journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

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Juhana Aunesluoma
also to be able to respond to any new developments such as the Schuman plan. To
be effective, this also required co-ordination outside the daily work of the OEEC. 45
Co-operation with Limits
With Conservatives back in power in Britain in late 1951, Uniscan meetings continued
along the lines established in 1950 and wide-ranging discussions of international
economic policy and European questions were continued. However, it is difficult
to establish the ultimate significance of these consultations from the point of
view of national policy-making in Britain or in Scandinavia. The British, who
sensed how keenly the Scandinavians wanted to integrate British responses to such
questions as sectoral integration schemes in Europe to their own, had by the end of
1950 grown somewhat uneasy lest the regular consultations with their Uniscan
partners forced them to tie their hands in advance of important policy-decisions in
the OEEC or elsewhere. In November 1950, during Labour's reign, a decision was
made in London, “that the United Kingdom could not admit that there should
always be a common Uniscan approach to O.E.E.C. problems”. The decision
applied to other topics discussed in the forum as well. 46 However, even if Uniscan
was therefore not let to develop de facto decision-making functions, it was appreciated
that even in cases when British and Scandinavian views diverged, a preliminary
exchange of views within the group was useful.
Despite fears in Scandinavia, that the new British government would not be as
interested as the Labour government had been in the Scandinavian dimension, various
developments spoke for the continuance of close Anglo-Scandinavian economic
consultations. First of all, the Scandinavians themselves seemed to want this,
even if the British sought to restrict the extent Uniscan may have been able to force
their hand. 47 Second, the British delegation in the OEEC favoured further openings
on the Uniscan front and set great value to its co-operation with the Scandinavians.
Third, until at least 1954-55 the Treasury did not abandon its original idea of closer
financial association between the United Kingdom and Scandinavia. And last but
not least, developments in Europe with the establishment of the ECSC and other attempts
towards further integration in the military and economic spheres increased
the Foreign Office's interest to use the Uniscan framework in keeping a special
channel open to the Scandinavians in European issues. Therefore, from early 1951
onwards there existed a wide interdepartmental consensus about the usefulness of a
distinctive Anglo-Scandinavian economic forum, a consensus at which the different
Whitehall departments arrived despite their own particular interests.
45. Hall-Patch telegram no.849 to FO, 8 October 1950, FO 371/87091, PRO.
46. Note of a UK Uniscan delegation meeting held in the Treasury, 17 November 1950, FO 371/87092,
PRO. Emphasis in the original.
47. An example of the value Swedish officials in charge of European policy set on Uniscan is found
in the memoirs of Ingemar Hägglöf. I. HÄGGLÖF, Drömmen om Europa, op.cit., p.56.