la Chine, il fallait parallèlement
poursuivre la Détente avec Moscou, afin «de gagner du temps, de paralyser
l’URSS». La stratégie américaine était «peut-être complexe, mais elle n’était pas
stupide; (elle n’était) pas un abandon à l’URSS, mais une tentative pour la prendre
dans des rets». Disons ici que l’explication que donnait Kissinger de la politique
américaine rejoignait tout à fait le contenu de ses conversations avec les Chinois à
l’époque. 101
Une Europe forte, ajoutait Kissinger, où la France jouerait «un rôle de pivot» (et
non pas une Allemagne trop sensible aux pressions soviétiques), convenait dans ce
contexte très bien aux Etats-Unis qui étaient prêts à aider Paris à accroître ses capacités
militaires. Il souligna que l’on n’avait jamais été aussi franc avec un dirigeant
étranger. Georges Pompidou répondit en soulignant l’importance de ces déclarations
et en assurant «qu’il y réfléchirait beaucoup».
Le fait que Kissinger ait été sincère le 18 mai avec le Président français et ait
vraiment envisagé un grand accord euro-américain politique et économique dans
lequel la France jouerait un rôle essentiel me paraît totalement confirmé par les
documents internes de la Maison Blanche en vue du sommet de Reykjavik. Outre
la stratégie fondamentale envers la Chine et l’URSS que nous avons vue, ces documents
soulignent l’importance d’une relance des relations transatlantiques pour lutter
contre les courants isolationnistes de part et d’autre de l’Atlantique. (Rappelons
ici que l’administration américaine était très inquiète d’un amendement du sénateur
Mansfield qui proposait de réduire de 75.000 à 100.000 hommes les effectifs américains
en Europe). Il faudrait commencer par constituer un groupe informel de
haut niveau entre les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France et la RFA qui
débroussaillerait les principaux problèmes politiques et économiques. Kissinger,
101. Cf. par exemple le meeting de Kissinger avec Mao le 12 novembre 1973, in: W. BURR, op.cit.,
pp.179-199.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 135
après sa conversation du 18 mai, estimait que Georges Pompidou, avec les élections
du mois de mars derrière lui, avec un nouveau gouvernement formé d’hommes
à lui et débarrassé du poids des gaullistes de stricte observance serait certes un
partenaire difficile mais pragmatique et prêt à un accord sur ces bases à condition
que celui-ci ne remette pas en cause l’autonomie de la politique française et l’émergence
d’une «personnalité européenne». On pourrait faciliter l’adhésion française
en proposant de développer la collaboration en matière militaire et dans les hautes
technologies (en particulier les réacteurs d’avions). 102
A la suite des explications apportées par Kissinger le 18 mai, une certaine
détente se produisit, en tout cas à l’Elysée (où Edouard Balladur avait remplacé
Michel Jobert comme secrétaire général). Le prochain accord soviéto-américain
apparaissait désormais surtout inutile, voire dangereux dans la mesure où il donnerait
des possibilités de manœuvre à l’URSS en-dessous du seuil d’une guerre, ce
qu’elle savait faire par tous les moyens de la stratégie indirecte et avec l’appui des
partis communistes et des mouvements révolutionnaires. Mais on ne le considérait
pas comme un instrument d’une volonté américaine de puissance: il apparaissait
plutôt comme contraire aux intérêts bien compris des Etats-Unis. Quant à «l’année
de l’Europe» et la Charte transatlantique, il fallait éviter de se laisser réintégrer par
ce biais dans les structures intégrées de l’OTAN, mais on pouvait accepter la
«déclaration de principes» qu’avait proposée Kissinger le 23 avril. 103
Le Quai d’Orsay avec en particulier Michel Jobert me paraît être resté beaucoup
plus raide, soutenu en cela par une partie de la presse et des milieux gaullistes qui
voyaient dans l’évolution de Washington la confirmation des analyses gaullistes sur
l’impérialisme américain. 104 A partir du printemps 1973 Georges Pompidou recevait
donc des conseils assez contradictoires à propos de l’attitude à tenir face aux
Américains. Toutes ces questions étaient à l’époque extraordinairement chargées
de passion et il n’est pas toujours facile de savoir quelle position le Président, en
outre gravement malade, prenait quant à lui.
Le Président français lui-même paraissait intéressé par les propos de Kissinger.
Il rencontra Heath le 21 mai. Dans cet entretien Pompidou se montra désireux d’un
accord avec les Américains, qu’il estimait possible. Visiblement, après les explications
fournies par Kissinger il n’était pas aussi pessimiste que certains de ses collaborateurs.
L’essentiel à ses yeux était que les Etats-Unis ne pouvaient pas se permettre
de se désintéresser de la sécurité de l’Europe. En même temps il était clair
qu’il n’accepterait pas n’importe quoi de leur part. Pompidou et Heath, tout en
étant conscients de la contribution indispensable des Etats-Unis à la défense de
l’Europe et tout en ne pensant pas que le sénateur Mansfield parviendrait à imposer
un retrait des troupes américaines en Europe, évoquèrent néanmoins la possibilité
de collaborer pour la prochaine génération de leurs systèmes nucléaires stratégi-
102. Note de Kissinger pour le Président Nixon avant Reykjavik, NPM/NSC CF/949/Pompidou-Nixon
Meeting.
103. Deux notes de Raimond pour Pompidou des 18 et 29 mai 1973, 5AG2/1021.
104. Cf. les mémoires caractéristiques de P. de SAINT ROBERT, Le secret des jours, Paris, JC Lattès,
1995.

136
Georges-Henri Soutou
ques, à l’horizon 1985. 105 Pompidou était cependant très prudent: plutôt que
comme quelque chose de dores et déjà décidé, il considérait la collaboration
franco-britannique dans ce domaine comme une option que l’on explorerait de plus
près le moment venu, quand il faudrait définir la génération suivante d’armements,.
106
On présente en général le sommet de Reykjavik comme un échec. Ceci me paraît
excessif et je voudrais en donner un bilan plus nuancé. Certes, ce sommet donna surtout
lieu à un large échange de vues, tournant d’ailleurs un peu en rond, sur les questions
internationales. Certes, on ne progressa pas sur les questions monétaires. Pompidou
devait d’ailleurs écrire à Nixon le 25 juin pour essayer de relancer la question,
insistant sur la nécessité de la lutte contre l’inflation, de la défense des nouvelles parités
définies en mars 1973, du contrôle des mouvements de capitaux à court terme. En
ce qui concerne le problème de l’or, Pompidou pensait débloquer la situation en permettant
aux banques centrales d’acheter ou de vendre de l’or sur le marché libre, ce
qui aurait mis fin au prix parfaitement devenu théorique de 35 dollars l’once d’or
(rappelons qu’un double marché de l’or existait depuis 1968, un marché libre et un
système d’échanges entre banques centrales au taux officiel de 35 dollars l’once).
Mais cela revenait quand même à reconnaître un rôle éminent à l’or comme instrument
de réserve, cela favorisait la France (qui avait de considérables réserves d’or),
l’Afrique du Sud et l’URSS, cela pénalisait les pays européens qui avaient gardé leurs
réserves en dollars. Il n’y avait aucune chance pour que Washington accepte. Nixon
répondit d’ailleurs le 6 août de façon parfaitement évasive. 107 On notera que Pompidou
était là en recul par rapport au sommet des Açores, où l’on n’avait pas posé le
problème de l’or, et en recul par rapport aux positions françaises de 1967-1969, époque
à laquelle Paris avait été prête à imaginer un système monétaire international qui
ne reposerait pas sur l’or, à condition d’être structuré, discipliné et rééquilibré par
rapport au dollar. 108 On constate là (nous en verrons d’autres exemples) un certain
retour à une version plus dure du gaullisme.
En ce qui concerne la Charte de l’Atlantique, ce fut un demi-échec. Pompidou
se montra beaucoup plus réservé que le 18 mai, refusant en particulier la proposition
américaine d’une préparation confidentielle à quatre. 109 En fait Pompidou
insista pour que la préparation de la Charte se déroula d’abord au moyen de conversations
bilatérales et non pas dans un cadre multilatéral trop proche à ses yeux de
l’OTAN. Cependant les conversations se poursuivirent, comme nous le verrons,
entre Kissinger (devenu Secrétaire d’Etat en août) et Michel Jobert; ce n’était pas le
blocage. Ajoutons que le Président, en fonction des équilibres complexes de sa
105. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.548-549.
106. Lettre de Pompidou à Heath du 29 juin 1973, 5AG2/1040.
107. 5AG2/1021.
108. Cf. mes remarques dans R. ARON, Les articles de politique internationale dans Le Figaro de 1947
à 1977, Tome III, Les Crises (février 1965 à avril 1977), présentation et notes par G.-H. SOUTOU,
Paris, Editions de Fallois, 1997, pp.29-31.
109. Les comptes-rendus se trouvent dans 5AG2/1023. Cf. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.549-571.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 137
majorité, devait sans doute beaucoup plus tenir compte des positions très négatives
des milieux gaullistes intransigeants que ne le pensait Kissinger.
En revanche le sommet fut un franc succès pour les questions militaires: Pompidou
déclara à la presse à la suite des entretiens qu’il était partisan du maintien des
troupes américaines en Europe (ce qui correspondait à sa conviction profonde et
confortait le Président Nixon face au sénateur Mansfield, mais qui était un engagement
public nouveau pour la Ve République!). En outre, mais cela resta bien sûr
absolument secret, ce qui contribua sans doute à l’impression d’échec du sommet,
on se mit d’accord (au cours d’un troisième entretien spécialement consacré à cette
question) 110 pour étendre les conversations sur les armements aux questions touchant
les armes nucléaires proprement dites, c’est-à-dire le saint des saints, au-delà
des informations sur la technologie des missiles et les capacités ABM des Soviétiques
auxquelles s’étaient limités les échanges jusque-là. «J’accepte donc volontiers
que nos experts se rendent à Washington et que l’échange s’accélère», déclara
Pompidou. Kissinger centraliserait du côté américain ces conversations.
Il est tout à fait évident que pour les Américains l’offre de développer la collaboration
militaire franco-américaine était destinée aussi à faciliter l’acceptation par
Paris de l’ensemble du programme que nous avons vu: les Français auraient en
effet la certitude de bénéficier, en matière politico-stratégique, de la même position
privilégiée que les Britanniques dans le grand ensemble euro-atlantique qui correspondait
à la vision de Nixon et Kissinger. 111 Il n’y manquait pas non plus l’assurance,
répétée à Reykjavik, que les Etats-Unis ne laisseraient pas la RFA acquérir
l’arme nucléaire, sujet qui préoccupait beaucoup Georges Pompidou. Celui-ci comprit
parfaitement la signification des offres américaines et annonça qu’il ne se laisserait
pas faire facilement:
«Naturellement, notre principe, compte tenu surtout des progrès que nous commençons
à faire dans le domaine de la défense, est de ne pas vendre notre âme pour un
plat de lentilles, quelle que soit la qualité de celles-ci». 112
Finalement Pompidou refuse le «plat de lentilles»:
le blocage des conversations militaires.
Conformément à la décision prise à Reykavik, des conversations d’ordre militaire
eurent lieu lors de deux voyages aux Etats-Unis de Robert Galley, ministre de la
Défense, et de Jean Blancard, fin juillet et fin août 1973. 113 Les Français demandèrent
d’étendre les conversations, jusque-là strictement limitées aux problèmes des
missiles français existants et à l’état des défenses ABM soviétiques, on l’a vu, aux
110. Le 1 er juin à 10 heures, 5AG2/1023.
111. Voir la note de Kissinger pour Nixon avant Reykjavik, déjà citée.
112. Troisième entretien, le 1 er juin à 10 heures, déjà cité.
113. Comptes-rendus de deux entretiens avec Kissinger, le secrétaire à la Défense Schlesinger et le général
Walters, les 27 juillet et 31 août, 5AG2/1040.

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Georges-Henri Soutou
futurs systèmes de missiles encore en développement et aux armes nucléaires proprement
dites. Tout en reconnaissant que les échanges déjà réalisés avaient été très
précieux pour améliorer la fiabilité des fusées françaises et prendre conscience de
la fragilité des armes nucléaires en service face aux contre-mesures soviétiques, les
Français souhaitaient désormais une aide pour la mise au point de la nouvelle génération:
missiles à têtes multiples indépendantes (MIRV), ogives thermonucléaires
durcies, ogives tactiques «propres». Comme le déclara Robert Galley,
«de nombreuses solutions sont possibles, mais toutes coûteront infiniment de temps
et d’argent. Il serait donc très précieux pour les scientifiques et les techniciens français
de savoir quelles de ces voies sont les plus fécondes pour faire progresser les
armes stratégiques et les armes tactiques propres».
Les Américains se montrèrent en fait assez réticents devant l’ampleur de ces
demandes. Ils n’acceptaient pas de parler tout de suite des programmes avancés,
comme la fusée M4 prévue pour les années 80, avec une tête MIRVée transportant
six ogives thermonucléaires durcies, mais uniquement des programmes en cours ou
à échéance rapprochée (années 70). Ils mettaient en doute l’utilité pour la France de
posséder des têtes MIRVées, capables d’attaquer à la fois plusieurs objectifs distants
les uns des autres, et estimaient que des têtes multiples simples MRV (sans
capacité de guidage indépendant pour chaque ogive) devraient lui suffire. En fait ils
ne cachèrent pas qu’ils ne voulaient pas encore compliquer la suite des négociations
SALT avec Moscou, en cas de révélation de la collaboration franco-américaine
sur ces armes très déstabilisantes. D’autre part ils insistaient pour que les
Français poursuivent leurs expériences sur le site du Nevada (comme les Britanniques)
et soulignaient la nécessité de disposer d’un système d’alerte face aux progrès
des Russes, qui à la fin des années 70 disposeraient d’ogives MIRVées et pourraient
éliminer d’un seul coup toutes les armes françaises. Or pour les Français ces
suggestions ne pouvaient avoir qu’une seule signification: les Américains, en
échange de leur assistance technique, souhaitaient malgré tout établir un certain
contrôle sur l’effort français (l’offre de procéder aux tests au Nevada et l’allusion à
la nécessité d’un dispositif d’alerte anti-missiles qui à l’époque ne pouvait être
qu’américain allaient dans ce sens) afin de ne pas compliquer les SALT.
Du coup les échanges s’arrêtèrent là, du moins pour l’époque de la présidence
Pompidou. Le 20 décembre 1973 Kissinger proposa à Georges Pompidou de les
reprendre, mais le Président français se montra parfaitement évasif. 114 Même freinage,
à la même époque, pour les conversations entre le chef d’état-major des
Armées (désormais le général Maurin) et le commandant des forces américaines en
Europe, général Goodpaster, pour préparer les conditions de l’engagement du
Corps de bataille français aux côtés des alliés. Un Conseil de Défense avait con-
114. Compte-rendu dans 5AG2/1023, publié par E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., p.611. Pour toute cette affaire
cf. MELANDRI, Aux origines …, op.cit. Il pose la question de savoir si malgré ce blocage la collaboration
ne se poursuivit pas en grand secret, encore du temps du Président Pompidou; les documents
français et américains auxquels on a accès maintenant m’amènent à conclure que les échanges
en matière de missiles et d’ogives nucléaires subirent bien un arrêt, lié également à la
dégradation générale des rapports franco-américains à partir de l’été 1973.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 139
firmé le principe de ces conversations et le Président, dans un premier temps, désirait
que fût préparé cet engagement éventuel. Pourtant le 30 octobre Georges Pompidou
fit retarder les conversations prévues, le temps que la situation induite par la
guerre du Kippour s’éclaircisse, et imposa une procédure très prudente: contact
préliminaire d’information entre Maurin et Goodpaster, contact politique ensuite,
et après seulement une «éventuelle» discussion technique. Même prudence à
l’occasion de la venue en France en décembre de l’amiral Moorer, président des
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 115
En fait Georges Pompidou avait durci ses positions en matière stratégique
depuis l’été et en revenait à une certaine «orthodoxie gaulliste». J’en veux pour
preuve un document dont on connaissait l’existence mais pas le contenu: le fameux
«testament stratégique» du Président. Il s’agit d’un texte rédigé par lui le 1er
février 1974, dont seuls le Premier ministre Pierre Messmer et le ministre de la
Défense Robert Galley reçurent un exemplaire. 116 Certes, ce document écartait certaines
conceptions extrêmes du texte équivalent précédent, l’Instruction personnelle
et secrète de De Gaulle en 1967, comme la défense tous azimuts et l’acquisition
de missiles intercontinentaux. Mais sa vision internationale d’ensemble était
pessimiste: l’affrontement américano-soviétique persistant, mais en même temps la
tendance de Washington et Moscou à s’entendre en dehors des Européens, les
poussées imprévisibles ou très calculées mais toujours «impérieuses» de la politique
américaine, couplées avec une tendance au repli stratégique au détriment de
l’Europe, les problèmes monétaires et ceux de l’énergie, tout cela contribuait à
créer «un état permanent d’incertitude et d’inquiétude». Il n’était pas question de
revenir à l’intégration atlantique qui obérerait la liberté de décision de la France,
même s’il était probable que la France interviendrait le cas échéant aux côtés de
l’Alliance, d’autant plus que l’attitude allemande en cas de crise était très incertaine.
Une force nucléaire franco-britannique ne représenterait nullement une solution,
à cause de l’absence de liberté d’action de la Grande-Bretagne par rapport aux
Etats-Unis et des réactions négatives prévisibles de la part de l’Allemagne et de
l’URSS. La seule solution restait donc de renforcer la dissuasion nationale française:
on passerait à six sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins, au lieu des cinq
prévus, on renforcerait l’arme nucléaire tactique, qui donnait toute sa crédibilité à
la dissuasion (ceci correspondait à la doctrine de «l’ultime avertissement» exposé
dans le Livre blanc sur la Défense de 1972). Le Corps de bataille serait également
renforcé; son intervention la plus probable serait en réserve de l’Alliance mais il
devrait être engagé avec ses moyens nucléaires (la France refusait une guerre purement
conventionnelle en Europe); là aussi, on peut remarquer que la coordination
avec l’OTAN, qui avait une doctrine différente de l’emploi des armes nucléaires
tactiques, poserait des problèmes difficiles.
115. Deux notes du général Thenoz, chef de l’état-major particulier de l’Elysée, des 30 octobre et 5 décembre
1973, avec annotations du Président, 5AG2/1040.
116. 5AG2/1040.

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Georges-Henri Soutou
La conclusion du document en confirmait l’inspiration dans l’ensemble très
gaullienne (quoique, une fois de plus, d’un gaullisme rationalisé) et confirmait le
coup d’arrêt porté aux discussions avec les Américains ou du moins leur freinage:
«Nous devons poursuivre cet effort seuls, et sans compromissions, jusqu’au moment où
se posera de façon aiguë le problème de l’alerte, encore que les alliés et en particulier les
Américains aient tendance à grossir l’importance de ce problème pour les raisons que
l’on imagine. Aucune indication sur nos programmes, aucune négociation avec qui que
ce soit ne devra être donnée ou entreprise sans mon autorisation personnelle».
La détérioration des rapports politiques avec Washington
à partir de l’été 1973.
Ce coup d’arrêt à une coopération militaire bilatérale qui avait commencé de façon
prometteuse s’expliquait à mon avis essentiellement pour des raisons de politique
générale, comme le laisse d’ailleurs entendre le «testament» du 1er février 1974.
Rappelons d’abord que, à l’occasion d’une visite de Brejnev aux Etats-Unis, les
deux pays signèrent le 22 juin 1973 un «accord sur la prévention d’une guerre
nucléaire"; les deux signataires ne se menaceraient pas mutuellement ni n’utiliseraient
la force l’un contre l’autre; ils se consulteraient en cas de danger de guerre
nucléaire ou s’il existait un danger qu’un conflit entre deux autres puissances
débouche sur une guerre nucléaire. Ce fut ce dernier point surtout qui suscita
l’inquiétude de Paris (on se souvient que le 15 septembre 1972 encore Kissinger
avait assuré Pompidou que l’accord proposé par Moscou n’aurait qu’une portée
très générale; Washington était en effet consciente de la tendance au condominium
que recelait la proposition soviétique. Mais en fait les Soviétiques tenaient à un
texte plus précis, et lors d’une rencontre avec Brejnev à Moscou début mai 1973 les
Américains avaient cédé et accepté que les deux pays se concertent et fassent tout
pour prévenir le risque d’une guerre nucléaire découlant d’un conflit entre pays
tiers). 117 Devant un texte qui allait ainsi beaucoup plus loin que ce qui était prévu
au départ, Pompidou vit le danger «d’une sorte de tutelle sur l’Europe», comme il
l’écrivit à Nixon le 13 juillet. 118 Les soupçons de condominium américano-soviétique
que son entretien avec Kissinger le 18 mai avait en partie apaisés revenaient en
force. D’autant plus que Paris voyait une certaine cohérence inquiétante entre
l’accord du 22 juin, les SALT qui conduisaient à une réduction de la garantie
nucléaire américaine à l’Europe, les MBFR qui risquaient de donner un droit de
regard important à l’URSS en Europe centrale:
«Tout se passe comme si Russes et Américains étaient en train de définir les règles d’un
jeu mondial dont ils seront les seuls vrais partenaires (…). Chaque superpuissance paraît
dans ce cadre accorder à l’autre le droit de réorganiser son propre camp». 119
117. H. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, op.cit., pp.274-286.
118. 5AG2/1021.
119. Note du ministère des Affaires étrangères du 20 juin 1973, 5AG2/1019.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 141
Décidément, on revenait à Paris à certains réflexes très «gaullistes».
Mais d’autres problèmes vinrent immédiatement se greffer sur celui de l’accord
du 22 juin. En particulier le projet américain de «Déclaration commune de principes
pour l’Alliance atlantique». Washigton commit là une erreur d’appréciation,
estimant que les Français, depuis Reykjavik, étaient d’accord sur le principe et souhaitaient
seulement que l’affaire n’apparût pas comme relevant de l’OTAN mais fît
l’objet d’une série de conversations bilatérales. (D’une façon générale d’ailleurs,
Henry Kissinger avait tendance à penser que les réticences du gouvernement français
à l’égard de l’accord américano-soviétique du 22 juin ou de la Charte de
l’Atlantique étaient à l’usage de l’opinion publique, mais ne reflétaient pas la position
officielle). 120 Pour Paris le problème posé par la Déclaration atlantique n’était
cependant pas seulement une question de procédure, mais de fond. Jean-Bernard
Raimond souligna pour le Président le 4 juillet 1973 que le projet de déclaration
préparé par Kissinger donnait un rôle dirigeant aux Etats-Unis dans tous les domaines
dans un grand ensemble atlantique, comportait un retour de fait de la France
dans l’OTAN, amènerait la CEE à renoncer «à définir progressivement son autonomie
et sa personnalité politique par rapport aux Etats-Unis». Certes, le souci de
Kissinger était de maintenir le leadership américain dans une période de bouleversement
des relations internationales, mais son projet de Déclaration n’était pas
«acceptable». Cependant on ne pouvait pas répondre de façon purement négative,
car «le maintien d’une solidarité occidentale nous est nécessaire». La solution
pourrait être de présenter un contre-projet français de Déclaration; on pouvait espérer
en effet qu’une négociation était possible. En effet, les services du Département
d’Etat avait préparé un autre projet qui était «assez raisonnable», moins «mauvais»
pour la France, que celui de Kissinger. La position américaine n’était peut-être pas
figée sur le texte «démesuré» de Kissinger. 121
Et de fait Michel Jobert remit un contre-projet français de Déclaration à Quinze
le 3 octobre 1973 au Conseil de l’Alliance atlantique, après s’en être entretenu avec
Georges Pompidou la veille. 122 Le texte français répondait à toutes les préoccupations
parisiennes à l’époque: il réaffirmait la nécessité de la solidarité atlantique et
du maintien des troupes américaines en Europe, mais il réaffirmait également la
nécessité de la dissuasion nucléaire (contre les tendances à la dénucléarisation dont
à Paris on soupçonnait les Américains et pour réagir contre une éventuelle dérive
des SALT). Il affirmait que les Etats-Unis ne laisserait pas l’Europe être soumise «à
une pression extérieure politique ou militaire susceptible d’aliéner sa liberté», ce
qui visait bien entendu les conséquences redoutées à Paris de l’accord américano-soviétique
du 22 juin (le «condominium»). Il affirmait la «spécificité» de la
défense de l’Europe ainsi que la contribution conventionnelle et nucléaire (pour
deux d’entre eux) des pays européens de l’Alliance. Cela correspondait à la volonté
de faire reconnaître la valeur pour l’Alliance de la Force de frappe et aussi de faire
120. Note de Kissinger pour Nixon du 29 juin 1973, NPM NSC CF/679/France vol.XI.
121. 5AG2/1021.
122. 5AG2/1021.

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Georges-Henri Soutou
prendre en compte, pour l’avenir, l’hypothèse de l’émergence d’une personnalité
européenne en matière de défense, comme Michel Jobert devait le faire à l’occasion
de son fameux discours devant l’Assemblée de l’UEO le 21 novembre 1973.
Soulignons ici que ce contre-projet français fut un grand succès, ce qui fut
occulté à l’époque par les crises de l’automne 1973 et de l’hiver 1973-1974, ainsi
que par la très médiatisée rivalité entre Kissinger et Jobert (à mon avis trop soulignée
par Kissinger dans ses mémoires): on le retrouve à peu près tel quel dans les
dix premiers articles de la «Déclaration sur les relations atlantiques» qui fut finalement
entérinée par le Conseil de l’Alliance, à Ottawa, le 19 juin 1974, après la mort
du Président Pompidou. Les Français avaient réussi une brillante opération: d’une
part ils avaient fait disparaître le projet à leurs yeux beaucoup plus gênant de Kissinger.
Ils avaient profité de l’occasion pour faire entériner par l’Alliance certaines
de leurs thèses essentielles sur la dissuasion nucléaire et sur la détente, et contre le
«condominium». Et enfin, ce qui est moins connu, ils avaient réaffirmé la solidarité
de l’Alliance alors que depuis le mois de juin 1973 le gouvernement allemand (tout
au moins le chancelier Brandt et son ministre des Affaires étrangères Scheel) réfléchissait
à l’émergence d’un nouveau système européen de sécurité permettant de
dépasser la division de l’Allemagne et proposait à Paris d’envisager une défense
européenne en dehors de l’OTAN. 123 On a donc dans cette affaire une quintessence
du gaullisme rationalisé de Georges Pompidou: défense sourcilleuse de l’indépendance
française mais solidarité fondamentale avec les Etats-Unis face à la menace
soviétique et au risque d’une dérive neutraliste de la RFA.
Bien entendu les Américains perçurent parfaitement les arrière-pensées au fond très
gaullistes de Paris, mais ils comprirent que le texte français était le maximum de ce que
l’on pouvait espérer et qu’il représentait «l’immense avantage de venir du principal
dissident au sein de l’OTAN». Ils décidèrent en fait immédiatement de retirer le projet
Kissinger de Déclaration et donc de laisser la voie libre au projet de Jobert. 124
Mais le débat avec les Etats-Unis, calmé sur ce point, allait se transporter sur un
autre, d’ailleurs connexe, celui du type de rapports à établir entre les Etats-Unis et
la CEE. En effet au cours de l’été les Belges et les Allemands, inquiets du blocage
de la Charte de l’Atlantique provoqué par les réticences françaises, avait proposé
d’élaborer parallèlement un document sur les relations entre la CEE et les
Etats-Unis, expliquant d’ailleurs que certains problèmes transatlantiques ne relevaient
pas de l’Alliance. 125 Les Américains embrassèrent cette idée, pensant en fait
pouvoir rattraper par là leur version très exigeante de Charte atlantique à laquelle
ils avaient dû renoncer, en faisant pression sur la France dans le cadre des Neuf par
l’intermédiaire de ses partenaires européens. En particulier Washington souhaitait
que ce document réaffirme «le caractère central de la relation transatlantique» et
123. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou …, op.cit. Je ne peux pas entrer ici dans les détails
de la position allemande à l’époque, fort complexe et même contradictoire, prise entre l’atlantisme
et une tentation neutraliste. Mais ces contradictions mêmes inquiétaient beaucoup Paris.
124. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 3 octobre 1973, NPM/NSC CF/679/France vol.XI.
125. H. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, op.cit., pp.183 ss.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 143
prévoie une consultation préalable avec les Etats-Unis avant toute décision économique
de la CEE. 126
Les Français acceptèrent pourtant que l’on préparât une déclaration
Etats-Unis-CEE, à condition que parallèlement on mît au point un texte sur «l’identité
européenne», afin que celle-ci ne risquât pas de se diluer dans le dialogue transatlantique.
127 En effet à l’automne 1973 une relance européenne paraissait à Paris
comme le seul moyen de réagir face aux incertitudes de la situation internationale
et en particulier face aux ambiguïtés allemandes. 128 Dans sa conférence de presse
du 27 septembre 1973 Pompidou avait proposé que les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement
se réunissent régulièrement pour traiter de la coopération politique, reprenant
probablement une idée de Jean Monnet. Le 31 octobre, à l’issue d’un conseil des
ministres consacré à cette question, Pompidou adressa à Brandt une lettre qui précisait
sa pensée: les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement devraient se réunir seuls, sans
ordre du jour, pour des conversations très ouvertes en vue «d’harmoniser leur attitude
dans le cadre de la coopération politique». 129 Cette relance devait aboutir au
sommet des Neuf à Copenhague les 15 et 16 décembre 1973: ce fut l’ancêtre du
Conseil européen des Chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement. A cette occasion on proclama
une «Déclaration sur l’identité européenne». Le texte réaffirmait «les liens
étroits» entre les Neuf et les Etats-Unis et la volonté de développer la coopération
avec eux, mais en même temps il réaffirmait, conformément à la thèse française,
que les Neuf formaient une «entité distincte et originale». Le document exposait les
grandes lignes d’action de l’Europe face aux différents problèmes mondiaux, y
compris la détente, le Moyen-Orient, la Chine, le sous-développement, de façon
très générale mais en marquant bien que l’Europe n’était pas seulement une
puissance régionale.
La guerre du Kippour en octobre 1973 et ses conséquences (le choc pétrolier)
vinrent comme on le sait compliquer les rapports franco-américains, Paris étant en
désaccord avec Washington sur la crise du Moyen-Orient et hostile aux initiatives
américaines en vue de constituer un groupe des pays consommateurs de pétrole. Il
n’est pas question de s’étendre ici, mais je voudrais souligner que pour les Français
l’invitation faite par Nixon le 9 janvier 1974 à une conférence sur les problèmes de
l’énergie à Washington était aussi une nouvelle façon de relancer le projet de
Déclaration atlantique de Kissinger: elle revenait pour eux en fait à créer sous
direction américaine «une communauté Etats-Unis/Europe/Japon». Les conseillers
de l’Elysée étaient divisés: certains estimaient que Jobert ne devait pas se rendre à
Washington, d’autres qu’il pouvait le faire mais qu’il faudrait se contenter d’échanges
de vues et en aucun cas n’aboutir à une organisation des pays consommateurs.
Finalement, au Conseil des ministres du 6 février, Georges Pompidou suivit les
conseils de modération que lui donnait Edouard Balladur et on décida que Jobert se
rendrait à la conférence de Washington cinq jours plus tard, mais pour un simple
126. Note de Walter Stoessel pour Kissinger du 5 octobre 1973, RG 59/70-73/Box 2278.
127. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 20 septembre 1973, NPM/NSC CF/679/France vol.XI.
128. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou …, op.cit.
129. 5AG2/1009.

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Georges-Henri Soutou
échange de vues. D’autre part on publia une déclaration selon laquelle «la décision
du gouvernement ne saurait être interprétée comme impliquant l’accord de la
France à la création d’un organisme institutionnalisant l’ensemble des relations
politiques et économiques entre un certain nombre de grands pays industrialisés».
130 Il est vrai que la France était à la suite du choc pétrolier en particulière
position de faiblesse: le 19 janvier Paris avait dû quitter le serpent monétaire européen
créé l’année précédente et annoncer que le franc flotterait pendant six mois. 131
C’était un coup sensible porté à la politique européenne de la France, dont la
relance, à l’automne 1973, avait paru comme la seule réponse possible aux difficultés
qui montaient avec Washington mais aussi avec Bonn et Moscou.
Au mois de mars 1974 la discussion sur la déclaration Etats-Unis-CEE revint
sur le devant de la scène. Washington repartit à la charge pour qu’avant toute décision
importante les Neuf consultent les Etats-Unis et que l’on conclue un «arrangement
consultatif organique» entre les deux parties. C’était inacceptable pour Paris;
Michel Jobert et le directeur politique au Quai d’Orsay François Puaux penchaient
vers un refus très ferme, ou tout au plus une acceptation très limitée de consultations
au cas par cas, quitte à provoquer une crise. Gabriel Robin, à l’Elysée,
conseillait certes de s’entourer de précautions mais de choisir une attitude moins
négative. Ce fut l’avis de Pompidou, qui tout en étant partisan de la «fermeté»
acceptait «le principe de la consultation». 132 Finalement on renonça à la déclaration
Etats-Unis-CEE et on se contenta d’en reprendre la substance dans l’article 11 de la
Déclaration d’Ottawa de l’Alliance atlantique du 22 juin 1974. Cet article annonçait
une «étroite consultation» entre les partenaires, la prise en compte des événements
survenant dans d’autres parties du monde et de l’interaction, dans leurs rapports,
entre les questions de sécurité et les questions économiques. C’était ce qui
restait de l’ambitieux projet de Kissinger de «globalisation» et de structuration de
l’Alliance atlantique, mais sous une forme édulcorée acceptable par Paris. Là aussi,
l’accord final n’intervint qu’après la mort de Pompidou mais il avait préparé le
compromis en acceptant la notion de consultation transatlantique et en résistant à la
tentation de l’escalade qui parfois animait le Quai d’Orsay.
Néanmoins, malgré cette solution au problème de la déclaration Etats-Unis-Europe, il
est clair que les rapports franco-américains s’étaient détériorés depuis l’été. Mais parallèlement,
on était de plus en plus inquiet à l’Elysée des progrès de la puissance et de
l’influence de l’URSS, on constatait la détérioration des rapports avec Moscou, l’accroissement
des pressions soviétiques sur la France, le fait que les vrais partenaires de l’URSS
à l’Ouest étaient désormais les Etats-Unis et la RFA. 133 Et pourtant Pompidou, parce qu’il
était méfiant à l’égard de la RFA et mécontent des Etats-Unis, restait fixé dans son langage
avec les Soviétiques sur des formules d’indépendance et d’équidistance de la France
130. 5AG2/1021, note de Gabriel Robin, successeur de Jean-Bernard Raimond, du 10 janvier pour Balladur,
avec des annotation de Balaldur, et annexes.
131. M. JOBERT, Mémoires d’avenir, op.cit., pp.283-287.
132. Notes de Puaux des 19 et 20 mars et de Robin du 28 mars et annotations de Pompidou, 5AG2/1021.
133. Notes de Gabriel Robin des 13 février et 6 mars 1974, 5AG2/1019.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 145
entre les blocs qui étaient très gaulliennes mais qui indirectement témoignaient d’une certaine
impasse de la politique française, d’un certain isolement. 134
Le 30 octobre 1973 le Département d’Etat constatait l’éloignement croissant
entre Paris et Washington, critiquant en particulier l’attitude de la France dans la
crise du Moyen-Orient. Il recensait à l’intention de Kissinger toute une série de
«points de pression possibles» sur la France, sans se dissimuler qu’ils étaient d’un
maniement délicat, en particulier dans la mesure où Paris pouvait y trouver, auprès
de ses partenaires européens, des arguments pour justifier sa politique d’indépendance
européenne. 135 En juin 1974, après la mort de Pompidou, le Département
d’Etat résumait l’évolution récente des rapports franco-américains d’une façon
abrupte mais pas tout à fait fausse en soulignant leur détérioration depuis le début
de 1973, le durcissement de l’attitude de Paris, le regain du néo-gaullisme, la
volonté de renforcer l’identité européenne et pour y parvenir une «attitude plus distante
et parfois hostile de Pompidou envers les Etats-Unis». 136
Conclusion.
Georges Pompidou avait donc recherché une amélioration profonde des relations
franco-américaines, dans le cadre d’un ensemble triangulaire Amérique-France-Europe
où la France aurait joué un rôle privilégié. En 1970-1971 un grand accord franco-américain
dans cette direction, avec des conséquences importantes sur les trois plans, politique,
économique et militaire ne paraissait pas, on l’a vu, hors de portée. Nixon en effet
était prêt à accepter le gaullisme pragmatique de son partenaire et à considérer la France
comme un relais important des Etats-Unis vers l’Europe. Cependant cet accord a
échoué (la conférence des Açores de décembre 1971 fut là un tournant essentiel) pour
des raisons structurelles: outre la complexité intrinsèque de certains problèmes comme
les questions monétaires ou nucléaires, qui ne facilitaient pas les compromis, Pompidou
était quand même plus «gaulliste» qu’on ne l’a cru souvent à l’époque, et nullement
disposé à faire la moindre concession en matière d’indépendance nationale ou à se
rapprocher de l’OTAN au-delà de très étroites limites, ou encore à accepter une accord
monétaire international entérinant la supériorité américaine sans contreparties. Quant à
Nixon et Kissinger ils étaient certes plus constructifs à l’égard de la France que
Kennedy et Johnson, mais, malgré leur vision proclamée d’un monde multipolaire où
l’Europe jouerait son rôle, ils ne renonçaient tout de même pas au leadership américain
dans le cadre atlantique.
Mais il y eut aussi des causes conjoncturelles: les crises de l’automne 1973, et
aussi le fait qu’à partir de cette année-là, avec la fin de la guerre du Vietnam et à la
suite du bouleversement international dû au choc Nixon de 1971 et aux SALT, les
134. Le compte-rendu de ses entretiens avec Brejnev à Pitsounda les 12 et 13 mars 1974 est à ce sujet
très significatif, 5AG2/1019.
135. RG 59/70-73/Box 2278.
136. RG 59/Briefing Books 1958-1976/Box 190.

146
Georges-Henri Soutou
Etats-Unis avaient moins besoin de la France pour faire triompher leurs conceptions
en Europe et dans le monde et pouvaient donc se montrer plus exigeants envers elle.
Désormais leur politique envers la Chine et l’URSS dominait tout et dans ce bouleversement
mondial ils éprouvaient le besoin de contrôler étroitement non seulement
l’Alliance atlantique, mais aussi le développement d’une Communauté européenne
de plus en plus puissante sur le plan économique et qui commençait à vouloir développer
une identité politique. Tandis que Georges Pompidou, devant les incertitudes
internationales et les inquiétudes que lui inspiraient Moscou et Bonn, revenait à une
conception plus strictement gaulliste de sa politique extérieure.
Cependant Georges Pompidou ne rechercha jamais la rupture avec Washington.
Même aux pires moments (automne 1973 et hiver 1973/74) il resta partisan de
formules de compromis et se montra moins raide que Michel Jobert. Du coup le
rapprochement avec Washington voulu par Pompidou eut des fruits posthumes: la
coopération nucléaire reprise par ses successeurs, la déclaration d’Ottawa de juin
1974, les accords Valentin-Ferber du 3 juillet de la même année qui étaient en
négociation depuis 1972. Conclus entre le chef de la Ière Armée française et le
commandant OTAN Centre-Europe, ces accords élargissaient à toute la Ière Armée,
et plus seulement au seul corps d’armée stationné en Allemagne, les accords Ailleret-Lemnitzer
de 1967. 137 Les rapports entre la France et l’OTAN restèrent définis
par ces textes jusqu’aux années 80. D’autre part il me semble que l’équilibre voulu
par Georges Pompidou entre les différents axes de la politique extérieure française,
vers Washington, vers Moscou, vers Bonn, vers l’Alliance, vers l’Europe, ainsi que
d’une façon générale sa vision d’un gaullisme rationalisé ne rejetant pas le principe
de bons rapports avec Washington, mais sur un plan bilatéral et non pas atlantique,
ne furent pas profondément remis en cause par ses successeurs avant la fin de la
Guerre froide. Jusque dans certains réflexes et certaines formulations typiques de la
diplomatie française des années 70 et 80 Georges Pompidou avait imprimé une
marque discrète, mais durable.
Georges-Henri Soutou
Professeur à l’Université de Paris IV Sorbonne
137. F. BOZO, La France et l’OTAN, Paris, Economica, 1914, p.117.

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Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen
Nicholas AYLOTT – Swedish Social Democracy and European Integration. The people’s
home on the market. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999. ISBN 0-7546-1028-4. - 42,50 £.
For a long time it seemed that there could be nothing better in the world than to be
a Swedish social democrat. At least that was how it felt like in Sweden. The Swedish
social democratic party (SAP) enjoyed decades of practically uninterrupted and
largely unchallenged reign and in the meantime helped to build the nation’s wealth
and welfare into unprecedented heights. While perfecting their own society and
helping poorer third world countries to stand on their own feet, Sweden remained
aloof of the more troublesome aspects of contemporary Europe. The Cold War was
waged elsewhere by somebody else, it seemed, and the process of political integration
in Western Europe concerned a group of nations Sweden did not belong to, and
was motivated by problems Sweden did not have.
In 1989-90 their fortunes changed. For some in the West the end of the Cold War
meant that history was over. For the Swedish social democrats history was about to
begin. From a position of sceptical detachment, Ingvar Carlsson’s social democratic
government suddenly made a U-turn in the fall of 1990 and announced their intention
to apply for membership in the European Community (EC). After a narrow victory in
the referendum in 1994, Carlsson’s SAP led Sweden into the European Union (EU)
in 1995, but subsequently Sweden has experienced difficulties in adapting to its new
role. The source of the troubles has mainly been a domestic one.
There is no other political party in Sweden, and perhaps in Northern Europe as a
whole, that may have felt to the same degree what a divisive issue the question of
European integration can be. In 1990, in a matter of months, the SAP became a
quarrelling, divided party, its internal discipline having gone, its appeal amongst
the electorate being in steep decline and its power-base, the mighty trade unions, in
full revolt. Further, the so called Swedish model of welfare society management
was heading towards financial and economic turbulence that forced the social
democrats into painful introspection.
Why should a highly successful political party so completely lose its internal unity
and discipline? What is it that makes the politics of European integration so difficult for
a party like the SAP? Nicholas Aylott adds to the body of literature that claims that from
the point of view of traditional political parties, there is something qualitatively different
in the politics of European integration. The way in which political parties representing
old societal cleavages find it difficult to come to terms with new ones concerning
supranational integration is well illustrated by the Swedish experience.
Why SAP should have faced all these difficulties in the 1990s has been a subject
of popular myth-making, and with a welcome work like Aylott’s, myth-breaking.
Based on surveys conducted in Sweden during the most intense debate before the
1994 referendum, Aylott shows how SAP’s rift over Europe cannot just be
explained as a struggle between the party’s right against its left or modernisers

148
Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen
against traditionalists, even if these factors should not be overlooked. The author
also shows how other ’contours of division’, for example ’isolationists v missionaries’,
’neutralists v supporters of collective security’ are not alone sufficient to
explain the rift over Europe. The way in which European integration divided and
divides SAP’s activists locally and nationally does not follow a clear cut pattern,
and hence explanations for the U-turn in 1990 and the subsequent trouble within
the party has to be looked for in the sequel of events unfolding from 1990 onwards.
It was as much the way in which the decision to apply for EU-membership was
made as much the substance of the decision itself, which eventually became the
source of the difficulties.
Previous explanations of SAP’s sudden change of heart have stressed the significance
of industrial lobbying and in particular external changes such as the end of
the Cold War. Aylott’s explanation is based on short term, domestic political factors.
In his view, the decision to apply was an act of desperation. Carlsson’s announcement
to apply for EC membership was a part of an attempt to manage an
acute economic and financial crisis and a response to a political challenge the government
faced from the pro-European opposition parties.
When Aylott turns his analysis from the climate of opinion and party structures
to the events that led to the decision to apply and to the ensuing management of the
divided party, the book becomes a contemporary history of the way in which SAP
made its historic decision, and what happened afterwards. Methodologically the
contemporary history that comprises the latter half of the book is less satisfactory
than the treatment of the internal divisions and the intellectual and cultural inheritance
today’s Swedish social democrats still carry with them, and which influences
their attitudes over European integration. The author’s explanation of these events
is plausible, but is stated rather than demonstrated. The empirical base of certain
key events in the story is too slender to be compensated by the narrative’s analytical
and intellectual coherence. Aylott may well be right, but before more empirical
evidence is put forward, we simply cannot be sure. A sceptical reader still leaves
room for other explanations of Sweden’s EU-decision as well.
Juhana Aunesluoma
Post-doctoral research fellow
Department of Social Science History
University of Helsinki
Gérard BOSSUAT, Andreas WILKENS (sous la direction de) – Jean Monnet, l’Europe et les
chemins de la Paix. Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999, 537 p. – ISBN 2-85944-359-2 –
210.00 FF, 32,01 Euro.
Jean Monnet hat in der Geschichtswissenschaft Konjunktur. Zwei große Biographien,
eine von François Duchêne 1994 (478 Seiten) und eine andere von Eric Roussel 1996
(1004 Seiten) legen davon ebenso Zeugnis ab wie die vorliegende umfangreiche
Dokumentation eines ehrgeizigen französisch-deutschen Kolloquiums mit Historikern
und Zeitzeugen aus dem Jahre 1997. Daneben hat Andreas Wilkens einen deut-

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 149
schsprachigen Sammelband herausgegeben. Die Publikationen gelten einem Mann,
der in der Geschichte der Nachkriegszeit nach gängigen – „harten“ - Kriterien nur
eine Nebenrolle spielte, keine Macht besaß, nie ein wirklich bedeutendes öffentliches
Amt innehatte, nicht als Visionär an der Spitze einer politischen Bewegung stand und
auch keine einflußreichen programmatischen Schriften verfaßt hat; selbst seine viel
zitierten Memoiren sind in großen Teilen von seinem Mitarbeiter François Fontaine
geschrieben worden. Und als François Mitterrand 1988 seine Gebeine in das Panthéon
überführen ließ, wußte über die Hälfte der Franzosen nicht, wer zur Ehre des
nationalen Altars erhoben wurde, während ein Viertel meinte, es handele sich um
einen Maler (Claude Monet).
Warum also erregt Jean Monnet das große Interesse der Historiker? Weil, so
lautet die These der Herausgeber, bis in die siebziger Jahre kein anderer in der
europäischen Einigung stärkere und dauerhaftere Spuren hinterlassen habe als Jean
Monnet. In der Tat, die Autoren des Bandes legen eine imponierend aussehende
Liste dessen vor, was er angeregt, auf den Weg gebracht oder beeinflußt hat, und sie
nehmen dabei zum Fluchtpunkt sein Wirken als geistiger Vater und Geburtshelfer
des Schuman-Plans bzw. der Montanunion. Damit ist das Leitthema des Bandes
angesprochen, Jean Monnets Platz im europäischen Einigungsprozeß, sein Beitrag
zur Umwertung der französisch-deutschen Beziehungen von bitterer Feindschaft
zu Freundschaft und hierdurch zur dauerhaften Befriedung Westeuropas.
In einem ersten Teil behandeln sechs Aufsätze Jean Monnets Lebensweg zwischen
Europa und den USA als Wirtschaftsexperte im öffentlichen Auftrag vom
Ersten bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg. Diese Jahre formten, so schreibt René Girault, den
Akteur, der im Jahre 1950 im Alter von dreiundsechzig Jahren die europäische Szene
betritt. Es folgen in zwei weiteren Abteilungen vierzehn Untersuchungen zu Jean
Monnets europäischem Wirken. Es geht zum einen darum, in welchem Maße er
durch seine persönlichen Beziehungen, insbesondere zu Konrad Adenauer, aber auch
zu dessen Nachfolgern bis zu Helmut Schmidt die deutsche Europapolitik beeinflußt
hat. Zum anderen werden seine spezifischen Beiträge zur europäischen Einigung
untersucht. Neben der EGKS gingen ja sowohl die EVG wie die Euratom auf seine
Initiativen zurück, bzw. waren seiner von vielen Autoren des Bandes hervorgehobenen
Fähigkeit zu verdanken, Projekte operationalisierbar zu machen und sie zum
richtigen Zeitpunkt verantwortlichen politischen Akteuren in die Hand zu geben. In
den sechziger Jahren agierte er für die Erweiterung der Europäischen Wirtschafts-Gemeinschaft
sowie die transatlantische Partnerschaft. Nach de Gaulles
Rücktritt ging es ihm darum, das Projekt einer Währungsgemeinschaft auf die europäische
Agenda zu setzen und ebenso engagierte er sich für die Einrichtung regelmäßiger
Beratungen zwischen den Staats- und Regierungschefs, die schließlich mit dem
1974 gegründeten „Europäischen Rat“ institutionalisiert wurden. Einige Aufsätze
thematisieren den Gegensatz der Europavorstellungen de Gaulles und Monnets,
andere die für de Gaulle hochverdächtige atlantische bzw. amerikanische Dimension
des Denkens und Handelns von Jean Monnet und seine Fähigkeit, hochrangige
amerikanische Freunde für seine europäischen Vorhaben einzuspannen.

150
Fast alle Beiträge der kompetenten Autoren stützen sich auf unveröffentlichte
Archivalien. Sie präzisieren den Platz Jean Monnets in der Geschichte der europäischen
Integration. Hinterfragen sie aber wirklich kritisch, vor allem für die Zeit ab
1955, seinen realen politischen Einfluß auf die politischen Akteure und die öffentliche
Meinung der Länder, die sich am Einigungsprozeß beteiligten, wie es Girault
fordert, und tragen sie so dazu bei, ihn zu entmythologisieren? Einige ehemalige
Gefährten Monnets meinten ja. Sie reagierten heftig und warfen den Historikern
vor, den noch gegenwärtigen Jean Monnet wie ein Relikt der grauen Vorzeit zu
behandeln, oder noch schlimmer, ihn so grausam zu sezieren, daß am Ende nur
noch Einzelteile übrig blieben. Hier nun sind wir bei der Legende Jean Monnet, der
im persönlichen Umgang, wie z.B. der ehemalige Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt
bezeugt, eine faszinierende Persönlichkeit gewesen sein muß und viele führende
Mitglieder der europäischen Klasse Europas in bemerkenswertem Maße beeindruckt
hat. Mit der Legende oder dem Mythos setzen sich die junge Historikerin
Elsa Guichaoua und Robert Frank auseinander. Sie diskutieren die Vermarktung
Jean Monnets als „Vater Europas“ durch die Vereinigung der Freunde Jean Monnets,
das Bedürfnis der Streiter der frühen Jahre und der heutigen Baumeister Europas
nach einem identitätsstiftenden Vorbild, wenn nicht gar „Heiligen“ der europäischen
Integration. Dagegen setzen sie die Aufgabe des Historikers, sich nicht zum
Gehilfen von Identitätsstiftung zu machen, sondern sich so weit wie möglich der
Wahrheit anzunähern. Neben den sonstigen Verdiensten des Bandes lohnt schon
allein die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Zeitzeugen und Historikern die Lektüre.
Gerhard Brunn
Universität Siegen
Douglas BRINKLEY and Richard T. GRIFFITHS (editors) – John F. Kennedy and
Europe. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1999, with a foreword by Theodore
Sorensen, ISBN 0-8071-2332-3, pp. XVIII-349. – 44,95 £.
The editors tell us that these essays – and the papers upon which they are based,
originally delivered at an October 1992 conference at the European University
Institute in Florence – show ”how activist the Kennedy administration’s European
policy truly was, how open JFK was to new approaches aimed at further cementing
the Atlantic alliance. Kennedy was a true believer in European unity” (p.XVI).
The essays actually justify their claims, and illustrate some of the dynamics
actuated by JFK’s activism and openness. The problem with the book as such is
that it does not really go beyond these rather obvious statements: after all, no one
ever seriously claimed that the Kennedy administration was not interested in
Europe or was solely focused on crises in the Third World. Nor is the issue of
Kennedy’s belief in European unity particularly controversial.
A good third of the book deals with the main personalities and their relationships
(Alistair Horne on Kennedy and Macmillan; Roger Morgan on Kennedy and
Adenauer; John Newhouse on De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons; David L. Di Leo

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 151
on George Ball and the Europeanists in the State Department; Walt W. Rostow on
Kennedy’s View of Monnet and Viceversa; Douglas Brinkley on Dean Acheson and
Kennedy). While illustrative of ideas and idiosyncrasies, they tend to be rather
apologetic but involuntarily end up sketching a JFK who appears as keen on
Europe as he is fundamentally unable to respond to De Gaulle’s challenge and articulate
a workable strategy on Euro-American partnership.
Another group of essays deals with strategy and NATO issues. Lawrence S. Kaplan
recounts the debate on the Multilateral Force. Bernard J. Firestone and Carl Kaysen
focus on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Bruce R. Kuniholm discusses the issue of the
Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Leopoldo Nuti deals with the diplomatic and political
implications of the ”opening to the Left” in Italy. José Freire Antunes debates the
Kennedy Administration’s relationships with Portugal.
Finally, a third batch of essays (by Thomas Zoumaras, Richard Griffiths, Ynze
Alkema, and William Diebold jr.) deals with the no less intricate topics of financial,
monetary and commercial initiatives to restructure the Atlantic partnership in view of
the changing role of Europe in the world economy, and particularly of the growing
American balance of payments problem.
Both these latter sets of essays present interesting new research that delves into
the multiple strands and intricacies of a trans-Atlantic relationship then undergoing
major strains and changes. Here the major feature is the interaction between structural
continuity and conceptual innovation, and the individual assessments of
Kennedy’s various proposals are judiciously balanced. All in all, they highlight the
intellectual creativity of the “best and the brightest” as well as the ineffectual character
of many policies that remained marred by inconsistencies and could really not
come to grips with the challenges they were meant to meet.
Specialists dealing with this period and these topics will find many interesting suggestions
and research acquisitions in these essays. What the reader will not find is
an overall assessment of European policies against the larger background of the
Kennedy administration’s problems and strategies. The editors did not attempt to
pull the various strands together in a synthetic view, and while left unexplained
their choice can perhaps be seen as symptomatic of the inventive but incoherent
and elusive character of Kennedy’s approach to Europe. As a conclusion of sorts
the reader can thus turn to Stuart Ward’s final essay on Kennedy, Britain and the
European Community. It skilfully shows the “difficulties of British and American
policymakers in finding a common approach to the problem of De Gaulle and
Europe” (p.318), and indicates that the actual course of European integration was
primarily set – Kennedy’s belief notwithstanding – by De Gaulle’s ability to frustrate
many of the “fundamental elements of Kennedy’s Grand Design” (p.332).
Federico Romero
Professor of North American History
Dipartimento discipline storiche
Università di Bologna

152
Andreas WILKENS (ed.) – Interessen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische
Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bouvier Verlag, Bonn, 1999, 446 p. – ISBN
3-416-02851-1 (HP) – 120,00 DM.
If we are to believe Andrew Moravcsik, then the role of supranational entrepreneurs
like Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein and Jacques Delors in the European integration
process has been greatly exaggerated. In his monumental The Choice for Europe
(1998) Moravcsik even goes so far as to claim that their efforts tended “to be futile,
and redundant, even sometimes counterproductive” (p.8). The contributors to Interessen
verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration would, at least as far
as Monnet is concerned, definitely disagree with this verdict. They are convinced,
and demonstrate persuasively, that Monnet has played a very effective and crucial
role during the first twenty years of the European integration process – especially
with respect to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and
Euratom, the preamble added by the Bundestag to the Franco-German treaty of
friendship, and the initiation of the first attempt at economic and monetary union.
Interessen verbinden contains sixteen chapters. In addition to thirteen chapters
written by different scholars, three chapters are due to Helmut Schmidt, Katherina
Focke and Rita Süssmuth. To begin with these three, Schmidt’s chapter contains
some observations on Monnet, as well as some reflections on the present state of
world politics: the European powers have no choice but to go further down the road
to ever closer union. Focke mostly limits herself to recollections of her meetings
with Monnet, especially her private visits to the Monnet household in Houjarray.
Süssmuth explains that Monnet’s achievements teach us that, although we should
never lose sight of our objective, what really matters are the methods to reach it.
As far as the scholarly chapters are concerned, Wolf Gruner discusses the evolution
of Monnet’s views on the “triad France-Europe-Germany” between 1940 and
1952. Monnet was one of the first leading Frenchmen to see that the realities of
post-war politics put an end to the schemes of French Western European dominance
based on German subservience elaborated during the war, and to advocate
instead an active Franco-German partnership for the construction of a supranational
Europe. In a lengthy essay Andreas Wilkens analyses the relationship between
Konrad Adenauer and Monnet with respect to the European policy of the Federal
Republic 1950–1957. He concludes that Adenauer and Monnet both agreed on the
desirability of binding the Federal Republic to the West, but that the former, as
opposed to the latter, regarded supranationality as no more than a means to save the
German nation state, and did not believe in the “progressive fusion of national sovereignties”.
Guido Thiemeyer deals with Monnet’s position concerning the plan for
a supranational agricultural community propagated by Pierre Pfimlin. Despite the
plan’s supranational aspects, Monnet did not embrace it. His only concern was to
see to it that this initiative would not interfere with the negotiations on the Schuman
Plan. Hans-Erich Volkmann reports on Adenauer, France and the vicissitudes
of the European Defence Community (EDC). The defeat of the EDC in the French
Assembly was a severe set-back for both Adenauer and Monnet, but did not lessen
their determination to go further on the way of European unification. Michael

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 153
Hollmann writes about Monnet’s succession as president of the High Authority.
Although the West German authorities were in favour of Monnet staying on as
president, the French were dead against it. Only at Messina did the Federal Republic
give way, and accepted René Mayer as Monnet’s successor. Werner Bührer
reports on Monnet’s non-relationship with West German industrialists. The latter
never changed their view of Monnet as an “extreme central planner”. Klaus
Schwabe compares the American interpretations of Atlantic partnership with that of
Monnet. He concludes that both the Americans and Monnet were in fundamental
agreement. They disagreed, however, on what was the best way to deter the Soviet
Union. Whereas Monnet regarded European unification as the best deterrent, the
Americans, and with them the majority of British, French and German politicians,
were of the opinion that everything depended on the credibility of their nuclear
forces. Wilfried Loth discusses the development of Monnet’s relationship with de
Gaulle in the context of the latter’s plans for a political union. Initially, Monnet
welcomed de Gaulle’s initiative, notwithstanding its intergovernmental nature, and
cooperated with him. Only after the French veto on British EEC membership and
the subsequent signing of the Franco-German treaty of friendship, did Monnet turn
against the French president. Matthias Schönwald analyses Monnet’s and Hallstein’s
ideas about Europe. According to him the two friends, “with the same antenna”,
disagreed on the role the United Kingdom and the United States could play in
European integration. In contrast to Monnet, Hallstein was no firm supporter of
British entry, and, fearful of American hegemony, he wanted to keep the Americans
at a distance. Matthias Schulz writes about the political friendship between Kurt
Birrenbach and Monnet and their role as initiators of the “Atlantic” preamble added
to the Franco-German treaty of friendship by the Bundestag. Hanns Jürgen Küsters
examines Monnet’s relations with the German chancellors from Adenauer to
Schmidt. Monnet was in close contact with Adenauer, and he also established a
good relationship with Willy Brandt, but he failed to do so with Kurt Georg Kiesinger
and Schmidt, while in the case of Ludwig Erhard a relation simply did not exist.
Gérard Bossuat, finally, deals with Monnet’s role in the first attempt at European
economic and monetary union in the beginning of the 1970s. After Brandt’s
election as chancellor in the autumn of 1969, Monnet was able to convince the
former of the necessity of a German initiative in this field. At the summit of The
Hague in December, the member states agreed to commission a report on the establishment
of an economic and monetary union. However, as a result of the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system and the nationalistic reflexes this crisis set free, nothing
came of this.
It will be evident from my overview, that this volume is rich in information. Many
of the contributions are also highly stimulating. I particularly enjoyed the chapters by
Wilkens, Thiemeyer, Loth and Bossuat. A few critical remarks may nevertheless be
permitted. The first is that Wilkens has not completely succeeded in turning the book
into a whole. It remains unclear why the chapters written by the three retired politicians
have been included. These offer precious little with respect to the book’s main
theme, Monnet and the integration of the Federal Republic in Europe. This remark

154
also applies to Schwabe’s contribution. Several historical episodes are moreover
related more than once, and their interpretation varies according to the authors. This
would not matter much, if there were cross-references, but unfortunately these are
almost non-existent. This is especially annoying where authors discuss Monnet’s
relations with Schmidt and Focke, and fail to take notice of their opinions on this
matter, as expressed in their own contributions to the volume.
My second point of criticism brings me back to Moravcsik’s argument on the role of
supranational entrepreneurs. Without exception, the contributors accept the image of
Monnet as the “the father of Europe”. As a result, those of them who deal with
Monnet’s part in the Rome Treaties, lightly pass over the fact that Monnet did his
utmost to torpedo the negotiations on the economic community. Apparently they are not
willing to face the fact that, in this case at least, Monnet’s actions were indeed “counterproductive”.
Their image of Monnet also prevents them from seeing that the latter’s role
in the formulation of the Pleven Plan differed completely from that of the Schuman
Plan. This time Monnet was kept under close surveillance by the French cabinet. It also
keeps them from noticing that in the Pleven Plan the supranational aspect was subordinated
to the intergovernmental aspect. No wonder that Monnet, as Adenauer explained
to Theodor Heuss, dissociated himself from the plan. Both Wilkens and Küsters note
Adenauer’s observation, but they do not attach any value to it.
This brings me to my final point of criticism. Insufficient attention is paid to
Monnet’s isolated position in France itself. It is only in Focke’s essay that the reader
catches a glimpse of the controversy that prevailed in France about both Monnet
and his supranational solutions. Focke relates that when she attended the solemn
reburial of Monnet’s body in the Panthéon, Monnet’s daughter explained to her that
she had given permission, because her father’s interment in the Panthéon was a
“posthume Anerkennung für einen Mann, den führende französische Politiker oft
abschätzig behandelt, ignoriert oder gar wegen seines übernationalen Denkansatzes
als Verräter diffamiert hatten” (p.29).
It was actually for a very short time that France saw the creation of supranational
European institutions (in which it would participate on an equal footing with the Federal
Republic) as a means of securing its position vis-à-vis that same Federal Republic.
With the launching of the Schuman Plan in the spring of 1950, supranationality
came to the fore in quite a spectacular way; but hardly five months later traditional
thinking in intergovernmental terms prevailed once again. The brief burst of supranationalism
must be attributed to the surprise tactics used with the launching of the
Schuman Plan. Before the French cabinet knew what plan it had accepted, this had already
been made public. From then on the French ministers followed all of Monnet’s
activities with great suspicion, as they considered him to be the man behind this fait
accompli policy. Although some of them had great difficulty with it, the ministers
accepted that it was best to let Monnet finish the job. It was, however, out of question
that he would get a new one. The French cabinet gratefully acknowledged Monnet’s
services as far as the formulation of the Pleven Plan was concerned, but they did not
want his involvement in this plan to go any further.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 155
My conclusion that Monnet was already sidetracked in the French struggle for
power in the autumn of 1950, means that I believe that there is more to Moravcsik’s
argument than the authors of Interessen verbinden probably would care to admit.
However, their common blind spot has not prevented them from writing a book that
will be enjoyed by everyone interested in the history of European integration.
Robert H. Lieshout
University of Nijmegen
Nijmegen Centre for German Studies
Fernando GUIRAO – Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1957.
Challenge and Response. (St. Antony’s Series), Macmillan Press, London, 1998, 240 S. -
ISBN 0-333-71078-9. – 45,00£.
Spanien blieb unter der Herrschaft Francos politisch in Europa isoliert. Als einziges
westeuropäisches Land war es von der Marshall-Plan-Hilfe ausgeschlossen; es war
weder Mitglied der Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
noch in die Europäische Zahlungsunion (EZU) eingebunden, und damit aus dem
System zunehmender ökonomischer Verflechtung der westeuropäischen Volkswirtschaften
nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ausgeschlossen. Die Ursachen und Folgen
der Isolierung Spaniens untersucht Fernando Guirao auf der Grundlage umfassender
Recherchen in spanischen, französischen, britischen und amerikanischen
Archiven. Herausgekommen ist eine wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Studie, die auf einer
breiten Quellengrundlage die (west)europäische Dimension spanischer Außen- und
Außenwirtschaftspolitik untersucht, und zugleich einen anspruchsvollen Beitrag zu
einer multilateralen internationalen Geschichtsschreibung liefert. Guirao widerlegt
dabei nicht nur eine Reihe gängiger Klischees über die Außenpolitiken der
europäischen Staaten und der USA, sondern versteht das spanische Beispiel auch
als Fallstudie über Grenzen und Reichweite multilateraler Verflechtungen.
Trotz gegenteiliger Verlautbarungen Francos wurde das Prinzip der Autarkie
nach 1945 aufgegeben, da sie ökonomisch, politisch und militärisch nicht haltbar
war. Die spanische Politik trug der Tatsache Rechnung, daß es traditionell rege
Außenhandelsbeziehungen mit den westeuropäischen Ländern und den USA gegeben
hatte. Die politische Ächtung der Diktatur ging nicht unbedingt mit deren wirtschaftlicher
Isolierung einher, und sie kann daher auch nicht - wie von der spanischen
Propaganda behauptet worden ist - für das geringe wirtschaftliche Wachstum
Spaniens verantwortlich gemacht werden. Aber auch das gegenteilige Argument -
mangelnde Bereitschaft zu ökonomischer Liberalisierung und ein ausgeprägter
Staatsinterventionismus seien verantwortlich gewesen - ist nicht haltbar. Das Verhältnis
zwischen externen und internen Faktoren zu gewichten, ist ein Ziel der Studie.
Für eine direkte Einflußnahme Francos auf die Außenwirtschaftspolitik hat
Guirao wenig Hinweise gefunden. Vieles spricht dafür, daß er für deren Details
kein Interesse zeigte, vielmehr pragmatisch orientierte Fachleute in der Administration
eine große Rolle spielten.

156
Im ersten Teil seiner Studie nimmt der Autor die unmittelbare Nachkriegszeit in
den Blick, in der Spanien wegen der Dollarlücke auf dem europäischen Kontinent
zum begehrten Handelspartner avancierte. Der Import wichtiger strategischer Rohstoffe
und Grundnahrungsmittel von der iberischen Halbinsel half den europäischen
Wirtschaften knappe Devisen zu sparen. Überdies ließ sich eine Lücke
füllen, die Deutschland nach dem Zusammenbruch der Handelsbeziehungen mit
Spanien gelassen hatte. Ganz pragmatisch standen nationale ökonomische Interessen
im Vordergrund, die es den Handelspartnern erlaubten, trotz politischer Ächtung
Spaniens partiell ökonomisch zu kooperieren. Dies galt für Frankreich - trotz
des Abbruchs diplomatischer Beziehungen und der Schließung der Grenze zu
Spanien - und für Großbritannien, dessen Regierungen die ,spanische Frage’
handelspolitisch pragmatisch behandelten. Die politische Ächtung hatte also
zunächst keinen tatsächlichen Effekt auf die spanische Wirtschaft.
Entsprechend groß waren die Hoffnungen, die Spanien mit der Ankündigung
des Marshall-Plans verband, der im zweiten Teil der Studie behandelt wird. Von
einer Teilhabe am European Recovery Program (ERP) versprach sich Spanien entgegen
gegenteiliger Behauptungen neben wirtschaftlichen Vorteilen auch eine
internationale Aufwertung des Regimes. Minutiös setzt sich der Verfasser mit
einem vom spanischen Handelsminister ausgearbeiteten detaillierten Import-Programm
auseinander, das vor dem Hintergrund der gewünschten Teilnahme am ERP
erstellt wurde. Die zur Rekonstruktion der spanischen Wirtschaft notwendigen
Importe lassen Rückschlüsse auf die wirtschaftliche Struktur des Landes zu, deren
besondere Defizite erwartungsgemäß auf dem industriellen Sektor und in der Infrastruktur
zu finden waren. Vorhandene Kapazitäten wurden durch einen eklatanten
Mangel an Rohstoffen nicht ausgelastet. Das verhinderte Innovation und ökonomische
Modernisierung. Die spanische Administration war sich der Untauglichkeit
wirtschaftlicher Autarkie durchaus bewußt und signalisierte die Bereitschaft zur
Liberalisierung der Wirtschaft des Landes, nicht aber in Politik und Gesellschaft.
Den Marshall-Plan nahm Spanien fälschlicherweise als wirtschaftliches, nicht aber
als politisches Instrument wahr, das zum engeren Zusammenschluß Westeuropas
zur Abwehr des Kommunismus beitragen sollte. Während Portugal in den Marshall-Plan
einbezogen wurde, war weder in der Truman-Administration noch in
den meisten europäischen Staaten eine gleichberechtigte Teilhabe Franco-Spaniens
politisch erwünscht. Guirao betrachtet dies als großen Fehler, da die Handelspolitik
als Hebel für eine politische Liberalisierung des Systems hätte eingesetzt werden
können. Zurecht weist er darauf hin, daß Isolation auf Dauer ein untaugliches Mittel
der Politik darstellt, da es das isolierte Regime im Innern eher stärkt als
schwächt und so dessen Öffnung und seinen Wandel verhindert. Die Ideologisierung
des Handels als politisches Mittel vor allem durch den Marshall-Plan habe
einen pragmatischen Umgang mit Spanien verhindert.
À la longue stellte der Ausschluß aus OEEC und EZU ein größeres Handicap
für die spanische Wirtschaft dar als die fehlenden ERP-Mittel. Wirtschaftliches
Wachstum war auch ohne Marshall-Plan-Hilfe möglich, wenn auch verzögert und
unstabil. Der dritte Teil der Untersuchung widmet sich daher den Folgen der Bilate-

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 157
ralität für die spanische Wirtschaft, die unter den Rahmenbedingungen einer multilateralen
Verflechtung in Europa strukturelle Benachteiligungen schuf, die die
Modernisierung Spaniens verzögerten. Von der EZU, dem ersten multilateralen
Zahlungssystem, das die Konvertierbarkeit der europäischen Währungen ermöglichte
und der ökonomischen Entwicklung entscheidende Impulse gab, war der
spanische Peso bis 1961 ausgeschlossen. Anders als die EZU-Mitglieder konnte
Spanien seine Zahlungsbilanzdefizite - ein Hauptproblem der spanischen Außenwirtschaft
- nicht über dritte Staaten ausgleichen. Einen pragmatischen Umgang
mit Franco-Spanien zeigten alle OEEC-Mitgliedstaaten jedoch beim Abschluß
bilateraler Handelsabkommen. Sie sahen aber vor allem Agrarexporte vor, die der
spanischen Wirtschaft nur geringe Gewinne in harter Währung einbrachten und so
die Import-Kapazität auf einem niedrigen Niveau stabilisierten.
Eine Beschränkung auf bilaterale Abkommen entsprach zwar nicht dem Kurs der
spanischen Regierung. Unter den gegebenen Umständen handelte sie aber so effektiv
wie möglich und richtete sich in der Situation ein. Auf diesem Umweg fand bereits in
den 50er Jahren eine „Europeanization“ (S.205) der spanischen Wirtschaft statt. Die
Isolierung Spaniens war also offensichtlich nicht so ausgeprägt, wie von Guirao an
anderer Stelle behauptet. Ob die Einbindung in multilaterale europäische Organisationen
aber tatsächlich die politische und gesellschaftliche Liberalisierung befördert
hätte, ist daher durchaus zweifelhaft und bleibt letztlich Spekulation. Insgesamt
liefert die instruktive Studie einen wesentlichen Beitrag zum Verständnis der Rolle
Spaniens im internationalen System nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.
Dr. Claudia Hiepel
Universität-GH Essen
Fachbereich 1 - Geschichte
Antonio VARSORI – L’Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992. Bari,
Laterza & Figli Spa, 1998, 277 p. - ISBN 88-420-5645-6. - 40.000,00 Lire.
Among the research topics of the post-war international history, Italian foreign policy
stays in the background. It keeps arousing interest all the more in the age of
interdependence, as further single national pieces combine into the complex picture
of international relations. Italy was not one of the major actors still in some cases
its role cannot be overlooked. Alas, such interest remains largely frustrated. An
important reason is that proper research based on official Italian documents cannot
keep pace with that of other Western countries. Because in Italy, in total ignorance
of the “thirty years rule”, released sources of the Foreign Ministry hardly cover the
middle of the 1950s; after that period, press, secondary sources and foreign
archives allow the researcher to follow the visible traces, but leave the decision-making
processes and rationales in the shadows. The seizure of documentary
sources is all the more damaging in view of the scarcity of private papers and the
opaque and complex nature of the topic, which besides may be a further reason for
the scarcity of works on Italian post-war foreign policy. Its vanishing clue, so hard

158
to catch and to define, the elusiveness of Italy’s presence in the international setting,
are peculiar features that need to be understood.
Antonio Varsori’s essay is full of evidence of this variety of elements. The first
half of the volume deals in detail with the period 1943-1957, and a second part
skims through three and a half decades seeking for main lines, “continuities and
change” and tentative findings. It recognises the myths encompassing Italian
foreign policy at home - full-heart idealist Europeanism, subordination to the USA,
rejection of power projection, and anticolonialism – as well as the anthology of
questions, idées reçues and commonplaces currently heard about Italy’s external
profile– inconsistency, tours de valse, and opportunism in a merely negative sense.
In fact, in Italy the gap between self-awareness and the way it is perceived by
others seems deeper than in most other countries. As commonplaces have always
some truth in them and myths respond to needs, the author’s effort to call things
with their “proper” names makes this a useful book as well for experts as for the
general public.
For some time historians have argued that Italy’s policy of the late 1940s and
1950s continued on traditional lines. By seeking a place in the Western alliance and
in the European construction, Italy behaved during the Cold War as a faithful heir
of its ancestors, trying to capitalise on its geopolitical position, with a clear idea of
what to seek: equality with the Allies and a regional power status. In the pursuit of
national interests within the logic of power politics, Varsori sees a continuity with
liberal and fascist nationalism that unveiled in moments such as the founding of the
Brussels Pact and the Atlantic Alliance or during the ratification of the EDC Treaty
in the attempted “blackmail” over the colonies and Trieste, whilst underlying the
whole Italian position all the time. Europeanism was therefore a cool-headed
choice: it was designed to render Italy its place among the winners and secure an
access to developed economies, but it never overcame the bonds with the US. Italy’s
policy therefore was not different from that of the other West European countries,
who all devised European integration as the best way to pursue national aims
in interdependence, and used their weaknesses as negotiating tools with the US.
Paradoxically, this “nationalism” declined when Italy abandoned the strict adherence
to the double way of Atlanticism-Europeanism. At the beginning of the 1960s,
many countries resented the rigidity of bipolarity. But, by seeking a role in the Middle
East, in the Mediterranean, by turning towards the Third World and searching for a
direct dialogue with Moscow, the emerging political and economic groups of the “center-left”
not only expressed the recovered ambitions and means of a regional power, but
answered domestic political problems and fuelled a rapidly expanding economy. The
overwhelming domestic political conflict and the gap between means and ends are the
basic explanations given to the inconsistency often reproached to Italian positions.
Capabilities always fell short of ambitions and, in order to satisfy the Left of the coalition
government, the Christian Democracy attempted to emulsify deeply diverse ingredients.
The domestic practice to reconcile opposites and avoid choosing became a model
for foreign policy, where Italy sought a mediating role, allowing a many-sided
position and dignifying the impossibility to choose. Varsori inserts in the analysis of

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 159
foreign policy a recent debate over the vanishing of Italy’s national identity in the
post-war period. By way of an explanation for the birth of movements and parties rejecting
Italy’s unity in the last decade, many historians and political scientists have argued
that, unlike the other European countries, post-war Italy experienced a vanishing
of people’s identity with a commonly accepted set of values and shared interests. As for
foreign policy, Varsori sees the vanishing of the external national identity appearing
during the 1960s, and deepening in the following decade. “In a country deeply conditioned
by a hard ideological confrontation, the idea of national identity and the need for
seeking national interests – weakened during the 1960s – appeared to a majority of the
political leadership and opinion makers just like fanciful old style ambitions or reactionary
attitude” (p.191). As the domestic situation deteriorated, foreign policy appears
more and more as a sum of episodes in an increasingly distant international context,
sometimes, as mere diplomacy to seek status per se. Italy’s external policy during the
1970s was therefore “often weak and ambiguous” (p.190). The Christian Democracy
led by Aldo Moro tried to face the risk of economic and political collapse by seeking an
entente with the Communist Party, which was seen as a guarantee of order. Italy became
the “sick man of Europe”, relying on, or imprisoned by the “fundamentals” of the
European and Atlantic framework: during the nasty period 1973-78 the external dimension
merely mirrored the domestic convulsions. The PCI itself, well aware of the limits
of Italian sovereignty, reformulated its foreign policy doctrine in order to soften American
opposition to its accession to power and West-European distrust toward Italy’s
economic future. However, too many unknown elements remain in the relations between
Italy and its allies that nothing more can be achieved than suspending judgement.
Overcoming the 1970s crisis also meant recovering serenity in external relations
and a capacity to play a meaningful role in the international system of the
“second Cold War”. Again, external conditions, among them the papacy of Karol
Woytjla, are acknowledged as having deeply influenced the domestic situation, that
in turn produced a new course in foreign policy. During the whole decade, the
Communist Party returned to formal, if not always real, opposition and a five-party
coalition was in power. For the first time since 1945, leaders from the minor parties,
the Republican Party and the Socialist Party, held the Prime Ministry together with
key positions such as the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence. A few persons,
Giovanni Spadolini, Lelio Lagorio, Bettino Craxi, Giulio Andreotti, who
were holding the keys of foreign policy capitalised on Italy’s ability to face economic
and political problems, and opened the way for a recovered role in international
affairs. The peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, in particular, appears as a key
moment because it reconciled the public opinion with the military as a concept and
as a body, but also showed that in the end Italy was not completely a tool in American
hands. The 1980s appear to be in Varsori’s recollection as the time of the rebirth
of a confident and growing country, in striking contradiction with the many
dark sides of a political season that ended in the Tangentopoli affair. The process
leading to the signing of the Single European Act in the mid 1980s however was a
typical example of a too common attitude, when the rare chance to play a visible
role was put after domestic preoccupation. In fact, after leading the European

160
Council at Milan to launch the intergovernmental conference on the revision of the
Treaties of Rome, against the opposition of Britain, Denmark and Greece, in the
autumn of 1985 the Craxi-Andreotti couple fought lonely for a federal solution,
wasting the newly-won credit in a lost battle mainly for domestic purposes.
The same domestic horizon, dominated by the “Clean Hands” process, obscured
the decline of bipolarity and the tentative emergence of a new international
system after 1992. Italy was indeed one of the countries less ready to grasp the
need for a reappraisal of a whole set of attitudes and habits. Looking at the Italian
case therefore suggests in an extreme way the interdependence between domestic
and international spheres and the need for closer insight and deeper analysis.
Elena Calandri
Università Degli Studi di Firenze
Susanna SCHRAFSTETTER – Die Dritte Atommacht. Britische Nichtverbreitungspolitik
im Dienst von Statussicherung und Deutschlandpolitik, 1952-68. (Schriftenreihe der
Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Band 79), Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1999, 254 S.,
ISBN 3-486-64579-X. - 40,00 DM.
Recent test explosions of atomic devices by France, India and Pakistan, the dissolution
of the Soviet Union which threatened to create several new nuclear powers, and the
endless tug-of-war between the United States and North Korea about the latter’s nuclear
arsenal show that nuclear non-proliferation will remain a core issue of international
relations in the 21st century. Already before the atomic age actually began, the U.S. and
Britain went to great length in order to prevent the diffusion of nuclear know-how and
technology. These efforts intensified when the nuclear club began to grow in the 1950s,
and numerous candidates for the possession of nuclear weapons appeared to set into
motion a general trend towards a nuclearization of national defences. It was not only the
danger of nuclear holocaust, but also the attempt to preserve their privileged status
against the have-nots which motivated the start of an active nuclear non-proliferation-policy
by Washington, Moscow and London. This was a particularly prominent
motive in the activities of the British government, as S. Schrafstetters study of British
non-proliferation policy in the 1950s and 1960s forcibly demonstrates. Based on a comprehensive
evaluation of archival materials in Britain, Germany and the United States,
she conveys the essentially defensive character of this policy, particularly vis-à-vis the
economically ascendant Federal Republic.
Schrafstetter presents a broad array of compelling evidence which shows that
the German question was indeed the “core concern of Britain’s non-proliferation
policy” (p.43). When Prime Minister Macmillan enumerated the reasons for Britain’s
support of the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 he emphasised that “the most vital of
all, more important than stopping contamination of the atmosphere, is stopping the
spread of nuclear weapons, especially of course to Germany” (p.76). Questions of
status were the dominant consideration behind these statements; the fear that a
nuclear Federal Republic might pursue an aggressively revisionist policy towards

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 161
the East was secondary. The victory of the Labour Party in 1964 elections brought
no change in this basic outlook.
In the end, this British policy appeared to have been crowned by success; Bonn
remained non-nuclear. However, the basic intention behind this strategy, that is to
preserve a privileged position among the concert of great powers, failed. Already in
the late 1950s, the United Kingdom became technologically dependent on the United
States and began to feel the detrimental influence of its nuclear policy on relations
with its European neighbours. When London, in the early 1960s, tried to compensate
its exclusion from the process of European integration by trading nuclear cooperation
for concessions by France, this strategy backfired. De Gaulle’s veto to Britain’s EEC
membership in 1963 made that only too obvious. Privileged relations with the U.S. in
nuclear matters and a leading role in Europe were mutually exclusive goals. Furthermore,
bilateral relations with Bonn stagnated during most of the 1960s, and much of
this was due to Britain’s nuclear policy, as the ill-fated MLF affair and the protracted
negotiations about the Non-Proliferation-Treaty of 1968 show.
Ideological attachment to the symbolic insignia of world power informed London’s
nuclear diplomacy much more than any rational calculation of an eventual threat to
national security. Ultimately, the British strategy was based on a tragic misjudgement
because eventually industrial capacity, economic competitiveness and the effects of European
integration turned out to be much more powerful assets in the international field
than the possession of nuclear weapons which are useful only in the most extra-ordinary
of circumstances. By its successful sponsorship of the policy of keeping the Federal
Republic away from the nuclear club, Britain might indeed have rendered even a
good service to the Federal Republic which, from the late 1960s onward and despite the
protestations of a strong coalition of conservative hard-liners, was concentrating its
energies on ultimately more profitable fields of state activity.
In her detailed exploration of the NPT-negotiations the author presents one of
the first archive-based international histories of this process. She shows succinctly
how Britain’s diplomats achieved all their immediate goals in the negotiations;
however, due to the basic flaw in the British approach - the idea of cementing great
power status by owing a few nuclear weapons more than other countries - this was
a futile victory which relegated Britain for a long time to an outsider position in the
European region. A demonstration of the often self-defeating nature of great power
ideology, the study of Schrafstetter is an important contribution towards a more
complete understanding of the dynamics of postwar international history.
Dr. Hubert Zimmermann
Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaft
Lehrstuhl Internationale Politik
Ruhr Universität Bochum

162
Eberhard BIRK – Der Funktionswandel der Westeuropäischen Union (WEU) im europäischen
Integrationsprozeß. Ergon, Würzburg, 1999, 298 p. – ISBN 3-933563-32-1. –
58,00 DM.
In his PhD Eberhard Birk from the University of Augsburg examines the functional
change of the Western European Union (WEU) in the process of European integration.
So far most publications on WEU were predominantly descriptive. For the most
part they were neglecting a structural analysis and the framework necessary to fully
understand and assess this institution against its historical background.
Birk’s politico-historical analysis approaches WEU by examining the functional
change that it underwent up to the present. He does so by assessing underlying interests
and events that were fundamental for the creation of the treaties. For that
purpose, the author not only analyses the treaties themselves (Dunkirk Treaty;
Brussels Pact; modified Brussels Pact in particular) but also takes into account underlying
interests of important actors, in particular by evaluating their memoirs (i.e.
Konrad Adenauer; Anthony Eden; François Mitterrand).
Following the author’s main hypothesis, the adoption of a treaty preceding the
creation of an international organisation depends on a primary objective, shared by
all partners, which can (but must not necessarily) be followed by one or several
secondary objectives. The primary function (Primärfunktion) will be a constant
factor as long as it becomes useless or will be replaced by a new primary function
(p.39). According to Birk, only by working out these primary objectives in the long
run allows an adequate understanding of any international organisation.
An important contribution lies in emphasising that WEU’s primary objective,
by the time of its creation and for the following three decades, was to control Germany’s
Bundeswehr in the making, an objective especially pursued by France and
eventually accepted by Bonn. Thus, the WEU was if not literally then at least in the
spirit of the modified Brussels Pact, more of an intra-oriented “weapons control
regime”, set up essentially in order to tame the German army (p.80).
In contrast and misleadingly, many historical analyses of the WEU only take
into account its current primary function – promoting a European Security and
Defence Identity (ESDI) – and take this as a criterion for judging its functions then.
However, the WEU’s current function only developed by the mid-eighties, when
changes in international politics allowed for a change of its primary objective.
Due to its relatively strict construction of a mutual assistance formula, expressed
in article 5 of the modified Brussels Pact, the WEU has often been said to
actually imply a rigid mutual assistance towards its members. In contrast, Birk
shows that mutual assistance is not even a secondary function (nor a function at all)
of the WEU since it never had military structures independent from NATO to translate
that obligation into reality. Therefore, the “formula of mutual assistance in
article 5 remained without practical meaning” (p.82). In this regard, comparing
both institutions and their functions will always be somewhat misleading (pp.41f;
pp.73ff; p.103; p.105).

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 163
Also, Birk convincingly proves that characterising the WEU as the “modified
Brussels Pact” is at the least problematic since the content of the initial pact had
been changed substantially. The unspoken objective of the Brussels Pact was to
create NATO, not anticipating that a WEU might be established at some point. The
“modified Brussels Pact", in contrast, was clearly a “weapons control regime",
especially by means of the newly established Agency for Arms Control, imposing
absolute and relative constraints on its members (p.79ff). The essential function of
the WEU appears in the protocols Nr. II - IV of the modified Brussels Pact, aiming
at a political control of the German army (p.222).
Even if the secondary function(s) (Sekundärfunktionen) are not imperative for
the adoption of the treaty, they will allow to master institutionally unanticipated
situations and tasks, thus contributing to the stabilisation of an international organisation.
In regard to the WEU, its secondary functions made it a relatively successful
institution inasmuch as it provided fora for dealing with several divers topics, such
as the Saar-question or Great Britain’s interest in coordinating politico-economical
issues with members of the European Community (EC) after de Gaulle had denied
London admittance to the EC (p.41). The WEU was successful because it could flexibly
handle various dissimilar issues on the secondary functions level.
According to Birk, the current primary function of the WEU – i.e. the development
of the ESDI – emerging in the mid-eighties when the Rome Declaration of
1984 and the Hague Platform of 1987 had pinned down WEU to the fields of security
and defence (p.125). But how is this turning point to be explained?
The ESDI emerged as the new function from the changed framework conditions of
security policy in international politics. Especially, frictions among NATO partners on
this side and beyond the Atlantic over security issues – SALT and ABM treaties of the
seventies; SDI; an increasing bilateralism of the superpowers - accelerated the request
of some Europeans (especially the French) for a Security and Defence Identity of their
own. Besides, the WEU Parliamentary Assembly played a crucial role in urging for the
ESDI since the Assembly constantly stressed the European dimensions of the WEU
compared to the more intergovernmental approach of the Council.
Birk therefore emphasises not to talk about a “revitalisation” of the WEU during
that period, since with a new function – developing the ESDI - something qualitatively
different emerged. Instead, one should rather talk of a “political reinterpretation”
(p.127) or “qualitatively changed repolitisation” (p.155). The old primary function –
arms control - declined by that time down to zero since retaining it would have proven
dysfunctional. This meant a change in quality (and not only a gradual change)
since the quality of the basis of the agreement had been changed in essence. From
that time onward, the WEU became a specialised organisation and its “secondary
functions” as a feature of the “old” WEU entirely disappeared (p.127).
Concerning its new function Birk comes to the conclusion that the WEU did
promote the process of European integration, but could not substantially serve as its
catalyst. Presently, after the Eastern enlargement process, the Union’s status is that
of a “contractor” (Subunternehmer) under the EU for defence issues. The future
function consists in reinforcing its contribution to the ESDI and serving as a mili-

164
tary / politico-military executive organ especially for carrying out the so-called
“Petersberg-Missions” for the EU, including the possibility of “out-of-area” operations.
Consequently, the WEU will be (or better: is already being) transformed
from a political to a military instrument (pp.217-227).
Altogether, Birk’s analysis offers a subtle and comprehensive investigation of
the WEU’s functional change in the course of time that allows to judge its historical
foundations as well as its current role more adequately.
Sebastian Mayer
Research Fellow
Free University of Berlin
William I. HITCHCOCK – France Restored. Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for
Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954. Chapel Hill/London, The University of North Carolina
Press, 1998, 291 S. – ISBN 0-8078-47478-X. – 12,50 £.
Nachdem sich die Forschung über die Anfänge des Kalten Krieges und die Rekonstruktion
Westeuropas zunächst vor allem auf die Rolle der USA und Großbritanniens
konzentriert hatte, rückt seit einigen Jahren Frankreich stärker in den Mittelpunkt des
Interesses. Verhielt sich die französische Seite tatsächlich so passiv, kurzsichtig oder
destruktiv, wie es die ältere Literatur nahelegt? Oder vermochte sich Frankreich,
ungeachtet seiner militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Schwäche, in weit höherem Maße
gegen die amerikanische Vormacht zu behaupten als bisher angenommen?
Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, zeichnet Hitchcock auf der Grundlage französischer,
britischer und amerikanischer Akten die französische Rekonstruktions-,
Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik während der ersten Dekade des Kalten Krieges
detailliert nach. Drei Themenkomplexe interessieren ihn dabei ganz besonders: Das
„Vermächtnis“ der Vierten Republik, der Beitrag der Vereinigten Staaten zur politischen
und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Nachkriegseuropas und die Anfänge der
europäischen Einigungsbestrebungen.
Entgegen früheren Auffassungen zieht er eine insgesamt positive Bilanz der
französischen Politik zwischen Kriegsende und der Mitte der 1950er Jahre. Frankreich
habe die Nachkriegsordnung entscheidend geprägt, indem die französische
Diplomatie über die Verwendung der Marshallhilfe mitbestimmt, den wirtschaftlichen
Wiederaufbau Westdeutschlands eingedämmt, dessen föderalen politischen
Aufbau gestärkt und dessen Wiederbewaffnung gebremst, die deutsch-französische
Aussöhnung forciert und eine führende Rolle in der westlichen Allianz erobert
habe: „Despite the apparent dependence on American aid, French planners were
succesful in outlining and pursuing a national strategy that advanced French
interests, cleverly skirting and at times adapting to American priorities“ (S.208).
Die USA seien auf diese Weise gezwungen worden, auf die Interessen Frankreichs
weit stärker Rücksicht zu nehmen, als nach dem Kräfteverhältnis zwischen den beiden
Ländern zu erwarten gewesen wäre. Auch die französische Integrationspolitik

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 165
deutet er in diesem Sinne „as a function of an overall national strategy that sought
to enhance the nation’s influence within Europe and the Atlantic Alliance“ (S.204).
Die Geschichte des Kalten Krieges, so könnte man die Ergebnisse der Studie
mit John Lewis Gaddis, der ein Vorwort beigesteuert hat, zusammenfassen, verlief
wesentlich komplizierter als lange Zeit angenommen: “If there was an American
‚empire by invitation’ in post-World War II Europe, this was one in which the subjects
instructed als well as invited the emperor” (S.X). Völlig neu ist diese Erkenntnis
allerdings ebensowenig wie die These von der konstruktiven Europa- und
Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs. Nicht zuletzt die deutsche Forschung hat seit
Mitte der 1980er Jahre wiederholt auf die maßgebliche Rolle Frankreichs bei der
Eingliederung Westdeutschlands in die westliche Gemeinschaft und der Integration
Europas hingewiesen. Sich mit dieser Literatur auseinanderzusetzen, hat Hitchcock
bedauerlicherweise versäumt – sein Buch hätte davon gewiß profitiert.
Werner Bührer
Technische Universität München

167
Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen
Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz
America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950
In September 1950, the U.S. government demanded that the NATO allies agree to the rearmament of
West Germany openly and immediately. The American government said it would not send over a
combat force that could serve as the heart of an effective defence system for the NATO area unless
this demand were accepted. This heavy-handed policy is traditionally interpreted as the outcome of a
bureaucratic conflict within the U.S. government: the military authorities, it is said, would only agree
to deploy the troops if the allies agreed to German rearmament, and Secretary of State Acheson reluctantly
gave way to the military on this issue. Using a variety of archival sources, this article challenges
that view. It concludes that what the U.S. government did in September 1950 has to be understood
in political terms: Acheson deliberately decided to take a very tough line with the NATO allies
at the time. That policy choice, it is argued, had a major bearing on U.S.-European relations, and had
a certain bearing even on the European integration process.
Les Etats-Unis, l’Europe et le réarmement allemand. Critique d’un mythe
(août-septembre 1950)
En septembre 1950, le gouvernement des Etats-Unis demande à ses alliés européens de l’alliance
atlantique de se rallier ouvertement et immédiatement au réarmement de l’Allemagne fédérale, disant
qu’une acceptation du principe constituerait le préalable à l’envoi des troupes américaines de combat
destinées à constituer l’épine dorsale de l’OTAN pour la défense en Europe. Cette façon de procéder
à la manière forte est traditionnellement présentée comme le résultat d’un confl it bureaucratique au
sein de l’administration américaine: les autorités militaires auraient subordonné le déploiement de
troupes à l’acceptation par les alliés du réarmement allemand, et le secrétaire d’Etat Dean Acheson,
malgré lui, aurait emboîté le pas des militaires. C’est ce que le présent article cherche à relativiser. En
utilisant diverses sources d’archives, il démontre que l’action de Washington en septembre 1950 doit
être envisagée en des termes politiques: Acheson a délibérément décidé d’adopter à l’égard des partenaires
de l’OTAN une ligne de conduite assez rude. Ce choix ternissait les relations américano-européennes
et avait aussi une certaine incidence sur le processus d’intégration européenne.
Die Vereinigten Staaten, Europa und die deutsche Aufrüstung (August-September 1950):
die Kritik eines Mythos
Im September 1950 verlangte die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von ihren NATO-Partnern eine
offene und sofortige Zustimmung in der Frage der Wiederbewaffung Westdeutschlands. Die Amerikaner
sagten, sie würden ihre zum Kernstück der Verteidigung Europas aufgestellten Kampftruppen
erst dann entsenden, wenn diese Bedingung erfüllt sei. Der schroffe Umgang mit den Alliierten wird
gemeinhin als Auswuchs eines bürokratischen Konfliks innerhalb der US-Verwaltung interpretiert:
die Spitze der Militärs, sagt man, hätte dem Truppenaufmarsch erst dann zugestimmt, wenn die Alliierten
sich mit der deutschen Aufrüstung einverstanden erklärt hätten, und Staatssekretär Dean Acheson
habe sich widerwillen diesen Forderungen der Militärs gebeugt. Der vorliegende Artikel bestreitet
dies. Anhand verschiedener Archivquellen zeigt er, dass Washingtons Vorgehensweise im
September 1950 durchaus politisch aufzufassen ist: Acheson hat ganz bewusst eine harte Gangart mit
den NATO-Partnern eingelegt. Diese politische Ausrichtung, so wird argumentiert, übte einen
bestimmenden Einfluss auf die amerikanisch-europäischen Beziehungen aus; sie hatte auch einen
gewissen Einfluss auf den europäischen Integrationsprozess.

168
Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen
Paul M. Pitman
“Un Général qui s'appelle Eisenhower”:
Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community
This article reconsiders the role of geopolitics in the formation of the European Economic Community
(EEC). Instead of arguing that either economic goals or strategic ambitions were the primary
drivers of foreign economic policy in the mid-1950s, it shows how the two sets of concerns acted
together to shape policy-making in France and Germany. Fundamental questions regarding the durability
of Atlantic economic ties and the reliability of NATO deterrence pushed the French and German
governments toward a new strategic and economic partnership. The reorganization of the European
economic order was the result not of any single incident such as the Suez Crisis or the Free
Trade Area proposal but of persistent tensions within the Atlantic system, which influenced - but did
not determine - domestic economic policy processes.
«Un Général qui s'appelle Eisenhower»:
la crise atlantique et les origines de la Communauté Economique Européenne
Le présent article reconsidère le rôle de la géopolitique dans la formation de la Communauté Economique
Européenne (CEE). Au lieu d'argumenter que soit des objectifs économiques, soit des ambitions
stratégiques eussent été les moteurs primaires de la politique extérieure économique au milieu
des années 1950, il montre combien des considérations relevant des deux domaines agissaient
conjointement pour façonner les décisions politiques en France et en Allemagne. Des problèmes
fondamentaux telles le caractère durable des liens économiques transatlantiques ou la fi abilite de la
force de dissuasion de l'OTAN incitèrent les gouvernements français et allemand à développer un
nouveau partenariat stratégique et économique. La réorganisation de l'ordre économique européen ne
résultait nullement d'un incident isolé, à l'exemple de la crise de Suez ou du projet de la Zone de
Libre-Echange, mais des tensions persistantes au sein du système atlantique qui, sans être déterminantes,
influençaient néanmoins la formulation de la politique économique dans chaque pays.
„Ein General namens Eisenhower“:
Die Atlantikkrise und die Anfänge der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinsschaft
Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die Geopolitik bei der Entstehung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
(EWG). Statt zu argumentieren, dass entweder wirtschaftliche Ziele oder strategische
Ambitionen die primär treibende Kraft der Außenwirtschaftspolitik in der Mitte der fünfziger Jahre
gewesen seien, zeigt der Artikel, wie die beiden erwähnten Bereiche eigentlich zusammenspielten
und den Entscheidungsprozess in Frankreich und in Deutschland gestalteten. Grundle gende Fragen
wie die Dauerhaftigkeit der atlantischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen oder die Zuverlässigkeit der NATO
Abschreckungsstrategie veranlassten die französische und deutsche Regierungen dazu, eine neue
strategische und wirtschaftliche Partnerschaft anzustreben. Die Umwandlung der europäischen Wirtschaftsordnung
wurde keineswegs ausgelöst durch einzelne Ereignisse wie die Suezkrise oder der
Vorschlag einer europäischen Freihandelszone, sondern durch die dauerhaften Spannungen im
atlantischen System, welche die innere Wirtschaftspolitik zwar nicht bestimmten, aber maßgebend
beinflussten.

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 169
Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan
Hegemony or Vulnerability?
Giscard, Ball, and the 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal
What was the character of America's international monetary relations with Europe during the early
1960's, and how were they related to the larger transatlantic political questions of the day? Using
newly opened sources on both sides of the Atlantic, this essay challenges the long-held view that the
United States was committed to maintaining its "hegemonic power" by propping up the Bretton
Woods system. Similarly, the authors undermine the standard belief that French international monetary
policy was singularly anti-American in the early 1960’s.
New evidence reveals that in 1962, to the great surprise of the Kennedy administration, French Minister
of Finance Valéry Giscard d'Estaing offered to help the United States with its balance of payments deficit and
gold losses. Inspired by Giscard's hints of support, Undersecretary of State Geor ge Ball and key members of
the Council of Economic Advisors crafted a monetary plan whose central component was a controversial
gold standstill agreement. In return for a European promise to formally limit their gold purchases from the
American Treasury, the United States would move aggressively to end its balance of payments deficit. At the
end of this arrangement, a new international monetary agreement would be negotiated with the Europeans to
replace Bretton Woods. Surprisingly, many within the Kennedy administration were willing to sacrifice the
central role of the dollar and its "seigneuriage" privileges in any new system, a position that would have had
much appeal for the Europeans. This article investigates the furious debate within the Kennedy administration
over the plan and explains why nothing came of Giscard’s apparent willingness to help ease the dollar
and gold outflow problem.
Hégémonie ou vulnérabilité?
Giscard d'Estaing, Ball, et le Gold Standstill Proposal de 1962
Quelles étaient au début des années 1960 les relations monétaires internationales entretenues par les
Américains avec l'Europe; quel était le rapport entre ces questions monétaires et les relations politiques
transatlantiques en général? En utilisant des sources récemment ouv ertes au public de part et
d'autre de l'Atlantique, le présent article défie l'idée longtemps reçue que les Etats-Unis se seraient
engagés à sauvegarder leur "puissance hégémonique" en soutenant le système de Bretton Woods. En
même temps, les auteurs contestent aussi la vieille croyance que la politique monétaire internationale
pratiquée en ces temps-là par la France aurait été particulièrement anti-américaine.
Les nouvelles données révèlent qu'en 1962, à la grande surprise de l'administration Kennedy, le ministre
français des Finances Valéry Giscard d'Estaing offrait son aide pour juguler le déficit américain de la balance
des payements et les sorties d'or. George Ball, le sous-secrétaire d'Etat et d'autres membres influents du
Council of Economic Advisors s'inspirèrent alors des suggestions de Giscard pour développer un plan monétaire
controversé dont le point de mire était une "trêve de l'or". En échange de la promesse formelle de limiter
leurs achats d'or auprès du Trésor américain, les Européens recevraient des Etats-Unis l'engagement que
ceux-ci s'attacheraient sérieusement à couper court au déficit de leur balance des payements. Au terme de cet
arrangement, un nouvel accord monétaire international serait négocié avec les Européens afin de remplacer
celui de Bretton Woods. Etonnamment beaucoup de monde à l'intérieur de l'administration Kennedy était
prêt à sacrifier dans ce nouveau système le rôle central du dollar et ses privilèges de "seigneuriage". En voilà
une position qui aurait eu beaucoup d'attrait pour les Européens. Le présent article analyse les débats serrés
déclenchés par le plan au sein du staff américain et explique pourquoi finalement il n'est rien sorti de concret
de cette apparente bonne volonté giscardienne de contribuer à enrayer l'exode du dollar et de l'or.
Hegemonie oder Schwäche?
Giscard d'Estaing, Ball und der Gold Standstill Vorschlag von 1962
Wie gestaltete sich in den frühen sechziger Jahren Amerikas internationale Währungspolitik gegenüber
Europa; und wie war diese in das allgemeine Tagesgeschäft der transatlantischen Beziehungen
eingebunden? Neue, erst seit geraumer Zeit zugängliche Quellen aus Beständen beiderseits des
Atlantik ermöglichen es die herkömmliche Meinung, dass die Vereinigten Staaten ihre hegemoniale

170
Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen
Macht durch ein Festhalten am Bretton Wooods System absichern wollten, infrage zu stellen.
Genauso bezweifelt der vorliegende Aufsatz auch die Standardvorstellung, Frankreichs internationale
Währungspolitik sei damals ganz besonders anti-amerikanisch ausgerichtet gewesen.
Neue Erkenntnisse zeigen wie 1962 - zur gro_en Überraschung der Kennedy-Administration -
der französische Finanzminister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing den Vereinigten Staaten sein Hilfe anbot,
um die Probleme der defizitären Zahlungsbilanz und der Goldausfuhr zu bereinigen. Beflügelt durch
Giscards angkündigte Unterstützung, arbeiteten der beigeordnete Staatssekretär Geor ge Ball und führende
Mitglieder des Council of Economic Advisors einen Plan aus, in dessen Mittelpunkt ein kontroversiertes
Goldstillhalteabkommen stand. Als Gegenleistung für ein ausdrückliches europäisches
Versprechen zukünftig Goldeinkäufe in den USA einzuschränken, würden die Amerikaner ihr Defizit
der Zahlungsbilanz nun verschärft bekämpfen. Danach sollte ein neues internationales Währungsabkommen
mit den Europäern verhandelt werden. Es würde jenes von Bretton Woods ersetzen.
Erstaunlich ist, wie viele Leute der Kennedy-Administration bereit waren die zentrale Rolle des Dollars
und seine "herrschaftlichen" Privilegien in einem neuen System aufzugeben das den Europäern
doch sehr entgegengekommen wäre. Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht die heftigen Debatten die
der Plan innerhalb der amerikanschen Verwaltung ausgelöst hatte, und erklärt auch warum aus Giscards
gutem Willen das Problem der Dollar- und Goldausfuhr zu entschärfen nichts wurde.

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 171
Hubert Zimmermann
Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict and Cooperation in Technology and
Monetary Policy, 1965-1973
This survey of transatlantic relations during the 1960s and early 1970s analyses, by concentrating on
the fields of monetary and technology policies, the causes and consequences of the erosion of European-American
relations in this period. The lacking interest of the United States for an expansion of
collaboration in high technology sectors left numerous existing possibilities unexplored. At the same
time, an already existing structure of mutual cooperation in monetary policy, the Bretton Woods system,
broke down, mainly due to an increasing unilateralism on part of the United States. The most
important consequence of these “American challenges” was an intensification of European cooperation.
The EC summit of The Hague in December 1969 was the most visible expression of this
reaction. The decisions to create a monetary union, increase technological cooperation and realise a
common foreign and security policy bore witness to this trend.
L’Europe occidentale et le défi américain:
conflits et coopération dans les domaines de la technologie et de la politique monétaire
(1965-1973)
L’analyse des relations transatlantiques dans les domaines de la politique monétaire et technologique
au cours des années soixante, début soixante-dix, révèle les causes et conséquences d’une érosion des
rapports entre Européens et Américains. Tandis qu’en matière des technologies de pointe les possibilités
réelles d’une extension de la coopération ne sont pas épuisées, à défaut d’un intérêt de la part des
Américains, la coopération déjà existante dans le domaine monétaire, c’est-à-dire le système de
Bretton Woods, s’effondre. L’unilatéralisme monétaire croissant des Etats-Unis en est la principale
cause. En réaction à ce «défi américain», les Européens intensifient leur coopération intra-communautaire.
La chose devient particulièrement manifeste à l’occasion du sommet de La Haye (décembre
1969) où sont adoptées les décisions de créer une union monétaire, de pousser la collaboration technologique
et de mettre en œuvre une politique étrangère et de sécurité européenne.
Westeuropa und die amerikanische Herausforderung:
Rivalität und Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Technologie- und Währungspolitik, 1965-1973
Anhand eines Überblicks über die transatlantischen Beziehungen in den Bereichen der Währungsund
Technologiepolitik in den 1960er und frühen 1970er Jahren werden die Ursachen und Folgen der
Erosion der europäisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen in diesem Zeitraum analysiert. Während auf
dem Gebiet der Hochtechnologien bestehende Möglichkeiten zu einer Ausweitung der Kooperation
aufgrund des Desinteresses der USA unterblieben, brach im Währungsbereich eine schon existierende
transatlantische Kooperationsstruktur, das Bretton Woods System, zusammen. Die Hauptursache
dafür war der zunehmende Unilateralismus der USA in der Währungspolitik. Die wichtigste
Konsequenz dieser „amerikanischen Herausforderungen“ war die Intensivierung der europäischen
Zusammenarbeit. Die EG-Gipfelkonferenz von Den Haag im Dezember 1969, auf der Beschlüsse zur
Schaffung einer gemeinsamen Währung, zur verstärkten Zusammenarbeit im Technologiebereich
und zur Verwirklichung einer gemeinsamen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik gefaßt wurden, war der
sichtbarste Ausdruck dieser Reaktion.

172
Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen
Georges-Henri Soutou
President Pompidou and the relations between the US and Europe
Georges Pompidou aimed at improving Franco-American relations profoundly within the framework
of a triangular structure constituted by America, France and Europe, with France occupying a privileged
position. An important Franco-American agreement along these lines with far-reaching consequences
on the political, economic and military level didn’t seem out of reach in 1970-71. However
this agreement failed (the Azores Conference in December 1971 being a decisive turning-point) for
structural reasons: besides the intrinsic complexity of certain problems like monetary or nuclear
questions that didn’t further compromises, Pompidou who after all was more Gaullist than people
used to think at that time was not in the least willing to make the slightest concession in matter of
national independence no more than to draw closer to Nato beyond very restricted limits or to accept
an international monetary agreement confirming American superiority without compensation. As to
Nixon and Kissinger they certainly were more positive towards France than Kennedy and Johnson
had been, but despite their proclaiming the vision of a multipolar world in which Europe could play
its part, they didn’t nevertheless renounce American leadership within the Atlantic framework.
But there were also economic causes considering the crises of autumn 1973 and also due to the f act
that from that year, with the end of the Vietnam war and in the aftermath of the international upheaval due
to the Nixon shock of 1971 and to SALT, the US depended less on France to make prevail their conceptions
in Europe and in the world and were thus in a position to display a more demanding attitude. Georges
Pompidou, on the other hand, in view of international uncertainties and anxieties aroused by Moscow and
Bonn, switched back to a more strictly Gaullist conception of his foreign polic y.
Georges Pompidou however never sought the rupture with Washington. Even in the worst
moments (autumn 1973 and winter 1973-1974) he continued to advocate compromise solutions. As a
result, Pompidou’s efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Washington bore posthumous fruit:
nuclear cooperation taken up again by his successors, the Ottawa declaration of June 1974, the Valentin-Ferber
agreements of the 3d July of the same year regarding cooperation between the 1 st Army
and Nato. These texts defined the relations between France and Nato up to the 80ies.
Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe
Georges Pompidou a recherché une amélioration profonde des relations franco-américaines, dans le cadre
d’un ensemble triangulaire Amérique-France-Europe où la France aurait joué un rôle privilégié. En
1970-1971 un grand accord franco-américain dans cette direction, avec des conséquences importantes sur
les trois plans, politique, économique, militaire ne paraissait pas hors de portée. Cependant cet accord a
échoué (la conférence des Açores de décembre 1971 fut là un tournant essentiel) pour des raisons structurelles:
outre la complexité intrinsèque de certains problèmes comme les questions monétaires ou
nucléaires, qui ne facilitaient pas les compromis, Pompidou était quand même plus «gaulliste» qu’on ne
l’a cru souvent à l’époque, et nullement disposé à faire la moindre concession en matière d’indépendance
nationale ou à se rapprocher de l’OTAN au-delà de très étroites limites, ou encore à accepter un accord
monétaire international entérinant la supériorité américaine sans contreparties. Quant à Nixon et Kissinger
ils étaient certes plus constructifs à l’égard de la France que Kennedy et Johnson, mais, malgré leur vision
proclamée d’un monde multipolaire où l’Europe jouerait son rôle, ils ne renonçaient tout de même pas au
leadership américain dans le cadre atlantique.
Mais il y eut aussi des causes conjoncturelles: les crises de l’automne 1973, et aussi le fait qu’à partir
de cette année-là, avec la fin de la guerre du Vietnam et à la suite du bouleversement international dû au
choc Nixon de 1971 et aux SALT, les Etats-Unis avaient moins besoin de la France pour faire triompher
leurs conceptions en Europe et dans le monde et pouvaient donc se montrer plus exigeants envers elle.
Tandis que Georges Pompidou, devant les incertitudes internationales et les inquiétudes que lui inspiraient
Moscou et Bonn, revenait à une conception plus strictement gaulliste de sa politique extérieure.
Cependant Georges Pompidou ne rechercha jamais la rupture avec Washington. Même aux pires
moments (automne 1973 et hiver 1973/74) il resta partisan de formules de compromis. Du coup le rapprochement
avec Washington voulu par Pompidou eut des fruits posthumes: la coopération nucléaire
reprise par ses successeurs, la déclaration d’Ottawa de juin 1974, les accords Valentin-Ferber du 3 juillet

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 173
de la même année concernant la coopération entre la 1 ère Armée et l’OTAN. Les rapports entre la France et
l’OTAN restèrent définis par ces textes jusqu’aux années 80.
Präsident Pompidou und die amerikanisch-europäischen Beziehungen
Georges Pompidou strebte nach einer Verbesserung der französisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen
innerhalb einer Dreieckstruktur Amerika-Frankreich-Europa in dessen Rahmen Paris eine vorrangige
Rolle übernommen hätte. Um 1970/71 schien ein derart gestaltetes großes französisch-amerikanisches
Abkommen mit wichtigen politischen, wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Auswirkungen
auch tatsächlich möglich. Trotdem scheiterte die Verständigung (die Konferenz auf den Azoren im
Dezember 1971 bildet diesbezüglich einen entscheidenden Wendepunkt). Neben der besonderen
Komplexität mancher Fragen, insbesondere im währungs– oder nuklearpolitischen Bereich – sie war
nicht dazu angetan einen Kompromiss zu fördern – gestaltete sich die letztlich starre Haltung beider
Seiten als ausschlaggebend für den Misserfolg. Pompidou war doch weit mehr „gaullistisch“ als man
damals glaubte. Er war weder bereit auch nur die geringsten Zugeständnisse in Sachen nationale
Unabhängigkeit zu machen, noch eine Annäherung Frankreichs an die Nato über gewisse, sehr eng
gezogene Grenzen hinaus zu dulden. Genauso wenig akzeptierte er ein internationales Währungsabkommen
das allzu einseitig die amerikanische Überlegenheit anerkannte. Nixon und Kissinger ihrerseits
waren zwar Frankreich gegenüber konstruktiver gesinnt als Kennedy und Johnson, und trotzdem
waren auch sie nicht bereit die amerikanische Vorherrschaft im atlantischen Bündnis
aufzugeben. Daran änderte auch ihre Vison einer multipolaren Weltordnung nichts, in der Europa
eine grössere Rolle hätte spielen sollen.
Es gab aber auch konjukturbedingte Gründe für den Misserfolg: die Krisen im Herbst 1973 und die
allgemein veränderte internationale Lage in Folge des Nixonschocks von 1971, der SALT-Gespräche
und der Beendigung des Vietmankrieges. All dies bewirkte dass die USA weniger auf Frankreichs
Mitwirkung angewiesen waren, um ihre Vorstellungen in Europa und der Welt durchzusetzen.
Französischerseits veranlassten die internationale Unsicherheit und die Beunruhigung über die
Moskauer und Bonner Politik Pompidou zu einer streng gaullistisch ausgerichteten Konzeption seiner
Außenpolitik zurückzukehren.
Georges Pompidou suchte aber nie den offenen Bruch mit Washington. Sogar im Augenblick der
schlimmsten Krisen (Herbst 1971; Winter 1973/74) blieb er stets ein Verfechter von Kompromisslösungen.
Die von ihm gewollte französisch-amerikanische Annäherung trug denn auch ihre Früchte
nach seinem Tod: die von seinen Nachfolgern wieder aufgenommene Zusammenarbeit im Nuklear -
bereich; die Ottawa-Erklärung vom Juni 1974, die Valentin-Ferber Abkommen vom 3. Juli desselben
Jahres über die Zusammenarbeit der 1. Armee mit der NATO. Bis in die achtziger Jahre hinein wurden
die Beziehungen zwischen Frankreich und der Nato durch diese Texte festgelegt.

Walter Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht (Hrsg.)
Grundfragen der europäischen
Verfassungsentwicklung
Forum Constitutionis Europae – Band 1
Das nationale Verfassungsrecht ist heute nur noch in der Zusammenschau mit den
Grundnormen der Europäischen Verträge zu verstehen. In diesem Sammelband
analysieren renommierte Verfassungs- und Europarechtler zentrale Fragen der
europäischen Verfassungsentwicklung.
Ingolf Pernice untersucht die »Constitutional Law Implications for a State Participating
in a Process of Regional Integration« und »Die politische Vision von
Europa und die notwendigen institutionellen Reformen«. Zu sehr unterschiedlichen
Folgerungen gelangen Paul Kirchhof und Manfred Zuleeg bei ihrer Analyse
des Verhältnisses zwischen nationalem Recht und Europarecht. Gerd Wartenberg
berichtet über »Praktische Erfahrungen bei der Bund-Länder-Koordinierung in
Angelegenheiten der EU«. Die zentrale Frage der Folgen des EU-Beitritts auf die
nationale Souveränität analysiert Miroslaw Wyrzykowski in seinem Beitrag »Die
Europaklausel der polnischen Verfassung – Souveränität in Gefahr?«.
Den Band beschließt Dimitris Tsatsos mit der Entwicklung eines »Prinzip(s) der
europäischen Verfassungsverantwortung«.
2000, 147 S., brosch., 58,– DM, 423,– öS, 52,50 sFr, ISBN 3-7890-6591-9
(Schriftenreihe Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Bd. 4)
NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft
76520 Baden-Baden

175
Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren
Marc TRACHTENBERG, is a professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia PA, 19104-6228, USA.
Website: http://www.history.upenn.edu/trachtenberg
Tel: (+ 215) 898-8477
E-mail: cram@sas.upenn.edu
Christopher GEHRZ, is a graduate student in the history department at Yale
University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA.
personal addr.: 15 Beacon Street, Hamden, CT 06514
Tel: (+ 203) 287-9692
E-mail: christopher.gehrz@yale.edu
Paul PITMAN, is a Research Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the
University of Virginia.
personal addr.: P.O. Box 302, Canyon, California 94516, USA.
Tel: (+ 925) 376-5176
E-mail: pitman@virginia.edu
Francis J. GAVIN, is an Assistant Professor of Public Policy at the Lyndon B.
Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, P.O. Box Y,
Austin, Texas, 78713-8925, USA.
Website: http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/
Tel: (+) 512-471-5249
Fax: (+) 512-471-1835
E-mail: fgavin@mail.utexas.edu
Erin R. MAHAN, received her Ph.D. in History from the University of Virginia in
May 2000. She is an Historian at the U.S. Department of State.
E-mail: MahanER@state.gov
Georges-Henri SOUTOU, est Professeur à l'Université de Paris IV – Sorbonne, Ecole
Doctorale du Monde contemporain, 1, rue Victor Cousin, F-75230 Paris Cedex 05.
E-mail: georges-henri.Soutou@paris4.sorbonne.fr
Dr. Hubert ZIMMERMANN, ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für
Internationale Politik, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Postfach 1021, 44780 Bochum.
Tel: (0049) 234 3222956
Fax: (0049) 234 3214532
E-mail: hubert.zimmermann@ruhr-uni-bochum.de

Kompakt und übersichtlich
NOMOS
aktuell
Who's Who in European
Integration Studies 2000
Dieses Verzeichnis von Hochschullehrern und Forschern mit
Arbeitsschwerpunkt Europäische Integration erscheint seit
1989. In die vorliegende dritte, aktualisierte Ausgabe wurden
auf vielfachen Wunsch auch Wissenschaftler aus Nicht-EU-
Staaten, die bisher in einem Ergänzungsband zusammengefaßt
worden waren, einbezogen.
Die Ausgabe 2000 enthält 1138 Eintragungen von Wissenschaftlern
aus insgesamt 33 nationalen Mitgliedsvereinigungen
der European Community Studies Associations (ECSA).
Die nach Staaten geordneten Eintragungen enthalten
- Namen und Anschrift,
- Schwerpunkte in Lehre und Forschung,
- institutionelle Zugehörigkeit,
- wesentliche neuere Publikationen.
European Community
Studies Association
Who’s Who
in European Integration Studies
2000
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
Baden-Baden
ECSA
Ein zweiteiliger Index erleichtert die Nutzung: Im ersten Teil
sind die verzeichneten Wissenschaftler ihren Forschungsschwerpunkten
zugeordnet, im zweiten Teil nach Disziplinen
und Ländern aufgelistet.
Dieses einzigartige Verzeichnis soll die Kommunikation
zwischen Wissenschaftlern, auch unterschiedlicher Disziplinen,
auf dem Gebiet der Europäischen Integration fördern und
erleichtern; es ist zudem eine überaus nützliches Handbuch für
jeden, der wissenschaftliche Experten zu den verschiedensten
Fragen der Europäischen Integration sucht.
NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft
76520 Baden-Baden · Fax (07221) 2104-27
Who's Who in European
Integration Studies 2000
2000, 372 S., brosch.,
48,– DM, 350,– öS, 44,50 sFr,
ISBN 3-7890-6938-8
(ECSA-Series • European Community
Studies Association – Europe /
Association pour l'Étude des
Communautés Européennes)
http://www.nomos.de

177
Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher
Nathalie BERGER. – La Politique Européenne d'Asile et d'Immigration. Enjeux et
perspectives. Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2000, 269 p. – ISBN 2-8027-1299-3. – 2.300,00
BEF. 57,02 EUR.
Eberhard BIRK. – Der Funktionswandel der Westeuropäischen Union (WEU)
im europäischen Integrationsprozeß. Würzburg, Ergon Verlag, 1999, 298 p.
– ISBN 3-933563-32-1. – 58,00 DM.
Konstantina BOTSIOU. – Griechenlands Weg nach Europa. Von der Truman-Doktrin
bis zur Assoziierung mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1947 –
1961. Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • Bruxelles • New York • Wien, Peter
Lang, 1999, 508 p. – ISBN 3-631-34725-1. – 103,00 SFR.
Douglas BRINKLEY and Richard T. GRIFFITHS. – John F. Kennedy and Europe.
Louisiana State University Press, 1999, 349 p. – ISBN 0-8071-2332-3. – 44,95 £.
Jean-Paul CAHN, Henri MENUDIER, Gérard SCHNEILIN. L'Allemagne et
la construction de l'Europe 1949 – 1963. Paris, Editions du Temps, 1999,
318 p. – ISBN 2-84274-105-6. – 130,00 FF.
André DUMOULIN. – L'identité européenne de sécurité et de défense. Des
coopérations militaires croisées au Livre blanc européen. Bruxelles • Bern •
Berlin • Frankfurt/M • New York • Wien, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 1999, 291 p. –
ISBN 90-5201-901-0. – 50,00 SFR.
Lothar GALL – Elisabeth MÜLLER-LUCKNER (Hrsg.). – Jahrbuch des
Historischen Kollegs 1999. München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2000, 199 p. –
ISBN 3-486-56492-7. – 48,00 DM.
Michael GEHLER, Rolf STEININGER. – Die Neutralen und die europäische Integration
1945 – 1995. The Neutrals and the Europen Integration 1945 – 1995.
Wien, Böhlau Verlag, 2000, 800 p. – ISBN 3-205-99090-0. – 980,00 ATS.
Serge GOVAERT. – Bruxelles en capitales. 1958 – 2000 de l'Expo à l'Euro. Bruxelles,
De Boeck Université, 2000, 225 p. – ISBN 2-8041-3473-3. – 980,00 BEF.
Gilbert GORNIG, Theo SCHILLER, Wolfgang WESEMANN (Hrsg.). – Griechenland
in Europa. Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • Bruxelles • New York • Wien,
Peter Lang, 2000, 206 p. – ISBN 3-631-35021-X. – 56,00 SFR.
Jackie GOWER & John REDMOND. – Enlarging the European Union. The
Way Forward. Hampshire, Ashgate, 2000, 208 p. – ISBN 1-84014-488-2. –
37,50 £.
Jagdisch GUNDARA, Sidney JACOBS. – Intercultural Europe. Diversity and
social policy. Hampshire, Ashgate, 2000, 375 p. – ISBN 1-85742-346-1. –
49,95 £.
Louk HAGENDOORN, György CSEPELI, Henk DEKKER, Rusell FARNEN. –
European Nations and Nationalism. Theoretical and historical perspectives.
Hampshire, Ashgate, 2000, 546 p. – ISBN 0-7546-1136-1. – 57,50 £.

178
Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher
Hans-Joachim HARDER (Hrsg.) – Von Truman bis Harmel. Die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von NATO und europäischer Integration.
Militärgeschichte seit 1945. München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2000, 238 p. –
ISBN 3-486-56490-0. – 68,00 DM.
Jason G. HARTELL, Johan F.M. SWINNEN. – Agriculture and East-West European
Integration. Hampshire, Ashgate, 2000, 284 p. – ISBN 0-7546-1201-5. –
39,95 £.
Peter HILPOLD. – Die EU im GATT/WTO-System. Aspekte einer Beziehung
«sui generis». New York • Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • Bruxelles •
New York • Oxford • Wien, Peter Lang, 2000, 394 p. – ISBN 3-631-36755-4.
– 79,00 SFR.
Max JAKOBSON. – Finnland im neuen Europa. Berlin, Berlin Verlag Arno
Spitz Gmbh, 1999, 154 S., – ISBN 3-87061-867-1. – 39,00 DM.
Christer JÖNSSON, Sven TÄGIL and Gunnar TÖRNQVIST. – Organizing European
Space. London, Sage Publications, 2000, 224 p. – ISBN 0-7619-6672-2. –
49,50 £. – Paper 0-7619-6673-0. – 16,99 £.
Osmo JUSSILA, Seppo HENTILÄ, Jukka NEVAKIVI. – Vom Großfürstentum
zur Europäischen Union. Politische Geschichte Finnlands seit 1809. Berlin,
Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz Gmbh, 1999, 415 S., – ISBN 3-87061-833-7. –
49,00 DM.
Seung-Ryeol KIM. – Der Fehlschlag des ersten Versuchs zu einer politischen Integration
Westeuropas von 1951 bis 1954. New York • Frankfurt am Main • Berlin •
Bern • Bruxelles • New York • Oxford • Wien, Peter Lang, 2000, 399 p. – ISBN
3-631-36330-3. – 97,00 SFR.
Yves LEJEUNE. – La participation de la Belgique à l'élaboration et à la mise en
oeuvre du Droit européen. Aspects organisationnels et procéduraux. Bruxelles,
Bruylant, 816 p. – ISBN 2-8027-1315-9. – 5.200 BEF – 128,90 EUR.
David W.P. LEWIS & Gilles LEPESANT. – What Security for which Europe? Case
Studies from the Baltic to the Black Sea. New York • Washington, D.C./Baltimore
• Boston • Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • Bruxelles • New York •
Wien, Peter Lang, 1999, 211 p. – ISBN 0-8204-4268-2. – 76,00 SFR.
Jean-Victor LOUIS & Hajo BRONKHORST. (sous la direction de). – The
Euro and European Integration. L'Euro et l'Intégration Européenne.
Bruxelles • Bern • Berlin • Frankfurt/M • New York • Wien, P.I.E.-Peter
Lang, 1999, 365 p. – ISBN 90-5201-912-6. – 54,00 SFR.
Patrick MITTMANN. – Die Rechtsfortbildung durch den Gerichtshof der Europäischen
Gemeinschaften und die Rechtsstellung der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union.
New York • Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • Bruxelles • New York • Oxford • Wien,
Peter Lang, 2000, 455 p. – ISBN 3-631-36145-9. – 103,00 SFR.
Beate NEUSS. – Geburtshelfer Europas? Die Rolle der Vereinigten Staaten im
europäischen Integrationsprozeß 1945 – 1958. Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
2000, 388 p. – ISBN 3-7890-6384-4. – 98,00 DM.
Saskia PAGELL. – Souveränität oder Integration? Die Europapolitik Dänemarks und
Norwegens von 1945 bis 1995. Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • Bruxelles •
New York • Wien, Peter Lang, 1999, 133 p. – ISBN 3-631-35587-4. – 40,00 SFR.

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher 179
Philippe POCHET & Bart VANHERCKE (eds). – Les enjeux sociaux de
l'union économique et monétaire. Bruxelles, Presses Interuniversitaires
Européennes, 1998, 181 p. – ISBN 90-5201-805-7. – 34,00 SFR.
Elizabeth POND. – The Rebirth of Europe. Washington, Brookings Institution
Press, 1999, 290 p. – ISBN 0-8157-7158-4. – 26,96 $.
Dietrich ROMETSCH. – Die Rolle und Funktionsweise der Europäischen Kommission
in der Ära Delors. Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • Bruxelles • New
York • Wien, Peter Lang, 1999, 414 p. – ISBN 3-631-35514-9. – 79,00 SFR.
Paul SABOURIN. – Le destin du continent européen. Le chemin de la Grande
Europe. Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1999, 345 p. – ISBN 2-8027-1269-1. –
2100,00 BEF – 52,05 EUR.
Raymond SALLER. – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Beteiligung der Kommunen
und Regionen an den Entscheidungen der Europäischen Union.
Würzburg, Ergon Verlag, 1999, 298 p. – ISBN 3-933563-42-9. – 58,00 DM.
Hans-Peter SCHWARZ (Hrsg.) – Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 1952. Herausgegeben im Auftrag des Auswärtigen
Amts vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte. München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag,
2000, 842 p. – ISBN3-486-56480-3. – 120,00 DM.
Hans-Peter SCHWARZ (Hrsg.) – Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 1969. Band I und Band II. Herausgegeben im Auftrag
des Auswärtigen Amts vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte. München, R. Oldenbourg
Verlag, 2000, 1601 p. – ISBN 3-486-56479-X. – 240,00 DM.
Kurt R. SPILLMANN, Andreas WENGER, Derek MÜLLER. – Towards the 21 st
Century: Trends in Post-Cold War International Security Policy. Studies in
Contemporary History and Security Policy. Bern • Berlin • Frankfurt am Main •
New York • Paris • Wien, Peter Lang AG, 1999, 335 p. – ISBN 3-906764-31-1. –
49,00 SFR.
Kurt R. SPILLMANN, Joachim KRAUSE. – Kosovo: Lessons Learned for International
Cooperative Security. Bern • Berlin • Frankfurt am Main • New York •
Paris • Wien, Peter Lang AG, 2000, 244 p. – ISBN 3-906765-16-4. – 39,00 SFR.
Michael STAACK. – Handelsstaat Deutschland. Deutsche Außenpolitik in
einem neuen internationalen System. Paderborn, Schöningh, 2000, 560 p. –
ISBN 3-506-78625-3. – 128,00 DM.
Bo STRATH (ed.). – Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other. Bruxelles •
Bern • Berlin • Frankfurt/M • New York • Wien, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2000, 517
p. – ISBN 90-5201-913-4. – 70,00 SFR.
Armand TOUATI. – La Nation, la fin d'une illusion? Paris, Desclée de Brouwer,
2000, 109 p. – ISBN 2-220-04726-1. 82,00 FF.
Hermann WEBER. – Die DDR 1945 – 1990. München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag,
1999, 355 p. – ISBN 3-486-52363-5. – 38,00 DM.
Bernadette WHELAN. – Ireland and the Marshall Plan 1947 – 1957. Dublin,
Four Courts Press, 2000, 424 p. – ISBN 1-85182-517-7. – 39,50 £.
Mette ZØLNER. – Re-Imagining the Nation. Debates on Immigrants, Identities
and Memories. Bruxelles • Bern • Berlin • Frankfurt/M • New York • Wien
P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2000, 284 p. – ISBN 90-5201-911-8. – 50,00 SFR.

Wilfried Loth (ed.)
Crises and Compromises:
The European Project 1963-1969
The Sixties were a decisive period in the history of European integration. The different
concepts of Euopean unification were clashing more violently than ever,
leading to the confrontation with French President Charles de Gaulle and to the
crisis of the »Empty Chair«. However precisely the extent of the crisis led to a
new basic consensus, which was to shape the structure of the European Community
lastingly. The so-called »compromise of Luxembourg« in early 1966 opended
the way to more confidence in a common future of the Europeans. With the
acceptance of the Harmel Report, a workable compromise was reached on the
aims and structure of the Western alliance. The Hague Summit in December 1969
set the course for the membership of Great Britain and further applicants, for a
new form of political cooperation and for the Monetary Union as well.
This volume, issued from the seventh Research Conference of the European Community
Liaison Committee of Historians held in Essen in November 1999, offers
for the first time a comprehensive view of the crises and compromises in the
European project of the Sixties. 26 leading experts from 11 countries are presenting
the main results of their most recent research in the archives of the European
Union and their member states. Thus, the volume will be seen as a milestone in
the historical reconstruction of the process of European integration.
In preparation January 2001, c. 600 pp., pb., c. 178,– DM, € 91.–
ISBN 3-7890-6980-9
NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft
76520 Baden-Baden

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JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION HISTORY
REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE
L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER
EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY
The purpose of The Journal of European Integration History is to encourage the
analysis and understanding of different aspects of European integration, especially
since 1945, in as wide a perspective as possible. The Journal publishes the
conclusions of research on diplomatic, military, economic, technological, social
and cultural aspects of integration. Numbers devoted to single themes as well as
to diverse subjects are published in English, French or German. Each number
includes reviews of important, relevant publications.
REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE
L’objectif de la Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne est de promouvoir l’analyse
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particulièrement depuis 1945, mais sans exclusive. La Revue publie les résultats des
recherches sur les aspects diplomatiques, militaires, économiques, technologiques,
sociaux et culturels de l’intégration. Les numéros à thème ou ceux ouverts à diverses
perspectives sont publiés dans l’une des langues suivantes: anglais, français, allemand.
Chaque numéro comprend des comptes rendus d’ouvrages importants.
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER
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Die Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration bietet ein Forum zur
Erforschung des europäischen Integrationsprozesses in allen Aspekten: den politischen,
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Ihren Schwerpunkt bilden Beiträge zu den konkreten Einigungsprojekten seit
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publiziert. Die Zeitschrift erscheint zweimal im Jahr. Neben Themenheften stehen
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Neuerscheinungen veröffentlicht. Die Beiträge eines internationalen
Autorenkreises erscheinen in englischer, französischer oder deutscher Sprache.
2000, Volume 6, Number 2
NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft
Baden-Baden