journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Introduction 7<br />
such as the attempt to create a European Defence Community and for the more successful<br />
un<strong>de</strong>rtakings such as the Schuman plan and the negotiation <strong>of</strong> the Treaties<br />
<strong>of</strong> Rome. The traditional focus on the 1950’s and on the incentives – and the lack<br />
there<strong>of</strong> – in the nation states to engage in the <strong>integration</strong> process is well justified.<br />
The time <strong>of</strong> birth <strong>of</strong> the European Community undoubtedly is the crux for un<strong>de</strong>rstanding<br />
why nation states have engaged in ceding sovereignty to the supranational<br />
community and what was the original ‘contract’ <strong>of</strong> the <strong>integration</strong> process. Examining<br />
why the Six set sails for the <strong>integration</strong> process that en<strong>de</strong>d with the EU – and<br />
why others did not (at that point <strong>of</strong> time at least) – is still an important subject for<br />
researchers. Two <strong>of</strong> the contributions to this issue are analyzing these problems in a<br />
country where dynamics and reluctance at one and the same time seem to have<br />
been most manifest. Seung-Ryeol Kim’s article on France’s Agony between «Vocation<br />
Européenne et Mondiale»: The Union Française as an Obstacle in the French<br />
Policy <strong>of</strong> Supranational European Integration, 1952-1954 is a study <strong>of</strong> France’s attempts<br />
to reconcile her priorities in the European policy with her world power status.<br />
European consi<strong>de</strong>rations – especially in relation to Germany – brought the<br />
French political lea<strong>de</strong>rship to engage first in the green pool negotiations and later in<br />
the attempt to establish a European Army with a European Political Community as<br />
a ‘ro<strong>of</strong> organization’. It was, however, difficult to reconcile these policies with the<br />
preservation <strong>of</strong> France’s world power role in which the Union Française was the<br />
main pillar. Thus, Seung-Reyol Kim shows how the concern for the endangered<br />
system <strong>of</strong> <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy between France and her earlier colonies contributed to the<br />
French rejection <strong>of</strong> the green pool and to the failure to ratify the EDC treaty. While<br />
Seung-Reyol Kim’s article focusses on the overseas aspect <strong>of</strong> French European<br />
policy, Lise Rye Svartvatn’s In Quest <strong>of</strong> Time, Protection and Approval: France<br />
and the Claims for Social Harmonisation in the European Economic Community,<br />
1955-56 turns the attention to the French domestic political consi<strong>de</strong>rations during<br />
the negotiations on the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Rome. Lise Rye Svartvatn’s work shows how<br />
France’s social policy pursued at European level inten<strong>de</strong>d to achieve the domestic<br />
aims <strong>of</strong> securing a continued expansion and mo<strong>de</strong>rnisation <strong>of</strong> French industry. In itself<br />
a reflection <strong>of</strong> temporal problems and domestic, political disunity on the question<br />
<strong>of</strong> European <strong>integration</strong>, the line pursued by France had nevertheless longterm effects<br />
on the institutional and policy-oriented compromises in the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Rome.<br />
Still, however important this original compromise on the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Rome was,<br />
the functions and dynamics <strong>of</strong> the European Communities met with changes in the<br />
face <strong>of</strong> challenges from outsi<strong>de</strong> forces. Even though the <strong>integration</strong> process initiated<br />
by the Six was progressively to become the heart <strong>of</strong> the <strong>de</strong>velopment <strong>of</strong> European<br />
institution-building and co-operation, it should be remembered that the Six did<br />
not have the monopoly in European <strong>integration</strong> and co-operation in the 1950’s and<br />
1960’s. Till now the relationship between those insi<strong>de</strong> the union and those outsi<strong>de</strong><br />
(or waiting to join) has been one <strong>of</strong> the most critical factors <strong>of</strong> the <strong>history</strong> <strong>of</strong> the European<br />
community. This was so already with the divi<strong>de</strong> between the Anglo-Scandinavian<br />
functionalists and the Continental fe<strong>de</strong>ralists at the time <strong>of</strong> the foundation <strong>of</strong><br />
the Council <strong>of</strong> Europe in 1949, the break-up <strong>of</strong> the OEEC in 1958-59 and the Euro-