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An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy 107
Despite political goodwill behind the plans and numerous studies, Anglo-Scandinavian
economic co-operation never took off the ground before EFTA. None the
less, from the viewpoint of British European policy in the 1950s, the plans for
deepening its economic and political relations with the Scandinavians are not wholly
insignificant, even if they lacked the final push success would have required.
Similarly, the talks the Scandinavian governments held with the British, first on European
economic reconstruction and later on integration policy were a substantial
part of their general policy towards Europe as well.
The period in 1949-51, when most pressing needs of reconstruction began to give
way to long-term schemes of Europe's politico-economic order, is particularly illuminating
in highlighting both the potential and the problems Anglo-Scandinavian economic
co-operation contained. The British government's so called Uniscan-initiative
from late 1949 is a good example of the ways in which Scandinavia was seen to fit in
Britain's overall European policy at the time. The internal discussions in London and
the subsequent negotiations that were held in December 1949 and January 1950 with
the Scandinavian governments, showed what political benefits the British government
sought from its closer association with them. The following years showed how severe
the economic ramifications proved to be. However, despite the inherent problems of
Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation that were soon realised, the continuing
work of the Anglo-Scandinavian Economic Committee, Uniscan (1950-60), was valued
as an informal consultative group where it was ascertained to which extent these countries
could or could not agree upon a common line towards various problems of international
economic policy and integration. 10
The idea of re-establishing the pre-war relationship between Scandinavia and
the sterling area surfaced soon after the war. Nevertheless, before 1949 neither specific
plans nor written documents were presented. Schemes for closer co-operation
in the economic field between Britain and the three Scandinavian countries were
first put forward at an official level in the Treasury in January 1949, after a suggestion
from the Bank of England. 11 As had been done privately before, officials then
10. Previous authors have been unanimous of Uniscan's neglible economic impact, and largely dismissed
it without considering its possible political significance. W. DIEBOLD Jr., Trade and Payments
in Western Europe. A Study in Economic Cooperation 1947-51, Harper & Brothers, New
York, 1952, pp.143-144; B. STRÅTH, Nordic Industry and Nordic Economic Cooperation. The
Nordic Industrial Federations and the Nordic Customs Union Negotiations 1947-1959, Almqvist
& Wiksell International, Stockholm, 1978, pp.87-92; A. MILWARD, The Reconstruction of Western
Europe 1945-51, Routledge, London, 1984, pp.316-319; M. AF MALMBORG, Den ståndaktiga
nationalstaten. Sverige och den västeuropeiska intergrationen 1945-1959, Lund University
Press, Lund, 1994, pp.91-92; K. E. ERIKSEN and H. Ø. PHARO, Kald krig of internasjonalisering
1949-1965. Norsk Utenrikspolitikks historie Bind 5, Cappelen, Oslo, 1997, pp.143-145. For a
discussion of Uniscan’s relationship to Britain’s cold war policy aims in Northern Europe, see J.
AUNESLUOMA, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War 1945-54, pp. 152-202. Unpublished D.Phil–
thesis, University of Oxford, 1998, (to be published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002).
11. E. W. Playfair (Treasury) (T) to Rowe-Dutton (T), 13 January 1949, T 236/5370, PRO; Playfair to
George Bolton (Bank of England), 17 January 1949; Lithiby minute, 21 January 1949, OV 28/31,
Bank of England Archive (BEA), London. See also Playfair to Allan Christelow (UK Treasury delegation,
Washington), 20 December 1949, FO 371/78139, PRO.