journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

94
Lise Rye Svartvatn
sentiments in French economic circles, the Foreign Ministry remained convinced
of the need to take account of social and fiscal differences among the Six. The outlook
for the ratification of a treaty that did not include clear arrangements in these
fields was considered poor. What mattered was therefore to set up a system taking
sufficient care of realities in order to gain the National Assembly’s approval and
necessary support in public opinion. 48 After the elections, instructions to the French
delegation in Brussels continued to insist on the need to harmonize social, as well
as fiscal, policies.
Hanns Jürgen Küsters writes that after the elections “a more open-minded approach
to European policy was expected of France. The political personalities did
in fact change, but the administration – and with it – its extremely anti-European
stance remained”. 49 It is not my impression that the Foreign Ministry was opposed
to a common market membership. Rather, it appears realistic with regard to the internal
situation in France and what it would take to overcome opposition to the
government’s choice of policy. 50 After January 1956 the Ministry no longer advocated
the need for an alignment of the social charges belonging to France’s partners
only. Just as consistently, it called for the need to undertake structural economic
and social domestic reforms. Thus, structural problems were no longer swept under
the carpet, and self-examination was more pronounced. As soon as the decision to
establish a common market was taken, France would have no choice but to surmount
the problems that membership presented.
Other questions, including the harmonization of charges, only constituted a means
to that end. It was made clear that membership would not be compatible with the maintenance
of the present economic and social equilibrium in France. The safeguard clauses
were temporary and would not spare France the necessary social and economic
changes, the importance of which could not be underestimated. The common market
would also constitute a step toward a merger of the economic policies of the countries
involved, and a certain integration of the countries’ foreign policies. Finally, it would
both legally and practically be impossible to realize simultaneously the merger of the
European markets and the markets of the French union. Acceptance or refusal of these
implications would have to take place. Before doing so, France would have to ascertain
that there was no other way to ensure in a comparable manner a durable reinforcement
of European co-operation and suitable conditions for the modernization and expansion
of the French economy. 51
The Ministry knew at an early point that the forthcoming Spaak report was unlikely
to take account of the French claims in a precise manner. 52 Nor was the Con-
48. DDF 1956, I, 67, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières,
02.02.1956.
49. H. J. KÜSTERS, The Origins of the EEC Treaty, op.cit., p.222.
50. DDF 1956, I, no.122, Note du Département, 23.02.1956.
51. DDF 1956, I, no.265, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières,
21.04.1956.
52. DDF 1956, I, no.67, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières,
02.02.1956.