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An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy 117
However, even if the Conservative government accepted the basic line Labour
had had towards Scandinavia and Uniscan, new developments emerged in Anglo-Scandinavian
relations that were partly due to the new government's foreign
political preferences, and partly due to economic developments with which the
Conservatives had to react soon after assuming office in 1951. The first problem
arose with the difficulties the new government encountered with Britain's balance
of payments in 1951-52. While disputes over coal exports or fish landings had been
a longstanding problem with the Scandinavians, there was now trouble on a wider
front. 48 In 1951 serious problems over Britain's balance of payments led to drastic
cuts in imports, and this affected all the three Scandinavian economies in their vital
export sectors. On top of this, there were problems in meeting previously agreed
levels of coal and steel exports to Scandinavia. After much hard bargaining, larger
quantities of coal and steel were secured in late 1951, after an intervention by the
Foreign Office, but the continuing import restrictions led to further problems and
strong protests from the Scandinavian governments.
In early 1952, just as tension on the trade sphere was gradually reduced, the Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden introduced the idea of linking the planned European
Defence Community (EDC) with existing European institutions. 49 This created a serious
problem for Sweden and for them it was additional proof that the Conservative
government had a different set of priorities towards Scandinavia than Labour had
had. Membership in European institutions with a military role was considered incompatible
with Sweden's neutrality policy. 50 The prospect of Sweden's forced withdrawal
from the Council of Europe if the Eden plan succeeded, posed a grave threat to the
Anglo-Scandinavian axis in other questions concerning Europe too. Arguments highlighting
the need to maintain Britain's 'special relationship' with Scandinavia, however,
were not enough for Eden to modify his European policy. Overriding concerns
over the future of West Germany in particular, placed Sweden further down on the list
of Britain's political priorities. 51 Further, Eden was in general less interested in the
different new multilateral forums of economic diplomacy that had emerged after the
war, and his general disregard for the OEEC was witnessed by the Swedish ambassador
who in their first encounter had to explain to the embarrassed secretary of state
what those four letters stood for. 52 In the end, the fact that the Eden plan never seriously
endangered Sweden's already restrained attachment to European institutions
was thanks to the French National Assembly, which rejected the EDC in 1954, and
not to concerns over Britain's relations with Sweden.
48. Accounts of Anglo-Scandinavian trade problems are found in B. NILSON, No Coal without Iron
Ore. Anglo-Swedish trade relations in the shadow of the Korean War, in: SJH 1/16(1991), pp.45-
72 and B. NILSON, Butter, Bacon and Coal. Anglo-Danish Commercial Relations, 1947-51, in:
SJH 3/13(1988), pp.257-77.
49. A. EDEN, Full Circle, Cassell, London, 1960, pp.47-48.
50. M. AF MALMBORG, Den ståndaktiga nationalstaten …, op.cit., pp.268-284.
51. Dennis Allen minute, 23 April 1952, FO 371/100931, PRO.
52. Hägglöf to Undén, 6 December 1951, Hp 1 Ba, vol.248, RA. According to Hägglöf, Eden however
became more interested in the OEEC later, Hägglöf to Undén, 16 December 1952, Hp 1 Ba,
vol.116, The Archives of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.