journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

90
Lise Rye Svartvatn
«La difficulté essentielle qu’il fallait surmonter était l’hostilité de la quasi-totalité de
l’opinion française à l’abolition, même progressive, de la protection dont jouissait, je
dirai plutôt souffrait, l’industrie française». 31
The argument presented here is that the demand for social harmonization was
vital in overcoming the French opinion’s hostility to the removal of protection that
membership of the common market seemed to imply. This did not come as a result
of the direct economic significance of the French claims, which seems to have been
minor. 32 The indirect significance of the claims was on the contrary considerable,
both politically and economically. Through these claims, France was able to secure
continued protection for French industry within the common market. The claims
were furthermore instrumental in justifying regulations for France within the
OEEC that had resulted in considerable advantages for French trade. Finally they
enabled French governments to avoid undertaking an otherwise necessary but politically
undesirable devaluation of the French franc.
Opposition to membership of a common market in the French National Assembly
reflected prevailing sentiments in French public opinion in general, and within
French industry in particular. The industrial sector feared foreign competition and
was reluctant to the removal of the protection which French industry enjoyed. 33
This protection consisted of a tax reduction on exports and a corresponding surcharge
on imports into the Franc Area. The claims for social harmonization were
conducive to overcoming opposition to economic integration by being instrumental
in maintaining these special regulations for French trade. It turned out as follows.
In Brussels France justified her resort to export-aid and special import-taxes with
the importance of social charges weighing upon French cost prices. 34 The claims
for social harmonization were in turn justified by the argument that they were made
in order to harmonize social charges: to prevent countries with less developed social
legislation from outclassing other countries. 35 Accordingly, as long as the
French claims for social harmonization were not accommodated, special protection
of French industry was justified. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continuance of
this protection was considered a necessity if a treaty on a common market was to be
ratified by the French National Assembly. 36
31. Ibid., p.281.
32. See pp.14-15.
33. R. MARJOLIN, Le travail d’une vie …, op.cit., p.284. See also Ph. MIOCHE, Le patronat français
et les projets d’intégration économique européenne dans les années cinquante, in: G. TRAUSCH
(ed.), The European Integration from the Schuman-Plan to the Treaties of Rome, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
and Bruylant, Baden-Baden and Brussels, 1993, p.247. Mioche explains that the employer’s
organization, the Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF), was divided in the question
of membership of the common market and why this was the case.
34. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 711, Note, 15.09.56.
35. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 711, Note pour Monsieur le Président de la Délégation française, 12.07.56.
36. DDF 1956, I, no.67, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières, 2 February
1956.