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An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy 109
The potential emergence of regional economic arrangements in Europe highlighted
Britain's problematic position. As the supranational alternative was dismissed in Britain
and its conditional “contract out of Europe” prepared, relations with the Scandinavians
were discussed too. A wide consensus existed in Whitehall that in the new situation it was
important to maintain Britain's close relations with Scandinavia, whatever the future relationship
between the continental countries and Britain should be. A contract out of the so
called “Little Europe” of the Six, which had only a limited bearing for the British economy,
should not be a similar contract out of Scandinavia. To maintain Britain's links with
the Scandinavians, which were not presumed to participate in such schemes as the Finebel
negotiations or later in 1950 in the Schuman and the Pleven plans, was a policy objective
that was in British eyes both politically feasible and economically necessary. However, as
discussions in late 1949 and early 1950 revealed, British policy-makers had more
far-reaching goals too about the political utility of an opening towards Scandinavia.
The development of Britain's political and economic relations with Scandinavia
seemed to offer Britain a unique opportunity. As E. W. Playfair presented the Treasury
view in October 1949, the development of closer relations with Scandinavia
may have been “the only means of avoiding being faced by a United Europe which
we either have to keep out or get into”. 16 Scandinavia, according to this reasoning,
could offer an alternative route to formulate Britain's Europeanness in political and
economic terms. From the political point of view, a step ahead on the Scandinavian
front seemed to bring certain advantages both as to allay US suspicions of British
procrastination in further economic integration in Europe, and to bring the Scandinavians
closer to Britain by economic means. The economic motivations of Britain's
Scandinavian opening arose from the perceived need to achieve a wider degree
of liberalisation in the unflexible current trading situation, especially in the
field of finance and payments. The bilateral, annual trade negotiations framework
was politically troublesome and any steps towards increased flexibility were welcomed
in Britain and in Scandinavia. 17 The Norwegians in particular were keen to
gain access to the capital markets of Britain, and to a lesser extent, in Sweden,
which could only be achieved through special arrangements. Furthermore, in the
OEEC-wide liberalisation process and in the talks leading to the European Payments
Union (EPU), the British were keen to enlist the Scandinavians on their side.
The general approach of the British and the Scandinavian governments towards questions
dealt with in the OEEC had been very similar in 1948-49, but in 1950 a rift opened
between low-tariff countries such as Sweden and Denmark and the British, who sought
further trade liberalisation through curtailing import restrictions which the low-tariff countries
relied upon. 18 However, in organisational questions, they had all been firmly against
the idea of a strong independent supranational bureaucracy or the suggestion of a “super-
16. Playfair to Copleston, 26 October 1949, T 236/5370, PRO.
17. Address by Sir Henry Wilson Smith, December 1949, HP Å 64, vol.HP 2216, Utrikesdepartement,
1920 års dossiersystem, Riksarkivet (RA), Stockholm.
18. V. SØRENSEN, Nordic cooperation …, op.cit., pp.40-61. Further on trade liberalisation, W. A.
BRUSSE, Tariffs, Trade and European Integration, 1947-1957. From Study Group to Common
Market, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1997.