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132 Erin Delaney posed a three-line whip against membership. Even though the terms of entry were negotiated by the Conservatives, these Labour MPs believed that it did not “automatically make them into ‘Tory Terms’; that is, terms which in their nature must by opposed by members of the Labour Party. The Labour Committee for Europe says these are terms that can honourably be supported by Socialists”. 53 Notwithstanding the rhetoric of the pro-Europeans, the majority of the Parliamentary Labour Party voted no, and animosities deepened. Many members of the Labour Party remained ideologically opposed to the idea of the Common Market, even though Britain had joined. To the “guardians of the Party’s ‘ultimate purpose’”, in other words, the Left-wing traditionalist socialists, “there was still little to choose between the collaborationist Social Democratic Europe of the revisionists and the capitalist-dominated Europe of the Conservative Party”. 54 One Labour MP, Eric Deakins, declared: “I am not merely against Britain's membership of the Common Market. Even if we were not in, I should be against the Common Market's very existence”. 55 In the more moderate press, however, the benefits of the EEC, as noted in the 1965-1967 period, were still being reported. In a 1973 issue of Political Quarterly, for example, an article discusses the increased attention paid to social policy within the Community. It reviews the 1971 progress report on the actions taken by Community institutions, Report on the Development of the Social Situation in the Community. A key element of the actions taken in 1971 by the Community included the reform of the European Social Fund “to allow the Community to promote schemes itself directly instead of through national governments.” 56 This and other achievements were touted as successes for socialism on the European stage. Harold Wilson, still the leader of the party, attempted to create and maintain cohesiveness in the party by throwing the European issue into the hands of the British public. The major elements of the 1974 Labour campaign strategy were the commitments to renegotiating the terms of entry and to a referendum on joining. The renegotiation process was a balancing act between the leadership, which, while not enthusiastic, was nonetheless committed to Europe, those on the pro-European Right, and the Party's Left, which was strongly against any involvement. The outlined renegotiation objectives in the Labour manifesto included the traditional concerns for the Commonwealth and developing countries, as well as a demand for changes in the Common Agricultural Policy and the Community Budget. After Labour won the 1974 election, in an opening statement to the Council of Ministers, the Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, reiterated that Britain “reserved the right to withdraw from the Community if satisfactory terms could not be 53. The Labour Party and the European Communities, Labour Committee for Europe, Sept., 1971 as quoted in L.J. ROBINS, The Reluctant Party, op.cit., p.88. 54. L.J. ROBINS, The Reluctant Party, op.cit., p.69. 55. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 5 th Series, 865(1973): 306. 56. E. WISTRICH, Social Policy in the Community, in: Political Quarterly vol.44, no.2(April-June 1973), p.212.

The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe 133 agreed.” 57 The renegotiated terms passed Parliament on 9 April 1975, though not because of Labour support. The Government had to rely on Opposition support, which it received: its own members were split - 137 Labour MPs voting for, 145 against, with 33 abstentions. The renegotiated terms were almost immaterial at the start of the referendum campaign, as most of “the opponents of membership were opposed whatever the terms”. 58 The referendum itself was also a question of intraparty factionalism, as the Left hoped to use the issue of EC membership in order to secure control of the leadership positions, by gaining support from the many members of the party who were against entry but not necessarily in favour of radical leftist economic policy. 59 The Left called for a national referendum on the issue of membership, expecting that with a withdrawal vote it could consolidate its position within the party. The mainstream element of the party, represented by Prime Minister Wilson, 60 also thought that the EC debate would provide it with a chance to strengthen its power – by “outmanoeuvring the left”. 61 Thus Wilson co-opted the Left’s strategy of holding a referendum. 62 Wilson, in an attempt to hold the party together, waived Cabinet responsibility during the referendum campaign, paradoxically allowing the Left and the Right of the Party to criticise each other with impunity. Neil Kinnock, writing in the leftist Tribune, scoffed at the idea that socialism could be better achieved by going into Europe and attacked Roy Jenkins and other revisionists: “Somehow the vocabulary of radical – even revolutionary – socialism has a hollow ring when it comes from such conventionally Right-wing, or to use current terminology, ‘moderate’ mouths”. 63 In response the Right-wing attacked the ‘Labourism’ of the Left-wing, which was not ‘socialism’ and was blocking “the way to the establishment of social democracy on the European model”. 64 Labour leadership hoped that the referendum decision in favour of entry, on the high turnout of about 65%, would help to put the membership issue to rest. However, to the Labour Left, the issue was far from settled. After the referendum, the Labour Party sent representatives to the European Parliament (EP), which the Conservative Party had done from the time of British accession in 1973. Some pro-European Labour Members of the European Parlia- 57. S. GEORGE, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p.79. 58. S. GEORGE, op.cit., p.88. 59. G. BROWN, op.cit., p.76. 60. Although Wilson was initially the Left’s candidate in the early 1960s, by his third term as PM in 1974, he had become much more centrist, and a supporter, though now lukewarm, of entry to the EC. 61. G. BROWN, op.cit., p.77. 62. For a thorough analysis of the referendum campaign, see J. SMITH, The 1975 Referendum, in: Journal of European Integration History, vol.1(1999), Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1999, pp.41-56; and, D. BUTLER and U. KITZINGER, The 1975 Referendum, Macmillan, London, 1999. 63. N. KINNOCK, Socialism and Sovereignty, in: Tribune, 2 May, 1975. 64. S. FIELDING, Labourism and locating the British Labour Party within the European Left, in: Working Papers in Contemporary History and Politics, No.11, University of Salford, Salford, 1996, p.7.

The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe 133<br />

agreed.” 57 The renegotiated terms passed Parliament on 9 April 1975, though not<br />

because <strong>of</strong> Labour support. The Government had to rely on Opposition support,<br />

which it received: its own members were split - 137 Labour MPs voting for, 145<br />

against, with 33 abstentions.<br />

The renegotiated terms were almost immaterial at the start <strong>of</strong> the referendum campaign,<br />

as most <strong>of</strong> “the opponents <strong>of</strong> membership were opposed whatever the terms”. 58<br />

The referendum itself was also a question <strong>of</strong> intraparty factionalism, as the Left hoped<br />

to use the issue <strong>of</strong> EC membership in or<strong>de</strong>r to secure control <strong>of</strong> the lea<strong>de</strong>rship positions,<br />

by gaining support from the many members <strong>of</strong> the party who were against entry but not<br />

necessarily in favour <strong>of</strong> radical leftist economic policy. 59 The Left called for a national<br />

referendum on the issue <strong>of</strong> membership, expecting that with a withdrawal vote it could<br />

consolidate its position within the party. The mainstream element <strong>of</strong> the party, represented<br />

by Prime Minister Wilson, 60 also thought that the EC <strong>de</strong>bate would provi<strong>de</strong> it<br />

with a chance to strengthen its power – by “outmanoeuvring the left”. 61 Thus Wilson<br />

co-opted the Left’s strategy <strong>of</strong> holding a referendum. 62<br />

Wilson, in an attempt to hold the party together, waived Cabinet responsibility<br />

during the referendum campaign, paradoxically allowing the Left and the Right <strong>of</strong><br />

the Party to criticise each other with impunity. Neil Kinnock, writing in the leftist<br />

Tribune, sc<strong>of</strong>fed at the i<strong>de</strong>a that socialism could be better achieved by going into<br />

Europe and attacked Roy Jenkins and other revisionists:<br />

“Somehow the vocabulary <strong>of</strong> radical – even revolutionary – socialism has a hollow<br />

ring when it comes from such conventionally Right-wing, or to use current terminology,<br />

‘mo<strong>de</strong>rate’ mouths”. 63<br />

In response the Right-wing attacked the ‘Labourism’ <strong>of</strong> the Left-wing, which was<br />

not ‘socialism’ and was blocking “the way to the establishment <strong>of</strong> social <strong>de</strong>mocracy on<br />

the European mo<strong>de</strong>l”. 64 Labour lea<strong>de</strong>rship hoped that the referendum <strong>de</strong>cision in favour<br />

<strong>of</strong> entry, on the high turnout <strong>of</strong> about 65%, would help to put the membership issue<br />

to rest. However, to the Labour Left, the issue was far from settled.<br />

After the referendum, the Labour Party sent representatives to the European<br />

Parliament (EP), which the Conservative Party had done from the time <strong>of</strong> British<br />

accession in 1973. Some pro-European Labour Members <strong>of</strong> the European Parlia-<br />

57. S. GEORGE, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, Clarendon Press, Oxford,<br />

1990, p.79.<br />

58. S. GEORGE, op.cit., p.88.<br />

59. G. BROWN, op.cit., p.76.<br />

60. Although Wilson was initially the Left’s candidate in the early 1960s, by his third term as PM in 1974,<br />

he had become much more centrist, and a supporter, though now lukewarm, <strong>of</strong> entry to the EC.<br />

61. G. BROWN, op.cit., p.77.<br />

62. For a thorough analysis <strong>of</strong> the referendum campaign, see J. SMITH, The 1975 Referendum, in:<br />

Journal <strong>of</strong> European Integration History, vol.1(1999), Nomos, Ba<strong>de</strong>n-Ba<strong>de</strong>n, 1999, pp.41-56;<br />

and, D. BUTLER and U. KITZINGER, The 1975 Referendum, Macmillan, London, 1999.<br />

63. N. KINNOCK, Socialism and Sovereignty, in: Tribune, 2 May, 1975.<br />

64. S. FIELDING, Labourism and locating the British Labour Party within the European Left, in:<br />

Working Papers in Contemporary History and Politics, No.11, University <strong>of</strong> Salford, Salford,<br />

1996, p.7.

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