journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

70
Seung-Ryeol Kim
With regard to the integration of foreign policy, the Quai d’Orsay seriously criticized
the modest result of elaboration of the ad hoc Assembly, and thus the coordination
of the foreign policy under the member states. The legal advisor at the Quai
d’Orsay, Gros, posed the question of how a state which surrendered its powers of
decision in foreign policy matters to the EPC could carry out its world-wide responsibility.
28
From the beginning the Beyen Plan for the creation of a customs union did not find
approval in France. One of its most ardent critics was the director of the Service de
Coopération Economique at the Quai d’Orsay, Olivier Wormser. 29 The question of the
Union Française was one of the reasons why Wormser was opposed to the Beyen Plan.
Wormser asserted that if the Beyen Plan was accepted and carried out, France would be
forced to open its overseas markets to other European member states. He argued that
France could not simultaneously invest in both the metropolitan territory and in the unproductive
economic areas of its overseas territories without letting other countries participate.
Wormser foresaw the danger that the markets of the overseas territories would
be opened for the other five states without economic benefit for France, although these
countries participated under prerequisites favourable to France. Thus, France would be
forced to grant them its privileges in the Union Française, and economic gains would be
lost - almost 40 percent of all exports of France were sold at this time within the Union
Française. This would entail enormous political problems, and France would lose its
world power position. 30
The French European agricultural policy was likewise adapted to the Quai
d’Orsay’s general change of course in European politics, away from pro-community
tendencies. In the meantime, the dissenting opinion of the Pflimlin Plan became
influential. A majority of administrative elites in the ministry of Agriculture carried
out the change from a pro-European agricultural policy to a national protectionist
concept, as supported by the majority of the professional associations. 31 In addition,
the question of the relation of the French overseas areas to a planned agricultural
commodities market also induced the French government to a reserved position
vis-à-vis the supranational community of the Six. The previous negotiations
for agricultural integration showed that this question could not be avoided any
longer. In order to consider the situation of the overseas territories in agricultural
integration, an interdepartmental conference took place under the leadership of the
conseiller technique of Bidault’s staff, du Vignaux, on 2 and 5 February 1953, including
the top officials from the Quai d’Orsay, the Ministère d'Etat, the ministry of
28. Ibid.; AN Papiers Bidault 38, le jurisconsulte (Gros), Note pour le secrétaire général (Parodi), 18
fév. 1953, a/s. Projet de Fédération politique européenne.
29. AMAE DE-CE 45-60, Vol.521, pp.211-214, Note, a/s: proposition Beyen, 7.2.1953; AMAE
DE-CE 45-60, Vol.521, pp.215-230, Note du Service de CE, a.s. intégration économique. Entretiens
avec M. Beyen et Conférence de Rome, 9.2.1953.
30. Ibid.
31. AN Papiers Bidault 38, Note pour le président, Wormser, 14.2.1953 a.s. pool agricole; G. THIE-
MEYER, op.cit., pp.80 ff.