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Juhana Aunesluoma
played with an idea of some kind of Anglo-Scandinavian economic association, or
of Scandinavian membership of the Sterling area. But it was not until October 1949
before the question of Scandinavia's relationship to the Sterling area and closer
co-operation with Britain was put forward to the Cabinet and subsequently adopted
as official policy. 12
There were several reasons why different departments in Whitehall opened the
issue of Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation in the autumn of 1949. The
immediate reason for calling up the representatives of the countries to discuss further
economic co-operation was provided by the US economic aid administration
(ECA), when it increased pressure for the establishment of regional economic
groups in Europe. In October 1949, the ECA chief, Paul Hoffman, delivered a
strongly worded speech for the Ministerial Council of the Organisation for European
Economic Co-operation (OEEC), in which he said that the US Congress would
not accept continuance of the recovery program without clear determination by the
Europeans to move towards economic integration. 13 On 2 November, the Ministerial
Council of the OEEC adopted a resolution, in which “the desirability was recognised
of promoting regional economic groupings”. 14 From the US viewpoint, this
seemed on the short term to open the best prospects for further integration of the
European economies. At the same time as American thinking was veering in favour
of regional arrangements in Europe, the French finally changed sides in the longstanding
Anglo-American dispute over the character and ultimate goals of the
OEEC, and joined the Benelux-countries and Italy in exploring further economic
co-operation outlined in the Finebel/Fritalux proposals. 15 This meant that the British
were left alone with the Scandinavians in opposing the increasingly influential
and better-consolidated Franco-American axis within OEEC.
12. Playfair to A. P. Grafftey-Smith (Bank of England), 11 October 1949, T 236/5370; Closer Economic
Association between Scandinavia and the Sterling Area, Report by the Official Committee
on Economic Development, 28 November 1949, ER(L)(49)321, CAB 134/245, PRO. Once the
plan was announced British journalists christened it as Uniscan. Other names given by journalists
included Ukiscan, Uniskan, Scandanglia, Scanuk, Brisk (in Norway) or L'uniscan and Uniscam (in
France). These names compared well with such contemporaries as Franebel, Finebel, Fritaluxal,
Fraswitaluxal, Benefrit or Benefit. Cripps said that it was a 'scandangle' that such names should be
allowed at all. Cripps' speech to the Treasury staff, 11.1.1950, Sir Stafford Cripps Papers, Nuffield
College, Oxford. Cripps's own favourite would have been 'Skanuk', as it reminded him of 'a viking
war cry'. G. HÄGGLÖF, Fredens Vägar, P.A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, Stockholm, 1973, p.179.
13. UK OEEC telegram no.1224 to FO, 30 October 1949, FO 371/7802, PRO; M. HOGAN, The Marshall
Plan. America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp.273-276; M. AF MALMBORG, Den ståndaktiga nationalstaten
…, op.cit., pp.90-91.
14. Henniker memorandum, 'Regional Economic Groupings. I Closer Economic Association between
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Sterling Area', 12 December 1949, FO
371/78139, PRO.
15. G. BOSSUAT, La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944-1954, vol.II,
Ministère des Finances, Paris, 1992, pp.707-712. See also R. T. GRIFFITHS & F. M. B. LYNCH,
The Fritalux/Finebel Negotiations 1949/1950, European University Institute, Florence, 1984.