journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

84
Seung-Ryeol Kim
gained more influence on France’s European policy in 1953-1954 than previously
under Monnet and Schuman.
With his realistic European policy, Bidault intended to meet all French positions
on the question of European integration. He could not decide however which orientation
to give to French foreign policy, whether to give priority to the Union
Française or to European integration. He simply postponed taking a clear position
on this question for later.
Despite the careful attitude of the French government, it seemed that the EPC
would lead in the near future to a federation, a framework within which France’s
world power status could be dissolved. France was against the final stage of European
supranational integration, which it expected in the EPC negotiations. In view
of this terrible prospect a number of people in France among those who had advocated
the ECSC and the EDC as monitoring control bodies over West Germany recoiled
from European supranational integration. The original opponents of this
functional integration, like the Gaullists, affirmed this regression.
In conclusion, the fear that supranational European integration would break
down the Union Française played a great role in France’s rejection of the supranational
construction of the EDC and the EPC. Thus the EPC project did not serve its
original purpose, the relief of the ratification of the EDC treaty, but proved only to
be a cumbersome burden for the ratification. France changed its attitude towards
the problem of the relationship between the Union Française and a supranational
European union two years later, during the EEC negotiations. At this time France
wanted to include its overseas territories in the community. This change in attitude
is of great importance for the success of the EEC negotiations. 70
70. It is very interesting to study why France changed its position in such a short period. But this article
will not tackle this question.