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France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community 89
jection even more difficult. 23 The Ministry therefore concluded that, as matters stood,
the best (and probably only) solution was to play for more time. 24 This was to be
done by demanding an examination of the problems that would result from the setting
up of a common market. At the Messina conference, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Antoine Pinay, acted in accordance with this conclusion. It has been argued that positive
conclusions at Messina were due to concessions made by France’s partners. 25
The countries agreed to undertake a study of the measures necessary in order to harmonize
the general policy of the participating states in the financial, economic and
social fields. 26 Furthermore, they declared it essential to study the progressive harmonization
of regulations now in force in the different states, particularly those relating
to the length of the workday and the payment of additional benefits. 27
In the time that followed, France made every effort to change the economic
terms of the Benelux proposal. As it had already been established that the proposal
could not be turned down, this was the only logical thing to do. If the economic
terms within a common market could be improved for France, scepticism within
public opinion would decrease at the same time as the outlooks on a dominating
German position. Earlier research into French European policy has shown that
French tactics before the Messina conference were to disrupt the link between the
acceptable proposal for sectoral integration and the unacceptable proposal for a
common market. This was to be done by focusing on topics most likely to divide
the other countries. Social harmonization was considered to be one such issue. 28
While there is no reason to doubt that disruption was what the Quai d’Orsay hoped
for before the conference, several circumstances indicate the existence of additional
motives. One of these is that the claims were sustained after the Messina conference
was over and the disrupting tactic had failed.
In Quest of Protection and Approval
Scholars commenting on the French claims have contested their economic importance.
29 Robert Marjolin considered them an absurd demand. 30 However, Marjolin
also gave the following description of what it would take to bring France into the
common market.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.: “il s’agirait d’étudier à loisir les conditions de réalisation du marché commun”.
25. H. J. KÜSTERS, The Origins of the EEC Treaty, in: E. SERRA (ed.), The Relaunching of Europe …,
op.cit., p.217.
26. Historical Archives of the European Communities (HAEC), CM3/ Nego 001, Introduction. La
Conférence de Messine, undated.
27. The Messina Declaration: (http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/messina.htm).
28. F. M. B. LYNCH, France and the International Economy …, op.cit., p.171.
29. A. S. MILWARD, Rescue …, op.cit., p.213. P. M. STIRK, A History of European Integration since
1914, Pinter, London, 1996, p.140.
30. R. MARJOLIN, Le travail d’une vie …, op.cit., p.286.