journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

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Kaiser offers numerous contentions about 1955-63 but there are four which are most significant.
The first is that in 1955 the British were complacent, arrogant and underestimated
the Six but did not 'miss a bus' at Messina (pp.27, 54-60). The criticisms ranged by Kaiser
about Britain's decision making and diplomacy in 1955 were not entirely original although
they were based on a more detailed analysis than that of preceding accounts. Kaiser has no
sympathy for Foreign Office attitudes, especially for the then Foreign Secretary, Harold
Macmillan, to whom he attributes personal responsibility for Britain's disastrous diplomacy
(pp.48-49). Although the failed diplomacy cannot be gainsaid, Kaiser's views on Macmillan
may be disputed; if Macmillan is to be criticised then it ought to be for his non-involvement
rather than his involvement. As to Kaiser's rejection of Miriam Camps' view that Britain
missed a bus in 1955 – questioning whether there was a bus to catch and adding that Britain
was heading along a different road (pp.54-60) – whilst these are germane points to raise,
they are speculative and suggest little more than the unpredictability of events for Britain
and the Six in 1955. Kaiser is on stronger ground in his second major argument which
explains how British attitudes towards European integration evolved over 1956-57 to produce
Plan G, Britain's proposal for a European industrial Free Trade Area (FTA) (pp.60-87).
Nevertheless, Kaiser's treatment of the FTA is ultimately negative and others, such as Ellison,
Moravcsik and Schaad, have offered more positive interpretations.
Kaiser's third and most significant argument is that Britain's first application for EEC membership
in 1961 was 'the result of a dual “appeasement” strategy' to maintain strong
Anglo-American relations, particularly the nuclear link, and to hold the Conservative Party
together whilst splitting the Labour Party (pp.XXXII and pp.108-173). Without doubt this is an
interesting explanation, if a rather contrived one. Yet that US pressure was dominant in Macmillan's
mind, and that an EEC application was seen as a diplomatic counter to secure the deal eventually
agreed at Nassau, underplays the other motives for the first application and overplays its
potential by-products. Furthermore, it could be argued that the domestic political context of the
application was not as straightforward as Using Europe suggests although extensive research on
this subject has yet to be produced. Nevertheless, the work of Bange, Deighton, Ellison, Griffiths
and Ward, Ludlow, Tratt, Hugo Young and John Young, amongst others, offer contrary interpretations
to Kaiser's on the motives for the first application.
Kaiser's fourth main argument considers the fate of Britain's first application. Here, he
focuses on high politics, particularly the relations between de Gaulle and Macmillan, and
the issue of nuclear diplomacy (pp.174-203). Although his account is far less developed in
terms of evidence than his treatment of the motives for the application, it nevertheless has
merit. Yet Ludlow's research on the conditional nature of the application and on the Brussels
negotiations themselves, along with the work of others, demonstrates that Kaiser tells only
one version of this story. Ludlow's concentration on the ebb and flow of the negotiations and
their technicalities and the attitudes of the Community and the Six suggests that Britain
failed to exploit opportunities for success prior to the strengthening of de Gaulle's power
after 1962. The first application's demise, according to Ludlow, was thus a significant failure
for the British, contrary to Kaiser's view that on the 'diplomatic level' it was 'a full success'
(p.203). Whatever view is taken of de Gaulle's veto in January 1963 it cannot be denied that
it left the British government in the position which it had worked to avoid since the Messina
Conference of June 1955.
Clearly, Using Europe is important in that Kaiser's arguments about 1955-63, despite the
criticisms that may be made of them, are significant and have generated historical debate.
Can the same be said of Kaiser's assertions about 'Britain and Europe' when he ventures outside
of 1955-63, especially as his epilogue covers 1963-1996 and the 1999 reprint's preface
comments on 1997-98? Using Europe does not make enough of its own historiographical
criticisms of the 'awkward partner' school and the British Sonderweg thesis as depicted in
the introduction (see pp.XXIX-XXXI). That Kaiser himself ultimately succumbs to 'round-