journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community 101
prevent the passing to stage two. Stage one was then to be prolonged by two years,
after which the decision to move to stage two was to be taken by a qualified majority.
However, France then made it clear that in making her decision on whether to
move from stage one or not she would not only consider the question of social harmonization,
but also the economic situation in its entirety. This provoked the German
delegation, who refused to continue the negotiations if France did not accept
the qualified majority voting, nor would the Germans continue the Euratom negotiations.
They also declared themselves unable to accept the proposition concerning
the length of the working week and corresponding overtime pay. 83
On the surface a resolution appeared impossible. Unofficial discussions revealed
however, that a solution that did not include France was considered impossible. 84 A solution
was reached when the German chancellor Adenauer met with Prime Minister
Mollet in Paris on November 6.
As far as equal pay and paid holidays were concerned, the two heads of state sustained
the formula from the conference in Paris in October. They further agreed on a general formula
on social harmonization saying that this would come as a consequence of the common
market. On the question of special regulations for France, France accepted an annual
investigation into the conditions for maintaining such regulations. The Council of Ministers
would also be empowered to demand a lowering of the French level of taxes and subsidies
if other countries were to be unfairly treated by this system. If this turned out to be
the case, countries negatively affected by the French regulations could also be allowed to
invoke safeguard clauses. France agreed to abolish the system when her balance of payments
had been in equilibrium for a year. On the difficult question concerning the length
of the work-week and corresponding overtime pay, the countries agreed not to make the
introduction of the forty hour week obligatory. 85 In spite of this decision, the German
view was that they had made a considerable concession. This because one knew for certain
that the forty hour week would not be a reality within the first stage. France would as
a consequence be entitled to safeguard clauses working to the advantage of French industry.
86 France renounced, on her side, the claim for veto in connection with the passing
from the first to the second stage of the transitional period.
The Franco-German agreement has been described as a “… recul sensible des positions
françaises; sur tous les points jusque là posés en préalables, les engagements précis
font place à des déclarations d’intention ou à des formules de compromis assez vagues”. 87
83. BA, B146/594, Aussenministerkonferenz der Länder der Montanunion über den Gemeinsamen
Markt und Euratom am 20 u. 21 Oktober in Paris.
84. Ibid.
85. BA, B146/594, Ergebnisprotokoll über die Ressortbesprechung im Auswärtigen Amt am 10. November
über die Probleme des Gemeinsamen Marktes und Euratom.
86. BA, B 146/594, Brüsseler Regierungskonferenz-Ergebnisse der vom Bundeskanzler am 5. und
6.11.1956 in Paris geführten Besprechungen über die Probleme des Gemeinsamen Marktes und
Euratom. 12.11.56.
87. P. GUILLEN, L’europe remède à l’impuissance française? Le gouvernement Guy Mollet et la négociation
des traités de Rome (1955-1957), in: Revue d’histoire diplomatique, 102(1988),
pp.319-335, p.331. See also W. LOTH: Deutsche und französische Interessen …, op.cit.,
pp.181-182.