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An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy 111
were widely held amongst British socialists in particular: “On the side of the British Labour
Party, illusions were rife about Scandinavia in general”, Alan Milward described
the socialists' “special relationship” over the North Sea in The Reconstruction of Western
Europe 1945-51. 25 When the gap between the continent and Britain seemed to widen
in 1949-51, both ministers and officials in London sought consolation from the presumed
unity between Britain and the “like-minded” people of the North, the
“champions of the Welfare state”, or “our staunchest friends and allies in Europe”, as
Roger Makins of the Foreign Office put it in the summer of 1951, witnessing that such
notions were not confined to socialist circles only. 26
Besides such a heightened sense of similarities between the British and Scandinavian
“mentalités”, and whatever political implications these – undoubtedly sincerely
held – views may have had, the plan Cripps put forward in November 1949
was based on political and economic arguments. For Cripps, as was the case with
officials in Whitehall as well, Anglo-Scandinavian co-operation was not just a tactical
ploy to manoeuvre into better positions in the Ministerial Council of the OEEC
or an act of solidarity among the brotherhood of socialists around the North Sea.
An opening towards Scandinavia was initially hoped to be at least a partial solution
to Britain's numerous problems in its economic and political position in Europe,
along lines that would build up Britain's economic strength in a way not inimical to
current British – or socialist – economic thinking and political traditions.
The establishment of Uniscan
One of the most useful political arguments in favour of further Anglo-Scandinavian
economic co-operation was that Britain needed to show that it had kept to its word
about its commitment to regional economic groups as a fundamentally desirable objective.
The British government had confirmed this to both domestic and international
audiences, but words needed to be supplemented with actions. And if actions fell short
of words, something was needed to sugar the pill in Washington at least. Desperately
looking for a way out, Foreign Office officials agreed that it could hardly be argued on
the basis of a closer economic association between Britain and Scandinavia
“that we should be acting as rather bad Europeans if we associated ourselves with a
regional group which would after all be based in that similarity of outlook and economic
structure which is the only logical foundation for any regional groups”. 27
In this view, there was no other serious alternative for Britain, because participation
in the regional group including Belgium and Italy would be more difficult
25. A. S. MILWARD, The Reconstruction …, op.cit., p.316.
26. Henniker memorandum, 'Closer Economic Association between Scandinavia and the Sterling Area',
30 November 1949, FO 371/78137; E. A. Radice minute, undated (1949), FO 371/78136; Sir
Roger Makins memorandum, "Impressions of Scandinavia", 28 June 1951, FO 371/94444, PRO.
27. Burrett minute, 8 November 1949, FO 371/78136, PRO.