journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ... journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
114 Juhana Aunesluoma man markets were also becoming more and more lucrative in particular for Danish agricultural products that had previously flowed to Britain, often on prices that irritated Danish producers. As West Germany's participation in any Uniscan arrangements was considered early on politically impossible in London, this proved to be a difficult stumbling bloc for the Danes and the Swedes. 35 Changes took place on the Atlantic front too as it became evident that US insistence on Britain's participation in regional trade groups was relaxing already in 1950. Further, as the European ground shifted in the spring of 1950 with the announcement of the Schuman plan, such a limited approach as was typified by Uniscan had far less sales value as an example of British steps towards integration from a Congressional or ECA point of view than was anticipated in 1949. In trade liberalisation and payments questions the most important arena was the OEEC, where both the British and the Scandinavians had been ever less enthusiastic to follow the Franco-American lead. The American views had at first been rather positive towards Cripps's more ambitious plans about co-operation with the Scandinavians, but the realisation of the economic difficulties that were ahead quickly distinguished much of the flair of enthusiasm in Washington. 36 The negotiations between the British and the Scandinavian governments ended in an agreement in January 1950 that the present economic circumstances did not allow the complete removal of all restrictions on payments between the four countries, but that there was scope for more limited action, which should be studied further. The practical meaning of this was that tourist allowances were increased without limit, with certain restrictions with Norway – the Scandinavian country, ironically enough, that had been most eager to develop its economic and political relations with Britain in the first place. 37 The declaration setting up the Anglo-Scandinavian Economic Committee was signed in Paris on 30 January 1950, four months before the Schuman Plan, when Cripps and the Scandinavian foreign ministers approved the officials' report. 38 On 31 January the Council of the OEEC was formally informed about its establishment and about the first steps towards payments relaxation within the group. 39 35. British officials had at first aired a wider plan covering the Uniscan countries, Netherlands and West Germany in November 1949, but this was shelved in December for its potential to bring about unwelcomed political consequences, such as appearing to sabotage the Benelux or the Fritalux negotiations. Berthoud to Hitchman (T), 9 November 1949, FO 371/78136; J. B. Richards minute (German political dept.), 2 December 1949, FO 371/78136; Duke minute, 15 December 1949, FO 371/78136, PRO. 36. Sir Oliver Franks telegram no.5739 to FO, 9 December 1949, FO 371/78138; Christelow to Playfair, 13 December 1949, FO 371/78139, PRO. 37. I. SOGNER, The European Idea …, op.cit., pp.307-327; K. E. ERIKSEN and H. Ø. PHARO, Kald krig of internasjonalisering …, op.cit., p.143. 38. Report by Officials, 21 January 1950, FO 371/87087; Agreed Minute, 30 January 1950, FO 371/ 87088, PRO. 39. Report by the Uniscan countries to the Council of OEEC, 'Further measures of co-operation: Anglo-Scandinavian Arrangements', 31 January 1950, C(50)41, microform 049, OEEC Archives, Historical Archives of the European Communities, Florence.
An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy 115 What was the most significant conclusion reached in the negotiations was that possibilities for further openings should be subjected to continuing study. This in fact became the rationale for setting up and maintaining Uniscan. Its main function was “to keep under review the carrying out of the financial recommendations and to explore further possibilities for economic co-operation” although later it functioned as an expert body discussing developments in Europe and in the international economy. The body began to work on a permanent basis, meeting on an official level normally twice a year in each capital. Informal ministerial meetings were organised occasionally, normally in conjunction with the OEEC Council in Paris. The first Uniscan meeting was held at the Danish Embassy in Paris in April 1950. The delegations, consisting of senior officials from the four countries, discussed organisational questions, actions taken in each country to implement the January declaration, and problems of economic disequilibria. The only tangible move forward on the financial side was the UK delegation's statement about steps for further relaxations of controls over possession of Scandinavian currencies in Britain. 40 On the economic policy front, Swedish proposals for studies on disequilibria were linked up with the work, which was being done within the OEEC “harmonisation” resolutions. 41 The first meeting set a pattern for the future Uniscan discussions: instead of spectacular advances towards Uniscan free trade, the agenda came to be dominated by “European” and other wider international questions. In the first meeting there was only one “European” question on the agenda, the forthcoming OEEC payments scheme. Characteristically, it was agreed that “it was desirable that representatives of the four Governments in Paris should keep in close touch and discuss the various proposals for a European Payments Union with a view of ensuring that discussions in the OEEC of such proposals take due account of the objectives of Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation”. 42 In practice this meant an agreement that “these and other points should be followed continuously in an Anglo-Scandinavian group in Paris in which the U.K. Delegation will have the initiative”. 43 This meant, that the previously informal co-operation of the British and Scandinavian delegations in Paris became institutionalised. The OEEC offshoot of Uniscan adopted a more active role in Anglo-Scandinavian economic talks from autumn 1950 onwards. The FO instructed Hall-Patch along these lines in October 1950, but was nevertheless reluctant to reduce Uniscan just as part of the “Paris machinery”. 44 Indeed, the leitmotif behind continuing this co-operation in the EPU era seems to have been a need for a more comprehensive exchange of views and co-ordination of policies in the OEEC, but 40. UK OEEC delegation telegram no.214 to FO, 4 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO. 41. Makins to Berthoud, 3 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO. 42. Hall-Patch telegram no.214 to FO, 3 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO. 43. Makins to Berthoud, 3 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO. 44. FO telegram no.1017 to OEEC Delegation, 3 October 1950, FO 371/87091, PRO.
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114<br />
Juhana Aunesluoma<br />
man markets were also becoming more and more lucrative in particular for Danish agricultural<br />
products that had previously flowed to Britain, <strong>of</strong>ten on prices that irritated<br />
Danish producers. As West Germany's participation in any Uniscan arrangements was<br />
consi<strong>de</strong>red early on politically impossible in London, this proved to be a difficult stumbling<br />
bloc for the Danes and the Swe<strong>de</strong>s. 35<br />
Changes took place on the Atlantic front too as it became evi<strong>de</strong>nt that US insistence<br />
on Britain's participation in regional tra<strong>de</strong> groups was relaxing already in<br />
1950. Further, as the European ground shifted in the spring <strong>of</strong> 1950 with the announcement<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Schuman plan, such a limited approach as was typified by Uniscan<br />
had far less sales value as an example <strong>of</strong> British steps towards <strong>integration</strong> from<br />
a Congressional or ECA point <strong>of</strong> view than was anticipated in 1949. In tra<strong>de</strong> liberalisation<br />
and payments questions the most important arena was the OEEC, where<br />
both the British and the Scandinavians had been ever less enthusiastic to follow the<br />
Franco-American lead. The American views had at first been rather positive towards<br />
Cripps's more ambitious plans about co-operation with the Scandinavians,<br />
but the realisation <strong>of</strong> the economic difficulties that were ahead quickly distinguished<br />
much <strong>of</strong> the flair <strong>of</strong> enthusiasm in Washington. 36<br />
The negotiations between the British and the Scandinavian governments en<strong>de</strong>d<br />
in an agreement in January 1950 that the present economic circumstances did not<br />
allow the complete removal <strong>of</strong> all restrictions on payments between the four countries,<br />
but that there was scope for more limited action, which should be studied further.<br />
The practical meaning <strong>of</strong> this was that tourist allowances were increased without<br />
limit, with certain restrictions with Norway – the Scandinavian country,<br />
ironically enough, that had been most eager to <strong>de</strong>velop its economic and political<br />
relations with Britain in the first place. 37 The <strong>de</strong>claration setting up the Anglo-Scandinavian<br />
Economic Committee was signed in Paris on 30 January 1950,<br />
four months before the Schuman Plan, when Cripps and the Scandinavian foreign<br />
ministers approved the <strong>of</strong>ficials' report. 38 On 31 January the Council <strong>of</strong> the OEEC<br />
was formally informed about its establishment and about the first steps towards<br />
payments relaxation within the group. 39<br />
35. British <strong>of</strong>ficials had at first aired a wi<strong>de</strong>r plan covering the Uniscan countries, Netherlands and<br />
West Germany in November 1949, but this was shelved in December for its potential to bring<br />
about unwelcomed political consequences, such as appearing to sabotage the Benelux or the<br />
Fritalux negotiations. Berthoud to Hitchman (T), 9 November 1949, FO 371/78136; J. B. Richards<br />
minute (German political <strong>de</strong>pt.), 2 December 1949, FO 371/78136; Duke minute, 15 December<br />
1949, FO 371/78136, PRO.<br />
36. Sir Oliver Franks telegram no.5739 to FO, 9 December 1949, FO 371/78138; Christelow to Playfair,<br />
13 December 1949, FO 371/78139, PRO.<br />
37. I. SOGNER, The European I<strong>de</strong>a …, op.cit., pp.307-327; K. E. ERIKSEN and H. Ø. PHARO, Kald<br />
krig <strong>of</strong> internasjonalisering …, op.cit., p.143.<br />
38. Report by Officials, 21 January 1950, FO 371/87087; Agreed Minute, 30 January 1950, FO 371/<br />
87088, PRO.<br />
39. Report by the Uniscan countries to the Council <strong>of</strong> OEEC, 'Further measures <strong>of</strong> co-operation: Anglo-Scandinavian<br />
Arrangements', 31 January 1950, C(50)41, micr<strong>of</strong>orm 049, OEEC Archives,<br />
Historical Archives <strong>of</strong> the European Communities, Florence.