journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community 93
What seems sure is that support for a pro-EEC policy still could not be, and was
not, taken for granted. 44 Improvements in France’s economic position may have
made it easier for the new government to lead a more pronounced policy in favour
of a common market.
Shortly after the Mollet take-over, the director of the economic and financial division
at the Quai d’Orsay, Olivier Wormser, wrote a note in which he discussed the
situation faced by the new government. Wormser emphasized that exports to the
OEEC area had expanded considerably, that gold and currency reserves had increased
and that the country had been able to repay an appreciable part of her
debts. 45 However, he simultaneously established that the situation was far from satisfactory,
and also marked by the precarious methods that had been used to obtain
the above mentioned results. Exports of finished products were still low, and France
had not yet seen all consequences of the loss of market shares in Indochina, of the
situation in North Africa and of the statute for the Saar. As for the methods used by
France, several countries were about to lose their patience with the French system
of export subventions and import taxes.
As Wormser put it, the government was faced with two options. One possibility
was to devalue and eliminate the export subventions and import taxes. The other alternative
consisted in making the other countries accept that the existing system
was a temporary but inevitable solution made necessary by the disparity between
French and international prices. He did not envisage that the new government
would be willing to devalue. Nor could the disparity in prices be rapidly eliminated.
It would take time before any policy of increased productivity and/or investments
could produce results. The international picture, the situation in North Africa
and the need to maintain full employment rendered a severe policy impossible.
Consequently, he concluded that the government would have to make the other
countries accept the French system of export subventions and a temporary tax on
imports. Wormser emphasized the emergency character and importance of the task
in question. Yet he was also aware that the French government seemed unable to
reach a clear and definite solution to the problem. The only way out seemed to be
«… de chercher à gagner du temps en érigeant des pratiques en vérité contestables,
en système doctrinal, tout en demeurant conscient qu’il s’agit là d’un expédient provisoire».
46
Material produced under the new government indicates that it ended up in
adopting Wormser’s recommendations. France’s reason to engage actively in the
ongoing work in the Spaak-committee was “l’intérêt politique qui s’attache à faire
un nouveau pas vers la construction de l’Europe”. 47 However, the common market
was simultaneously considered an economic opportunity, where increased but limited
competition would enhance a reform of the French economy. Due to prevailing
44. Christian Pineau, in: E. SERRA (ed.), The Relaunching of Europe …, op.cit., p.282.
45. MAE, PW, Vol.80, Note, 30.01.56.
46. Ibid.
47. DDF 1956, I, no.62, Note du Service de Coopération économique, January 1956.