journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ... journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
96 Lise Rye Svartvatn searchlight. France’s problem was that the country’s industrial sector was relatively small and unproductive. This has been explained by the fact that no net investments had taken place in the period from 1930 to 1945. Low productivity and lack of competitive power has also been traced back to the 1931 sterling devaluation and the introduction of a preferential tariff within the British Empire. These steps augmented France’s trade with its own empire. 59 Since the French Empire was undeveloped and not able to compete in a free market, this trade had been highly protected. Due to the protection, structural changes that competition otherwise would have provoked, such as the merger of small firms into larger units, had not taken place. 60 France in the mid-fifties was still protectionist. According to the Foreign Ministry, economic circles took little interest in exports. Quotas were kept up not only for balance of payment-reasons, but also due to the will, justified or not, to protect. 61 The fact that France managed to keep its trade on the present level of liberalization was attributed to the system of import taxes and export aid. 62 In 1956 the ILO published an investigation into the cost of labour that showed that wage costs and obligatory social charges in France were higher than in Germany. Table 2: Average hourly earnings, obligatory social charges and cost of days off with pay 63 Average hourly earnings, 1954 Obligatory social charges expressed as percentage of asseable wages at 01.01.1956 Cost to employers of days off with pay as percentage of wages, 1952-53 Wages + obl. social charges + cost of days off with pay. Indices: Switzerland =100 In Swiss francs Indices: Switzerland = 100 France 1.88 73 29.8 7.2 92 Germany 1.74 68 11.7 9.8 75 However, the ILO investigation did not take account of private agreements between undertakings and trade unions that, unlike in France, constituted a considera- 59. In the constitution of 1946 the term “empire” was replaced by the term “union”. 60. F. M. B. LYNCH, France and the International Economy …, op.cit., Conclusion. 61. DDF 1956, I, no.265, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières, 21.04.1956. 62. DDF 1956, I, no.67, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières, 02.02.1956. 63. Source: International Labour Office: Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation. Report by a Group of Experts, Geneva 1956, p.33. Since the three sets of data related to different dates, the ILO emphasized that the aggregates were approximations. It was considered unlikely that this affected the relative magnitude in any substantial degree.
France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community 97 ble part of total social charges weighing upon German employers. Nor did it take account of the overvaluation of the French franc and the undervaluation of the German mark. Thus, the disparity in the cost of labour in the two countries was, according to officials in the Interministerial Committee for Questions of European Integration (SGCI), less than indicated in the table above. The SGCI concluded that in the course of two years the difference in the cost of labour between France and Germany had decreased from 22.6% in 1954 to only 7% in 1956. 64 The Quai d’Orsay was well aware that a harmonization of social charges would not compensate for the disparity between French and foreign prices. The Ministry was of the opinion that this disparity was mainly due to the structure of the French costs and to the sum of production costs. After the Second World War, subsequent French governments had, in contrast to the previous period, led a policy focused on investments. Simultaneously, a policy of increased wages had been pursued. At the national level the increase in income had balanced the increase in prices. At the international level these policies had created a gap between French and foreign prices. 65 Consequently, harmonization of social legislation would only very slightly improve the situation for those branches of French industry where prices were higher than in other countries. Nor was such harmonization likely to be accepted by France’s partners. Not only would it contradict objectives with regard to competition pursued notably among the Six, social harmonization would also worsen the European countries’ competitive position on the international market without improving France’s position versus third countries. 66 The Quai d’Orsay was concerned with the danger involved in describing the gap in prices as a general disparity. Export-aid and import-taxes did not concern all products. This could be interpreted as if disparities did not exist within sectors outside the scope of these arrangements, which would mean that the disparity was not general. It could also be interpreted as if disparities within these branches were compensated for by specific distortions to the detriment of other countries. 67 An investigation into general price disparities would highlight the need for reform of the structure of French costs. 68 Alternatively it could lead France’s partners to recommend with reinforced insistence a devaluation of the French franc. The Ministry was well aware that a permanent elimination of price disparities would take both devaluation and reform. Yet while the Mollet government did not share the preceding government’s reasons against devaluation, it was all the same against it. 69 The system of export aid and import taxes was conducive to avoiding devaluation. The argument presented by the French government was that the price disparities were 64. CAC, 910004/2, Note sur l’incidence des charges sociales et de la charge salariale globale, undated. 65. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 711, Note, 15.09.1956. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. One is left with the impression that this was the case, since the Ministry advised against a sector-wise study of price disparities since this could reveal specific distortions harmful to certain countries. 68. Ibid. 69. DDF 1956, I, no.265, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières, 21.04.1956.
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96<br />
Lise Rye Svartvatn<br />
searchlight. France’s problem was that the country’s industrial sector was relatively<br />
small and unproductive. This has been explained by the fact that no net investments<br />
had taken place in the period from 1930 to 1945. Low productivity and lack <strong>of</strong><br />
competitive power has also been traced back to the 1931 sterling <strong>de</strong>valuation and<br />
the introduction <strong>of</strong> a preferential tariff within the British Empire. These steps augmented<br />
France’s tra<strong>de</strong> with its own empire. 59 Since the French Empire was un<strong>de</strong>veloped<br />
and not able to compete in a free market, this tra<strong>de</strong> had been highly protected.<br />
Due to the protection, structural changes that competition otherwise would<br />
have provoked, such as the merger <strong>of</strong> small firms into larger units, had not taken<br />
place. 60 France in the mid-fifties was still protectionist. According to the Foreign<br />
Ministry, economic circles took little interest in exports. Quotas were kept up not<br />
only for balance <strong>of</strong> payment-reasons, but also due to the will, justified or not, to<br />
protect. 61 The fact that France managed to keep its tra<strong>de</strong> on the present level <strong>of</strong> liberalization<br />
was attributed to the system <strong>of</strong> import taxes and export aid. 62<br />
In 1956 the ILO published an investigation into the cost <strong>of</strong> labour that showed that<br />
wage costs and obligatory social charges in France were higher than in Germany.<br />
Table 2: Average hourly earnings, obligatory social charges and<br />
cost <strong>of</strong> days <strong>of</strong>f with pay 63<br />
Average hourly earnings,<br />
1954<br />
Obligatory<br />
social<br />
charges<br />
expressed<br />
as percentage<br />
<strong>of</strong><br />
asseable<br />
wages at<br />
01.01.1956<br />
Cost to employers<br />
<strong>of</strong> days <strong>of</strong>f<br />
with pay as percentage<br />
<strong>of</strong><br />
wages, 1952-53<br />
Wages + obl.<br />
social charges +<br />
cost <strong>of</strong> days <strong>of</strong>f<br />
with pay. Indices:<br />
Switzerland<br />
=100<br />
In Swiss<br />
francs<br />
Indices:<br />
Switzerland<br />
= 100<br />
France 1.88 73 29.8 7.2 92<br />
Germany 1.74 68 11.7 9.8 75<br />
However, the ILO investigation did not take account <strong>of</strong> private agreements between<br />
un<strong>de</strong>rtakings and tra<strong>de</strong> unions that, unlike in France, constituted a consi<strong>de</strong>ra-<br />
59. In the constitution <strong>of</strong> 1946 the term “empire” was replaced by the term “union”.<br />
60. F. M. B. LYNCH, France and the International Economy …, op.cit., Conclusion.<br />
61. DDF 1956, I, no.265, Note <strong>de</strong> la Direction générale <strong>de</strong>s Affaires économiques et financières, 21.04.1956.<br />
62. DDF 1956, I, no.67, Note <strong>de</strong> la Direction générale <strong>de</strong>s Affaires économiques et financières,<br />
02.02.1956.<br />
63. Source: International Labour Office: Social Aspects <strong>of</strong> European Economic Co-operation. Report<br />
by a Group <strong>of</strong> Experts, Geneva 1956, p.33. Since the three sets <strong>of</strong> data related to different dates,<br />
the ILO emphasized that the aggregates were approximations. It was consi<strong>de</strong>red unlikely that this<br />
affected the relative magnitu<strong>de</strong> in any substantial <strong>de</strong>gree.