journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN 

INTEGRATION HISTORY 

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE 

L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE 

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER 

EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION 

edited by the 

Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine 

auprès de la Commission européenne 

2002, Volume 8, Number 1 

NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft 

Baden-Baden

Editors 

Published twice a year by the 

Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire 

contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne 

in cooperation with the 

Jean Monnet Chairs in History of European Integration 

with the support of the 

European Commission, DG X University Information 

Editorial Board 

LOTH, Wilfried (chairman) 

Universität Essen 

Jean Monnet Chair 

BITSCH, Marie-Thérèse 

Université de Strasbourg III Robert Schuman 


BOSSUAT, Gérard 

Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 


DEIGHTON, Anne 

Wolfson College, Oxford 

DUMOULIN, Michel 

Université catholique de Louvain 


GUIRAO, Fernando 

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona 


LAURSEN, Johnny 

University of Aarhus 

MILWARD, Alan S. 

European University Institute, Florence 

SCHWABE, Klaus 

Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen 


TRAUSCH, Gilbert 

Centre Robert Schuman, Université de Liège 

VAN der HARST, Jan 

University of Groningen 


VARSORI, Antonio 

Università degli Studi di Firenze 








Editorial Secretariat 

Charles Barthel, director 

Address: 

Centre d’études et de recherches européennes 

Robert Schuman 

4 Rue Jules Wilhelm 

L-2728 Luxembourg 

Tel.: (3 52) 4 78 22 90/4 78 22 91 

Fax.: (3 52) 42 27 97

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY 

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE 

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION 

edited by the 

Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine 

auprès de la Commission européenne 

2002, Volume 8, Number 1

The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international 

symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on European 

integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries 

who work on contemporary history. 

The Liaison Committee: 

– gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War; 

– advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history. 

Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the 

Community institutions; 

– enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources; 

– promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research: 

seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published. 

The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für 

Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being 

the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the 

increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum. 

The Liaison Committee is supported by the European Commission, but works completely independently 

and according to historians’ critical method. 

❋ 

Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des 

Communautés européennes s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commission 

avait organisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction 

européenne. Il regroupe des professeurs d’université des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spécialistes 

d’histoire contemporaine. 

Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission: 

– de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre 

mondiale; 

– de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi 

le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archives 

des institutions communautaires; 

– d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition 

(archives, sources orales...); 

– d’encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et 

de susciter de nouvelles recherches: sept grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés. 

L’édition du Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne 

– Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations 

du Groupe de liaison. Première revue d’histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l’histoire de la 

construction européenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant 

de jeunes historiens vouant leurs recherches à l’Europe contemporaine. 

Le Groupe de liaison bénéficie du soutien de la Commission européenne. Ses colloques et publications 

se font en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.



ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION 


Johnny LAURSEN, coordinator 

Johnny LAURSEN 

Towards a Supranational History? 

Introduction............................................................................................ 5 

Milène WEGMANN 

Neoliberale Europa-Föderationskonzepte 1918-1945 ..........................11 

Bertrand VAYSSIÈRE 

Les origines italiennes du fédéralisme européen pendant 

la Seconde Guerre mondiale .................................................................37 

Seung-Ryeol KIM 

France’s Agony between «Vocation Européenne et Mondiale» ..........61 

Lise Rye SVARTVATN 

In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval: 

France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in 

the European Economic Community, 1955-56...............................85 

Juhana AUNESLUOMA 

An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and 

British Policy towards Scandinavia 1949-1951..................................103 

Erin DELANEY 

The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe........................121 

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen ....................139 

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen .....................................155 

Notices – Informations – Mitteilungen...............................................163 

Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren........................................................165 

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher.....................167

Editorial notice 

Articles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will then 

arrange for the article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotes 

included. They may be in English, French or German. 

Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to any 

other publication at the same time as to the Journal of European Integration History. Authors 

should retain a copy of their article. The publisher and editors cannot accept responsibility for 

loss of or damage to authors’ typescripts or disks. 

The accuracy of, and views expressed in articles and reviews are the sole responsibility of the 

authors. 

Authors should ensure that typescripts conform with the journal style. Prospective contributors 

should obtain further guidelines from the Editorial Secretariat. 

Articles, reviews, communications relating to articles and books for review should be sent to the 

Editorial Secretariat. 

Citation 

The Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows: 

JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page). 

ISSN 0947-9511 

© 2002 NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden and the Groupe de liaison des professeurs 

d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. Printed in Germany. 

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or 

transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, 

without prior permission of the publishers.

5 

Towards a Supranational History? 

Introduction 

Johnny Laursen 

As these lines are being written the European Convent has for some time been 

engaged in a debate over what form the future European Union should take. In a 

sense this discussion also involves a debate over the European past. How should we 

understand the nature and future of the European nation states? What are the exact 

nature and dynamics of the European integration process? What relationship 

between the European community and the Europe beyond? Does there exist – from 

Reykjavik to Diyarbakïr – a European polity with shared values and concepts? 

While politicians are struggling with these questions in an effort to shape the future, 

historians and social scientists are struggling with much the same questions in 

an effort to shape the past. Past, present and future European integration is in many 

ways equally elusive. Just as the present European order is up to discussion also the 

history of European integration is hard to define. 

First, the historians of the EU are studying a subject matter which has not yet 

found its final shape. Hence, the transient, still changing nature and borders of the 

EU and of the other European institutions can make it difficult to find a common 

perspective and a shared set of research questions. This is much more so as the history 

of European integration is not only pursued by historians, but also by other 

disciplines such as political science, law etc. 

Secondly, the field embraces a variety of methods and approaches in the way researchers 

work on the history of European integration. The established tradition in 

the field is that of the empirical, archive-based and severely footnoted ‘histoire 

événementielle’, closely related to its near cousin the diplomatic history. However, 

although the subject matter – history of European integration – is obligatory, the 

methods and the academic backgrounds of the students of the field are far from exclusive. 

Not only historians (of which there are many kinds already), but also political 

scientists, sociologists, lawyers and many others apply themselves to this rich 

field. It is an example of an enriching, interdisciplinary exchange between archive-based, 

empirical history and more theory-oriented approaches. The variety of 

methods and approaches is a source of scientific innovation and copiousness, although 

this admittedly does little to narrow down what the study of the history of 

European integration is really about. 

Third, we are dealing with a subject which is not easy to define in terms of geography 

and chronology. If we chose the easy and conventional way to define the 

subject matter, that is to say that the history of European integration is the history 

about the creation and development of the European Union, many questions remain 

open. What place does the history of the coming new memberstates of the EU such 

as the Czech Republic, Estonia or Malta take in such a framework? Is the historical 

experience of these countries really only relevant from the point of view of mem-

6 


bership, or can the study of European integration embrace wider issues and broader 

chronological periods of time than that of the existence of the European community? 

Does there exist, beneath the Iron Curtain of the Cold War, a history of European 

integration shared by the peoples of both Eastern and Western Europe? Indeed, 

the boundaries of the subject matter seem to change as the focus shifts between institutions, 

politics, security issues and identities and perceptions. 

Fourth, and most important the field has special features which constitute a challenge. 

In many ways the study of European integration is and has been – and should 

to a large extent be – national history. It is on the other hand also a field that highlights 

the limitations of the national history perspective. We are looking at a process 

where power and political dynamics are vested into something above the national – 

something supranational – so if we want to explain this or that negotiation process or 

this or that set of identity patterns we will have to look at the nation state plus something 

beyond, a complex pattern of interaction between national governments, Nonstate 

actors and more or less supranational institutions and processes. 

Even though this issue of the Journal of European Integration History is an open issue 

and not a thematic one, the six contributions are nevertheless a fairly representative 

selection of the established research areas of the history of European integration. 

Milène Wegmann’s study on the Neo-liberal Conception of a European Federation, 

1918-1945 can be considered a study of the intellectual pre-history of the European integration 

process. The author demonstrates how a group of influential neo-liberal economists 

such as von Hayek, Röpke, Einaudi and Robbins developed a set of politico-economic 

doctrines in the interwar period, where a customs union within a liberal 

economic system was intrinsically linked to a political federation and an international 

system of states based on international law. During the Second World War these thinkers 

moved towards a stronger focus on the requirements of social and cultural integration 

as a necessary foundation for a successful federation. The author is able to trace 

back the development of a number of key concepts in the federalist thinking to the intellectual 

origins in the period 1918-1945. Bertrand Vayssière’s work on The Italian Origins 

of European Federalism during the Second World War investigates the emergence 

of the Movimento Federalista Europeo and the influences and the circumstances of the 

Manifesto de Ventotene edited by Altiero Spinelli in collaboration with Ernesto Rossi 

and Eugenio Colorni in 1943. The militant federalism of these oppositional Italian intellectuals 

who were convinced of the central role that a federal European solution would 

play in the future peace system explains the particular strength of European federalism 

in Italy and throws light on one of the main sources of the emergence of the European 

federalist movements. Moreover, Bertrand Vayssière carries the analysis beyond intellectual 

and elitist political history with his analysis of how the Italian federalists failed 

to adapt to the hard peacetime realities of the primacy of national priorities in the 

post-war world. Here we move into another important current in the history of European 

integration. 

The pursuit by national elites of European power politics and of national political 

agendas has with good cause played a central role in the studies of the European 

integration process in the 1950’s. This holds good for both the abortive ventures

Introduction 7 

such as the attempt to create a European Defence Community and for the more successful 

undertakings such as the Schuman plan and the negotiation of the Treaties 

of Rome. The traditional focus on the 1950’s and on the incentives – and the lack 

thereof – in the nation states to engage in the integration process is well justified. 

The time of birth of the European Community undoubtedly is the crux for understanding 

why nation states have engaged in ceding sovereignty to the supranational 

community and what was the original ‘contract’ of the integration process. Examining 

why the Six set sails for the integration process that ended with the EU – and 

why others did not (at that point of time at least) – is still an important subject for 

researchers. Two of the contributions to this issue are analyzing these problems in a 

country where dynamics and reluctance at one and the same time seem to have 

been most manifest. Seung-Ryeol Kim’s article on France’s Agony between «Vocation 

Européenne et Mondiale»: The Union Française as an Obstacle in the French 

Policy of Supranational European Integration, 1952-1954 is a study of France’s attempts 

to reconcile her priorities in the European policy with her world power status. 

European considerations – especially in relation to Germany – brought the 

French political leadership to engage first in the green pool negotiations and later in 

the attempt to establish a European Army with a European Political Community as 

a ‘roof organization’. It was, however, difficult to reconcile these policies with the 

preservation of France’s world power role in which the Union Française was the 

main pillar. Thus, Seung-Reyol Kim shows how the concern for the endangered 

system of dependency between France and her earlier colonies contributed to the 

French rejection of the green pool and to the failure to ratify the EDC treaty. While 

Seung-Reyol Kim’s article focusses on the overseas aspect of French European 

policy, Lise Rye Svartvatn’s In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval: France 

and the Claims for Social Harmonisation in the European Economic Community, 

1955-56 turns the attention to the French domestic political considerations during 

the negotiations on the Treaty of Rome. Lise Rye Svartvatn’s work shows how 

France’s social policy pursued at European level intended to achieve the domestic 

aims of securing a continued expansion and modernisation of French industry. In itself 

a reflection of temporal problems and domestic, political disunity on the question 

of European integration, the line pursued by France had nevertheless longterm effects 

on the institutional and policy-oriented compromises in the Treaty of Rome. 

Still, however important this original compromise on the Treaty of Rome was, 

the functions and dynamics of the European Communities met with changes in the 

face of challenges from outside forces. Even though the integration process initiated 

by the Six was progressively to become the heart of the development of European 

institution-building and co-operation, it should be remembered that the Six did 

not have the monopoly in European integration and co-operation in the 1950’s and 

1960’s. Till now the relationship between those inside the union and those outside 

(or waiting to join) has been one of the most critical factors of the history of the European 

community. This was so already with the divide between the Anglo-Scandinavian 

functionalists and the Continental federalists at the time of the foundation of 

the Council of Europe in 1949, the break-up of the OEEC in 1958-59 and the Euro-

8 


pean market schism between The Six and The Seven throughout the 1960's. Juhana 

Aunesluoma’s contribution An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation 

and British Policy towards Scandinavia 1945-51 analyses the perceptions and 

aims in the British Scandinavian policy and in the establishment of the so-called 

Uniscan co-operation between the UK, Norway, Denmark and Sweden. For a brief 

moment in 1949 the Uniscan had potential to achieve more than the eventual formless 

consultations. This study of Uniscan allows a glimpse of the perceptions of 

many British and Scandinavian decision-makers in the 1950’s. In this sense it is an 

important contribution to the pre-history of EFTA. 

Of course the history of European integration is not limited to the history of the 

European Communities. On the one hand the integration process exerted an influence 

that went far beyond the tariff wall of the EEC. The creation of the Schuman 

Plan and the EEC became important factors for other European states such as 

Greece, Portugal and Austria. On the other hand, the influence worked also the other 

way round. Two of the most momentous events for the development of the European 

Communities was when the British decided first to stay aloof and later on to join 

the EEC. As today the question of enlargement of the European Communities did 

not only pose a challenge to the Community in terms of widening, but touched 

upon the balance of power between states and institutions, upon decision-making 

procedures and policies. Is it actually possible to explain the development of the 

EEC without evoking the question of the British EEC-membership hovering over 

the organisation throughout the 1960’s? The question of enlargement has been one 

of the most dynamic and conflict-ridden factors in the history of the Community 

during its existence. But it is also an issue which makes it necessary to redefine the 

research questions designed for the study of the 1950’s. While the 1950’s might 

shed light on why nation states join forces and cede sovereignty – or not – creating 

a supranational community, the rise of the enlargement question from 1961 onwards 

shifts the question to why nation states should decide to join an already existing 

supranational co-operation with an established institutional structure and a 

fixed body of law. Archive-based historical research has in later years begun to till 

this land. Hopefully the next few years will see the publication of historical studies 

of the first successful enlargement of the EC in 1972-73 based on primary sources. 

The implications cannot yet be clearly seen. The many variants of integration theory 

will also hopefully receive new stimulus from these research results. It is a real 

challenge to the many more or less theoretical efforts to come to grasp the integration 

process and the nature of the ever closer union trying to incorporate the changing 

dynamics and factors as the community grew from six to fifteen nation states. 

Perhaps it would require two sets of theory: one explaining why nation states 

should come together and create a supranational community and the other analysing 

why nation states should join such a community created after the designs of 

others. 

Another challenge to the history of European integration is the progress of the 

archive-based studies of community policies made into the field former monopolised 

by policy studies. In recent years researchers have broadened our knowledge

Introduction 9 

about the structures and policies of the emerging community. Beginning with the 

1960’s a number of the early policy areas have been studied and mapped in greater 

depth than before. Lise Rye Svartvatn’s aforementioned contribution and Erin Delaney’s 

The Labour Party’s Changing Relationship to Europe. The Expansion of 

European Social Policy, are in fact examples of this trend. While the former looks 

at the French strategies used in the field of social policy, the latter focuses on the 

British Labour Party’s views on the social policies implemented by the EC. The 

first looks at the French position at the time of the Treaty of Rome, while the latter 

traces the long term patterns of continuity and change in the British Labour Party’s 

views of the EC using the example of the EC’s development of social policies. Both 

approaches have their merits. Delaney is thus able to show on the one hand how the 

Euro-scepticism of the British Labour Party had strong roots in its initial perception 

of the social nature of the Common Market, and on the other hand how the growth 

of the community’s social policies had a backlash on the Labour Party’s doctrines 

in general and on the Labour Party’s European policy in particular. This contribution 

reminds archival researchers of how useful it can be to take a broader look that 

underlines the inert nature of political perceptions and ideologies, the importance 

of long term change and macro-historical patterns. 

One of the fascinating aspects of the policy studies analysing the origins of important 

EEC-policies in the 1960’s is that they throw light on the emerging community 

institutions and the maze of community decision-making processes. This can 

be seen in Piers Ludlow’s studies of the European Commission at important turning 

points in the 1960’s as well as in Ann-Christine Lauring Knudsen’s Ph.D.-thesis on 

the making of the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy. Other research results in 

fields such as the trade policy, the Common Market and the GATT-negotiations and 

the relationship to the less developed countries of the world could be mentioned. 

Indeed only in the 1960’s the community archives of the EEC institutions really begin 

to abound with documents that can offer an alternative or a supplement to the 

documents in national archives. With an overall view of the integration process of 

the 1960’s and 1970’s emerging, the discipline will have covered a first, long exhaustive 

stretch comparable to the political feat marked by the consolidation and 

expansion of the European Community at the end of that period. With an in-depth 

overview of the integration history of the 1960’s the history of European integration 

will furthermore have moved from its origins as either federal history or as a 

particular aspect of this or that country’s foreign policy to a discipline that is also 

supranational in the sense that its subject matter is more than the accumulated sum 

of national policies. The history of European integration is still a quite national 

business or a special branch of foreign policy studies. We tend to write on ‘Country 

X and the European Y’ or ‘Country X, Country Y and the European Z’. Sources 

from the national foreign ministry archives abound in this kind of research. Still, 

this is important work – also for the history of European integration. However, with 

the shift in focus from the pioneering years of European integration research – the 

1950’s – to the following decades one may hope that the history of European integration 

will also move even more towards a more supranational focus. The French

10 


historians will hardly claim a veto. British historians will not want to renegotiate 

their – admittedly momentous – contribution to European integration history, nor 

will Danish historians vote no. In this respect it is encouraging that many of the 

contributions to this issue are from younger scholars working on source materials 

and subjects other than that of their own nationality. However, there remains an enlargement 

issue confronting students of the European integration history. It is important 

that EU history should also be seen from the perspective of non-EU countries, 

from coming member-countries and that non-EU aspects of European 

integration should also be included. 

The 1970’s and 1980’s will bring new questions and an expansion of the subject 

to new policies, themes and institutions. But empirical, archive-based historical research 

is moving slowly and will always be lingering at the threshold of the access 

limits to the archives. It is therefore a strength that the field is broader and more 

varied than this classical school of historical studies. Other methods and approaches 

can – and should – be applied to the recent epochs of European integration 

inaccessible for the archive-grinding historian, to the past already covered by this 

school of history and to entirely other themes and subject areas of the elusive phenomenon 

we know as European integration. It appears that the history of European 

integration is, as Ernest Hemingway called his memoirs about the years in Paris, a 

moveable feast. 

In the 19th century many historians played an important role in laying the foundations 

for the emerging nation states not to mention for the emerging European 

nationalisms. After the catastrophes of the 20th century the craft attained new functions 

as a critical voice that contributed to political and moral reflection in the European 

democracies. The painful past, war and peace, the workings of the political 

order and the limits of liberty were scrutinized by many political historians. And 

rightly so. A functioning democracy needs a critical and inquisitive history writing 

in order to stimulate discussion on the workings of the democratic and social institutions. 

As the European Union has grown to a political and social factor of the first 

rank for many of the European democracies it is now more necessary than ever to 

subject the making of European policy in the nation states to the searching light of 

historians and other students of the field. Moreover, as the European Union is becoming 

a political entity with strong democratic and social institutions also supranational 

Europe itself will require such a critical history with an interpretative 

framework broader than that of the single nation state. It might well be difficult to 

say what conclusions the European Convent will arrive at, but it is a reasonably fair 

guess that the proceedings will be wordy and that they will focus on the democratic 

institutions. And democracies – also supranational or federal democracies – need 

their history.

11 

Neoliberale Europa-Föderationskonzepte 1918-1945 

Milène Wegmann 

Die geschichts- und wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Literatur, die auf die Kritik deutscher 

Neoliberaler an den Formen der europäischen Integration eingeht, beruht für 

die Zeit vor 1945 in erster Linie auf Röpkes Werk International Economic Disintegration 

(1942). 1 Diese Abhandlung Röpkes fand bei frühen Vertretern der europäischen 

Integration wie Walter Hallstein 2 besondere Beachtung. Die historische Integrationsforschung 

hat die Stellungnahmen neoliberaler Wirtschaftswissenschafter 

zum Problem der Schaffung einer Staatenföderation aus der Zwischenkriegszeit 

und den Jahren des Zweiten Weltkrieges bisher kaum berücksichtigt. 3 Nachdem 

wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Schriften aus Walter Lipgens‘ Quellensammlung 

Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen 1940–1945 ausdrücklich 

ausgeklammert worden sind, ist eine Auswahl zentraler Texte neoliberaler Ökonomen 

der Jahre 1939-45 in die Documents on the History of European Integration 

(1985/86) aufgenommen worden. Die in den Documents aufgeführten Quellen, 

ergänzt um weitere neoliberale Föderationsentwürfe der Jahre 1918-39 sowie der 

Jahre 1939-45, erlauben es, die Frage zu behandeln, ob von spezifisch „neoliberal“ 

geprägten Föderationskonzepten gesprochen werden kann. In der vorliegenden 

Studie werden die Besonderheiten der neoliberalen föderativen Neuordnungsideen 

zwischen 1918 und 1945 herausgearbeitet und im Kontext der sich über die nationalen 

Grenzen hinweg formierenden Bande der neoliberalen Wirtschaftswissenschafter 

untersucht. 

Die Neoliberalen werden nach 1945 in der Literatur als Integrationsskeptiker wahrgenommen. 

Für die Mehrheit der Neoliberalen als internationale Forschungsgemeinschaft 

trifft diese Beobachtung zu. Im Gegensatz zur Mehrheit der deutschen Neoliberalen 

– darunter Röpke – begrüßte jedoch die Mehrheit der italienischen und der 

französischen Neoliberalen – darunter Rueff, Villey, Allais und Hornbostel – die 

EWG-Integration, weil sie ihr einen liberalisierenden Einfluß auf die Mitgliedstaaten 

zuerkannten. Unter den Mitgliedern der neoliberalen Gesellschaft Mont Pèlerin Society 

trat Allais nach 1945 in verschiedenen europäischen Organisationen am aktivsten auf: 

1. A.J. NICHOLLS, Freedom with Responsibility, Oxford, 1994; H. PEUKERT, Das sozialökonomische 

Werk Wilhelm Röpkes, Frankfurt/M., 1992; J. STOHLER, Neoliberalismus und europäische 

Integration, in: Europa-Archiv, 17(1962), S.99 ff.; H.J. KÜSTERS, Die Gründung der Europäischen 

Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Baden-Baden, 1982; L. HERBST, Die zeitgenössische Integrationstheorie 

und die Anfänge der europäischen Einigung 1947-1950, in: Vierteljahreshefte für 

Zeitschichte, 34(1986), S.161 ff. 

2. Sekretariat für Fragen des Schuman-Plans, PAAA, B 15, Marchtaler, 5.7.1950, S.115. 

3. Vereinzelt sind Hinweise auf neoliberale Wirtschaftswissenschafter in den folgenden Beiträgen erfolgt: 

J. PINDER, British Federalists 1940-1947, From Movement to Stasis, in: M. DUMOULIN (Hrsg.), 

Plans des temps de guerre pour l’Europe d’après-guerre 1940-1947, Actes du Colloque de Bruxelles 

12-14 mai 1993, Groupe de liaison des historiens auprès des Communautés, Brüssel-Baden-Baden, 

1995, S.247-274. L. JÍLEK, L’Union Européenne à Bâle entre 1938 et 1946, Pôle helvétique et versant 

mondial dans les projets d’une association européaniste, in: M. DUMOULIN (Hrsg.), op.cit., S.277.

12 


Er hatte seit der Befreiung Frankreichs in die Debatte zur europäischen Frage eingegriffen 

und wurde dann Mitglied der Ende 1946 bzw. anfangs 1947 gegründeten Vereine 

Union européenne des fédéralistes (UEF) und Ligue Indépendente européenne de 

Coopération économique (Conseil français). Er gehörte ebenfalls dem Conseil français 

des Mouvement européen an. Allais veröffentlichte seit 1945 zahlreiche Artikel über ein 

Vereinigtes Europa und nahm als Referent am Ersten Kongreß der UEF in Montreux 

(27. bis 30.8.1947), – gemeinsam mit Rueff 4 – am Haager Europa-Kongreß (7. bis 

10.5.1948) und am Congrès International d’Etudes sur la Communauté européenne du 

Charbon et de l’Acier in Stresa (Juni 1957) teil. 5 Villey unterbrach seine Lehrtätigkeit 

als Professor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften an der Universität Poitiers nach dem Krieg 

für ein Jahr, um für das Projekt einer europäischen Föderation zu arbeiten. 6 Rueff war 

1952-1958 président de chambre am Gerichtshof der Montanunion und 1958-1962 

Richter und président de chambre am Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. 

Im September 1958 wurde er zum Präsidenten des Comité d’Experts pour la Réforme 

Economique et Financière ernannt, das unter dem Druck der Europäischen Zahlungsunion 

und des EWG-Vertrags die Konvertibilität des Franc vorbereitete. Die Wirtschafts- 

und Währungsreform von Pinay/Rueff schuf die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen 

der V. Republik. Nachdem er seit 1958 mit de Gaulle eng zusammengearbeitet hatte, 7 

wurde Rueff in der V. Republik dessen Finanzberater. 

Die ursprünglichen Protagonisten einer Staatenföderation, Röpke, von Hayek und 

Robbins, wandten sich jedoch nach dem Beginn des Kalten Krieges von den Bestrebungen 

zur Schaffung einer europäischen Föderation ab. Die neoliberalen Föderalisten hatten 

bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges die Idee einer institutionell abgesicherten „liberalen 

Föderation“ von Staaten als wünschenswerte Alternative zur sozialistischen internationalen 

Planung und zu einem sozialistischen europäischen Einheitsstaat vertreten. Sie gingen 

dabei von einem engen Zuordnungsverhältnis der Wirtschaftsformen und der 

politischen Strukturen aus: Marktwirtschaft, nationaler/internationaler Föderalismus und 

Weltwirtschaft würden sich gegenseitig entsprechen. Der Verwirklichung einer solchen 

„liberalen Staatenföderation“ standen in den Nachkriegsjahren und nach dem Beginn des 

Kalten Krieges politische und wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen entgegen, die mit den Voraussetzungen 

der neoliberalen Europaföderations-Modelle in Widerspruch standen: In der 

Mehrzahl der wirtschaftlich führenden Staaten wurde die Wirtschaftsplanung in den 

Nachkriegsjahren fortgesetzt. Eine europäische Föderation konnte unter diesen Umständen 

nicht mehr als die „Erfüllung des liberalen Wirtschaftsprogramms“ (von Hayek 1939) 

betrachtet werden. Die Liberalisierung des Außenhandels verzögerte sich; erst dreizehn- 

4. J. RUEFF, Œuvres complètes 1, Paris, 1977, S.225. 

5. M. ALLAIS, Erreurs et Impasses de la Construction Européenne, Paris, 1992, Anm.2, S.101. 

6. Mme Villey, Wortbeitrag an der Versammlung der Mont Pèlerin Society, Caracas, 5.-13.9.1969, 

Summary. Typoskript, S.3, Nachlaß Pierre Goodrich: Box 2, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford 

University, CA, USA. Vgl. auch D. VILLEY, Redevenir des hommes libres, Paris, 1946, 

S.205 ff., S.291. 

7. M. VAÏSSE, La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969, Paris, 1998, S.42, 

S.167, Anm.9.

Neoliberale Europa-Föderationskonzepte 1918-1945 13 

einhalb Jahre nach dem Kriegsende (27.12.1958) wurde die äußere Konvertibilität der 

Währungen aller westeuropäischen Staaten wiederhergestellt. 

Die neoliberalen Föderationskonzepte von 1918 bis 1945 sind aus der akademischen 

Auseinandersetzung von Theoretikern der Finanz-, Außenwirtschafts- und der Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik 

hervorgegangen. Robbins (1898-1984) lehrte abwechslungsweise 

in Oxford (1924; 1927-29) und an der London School of Economics (1925-27), bis er 

1929 definitiv in London blieb. Von Hayek (Wien, 1899 – Freiburg i. Br., 1992) war seit 

1931 ebenfalls an der London School of Economics tätig. Röpke (1899-1966) fand nach 

einer etappenreichen Dozentenkarriere – 1924-28 außerordentlicher Professor Universität 

Jena, 1927-28 USA, 1928-29 Universität Graz, 1929-31 Universität Marburg a. L., 

1933-37 Universität Istanbul – 1937 seinen endgültigen Platz am Institut Universitaire de 

Hautes Etudes Internationales (Genf). Einaudi (1874-1961) lehrte ab 1898 an der Universität 

Turin Finanzwissenschaft, bis er Ende September 1943 ins Schweizer Exil gehen 

mußte. 1944 folgte er einer Einladung, für die italienischen Studenten in einem Genfer 

Flüchtlingslager einen Kurs zu halten, der später unter dem Titel Lezioni di politica 

sociale veröffentlicht wurde. Am 9.12.1944 wurde Einaudi nach Italien zurückberufen, 

als Präsident der Banca d’Italia. Rueff (1896-1978), aus einer angesehenen jüdischen 

Familie stammend, lehrte 1923-30 am Institut de Statistique de l’Université de Paris und 

wurde 1933 Titularprofessor an der Ecole libre des sciences politiques (Paris). Baudin 

(1887-1964) lehrte seit den 20er Jahren an der Faculté de Droit de Paris et de Dijon und 

an der Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Paris. 

Die genannten neoliberalen Wirtschaftswissenschafter übten teils bereits im hier 

untersuchten Zeitraum (1918-45), teils nach 1945 Tätigkeiten in Verwaltung und 

Politik aus: Robbins wirkte bei der Demobilisierung nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg in 

der Verwaltung mit und leitete 1941-45 die Wirtschaftsabteilung des Sekretariats des 

britischen Kriegskabinetts. Mit Keynes zusammen vertrat er Großbritannien auf verschiedenen 

internationalen Konferenzen, die sich mit den wirtschaftlichen Nachkriegsproblemen 

beschäftigten, so etwa auf der Konferenz von Bretton Woods. Von 

Hayek gewann erst unter der Regierung Thatcher politischen Einfluß. Röpke, der 

1930-31 Mitglied der Reichskommission zur Krisenbekämpfung (Brauns-Kommission) 

war, mußte 1933 aus politischen Gründen nach Istanbul emigrieren. Erst nach 

dem Krieg konnte er immer wieder formell und informell die Beratung von Bundeswirtschaftsminister 

Erhard wahrnehmen. Einaudi wurde 1919 zum Senator gewählt. 

1945 hatte er das Präsidium der Bank von Italien inne. 1947 übte Einaudi das Amt 

des stellvertretenden Ministerpräsidenten und Budgetministers im Kabinett De Gasperi 

aus. In den Jahren 1948 bis 1955 vertrat er Italien als erster Präsident der Republik. 

Zusammen mit dem neoliberalen Philosophen Croce gehörte Einaudi zu den 

Mitbegründern der Liberalen Partei Italiens. Neben seiner wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit 

verfolgte Rueff über mehr als dreissig Jahre eine Karriere als hoher Beamter: 

1926 war er „chargé de mission“ im Kabinett Poincaré. Um 1927 wurde er in die 

Wirtschafts- und Finanzsektion des Völkerbundssekretariats gewählt. Von 1939 bis 

zur deutschen Besetzung Frankreichs diente er als sous-gouverneur der Banque de 

France. 1944 wurde Rueff zum Präsidenten der Délégation économique et financière 

der Mission militaire pour les Affaires allemandes et autrichiennes ernannt. 1945 war

14 


er als Wirtschaftsberater des Obersten Kommandierenden über Deutschland tätig, 

vertrat Frankreich als Delegierter bei der Reparationskommission in Moskau und saß 

der Pariser Reparationen-Konferenz vor. 1946 war Rueff Delegierter an der Pariser 

Friedenskonferenz und stellvertretender Delegierter in der ersten und zweiten Versammlung 

der Vereinten Nationen. 1946 (bis 1952) wurde Rueff zum französischen 

Gesandten in der Agence interalliée des Réparations ernannt und führte dessen Präsidium. 

In diesen Jahren nahm er als französischer Kommissar in der Commission tripartite 

de l'or monétaire Einsitz. 1949-50 war Rueff Staatsminister von Monaco. Wie 

Rueff war auch Baudin für den Völkerbund tätig: als französischer Experte im 

Comité fiscal (1938). Die damals noch relativ jungen neoliberalen Wirtschaftswissenschafter 

vermochten zwischen 1918-45 die Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsordnung in 

keinem einzigen Staat auch nur ansatzweise in ihrem Sinne zu reformieren, 

geschweige denn die Idee einer liberalen Staatenföderation in die Diskussion der 

politischen Entscheidungsträger einzubringen. Nach 1945 jedoch übten Neoliberale 

in mehreren europäischen Staaten – Westdeutschland, Frankreich, Italien, Österreich, 

der Schweiz – und in den USA Beratertätigkeiten und politische Ämter aus, die in 

gewissen Grenzen Möglichkeiten zur Umsetzung der neoliberalen Prinzipien boten. 

Die Beschäftigung mit Föderationskonzepten im Zeichen des liberalen Internationalismus 

1918-45 zeigt, daß sich die Kritik deutscher und britischer neoliberaler 

Nationalökonomen an der europäischen Integration seit den späteren 40er Jahren 

auf jahrelange Studien auf diesem Gebiet stützte, auch wenn ihre Stellungnahmen 

in der Folge der veränderten politischen Bedingungen nach 1945 Akzentverschiebungen 

erfuhren. Der Vorwurf des Dogmatismus in der Haltung neoliberaler Wirtschaftswissenschafter 

gegenüber der europäischen Einigung, von der zeitgenössischen 

Rezeption wie der späteren Forschung vielfach erhoben, 8 erscheint in 

Anbetracht des Meinungswandels gerade von neoliberalen Hauptexponenten der 

Europa-Föderationskonzepte (Robbins, von Hayek, Röpke) als wenig angebracht. 

Das Urteil Herbsts, die liberalen Integrationstheoretiker hätten bis zum Ende des 

Zweiten Weltkrieges kein Konzept entwickelt, das den regionalen Reintegrationsinteressen 

des europäischen Raums und dem Deutschlandproblem Rechnung getragen 

hätte, 9 wäre zu korrigieren, da sich Röpke in dieser Zeit den Voraussetzungen 

und Prinzipien eines föderativen Zusammenschlusses zugewandt hat und Einaudi, 

Robbins und von Hayek konkrete und detaillierte Konzepte für die Errichtung einer 

Europaföderation erstellt haben. Der vorliegende Beitrag ist als ideengeschichtliche 

Arbeit zu verstehen. Die Frage nach dem Umsetzungspotential der neoliberalen 

Europavorstellungen bedürfte eigener Forschungen. 10 

Nach einer Einführung zum frühen Neoliberalismus werden die neoliberalen Föderationskonzepte 

1918-1939 bzw. 1939-1945 gesondert behandelt. In der Phase 

1939-1945 sind wesentliche Veränderungen in der Begründung der neoliberalen Föderationskonzepte 

zu beobachten. Mit dem Kalten Krieg begann eine dritte Phase, die bei 

8. J. STOHLER, op.cit., S.99. 

9. L. HERBST, op.cit., S.182. 

10. M. WEGMANN, Früher Neoliberalismus und europäische Integration, Bd. 2, Von den Wirtschaftswissenschaften 

zur Politik, in Vorbereitung.


wichtigen Exponenten der neoliberalen Föderalisten – darunter Robbins, von Hayek 

und Röpke – zu einer Neubeurteilung der Europaintegration führte. Im Kapitel 2 werden 

die Föderationskonzepte Einaudis, Rueffs, Röpkes, Robbins' und von Hayeks von 

1918-39 vergleichend untersucht, indem (2.1) ihre räumliche Gestalt behandelt und 

ideen- und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Bezüge zu Cobdens kosmopolitischer Theorie 

des Freihandels und seiner Völkerbundskonzeption einerseits und zu Lists Zollunionsmodell 

andererseits erörtert werden. Die beiden genannten Aspekte führen zur Frage 

nach der Bedeutung der Nation und der Einschätzung des Nationalismus im Hinblick 

auf die Revision des Liberalismus (2.2). Von da aus gilt es, die Teilung der Souveränität 

zwischen der Föderation und den Mitgliedstaaten nach den Konzeptionen Einaudis, 

Robbins' und von Hayeks zu klären und die Rolle der Staatssouveränität zu erörtern 

(2.3). Die Neoliberalen erachteten die rechtliche, wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und 

politische Ordnung eines Staates als „interdependent“. Unter 2.4 ist zu untersuchen, 

welche Konsequenzen die Neoliberalen aus ihrer Forderung nach einer rechtlich-wirtschaftlichen 

bzw. gesellschaftlich-politischen „Gesamtordnung“ für die Schaffung 

einer internationalen Ordnung und einer Staatenföderation zogen. Im Kapitel 3 werden 

die neoliberalen Föderationsentwürfe während des Zweiten Weltkrieges untersucht, 

indem sie mit ihren früheren Arbeiten verglichen werden. Die Aufmerksamkeit gilt 

(3.1) dem Zusammenhang zwischen den Wirtschaftsformen und den politischen Strukturen 

einer Staatenföderation, (3.2) der Frage nach dem gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen 

Europabild, (3.3) der Rolle der Staatssouveränität und der Einschätzung des Nationalismus 

in den Schriften der neoliberalen Föderalisten. Anschließend werden unter 4 

die Besonderheiten der neoliberalen Föderationkonzepte hervorgehoben und die Frage 

beantwortet, inwieweit sie sich unter die Föderationsschriften der europäischen Widerstandsbewegungen 

einordnen lassen. In der Zusammenfassung werden die wesentlichen 

Merkmale der neoliberalen Föderationsentwürfe 1918-1945 hervorgehoben. 11 

1. Der frühe Neoliberalismus – ein positives Konzept für eine freiheitliche und 

sozial bewußte Wettbewerbswirtschaft 

„Neoliberalismus“ bezeichnet zum einen eine wirtschafts- und gesellschaftspolitische 

Konzeption und zum anderen ein System von Personen, die durch den Transfer von Ideen 

miteinander verbunden sind. Der Begriff „Neoliberale“ ist als Selbstbezeichnung erstmals 

im Colloque Walter Lippmann Ende August 1938 in Paris belegt. Alexander Rüstow hat 

ihn dort als Selbstbezeichnung vorgeschlagen, nachdem er selbst schon im Herbst 1932 

im Verein für Socialpolitik vom „neue[n] Liberalismus“ gesprochen hatte, den er „mit 

[s]einen Freunden“ vertrete. 12 In der griechisch-neulateinischen Form geht der Theoriebe- 

11. Ausführlicher und weitere Belege vgl. M. WEGMANN, Früher Neoliberalismus und europäische 

Integration. Interdependenz der nationalen, supranationalen und internationalen Ordnung von 

Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1932-1965), Baden-Baden, 2002. 

12. A. RÜSTOW, Diskussionsbeitrag. Verhandlungen des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Dresden, 

28.-29.9.1932, in: Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, 187(1932), S.69.

16 


griff „Neoliberalismus“ jedoch nicht auf Rüstow zurück. Lavergne hatte den Theoriebegriff 

„néo-libéralisme“ schon ein Vierteljahr vor dem Colloque Walter Lippmann in seiner 

Monographie Essor et décadence du Capitalisme eingeführt. 13 

Der Neoliberalismus entstand aus dem Bewußtsein einer tiefen Krise nicht nur 

des wirtschaftlichen, sondern auch des gesellschaftlichen Lebens und der tradierten 

bürgerlichen Wertvorstellungen in der Zwischenkriegszeit. Der Neoliberalismus, 

der sich 1938 in Paris als internationale Forschungsgemeinschaft mit eigenem 

Institut formierte, ist den liberalen wirtschaftspolitischen Erneuerungsbestrebungen 

zuzuordnen, die in der Folge der großen Depression von 1872-1890 in den westund 

mitteleuropäischen Staaten sowie den USA zu beobachten waren. Anlaß zu 

den wirtschaftspolitischen Erneuerungsbestrebungen seit etwa 1880 war die 

Ernüchterung über die wirtschaftlichen und sozialpolitischen Konsequenzen des 

Wirtschaftsliberalismus. Auf der inhaltlichen Ebene jedoch stellte der Neoliberalismus 

der Zwischenkriegszeit und der zweiten Nachkriegszeit keine unmittelbare 

Fortsetzung einer der früheren liberalen Erneuerungsbewegungen dar. Für die 

Zuordnung zu den Neoliberalen ist in der vorliegenden Arbeit die Selbstbezeichnung 

der liberalen Wirtschaftswissenschafter, Juristen, Politiker und Philosophen 

als „Neoliberale“ und ihre gegenseitige Anerkennung der Zugehörigkeit zu diesem 

Kreis maßgebend. Rueff und Baudin (F), Einaudi (I), de Madariaga (E), Robbins 

(GB), Condliffe (GB), der Wahlbrite von Hayek, von Mises (A), von Haberler (A 

bzw. USA), Heilperin (USA), Rappard (CH) und die beiden Deutschen Röpke und 

Rüstow erfüllen diese Kriterien. 

Die Anfänge des Neoliberalismus waren polyzentrisch: Seit den frühen 20er 

Jahren hatten Liberale in verschiedenen Staaten – Großbritannien, Österreich, Italien, 

Frankreich, Deutschland, USA, Schweiz – ähnliche, ja weitgehend übereinstimmende 

Ansätze zur Reformierung des Liberalismus entwickelt. Seit 1935 ist 

ein enges Beziehungsgeflecht der später sogenannten Neoliberalen über die Staatsgrenzen 

und Kontinente hinweg nachzuweisen. Auf Initiative des Pariser Philosophen 

Rougier traten die europäischen und US-amerikanischen Neoliberalen in 

Paris im Sommer 1938 zu ihrem ersten internationalen Kolloquium zusammen und 

gründeten im Frühjahr 1939 ein eigenes Forschungsinstitut, das Centre international 

pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme (Paris), dessen Tätigkeiten aber infolge der 

nationalsozialistischen Besetzung von Paris eingestellt werden mußten. Schon 

1944 bereitete von Hayek die Neugründung einer internationalen Vereinigung der 

13. In der Neoliberalismus-Literatur wird im allgemeinen das Colloque Lippmann als „Geburtsstunde“ 

des griechisch-neulateinischen Theoriebegriffs „Neoliberalismus“ angenommen. G. EISER- 

MANN, Alexander Rüstow, Persönlichkeit und Werk, in: Wirtschaftsordnung und Menschenbild. 

Schriftenreihe der Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft, Heft 4, Köln, 1960, S.149; B. 

LAVERGNE, Essor et décadence du Capitalisme, Paris, 1938, S.172, Anm.1. Das Vorwort des 

Bandes ist auf den 20. April 1938, also vor dem Colloque Lippmann, datiert. Nach der Eintragung 

der Druckerei Dardaillon et Dagniaux (St. Denis) ist das Buch im April 1938 gedruckt worden. 

Lavergnes Monographie war den Kolloquiums-Teilnehmern bekannt. Sie ist im Vorwort der im 

Juni 1939 gedruckten Akten zitiert, allerdings unter ungenauer Wiedergabe des Titels. L. ROU- 

GIER, Avant-propos, in: Compte-rendu des séances du Colloque Walter Lippmann, Paris, 1939, 

S.7, Anm.1.


Neoliberalen vor. Im April 1947 entstand unter seinem Präsidium die Mont Pèlerin 

Society als geschlossene Gesellschaft neoliberaler Wirtschaftswissenschafter, Juristen 

und Philosophen. 

Alle oben erwähnten Wirtschaftswissenschafter und Philosophen traten dieser Gesellschaft 

bei. Die Neoliberalen bekannten sich zu einem positiven Konzept für eine freiheitliche 

und sozial bewußte Wettbewerbswirtschaft als Antwort auf die Krise des laissez 

faire-Liberalismus. Sie konzentrierten sich darauf, die Prinzipien und Voraussetzungen 

einer liberalen Gesellschaftsordnung herauszuarbeiten, entwarfen aber kein politisches 

Programm im eigentlichen Sinne, denn die Gesellschaft entzieht sich nach liberaler Auffassung 

jedweder Planung. Die Teilnehmer des Colloque Walter Lippmann und die 

Hauptexponenten der Mont Pèlerin Society waren von der Überlegenheit einer freien 

Gesellschaft selbstbestimmter Individuen überzeugt und sahen ihre Aufgabe darin, die 

freie Gesellschaft gegen Angriffe philosophisch zu verteidigen. In der freien Marktwirtschaft 

erkannten sie das gegenüber dem Kollektivismus oder einer gemischten Wirtschaft 

überlegene System. Regierungsinterventionen in den Markt-Preis-Mechanismus wie 

staatlich festgesetzte Mindestlöhne oder die Subventionierung der Landwirtschaft 

betrachteten sie als schädlich. Eine stabile monetäre Ordnung, beruhend auf liberalen 

Prinzipien, wäre die erste Voraussetzung des liberalen internationalen Handels. Unumstritten 

war die Forderung nach einer liberalen Außenhandelspolitik. Die Neoliberalen – 

darunter auch die frühen Chicago-Neoliberalen Knight, Simons und Friedman – wußten 

um die Möglichkeit eines Marktversagens und anerkannten die Notwendigkeit staatlichen 

Handelns bei öffentlichen Gütern und externen Effekten. Der Gesellschaftsvertrag sollte 

nach den Vorstellungen des frühen Neoliberalismus (1932-1965) auf folgenden Grundlagen 

beruhen: Stärkung der Macht des Staates zur Durchsetzung und Aufrechterhaltung 

der liberalen Wirtschaftsordnung; Aufbau einer internationalen Rechtsordnung für den 

internationalen Handel; Stärkung intermediärer Strukturen (Familie, Vereine, Gemeinde) 

auf sozialem und administrativem Gebiet; Stärkung der individuellen Selbstverantwortung 

und Konzentration des Staates auf die Fürsorge im eigentlichen Sinne; staatliche 

Rahmenpolitik und liberaler, d.h. marktkonformer Interventionismus; monetäre Stabilität, 

restriktive Geldpolitik; offene Märkte; starker Staat in der Rolle des Schiedsrichters über 

den wirtschaftlichen Interessengruppen; staatliches Handeln bei Marktversagen; Dekonzentration 

der Wirtschaft, Dekartellierung; Förderung kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen 

mittels Wettbewerbsrecht. 

Die von den Neoliberalen konzipierte Wirtschaftsordnung zielte nicht auf die 

Schaffung einer staatsfreien Wirtschaft ab, sondern setzte im Gegenteil den Staat 

als Schiedsrichter ein, der die rechtliche Rahmenordnung für das Wirtschaften festlegte 

und die Einhaltung der „Spielregeln“ in der Wirtschaft überwachte. Da sich 

die Aufgaben des neoliberalen „starken Staates“ nicht in der Schaffung von Rahmenbedingungen 

der äußeren Sicherheit erschöpften, sondern sich auf die Gestaltung 

und Durchsetzung der Wirtschaftsordnung sowie auf marktkonforme Interventionen 

14 erstreckten, reichten sie über die Aufgaben des „Nachtwächterstaates“ 

14. Vgl. die „Maximen rationeller Intervention”: W. RÖPKE, Staatsinterventionismus, in: Handwörterbuch 

der Staatswissenschaften, Ergänzungsband zur 4. Auflage, Jena, 1929, S.861-882.

18 


der Freihändler des 19. Jahrhunderts hinaus. Diese Feststellung gilt für den 

US-amerikanischen Neoliberalismus und insbesondere die frühe Chicago-Gruppe 

(d.h. bis 1965) gleichermaßen wie für den europäischen Neoliberalismus. 15 

2. Föderationskonzepte im Zeichen des liberalen Internationalismus: vom 

Ende des Ersten bis zum Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkrieges 

2.1. Zwischen Europaföderation und Weltföderation 

Einaudi verfocht in zwei Briefen im Corriere della Sera vom 5. Januar 1918 und 

vom 28. Dezember 1918 die Idee, statt des Völkerbundes eine Staatenföderation 16 

zu gründen. Rueff schlug Ende 1928, anfangs 1929 vor, die Mitglieder des Völkerbundes 

sollten einen „gemeinsamen Markt“ mit einer liberalen Zollpolitik errichten, 

der allen beitrittswilligen Staaten offenstehen würde. 17 Röpke sprach sich in 

einem Brief an Franz Klein (18.5.1939) dafür aus, in Anbetracht des „trockenen 

Krieges“ zwischen den Achsen- und den Status-quo-Mächten „an die Stelle des 

Völkerbundes ein europäisches Föderativsystem“ zu setzen. 18 Robbins entwarf in 

der Ausarbeitung seiner 1935 am Genfer Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes 

Internationales gehaltenen Vorlesungsreihe Economic Planning and International 

Order eine „liberale Föderation” 19 von Staaten als die wünschenswerte Alternative 

zur sozialistischen internationalen Planung und zur internationalen Anarchie. Von 

Hayek schließlich trat in einem kurz vor Kriegsbeginn 1939 verfaßten Aufsatz entschieden 

ein für die „Idee eines föderativen Zusammenschlusses als konsequent[er] 

Entwicklung des liberalen Standpunktes“ und als „neuen Stützpunkt“ für alle diejenigen 

Liberalen, die sich vom Liberalismus enttäuscht abgewandt hatten. 20 Die 

15. Einzig von Mises vertrat in mancher Hinsicht Positionen, die an die alte Vorstellung des Nachtwächterstaats 

erinnerten. Von Mises stand jedoch im Colloque Walter Lippmann und der Mont 

Pèlerin Society mit seiner Haltung isoliert da und wurde deshalb von den Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft 

heftig angegriffen. Graham (US) hielt von Mises 1947 vor, einem „jungle”-Kapitalismus 

das Wort zu reden. Das Protokoll zur Tagung Free Enterprise or Competitive Order im Rahmen 

der Gründungskonferenz zeugt von der geschlossenen Gegnerschaft der anderen Mitglieder gegen 

von Mises‘ radikale Positionen. F.D. Graham, Wortbeitrag, Tagung Free Enterprise or Competitive 

Order, Mont Pèlerin Society Meeting Seelisberg, 1.4.1947, Gesprächsprotokolle, aufgezeichnet 

von D. Hahn, Typoskript, Teil 2, S.5, Nachlaß Friedrich A. von Hayek: Box 81, Hoover Institution 

Archives. Stanford University, CA, USA. 

16. L. EINAUDI, La Società delle Nazioni è un ideale possibile? in: L. EINAUDI (Hrsg.), La Guerra 

e l'Unità Europea, Milano, 1948, S.11 ff.; L. EINAUDI, Il dogma della sovranità e l'idea della 

Società delle Nazioni, in: op.cit., S.23 ff. 

17. J. RUEFF, Note sur un projet de „pacte économique“, Décembre 1928-mars 1929, in: J. RUEFF, 

op.cit., S.291 f. 

18. W. RÖPKE, Briefe 1934-1966, Erlenbach-Zürich, 1976, S.33. 

19. L. ROBBINS, Economic Planning and International Order (1937), New York, 1972, S.242 und 245. 

20. F.A. von HAYEK, Die wirtschaftlichen Voraussetzungen föderativer Zusammenschlüsse, in: F.A. 

von HAYEK (Hrsg.), Individualismus und wirtschaftliche Ordnung, Salzburg, 1976, S.343.


Föderationskonzepte der liberalen Erneuerer waren teils in der Erwartung, 21 teils in 

der Folge des Scheiterns des Völkerbundes entstanden. Vorbehaltlos bekannte sich 

nur der Neoliberale Rappard (1930) noch zum Völkerbund in seinem Werk Uniting 

Europe, 22 erwartete aber, daß in einem Prozeß zunehmender internationaler Verflechtung 

eine „Weltregierung“ den Völkerbund ablösen werde. 23 

Die räumliche Gestalt der Staatenföderation wurde in den erwähnten Texten nicht 

definitiv bestimmt; Dem liberalen Kosmopolitismus entsprechend sahen Einaudi, 24 

Rueff, 25 Robbins 26 und von Hayek 27 die Möglichkeit vor, die Föderationsmitgliedschaft 

auch für die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika zu öffnen. Die Grundsätze, die 

Robbins entwarf, bezogen sich auf die Schaffung einer Weltföderation, beanspruchten 

aber ebenso Gültigkeit für Föderationen, die kleiner wären als diese. 28 Die Frage, ob 

Deutschland schon zu Beginn in die Föderation aufgenommen werden sollte, erfuhr bei 

Einaudi wie bei Röpke eine zurückhaltende bzw. ablehnende Antwort. Gegen Ende des 

Ersten Weltkrieges sah Einaudi im Fortbestehen der Kriegsallianz den Ausgangspunkt 

für eine europäische Föderation. Röpke bezog das „europäische Föderativsystem“ im 

Frühling 1939 auf diejenigen Staaten, die sich in der Gegnerschaft gegen die Achsenmächte 

trafen und die Ideale des Völkerbundes hochhielten. Auf den „Weltstaat“ griff 

Röpke jedoch in verschiedenen anderen Arbeiten der dreißiger Jahre als fiktives Vorbild 

zurück, um die Freihandelstheorie im Sinne Cobdens (1804-1865) zu erhellen. Das 

Währungssystem, das Rechtssystem und die dem Währungs- und dem Rechtssystem 

entsprechenden Normensysteme waren in dieser Sicht die „Substitute des Weltstaates“, 

welche die liberale Ära geschaffen hatte und nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg zusammengebrochen 

waren. 29 In seinem Beitrag L'internationalisme monétaire et sa crise schloß 

Heilperin in Anlehnung an Robbins auch Erwägungen über einen Weltstaat und eine 

die ganze Welt umfassende Föderation von Staaten ein und stellte fest, daß sich die 

Frage der internationalen Beziehungen in diesem Falle nicht stellen würde, wären dann 

21. L. EINAUDI (1918) 

22. Der Titel dieses Buches lehnte sich an die Entwicklung an, in deren Verlauf der Völkerbund immer 

mehr, wenn auch nicht ausschließlich eine Liga europäischer Staaten wurde. W.E. RAPPARD, 

Uniting Europe, New Haven, 1930, S.138, 245 und 283. Rappard zog in seinem Aufsatz Europa 

und der Völkerbund (1929) die Schlußfolgerung, nicht ein Bund der europäischen Staaten, der sich 

einer nichteuropäischen Welt gegenübersehen würde, sei das Ideal, sondern ein einiges Europa als 

wesentlicher Bestandteil eines universellen Völkerbundes. W.E. RAPPARD, Europa und der 

Völkerbund, in: Europäische Gespräche, 7(1929), S.221. 

23. W.E. RAPPARD, The Beginnings of International Government, in: American Political Science 

Review, 24(1930), S.1011 f. 

24. L. EINAUDI, La Società delle Nazioni è un ideale possibile?, op.cit., S.11. 

25. J. RUEFF, Note sur un projet de „pacte économique“, op.cit., S.292. 

26. L. ROBBINS, Economic Planning …, op.cit., S.247. 

27. F.A. von HAYEK, Die wirtschaftlichen Voraussetzungen …, op.cit., S.332 f. und S.336. Vgl. auch 

Streits Konzeption einer „(nord-)atlantischen Union“, auf die sich von Hayeks Erörterungen beziehen: 

C. STREIT, Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North 

Atlantic, New York, 1939, S.6. 

28. L. ROBBINS, Economic Planning …, op.cit., S.245-248 und 255. 

29. W. RÖPKE, Weltwirtschaft und internationales Rechtssystem, in: Friedens-Warte, 36(1936), 

S.102.

20 


die Probleme zwischen den Staaten doch nur auf diejenigen Bereiche beschränkt, in 

denen die Staaten noch eigene Souveränitätsrechte besäßen. 30 Im Unterschied zu den 

erwähnten Arbeiten Röpkes und Heilperins zog Robbins in seiner Studie von 1935/ 

1937 den imaginierten Weltstaat nicht nur im Sinne eines fiktiven Referenzrahmens 

heran, sondern setzte sich mit seinen theoretischen Grundlagen und mit Alternativen zu 

einem derartigen Gebilde systematisch auseinander. Ein vollkommen einheitlicher 

Weltstaat erwies sich in Robbins' Analyse als weder realisierbar noch wünschenswert, 

da das liberale System nicht minder als der internationale Kommunismus an den 

räumlichen Dimensionen, den sprachlichen Voraussetzungen und dem mangelhaften 

Schutz der Freiheit in einem Weltstaat scheitern müßte. 

Die Gedanken neoliberaler Wirtschaftswissenschafter über die Schaffung einer 

Europaföderation und einer Weltföderation waren also in der Zeit vom Ende des 

Ersten bis zum Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges miteinander verknüpft, wozu der 

Völkerbund, sich zwischen der theoretischen Universalität und der Konzentration 

auf Europa befindend, wesentliche Denkanstöße gab. 

Die Diskussion um die Schaffung einer Staatenföderation trat anfangs der dreißiger 

Jahre ins Spannungsfeld der Kontroverse über Freihandel und Protektionismus. Im 

Zusammenhang mit dem Fortschreiten des Prozesses der Integration der Volkswirtschaften 

zu einer Weltwirtschaft folgte Röpke List, der im Wachsen des räumlichen Bereichs 

der „wirtschaftlichen Integration“ (Röpke) Stufen eines einheitlichen Integrationsprozesses 

erblickte, der auf eine mindestens ebenso enge Verbindung der „zivilisiertesten Nationen 

der Erde“ (List) hinauslaufen würde, wie die Grafschaften im England des 18. Jahrhunderts 

es gewesen waren. 31 Daß der wirtschaftliche Integrationsprozeß über die 

Staatsgrenzen hinwegschreite, nachdem er in der Vergangenheit weder an Stadt- noch 

Landesgrenzen haltgemacht hatte, entspricht nach Röpke der „inneren Logik der Entwicklung”. 

32 List (1789-1846) hatte die deutsche politische und wirtschaftliche Einigung 

nicht als Selbstzweck verfochten, sondern als Voraussetzung einer kontinentaleuropäischen 

und dann einer universellen Union. 33 Gemäßigte Erziehungsschutzzölle wären als 

befristete Maßnahmen berechtigt, um die einzelnen Staaten wirtschaftlich so weit zu entwickeln, 

daß sie eine Union mit den anderen industrialisierten Staaten gründen und zum 

Freihandel übergehen könnten. 34 Trotz seiner Kritik an einzelnen Prämissen von Adam 

Smith‘ Kosmopolitismus war das Ziel Lists der universelle Freihandel und sein wirtschaftspolitisches 

Vorbild Großbritannien. 35 Diese Positionen Lists waren mit der klassischen 

Lehre der Nationalökonomie vereinbar, die später von J. St. Mill (1806-1873) und 

den Neoliberalen vertreten wurden. 36 Rüstow, Röpke, von Haberler, Rueff, Robbins und 

30. M.A. HEILPERIN, L'internationalisme monétaire et sa crise, in: P. MANTOUX (Hrsg.), La crise 

mondiale, Paris, 1938, S.363 f. 

31. F. LIST, Das nationale System der Politischen Ökonomie, Jena, 1928, S.210; W. RÖPKE, Die säkulare 

Bedeutung der Weltkrisis, in: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 37(1933), S.17. 

32. W. RÖPKE, op.cit., S.18 f. 

33. F. LIST, op.cit., S.60 ff., 213 f., 268, 526 ff. und 536 f. 

34. Ibid., S.213 f., 420 f., 431-434 und 540 f. 

35. Ibid., S.53 f. und 208-214. 

36. Ibid., S.204-220.


von Hayek räumten in den 20er/30er Jahren Präferenzzöllen und Zollunionen eine positive 

Funktion als „Maßnahmen einer liberalen Handelspolitik“ ein. 37 Gleichzeitig machten 

sie jedoch auf die Aufgabe aufmerksam, den „partiellen Freihandel“ trotz des liberalen 

Gehalts seiner Idee vor dem Mißbrauch durch protektionistische Bestrebungen zu schützen. 

Unmittelbaren Anlaß zu dieser Befürchtung gaben die hochprotektionistischen Zölle 

der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und das Beispiel der „Empire Free Trade”-Bewegung 

Lord Beaverbrooks, welche Präferenzzölle für die Dominions und gleichzeitig 

Schutzzölle für das Mutterland forderte. Die – unter internationalem Blickwinkel – positiven 

Ansätze, die eine Zollunion rechtfertigten, führten gedanklich konsequenterweise zu 

einer die ganze Welt umspannenden Zollunion. 

Zwischen dem Konzept einer Zollunion nach List und dem kosmopolitischen 

Freihandel nach Cobden bestand in den während der Zwischenkriegszeit verfaßten 

Schriften Röpkes, Rueffs, Robbins‘ und von Hayeks kein unüberbrückbarer 

Gegensatz. Die Überlegungen der neoliberalen Wirtschaftswissenschafter zum Problem 

einer Staatenföderation schwankten vor dem Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges 

zwischen einer Föderation globalen und einer Föderation kontinentalen, europäischen 

Ausmaßes. 

2.2. Die Forderung der liberalen Erneuerer nach Überwindung des Nationalismus 

und Beschränkung der nationalstaatlichen Souveränität 

Neoliberale wie Robbins, von Hayek, Einaudi, Rueff, Condliffe und Röpke erblickten 

im Nationalismus und Bellizismus nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg eine vitale 

Bedrohung des Wirtschafts- und Sozialsystems, die daran war, die europäische 

Kultur zu zerstören, und forderten die Überwindung des Nationalismus, wenn nicht 

die „Abschaffung des Nationalstaats“ (von Hayek). 38 

Einaudi unterschied zwei graduelle Formen der Souveränität: die „vollkommene 

Souveränität“ und die „relative Souveränität“, welch letztere durch die bloße 

Existenz anderer Staaten sowie durch die Kooperation mit diesen bestimmt wird. 

Einaudi, Robbins und von Hayek bekämpften die Souveränität als in höchstem 

Maß schädliche Eigenschaft des Nationalstaates, als die Quelle von Elend und 

Armut, von Krieg und Chaos. 39 Mit Blick auf Deutschland erläuterte Einaudi 1918 

37. A. RÜSTOW, Was hat die Wirtschaftswissenschaft zur Zollfrage zu sagen? 19.2.1925, Typoskript, 

BAK N1169/244; G. von HABERLER, Der internationale Handel (1933), Berlin, 1970, 

S.283-289; W. RÖPKE, Liberale Handelspolitik, in: B. GOETZ (Hrsg.), Die Wandlungen der 

Wirtschaft im kapitalistischen Zeitalter, Berlin-Grunewald, 1932, S.225; L. ROBBINS, Economic 

Planning …, op.cit., S.121 f.; F.A. von HAYEK, Die wirtschaftlichen Voraussetzungen …, op.cit., 

S.331-336; J. RUEFF, op.cit., S.288 f. 

38. L. ROBBINS, Economic Planning …, op.cit., S.239, 299 und 325 ff.; W. RÖPKE, Die säkulare 

Bedeutung der Weltkrisis, op.cit., S.27; F.A. von HAYEK, Die wirtschaftlichen Voraussetzungen 

…, op.cit., S.341; Colloque Lippmann, op.cit., S.57-66; L. EINAUDI, Il dogma …,op.cit., S.28; J. 

Rueff, op.cit., pp. 287-293. 

39. L. EINAUDI, Il dogma …,op.cit., S.25; L. ROBBINS, op.cit., S.240-244; F.A. von HAYEK, 

op.cit., S.341.

22 


die „innere Logik“, dergemäß die volle und absolute Souveränität nach der Weltherrschaft 

strebe, da sie in sicherheitspolitisch und wirtschaftlich vollendeter Form 

nur unter der Bedingung weltumspannender Hegemonie errichtet werden könne. 

Der Versuch, eine „Società delle Nazioni“ aus souveränen Staaten zu schaffen, 

würde im Nichts enden und weiteren Anlaß zu Zwist und Krieg bieten. 40 

Einaudi, Robbins und von Hayek machten folgende Bereiche aus, in denen der 

Nationalstaat auf seine Souveränität zugunsten des Bundesstaates verzichten 

müßte: außenpolitisch auf das Recht der Kriegführung (Robbins); wirtschaftspolitisch 

auf das Recht, die freie Bewegung von Kapital und Arbeit zu begrenzen 

(Robbins, von Hayek), auf die Unterstützung bestimmter Industrien durch staatliche 

Beeinflussung der Preise, auf Staatsmonopole und andere Formen monopolistischer 

Organisationen einzelner Industrien, auf eine selbständige Währungs- und 

Finanzpolitik, möglicherweise auf eine nationale Zentralbank (Robbins, von 

Hayek) und unter Umständen auch auf verschiedene Formen indirekter Steuern. 

Auf dem Gebiet des Verfassungsrechts ging Einaudi sogar so weit, das Recht der 

Parlamente, innerhalb des Staatsgebietes Gesetze zu erlassen, in seinem Entwurf 

eines Bundesstaates zu beschränken. 

Röpke zog aus der mangelnden Übereinstimmung des wirtschaftlich und des 

politisch integrierten Raumes, aus dem Widerspruch zwischen der weltwirtschaftlichen 

Verflechtung und dem Nationalismus der freien Völker den Schluß, der einzige 

Weg aus der Weltkrisis der 30er Jahre führe zur Lösung, die „wirtschaftliche 

Integration“ durch eine „politische“ zu ergänzen, den „Grad der politischen Kooperation 

der Völker dem Grade ihrer wirtschaftlichen Kooperation“ anzupassen. 41 In 

der politischen Kooperation oder Integration – Röpke verwendete die Begriffe synonym 

wie in der zeitgenössischen Literatur bis in die ersten Jahre nach dem Zweiten 

Weltkrieg üblich – erblickte Röpke ein „neues System der internationalen 

Sicherheit und des Friedens“, das die Wohlfahrt und Zivilisation, die Erhaltung und 

Erhebung Europas gewährleisten würde. 42 

Der integrale Nationalismus und die Verabsolutierung der nationalen Souveränität 

im Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus erschütterten die Verbindung von liberaler 

und nationaler Idee, die von den Anfängen der liberalen Bewegung an ein „Fundamentalprinzip“ 

(Lothar Gall) des Liberalismus in Europa gebildet hatte. 43 Die vielfachen 

liberalen Emanzipationsziele, welche der Liberalismus im Nationalismus des 

19. Jahrhunderts konkretisiert sah, wurden durch die faschistische und nationalsozialistische 

Übersteigerung des Nationalen aufgehoben. Röpke, Rueff, Einaudi, Robbins 

und von Hayek griffen angesichts dieser Gefährdung des Liberalismus auf dessen 

kosmopolitische Tradition zurück, die nicht nur im Bereich der Wirtschaft, sondern 

40. L. EINAUDI, Il dogma …,op.cit., S. 25-28. 

41. W. RÖPKE, Die säkulare Bedeutung der Weltkrisis, op.cit., S.27; Colloque Lippmann, op.cit., 

S.65. 

42. W. RÖPKE, Die säkulare Bedeutung der Weltkrisis, op.cit., S.27. 

43. L. GALL, Liberalismus und Nationalstaat, in: L. GALL, Bürgertum, liberale Bewegung und Nation, 

Ausgewählte Aufsätze, München, 1996, S.191.


auch der Geisteshaltung und des Bildungsideals 44 („Weltbürgertum“) im liberalen 

Nationalismus des 19. Jahrhunderts ihren Platz gehabt hatte. 

2.3. Weder Staatenbund noch Einheitsstaat. 

Liberaler Internationalismus gegen hegemoniale „Großräume“ 

Die von Einaudi, Robbins und von Hayek skizzierten Idealvorstellungen zielten 

weder auf einen „Staatenbund“ noch auf einen unbeschränkten „Einheitsstaat“ ab, 

sondern auf eine „Föderation“ in der Bedeutung der deutschen Bezeichnung „Bundesstaat“. 

Robbins fügte dem „Bundesstaat“ das Attribut „super-national“ bei, so 

etwa wenn er in Abhebung vom Liberalismus des 19. Jahrhunderts zur Verwirklichung 

des „internationalistischen Liberalismus“ die Notwendigkeit einer übernationalen 

Autorität forderte, die einen Apparat darstellen würde, um Recht und Ordnung 

aufrechtzuerhalten. 45 Was die Abtretung von Souveränitätsrechten an die 

Gemeinschaft anbelangt, reichten die Föderationskonzepte Einaudis, Robbins‘ und 

von Hayeks weit über das hinaus, was in den ersten beiden Stufen zur Umsetzung 

der Römer Verträge erreicht werden konnte, und nahmen die wesentlichen Züge 

des vollendeten Binnenmarktes vorweg. 

Die Analyse der Föderationsentwürfe der Wirtschaftswissenschafter, die in den dreißiger 

Jahren für einen erneuerten Liberalismus eintraten, läßt die kosmopolitische Ausrichtung im 

Zeichen des liberalen Internationalismus als besonderes Merkmal dieser Konzepte erkennen. 

Als Idealfall angestrebt wurde eine Weltföderation, ein die ganze Welt einschließlich 

der Kolonialgebiete umfassender Bundesstaat; die Föderation sollte allen zur wirtschaftlichen 

Verflechtung fähigen Staaten offenstehen. Die liberal-internationalistischen Grundlagen 

dieser Konzepte hoben sich deutlich von den aufkommenden totalitaristischen Hegemonialplänen 

ab, da sie weder auf dem Nationalismus noch auf Rassendenken beruhten, 

sondern im Gegenteil beide als verderblich ablehnten. Eine möglichst umfassende Föderation 

von Staaten war dazu bestimmt, die Hegemonie des Stärkeren zu verhindern. In diesem 

Sinne wiesen auch Rüstow und Röpke die Vorstellung von „Großräumen“, wie die 

Nationalsozialisten sie propagierten, bereits in den frühen dreißiger Jahren zurück. 46 Gegen 

die von den Nationalsozialisten gepriesene autarkische „Raumbildung“ führte Röpke die 

handels- und außenpolitischen Konsequenzen einer „Selbsteinkreisung“ der Deutschen in 

Deutschland, Südost- und Osteuropa und das Gegenbeispiel der Kleinstaaten Dänemark, 

Niederlande und Schweiz an, die sich auch „ohne 'Raum'“ bestens entwickelten. 47 

Die Prinzipien einer liberalen Weltwirtschaft mit ihrer Politik der offenen Tür, 

von den Neoliberalen in Anlehnung an Cobdens Kosmopolitismus verfochten, 

44. H.-U. WEHLER, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1, München, 1987, S.510 f. 

45. L. ROBBINS, Economic Planning …, op.cit., S.240 f. Von Hayek verwendete für den Bundesstaat 

ebenfalls das Attribut „überstaatlich“. F.A. von HAYEK , Die wirtschaftlichen Voraussetzungen 

…, op.cit., S.337. 

46. A. RÜSTOW, Autarkie und Export, Berlin, 21.3.1931. Typoskript. BAK N 1169/271. 

47. U. UNFRIED (Pseudonym Röpkes), Die Intellektuellen und der „Kapitalismus“, in: Frankfurter 

Zeitung, 11.9.1931, Nr.676; W. RÖPKE, Weltwirtschaft, Eine Notwendigkeit der deutschen Wirtschaft, 

Tübingen, 1932, S.16.

24 


standen im krassen Widerspruch zur Konzeption autarker „Großwirtschaftsräume”. 

48 Von Mises wies eine Bildung von Vereinigten Staaten Europas als Weg 

zum Krieg mit Amerika und der Sowjetunion aus, wenn in einer europäischen 

Union Chauvinismus, Streben nach Autarkie, Imperialismus und Militarismus von 

der nationalen Ebene auf einen größeren Kreis von Staaten übertragen würden. 49 

2.4. Freiheit der Teile in der Ordnung des Ganzen 

Die vorgestellten Konzepte des internationalistischen Liberalismus standen im Zeichen 

des Pazifismus liberaler Prägung, zu dem sich insbesondere Röpke in der 

Zwischenkriegszeit wiederholt ausdrücklich bekannte. Das Streben nach einer 

„wirksamen internationalen Rechtsordnung“ (von Hayek), einem internationalen 

gesetzlichen Rahmenwerk zur freien Entfaltung der persönlichen Initiative, verband 

die Wiener bzw. Londoner Vertreter eines revidierten Liberalismus mit den 

deutschen Neoliberalen. Den spezifischen Ansatz Edwin Cannans, des Begründers 

der Londoner neoliberalen Schule, spiegelte Robbins‘ Zugangsweise wider, indem 

Robbins die Frage, welche Aufgaben in der Macht der lokalen-staatlichen Autoritäten 

eines Bundesstaates verbleiben sollten, nicht im Kontext der nationalstaatlichen 

Interessen, sondern im Kontext des gemeinsamen Interesses der Föderation klärte. 

Die Entwürfe einer Föderation von Staaten im Zeichen des internationalistischen 

Liberalismus stellen eine feste Beziehung zwischen den Wirtschaftsformen 

und den politischen Strukturen auf. Robbins und Röpke formulierten das Verhältnis 

von nationaler Planung und internationaler Unordnung als Kausalbeziehung in dem 

Sinne, daß die erstere die letztere hervorbringe. 50 In demselben gedanklichen 

Zusammenhang erblickte von Hayek im Bundesstaat eine Absicherung gegen 

sozialistische Wirtschaftsformen, da mangelnde gemeinsame Ideale und Wertsetzungen 

im Bundesstaat es verhindern würden, daß der Bund selbst oder die nationalen 

Regierungen noch die Macht zu sozialistischer Planung würden ausüben 

können. 51 Von Hayek sah keinen Ersatz für den Mythos des Nationalismus entstehen, 

der wie dieser im Nationalstaat die Lenkung des Wirtschaftslebens legitimatorisch 

abzustützen imstande wäre. Gleichzeitig betonte von Hayek den unauflösbaren 

Konnex zwischen der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Vereinigung, sei 

doch der wirtschaftliche Zusammenschluß unabdingbar, um den politischen 

48. W. RÖPKE, Die wirtschaftlichen Elemente des Friedensproblems II, in: Friedens-Warte, 

37(1937), S.55. 

49. L. von MISES, Liberalismus, Jena, 1927, S.125-130. 

50. L. ROBBINS, Economic Planning …, op.cit., S.221 ff.; W. RÖPKE, Les problèmes économiques 

internationaux d'un monde en transformation, Antrittsvorlesung Institut Universitaire de Hautes 

Etudes Internationales, Genève, 25.10.1937, in: La crise mondiale, Paris, 1938, S.305. Diese Überlegungen 

Robbins‘, Röpkes und von Hayeks (s.u.) sind im Kontext der Planwirtschaftsdebatte der 

20er/30er Jahre zu sehen. 

51. Diese These von Hayeks hat im Kreise der Wirtschaftswissenschafter des Federal Union Research Institute 

während des Zweiten Weltkrieges eine große Kontroverse ausgelöst: J.M. WILSON, Economic 

Aspects of Federation, in: Federal Union Research Institute, First Annual Report, London, 1940.


Zusammenhalt des Bundes zu bewahren. Nicht in minderem Masse waren die politischen 

Strukturen und Wirtschaftsformen in Robbins' Weltföderation von dem 

einen Prinzip, der „internationalen liberalen Planung”, 52 geformt. In dem so konzipierten 

Bundesstaat würde demgemäß weniger regiert, ohne daß sich allerdings 

laissez faire und Anarchie einstellen würden, denn dagegen schützte das gesetzliche 

Rahmenwerk zur Aufrechterhaltung von Recht und Ordnung. 53 

3. Neoliberale Konzepte einer Europaföderation während 

des Zweiten Weltkrieges 

Während von Haberler, der 1936 in die Vereinigten Staaten emigriert war, und Lippmann 

aus Sorge vor einer erneuten Beherrschung Europas durch Deutschland und aufgrund 

der mangelnden geographischen Geschlossenheit Europas die Idee einer europäischen 

Föderation als unrealistisch abtaten, 54 zählten sich Einaudi und Röpke, 

Robbins und von Hayek während des Zweiten Weltkrieges zu den „Föderalisten“. Einaudi, 

der zu den frühesten italienischen Föderalisten gehörte, wurde nach seiner Flucht 

in die Schweiz (8.9.1943) Mitglied des Movimento Federalista Europeo. Röpke schloß 

sich keiner Organisation an, bekannte sich aber in seinem Werk Internationale Ordnung, 

beendet im Januar 1945, ebenso wie in der überarbeiteten Neuauflage von 1954 

ausdrücklich zu den „Föderalisten”. 55 1944 veröffentlichte Röpke einen Artikel zur 

föderalistischen Lösung der deutschen Frage in den Quaderni del Movimento Federalista 

Europeo. Robbins gehörte den britischen Föderalisten (Federal Union) seit den 

Anfängen ihrer Bewegung zu Beginn des Jahres 1939 an. Von Hayek, Robbins und de 

Madariaga, der gleichzeitig Mitglied der Paneuropa-Union war, stellten sich dem Londoner 

Federal Union Research Institute zur Verfügung, das im März 1940 in der 

Absicht gegründet worden war, Wissenschaftern die Möglichkeit zu bieten, die Idee 

einer europäischen Föderation möglichst detailliert auszuarbeiten. In seinem Werk The 

Quest for Peace since the World War (1940) setzte Rappard (Genf) seine Hoffnungen 

auf das föderative Prinzip in den internationalen Beziehungen nach dem Vorbild der 

Schweiz und der Vereinigten Staaten. 56 Zu unmittelbaren Kontakten kam es im Rahmen 

der Federal Union noch vor der Besetzung Frankreichs zwischen Robbins und von 

Hayek einerseits und Rueff und Baudin andererseits, als eine Gruppe von Ökonomen 

des Federal Union Research Institute am 13. und 14. April 1940 in Paris ihre Pläne mit 

französischen Gleichgesinnten berieten. 57 Aus diesem Treffen ist keine Resolution zu 

52. L. ROBBINS, Economic Planning …, op.cit., S.258. 

53. F.A. von HAYEK, Die wirtschaftlichen Voraussetzungen …, op.cit., S.337 und 340. 

54. G. von HABERLER, The Political Economy of Regional or Continental Blocs, in: S.E. HARRIS 

(Hrsg.), Postwar Economic Problems, London, 1943, S.335; W. LIPPMANN, US War Aims, London, 

1944, S.76 ff. 

55. W. RÖPKE, Internationale Ordnung, Erlenbach-Zürich, 1945, S.55. 

56. W.E. RAPPARD, The Quest for Peace since the World War, Cambridge/MA, 1940, S.498-501. 

57. Anglo-French Ecomomists‘ Conference, Paris, 13.–14.4.1940, in: Federal Union Research Institute, 

First Annual Report, 1939–1940, London, 1940, Quelle ohne Paginierung.

26 


einem bestimmten Programm hervorgegangen. Die Forderung, die vorgesehene Föderation 

müsse eine liberale Außenwirtschaftspolitik annehmen, dürfte von den neoliberalen 

Diskussionsteilnehmern eingebracht worden sein. 58 

Während des Zweiten Weltkrieges sind Beziehungen zwischen den britischen 

(Robbins, von Hayek), italienischen (Einaudi), deutschen bzw. schweizerischen 

(Röpke, Rappard), französischen (Rueff, Baudin) und spanischen (de Madariaga) 

neoliberalen Föderalisten nachweisbar, teils durch die FU, teils durch den MFE 

vermittelt, teils aber auch außerhalb dieser Strukturen. 

3.1. Das Verhältnis der Wirtschaftsverfassung und der politischen Strukturen 

einer Staatenföderation 

Der durch von Hayek noch vor Kriegsbeginn ausführlich dargelegte Zusammenhang zwischen 

den Wirtschaftsformen und den politischen Strukturen einer Staatenföderation 

gewann in den Arbeiten seiner neoliberalen Kollegen in Großbritannien, Frankreich, der 

Schweiz und Italien große Bedeutung, nachdem sich für die Liberalen die Frage der wirtschaftlichen 

Neuordnung nach dem Krieg und der Wiedererrichtung liberaler politischer 

Strukturen auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene stellte. Die These, daß die Wirtschaftsverfassung 

und die politischen Strukturen in einer Staatenföderation wie auf der Ebene des 

Nationalstaates in einem strengen Zuordnungsverhältnis stünden, wurde von Röpke 1944 in 

eine griffige Formulierung gefaßt: Die Antithese zwischen Marktwirtschaft und Kollektivismus 

setzte sich auf dem Gebiet der internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in die Antithese 

zwischen Weltwirtschaft und kollektivistischer Großraumwirtschaft um. 

“Weltwirtschaft ist nichts anderes als die marktwirtschaftliche Form und Großraumwirtschaft 

nichts anderes als die kollektivistische Form der internationalen Wirtschaftsverfassung, 

und in beiden Fällen muß die Form der internationalen Wirtschaftsverfassung der 

nationalen entsprechen: die Weltwirtschaft der Marktwirtschaft, die Großraumwirtschaft 

dem Kollektivismus auf der ganzen Linie, d.h. nach außen wie nach innen”. 59 

In der Frage nach der Form, in der eine echte Weltwirtschaft möglich wäre, schloß 

Röpke 1944 (wie in seinen Aufsätzen vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg) einen vollendeten 

Weltstaat als unwahrscheinlich aus und trat für einen multilateralen und freien internationalen 

Wirtschaftsverkehr der Staaten ein, für eine weltweite Markt-, Preis- und Zahlungsgemeinschaft. 

Was die in diesem Rahmen möglicherweise entstehenden Staatenföderationen 

für einzelne Gebiete oder Staatengruppen anbelangt, hob Röpke die gegenseitige 

Zuordnung von Marktwirtschaft – nationalem und internationalem Föderalismus – Weltwirtschaft 

hervor, die mit dem einzelstaatlichen wie dem überstaatlichen Kollektivismus 

nicht vereinbar wären, da dieser die Föderation sprengen würde. 60 

58. Der Bericht ordnet die verschiedenen Beiträge nicht den jeweiligen Votanten zu. Abgesehen vom 

Zeugnis dieses Treffens sind meines Wissens in Rueffs Bibliographie keine Schriften über Föderationskonzepte 

aus der Zeit während des Zweiten Weltkrieges überliefert. 

59. W. RÖPKE, Wirtschaftsverfassung und politische Weltordnung, in: Friedens-Warte, 43(1943), 

S.30 f.; W. RÖPKE, Civitas Humana, Erlenbach-Zürich, 1944, S.387. 

60. W. RÖPKE, Von alten zu neuen Wirtschaftsformen, in: Neue Schweizer Rundschau, Neue Folge, 

11(1943), S.87 f.


Die dichotomische Gegenüberstellung von Marktwirtschaft – Staatenföderationen 

einerseits und Kollektivismus – Großräumen andererseits gipfelt in der Gegenüberstellung 

einer Friedensordnung und einer von Spannungen und kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen 

geprägten Wirtschafts- und Staatsordnung, der kein dauerhafter Bestand beschieden 

wird. 61 Die Beschränkung der föderativen Gewalt auf eine eng definierte Anzahl Aufgaben 

in der europäischen Föderation Einaudis ließe sozialistische Wirtschaftsplanung und 

ökonomische Zentralisierung ebenfalls nicht zu. 62 Mit Blick auf eine Mitgliedschaft der 

Sowjetunion in einer europäischen Föderation schloß sich Robbins von Hayeks These an 

und stellte fest, die totalitäre Diktatur als Regierungsform sei mit der Föderation freier 

Völker inkompatibel. 63 Von Haberler sah die angemessene wirtschaftliche und politische 

Verfassung für sozialistische Staaten und für Staaten mit hochentwickeltem wirtschaftspolitischem 

Interventionismus nur in einer vollständigen ökonomischen und politischen 

Vereinigung, um aus der Arbeitsteilung maximale Vorteile zu ziehen und Produktionspläne 

umsetzen zu können. Von Haberler zweifelte jedoch an der freiwilligen und friedlichen 

Errichtung eines derartigen Staates. 64 

3.2. Gesellschaftliches und kulturelles Europabild 

Während sich die Arbeiten neoliberaler Ökonomen zum Föderationsproblem vor dem 

Zweiten Weltkrieg auf die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte konzentriert hatten, erkannten die 

Neoliberalen in den Studien, die im Zweiten Weltkrieg entstanden, den außerökonomischen 

Bedingungen einer Staatenföderation eine vorrangige Bedeutung zu. So 

wurde das Verhältnis von ökonomischer und sozialer bzw. von ökonomischer und geistig-moralischer 

„Integration“ im Zusammenhang mit den Föderationskonzepten thematisiert. 

Im Unterschied zu den früheren Entwürfen wandten sich die neoliberalen Föderationskonzepte 

des Zweiten Weltkrieges dem gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen Bild 

Europas zu und setzten mit Hilfe des Instrumentariums der historischen und sozio-psychologischen 

Nationalismusforschung zu einer Definition der europäischen Identität an. 

Die Frage, ob die soziale Integration als Ergebnis der ökonomischen Integration angestrebt 

werden könnte oder ob die erstere die unabdingbare Voraussetzung der letzteren sei, 

entschieden Röpke, Robbins, von Hayek und von Haberler 65 in dem Sinne, daß die 

soziale und kulturelle Integration der ökonomischen vorangehen müßte, eine institutionelle 

Absicherung aber notwendig sei. Die Kontroverse zwischen den sog. „Realisten“ 

und den „Institutionalisten“ wurde nicht so einseitig zugunsten der „Realisten“ ausgetragen, 

wie die „Institutionalisten“ nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg es empfanden. Eine 

61. Dieser Vergleich greift auf die Augustinische Dichotomie der Civitas Dei und der Civitas diaboli 

zurück. W. RÖPKE, Civitas Humana, op.cit., S.391. 

62. L. EINAUDI, I problemi economici della federazione europea (1944), Milano, 1946, S.7. 

63. L. ROBBINS, The Economic Causes of War, London, 1939, S.106. 

64. G. von HABERLER, The Political Economy …, op.cit., S.342. 

65. G. von HABERLER, op.cit., S.339 f.; W. RÖPKE, International Economic Disintegration, London, 

1942, S.71-81; W. RÖPKE, Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart, Erlenbach-Zürich, 1942, 

S.379; L. ROBBINS, The Economic Causes of War, op.cit., S.106; F.A. von HAYEK, Der Weg 

zur Knechtschaft, Erlenbach-Zürich, 1945, S.292.

28 


institutionelle Lösung schien den neoliberalen Föderalisten angebracht, sofern sich die 

wirtschaftliche und politische „Integration“ innerhalb des Rahmens der gesellschaftlichen 

und kulturellen „Integration“ vollziehen würde. Dies bedingte, daß nicht nur die 

wirtschaftlichen, sondern auch die politischen und gesellschaftlichen Strukturen der Einzelstaaten 

und der Föderation(en) liberal wären, 66 und zwar liberal nach dem Konzept des 

erneuerten internationalistischen Liberalismus und nicht nach den Grundsätzen des 

laissez faire-Liberalismus des 19. Jahrhunderts. 

In Robbins', Röpkes, von Hayeks und Einaudis Föderationskonzepten der 

Kriegsjahre ist gegenüber ihren früheren Überlegungen eine Zurücknahme der 

Föderationskonzepte auf europäische Dimensionen zu beobachten. Nachdem sich 

Robbins in seinem Werk Economic Planning and International Order (1937) in 

erster Linie mit den Grundlagen einer Weltföderation befaßt hatte, verwarf er in 

einer nach dem Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkriegs vollständig überarbeiteten Veröffentlichung 

seiner Genfer Vorlesungsreihe vom Frühjahr 1939, The Economic 

Causes of War, und in seinem Beitrag Economic Aspects of Federation zum Sammelband 

Federal Union von 1940 eine Weltföderation als Utopie, 67 um stattdessen 

die Grundlagen einer europäischen Föderation zu erörtern. Röpke, der 1941/1942 

noch eine „Weltstaatengemeinschaft“ mit föderativer Struktur, 68 d.h. zusammengesetzt 

aus „regionalen und kontinentalen Untergruppen”, 69 unterstützt hatte, wandte 

sich 1943 von der Idee einer solchen „Weltstaatengemeinschaft” 70 bzw. einer 

„weltumfassend[en] Föderation” 71 ab und trat in der Folge für die Bildung von 

„Staatenföderationen“ als „Zwischenstufe zwischen dem Nationalstaat und der 

neuen internationalen Rechtsgemeinschaft“ ein. 72 Eine solche Staatenföderation 

wäre die „europäische Föderation“, der wiederum straffere „regionale Staatenföderationen“ 

(Skandinavien, Atlantikstaaten, Donauländer, Balkanländer u.a.) 73 untergeordnet 

wären. Während sich von Hayeks Studie von 1939 noch auf Streits Konzeption 

einer föderativen Union, bestehend aus den USA, Großbritannien, Irland, 

Kanada, Australien, Neuseeland, Südafrika, Frankreich, der Schweiz, Belgien, den 

66. W. RÖPKE, Internationale Ordnung, op.cit., S.64 f.; L. ROBBINS, The Economic Causes of War, 

op.cit., S.106; G. von HABERLER, The Political Economy …, op.cit., S.340-342. 

67. L. ROBBINS, The Economic Causes of War, op.cit., S.105; L. ROBBINS, Economic Aspects of 

Federation, in: M. CHANNING-PEARCE (Hrsg.), Federal Union (1940), London, 1991, S.184, 

Anm.1 und S.185. In einer im Januar 1939 verfaßten Anmerkung zu seinen Ausführungen über 

„Federation the only Remedy“ des Wintersemesters 1936/37 schränkte Robbins sein Föderationskonzept 

auf die westlichen Demokratien ein. L. ROBBINS, The Economics of Territorial 

Sovereignty, abgedruckt in: L. ROBBINS, The Economic Basis of Class Conflict and Other Essays, 

London, 1939, S.105, Anm.1. 

68. W. RÖPKE, Wende der Weltwirtschaft, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) 30.5.1941, Nr.832; W. 

RÖPKE, Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart, op.cit., S.378. 

69. W. RÖPKE, Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart, op.cit., S.378. 

70. W. RÖPKE, Civitas Humana, op.cit., S.389. 

71. W. RÖPKE, Weltwirtschaft und internationale Geldordnung nach dem Kriege, in: Schweizer Monatshefte, 

22(1943), S.552. 

72. Ibid. 

73. W. RÖPKE, Internationale Ordnung, op.cit., S.63.


Niederlanden, Dänemark, Norwegen, Schweden und Finnland, 74 bezogen hatte, 

hielt er es am Ende des Krieges für sinnvoller, einen verhältnismäßig engen Zusammenschluß 

in einem Föderativstaat zunächst auf ein kleineres Gebiet, einen Teil 

Westeuropas, zu beschränken und erst sukzessive auszudehnen. 75 Dieser Kern 

eines europäischen Föderativstaats würde auf gemeinsamen Grundlagen in der 

Kultur, den Weltanschauungen und dem Lebensstandard aufbauen. Im März 1945 

glaubte Einaudi den Augenblick gekommen, „das Unmögliche zu wollen“ und die 

Föderation Europas zu verwirklichen, nachdem diese Lösung im Sommer 1940 

noch als Ergebnis eines sehr langen Prozesses erschienen war. 76 Einaudi hatte 

schon in seiner Flugschrift vom September 1943 und in seinem Essai von 1944 

nicht mehr von einer „Weltföderation“ gesprochen. 

Hatten die Realisierungschancen eines weltumspannenden Bundesstaates in 

den theoretischen Entwürfen der Zwischenkriegszeit noch keine vorrangige Bedeutung 

innegehabt, so zwang die unmittelbare Aufgabe, eine konkretisierbare Neuordnung 

der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen für die Nachkriegszeit vorzuschlagen, zur 

Ausrichtung nicht nur auf die theoretische Wünschbarkeit, sondern auch auf die 

praktische Machbarkeit. 

Zur geographischen Redimensionierung der neoliberalen Föderationskonzepte 

hatte das definitive Scheitern des Völkerbundes wesentlich beigetragen. Für die auf 

dem europäischen Kontinent verbliebenen neoliberalen Nationalökonomen spielte 

die Konfrontation mit den kriegsentscheidenden außereuropäischen oder als außereuropäisch 

empfundenen Großmächten, insbesondere mit den Vereinigten Staaten 

von Amerika und den von ihren Repräsentanten vorgebrachten Europaplänen, eine 

entscheidende Rolle. Das Bewußtsein, daß sich die machtpolitische Abdankung 

Europas – und zwar nicht des „neuen Europas“ der Goebbelsschen Propaganda, 

sondern des „Abendlandes“, des „alten Kontinents“ – vollziehe, 77 und das Bestreben, 

Europa gegenüber der „jüngeren Nation“ (USA) abzugrenzen, sind als Motivation 

erkennbar, die bei Röpke und Einaudi zur Konzentration ihrer Bemühungen 

auf Europa geführt hat. 78 Die Großraum-Ideologie und die nationalsozialistische 

Europa-Propaganda, die nach dem Sieg über Frankreich in staatlichen Planungen 

74. C. STREIT, op.cit., S.6 f. 

75. F.A. von HAYEK, Der Weg zur Knechtschaft, op.cit., S.292. 

76. L. EINAUDI, Die Föderationsidee vor einem Vierteljahrhundert und heute, in: Neue Schweizer 

Rundschau, Nr.11, März 1945, S.660; L. EINAUDI, The Nature of a World Peace, in: Annals of 

the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 210(1940), S.66. 

77. Zur zeitgenössischen Diskussion um die Abgrenzung der „europäischen“ von der „amerikanischen“ 

Kultur: A. KELLER, Der Kampf der Kontinente, in: NZZ, 6.6.1943, Nr.892; Redaktion 

NZZ, Gedanken über eine „Neuorganisation der Welt“, in: NZZ, 13.11.1943, Nr.1787; E. 

SCHÜRCH, Unsere Friedensvorbereitungen, in: NZZ, 14.12.1943, Nr.2014; Redaktion NZZ, 

Staat und Wirtschaft in den Vereinigten Staaten, in: NZZ, 28.2.1944, Nr.346; Redaktion NZZ, 

Amerikas und Europas Beiträge zum Wiederaufbau der Welt, in: NZZ, 27.5.1944, Nr.897; H.-R. 

SCHWYZER, Besinnung auf Europa. Rezension von G. de Reynold, La formation de l'Europe, 

1944, in: NZZ, 20.3.1945, Nr.481. 

78. W. RÖPKE, Internationale Ordnung, op.cit., S.57 f. 

Einaudis Argumentation setzte bei der ökonomischen Abdankung der neben den USA „klein“ gewordenen 

europäischen Nationalstaaten (Frankreich, Italien und Deutschland eingeschlossen) an.

30 


zur Schaffung einer „europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft“ oder eines 

„Europäischen Staatenbundes“ Gestalt annahm, 79 boten die unmittelbare Herausforderung, 

eine liberale Antwort vorzubereiten, die sowohl auf Europa bezugnehmen 

als auch die Einbindung in die Weltwirtschaft gewährleisten würde. Die auf 

weltweite, „internationale Integration“ angelegten neoliberalen Föderationskonzepte 

der Zwischenkriegszeit wurden daher nicht der europäischen „regionalen 

Integration“ geopfert, sondern mit dieser verknüpft: Röpke bezeichnete eine föderative 

„Block”-Bildung als „offen”, 80 insofern als dieser „Block“ (Röpke) mit den 

anderen Staaten der Welt in einer liberalen Markt-, Preis- und Zahlungsgemeinschaft 

vereint wäre. Das liberale System eines multilateralen und freien Wirtschaftsverkehrs 

sollte nicht bloß auf „regionaler“ Basis wie in einer europäischen 

Föderation, sondern auch international Geltung erlangen. Mit der auf Multilateralität, 

einem internationalen Währungssystem und einer konformen Handelspolitik 81 

beruhenden Weltwirtschaft, die an den Rahmen einer internationalen Rechtsordnung 

und des dazugehörigen Normensystems gebunden ist, verfochten Röpke, 82 

Rüstow, 83 Robbins 84 und von Haberler 85 die Alternative „Kollektivismus – laissez 

faire“ in den wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen der Staaten oder Föderationen zu überwinden. 

Die auf marktwirtschaftlichen Prinzipien gründende weltwirtschaftliche 

Ordnung war dabei nicht als Kompromiß zwischen internationalem Kollektivismus 

und internationalem laissez faire gedacht, sondern als ein tertium, als eine dritte 

Möglichkeit, die weder mit dem Kollektivismus noch mit dem laissez faire etwas 

gemeinsam haben würde. 

Robbins und Röpke beobachteten im Verlauf des Zweiten Weltkrieges, daß sich die 

Entstehung eines gemeinsamen europäischen Bewußtseins abzeichnete, 86 das auf der 

Umwandlung des Nationalgefühls beruhte und Grundlage einer Art von „europäischem 

Patriotismus“ (Röpke) werden könnte. In seinem Entwurf zur Studie The Economics of 

International Federation (31.10.1939) ging Röpke von der Überlegung aus, daß für die 

politische „Integration“ echte Leidenschaft notwendig sei und zwar eine Art von 

„europäischem Patriotismus“, da Leidenschaften und Gefühle stärker seien als ökonomi- 

79. W. LOTH, Rettungsanker Europa? Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen vom Dritten Reich bis zur 

Bundesrepublik, in: H.-E. VOLKMANN (Hrsg.), Ende des Dritten Reiches – Ende des Zweiten 

Weltkriegs, Serie Piper 2056, München, 1995, S.201-204. 

80. W. RÖPKE, Die internationale Wirtschaftsordnung der Zukunft, Pläne und Probleme, in: Schweizer 

Monatshefte, 22(1942), S.375. 

81. Die konforme Handelspolitik beschränkt sich auf eine maßvolle Schutzzollpolitik im Gegensatz 

zur nichtkonformen Handelspolitik (Kontingents-, Clearings- und Monopolpolitik). 

82. W. RÖPKE, Die Lehre von der Wirtschaft (1937), 2., unveränderte Auflage, Erlenbach-Zürich, 

1943, S.45 ff.; W. RÖPKE, Civitas Humana, op.cit., S.389. 

83. A. RÜSTOW, Nachwort zu W. RÖPKE, International Economic Disintegration, op.cit., 

S.274-278. 

84. L. ROBBINS, Economic Planning …, op.cit., S.247; L. ROBBINS, Economic Aspects of Federation, 

op.cit., S.185. 

85. G. von HABERLER, The Political Economy …, op.cit., S.340-342. 

86. L. ROBBINS, The Economic Causes of War, op.cit., S.106; W. RÖPKE, The Economics of International 

Federation, Projektskizze, Genf, 31.10.1939, in: IUHEI, 40ème anniversaire 1927-1967, 

Genf, 1967, S.95; W. RÖPKE, Internationale Ordnung, op.cit., S.56.


sche Interessen und die wirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen einer Föderation ertragen ließen. 

Die Grundlagen des europäischen Patriotismus sahen Röpke und Robbins im europäischen 

patrimonium, dem gemeinsamen kulturellen Erbe Europas. An eine gemeinsame 

gesprochene Sprache (vgl. Herder, Fichte, Meinecke) konnte das europäische Bewußtsein 

nicht unmittelbar anknüpfen, jedoch an die gemeinsamen Werte, die durch die griechische 

und römische Kultur, die christliche und aufklärerische Tradition vermittelt wurden und in 

der humanistischen Bildung vereint waren. Mit Humanität und Toleranz, Vernunft und 

Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und religiöser Ehrfurcht wurde von Robbins und Röpke der 

Kanon der europäischen Werte beschrieben, die sich in gemeinsamen Gewohnheiten und 

einer bestimmten europäischen Lebensart ausdrückten. Röpke zog zur Bestimmung des 

europäischen Bewußtseins den Begriff der „Schicksalsgemeinschaft“ heran, der in der 

Literatur der deutschen Romantik ein Topos dargestellt hatte und von Otto Bauer in die 

Nationalismus-Forschung eingeführt worden war. 

Hatten Hayes und Katz auf die Abgrenzung von den Anderen und auf die einigende 

Wirkung eines gemeinsamen Feindes als Bedingung für die Herausbildung 

des Wir-Gefühls bei den Angehörigen einer Nation hingewiesen, so erkannten 

Röpke und Robbins im Kampf gegen den „Totalitarismus“ und in der gemeinsamen 

Erfahrung der Leiden des Krieges eine Chance für die Herausbildung der 

europäischen Identität. 87 De Madariaga sah im Rahmen seiner Studie für das 

Federal Union Research Institute die Schaffung eines permanenten Rates der Föderation 

vor, dem die Überwachung der Erziehung und Bildung obliegen sollte. Eine 

auf die „supernationale“ Identität ausgerichtete Erziehung und Bildung wäre mittels 

Radio, Film, Zeitungen und Theater zu fördern. 88 Der Zweck einer europäischen 

Föderation läge nach Einaudi in der Förderung des kulturellen und geistigen 

Lebens der einzelnen Glieder, da die Menschen durch die wirtschaftliche Vereinigung 

vom Materiellen befreit und nicht etwa versklavt würden. 89 Anhand des Beispiels 

der Kantone der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der amerikanischen 

Bundesstaaten zeigte Einaudi auf, daß die Befürchtungen der Gegner des 

Föderalismus unbegründet seien, wonach in einer europäischen Föderation die 

nationalen Kulturen, ihre geistigen Werte, ihre Forschung, ihre Literatur, Musik 

und Kunst untergehen müßten und das kulturelle und intellektuelle Leben auf diejenigen 

Orte beschränkt sein würde, die zugleich Schwerpunkte wirtschaftlicher 

Entwicklung wären. 

Im kulturell definierten Europa Röpkes, Robbins‘ und Einaudis sollte Deutschland 

unverzichtbares Mitglied sein, wäre der Nationalsozialismus erst einmal „ausgerottet“ 

und hätten sich die Deutschen vom Totalitarismus geläutert. Großbritannien, gegen des- 

87. C.J.H. HAYES, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (1931), New York, 1963, S.161 

f.; D. KATZ, The Psychology of Nationalism, in: J.P. GUILFORD (Hrsg.), Fields of Psychology, 

New York, 1940, S.163–181; L. ROBBINS, The Economic Causes of War, op.cit., S.109; W. 

RÖPKE, The Economics of International Federation, op.cit., S.96; W. RÖPKE, Internationale 

Ordnung, op.cit., S.57-61. 

88. S. de MADARIAGA, Note on Federal Powers over Education, in: Federal Union Research Institute, 

Second Annual Report, London, 1941. 

89. L. EINAUDI, I problemi economici …, op.cit., S.110.

32 


sen Mitgliedschaft Robbins und Einaudi auch keine Einwände gelten ließen, stand in 

Röpkes Föderationskonzept die Führungsrolle zu, nachdem es sich durch seine Erfahrung 

mit dem British Empire, durch seine historische Rolle als ausgleichende Macht in 

Europa und Hüterin der Pax Britannica sowie durch seinen Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus 

zu dieser Aufgabe legitimiert hatte. 

3.3. Staatssouveränität und Nationalismus in der Einschätzung neoliberaler 

Föderalisten während des Zweiten Weltkrieges 

Röpke und Einaudi orientierten ihre Konzepte am Vorbild eines Föderativstaates 

wie der Schweiz, in dem die Eigenrechte der einzelnen Glieder respektiert werden. 

Die Voraussetzung für eine so geartete Föderation wäre nach Röpke und von 

Hayek 90 die föderative Umbildung der zentralisierten Staaten selbst, so daß sich 

schließlich die Glieder der Nation so verhalten würden wie die Nation zur „Übernation“. 

Die Aufgaben würden bei Röpke, Einaudi und von Hayek jeweils nach 

dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip zwischen den Gliedern der untersten Stufe und den 

jeweils umfassenderen Verbänden oder dem Bund verteilt, indem der größeren Einheit 

nur diejenigen Aufgaben zufallen, die sich für die kleineren Einheiten als zu 

universell erwiesen haben. 91 Röpke bezeichnete diese Föderation als „internationale 

Gemeinschaft“ und bestritt die Notwendigkeit einer „supranationalen Gemeinschaft“, 

da diese Struktur zu zentralistisch wäre und einer föderativen Durchgestaltung 

entgegenstünde. 92 Um den föderativen Charakter des Zusammenschlusses 

deutlich zu machen, sprach von Hayek von einer „Gemeinschaft von Nationen 

freier Menschen“ und nicht von einer „Vereinigung von 'freien Nationen'”. 93 

Dem Verlangen der Einzelstaaten nach Selbständigkeit kam von Hayek entgegen, 

indem er ihnen die Autonomie in inneren Angelegenheiten beließ und der Föderation nur 

ein „Minimum an Befugnissen“ zugestand. Von Hayek beschrieb 1945 die Befugnisse 

der Föderation als „im wesentlichen“ mit den „Befugnissen des ultraliberalen ‚Laissez-faire‘-Staates” 

94 übereinstimmend. Aus dem Kontext gelöst, erweist sich dieser Vergleich 

als irreführend und widersprüchlich sowohl zu von Hayeks Föderationsentwurf 

von 1939 als auch zu seiner eigenen Kritik am laissez faire-Begriff und an den Anhängern 

eines extremen laissez faire-Prinzips im Weg zur Knechtschaft (1945). 95 Auf die Befugnisse 

des laissez faire-Staates rekurrierte von Hayek 1945 in Abhebung von den Befugnissen, 

welche dem Staat „in jüngster Zeit“ übertragen worden waren. Unter letzteren 

sind die staatlichen Lenkungsbefugnisse der Kriegswirtschaft, die keynesianische Wirtschaftspolitik 

und die Aufgaben des „Wohlfahrtsstaats“ zu verstehen. Die Befugnisse des 

laissez faire-Staates, welche von Hayek an die politische Instanz der Föderation übertra- 

90. F.A. von HAYEK, Der Weg zur Knechtschaft, op.cit., S.285-289. 

91. W. RÖPKE, Internationale Ordnung, op.cit., S.55; L. EINAUDI, I problemi economici …, op.cit., 

S.7; F.A. von HAYEK, Der Weg zur Knechtschaft, op.cit., S.288 f. 

92. W. RÖPKE, op.cit., S.55 ff. 

93. F.A. von HAYEK, Der Weg zur Knechtschaft, op.cit., S.287 und 291. 

94. Ibid., S.286. Hervorhebung MW. 

95. Ibid., S.111 und 37.


gen wissen wollte, sollten darauf ausgerichtet sein, wirtschaftliche Restriktionen aller Art 

zu verhindern. Damit ist gesagt, daß es einen Staat, der nicht handelt noch Eingriffe 

macht, nicht geben darf, 96 sondern dass „ein weites und unumstrittenes Gebiet für die 

Betätigung“ des Staates darin besteht, die Bedingungen für das Funktionieren des Wettbewerbs 

zu schaffen und Leistungen dort zu erbringen, wo kein echter Wettbewerb möglich 

ist. 97 4. Gemeinsamkeiten und Besonderheiten der Föderationskonzepte des 

liberalen Internationalismus und des nichtkommunistischen Widerstandes 

Die neoliberalen Föderationskonzepte aus Italien, Frankreich, Großbritannien und 

der Schweiz teilten mit den nichtkommunistischen Widerstandsgruppen in allen 

europäischen Ländern die Absage an den übersteigerten Nationalismus, die Wiederherstellung 

des Rechts und der Menschenrechte, den inneren Föderalismus 

gegen den zentralisierten Nationalstaat, die „freiwillige“ Föderierung der europäischen 

Völker gegen die „totale Zusammenfassung“ und die Beschränkung der 

nationalstaatlichen Souveränität. Wie fast alle nichtkommunistischen Widerstandsautoren 

bejahten die Neoliberalen in ihren Schriften während des Zweiten Weltkrieges 

die Teilnahme der Deutschen an einer europäischen Föderation nach dem 

Ende des NS-Regimes und gingen von der Freigabe der Kolonien bzw. der Öffnung 

ihrer Märkte aus. Mit ihrer wirtschaftlichen Kritik, die in der Kolonialpolitik weit 

höhere Kosten als Gewinne erkannte und den Imperialismus als mit der Vorstellung 

einer liberalen Gesellschaft und dem Liberalismus überhaupt unvereinbar 

erklärte, 98 stellten sich die Neoliberalen in die Tradition der angelsächsischen Liberalen, 

die im frühen 19. Jahrhundert den Erwerb von Kolonien bekämpft hatten. 

Die Entwürfe Einaudis, Robbins' und von Hayeks vom Ende des Ersten bis zum 

Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs hatten sich jedoch von der Mehrheit der zeitgenössischen 

Pläne abgehoben, insofern als sie die entschlossene Einschränkung der 

nationalstaatlichen Souveränität forderten und nicht nur eine Assoziation von Staaten 

unter behutsamer Begrenzung ihrer Souveränität. Von anderen nichtkommunistischen 

Föderationskonzepten, die während des Zweiten Weltkieges verfaßt worden 

waren, unterschieden sich die neoliberalen Entwürfe dieser Jahre, indem sie 

die Rückkehr zu marktwirtschaftlichen Wirtschaftsformen als Voraussetzung zur 

Föderierung Europas erachteten und der Sozialisierung in allen damals erörterten 

Formen entgegentraten. 

96. Vgl. ibid., S.111. 

97. Ibid., S.62. 

98. F.A. von HAYEK, Der Weg zur Knechtschaft, op.cit., S.276. R. HAUF, (Hrsg.), Denkschrift 2 des 

„Freiburger Kreises“, in: K. SCHWABE (Hrsg.), Gerhard Ritter, Ein politischer Historiker in 

seinen Briefen, Boppard, 1984, S.723 f. und 754; L. ROBBINS, The Economics of Territorial Sovereignty, 

in: L. ROBBINS, The Economic Basis …, op.cit., S.95 f.; L. ROBBINS, The Economic 

Causes of War, op.cit., S.73-78; W. RÖPKE, Internationale Ordnung, op.cit., S.78.

34 


5. Zusammenfassung und Schlußfolgerung 

Die neoliberalen Föderalisten vertraten 1918-1945 eine institutionell abgesicherte 

„liberale Föderation“ von Staaten als „Vollendung des liberalen Wirtschaftsprogramms“ 

(von Hayek) und wünschenswerte Alternative zur sozialistischen internationalen 

Planung. Die institutionelle Absicherung ging in ihren Konzepten über die internationale 

Zusammenarbeit hinaus, wenn auch unterschiedlich weit: Einaudi, Robbins 

und von Hayek bekannten sich zu einer „übernationalen Regierung“, wohingegen 

Röpke 99 zwar eine föderative „zwischenstaatliche Gemeinschaft“ nach dem Muster der 

Bundesstaaten Schweiz und USA befürwortete, nicht jedoch eine „supranationale 

Gemeinschaft“. Ein so oder ähnlich verstandener mittlerer Weg zwischen dem Modell 

der Konföderation und demjenigen der Föderation wurde von den britischen 

Föderalisten 100 in der Zwischenkriegszeit als in sich widersprüchlich beurteilt, als eine 

Lösung, die höchstens vorübergehenden Charakter haben und sich entweder zu einem 

Staatenbund oder einem Bundesstaat entwickeln würde. 

Die neoliberalen Föderalisten verfochten die These, daß Wirtschaftsformen und 

politische Strukturen in einem engen Zuordnungsverhältnis stünden. Aus dieser 

Beziehung, die bereits von Robbins und Röpke in früheren Arbeiten erkannt und 

durch von Hayek im Zusammenhang mit der Frage der Errichtung einer wirtschaftlichen 

Föderation weiter ausgearbeitet worden war, leiteten die neoliberalen 

Föderalisten die Entsprechung Marktwirtschaft – innerer/ äußerer Föderalismus – 

Weltwirtschaft ab. Zwischen diesen liberalen wirtschaftlichen und politischen 

Strukturen einerseits und Kollektivismus – Zentralismus – Großraumwirtschaft 

andererseits bestand ein unüberbrückbarer Gegensatz. Zollunionen forderten keinen 

Widerspruch heraus (Röpke), solange sie als Maßnahmen liberaler Handelspolitik 

eingesetzt würden, und wurden geradezu als Synonym für die „Föderation“ 

verstanden (Einaudi, von Hayek, Robbins). Der Gefahren hochprotektionistischer 

Zollunionen waren die Neoliberalen allerdings eingedenk. 

Die neoliberalen Föderationskonzepte zeichneten sich durch eine kosmopolitische 

Ausrichtung im Sinne des liberalen Internationalismus aus. Freiheit und Ordnung 

sollten durch einen Rahmen gesetzlicher Regelungen in der Föderation und 

durch ein internationales Rechtssystem für die weltweiten zwischenstaatlichen 

Beziehungen gesichert sein. Dem liberalen System eines multilateralen und freien 

Wirtschaftsverkehrs war nicht nur regionale, sondern internationale Geltung zugedacht. 

Wirtschaftspolitisch und gesellschaftlich sollten die Strukturen der Einzelstaaten 

wie der Föderation als ganzer liberal sein und zwar im Sinne des erneuerten 

internationalistischen Liberalismus. 

Nachdem die neoliberalen Föderalisten vom Ende des Ersten bis zum Beginn 

des Zweiten Weltkrieges die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte von föderativen Zusammen- 

99. W. RÖPKE, Wirtschaftsverfassung und politische Weltordnung, op.cit., S.33. 

100. M. CHANNING-PEARCE, Introduction, in: M. CHANNING-PEARCE (Hrsg.), Federal Union 

(1940), London, 1991, S.12; F. ROSSOLILLO, La scuola federalista inglese, in: S. PISTONE 

(Hrsg.), L’idea dell’unificazione europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale, Turin, 1975, 

S.74 f.


schlüssen untersucht hatten, wandten sie sich im Zweiten Weltkrieg den außerökonomischen 

Bedingungen einer Staatenföderation zu und erkannten der gesellschaftlichen 

und kulturellen Integration eine primordiale Bedeutung zu. Röpke, 

Robbins, Einaudi, de Madariaga und von Haberler, der allerdings eine europäische 

Föderation nicht unterstützte, befaßten sich mit dem gesellschaftlich-kulturellen 

Bild Europas und der Frage einer europäischen Identität. Sie erachteten die soziale 

und kulturelle Integration als Vorbedingung für die ökonomische Integration und 

wiesen auf die Notwendigkeit einer institutionellen Absicherung hin. 

Die wesentlichen Merkmale, welche die neoliberalen Föderationskonzepte miteinander 

teilten, sind aus dem gemeinsamen Diskurs der neoliberalen Wirtschaftswissenschafter 

hervorgegangen: das Zuordnungsverhältnis von Wirtschaftsformen 

und politischen Strukturen, die kosmopolitische Ausrichtung der Föderationskonzepte 

im Sinne des liberalen Internationalismus, der Primat der sozialen und kulturellen 

Integration vor der ökonomischen Integration und die Absage an das laissez 

faire in den internationalen Beziehungen. 

Dr. phil. Milène Wegmann 

Universität Bern

NOMOS Aktuell 

Früher Neoliberalismus und 

europäische Integration 

Der Neoliberalismus wird in dieser grundlegenden 

archivgestützten Arbeit als eine wirtschafts- und gesellschaftspolitische 

Konzeption und zugleich als ein 

System von Personen untersucht, die durch den 

Transfer von Ideen miteinander verbunden sind. Die 

Außenwirtschaftspolitik und die internationale Wirtschaftsordnung 

gehören zum Kern der neoliberalen 

Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik. Das interdisziplinär angelegte 

Werk ist die erste umfassende Studie zur neoliberalen 

Theorie der Interdependenz der Ordnung 

von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft auf nationaler, supranationaler 

und internationaler Ebene. Auf der Suche 

nach einer Neuordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 

brachten die neoliberalen Föderalisten 

1918-1945 eine spezifisch neoliberale Konzeption 

einer europäischen Föderation hervor. Nach dem 

Beginn des Kalten Krieges teilten die Neoliberalen in 

der Frage der europäischen Integration weiterhin gemeinsame 

Ziele und Prinzipien. Weil der Neoliberalismus 

einem »offenen System« entspricht, ließ die 

gemeinsame Grundhaltung jedoch aufgrund unterschiedlicher 

national geprägter Erfahrungs- und Erwartungshorizonte 

konkrete Entscheidungen für oder 

gegen die EWG zu. 


Früher Neoliberalismus und 

europäische Integration 

Interdependenz der nationalen, 

supranationalen und internationalen 

Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 

(1932 – 1965) 

2002, 574 S., brosch., 

49,– €, 84,– sFr, 

ISBN 3-7890-7829-8 

NOMOS

37 

Les origines italiennes du fédéralisme européen pendant 

la Seconde Guerre mondiale. 

Bertrand Vayssière 

La guerre de 1939-1945 tient une place particulière dans le renouvellement de la 

pensée fédéraliste. Elle est d'abord une manifestation des égoïsmes nationaux qui 

ne peuvent que déboucher sur des règlements de comptes, faute d'arbitrage juridique. 

Elle est ensuite une préfiguration du «grand nettoyage», logique espérée par 

toutes les tendances du fédéralisme de l'entre-deux-guerres. Suivant cette dernière, 

certains hommes commencent à envisager de nouveaux modes d'action au sein 

même de la Résistance. 

Ce sont les Italiens qui se montrent les plus prompts à formuler une définition 

ambitieuse du fédéralisme, à tel point qu'ils sont les premiers à mettre sur pied, 

avant même la fin de la guerre, une organisation susceptible de faire entendre leur 

voix. L'Italie apparaît donc bien comme un «laboratoire du fédéralisme militant», 

qui cherche à combiner théorie et impulsion politique. L'opération de «médiatisation» 

se fait au sein de la Résistance et dans l'exil, précisément dans cette Suisse 

neutre qui devient le refuge de nombreux Italiens vers la fin de la guerre. C'est dans 

le cadre de cet exil que les premiers contacts vont être établis en dehors de la communauté 

italienne, permettant au fédéralisme de franchir les frontières et ainsi 

d’acquérir une véritable dimension européenne. Cette dimension européenne est 

précisément la seule à même de faire comprendre l'originalité de l'idée fédéraliste 

au sein de la Résistance, et l'importance qu'elle a pu avoir après la guerre. Nous 

sommes ainsi en désaccord avec l'idée défendue par certains chercheurs, selon 

laquelle le fédéralisme ne trouve sa force doctrinale qu'à partir de 1945. 1 Certes, si 

l'on se réfère à l'exemple français, il est évident que la Résistance contrôlée peu à 

peu par de Gaulle a effacé les différences idéologiques d'un bloc que l'on veut 

monolithique, et opposé par nature à tout ce qui est fédéraliste. 2 En revanche, une 

étude de ce même courant dans le milieu de la résistance italienne y montre une 

vigueur exceptionnelle, 3 alors que l'on peut voir dans l'organisation du Movimento 

Federalista Europeo (1943) une préfiguration de l’Union Européenne des Fédéralistes, 

qui sera effectivement créée en 1946. 

A trop étudier l'activisme fédéraliste à l'intérieur des frontières nationales, il est 

difficile de donner les éléments de réflexion susceptibles de faire comprendre le 

1. Chr. REVEILLARD, Les tentatives de construction d'une Europe fédérée (l940-1954). Le fédéralisme 

européen contre les nations, Université de Paris, 1995, p.100. On trouve la même idée défendue 

par A. GREILSAMMER, Les mouvements fédéralistes en France de 1945 à 1974, Paris, 

Presses d’Europe, 1975, p.33. 

2. On peut en trouver une confirmation dans les souvenirs du résistant et fédéraliste H. FRENAY, La 

nuit finira, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1973, pp.254-257. 

3. Voir en particulier la thèse de P. GRAGLIA, L'europeismo nella lotta antifascista: il movimento 

di "Giustizia e Liberta" ed i federalisti di Ventotene (1929-1943), Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, Firenze, 

1988.

38 


renouveau et la place du fédéralisme européen dans l'après-guerre. On peut même 

dire, dans le cas français, que l'étude de l'idée fédéraliste sert bien souvent à illustrer 

sa nocivité et à justifier a posteriori l'apparente désaffection à son égard. Pour 

nous au contraire, l'idée fédéraliste a une place essentielle dans la Résistance, un 

«dénominateur commun» selon les mots de Norberto Bobbio, qui ne pouvait 

qu'éclore dans une période bouleversée. La guerre, combattue par les fédéralistes, 

sera cependant toujours revendiquée par eux comme étant l'une de leurs matrices, 

comme moteur de leur engagement à 1a détruire. 4 A l’image de la plupart des idées 

politiques qui se font entendre dans l'immédiat après-guerre en Europe, le fédéralisme 

s'élève sur un champ de ruines, s'insère dans une réalité guerrière et cette origine 

le marquera pour longtemps, en particulier dans ses difficultés à s’adapter au 

cadre politique inédit de la Libération, marqué par la Guerre froide. Il est donc intéressant 

de voir, à travers son élaboration, comment l’Europe devient une alternative 

politique à part entière, et de quelle manière les fédéralistes se préparent aux enjeux 

de l'après-guerre. L’étude de l'action des fédéralistes italiens pendant la guerre est 

donc un bon moyen d'aborder la naissance d'un véritable courant «scientifique» 

issu d'une pensée jusque-là brouillonne. Nous verrons aussi comment cette pensée, 

déterminée et modelée selon les circonstances d'une guerre totale, a dû s'adapter au 

cadre de la Libération. 

Les Archives Historiques des Communautés Européennes de Florence contiennent 

de nombreuses sources qui permettent d'éclairer les premiers balbutiements de 

la pensée fédéraliste au sein de la Résistance, notamment à travers une volumineuse 

documentation de diverses origines (fonds Walter Lipgens). Le fonds Altiero 

Spinelli éclaire les motivations et le parcours du plus bouillant des fédéralistes ainsi 

que son activité fébrile, dont on peut sentir l'intensité à travers sa correspondance, 

ses écrits ou ses rapports, ainsi que son rôle dans la rédaction du premier document 

politique du fédéralisme européen de la Résistance, le Manifeste de Ventotene. Ces 

travaux permettent également de mesurer l'apport intellectuel et l'impact de cette 

forte personnalité, dans une action qui se veut avant tout collective. 5 D'autres 

acteurs italiens ont laissé des souvenirs de leur action, dont certains se limitent à 

raconter un épisode de leur vie: c’est le cas par exemple du fédéraliste Luciano 

Bolis qui, dans Mon grain de sable, 6 raconte son arrestation par les fascistes à la fin 

de la guerre, et nous permet de comprendre l'importance de la Résistance dans son 

engagement fédéraliste. Concernant plus précisément l'action menée par les fédéralistes 

italiens en terre helvétique à partir de septembre 1943, de nombreuses 

4. «La guerre ne change pas substantiellement les problèmes de vie et de mort qu’il nous faut résoudre. 

Mais elle précipite, elle accélère furieusement leur évolution, elle transforme en un processus 

paroxystique ce qui normalement se serait étalé sur un grand espace de temps, et elle change avec 

une extraordinaire rapidité les conditions de réalisation historique», J. MARITAIN, L’Europe et 

l'idée fédérale, Mame, Paris, 1993, p.51 (texte écrit en 1940). 

5. Voir l'autobiographie d'A. SPINELLI, Come ho tentato di diventare saggio. La goccia e la roccia, 

Il Mulino, Bologna, 1987. 

6. L. BOLIS, Il mio granello di sabbia, Einaudi, 1946; éd. française, Mon grain de sable, La Fosse 

aux Ours, Lyon, 1997.

Les origines italiennes du fédéralisme européen 39 

recherches ont été menées outre-Alpes, 7 qui continuent actuellement sous la houlette 

du professeur Luigi V. Majocchi au Département d'Histoire de l'Université de 

Pavie, grâce à l'ouverture d’archives inédites de certains des acteurs fédéralistes italiens, 

telles que celles de Guglielmo Usellini. 8 Enfin, il faut revenir aux Archives de 

Florence pour tout ce qui touche à l'organisation du premier mouvement fédéraliste 

européen dans l'après-guerre, l'Union Européenne des Fédéralistes, dont le fonds 

est riche de plus de deux cents dossiers. 

1) Le Manifeste de Ventotene: 9 genèse et enseignements. 

Les Italiens sont-ils les initiateurs du militantisme fédéraliste, tel qu'il va s'imposer 

à l'issue du conflit? On aurait tendance à le penser en étudiant les textes qu'ils font 

alors circuler, au premier chef le Manifeste de Ventotene, l'organisation clandestine 

qu'ils mettent en place dans leur pays, et enfin les liens qu'ils tissent autour d'eux 

avant même la fin de la guerre. Il est vrai que les réflexions italiennes sur un éventuel 

Etat européen s'appuient sur un héritage d'avant-guerre conséquent. L'un des 

auteurs les plus revendiqués par les fédéralistes italiens dès le début du conflit est 

l'un de leurs compatriotes, Luigi Einaudi, futur président de la République. Ce dernier 

avait écrit dès 1918, dans le Corriere della Sera, deux articles virulents contre 

«l'internationalisme bâtard» que mettait en place la Société des Nations, système 

incapable de résoudre les problèmes européens et ne pouvant empêcher, par conséquent, 

l'exaspération de conflits non réglés. 10 Il n'est pas anachronique de parler de 

ces textes, dans la mesure où ils sont connus des fédéralistes italiens de la 

Résistance, qui iront jusqu’à les faire publier dans la clandestinité, adoptant ainsi 

les points de vue de l'auteur qui, lui-même, adhère au Movimento Federalista Europeo 

dès sa création, en 1943. Les critiques de Luigi Einaudi sont d'ailleurs «intemporelles»: 

elles ne traitent pas précisément de la SDN, mais des problèmes que soulève 

tout type d'organisation internationale. D'après lui, la SDN est une mauvaise 

réponse à ces problèmes, dans la mesure où elle ne s’attaque pas au fond de la 

7. E. SIGNORI, La Svizzera e i fuorusciti italiani. Problemi e aspetti dell'emigrazione politica, 

1943-1945, Milano, 1983; R. BROGGINI, Terra d'asilo. I rifugiati italiani in Svizzera, 1943-1945, 

Bologna, 1993; F. POZZOLI, Il federalismo europeo organizzato in Svizzera 1943-1945, thèse, 

1994-95, Luigi V. Majocchi (directeur). 

8. Voir la thèse de C. R. MERLO, Guglielmo Usellini, un socialista-federalista rifugiato in Svizzera 

(dicembre 1943-maggio 1945), thèse, 1994-95, Luigi V. Majocchi (directeur). 

9. Le Manifeste ayant été publié maintes fois, nous nous contentons ici de signaler sa présence dans 

W. LIPGENS, Documents on the History of European Integration, vol.1, Continental Plans for 

European Union, 1939-1945, De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1985, pp.471-484. 

10. Luigi Einaudi a d'abord écrit, dans le Corriere della Sera, «La Società delle Nazioni è un ideale 

possibile?» (édition du 5 janvier 1918), puis, «Il dogma della sovranità e l'idea della Società delle 

Nazioni» (28 décembre 1918). Ces deux articles figurent également dans les Lettere Politiche publiées 

à Bari, en 1920, sous le pseudonyme de «Junius», puis sous son vrai nom dans La guerra e 

l'unità europea, Milano, 1948, réédité en 1950, qui contient les principaux écrits fédéralistes d'Einaudi 

datant de la période de 1918 à 1948.

40 


question, celui de la souveraineté nationale (premier article). C'est pourquoi 

Einaudi propose un autre modèle propre à résoudre les problèmes européens (et 

c'est sur ce chapitre que les fédéralistes italiens l'ont suivi), celui des Etats-Unis 

d'Amérique, c'est-à-dire celui de l'intégration institutionnelle. Le deuxième article 

est dans la continuité du premier, dans la mesure où il donne les raisons qui rendent 

nécessaire l'unification européenne: il s'agit de l'interdépendance économique 

croissante des Etats entre eux, qu'en bon libéral il juge plus forte que les réalités 

politiques nationales. On peut comprendre l'importance accordée par les fédéralistes 

à ces textes qu'ils vont en grande partie récupérer, dans la mesure où, pour 

la première fois, les raisons de l'unité européenne ne ressortissent pas exclusivement 

d'un point de vue moralisateur ou pacifiste, mais d'une véritable discussion 

critique permise par les incohérences de la SDN. 11 

Le Manifeste de Ventotene peut faire comprendre les caractéristiques principales 

du fédéralisme «de guerre». L'une des raisons essentielles en est qu'il a systématiquement 

été revendiqué par les fédéralistes eux-mêmes comme l'acte de naissance 

de la vocation politique du fédéralisme, de même que son principal initiateur, 

Altiero Spinelli, est reconnu comme l'une des personnalités fédéralistes les plus 

actives de l'après-guerre. L'autre raison en est que le Manifeste de Ventotene, outre 

les avancées doctrinales qu'il représente dans les domaines politiques et sociaux, 

marque un changement majeur dans la perception fédéraliste du monde, qui ne peut 

être séparé des conditions dans lesquelles il a été écrit: œuvre clandestine, rédigée 

dans les geôles mussoliniennes en 1941, il fait le constat d'un monde qui a sombré 

à nouveau dans les affres de la guerre, entraîné par la mécanique guerrière du nationalisme. 

On ne peut comprendre l'impact de ce document dans les cercles fédéralistes, ni 

même sa nouveauté, si l'on a pas à l'esprit ce qu'était le fédéralisme avant la guerre, 

alors représenté par des mouvements hétéroclites repoussant d'eux-mêmes l'appellation 

de «fédéralistes». 12 Or, le Manifeste de Ventotene, bientôt suivi par divers 

textes comme la Déclaration des Résistances européennes (juillet 1944), lui aussi 

d'origine italienne, revendique le cadre européen comme étant nécessaire pour 

mener une réforme radicale dans les domaines politiques et sociaux. Ce texte, 

même s'il faut lui reconnaître une certaine confidentialité, marque l'introduction, 

dans le débat politique, d'un européisme plus militant, constat à la fois d'un sentiment 

d'échec et d'une volonté d'en sortir, moule multiforme dans lequel se reconnaissent 

tous ceux qui veulent réformer une société jugée «selérosée». 

Le Manifeste de Ventotene est rédigé par Altiero Spinelli en collaboration avec 

Emesto Rossi, professeur d'économie, et avec le socialiste Eugenio Colorni, rédac- 

11. La SDN sert également de point de départ à une autre réflexion de type fédéraliste de deux auteurs 

italiens, Giovanni Agnelli (fondateur de la FIAT) et Attilio Cabiati qui, dans Federazione Europea 

o Lega delle Nazioni?, Torino, 1918, reprochent à la SDN les mêmes défauts qu'Einaudi, plus précisément 

la nullité du Tribunal Suprême, et appellent encore plus fortement que lui à la mise en 

place de la Fédération européenne. 

12. Pour Christophe Réveillard, le fédéralisme de l'entre-deux-guerres «conservait un caractère de 

confidentialité affirmée et impliquait la cooptation», op.cit., p.13.


teur en chef de l'Avanti. Spinelli est un «militant-né»: très jeune, il entre dans l'activité 

clandestine antifasciste du Parti communiste italien dont il devient secrétaire 

des Jeunesses pour l’Italie centrale. Le 3 juin 1927, il a seulement 20 ans lorsqu'il 

est arrêté par la police mussolinienne, et condamné à 16 ans et 8 mois de prison par 

le Tribunal spécial fasciste (Tribunal de Sûreté de l'Etat). Après 10 années de prison, 

malgré quelques lois d'amnistie, il est maintenu en détention au printemps 

1937 à Ponza, 13 avant d'être transféré en juin 1939 sur l'île de Ventotene. Mais en 

1935, la rupture est consommée, à l'occasion d'une réunion clandestine du parti à 

Ponza, où Spinelli se refuse à prendre partie contre Zinoviev, Kamenev et Boukharine, 

accusés d'être des espions. Cette rupture n’est pas seulement motivée par des 

raisons conjoncturelles: il y a également à ce moment-là dans la démarche de Spinelli 

la recherche d'une nouvelle forme de pensée apte à satisfaire sa vision du 

monde, la quête d'une idéologie plus adaptée à ce qui ne peut manquer de naître de 

la guerre. Comme il l'explique lui-même dans une lettre à Albert Camus, qu'il 

espère gagner à son rêve fédéraliste au moment de la Libération: 

«J'ai abandonné l'optimisme historique du marxisme qui était sûr que l'humanité 

était guidée vers des buts toujours plus élevés par la Providence […]. Je suis arrivé à 

me persuader que toute l'activité de l'homme civilisé est une construction audace 

(sic) et frêle au-dessus d'un gouffre qui menace de l'engloutir continuellement». 14 

Cette vision plus pessimiste mais, selon lui, plus réaliste de l'avenir politique, il 

la recherche et semble la trouver à la lecture des fédéralistes britanniques des 

années 30 (Walter Layton, William Beveridge), ainsi que dans les Federalist Papers 

d'Alexander Hamilton, John Jay et James Madison. 15 Les Britanniques ont cependant 

eu plus d'importance, puisque Spinelli dit s'être inspiré, dans sa réflexion sur la 

crise de l'Etat national, des ouvrages de Lord Lothian et Lionel Robbins. 16 Mêmes 

Motivations chez Ernesto Rossi, qui lui aussi paie très cher son engagement antifasciste. 

Après avoir adhéré à l'Alleanza Nazionale du député libéral Giovanni 

Amendola, suite à l'assassinat de Matteotti (10 juin 1924), puis à l'association 

secrète Italia Libera, il s'exile en France en 1925, puis revient clandestinement en 

Italie à la fin de l'année, enseigne l'économie à Bergame et collabore à la Riforma 

Sociale de Luigi Einaudi. Arrêté en 1930 avec le groupe dirigeant de Giustizia e 

Libertà auquel il a adhéré, il est condamné à neuf ans de prison, qu’il effectuera du 

30 octobre 1930 au 12 novembre 1939, avant d'être exilé à Ventotene, où il rencontre 

Altiero Spinelli. 

Le contexte dans lequel a été décidée l'élaboration du Manifeste est important 

pour comprendre les motivations de ses auteurs: le document est, en effet, diffusé 

13. Regia Questura di Roma, acte du 25 février 1937 du Sig. Giudice di Sorveglianza, AS-142, Archivi Storici 

delle Comunità Europee (ASCE), Florence: prolongation faite le 17 du mois, et qui fixe son confinement 

à 5 ans sur l’îlot de Ventotene, car il est jugé «élément dangereux pour l'ordre de l’Etat». 

14. Lettera a Camus, 18 mars 1945, p.1, AS-7, ASCE. 

15. Ensemble des articles que ces trois hommes font paraître entre octobre 1787 et avril 1788 à l'occasion 

de la campagne de ratification du projet de Constitution des Etats-Unis, d'inspiration fédéraliste. 

16. Ph. KERR (Lord Lothian), Pacifism is not enough, Oxford University Press, Londres, 1935; L. 

ROBBINS, Economic Planning and international order, MacMillan Press, Londres, 1937.

42 


sous forme polycopiée sur le continent, dès juillet 1941, par l’intermédiaire 

d'Ursula Hirschmann, épouse de Colorni (et future femme de Spinelli), qui avait 

obtenu le droit de vivre à Ventotene avec son mari et ses filles, 17 d'Ada Rossi 

(femme d’Ernesto) et des sœurs de Spinelli, Fiorella et Gigliola. Il a pour titre 

«Pour une Europe libre et unie. Projet de manifeste». Il est édité clandestinement à 

Rome par Eugenio Colorni en janvier 1944, avec deux autres essais d'Altiero Spinelli, 

Les Etats-Unis d'Europe et les différentes tendances politiques, et Politique 

marxiste et politique fédéraliste, 18 sous le titre général «Problèmes de la fédération 

européenne». Le Manifeste a donc pu être lu et connu par certains milieux 

résistants pendant la guerre, mais seulement en Italie, à Rome ou à Milan et non à 

l'extérieur, comme le reconnaît Spinelli lui-même. 19 

Le travail de rédaction est partagé entre Spinelli, qui s'est chargé des problèmes 

de la crise de la civilisation occidentale, de l'unité européenne et du thème du «parti 

révolutionnaire» européen, et Rossi, aidé de Colorni, qui a rédigé la partie concernant 

la réforme de la société. Dans sa Préface à la première édition du Manifeste, le 

22 janvier 1944, Spinelli résume sa pensée concernant la manière de mettre en 

place la future structure politique européenne: «Partir du préalable que le premier 

objectif à atteindre, c'est celui d'une organisation unitaire dans le domaine international, 

jette une nouvelle lumière sur tous les problèmes». 20 Le texte lui-même, 

assez court (24 pages), se partage en trois moments forts: dans la première partie, 

intitulée «la crise de la civilisation moderne», les auteurs critiquent les 

Etats-nations devenus Etats-Moloch, «faiseurs de soldats» et briseurs des libertés 

individuelles. Face à cette «crise», la seule solution entrevue par les auteurs consiste 

à créer de toutes pièces «l'unité européenne» qui nécessite le recours à 

«l'action révolutionnaire». Enfin, cette action politique à grande échelle devrait permettre 

de mener à bien une tâche plus délicate, «la réforme de la société», qui consiste 

en un équilibre savant entre socialisme, largement revendiqué, et action individuelle, 

un peu à l'image du «socio-libéralisme» qui avait été défendu par le groupe 

antifasciste Giustizia e Libertà des frères Rosselli. On voit donc que la revendication 

fédéraliste s'accompagne d'une critique totale des cadres politiques nationaux 

ainsi que de la promesse d'une réforme générale des structures sociales. 

17. Voici comment Spinelli relate les «voyages» de sa future femme: «La chose était au point de vue 

matériel relativement facile, car vous deviez vous soumettre à une fouille corporelle et de vos valises, 

qui consistait [pour Ursula] à se faire enfermer par la police dans une pièce avec une vieille 

femme de ménage qui, au lieu de la fouiller empochait un gros pot-de-vin, et un quart d'heure après 

ouvrait la porte en annonçant que tout allait bien». A. SPINELLI, op.cit., p.316. 

18. Ces deux textes figurent dans leur intégralité dans W. LIPGENS, Documents, Berlin, New York, 

1985, vol.1, pp.484-492. 

19. «Je ne suis pas à même de connaître le degré de pénétration des écrits fédéralistes. Il faut tenir 

compte du fait qu'un seul papier illégal était lu par plusieurs personnes et que souvent on le copiait 

à la machine et on le polycopiait çà et là avant de le détruire. Ce qui est certain, c'est que les milieux 

antifascistes romains, milanais et turinois de 1943 connaissaient directement ou indirectement le 

Manifeste. Je ne sais pas si Silone le connaissait en 1942 en Suisse. Je ne crois pas que Trentin ait 

pu le connaître en France», Le Manifeste de Ventotene, in: Les Cahiers de Ventotene, Institut 

d’Etudes Fédéralistes Altiero Spinelli, Lyon/Ventotene, 1988, p.59. 

20. Ibid., p.13.


Le Manifeste insiste sur deux idées importantes, d'après les auteurs eux-mêmes: 

«La première était que la fédération n'était pas présentée comme un bel idéal […] 

mais comme un objectif dont il fallait hâter la réalisation, dès notre propre génération 

[…] la seconde idée significative consistait à dire que la lutte pour l'unité européenne 

allait créer une ligne de partage nouvelle entre les divers courants politiques, 

différent de celui du passé». 21 

C'est dans ces dispositions volontaristes que l'on s'éloigne le plus de «l'esprit 

intellectualiste» des européistes de l'entre-deux-guerres, par exemple d'un Julien 

Benda qui voyait dans l'unité européenne la «victoire de l’abstrait sur le concret». 22 

Avec ce message clair et ambitieux, les fédéralistes de la Résistance italienne parviennent 

à une phase plus mature, à une prise en compte plus rationnelle des possibilités 

de réorganisation politique du Vieux continent, où la notion de «révolution», 

dans son acception la plus complète, est clairement revendiquée. Créer un nouveau 

système exige de détruire l'ancien, et d'agir vite car cette issue est envisagée à court 

terme. 

Le Manifeste de Ventotene se termine ainsi par une invitation à l'action militante, 

une main tendue à ceux qui sont près à accepter ces idées, où qu'ils soient: 

«Par la propagande et par l'action, en cherchant à nouer, par tous les moyens, des 

ententes et des liens entre les divers mouvements qui vont très certainement se former 

dans les différents pays, il faut, dès à présent, jeter les bases d'un mouvement qui 

sache mobiliser toutes les forces pour donner naissance à la nouvelle organisation 

qui sera la création la plus grandiose et la plus novatrice établie en Europe depuis des 

siècles[…]». 23 

Les auteurs du Manifeste font donc un pari sur l'avenir, mais ils cherchent avant 

tout, pour des raisons pratiques, à créer un premier mouvement en Italie. 

2) Le Movimento Federalista Europeo, première forme d'organisation d'un 

fédéralisme militant. 

Ce mouvement est créé dès la chute du fascisme dans l'ensemble de la péninsule, et 

la nomination de Pietro Badoglio comme chef de gouvernement le 25 juillet 1943. 

Le Movimento Federalista Europeo est mis sur pied lors d'une réunion clandestine 

tenue à Milan les 27 et 28 juillet 1943, dans la maison du physicien Mario Alberto 

Rollier, que Spinelli avait rencontré en tant que militant du Partito d’Azione et qui 

avait été membre du parti fasciste jusqu'à ce que celui-ci adopte les premières lois 

antisémites. 24 On peut dire un mot du Partito d’Azione, dans la mesure où cette formation 

politique nouvelle joue un rôle important dans l'itinéraire d'une grande par- 

21. A. SPINELLI, Come ho tentato …, op.cit., p.312. 

22. J. BENDA, Discours à la nation européenne, Folio, Paris, 1992 (éd. Originale, NRF, Paris, 1933). 

23. Le Manifeste de Ventotene, op.cit., p.36. 

24. C. ROGNONI-VERCELLI, Mario Alberto Roltier, un Valdese federatista, Ed. Universitarie Jaca, 

Milano, 1991.

44 


tie des fédéralistes italiens. Celui-ci a été créé par les antifascistes Ferruccio Parri, 

Ugo La Malfa, Adolfo Tino, anciens de Giustizia e Libertà, qui publient leur premier 

manifeste en décembre 1941 et établissent un programme en sept points à 

Rome, le 4 juin 1942. Parmi ces sept points, on note l'abolition de la monarchie, la 

décentralisation, les nationalisations, la réforme agraire, le syndicalisme, la séparation 

de l'Eglise et de l'Etat. Le septième point porte sur la nécessité d'une Fédération 

européenne et c'est celui qui permet les rapprochements entre MFE et Partito 

d’Azione, qui se vérifie par l'adhésion de Spinelli et Rossi à ce dernier, en 1943. 

Parmi les personnalités présentes lors de la réunion de Milan, on peut repérer quelques 

futurs acteurs notoires du militantisme européen: les trois auteurs du Manifeste de 

Ventotene (qui ont été libérés au début du mois de juillet), Ursula Hirschmann, Franco 

Venturi, Guglielmo Jervis, Vindice Cavallera, Leone Ginzburg, Vittorio Foa, Enrico 

Giussani, etc. (au total 22 personnes). Difficile de trouver une véritable homogénéité 

politique parmi ces fondateurs, si ce n’est leur engagement dans la Résistance. La composition 

politique de cette première assemblée montre cependant que les idées 

défendues par le Manifeste de Ventotene commencent à être connues, suscitant l'adhésion 

ou, au moins, la sympathie de résistants italiens issus d'horizons politiques différents: 

en effet, parmi les 22 personnes présentes, 9 viennent, comme Rossi, Colorni et 

Spinelli, de Ventotene, 14 ont adhéré au Partito d’Azione, 3 sont ou vont devenir socialistes, 

et deux sont membres du Parti Républicain, alors que Spinelli, sa femme Ursula 

et sa sœur Fiorella se disent «sans parti». 25 Parmi les «thèses politiques» à la base du 

MFE, écrites par Spinelli à Ventotene et discutées lors de cette réunion de Milan, on 

trouve quelques principes directement inspirés du Manifeste: le désir d'aller jusqu'à 

l'écrasement du nazisme et de fonder par la suite une paix solide (point 1); la volonté de 

rompre avec les droits régaliens de l’Etat, présentés comme des moyens d'asservissement 

des individus au profit d'un Moloch jamais rassasié (point 2); le refus d'adopter 

une formule confédérale du type SDN ou Confédération germanique (point 3); la 

volonté de mettre en place une Fédération européenne avec tous les pouvoirs 

nécessaires (point 4); le désir de fonder cette Fédération en mettant d'emblée de côté les 

aspirations politiques des uns et des autres, celles-ci ne pouvant être satisfaites qu'une 

fois que la légitimité du nouvel Etat européen ne sera plus remise en cause (point 5); la 

nécessité d'agir vite par un vaste effort de propagande et d'information (point 6). 

Il faut bien insister sur le fait que les fédéralistes de la première heure se mettent 

en retrait de tout militantisme politique classique, ne faisant la différence qu'entre 

partis «progressistes» (plutôt de gauche à l'heure de la Libération, de toute façon 

ouverts aux problèmes européens) et «réactionnaires» (les partis qui ont collaboré, 

ceux qui montrent des réticences à tout type d'organisation du continent, parmi ces 

derniers les partis communistes). Cette attitude est à retenir dans le combat fédéraliste 

car elle permet au mouvement une souplesse qui fait passer l'objectif européen 

avant toute considération partisane. Même le socialiste Eugenio Colorni, qui a participé 

à la rédaction du Manifeste de Ventotene et à la création du MFE, démythifie 

la légende d'une Europe faite par le seul socialisme: 

25. A. SPINELLI, Come ho tentato …, op.cit., p.34.


«Nous savons par expérience que les sentiments chauvins et les intérêts protectionnistes 

peuvent facilement conduire au conflit et à la concurrence même entre deux démocraties; 

et il n'est pas dit qu'un Etat socialiste riche doive nécessairement accepter de mettre en 

commun ses propres ressources avec un autre Etat socialiste bien plus pauvre, par le seul 

fait que dans ce dernier est en vigueur un régime interne similaire au premier» 26 . 

Les motivations des fédéralistes italiens apparaissent à travers les articles de 

leur organe de presse, L'Unità Europea. Ce journal, dont le premier numéro paraît 

en mai 1943, est le principal organe de la pensée fédéraliste au sein de la 

Résistance italienne: les deux premiers tirages sont réalisés clandestinement à 

Rome sous la direction d'Ursula Hirschmann, Ada Rossi, Cerilo Spinelli et 

Guglielmo Usellini, puis à Milan (Mario Alberto Rollier), excepté le n°5 édité en 

Suisse. Tiré à 4.000 exemplaires en juin 1944, il passe en juin 1945 à 7.000 avant 

de devenir hebdomadaire à partir du 29 avril 1945 et ce jusqu'à la fin des années 

quarante, époque où il sera relayé par le nouveau titre du MFE, Europa Federata. 

Comme pour tout ce qui concerne la presse clandestine, faite dans l'urgence et 

donc avec un délai de réflexion très court, sans compter le manque de moyens, la 

valeur des articles de L 'Unità Europea est très inégale. Ces articles, bien souvent, 

se répètent et sont, bien entendu, anonymes (bien que l'on sache que la plupart ont 

été rédigés par Spinelli ou Rossi). Le message est à la fois simple et ambitieux: la 

possibilité pour le MFE de devenir un élément de liaison entre les différents partis 

démocratiques, sans pour autant être annexé par un parti («Movimento o Partito?») 

27 et, partant, d'influencer programmes et action («Le Tendenze Federaliste», 

où l'on insiste sur l'importance d'un «préalable fédéral» avant toute restauration 

démocratique). 28 Le terme «Révolution» revient le plus souvent, ainsi que la nécessité 

de s'insérer dans la politique concrète de chaque nation pour ensuite passer à 

l'échelle supérieure («Governo di Unione Nazionale o Politica Federalista»; 29 

«Intransigenza»). 30 En ce qui concerne la méthode, on trouve une première contradiction 

entre ceux qui se réfèrent au texte de Milan d'août 1943, souhaitant en passer 

par l'appel aux masses (bien que le mot «Constituante» n'apparaisse jamais dans 

ces 8 numéros, terme auquel on préfère pacte), 31 ceux qui croient en la seule bonne 

volonté des pays vainqueurs 32 et ceux qui s'en méfient. 33 Ce qui est clair, en revanche, 

c'est la nécessité d'abandonner les «mirages» du système confédéral de 

l’Europe «de Briand». L'ennemi, lui, est omniprésent, ne serait-ce que par les références 

à son rôle dialectique: c'est l'action destructrice du Nazisme-Fascisme qui va 

26. Eugenio Colorni, préface à l'édition clandestine des Problemi della Federazione Europea, janvier 1944. 

27. Titre d'un article de Guglielmo Usellini, futur secrétaire général de l'Union Européenne des Fédéralistes, 

(UEF), paru dans L'Unità Europea, n°2, août 1943. 

28. Article paru dans L'Unità Europea, n°1, mai 1943 (Altiero Spinelli). 

29. Ernesto Rossi, paru dans L’Unità Europea, n°4, janvier 1944. 

30. Altiero Spinelli, L’Unità Europea, n°3, septembre 1943. 

31. Il faut attendre l'intervention de Piero Calamandrei au second Congrès de l’UEF à Rome en novembre 1948 

pour que le terme «Constituante» devienne un des mots d’ordre principaux des fédéralistes italiens. 

32. Ainsi en est-il d'un l'article de l’Anglaise Edith Monroe, repris dans le n°4 de L'Unità Europea, où 

le Fédérateur pourrait être l’URSS. 

33. E. ROSSI, L'inghilterra e l'Italia, in: L’Unità Europea, n°3, septembre 1943.

46 


permettre le renouveau politique et social tant attendu. Ainsi, à propos de la mort 

d'Eugenio Colorni lors de la libération de Rome (juin 1944) est-il écrit, dans le n°5, 

«que parfois [Colorni] était même porté à mettre en avant, paradoxalement, les aspects 

positifs de la politique hitlérienne, dans la mesure où celle-ci allait renverser toutes ces 

absurdes souverainetés anachroniques de trente-deux Etats-nations qui divisaient notre 

continent». 34 

Dans le feu de l'action, les fédéralistes se soucient cependant encore peu des 

réactions des partis classiques, et cherchent d'abord à faire connaître leurs thèses. 

La dernière résolution prise à Milan concerne l'organisation du MFE, en Italie et à 

l'étranger: Mario Alberto Rollier est nommé responsable du mouvement à Milan et 

Eugenio Colorni à Rome, alors que Spinelli et Rossi sont chargés de faire connaître 

celui-ci hors des frontières italiennes. Les résolutions issues de la rencontre clandestine 

de Milan sont publiées en italien dans L’Unità Europea (septembre 1943). 

L'importance de la rencontre de Milan dans l'amorce d'un véritable activisme fédéraliste 

est résumée par Spinelli: d'après lui, la création du MFE doit donner le 

départ d'une alliance avec les fédéralistes «d'au-delà des Alpes». 

3) Le milieu fédéraliste en Suisse. 

Les idées du fédéralisme italien ont beau être ambitieuses, elles ne sont pour l'instant 

que l'apanage d'une minorité qui vit en vase clos. Dès le départ, les rédacteurs du Manifeste 

de Ventotene ont compris qu'elles devaient, pour survivre, être diffusées. Ce combat 

pour la reconnaissance débute dans le chaos d'une Libération incomplète, celle qui 

est opérée sur le territoire italien après la première chute de Mussolini (25 juillet 1943). 

Avec l'élargissement des principaux protagonistes fédéralistes, la diffusion de leurs 

idées hors des frontières devient possible. Le premier pays visé est la Suisse, ce qui 

s'explique par des raisons pratiques, en même temps qu'idéologiques. 

La Suisse est considérée comme un sanctuaire par les premiers fédéralistes. Cette terre 

est en effet hospitalière à ceux qui, dans l'exil que leur a imposé la guerre, réfléchissent à 

un nouvel ordre européen, et qui vont jusqu'à voir dans ce pays la préfiguration de ce que 

pourrait être une Europe fédérale. 35 Spinelli, en particulier, veut profiter de son exil pour 

34. Un grave lutto del MFE. L'assassinio di Eugenio Colorni da parte dei nazifascisti a Roma, in: 

L'Unità Europea, juillet 1944, n°5. 

35. C'est le cas des réfugiés français. Voir L. VAN VASSENHOVE, L’Europe helvétique: étude sur les possibilités 

d’adapter à l’Europe les institutions de la Confédération helvétique, La Baconnière, Neuchâtel, 1943; 

et R. SILVA, Essai sur la Suisse d'aujourd'hui, Lausanne, 1941, auquel on peut ajouter Au service de la Paix. 

L’Idée Fédéraliste, La Baconnière, Neuchâtel, 1946. Dans ce dernier ouvrage il écrit que «quoique sur un 

plan infiniment plus modeste [que les Etats-Unis, la Suisse] représente au centre d'une Europe morcelée l'idée 

fédéraliste qui a forcé le succès» (p.188). A noter que Luigi Einaudi a lui aussi profité de son exil en Suisse 

pour vanter les mérites du modèle helvétique, dans un texte écrit en 1943, «Di taluni insegnamenti della Svizzera 

nel momento presente» et publié dans La guerra e l’unità europea, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1986, pp.493 ss. 

On peut relever que les trois personnages cités dans cette note militeront tous, à des degrés divers, pour la Fédération 

européenne au sein de l'Union Européenne des Fédéralistes.


rassembler autour de lui ceux qui étaient déjà fédéralistes, ou «convertibles» au fédéralisme, 

et de réaliser ainsi l'espoir de propagande évoqué à la réunion de Milan. 36 

L'attraction de la Suisse est particulièrement ressentie par les Italiens, qui vont s’y 

réfugier en masse vers la fin du conflit. Bien sûr, ce rôle d'asile a déjà joué pour de nombreux 

antifascistes bien avant la guerre, comme, par exemple, pour Ignazio Silone, fixé à 

Zurich depuis l930, 37 où il mène une intense activité politique. Mais c'est surtout avec ce 

que les Italiens appellent le «Grand Exode» que sont réunies les conditions d'une véritable 

ébullition politique dans le milieu des réfugiés en Suisse. Ce «Grand Exode» s'accélère 

après la libération de Mussolini, alors détenu dans les Abruzzes, par un détachement de 

SS (12 septembre 1943). Comme dans tous les moments de panique, se mélangent les 

fuyards, quelles que soient leurs origines sociales; le 5 septembre, les douaniers suisses 

enregistrent l'entrée de la belle-fille et de la fille du maréchal Badoglio, les 8 et 9 septembre, 

c'est au tour de la princesse de Piémont, Maria José de Savoie, accompagnée de ses 

quatre enfants; au milieu du mois de septembre, on trouve de nombreux fédéralistes, 

parmi lesquels Ernesto Rossi (le 14 septembre à partir du poste-frontière d'Arogno) et 

Altiero Spinelli (le 15 septembre à partir de Gandria). L'afflux est alors si important que le 

Conseil fédéral suisse décide de fermer les frontières le 16 septembre mais, le 17, on enregistre 

encore 10.000 entrées et d'autres encore après, parmi lesquelles celle de Luigi 

Einaudi (22 septembre). 38 Pour des raisons de commodité, ces réfugiés sont regroupés 

dans le canton du Tessin, autour de Lugano, ce qui est une manière de les maintenir en 

dehors de la communauté suisse, puisqu'ils échouent tout près de la frontière. 

C'est dans cet îlot, si proche et si loin de la guerre en même temps, que vont s'opérer 

les premières actions des fédéralistes italiens, notamment en ce qui concerne le recrutement. 

Ce sont des Italiens de l'exil qui sont les premiers à être engagés dans le tout nouveau 

mouvement: c'est en Suisse que Spinelli va rechercher et obtenir l'adhésion de Luigi 

Einaudi, d'Ignazio Silone, du socialiste Leo Valiani et d'autres figures de la Résistance italienne 

réfugiées de l'autre côté des Alpes, ainsi que d'anciens fascistes ayant tourné le dos 

au régime alors en pleine radicalisation. Beaucoup des premiers adhérents au fédéralisme 

sont d'ailleurs concernés par ce rejet, faisant partie d'une génération qui n'a connu que les 

désillusions du Fascisme. 39 Il se crée donc en Suisse, sous la direction de Spinelli et Rossi, 

36. A. SPINELLI, Come ho tentato …, op.cit., pp.46 et 54. 

37. Entré au PSI en 1921, il a participé à la fondation du PCI, qu'il a représenté à la conférence internationale 

de Moscou, où il s'est exilé. Il quitte ce parti en 1930 pour venir s'installer en Suisse, où 

le rencontrent les fédéralistes. Sa première grande œuvre est Fontamara (1930). 

38. On possède quelques données précises sur ces entrées «sauvages» grâce aux notes de l'officier 

suisse Antonio Bolzani, chargé de l'accueil des réfugiés, qui tient un carnet dans lequel figurent 

185 noms et qu'il publie dans Oltre le rete, Milano, 1946. 

39. Pour le fédéraliste néerlandais Henri Brugmans, qui a rencontré ses homologues italiens dès la Libération, 

Luciano Bolis représente bien en ce sens un symbole: «Tout jeune, il avait été fasciste 

avec un enthousiasme sincère. Avec ferveur, il crut d'abord à la logomachie chauvine qui exaltait 

le sacrifice comme idéal […] Puis, comme d'autres, il avait été pris par ses premiers doutes et, chemin 

faisant, finit dans les rangs d'une clandestinité en armes […] Pouvait-on revenir à la situation 

des années 1920, qui avait vécu la décomposition des partis et des syndicats? Non, il fallait un programme 

novateur». H. BRUGMANS, A travers le siècle, Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 

Bruxelles, 1993, p.245.

48 


une petite communauté italienne active, qui fait découvrir et prospérer dans ce terreau des 

réfugiés les thèses fédéralistes. Ces dernières figurent dans les Quaderni del Movimento 

Federalista Europeo, qui publient dans un premier temps sur des feuilles polycopiées, 

puis sous forme d’opuscules d'environ 50 pages, les contributions de Rossi et Spinelli 

sous leurs pseudonymes respectifs (Storeno et Pantalone), ainsi que celles de tous ces 

auteurs britanniques que les deux italiens ont appris à connaître dans leur exil à Ventotene. 

En plus de cet exploit éditorial, il faut rappeler qu'en Suisse est publié le n°5 de L'Unità 

Europea, ainsi que certains opuscules destinés à une large diffusion au sein des exilés italiens. 

La chance des Italiens, pendant cette période suisse, est également d'avoir rencontré 

certains intermédiaires d'autres nationalités, qui ont permis aux idées fédéralistes 

d'emprunter des circuits variés. Cette activité fébrile n’est cependant pas appréciée par 

tout le monde. Le socialiste italien Piero della Giusta, de passage à Genève, rend ainsi 

compte du travail de Rossi dans son journal, à la date du 20 décembre 1943: 

«Son rendement moyen est de deux opuscules de 40-60 pages par mois […] Les 12 

Tables de la Fédération ont la couleur de l'exil et de l'isolement, et même le goût. 

Elles ont été conçues dans une atmosphère vraiment fébrile, irréelle et liée au confinement, 

où les rêves d'un avenir meilleur se fondent avec les espérances d'une justice 

plus proche, où l'action est toujours plus lointaine, où l'inaction allume les cerveaux 

dans des constructions et des reconstructions idéales, où les proportions et les mesures 

semblent se perdre dans les idéalisations juridiques les plus pures». 40 

Cependant, les fédéralistes arrivent à créer à Genève, ce même mois, un Centre 

d'action pour la Fédération Européenne (pris en charge par Rossi à partir de mars 

1944), la ville leur accordant l'accès à la bibliothèque imposante du Palais Wilson. 

C'est la première fois qu'une occasion est donnée aux fédéralistes de se faire connaître 

et, au-delà des premières désillusions et de la faiblesse des moyens dont sont 

conscients les propagateurs de cette idée, la période du «Grand Exode» leur donne 

une chance d'être entendus. Ainsi, l'historienne italienne Cinzia Rognoni-Vercelli 

signale quelques meetings importants tenus par les fédéralistes peu avant la fin de 

la guerre: le 3 février 1945 à Lugano (600 personnes), le 6 février à Lausanne, puis 

le soir à Vevey, devant une centaine d'étudiants en ingénierie, et le 7 février au 

camp de Travail de Cassoney (une centaine de personnes). 41 

On ne peut cependant oublier que cet effort touche essentiellement les Italiens, 

dont la réflexion sur la question est déjà bien avancée et dont les ressortissants sont 

les plus nombreux dans la Confédération, les Suisses restant étrangers à ces efforts. 

L'effet «médiatique» ne doit donc pas être surestimé, même s'il permet un premier 

contact. Comme le conclut l'historien Lubor Jilek, on peut dire que 

«c’est donc en tant qu'abri, par le biais des débats, des revues, et des bibliothèques 

que la Suisse permit à l'européanisme italien d'étoffer, en 1944-1945, le raisonne- 

40. P. DELLA GIUSTA, Diario, Milano, 1948, pp.14-15. Cet «idéalisme» a été brocardé par Christophe 

Réveillard en des termes assez semblables: «L'une des faiblesses de l'argumentation fédérale 

est la facilité à construire des systèmes, des plans logiques et ordonnés mais pas tous en phase avec 

les réalités psychologiques, sociales, politiques et géographiques du moment». Chr. RE- 

VEILLARD, op.cit., p.47. 

41. C. ROGNONI-VERCELLI, art.cit., pp. 136-137.


ment hamiltonien conçu à Ventotene dans le fragile espoir de pouvoir le faire connaître 

à l'échelle continentale». 42 

Nous allons maintenant étudier les actions lancées par les fédéralistes depuis la 

Suisse, les premières qui méritent véritablement le terme d'«européennes» étant 

donné qu'elles permettent d'établir des contacts qui vont déboucher sur une première 

organisation internationale au moment de la Libération. 

4) Par-delà les frontières. 

En effet, lorsque Rossi et Spinelli entrent clandestinement en Suisse, ils se retrouvent 

dans un milieu où le flux italien les condamne à l'anonymat et à la méfiance d'autorités 

qui interdisent toute réunion politique. Il faut donc sortir de ce «ghetto», matérialisé par 

le parcage des réfugiés dans certains camps dont il est difficile de s'échapper. Malgré 

quelques tentatives pour se faire connaître au nom de l'antifascisme, 43 les premiers mois 

sont assez décevants bien que se manifestent quelques sympathisants. Parmi ceux-ci, 

les premiers contacts non-italiens de Rossi et de Spinelli vont être décisifs par la suite: 

François Bondy, socialiste né en Autriche-Hongrie et qui a acquis la nationalité suisse, 

les Français Laloi et Jean-Marie Soutou, représentants officiels à Genève du Comité 

Français de Libération Nationale (devenu le 3 juin 1944 le Gouvernement provisoire de 

la République française) vont avoir un rôle décisif. C'est par leur intermédiaire que 

Rossi et Spinelli rencontrent le Secrétaire Général du Conseil œcuménique des Eglises, 

le néerlandais Willem Vissert’Hooft, et c'est dans la maison de ce dernier que se tiennent 

diverses réunions entre représentants de certains courants de Résistance intéressés 

par le thème du fédéralisme européen. Hooft avait déjà fait montre de son engagement 

pour dénoncer la barbarie nazie, que la hiérarchie des Eglises catholique et protestante, 

mis à part certains gestes isolés, s'était bien gardée de condamner, et il avait officiellement 

demandé que ces Eglises se prononcent en faveur d'une réorganisation de l'ordre 

international, dans un sens plus respectueux des valeurs chrétiennes fondamentales. 44 

On note quatre rencontres à l'origine de la Déclaration des Résistances européennes 

(31 mars, 29 avril, 20 mai et 7 juillet 1944), qui en est le résultat direct. 

42. L. JILEK, L'idée d’Europe devant la guerre: les exilés et le fédéralisme européen en Suisse, 1938- 

1945, in: A. BOSCO (éd.), The Federal ldea, vol.2, The History of Federalism since 1945, Lothian 

Foundation Press, London, New York, 1992, p.40. Renata Broggini va encore plus loin, en écrivant 

que «la présence et l'action menées en Suisse par Rossi et Spinelli, sans compter, évidemment, Einaudi 

furent décisives pour le développement d'un fédéralisme organisé. Grâce à eux, les thèses 

fédéralistes s'insérèrent dans le débat politico-culturel de l'émigration italienne et européenne, 

constituant les bases d’un véritable travail international». R. BROGGINI, op.cit., p.325. 

43. E. ROSSI et A. SPINELLI, Lettre ouverte du Mouvement italien pour la Fédération européenne 

à tous les antifascistes, novembre 1943, original en français. 

44. W.A. Vissert’Hooft avait notamment rédigé avec H. Schönfeld, en novembre 1939, un texte rappelant 

«la responsabilité de l’Eglise envers l’ordre international», texte relayé par un nouvel appel 

en avril 1940, «L’Eglise œcuménique et la situation internationale», demandant aux Eglises de briser 

le silence sur la nature anti-chrétienne des forces en action sur toute l’Europe.

50 


L'assistance est un véritable méli-mélo des forces d'opposition au nazisme: outre 

Rossi et Spinelli représentant le MFE, on compte également Egidio Reale (Partito 

Repubblicano), les Français Laloi et Soutou, les Allemandes Hanna Bertholet et 

Hilda Monte (de son vrai nom Hilde Meisel), toutes deux membres de l’Internazionaler 

Sozialistischer Kampftund (ISK), 45 ainsi que le Yougoslave Lazar Latinovic; 

Hooft représente symboliquement les Pays-Bas. En plus de ces personnes identifiables, 

il faut compter un Polonais, un Tchécoslovaque, un Norvégien et un Danois, 

quatre acteurs dont l'Histoire n'a pas retenu les identités. Nous ne reviendrons pas 

sur les différentes péripéties des discussions, retenons seulement le fait qu'elles 

offrent une plate-forme européenne, même modeste (n'oublions pas la marginalisation 

des idées fédéralistes au sein des mouvements nationaux de Résistance), aux 

thèses venues d'Italie. Le 29 avril, Rossi et Spinelli obtiennent l'adhésion de principe 

du Partito Cristiano Sociale, du Partito d’Azione et du Partito Repubblicano à 

leur travail, ainsi que celle du Liberal Party le 20 mai. 46 

Lors de la rencontre du 20 mai 1944, il est décidé d'envoyer un avant-projet de 

déclaration, alors en cours de rédaction, à toutes les résistances représentées au 

cours des réunions, tout en créant un «Comité provisoire pour la Fédération européenne» 

(avec Rossi et Soutou comme directeurs), chargé de maintenir des liaisons 

plus serrées avec les différentes résistances et de recevoir les adhésions. Avec 

l'avant-projet est envoyée une lettre, signée Spinelli, où est signalée l'existence de 

ce Comité provisoire et l'urgence de répondre aux propositions contenues dans 

l'avant-projet de Déclaration. Ces réponses sont cependant peu nombreuses, 

peut-être à cause d'un contexte qui oblige à l'action plus qu'à la réflexion: deux 

semaines après l'envoi, les Alliés débarquent en Normandie et la phase finale de la 

Résistance se dessine. Parmi les rares réponses, on peut dénombrer celles qui viennent 

du Mouvement de Libération Nationale et du Comité Français pour la Fédération 

Européenne, du Partito d’Azione, du Socialist Vanguard Group (lui aussi 

affilié à l’ISK), ou de personnalités telles que Lord Layton, ainsi que des réseaux 

français Libérer et Fédérer et de la Revue libre; 47 en revanche, les Résistances norvégiennes 

et danoises restent silencieuses. Certaines réponses montrent de la 

méfiance vis-à-vis du projet et se contentent de promettre l'envoi hypothétique de 

simples observateurs (qui ne viendront jamais), tel ce message du Partito Socialista 

Italiano di Unità Proletaria (PSIUP) du 3 juin 1944, qui rappelle que le projet 

d'Europe fédérale est pour l'instant une utopie. De toute manière, les grands partis 

traditionnels se démarquent de cette entreprise et l'on ne retrouve, autour de l'idée 

fédéraliste défendue à Genève, que des groupes minoritaires: ainsi le Socialist Vanguard 

Group, dont le chef est Allan Flanders, n'est qu'une aile très marginale du 

45. L'ISK a été créé à Göttingen par Leonard Nelson, et a essaimé dans quelques pays européens, parmi 

lesquels la Grande-Bretagne (Socialist Vanguard Group) et la France (Internationale Militante 

Socialiste). Ces mouvements se réclament d'une gauche non-marxiste, tout en prônant un réformisme 

social très avancé. 

46. Voir L’Unità Europea, n°4 (Milan) et n°5 (Suisse). 

47. Il progetto di dichiarazione federalista dei movimenti di resistenza europei, in: L'Unità Europea, 

n°5, juillet-août 1944, pp.1-2.


Labour Party, sur lequel il n'a strictement aucune influence, même s'il peut compter 

sur une tribune de presse de bonne qualité (Socialist Commentary). 

Malgré ces contacts limités, une discussion s'est engagée et elle va faire en sorte 

que les idées fédéralistes italiennes ne meurent prématurément. Doit-on rappeler 

que ce texte, dont la Déclaration finale est adoptée le 7 juillet, reste fortement symbolique, 

la Suisse étant un pays neutre, les Allemands et les Italiens étant discrédités 

par leurs nationalités, alors que les Français représentent un Etat qui n'est pas 

encore en place? Il faut bien reconnaître que la Déclaration reste un document très 

confidentiel, même si l'on peut enregistrer quelques échos à l'étranger, notamment 

en Grande-Bretagne, où elle est reproduite dans son intégralité dans la revue du 

groupe Federal Union (créé en 1938) en octobre 1944. 48 

On peut cependant signaler quelques initiatives réclamant la Fédération comme 

solution politique d'avenir, encouragées par la diffusion de ce texte. C'est le cas de 

la Déclaration du Comité français pour la Fédération européenne (CEFE) de juin 

1944. 49 Le CFFE, créé à Lyon le même mois, émane du Mouvement de Libération 

Nationale, dirigé par Jacques Baumel (pseudonyme Rossini), Henri Frenay et 

André Ferrat. Le MLN a été créé le 8 février 1944 avec les réseaux Combat, 

Défense de la France, Résistance, Lorraine, alors que le Front National communiste 

et l’Organisation Civile et Militaire s’en sont exclus. En réponse à la 

Déclaration des Résistances Européennes, parvenue en France fin mai, début juin 

1944, le MLN se transforme en CFFE, sous la direction d'Albert Camus (Combat), 

André Ferrat (Franc-Tireur) et Gilbert Zaksas (Libérer et Fédérer). 

Pour bien comprendre le contexte de cette prise de position fédéraliste du 

CFFE, il faut avoir à l'esprit les particularités de la résistance française basée non 

loin de la Suisse, à Lyon: dans cette ville existe un «milieu résistant» varié, du fait 

qu'elle est devenue très tôt le principal refuge de ceux qui ont fui la France occupée. 

C'est à Lyon qu'Emmanuel Mounier fait reparaître Esprit, avec la plupart des 

membres de l'ancienne rédaction (mais également avec de nouveaux venus de la 

ville elle-même, tels que Jean-Marie Domenach), dont l'un des buts est «d'approfondir 

l'idée fédérative», délaissée jusque-là par cette revue; 50 c'est à Uriage, non 

loin de Lyon, que, sous la direction du capitaine de Segonzac, fut créée cette école 

des cadres qui penche peu à peu vers la Résistance et que fréquenta de temps à 

autre Henri Frenay, venu s'installer à Lyon avant de fonder le réseau et le journal 

Combat, où il appelle régulièrement à une «résistance européenne […] ciment des 

unions de demain»; 51 c'est à Lyon, en mars 1944, que Libérer et Fédérer s'associe 

48. European Resistance Calls for Federation, in: Federal Europe, Federal News, n°116, Londres, October 

1944, pp.1-2 et 11. 

49. On peut trouver cette Déclaration dans son intégralité dans L'Europe Fédéraliste, n°1, septembre 

1944 (Genève), p.3, reprise dans Cahiers de la Fédération européenne (CFFE), vol.1, Paris, février 

1945, pp.25-27. 

50. Cette idée avait été exprimée par Emmanuel Mounier dans les derniers numéros précédant l'invasion, 

notamment dans «Gardons-nous de notre ennemi l’Ennemi» in: Esprit, Lyon, janvier 1940, 

et «A nos lecteurs», in: Esprit, février 1940. 

51. Résistance … Espoir de l’Europe, in: Combat (Alger), 12 décembre 1943.

52 


au mouvement socialiste L’Insurgé, créé en juillet 1942 par Marceau Pivert, en éditant 

un manifeste commun où l'on parle d'une «intégration dans les Etats-Unis 

d’Europe». 52 A Lyon, gravitent des européistes en rupture de milieu parisien, tels 

qu'André Philip ou François de Menthon, et nombre d'organisations qui jouent un 

rôle de relais précieux dans l'information de la Résistance et qui lui permettent 

d'être plus forte malgré la répression. Ainsi que l'écrit Michel Winock, «… ces 

groupes sont utiles à l'information: on s'échange des ‘tuyaux’, on accueille des visiteurs 

qui reviennent de voyage». 53 L'idée européenne y gagne ainsi tout naturellement 

des adeptes. 

Les appels à la solidarité européenne des forces de la Résistance par les fédéralistes 

italiens semblent donc porter leurs fruits en cette période de la fin de la 

guerre. Pour Spinelli, le CFFE, auquel il envoie une «lettre ouverte» dès le mois 

d'août 1944 54 paraît être «le parfait équivalent de nôtre mouvement italien». 55 

L'espoir est tellement fort que le même Spinelli voit dans cette création française 

l'amorce d'un «mouvement populaire fédéraliste européen», comme il l'écrira dans 

un rapport au MFE d’octobre 1944. 56 En outre, Spinelli fait part de considérations 

beaucoup plus tactiques, en rapport avec une situation politique en pleine évolution: 

les Italiens, discrédités en masse par le régime fasciste, auront peu de chance 

d'être écoutés dans l'après-guerre, de même que les Allemands. Le champion, dans 

ces conditions, ne peut être que la France, qui «aura sans doute plus d'autorité 

vis-à-vis des grandes puissances mondiales que celle de tout autre pays». On 

retrouve cette préoccupation chez Rossi qui, dans un mémorandum écrit en décembre 

1944, explique qu' 

«actuellement le MFE dédie sa principale attention à la France, où il cherche à 

susciter un vaste courant d'opinion publique favorable à son programme, car il 

estime que c'est la France surtout qui devrait demain prendre l'initiative de l'union 

fédérale européenne». 57 

On sent dès 1944 l'enthousiasme des fédéralistes italiens et l'assurance que les 

espoirs formulés pendant la guerre sont sur le point de se réaliser. Cet optimisme 

n'empêche pas de se poser des questions sur la composition de cette Europe unie et, 

déjà, certains perçoivent que l'unification va poser des problèmes d'ordre idéologique. 

Maintenant que la fin du conflit approche, les fédéralistes ont donc de plus en plus tendance 

à tenir compte du contexte international, un élément inconnu qui peut avoir un 

effet perturbateur dans la poursuite de leur idéal. Mais avant cette prise en compte, il 

52. Libérer et Fédérer, avril-mai 1944, n°15-16. 

53. M. WINOCK, «Esprit». Des intellectuels dans la cité, 1930-1950, Seuil, Paris, 1996, p.226. 

54. Déclaration du Comité Français pour la Fédération Européenne et Lettre ouverte du Movimento 

Italiano per la Federazione Europea au Comité Français pour la Fédération Européenne, in: 

L’Europe Fédéraliste, n°l, septembre-octobre 1944, pp.3 et 6-7. 

55. Lettre d'Altiero Spinelli à Emesto Rossi, 17 août 1944, cité dans E. PAOLINI, Dalla lotta antifascista 

alla battaglia per la Federazione europea. 1920-1948: documenti e testimonianze, Il Mulino, 

Bologna, 1996, p.395. 

56. Rapport de Spinelli, octobre 1944, WL-27, ASCE. 

57. E.ROSSI, Mémorandum du 8 décembre 1944, Genève, WL-27, ASCE.


s'agit pour eux de sonder les forces politiques traditionnelles, dont le Manifeste disait 

qu'elles pouvaient tout aussi bien être des «alliées» que des «obstacles». 

5) Constats des derniers jours de la guerre. 

C'est au moment où se termine la Seconde Guerre mondiale que les fédéralistes du 

MFE tentent de faire connaître leur action au plus grand nombre, particulièrement aux 

décideurs politiques. Une lettre d’Ernesto Rossi aux militants romains, datée du 7 octobre 

1944, raconte le périple commencé la veille par François Bondy et Jean-Marie Soutou, 

envoyés en France avec des documents fédéralistes. Les contacts à l'étranger ne 

s’arrêtent pas là; dans la même lettre, Rossi donne à ses correspondants du MFE des 

nouvelles d'Angleterre, où se trouve un autre envoyé fédéraliste («Robert») 58 qui lui a 

signalé l'intérêt pour les idées fédéralistes de certains journaux comme le Times et le 

Tribune, lui demande des informations sur le MFE pour le Socialist Vanguard Group, et 

parle de l'espoir de ce mouvement que soit élu président du Labour Party Harold 

Laski, 59 l'un des plus grands théoriciens du fédéralisme en Grande-Bretagne. 

La Libération qui s'annonce correspond à cette page blanche attendue par l'ensemble 

des résistants depuis les premières heures de leur combat. L'attitude des fédéralistes 

montre cependant que, à côté de l'enthousiasme qui prévaut face au succès annoncé, il y 

a une grande défiance vis-à-vis des projets de libération de l'Europe par les Alliés. 

Ernesto Rossi, par exemple, se méfie de ce qu'il appelle la «Sainte Alliance des trois 

grandes puissances victorieuses», 60 mais par-dessus tout de l'attitude des communistes, 

qu'il voit comme les plus sérieux ennemis de la paix. Cet anticommunisme va devenir 

une sorte de lien commun propre aux fédéralistes, certains pour les raisons personnelles 

que nous avons déjà exposées (Spinelli), la plupart parce que le communisme est à leurs 

yeux l'ennemi naturel du fédéralisme, depuis que Lénine a explicitement condamné ce 

dernier en 1915. 61 Et de fait, Rossi dénonce dans sa correspondance un complot soviétique 

ourdi à l'échelle européenne, et dont il voit le centre en France: 

«En France les communistes ont repris les mots d'ordre de L’Action française et se 

montrent d'accord avec l'extrême droite dans la propagande du plus étroit nationalisme, 

contre les ‘boches’, pour la destruction de l'Allemagne, etc.». 62 

58. Il s'agit du suisse Pierre Robert, militant de la Fédération syndicale internationale des Transports. 

59. Auteur en particulier de Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty, Oxford, 1917, The Foundation of Sovereignty 

and other Essays, London, 1921, et Nationalism and the Future of Civilization, London, 1932. 

60. Lettre d’Ernesto Rossi à Luciano Bolis, 24 septembre 1944, p.2, WL-27, ASCE. 

61. LÉNINE, Sur le mot d'ordre des Etats-Unis d'Europe, Sozialdemokrat, 23 août 1915 in: R. MON- 

TELEONE, Le ragioni teoriche del rifiuto della parole d’ordine degli Stati Uniti d’Europa nel movimento 

comunista internazionale; S. PISTONE (dir.), L’Idea dell’unificazione europea dalla Prima 

alla Seconda Guerra mondiale, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Torino, 1975, p.83. 

62. Lettre d’Ernesto Rossi à Mario Alberto Rollier, Genève, 24 septembre 1944, WL-27, ASCE. Dans 

une lettre aux militants de Rome du 7 octobre 1944, il s'attaque au mythe du «Parti des fusillés» 

orchestré par L'Humanité, WL-27, ASCE. Pour les fédéralistes, le combat contre la monopolisation 

de la Résistance par les communistes a déjà commencé.

54 


Pour Rossi, cette tactique, qui consiste à soulever la haine contre le bouc émissaire 

allemand, devrait permettre à l’URSS de se présenter comme le seul Sauveur 

crédible dans le chaos de la Libération. 

Le danger étant identifié, il faut agir vite, surtout dans la mesure où les communistes, 

eux aussi, parient sur une situation révolutionnaire pour faire triompher 

leurs idéaux. Cependant, c’est au moment où il faut trouver une véritable stratégie 

politique que les fédéralistes, comme la plupart des résistants, vont se rendre 

compte que les partis traditionnels, par eux condamnés, restent de sérieux obstacles. 

Les fédéralistes italiens, qui à Ventotene, à Milan ou en Suisse, pariaient sur la 

rapidité et la spontanéité pour consolider leur mouvement à l'heure de la Libération, 

prennent conscience des difficultés à implanter le MFE. Pour Ernesto Rossi, 

qui est encore en Suisse, ces difficultés proviennent des militants eux-mêmes, qui 

jouent le jeu des partis traditionnels. Dans une lettre du 2 décembre 1944 aux militants 

romains (et qui avaient été présents lors de la création du MFE en juillet 

1943), il dénonce leur «inactivité» et, plus grave, il déplore «qu'il n'y ait plus personne 

parmi vous qui croit vraiment à l'absolue prééminence des problèmes internationaux 

sur les problèmes de politique intérieure». 63 

Dans une lettre envoyée le même jour au seul Vindice Cavallera, il va jusqu'à 

dire que «[…] à Rome vous avez laissé mourir le MFE, juste quand était venu le 

bon moment pour commencer un travail sérieusement». 64 En fait, Rossi a peur que 

la toute nouvelle organisation fédéraliste ne devienne l'exclusivité d'un parti politique, 

quel qu'il soit. Il avait d'ailleurs déjà exprimé cette hantise dans une lettre antérieure, 

toujours aux militants romains, en affirmant: 

«Nous trahirons nos morts et nous nous trahirons nous-mêmes si nous nous mettons 

à faire de la petite politique, cherchant à nous attirer les bonnes grâces du Vatican, du 

gouvernement anglais et américain pour avoir des postes au ministère […] Nous 

devons sauver notre drapeau, pour constituer un véritable point de rencontre des forces 

progressistes». 65 

Il faut reconnaître qu'après la mort d'Eugenio Colorni, qui avait été chargé par le 

MFE de représenter le mouvement à Rome, la tache est difficile pour les fédéralistes 

dans la capitale: jouant de ses sympathies socialistes, parti que les fédéralistes 

considèrent comme le premier des «forces progressistes», Colorni avait pu 

recruter certains jeunes adhérents, tels que Leo Solari, Achille Corona ou Mario 

63. Lettre d’Ernesto Rossi à Vindice Cavallera, Manlio Rossidoria, Luisa Usellini et autres amis fédéralistes 

de Rome, Genève, 2 décembre 1944, WL-27, ASCE. Dans cette même lettre, Rossi exprime 

la peur que l'européisme ne retombe dans la stérilité de l'avant-guerre, lorsque ses plus ardents 

défenseurs n'étaient que des «amants de la paix» tels que Dante, Hugo, Cattaneo ou Garibaldi. Le 

fait que les premiers militants se retirent peu à peu de l’action n'est pas le propre des seuls Italiens, 

comme le montre cette lettre de Rossi du 4 décembre 1944 (le surlendemain), où il écrit: «le mois 

dernier nous n’avons plus eu de contacts avec des fédéralistes, sauf avec Pierre [Soutou] qui maintenant 

a une charge officielle à la légation française et qui donc doit prendre beaucoup plus de précautions 

que quand il était un simple [privé] comme nous», WL-27, ASCE. 

64. Lettre d’Ernesto Rossi à Vindice Cavallera, Genève, 2 décembre 1944, WL-27, ASCE. 

65. Lettre d’Ernesto Rossi à Mario Alberto Rollier, Genève, 24 septembre 1944, WL-27, ASCE.


Zagari; après sa mort, ceux-ci vont prendre du recul par rapport au mouvement et, 

après la Libération, se consacrer de manière exclusive à leur formation politique. 

Du côté de la démocratie chrétienne, l’homme politique en qui les fédéralistes 

italiens avaient le plus confiance pour mener une action conforme à leurs principes 

était Carlo Sforza, dans la ligne des idées qu'il avait exprimées en exil dans 

l'entre-deux-guerres. 66 Cette confiance avait été affichée dans une lettre que Rossi 

et Spinelli lui avaient envoyée de Ventotene à la suite du congrès de Montevideo 

(août 1942), où s'étaient rassemblés des milliers d’Italiens réfugiés en Amérique. 

Lors de ce congrès présidé par Sforza, il avait été adopté une déclaration dont le 

septième point surtout avait attiré l'attention des fédéralistes, puisqu'il proclamait la 

primauté du droit international. 67 L'idylle avec les idées fédéralistes ne durera 

cependant pas, à partir du moment où Sforza réintègre des fonctions officielles et 

adopte un discours moins idéaliste, comme dans cette interview accordée par lui au 

New York Times, le 3 mars 1944: Sforza y déclare que l'Italie ne doit rendre les îles 

du Dodécanèse à la Grèce que si les populations de ces îles le demandent par référendum, 

que les Alliés doivent restituer les colonies libyenne, érythréenne et somalienne 

à l'Italie, et qu'un échange doit se faire avec la Yougoslavie, consistant à conserver 

l'Istrie contre la ville de Fiume. Ces propos sont dénoncés par Rossi comme 

ceux qu'aurait pu tenir «n’importe quel homme politique de l'ancien temps qui verrait 

les problèmes internationaux du strict point de vue des intérêts de son propre 

pays». 68 Il critique les croyances selon lesquelles le principe national et le droit à 

l'autodétermination des peuples suffiraient à faire cesser le cycle guerrier en 

Europe: les avertissements d'Einaudi, donnés en 1918, sont bel et bien repris par les 

fédéralistes pour critiquer l’attitude des hommes politiques italiens. 

En ce qui concerne la France, Spinelli s'y rend en septembre 1944, car les fédéralistes 

parient encore sur la bonne volonté de ses dirigeants pour faire aboutir leurs 

efforts: ainsi, le point 7 des directives de travail arrêtées par le MFE au Congrès de 

Milan d’août 1943 parlait de la «convocation dans un pays neutre d'une conférence 

internationale fédéraliste», en apparence la Suisse; en 1945, parce que la France 

semble pouvoir devenir le champion de la cause européenne, le lieu d'élection est 

Paris, où va effectivement se tenir la première conférence fédéraliste, au mois de 

mars. Les rapports sur la situation française, que Spinelli envoie régulièrement à 

Rossi, toujours en Suisse, sont intéressants pour saisir l'image d'un pays encore 

plongé dans le chaos de la Libération et surtout pour comprendre les espérances et 

les défiances des fédéralistes vis-à-vis de l’Hexagone. 

Ces rapports se focalisent sur la personne du général de Gaulle: on peut même 

percevoir dans les premières analyses faites de ce personnage les futures réticences 

envers l'homme politique français. C'est bien lui qui restaure les cadres de l’Etat 

souverain, par l'intermédiaire de la restructuration administrative et des nationalisa- 

66. En particulier dans Les Etats-Unis d'Europe, in: Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles, décembre 

1929-janvier 1930, n°2, pp.103-118. 

67. Cette déclaration est reproduite dans l'article de E. ROSSI, La politica estera italiana, in: L'Unità 

Europea, n°5, juillet-août 1944, pp.4-5. 

68. E. ROSSI, La politica estera italiana, op.cit., p.5.

56 


tions, et qui vide la Résistance de tout son sens en marginalisant les Comités de 

Libération; 69 de plus, il est vu par Spinelli comme l'un de ces «vieux hommes politiques» 

condamnés par les fédéralistes pendant la guerre, accusés de vouloir restaurer 

cet ancien régime politique combattu par les idéaux de la Résistance: 

«De Gaulle vise haut et grand 70 en voulant que la France soit la quatrième puissance 

mondiale. Le chauvinisme français se montre très satisfait de toutes ses affirmations 

de grandeur que de Gaulle fait de manière répétée». 71 

Le combat fédéraliste semble devoir d'ores et déjà choisir son camp, en opposition 

à un homme qui restaure ce que l’on veut anéantir. Les affirmations de Spinelli 

à ce sujet se veulent par ailleurs rassurantes, bien que l'on y décèle une certaine 

gêne: «[…] les meilleures têtes politiques de la gauche française - socialistes, syndicalistes, 

MLN - sont fédéralistes et participeront à la conférence; cependant, j'ai 

dû préparer pratiquement tout le matériel nécessaire pour un tel événement». 72 

Ainsi, la première conférence fédéraliste qui doit se tenir à Paris entre les principaux 

courants fédéralistes de la Résistance, à la fin du mois de mars 1945, semble pouvoir 

être l'amorce du renouveau politique tant attendu, en même temps qu’un moyen de confronter 

des idées forgées dans la clandestinité des différentes Résistances. 

6) Les «rendez-vous manqués» de l’après-guerre. 

Si ce rendez-vous international semble marquer une première victoire des fédéralistes 

italiens, dans la ligne de ce qu'ils réclamaient depuis l'exil de Ventotene, on 

peut se demander s'ils ont réussi à faire passer leurs idéaux dans leur propre pays et 

à vaincre les réticences de la classe politique au moment de la Libération. On a vu 

les liens importants de nombreux fédéralistes italiens avec le Partito d’Azione. Pour 

certains d'entre eux, ce parti hors normes, issu de la «lave incandescente de 1945» 73 

et donc non entaché par les calculs et les combinaisons des partis politiques traditionnels, 

pouvait devenir une arme importante, ou, au moins, ce relais politique tant 

attendu pendant la Résistance. Dans ses souvenirs, Spinelli explique l'engagement 

de nombreux fédéralistes, dont lui, dans ce parti, pour des raisons qui semblent 

conformes aux objectifs du Manifeste de Ventotene: 

69. «Le gouvernement provisoire de de Gaulle a réussi de manière à peu près complète à reconstruire 

la structure administrative de l’Etat. Les Comités de Libération départementaux et communaux, 

n’ayant pas réussi à devenir des organes d'administration, réduits à être de simples organes consultatifs 

des préfets et des maires nommés par les préfets, perdent chaque jour plus de sens». In: Rapport 

d’AItiero Spinelli, 15 mars 1945, p.1 , WL-27, ASCE. 

70. En français dans le texte. 

71. Rapport de Spinelli, 15 mars 1945, p.2, WL-27, ASCE. 

72. Ibid., p.2. 

73. Expression de l'historien italien R. LOMBARDI (et membre du PDA), Problemi di potere in Milano 

liberata, p.266, cité par P. GINSBORG, Storia d’Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi, Torino, Einaudi, 

1989, p.117.


«Il paraissait assez naturel que l'idée d'une nouvelle bataille politique comme la 

nôtre, riche au point de vue culturel mais sans passé politique, trouve le meilleur 

écho dans ce parti inédit, grouillant d'intellectuels, dans lequel s'effectuait une 

recherche fébrile d'horizons nouveaux, et qui ne souffrait pas du frein d'un passé 

marqué par la seule action politique quotidienne dans un cadre national». 74 

C'est dire que, lorsque Ferruccio Parri, chef du Partito d’Azione (PDA), parvient à la 

présidence du Conseil italien en juin 1945, les espoirs sont grands. Il est vrai que le 

PDA se qualifie lui-même de «parti de la démocratie révolutionnaire», et, dans son programme, 

revendique la formule politique du fédéralisme. Lors d'un congrès tenu à 

Rome entre les 4 et 8 février 1944, les azionisti ajoutent à leur programme sur l'élection 

de l'Assemblée constituante un point 9 intitulé «politique étrangère et fédéralisme», 

appelant à «la formation des Etats-Unis d’Europe, le premier pas vers l'abolition des 

souverainetés nationales qui ont toujours conduit à la guerre». 75 La volonté que ce point 

figure dans la nouvelle Constitution est mise en avant dans le «plan de travail» du PDA 

rédigé la même année par le juriste Piero Calamandrei (décembre), où il est demandé 

que soit incluse dans la Constitution italienne une déclaration portant l'acceptation 

d'une limitation de souveraineté au cas où une fédération européenne serait mise en 

place. 76 La présence d’Altiero Spinelli et d’Ernesto Rossi au secrétariat du PDA à 

Rome est une garantie pour les fédéralistes que ce gouvernement va dans leur sens: 

beaucoup des hommes du gouvernement, au premier chef Ferruccio Parri, de même 

que Piero Calamandrei, sont membres du MFE, alors que Rossi a des liens d'amitié 

avec certains membres de l'ancien mouvement Giustizia e Libertà, largement représenté 

dans les rangs du PDA. 

C'est pour cette raison que Spinelli et Rossi, pris par leurs nouvelles responsabilités 

politiques, prennent du recul par rapport au MFE, dont le premier président de 

l'après-guerre est Umberto Campagnolo. Cet éloignement volontaire a une grande 

importance à l'heure où se rencontrent les différents mouvements fédéralistes européens 

dans le but de créer une plate-forme commune. En effet, ce sont les représentants 

du fédéralisme intégral, inspirés par le personnalisme d'origine française, 77 

qui sont présents en masse lors des réunions préparatoires dont le but est de réfléchir 

à la doctrine et à l'organisation d'un mouvement fédéraliste unifié: Spinelli et 

Rossi n’étaient présents ni à la réunion d’Hertenstein (15 au 22 septembre 1946) ni 

à celle de Luxembourg (13 au 16 octobre 1946), qui président à la constitution de 

l'Union Européenne des Fédéralistes, le 15 décembre 1946, à Paris, dans les locaux 

de La Fédération (mouvement créé le 4 octobre 1944), même si une délégation du 

MFE était présente. Il y a dans ce déséquilibre un élément de fragilisation, surtout 

si l'on pense que les liens idéologiques avec la Résistance de cette toute nouvelle 

74. A. SPINELLI, Come ho tentato …, p.34. 

75. Ce programme figure dans le journal du PDA, L’Italia Libera, 7 avril 1946. 

76. Piano di lavoro del PDA, publié dans Quaderni dell’Italia Libera, 30 décembre 1944. 

77. Fédéralisme qui se réclame de l'héritage proudhonien, dont les principaux inspirateurs sont 

Alexandre Marc et Denis de Rougemont, et dont le principe est que l'individu doit se mouvoir et 

se réaliser au contact des diverses cellules (familiale, communale, professionnelle) qu'il est amené 

à connaître et dans lesquelles il s'engage pleinement.

58 


internationale ne sont pas toujours évidents. 78 De plus, la différence entre les tendances 

fédéralistes réside non seulement dans les origines idéologiques, mais également 

dans les buts à atteindre, ce que Spinelli résume de manière très radicale: 

«Le mouvement italien était anti-idéologique, le mouvement français profondément 

idéologique. Le mouvement italien voulait créer des institutions européennes 

dans le but de développer un nouveau cadre politique européen qui révolutionnerait 

profondément l’ensemble de la vie nationale et politique. Le mouvement français 

regardait les institutions européennes comme un simple élément de coordination, 

incapable en lui-même de provoquer le changement, et pour cette raison soutenait 

un programme d’action multiforme concernant toutes les parties de la société». 79 

Il est vrai que ce point de vue est donné bien après les faits (1953). Il n’en témoigne 

pas moins du manque crucial d'homogénéité du fédéralisme de l’après-guerre, qui s'est 

coupé de sa source d'inspiration la plus prolifique. 

Hélas pour Spinelli et Rossi, l'espoir qui les a fait s'éloigner de l'activisme fédéraliste 

est très vite déçu. Le PDA ne reprend pas les mots d'ordre du MFE, comme souhaité. 

Ce refus peut s'expliquer par des raisons internationales mais également internes, le 

PDA perdant sa ferveur révolutionnaire une fois la guerre terminée: ainsi, les Comités 

de libération nationale formés dans toute la péninsule en 1945, instruments de démocratie 

directe qu'appuyaient les azionisti pendant la Résistance, perdent-ils peu à peu le 

soutien de Parri, pressé par l'aile libérale de son parti. Dans un document de travail 

rédigé par Ugo La Malfa en juillet 1945, on peut voir les raisons qui poussent les membres 

du PDA à repousser toute revendication fédéraliste. 80 Les raisons internationales 

priment et montrent une vision bien différente de celle adoptée pendant la guerre: «La 

Fédération européenne est une bonne idée, mais il faudrait savoir comment éviter de 

donner à cette fédération un caractère antirusse ou antibritannique. La Russie et 

l'Angleterre participeront-elles à la fédération européenne»? La place de l'Allemagne 

pose aussi des questions angoissantes: «Sans ces nations [Russie et Angleterre] la fédération 

finirait par s'acheminer vers une hégémonie allemande […], en gros ce que voulait 

obtenir le National-Socialisme». 

Les raisons internes ne manquent pas également dans le recul du PDA et le titre 

du document de travail suffit à exprimer les inquiétudes du parti: «Plan de renoncement 

à la souveraineté: nous pouvons être traités d'ennemis du pays et d'anti-italiens». 

Toutes ces raisons justifient le rejet de l'alliance avec les fédéralistes et de 

toute tactique partisane allant dans leur sens: «Tant que ces interrogations ne seront 

78. Cette critique vise particulièrement certains membres français de l’UEF, qui avaient été tentés pendant 

la guerre par l'expérience de Vichy, en premier lieu les membres du groupe La Fédération, 

dirigé par Jacques Bassot et André Voisin. C'est en pensant à ces derniers que la revue Esprit, dans 

un numéro spécial consacré au fédéralisme européen (novembre 1948), dénonce «cette pâte très 

mêlée d'odeurs suspectes» qui lui paraît constituer l'UEF. 

79. A. SPINELLI, Storia e Prospettiva del MFE, in: L'Europa nel mondo, s.l., 1953, pp.156-160, cité dans 

A. HICK, The European Union of Federalists, in: W. LIPGENS et W. LOTH, Documents, t.4, p.11. 

80. «Piano con la rinuncia alla sovranità: potremo essere tacciati di nemici del paese e di antiitaliani», 

15 juillet 1945, AS-5, ASCE.


pas levées, il n'est pas opportun de faire de la Fédération européenne la base de 

notre programme de politique extérieure». 81 

Dans ce secteur comme dans d’autres, le PDA a fait preuve de trop d'hésitations. 

Celui-ci disparaît à l'issue de ce qui sera son dernier congrès, en février 1946, 

quand une scission intervient entre les tendances socialistes, représentées par Emilio 

Lussu, et les tendances libérales, dirigées par La Malfa. Le parti n'y survivra 

pas, et son expérience politique sera des plus courtes: appelé à la présidence du 

Conseil le 21 juin 1945, Parri quitte ses fonctions en décembre de la même année, 

remplacé par Alcide de Gasperi, qui n'entretient aucun lien avec le MFE. 

Conclusion 

Ainsi, la situation politique dans l’Europe de l'immédiat après-guerre ne correspond pas 

vraiment à ce qu'en espéraient les Italiens, ni du point de vue du fédéralisme militant, ni 

du point de vue des réformes politiques engagées dans chacun des pays. 

Bien entendu, suivant leur vœu, une plate-forme internationale a été instaurée, 

d'abord au sein de l'éphémère Comité International pour la Fédération européenne, 

résultat de la Conférence de Paris (22 au 25 mars 1945), puis de l'Union Européenne 

des Fédéralistes, mais cette plate-forme n'est homogène que par défaut. Les fédéralistes 

semblent bien mal partis, d'autant qu'ils refusent, par principe, l'alliance avec d'autres 

mouvements européistes, catalogués comme passéistes et trop timorés. Les trois années 

1946-1948 ne permettent pas de définir avec certitude quelle tendance s'impose à 

l'UEF: les fédéralistes sont à la recherche d’une doctrine, voire d’un «juste milieu», ce 

qui explique la position du modéré Henri Brugmans à la tête de l'UEF. On peut simplement 

constater qu'à l'issue du second Congrès des fédéralistes à Rome (novembre 

1948), la tendance spinellienne prend un ascendant incontestable dans les esprits, mais 

pas encore dans l'organisation. C'est l'échec patent de l'«Europe Troisième Force», illustré 

par les crises de Prague et de Berlin, qui va orchestrer le retour des Italiens à l'action 

militante, dans la foulée du Plan Marshall. 

On ne peut que constater le parallélisme évident qu'il y a entre le refroidissement 

des relations Est/Ouest et l'affirmation des idéaux fédéralistes, jusqu'à ce que 

ces deux correspondent avec le projet d’armée européenne d'octobre 1950. Autant 

dire que l'année 1948 clôt effectivement ce que Denis de Rougemont a appelé la 

«campagne des Congrès européens»: l’UEF inaugure une nouvelle stratégie, qui 

repose sur les contacts personnels au plus haut niveau (Spaak, Schuman, de Gasperi) 

et qui utilise le relais de la presse et de l'édition: 82 inutile de dire que ce nou- 

81. Ibid., p.1. 

82. On doit souligner les difficultés des fédéralistes à faire connaître leurs idées en passant par les maisons 

d’édition traditionnelles: c'est par exemple le cas du livre de L. EINAUDI, La guerre et l'unité 

européenne, refusé successivement par Plon et Gallimard. Voir lettre de Michel Berveiller à Guglielmo 

Usellini, 22 décembre 1948, UEF-5, ainsi que par Calmann-Lévy, Lettre de refus de Raymond 

Aron à Michel Berveiller, 18 décembre 1948, UEF-2, ASCE.

60 


veau combat correspond de plus en plus aux attentes de Spinelli, très à l'aise dans 

ces nouveaux chantiers politiques qui s'ouvrent dans la foulée du Plan Schuman. 83 

Nous sommes bien au cœur du combat pour la supranationalité, que les fédéralistes 

engagent en s'appuyant sur un militantisme qui semble préservé de toute polémique: 

l'objectif commun est de faire céder les Etats européens occidentaux, notamment 

avec le projet de Communauté Politique européenne qui, s'il venait à aboutir, 

permettrait l'aboutissement de cette «société fédérale», suivant les prédictions que 

Spinelli avait formulées pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cependant, ce retour 

mérité et efficace des fédéralistes italiens au premier plan ne doit pas faire oublier 

que ceux-ci ont dû renoncer, pour ce faire, à une partie de leurs idéaux: le projet 

européen pour lequel ils vont alors se battre tourne le dos aux espoirs de la 

Résistance, vérification supplémentaire que le Vieux Continent, partagé en deux, 

n'est plus vraiment maître de son destin, et que le Fédéralisme n’a pas su s’imposer 

en idéologie autonome … 

83. On peut signaler que deux dirigeants «intégraux» de l'UEF, respectivement Denis de Rougemont 

et Henri Brugmans, seront appelés à diriger des instances culturelles européennes créées en 1950, 

le Centre européen de la Culture à Genève et le Collège de Bruges: ces grandes figures prennent 

donc de la distance avec l’action militante fédéraliste, au profit du seul Spinelli.

61 

France’s Agony between «Vocation Européenne et Mondiale» 

The Union Française as an Obstacle in the French Policy 

of Supranational European Integration, 1952-1954 

Seung-Ryeol Kim 

Supranational European integration, beginning with the Schuman Plan in 1950, was 

sought by the first “Six-countries” in order to reconstruct their economies. But the hidden 

goal of the most important member state in this European community, France, was 

to control West Germany by means of supranational European integration. It was much 

supported by the United States, which intended to draw upon German economic and 

military capacities in view of the escalation of the Cold War. It therefore had both a 

European and a global perspective. 1 To the latter belonged also problems that were 

related with the colonies of European powers, above all Great Britain and France. 

Although the problems regarding colonies did not originally concern supranational 

integration, they always influenced the process of the latter. 

In the 1950s Great Britain did not take part in supranational European integration. 

One of the reasons for British non-participation was that Great Britain thought 

the consolidation of the Commonwealth would not be compatible with the supranational 

integration in which Great Britain should transfer some parts of its sovereignty 

to a European community. The British stance on supranational European integration 

began to change in 1956, when the British government estimated that in 

the long term the Commonwealth would not have the same impact on the British 

economy than the Common Market of the “Six-countries”. After a long internal 

discussion, Whitehall decided to participate in supranational European integration 

in 1961. Which role did the Union Française play in early supranational European 

integration? Contrary to Great Britain, when drawing up the Schuman Plan, France 

thought that the Union Française-policy and supranational European integration 

might be compatible. 2 The Territoires d’Outre-Mer (TOM) were excluded from the 

European communities during the negotiations on the European Coal and Steel 

Community (ECSC), the European Defence Community (EDC) and the common 

agricultural projects in the early 1950s. The questions of the relationship between 

the Union Française and the supranational European community played a role, but 

were not an obstacle for the success of these projects. It was not until 1955-1957 

that France suddenly wanted to include its overseas territories in the supranational 

1. C. WURM, Early European Integration as a Research Field: Perspectives, Debates, Problems, in: 

C. WURM (ed.), Western Europe and Germany. The Beginnings of European Integration 

1945-1960, Oxford, Washington, 1995, pp.9-26. 

2. These differences between the policies of two European powers towards supranational European integration, 

according to Clemens Wurm, lie in the degree of importance of their Empires to their national 

economies and in their policies over West Germany. France felt a future security threat more seriously 

than Great Britain. Therefore, France took supranational integration for an inevitable measure to control 

an ever stronger West Germany. See C. WURM, Two Paths to Europe: Great Britain and France from 

a Comparative Perspective, in: C. WURM (ed.), op.cit., pp.175-200.

62 


European integration process, hoping that it could solve colonial financial problems 

with the help of the other partner states, which was a great burden on them. 

Did not, however, the “vocation mondiale” make it difficult for France to lead 

early supranational integration, just as in the case of Great Britain? Gérard Bossuat 

deals with the subtle questions arising from the relationship between the French 

overseas areas and the European Political Community (EPC) in 1953. In 1953 

France could not control the process of European integration and no longer wanted 

to play the role of leader of integrated Europe. As the subtitle, “from criticism to repudiation 

[of the projected EPC]; France’s vocation mondiale”* alludes to, according 

to Bossuat, 

“the European construction failed in 1953, because of the French governments’ 

dilemma, having to choose between Europe, whose destiny they might not be able to 

control and the perpetuation of France’s world power”*. 3 

Bossuat’s outstanding contribution still needs to be completed in some points. 

He only analyses the problem of the Union Française in the negotiations of the 

EPC. (Even this aspect he treated too briefly). But problems of the TOM in European 

integration in these years were not only related to the EPC, but also to the process 

of ratification of the EDC treaty and the negotiations of a European agricultural 

community. This article investigates the questions arising from the relationship between 

the Union Française and all the projects of supranational European integration 

between 1952 and 1954. 4 

3. Quotations marked with an * have been translated by the author. 

G. BOSSUAT, La France, l’aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944-1954, Paris, 

1992, pp.882 and 897. Georges-Henri Soutou refers to these problems in his research which tries 

to portray Bidault’s European policies, but does not go as much into details as Bossuat. G.-H. 

SOUTOU, Georges Bidault et la construction européenne 1944-1954, in: Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique, 

Paris, 1991, pp.267-306. The writings of the politicians who were engaged in early European 

integration, for example P.-H. TEITGEN (Faites entrer le témoin suivant, 1940-1958, De 

la Résistance à la V e République, Paris, 1988), H. ALPHAND (L’étonnement d’être. Journal 

(1939-1973), Paris, 1977) and M. DEBRÉ (Trois Républiques pour une France. Mémoires 2: Agir 

(1946-1958), Paris, 1988), give us only some information on this subject. In order to define their 

positions on this subject, therefore, it is better to consult classified documents that they wrote. 

4. The points that Bossuat overlooked derive from the fact that he did not consult file 42 of the private 

archive of Georges Bidault in the Archives Nationales (AN) entitled “Europe et Union Française” 

(AN Papiers Bidault 42). In 1953, the French government was confronted with problems which 

supranational European integration would bring about in the Union Française. Conscious of this 

problem, foreign minister Georges Bidault collected appropriate documents in one special file. 

This is file 42. This article is based on the analysis of this special file. This defect is found in expert 

studies to the “pool vert”, too. See G. NOËL, France, Allemagne et «Europe verte», Berne, 1995; 

G. THIEMEYER, Vom «Pool Vert» zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Europäische Integration, 

Kalter Krieg und die Anfänge der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik 1950-1957, 

München, 1999.

France’s Agony between «Vocation Européenne et Mondiale» 63 

The Union Française, the ECSC and the EDC, 1950-1952 

During the negotiations for the ECSC, Italy demanded that the French overseas 

areas should be included in the ECSC because it wanted to import the iron ore 

mined at Quenza in eastern Algeria at a low price. Jean Monnet argued that the 

inclusion of the TOM in the ECSC might raise a difficult problem because of the 

complexity of the customs systems of the French overseas territories, which would 

require modifications of the system of the Union Française. Monnet proposed a 

compromise solution: ensuring Italy a regular iron supply without incorporating 

Algeria into the Schuman Plan. France accepted this proposition. The TOM were 

not included in the ECSC, but France was obliged to grant the other member states, 

above all Italy, “the same preferential measures”* which it enjoyed. 5 

The Pleven Plan for the creation of a supranational European Army took into 

account France’s special responsibilities in its overseas areas. Those participating 

states that had national armed forces would keep their own command of the part of 

their existing army that would not be integrated into the European army. 6 France 

could have under its command the part of army stationed in its overseas areas as 

well as the great part of army on the continent. However, during the negotiations 

France had to give way to the demands of the other partner states which were based 

on the principle of equality, so that it agreed that direct national command would 

remain only in overseas areas. That meant that all troops in Europe should be subordinated 

to a supranational EDC. 7 

That was a point on which the EDC treaty of May 1952 suffered harsh criticism 

from EDC opponents. On the one hand, many Frenchmen feared that West Germany 

would soon take the supremacy on the continent, because the great part of the 

French army would have to remain stationed further in the overseas areas, particularly 

in Indochina. France might thus drop back to third rank within the EDC, after 

Germany and Italy. On the other hand, it was feared that a two-fold division of 

French armed forces - between Europe and the TOM - would leave France too 

weak to defend the TOM. 8 

The Union Française played a role in the period between 1950-52, but was not 

an obstacle to the success of these projects. The ECSC was ratified in December 

1951. And the EDC treaty was signed in May 1952. The French government could 

5. G. BOSSUAT, op.cit., pp.764 ff.; Article 79 of the ECSC treaty of 18 April 1951 in: FORSC- 

HUNGSINSTITUT DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSWÄRTIGE POLITIK (Hrsg.), 

Europa. Dokumente zur Frage der Europäischen Einigung, München, 1962, Bd.2, pp.741 ff. 

6. Text in: Europa. Dokumente zur Frage der Europäischen Einigung, op.cit., pp.814 ff. 

7. G.-H. SOUTOU, France and the German Rearmament Problem, in: R. AHMANN et al. (ed.), The 

Quest for Stability, Problems of West European Security 1918-1957, Oxford, 1993, pp.487-512. 

8. Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris (AMAE), Europe 44-60, Généralités, CED, 

Vol.69, pp.24-43, JB/SR, Note, 15 mai 1952, A.S. Traité instituant une CED; AMAE Europe 

44-60, Allemagne, Vol.378, pp.222-227, Seydoux, Note, La politique franco-allemande, 2.5.1952; 

AMAE Europe 44-60, Allemagne, Vol.1.055, pp.57-63, S/D Centraleurope (Sauvagnargues), 

Note, A.S. Arrangements contractuels entre les Trois Puissances Alliées et la République Fédérale 

d’Allemagne, 8.6.1952; R. MASSIGLI, Une comédie des erreurs, Paris, 1978, pp.322 ff.

64 


exclude its overseas areas from supranational European integration, without fearing 

that this would bring about problems for France maintaining the Union Française 

and, therefore, its world power position alongside the U.S. and Great Britain. 

The French Initiative for a Political Integration in 1952 and 

the Draft EPC Treaty of Ad Hoc Assembly 

The Assemblée Nationale, especially the parliamentary delegation of the principal 

socialist party, the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), had 

demanded certain prerequisites for the EDC ratification in February 1952, one of 

which was the establishment of a supranational political authority for the European 

Army. 9 That was why the French government proposed a European Political Community 

(EPC) to the other EDC member states in July 1952, not quite two months 

after the signature of the EDC treaty of May 1952. The EPC aimed at facilitating 

the ratification of the EDC treaty by the Assemblée Nationale. Up to the end, Guy 

Mollet, leader of the SFIO, still considered the EPC project as valuable for securing 

the agreement of the SFIO to the EDC treaty. He therefore demanded that the 

French government fulfill this prerequisite. 10 But French governments proved unable 

to negotiate an acceptable treaty. During the almost two years of EPC negotiations, 

France was strongly opposed to the Dutch plan (Beyen Plan) for a customs 

union, which the Netherlands took for conditio sine qua non for their accepting the 

EPC. The SFIO itself rejected the Beyen Plan as well. Therefore, it seemed that the 

Beyen Plan was a principal reason why the EPC project did not serve its original 

purpose, i.e. the relief of the ratification of the EDC treaty. Most accounts on the 

EPC proceed from this assumption. 11 As will be demonstrated in the following 

pages, however, documents on the EPC show us a more decisive reason for its failure 

than the Beyen Plan - namely, the Union Française. 

The supranational military integration first required the answer to one question: 

Whom should the European Army obey and serve? Without solving this question, a 

merger of the national armies would remain possible only on a confederal basis, as 

with NATO. 12 Therefore, the demand of the Assemblée Nationale was logical and 

9. R MITTENDORFER, Robert Schuman - Architekt des neuen Europa, Hidesheim, Zürich, New 

York, 1983, pp.382-420. 

10. For the position of Guy Mollet, see Archives Jean Monnet. Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, 

Lausanne. La Communauté Politique Européenne (AMJ), file 11. 

11. G. TRAUSCH (Hrsg.), Die europäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von 

Rom: Pläne und Initiativen, Enttäuschungen und Mißerfolge, Baden-Baden, 1993; W LOTH, Die 

EVG und das Projekt der Europäischen Politischen Gemeinschaft, in: R. HUDEMANN (Hrsg.), 

Europa im Blick der Historiker. Europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert. Bewußtsein und Institution, 

München, 1995 (Historische Zeitschrift Beiheft, Bd.21), pp.198-199. 

12. W. LIPGENS, Die Bedeutung des EVG-Projekts für die politische europäische Einigungsbewegung, 

in: H.-E. VOLKMANN et al., (Hrsg.), Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, 

Boppard am Rhein, 1985, p.23.


reasonable. Which form the political authority for the European army should take, 

however, was not clear from the Assemblée Nationale’s demands. On the one hand, 

an integration of the EDC member states’ foreign politics (”pool diplomatique”) 

could be intended; on the other hand, civil and parliamentary control over the military 

could also be intended. In addition, the creation of functional sectoral communities 

demanded an authority which could coordinate them. This involved the 

ECSC and the EDC directly. For Schuman, however, a “pool diplomatique” was 

not acceptable, since this carried too many federal characteristics. The important 

thing for him was to reinforce the democratic control over the two technocratic 

communities (ECSC, EDC) in a political community. Schuman’s concept for political 

integration was mainly motivated by the wish to facilitate the parliamentary 

agreement to the EDC treaty. 13 

At the ECSC conference of member states in Luxembourg on 10 September 1952, 

the six foreign ministers gave the Common Assembly of the ECSC the mandate to draft 

a treaty constituting an EPC. The results were then to be submitted within six months. 

The new aspect of this resolution, in comparison to the French-Italian suggestion of July, 

was the Dutch initiative for economic integration. 

The Assembly of the ECSC accepted the invitation of the six foreign ministers to 

draft an EPC treaty and constituted itself for that purpose as an “ad hoc Assembly” in 

September 1952. After six months of collaboration, the draft treaty was adopted by the 

ad hoc Assembly on 10 March 1953. One day earlier the president of the ad hoc Assembly, 

Paul-Henri Spaak, had handed over the draft treaty to the acting president of the 

ECSC Council of Ministers, the French foreign minister Georges Bidault. 

The cornerstone of the draft EPC treaty was a directly elected Peoples’ Chamber, 

which served as an instrument for effective parliamentary control. It also functioned 

as an organic combination of the ECSC and the EDC in the EPC, without 

bringing about a significant expansion of jurisdictions. Perhaps eventually, the EPC 

would lead to the creation of a common market. But the EPC only had the right to 

prepare for the progressive creation of a common market. As far as a common foreign 

policy was concerned, the draft treaty only proposed that the member states 

should coordinate their foreign and security policies within the framework of the 

EPC. As far as the territories were affected, two articles only referred to France. 

Before dealing with them, it is worthwhile to look at the structure of the Union 

Française. 

According to the French constitution of 13 October 1946 the overseas areas 

were divided into the following four categories: 

1) the Départements d'Outre-Mer (DOM), which included the Algerian departments 

and, by reason of a law from 19 March 1947, the Martinique, the isles 

of Réunion, Guadeloupe and French Guyana, each forming a department (altogether 

approximately 10 million inhabitants); 

13. AN MRP 350 AP 50, Commission exécutive 1952-1953, Réunion du 30 oct. 1952 relative aux problèmes 

posés par l’Autorité politique européenne, sous la présidence de M. de Menthon.

66 


2) the Territoires d'Outre-Mer (TOM), which referred to all overseas areas 

which had formerly been colonies (about 25 million inhabitants); 

3) the Territoires associés, which meant the mandates Cameroon and Togo, administered 

under the supervision of the trustee council of the UN (altogether 

about 4 million inhabitants); 

4) the Etats associés, which consisted of the protectorates Morocco, Tunisia and 

Indochina (altogether 35,5 million inhabitants). 

Together with the metropolitan France the DOM and the TOM overseas regions 

and territories formed the constitutional association of the French Republic, which 

was under the sovereignty of France (article 60 of the French 1946’s constitution). 

The Union Française consisted of the French Republic and the “Territoires et Etats 

associés”. 14 

On 24 October 1952 the leader of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire 

(MRP), Pierre Henri Teitgen, demonstrated how complex and sensitive the problem 

of the relations of the Union Française with the supranational EPC was. He assumed 

first that 

”France was not only a European power but also a world power, whose interests 

went beyond the framework of the European continent”* 

and that the connection between the homeland and its overseas areas was “indivisible”. 

He found the suggestion of the Council of Europe unacceptable that non-European 

territories and states, which were in a constitutional relation with European states, 

could not become full members, but only be associated. According to him this mere association 

would loosen the connection of France with its overseas areas. 15 Teitgen 

strove to find a solution which made it possible to drive supranational integration further 

without endangering the Union Française. Just as Teitgen, the Gaullist Michel Debré 

rejected the suggestions of the Council of Europe. Debré maintained that the French 

African areas were to be included as full members into the EPC, that the EPC should 

not have decision-making powers over member states’ foreign policies, and that it 

should be constructed in a loose form. As a matter of fact, if the EPC were vested with 

greater powers, it could intervene in the affairs of the French overseas areas. 16 

In the plenary session of the ad hoc Assembly on 7 January 1953, the French 

Senegalese Léopold Sédar Senghor argued that the French overseas areas should be 

included into the EPC. For Senghor, a convinced supporter of the idea “Eurafrika”, 

it was incomprehensible that the TOM, which were an integrated constituent of the 

French Republic, should be excluded from the EPC. Their exclusion risked alternative 

developments, namely independence from France. These areas were ready to 

14. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn (PAAA) II, Bd.889, AZ 224-41-03, p.160, Vermerk 

über die Struktur der Union Française. 

15. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Déclaration faite par Teitgen à la commission préconstituante, 24.10.1952. 

16. PAAA II, Bd.854, AZ 240-10 Bd.1, Schwarz-Liebermann, Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Unterausschüsse 

des Verfassungsausschusses vom 3.-4. Dezember 1952; PAAA II, Bd.889, AZ 

224-41-03, p.157, C.F. Ophüls, Einbeziehung der überseeischen Gebiete (Union Française) vom 

30.5.1953.


open their markets for Europe, however, only on the condition that they should become 

members of the European communities. Senghor demanded an increase in 

the number of French seats in the People’s Chamber, from 63 to 83. Twenty seats 

were intended for the overseas areas. In the ensuing debate, almost all French delegates 

including Debré treated the inclusion of the TOM into the EPC as already decided 

or natural. Although they had not completely the same opinion as Senghor, 

they supported Senghor’s suggestions out of fear of the separation of the TOM 

from the metropolitan France. These suggestions met the rejection of parliamentarians 

from other member states, above all from Germany, so that the debate ended 

without result. 17 

In February 1953 the French parliamentarians strove again to include the 

French overseas areas into the EPC. Teitgen maintained that these areas should be 

represented at least “symbolically” in the People’s Chamber. For this reason, the 

number of French seats should be increased. 18 Teitgen’s suggestions were laid 

down in article 15 and 101 of the draft EPC treaty. 

According to article 101, the parts of the Union Française that were under the 

sovereignty of France should be included through the signing of this accord into the 

valid area of the EPC treaty, if France raised no objections to the signature of this 

accord. France could list them in a subsequent protocol, if it were first to exclude 

them from the valid areas of the EPC. In addition, France could at its discretion revise 

the application of the treaty and the community’s laws in the Union Française. 

This referred to the DOM and the TOM. Indirectly included were the Territoires associés 

and the Etats associés which were not under the sovereignty of France but 

which France represented in international affairs. These could also be included 

through a special protocol. 19 According to article 15, France would hold in addition 

seven extra seats in the People’s Chamber to account for its overseas areas, for a total 

of 70 seats, if these colonies would be included in the EPC. However, Germany 

and Italy would each have 63 seats. 

17. Abänderungsvorschlag zum Bericht des Verfassungsausschusses Nr.40 (Senghor), in: Sonderversammlung 

für die Gründung einer Europäischen Politischen Gemeinschaft, Straßburg, 1953, Kurzbericht 

der Beratungen der dritten Sitzung vom 9. Januar 1953, pp.15-23; Sonderversammlung für 

die Gründung einer Europäischen Politischen Gemeinschaft, Straßburg, 1953, Aussprache. 

Wörtlicher Bericht über den Verlauf der Sitzungen, pp.199 ff.; AMAE DE-CE, CECA, Vol.521, 

pp.187-197, DGAP/Europe/S/Direction du Conseil de l’Europe, note, 15.1.1953, a.s. Réunion des 

travaux de l’Assemblée ad hoc. This document marked the speech of Senghor as “une intervention 

très remarquée”. 

18. PAAA II, Bd.855, AZ 240-10 Bd.2, von Brentano an Hallstein am 7. Februar 1953; PAAA II, 

Bd.855, AZ 240-10 Bd.2, Schwarz-Liebermann an Ophüls vom 11.2.1953; PAAA Materialsammlung 

MD Dr. Herbert Blankenhorn, Auswärtiges Amt, Satzung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. 

Materialien. 31. März 1953, pp.45-47 and 174-176. 

19. PAAA II Bd.889, AZ 224-41-03, pp.158 ff., Ophüls, Einbeziehung der überseeischen Gebiete 

(Union Française), 30. Mai 1953.

68 


French Criticism of the Draft EPC Treaty of the ad hoc Assembly: 

France’s “Vocation Mondiale” 

After the signature of the Bonn and Paris treaties in May 1952, the government 

Pinay/Schuman was exposed to increasing criticism in the Assemblée Nationale. It 

was alleged that the government promoted the sale of France’s national sovereignty 

and its historical great power status through European integration. The attack on 

Schuman’s policies referred concretely to the EDC and the politics of the Union 

Française. 20 During the EPC negotiations of the ad hoc Assembly, Paris experienced 

a governmental crisis that led to Bidault replacing Foreign Minister Schuman 

at the end of the year. This followed demands by the Gaullist opposition, 

which supported the formation of the government of the new Prime Minister René 

Mayer on the condition that Schuman should be replaced by Bidault. 21 

Although it was officially explained that the previous European policy would 

continue unchanged under the new government, modifications soon became clear, 

in particular in France’s concept of the European Army. High-level civil servants at 

the Quai d’Orsay defended the opinion that France should carry out a reversal in 

policy by giving up the EDC and simultaneously developing NATO in order to prevent 

the Germans from an unaligned military build-up. 22 The top officials’ argumentation 

was based to a large extent on problems regarding the Union Française. 

According to them, by retaining the Union Française, France could continue its 

role of world power alongside Great Britain and the USA, and maintain a continental 

balance against Germany, which might regain strength. The administrative elite 

understood that the British did not accept the supranational elements in European 

integration because of their responsibility in relation to the Commonwealth. Now, 

however, the EDC threatened to develop into a supranational political community 

that would particularly impair the world power position of France to the extent that 

it split the French army into two sections - one for the homeland and a second for 

the overseas territories - and thus weaken the French army as a whole. This would 

lead to France possibly losing its overseas territories, although the right to withdraw 

the French soldiers from the European army was planned for France in the 

case of a crisis in the Union Française. 23 

Alarmed by his colleagues, Hervé Alphand (president of the Interim Committee 

of the EDC), a convinced proponent of the EDC, criticized this view of the EDC, 24 

20. See R. MITTENDORFER, op.cit., pp.447-467. 

21. R. MITTENDORFER, op.cit., p.475; PAAA Büro Staatssekretäre 1949-1967, Bd.59, pp.152-161, 

Hausenstein, Aufzeichnung über meinen Besuch bei Herrn R. Schuman am 19. Januar 1953 und 

als Anlage zu meinem Brief vom 21. Januar 1953. 

22. AN Papiers Bidault 34, A. Gros, Résumé de la conversation du samedi 24 janv. 1953, written on 

27 January 1953; AN Papiers Bidault 34, De la Tournelle (directeur politique) et al., Note sur la 

CED, 28.1.1953. This document was signed by De la Tournelle as well as by Gros (chef du service 

juridique), Seydoux (directeur d’Europe), de Leusse (chef du service de presse), Boegner (chef du 

service des pactes) and De la Tournelle; AN Papiers Bidault 34, Lettre De la Tournelle à Pierre 

Louis Falaize (directeur du Cabinet de Bidault), 29.1.1953. 

23. AN Papiers Bidault 34, De la Tournelle (directeur politique) et al., Note sur la CED, 28.1.1953.


particularly the notion that the EDC would impair French responsibility in relation 

to the Union Française and endanger the French world power status. He argued that 

the EDC would not endanger France’s legal, economical and moral connection 

with the Union Française by any means. The overseas navy was not the object of 

integration. For a time, about 50 percent of the French army would remain under 

national authority. Furthermore, the additional protocols, which were negotiated at 

that time, would ascertain France’s privilege to be able to withdraw its army relatively 

quickly and without restriction in the case of a crisis in the overseas territories. 

The only restriction that would limit French foreign policy was policy regarding 

defence in Europe. This limitation could be balanced on the one hand by the 

reserved rights of France in Germany, which had been guaranteed by the Bonn treaties, 

on the other hand by the responsibilities in the world. Thus France could remain 

in the “permanent Group” of NATO alongside the USA and Great Britain. 

“France belongs to two systems”, so Alphand, “one at European level, which will materialize 

under the form of the Community, the other at world level, the Union Française; 

France while becoming European, will continue to remain a world power”*. 

The alternative discussed by the opponents of the EDC at the Quai d’Orsay was 

out of question. The idea of an extension of NATO had already proved futile because 

of American objections. For Alphand it was under any circumstances unacceptable 

to give up the EDC. 25 

As for the EPC, the director of the European department of the Quai d’Orsay, F. 

Seydoux, elucidated French intentions: the danger that the creation of the EPC 

would lead to a new renouncement of sovereignty had to be avoided. From the beginning 

France should resist a complete institutional structure of a federalist type. 

Seydoux therefore only was prepared to accept the creation of a directly elected 

European Parliament, but its functioning was not necessary in the initial stages of 

the project. The creation of a new executive which should replace the High Authority 

of the ECSC and the Board of Commissioners of the EDC seemed unnecessary, 

even dangerous, because 

“its mere creation risked to bring about, by that very fact, new extensions of competence, 

thus new cessions of sovereignty”*. 26 

The department Afrique-Levant at the Quai d’Orsay warned that even the direct 

election for a People’s Chamber would seriously weaken, or dissolve in foreseeable 

time, the connection between France and its overseas territories. Therefore, the 

directly elected parliament should be replaced by an indirectly elected one, with 

deputies drawn from the national parliaments. 27 

24. AN Papiers Bidault 34, Alphand, Note pour le Président, 10. févr. 1953, secret. 

25. Ibid. 

26. AMAE, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières, Service de Coopération Economique 

(DE-CE) 45-60, Vol.578, pp.1-6, Note de Seydoux, 2.1.1953, a.s: Communauté politique européenne. 

27. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques (DGAP), Direction 

d’Afrique-Levant, sous-direction d’Afrique, Note, 12.1.1953, a.s./Europe et Union Française.

70 


With regard to the integration of foreign policy, the Quai d’Orsay seriously criticized 

the modest result of elaboration of the ad hoc Assembly, and thus the coordination 

of the foreign policy under the member states. The legal advisor at the Quai 

d’Orsay, Gros, posed the question of how a state which surrendered its powers of 

decision in foreign policy matters to the EPC could carry out its world-wide responsibility. 

28 

From the beginning the Beyen Plan for the creation of a customs union did not find 

approval in France. One of its most ardent critics was the director of the Service de 

Coopération Economique at the Quai d’Orsay, Olivier Wormser. 29 The question of the 

Union Française was one of the reasons why Wormser was opposed to the Beyen Plan. 

Wormser asserted that if the Beyen Plan was accepted and carried out, France would be 

forced to open its overseas markets to other European member states. He argued that 

France could not simultaneously invest in both the metropolitan territory and in the unproductive 

economic areas of its overseas territories without letting other countries participate. 

Wormser foresaw the danger that the markets of the overseas territories would 

be opened for the other five states without economic benefit for France, although these 

countries participated under prerequisites favourable to France. Thus, France would be 

forced to grant them its privileges in the Union Française, and economic gains would be 

lost - almost 40 percent of all exports of France were sold at this time within the Union 

Française. This would entail enormous political problems, and France would lose its 

world power position. 30 

The French European agricultural policy was likewise adapted to the Quai 

d’Orsay’s general change of course in European politics, away from pro-community 

tendencies. In the meantime, the dissenting opinion of the Pflimlin Plan became 

influential. A majority of administrative elites in the ministry of Agriculture carried 

out the change from a pro-European agricultural policy to a national protectionist 

concept, as supported by the majority of the professional associations. 31 In addition, 

the question of the relation of the French overseas areas to a planned agricultural 

commodities market also induced the French government to a reserved position 

vis-à-vis the supranational community of the Six. The previous negotiations 

for agricultural integration showed that this question could not be avoided any 

longer. In order to consider the situation of the overseas territories in agricultural 

integration, an interdepartmental conference took place under the leadership of the 

conseiller technique of Bidault’s staff, du Vignaux, on 2 and 5 February 1953, including 

the top officials from the Quai d’Orsay, the Ministère d'Etat, the ministry of 

28. Ibid.; AN Papiers Bidault 38, le jurisconsulte (Gros), Note pour le secrétaire général (Parodi), 18 

fév. 1953, a/s. Projet de Fédération politique européenne. 

29. AMAE DE-CE 45-60, Vol.521, pp.211-214, Note, a/s: proposition Beyen, 7.2.1953; AMAE 

DE-CE 45-60, Vol.521, pp.215-230, Note du Service de CE, a.s. intégration économique. Entretiens 

avec M. Beyen et Conférence de Rome, 9.2.1953. 

30. Ibid. 

31. AN Papiers Bidault 38, Note pour le président, Wormser, 14.2.1953 a.s. pool agricole; G. THIE- 

MEYER, op.cit., pp.80 ff.


the Interior, the ministry de la France d'Outre-mer, the ministry of Economic affairs 

and the ministry of Agriculture. 32 

At this conference Wormser and du Vignaux presented documents which represented 

the position of the Quai d’Orsay. 33 According to them, contrary to the EC- 

SC, the agricultural community was of great importance for relations between 

France and its overseas areas, since the agricultural sector dominated these economic 

relations. There were five possible solutions: 1) total exclusion of the overseas 

areas from the European agricultural community, 2) the system of the ECSC, 

3) partial inclusion, 4) total inclusion in the European agricultural community and 

5) modification of the structure of the agricultural community. Solutions 1 and 2 

would separate the homeland from its overseas areas. Solution 4, which most seriously 

considered the relationship between metropolitan France and the Union 

Française, encountered an insurmountable obstacle, if the agricultural community 

intended to create a supranational agricultural commodities market. France itself 

was an important sales market for its overseas areas, just as the overseas areas were 

important customers for France’s agricultural (above all, sugars, wheat and preserved 

food) and industrial products. These were currently sold under the preference 

system on a higher price level than world prices. If the agricultural sales markets 

of the other five European states were opened to the French overseas areas by 

virtue of their being integrated into the European community, it would be favourable 

to the French overseas areas. The European states would accept this only on the 

condition of reciprocity for their industrial products. This meant a great sacrifice 

for France, because it would no longer enjoy exclusive access to the preference system. 

The substantial problem was whether the European partners were ready to carry 

the responsibility for social development together with France, although this, 

from an economic point of view, would be very unproductive. All the arguments 

concerning solutions 1, 2 and 4 applied to solution 3. Wormser recommended solution 

5: if France did not intend to sacrifice itself, it was necessary, 

“to give up the idea that the objective of this Community has to be the creation of a 

Common Market and to think of organizing trade in certain basic products taking 

into due consideration trade with our overseas territories in the negotiations with our 

European partners”*. 34 

32. AMAE DE-CE 45-60, Vol.577, pp.354-390, Rapport sur la création d’une Communauté européenne 

de l’agriculture et de l’alimentation présenté par M. Philippe Lamour au nom de la Commission 

de l’Agriculture, Paris, 16.10.1952, Conseil Economique Ph.L./J.B. 1625/Agr./120; AN Papiers 

Bidault 42, Note relative aux réunions tenues au Quai d’Orsay les 2 et 5 févr. 1953 entre les cabinets 

ministériels en vue de la préparation d’un comité interministériel, 7.2.1953. 

33. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Service de Coopération Economique, 

Communication au conseil des ministres, 27.1.1953. a.s./ l’organisation européenne des marchés 

agricoles et les TOM; AN Papiers Bidault 38, Note pour le président, Wormser, 14.2.1953 a.s. pool 

agricole; AN Papiers Bidault 38, Note pour le président, Wormser, 14.2.1953 a.s. pool agricole. 

34. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Service de Coopération Economique, 

Communication au conseil des ministres, 27.1.1953. a.s./ l’organisation européenne des marchés 

agricoles et les TOM.

72 


An organization of this type would by no means be a European community, but 

a bilateral and intergovernmental organization. It would ultimately be better to negotiate 

the question of the agricultural community within the framework of the 

OEEC. All participants in the interdepartmental conference shared the basic idea of 

this document. 35 

In France question of the EDC, the EPC, the customs union and the agricultural 

community depended closely on the kind of future relations between the Union 

Française and European community to be created. Awareness of this problem arose indirectly 

through the Strasbourg recommendation of the Assembly of the Council of Europe 

in September 1952 for common investments in all overseas areas of European 

countries, but such awareness was also directly caused by the EDC treaty and the EPC 

negotiations of the ad hoc Assembly. 36 In the Conseil de la République and the Assemblée 

de l’Union Française the problem had been discussed in the context of the EDC 

several times in 1952. In the discussion many feared that supranational European integration 

would separate France from its overseas areas. 37 

In view of this procedure the Quai d’Orsay began to intervene. It should be noted 

that the department Afrique-Levant had warned Schuman several times since 

October 1952 of arising problems for the Union Française from European integration. 

At that time Schuman did not take the warning seriously. 38 Nor did Monnet 

think it wise to tackle this problem at this stage. He asked Schuman, 

“to prevent representatives of the overseas territories from being designated at the 

Common Assembly and consequently to prevent also the question of the European 

Community’s relationship with the overseas territories belonging to the Union 

Française from being brought up for discussion at that moment”*. 

The Territoires d'Outre-Mer should only be included when Germany would be 

reunified, in order to retain the balance in European communities. 39 The department 

Afrique-Levant considered a provisional solution: The representatives from 

the overseas territories would participate in the parliament of the EPC, but the EPC 

35. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Note relative aux réunions tenues au Quai d’Orsay les 2 et 5 févr. 1953 

entre les cabinets ministériels en vue de la préparation d’un comité interministériel, 7.2.1953. 

36. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Direction des Affaires politiques 3ème Bureau, Pour M. le Ministre (à l’attention 

du professeur Luchaire), 6.2.1953, le Directeur-adjoint, Delteil, objet: Proposition de résolution 

tendant à inviter le Gouvernement à constituer une Commission chargée d’étudier les rapports 

entre l’Union Française et l’Organisation Politique de l’Europe présentée par Debré, au 

Conseil de la République; AMAE DE-CE 45-60, Vol.577, pp.420-424, L’entrée des TOM dans la 

Communauté Européenne, 26.11.1952, G. Peter, Office du Niger (organisme publique autonome) 

à Wormser ou Brunet; AN 457 34, RL/SB, les objections faites à la CED au cours des débats de 

l’Assemblée nationale, du Conseil de la République et de diverses manifestations politiques, confidentiel, 

undated. 

37. AN Papiers Bidault 34, Direction d’Afrique-Levant, S/D d’Afrique, Note a.s: Chambrun, Question 

n°4, 17.2.1953. 

38. AN Papiers Bidault 42, DGAP, Direction d’Afrique-Levant, sous-direction d’Afrique, Note, 

12.1.1953, a.s./Europe et Union Française. 

39. Lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman le 28 juin 1952, in: FONDATION JEAN MONNET POUR 

L’EUROPE (ed.), Jean Monnet - Robert Schuman, Correspondance, 1947-1953, Lausanne, 1986, 

p.148.


should not be endowed with powers over the French overseas territories from the 

start, and the jurisdiction of the EPC should be extended only later and gradually 

by France to non-European areas. 

These were the contents of article 101 of the draft EPC treaty of the ad hoc 

Assembly. Problems nevertheless remained: 

“1) If we reject the de facto extension, the consequence will be a break between metropolitan 

France and the overseas territories and a discriminatory treatment”*. 

In view of the American anti-colonial policy and the intensifying drive towards 

independence within the states of the Union Française (Indochina, Morocco and 

Tunisia), the weakening of the French sovereignty by the supranational European 

community would very probably lead to a “coupure” (split) of the French Empire. 

“2) two disadvantages at least will necessarily appear: a) a break this time between 

the Republic and the rest of the Union Française b) French sovereignty in the considered 

field will have to be shared with Germany and Italy in particular”*. 

In addition, there was no guarantee that the French delegates from Africa would 

act loyally towards France. Altogether it was to be expected that the relationship 

between the European community and the Union Française would supersede the 

existing connections between France and its overseas areas. This dilemma was to 

be taken “extremely serious”*. Amongst the problems caused by supranational European 

integration it was the most fundamental problem that France was confronted 

with at the turn of 1952-1953. All the difficulty 

“is indeed due to the fact that France can’t belong to the same extent to a European 

Community and to the Union Française, unless the two of them are completely 

merged”*. 40 

It was a question of priorities. According to some, such as Monnet and Schuman, 

Europe was right of way, whereas others gave the Union Française first priority. 

The convinced Gaullist Michel Debré pleaded for the second option. He defined 

Monnet’s supranational European communities as “an immense adventure”* for all 

and “some kind of nightmare” for many. According to him, these communities 

should be changed to the extent that the power of decision rested with the council 

of the heads of government. The Assembly however should by no means be endowed 

with “governmental and legislative power” and the Executive Council 

should function only administratively. Thus Debré’s Europe was called “a coalition 

of national authorities” or “an association of sovereignties”. 41 Debré represented 

the prevailing opinion of the Conseil de la République, the Assemblée de l’Union 

Française and the Comité d'études et de liaison du patronat de l'Union Française 

(CELPUF), which was close to the Conseil national du patronat français 

40. AMAE Papiers Massigli (PA-AP 217), Vol.76, pp.34-37, DGAP, Note sur la représentation des 

TOM dans une éventuelle Assemblée européenne, 10.11.1952; AN Papiers Bidault 42, DGAP, Direction 

d’Afrique-Levant, sous-direction d’Afrique, Note, 12.1.1953, a.s./Europe et Union Française; 

AN Papiers Bidault 42, Direction d’Afrique-Levant, s/d d’Afrique (Jurgensen), Note, 29 

janv. 1953, a.s./Europe et Union Française. 

41. AN Papiers Bidault 34, Debré, Note à l’attention de M. Bidault, 30.1.1953.

74 


(CNPF). 42 The minister responsible for the French Territoires d’Outre-Mer, Jacquinot, 

shared Debré’s opinion: 

“The realization of the Union Française precedes and prevails for us over the realization 

of the European entity. One should not forget that the French grandeur is made 

up of metropolitan France as well as of all its overseas territories”*. 43 

The majority of the French government was inclined to master this dilemma not 

by modifying the old French colonial system but by restructuring European integration, 

so as to develop from 

“a federal or merged system into a confederate or associative system, taking the 

Union Française as an indissociable whole, that will only enter into a sufficiently 

flexible relationship with Europe”*. 44 

With this solution France could benefit from the additional advantage of being 

able to co-operate with Great Britain in such a confederate Europe in European and 

overseas affairs. 45 

Contrary to this train of thought, the leaders of the MRP and the SFIO took a 

positive position on the question of the inclusion of the French overseas territories 

into the European communities. Guy Mollet, the leader of the French socialist party, 

was surprised at the negative opinion of the Assemblée de l’Union Française in 

Versailles. He held the view that the specialized communities should be limited to 

Europe only, but that in the long run France was not in the position to solve the 

problems of its underdeveloped overseas territories alone. In full agreement with 

Mollet, Rose and Alduy emphasized the necessity to tackle the question of the 

creation of a European investment bank in the French overseas areas as soon as 

possible. Moreover, in a note which is to be found in Mollet’s private archives 

42. Organisation Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste, Paris (OURS), Archives Guy Mollet (AGM) 110, 

Lettre du Secrétariat Général de l’Assemblée de l’Union Française à G. Mollet, 13.1.1953; AN Papiers 

Bidault 42, Conseil de la République, N°14 année 1953, annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 20 

janv. 1953, Proposition de Résolution tendant à inviter le Gouvernement à constituer une commission 

chargée d’étudier les rapports entre l’Union Française et une organisation politique de l’Europe présentée 

par M. Michel Debré, Exposé des motifs; AN Papiers Bidault 42, «L’Union Française et l’Europe», 

travaux de la conférence plénière du CELPUF des 13 et 14 janvier 1953. The CELPUF consisted of the 

entrepreneurs from the metropolitan France, Algeria, the Départements d’outre-mer, the Territoires 

d’outre-mer, the Territoires Associés, the Etats Associés, and the Etats protégés. The President was 

chairman of the Comité National du Patronat Français, G. Villiers. The CELPUF dedicated its plenary 

session on 13 and 14 January 1953 to the study of the problem that was raised by the creation of an EPC 

and a Common Market in relation to the Union Française. (AN Papiers Bidault 42, lettre de Villiers à 

Bidault, 20.1.1953); AN Papiers Bidault 42, N°111, Conseil de la République, année 1953, annexe au 

procès-verbal de la séance du 26 févr. 1953, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires étrangères 

sur la proposition de résolution de M. Michel Debré tendant à inviter le Gouvernement à constituer 

une commission chargée d’étudier les rapports entre l’Union Française et une organisation politique 

de l’Europe par M. Marius Moutet (sénateur). 

43. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Le Monde, 27.1.1953, Discours de M. Jacquinot, 25.1.1952. 

44. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Direction d’Afrique-Levant, s/d d’Afrique, Note, 29 janv. 1953, a.s./Europe 

et Union Française. 

45. Ibid.; AN Papiers Bidault 42, MAE, DGAP, Europe, S/Direction du Conseil de l’Europe, Note, 

27.1.1953, A/S. Situation des Territoires d’Outre-Mer à l’égard des Communautés européennes.


Nr.106 (Articles et interventions de Mollet sur l'Europe, 1948-1955) he completely 

agreed with article 101 of the draft EPC treaty suggested by Teitgen. 46 For Mollet, 

the question of the Union Française was not a reason to modify the supranationality 

of European integration. The special issue of the party newspaper of the MRP 

(Forces Nouvelles) on 20 December 1952 announced the result of the internal discussions 

of the MRP regarding these problems. According to the expert on the Union 

Française, G. Le Brun Keris, these problems were used as a tactical instrument 

by opponents of the European integration. However, 

“we cannot give up either the European Union, the answer to German pressure, 

among other advantages, or our overseas territories to which so many moral ties are 

linking us and without which we would only be a very small power”*. 

Le Brun Keris, therefore, advocated that the French Republic as a whole should 

be integrated into the EPC and so the jurisdiction of the EPC should be extended to 

the French overseas territories. However, one should find a balance between driving 

European integration forward and retaining the Union Française. 

“Just as France judged it necessary for its own legislation and regulations, the European 

Community’s legislation and regulations as well will have to be adapted to the 

situation of the different overseas countries by means of application rules determined 

by the relevant bodies within the French Republic”*. 

Teitgen, the leader of the MRP, who was engaged in the negotiations of the ad 

hoc Assembly, was of exactly the same opinion. 47 For Le Brun Keris as well as for 

Teitgen, the question of the Union Française was not a reason to modify the supranationality 

of European integration. 

What was Bidault’s position, as the new foreign minister, on European integration 

as a whole? Bidault alluded to making certain modifications to the European policies of 

his predecessor in favour of those who most strongly represented national feelings. He 

did not, however, go so far as to abolish the existing achievements. The experienced 

French diplomat Chauvel recommended to Bidault on 25 January 1953, to implement 

the EDC in the light of the negotiations compromising the positions of “the pole MRP 

and the pole RPF”, a recommendation which Bidault accepted. On 21 April 1953, Bidault 

rejected the demand of the French military to modify the determined EDC transition 

period to an indefinite period of time and also the demand of the high-level civil 

servants of the Quai d’Orsay to renounce the EDC. Bidault took account of the strong 

46. OURS, Comité directeur, procès-verbal, Vol.9, 25 mai 1952 - 26 juin 1953, Réunion du 26 novembre 

1952; OURS AGM 106, Note, undated, author unknown (G. Mollet?). 

47. AN MRP 350 AP 128, Forces Nouvelles N°28 Samedi 20 décembre 1952, «C’est toute la République 

qui doit rentrer dans la Communauté européenne, par G. Le Brun Keris»; AN Papiers Bidault 

42, G. le Brun Keris, Note sur les rapports à établir entre les pays d’outre-mer membres de 

la République Française et la Communauté politique européenne, undated. Le Brun Keris suggested 

as a measure for this balance that direct elections should not be introduced at the beginning. In 

this point he dissociated himself from Teitgen (AN Papiers Bidault 39, Lettre de G. Le Brun Keris 

(Conseiller de l’Union Française) à Bidault, 24.2.1953).

76 


national feelings in France, but he was not prepared to jeopardize the supranational European 

army. 48 Bidault was thus closer to Alphand’s position than to that of the opponents 

of the EDC at the Quai d’Orsay. His attitude towards the EDC laid the foundation 

for his position on the EPC. 

In order to define the French position in view of the conference of the six foreign 

ministers in Rome on 24-25 February 1953, Bidault called a meeting on 11 

February, at which all the Quai d’Osay’s top civil servants were present. 49 Teitgen 

was invited to report on the work of the ad hoc Assembly. The top civil servants 

criticized many points in Teitgen’s report. The theme of this debate dealt with the 

question of whether the Germans could be sufficiently controlled in the supranational 

European community or, conversely, whether the community might finally 

be controlled by the Germans in the foreseeable future. The participants also discussed 

whether promoting supranational European integration would be compatible 

with France’s world power position, based on the Union Française. 

On the one hand, there were Teitgen, Alphand and Maurice Schumann who defended 

the continuation of Schuman’s European policies and the compatibility of 

these policies with retaining the Union Française. On the other hand, Parodi, de la 

Tournelle, de Maroerie, Gros, Seydoux, Wormser, Sauvagnargues and du Vignaux 

argued for the modification of Schuman’s European policies and for a French foreign 

policy which put more emphasis on the Union Française than on Europe. 

Their position was typically represented by the secretary general at the Quai d’Orsay, 

Alexander Parodi and the head of the European department, F. Seydoux. Parodi 

linked the EPC project to French foreign policy as a whole. With the Schuman 

Plan, France had taken the initiative and determined the speed and direction of European 

integration. However, France had gradually been deprived of its initiative 

and was driven to the point that it now was confronted with the so-called ‘Luxembourg 

resolution’. 

“What is the meaning of all this? That France has to disappear as an independent 

state (…)? On the other hand, this European Community will not be controlled by 

France. When the projects of the ECSC and the EDC were put forward, we could 

legitimately assume that the European Community, as it was conceived, would operate 

under French leadership. It is obvious that Germany will be the leader of this 

community”*. 

48. AN Papiers Bidault 34, Chauvel, Note, 25. janv. 1953; G.-H. SOUTOU, Bidault et la construction 

européenne 1944-1954, in: Revue d’histoire diplomatique, 1991, p.298. For the position of the 

Gaullists on European integration see, SEUNG-RYEOL K., Der Fehlschlag des ersten Versuchs 

zu einer politischen Integration Westeuropas von 1951 bis 1954, Frankfurt am Main, 2000, 

pp.77-83. 

49. AMAE DE-CE 45-60, 1948-1954, Vol.578, pp.286-308, Compte-rendu de la réunion tenue le 

Mercredi 11 février à 20h30 chez M. Bidault sur l’organisation politique de l’Europe. Participants: 

Bidault, Maurice Schumann (secrétaire d’Etat), Pierre-Henri Teitgen (leader of the MRP), Parodi 

(secrétaire général), de la Tournelle (directeur des Affaires politiques), Alphand (president of the 

Interim Committee of the EDC), de Maroerie, Prof. Gros, Seydoux (chef de la direction pour l'Europe), 

Wormser (chef du Service de coopération économique), Brouillet, Sauvagnargues (direction 

de l’Afrique-Levant), du Vignaux, de Folin.


If the French overseas areas were opened to Europe, he emphasized, France 

would lose its rank as a world power. 50 Bidault replied to Parodi that France, Great 

Britain and the U.S. would have to lead the Western world. Seydoux held the view 

that it was impossible for France to belong to the Six and at the same time to remain 

one of the three great powers. Bidault replied again that both should remain 

compatible. Bidault seemed to be torn, but was nearer to Teitgen’s thinking than to 

Parodi’s. Bidault insisted on a minimum amount of integration: 

“It is not a question of giving Europe the possibility to extend its authority to unlimited 

fields. It is only a matter of uniting the ECSC and the EDC in order to have few 

and centralized organizations”*. 

The only new element, which Bidault sought to introduce through the EPC 

project, was “suffrage universel”. He therefore finally said that the EPC should 

“open its windows by means of universal suffrage”. However, he did not take a 

clear position on the question of the Union Française, which he called “our great 

concern”, with the exception of the principle quoted above. 51 

Bidault however was not convinced of the necessity of direct elections. At the 

meeting of the board of MRP directors on 4 March 1953, Bidault said: “It seems 

most uncertain to me that universal suffrage should be adopted”*. A. Colin replied: 

“Universal suffrage is essential in order to create a certain dynamism”*. 52 Bidault 

did not think that direct elections were a measure to speed up the European integration 

as Colin thought, but for him it was only a tactical instrument in order to make 

the ratification of the EDC treaty easier. 

While visiting Paris on 20 February 1953, Beyen asked Bidault whether the 

French government intended to submit the EDC treaty together with the EPC treaty 

to Parliament for ratification or whether the government would be content with 

“favourable perspectives” regarding the creation of a political community. Beyen 

said that the first hypothesis would cause difficulties between both states, because 

the French Parliament did not want economic integration, whilst the Dutch Parliament 

was opposed to the EPC, if it were not combined with economic integration. 

Bidault replied: 

“The French Parliament stated, among other necessities, the need to create a political 

community. It isn’t sure whether today it would do the same again as one year ago”*. 

He therefore did not demand that the EPC treaty should be ready to be signed 

before the ratification of the EDC treaty. 53 So it seemed that both politicians agreed 

upon the second hypothesis. 

Bidault expressed his basic position regarding the European policy in a speech 

at the Assemblée Nationale on 9 March 1953. The aim was, according to Bidault, 

to build Europe without breaking France down, to create Europe, but not to dis- 

50. Ibid. 

51. Ibid. 

52. AN MRP 350 AP 50, Commission exécutive du 4 mars 1953, p.10. 

53. AN Papiers Bidault 38, Note, 20.2.1953, a.s. Entretien entre le Président Bidault et M. Beyen, Ministre 

des Affaires Etrangères des Pays-Bas, le 20 février 1953.

78 


solve France therein, to raise and maintain France’s leadership of the European 

community. The French spoke in the name of 120 million people. In their name 

they would strengthen the Union Française and create Europe. 54 

Bidault’s main positions regarding the EPC can be summarized as follows: balancing 

Europe and the Union Française (”vocation européenne et mondiale” – European 

calling and world calling); resuming integration within the framework of 

the six states; making the jurisdiction of the EPC correspond, from the beginning, 

to that of the ECSC and the EDC; refusal of the Beyen Plan; entrusting the EPC 

only with the right to make suggestions regarding a Common Market. Besides the 

question of direct elections, the questions of the concrete structure of the EPC’s executive, 

and the relationship between the EPC and the Union Française were also 

remaining open. 55 

The Governmental Conference in Rome in September-October 1953 and the 

Failure of the EPC Project 

The conferences for the additional protocols of the EDC treaty and for agricultural 

integration in 1953 ended without results. The four foreign minister conferences of 

the ECSC states dealing with the draft of the ad hoc Assembly 56 also brought no 

results. It is remarkable that Bidault referred each time to the difficulties regarding 

the Union Française without taking a clear position on this. The diplomatic conference 

which was intended to discuss the draft EPC treaty of the ad hoc Assembly, 

according to article 38 of the EDC treaty, took place in Rome in September-October 

1953. In the following section the internal debates of France for the preparation 

of the Rome conference are discussed with special consideration given to the question 

of the Union Française. 57 

The high-level civil servants of the Quai d’Orsay made every effort to convert 

the supranational character of the draft treaty of the ad hoc Assembly into a confederal 

form. They criticized the draft treaty of the ad hoc Assembly on the points of 

economic integration, of coordination with regard to foreign policy, of its supranational 

structure (above all the executive council) and, not least, the relationship be- 

54. „Bericht über die Behandlung des Vertragsentwurfes nach dem 10. März 1953“, submitted by Dr. 

von Brentano on the meeting of the Constitutional Committee of the ad hoc Assembly on 23 June 

1953, in: Leitfaden und amtliche Dokumente des Verfassungsausschusses, Mai-Juli 1953, p.47. 

55. AN Papiers Bidault 38, Note du Gouvernement français relative au projet de marché commun, 

21.2.1953; AN Papiers Bidault 38, Conception française pour l’organisation et le fonctionnement 

de l’organisation exécutive, undated - author unknown (it is nevertheless sure that this note before 

the conference of ministers of foreign affairs in Rome was drawn up in February). 

56. The conferences were held in Rome in February, in Strasbourg in March, in Paris in May and in 

Baden-Baden in August 1953. 

57. In May, the Mayer government was brought down. The cabinet crisis lasted until July, when the 

new Laniel government was formed. Bidault remained minister of foreign affairs. The European 

policies of the new government continued essentially unchanged.


tween the Union Française and the community. The last point of criticism will be 

brought under further analysis in the next paragraph. 

On 27 April 1953, an interdepartmental conference took place in the office of the 

secretary general of the French Foreign Office, Parodi, in order to consider the consequences 

of the draft EPC treaty for the Union Française. 58 Bourgeot took the view that 

direct elections were unfavourable, since they would set the overseas territories in direct 

contact with the five other states. It would be desirable that the European Parliament 

would consist of the delegates selected from the national parliaments. Ratineau drew attention 

to the fact that the draft EPC treaty would offer to the overseas territories a “itinéraire 

de fuite” [escape route] from France. Roaux feared that the draft treaty would 

cause the separation of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia from France. Bardet was worried 

that, on the one hand, if the Etats associés should participate in the EPC, irregardless of 

form, their direct contacts with the five other states could break off the close connection 

between them and France. On the other hand, he was concerned that, if they remained 

outside of the EPC, France would lose its guiding role over them. Burin des Roziers 

pointed out that a studying committee, which had been set up on Mayer’s suggestion 

within the framework of the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, had recently submitted 

its research results. It was agreed that the interested ministries should make their 

views clear and a conference among them should take place one day between 4 and 9 

May. 59 On the basis of the documents that the author examined, it can not be ascertained 

whether this conference actually took place. However, it is clear that the views 

that had been expressed by the top civil servants from the interested ministries were not 

modified at a later stage. For example, the minister in charge of France d’Outre-mer, L. 

Jacquinot, endorsed Bourgeot’s fears regarding direct elections. Moreover, he pointed 

out that the supranational Executive Council should be replaced by an office whose 

head was to be appointed by the Council of national ministers. He rejected the extension 

of jurisdiction of the EPC on foreign policy and on economic integration. 60 

The top civil servants of the Quai d’Orsay shared these fears. Jurgensen regarded 

the guarantee of article 101 of the draft treaty as insufficient. He proposed that 

the EPC should become “supple” in order to let the Union Française as a whole 

58. AMAE Europe 44-60, Vol.78, p.140, Bidault au Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer, de l’Intérieur 

et des Etats associés, 10 avril 1953; AN Papiers Bidault 42, Compte-rendu de la réunion du 27 avril 

concernant le problème des rapports entre l’Union Française et la Communauté Européenne, 28 

avril 1953. In this meeting participated the ministry of Foreign affairs [Parodi, De la Tournelle, 

Marchal (directeur d’Afrique-Levant), Jurgensen (Sous-directeur d’Afrique-Levant), Salade (Direction 

d’Asie), Argod (Direction d’Europe), Valery (Direction Economique)], the cabinet of the 

president of the Conseil des ministres [Burin des Roziers, (Conseiller diplomatique au cabinet du 

président du conseil)], the Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer [Ratineau (Cabinet du Ministre), 

Bourgeot (Sous-Directeur aux Affaires politiques), Servoise (Direction des Affaires politiques)], 

the Ministère des Etats associés [Aurillac (directeur des Services politiques), Bardet (directeur-adjoint)] 

and the Ministère de l’Intérieur [Roaux, (sous-directeur d’Algérie)]. 

59. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Compte-rendu de la réunion du 27 avril concernant le problème des rapports 

entre l’Union Française et la Communauté Européenne, 28 avril 1953. 

60. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer, Direction des Affaires politiques, JB/ 

CJ, Note, 5.5.1953, a.s. du projet de traité portant statut de la Communauté Européenne (en ce qui 

concerne les TOM).

80 


take part in it, without jeopardizing the close connection between those areas and 

France. He argued for indirect elections for the European Parliament. He spoke 

against the establishment of a supranational Executive Council, whose function the 

Council of national ministers could assume, and he also rejected each extension of 

jurisdiction of the EPC on foreign policy and economic integration. 61 

The research results of the above mentioned studying committee (which was chaired 

by general Catroux) consisted of two parts: 1) the institutional and political aspects, 2) the 

economic aspects. The author of the first part was Jurgensen, the second part was written 

by René Servoise from the ministry de la France d'Outre-mer. The first part was identical 

with the draft that Jurgensen had developed internally at the Quai d’Orsay. Servoise regarded 

the Community of the Six as an insufficient framework for the development of the 

economy of the French overseas areas. These two parts, which were used as one of the 

important main documents for laying down the French attitude, were published in the 

magazine “Politique Etrangère” of the Centre d'Etudes de politique étrangère in 1953. Jurgensen 

did not want to be revealed as the author of the first part. Therefore, the author of 

the first part - “L'Union Française et les institutions européennes”, was called “XXX”. 62 

Seydoux summarized the internally developed thoughts of the Quai d’Orsay, in 

contact with Bidault. As for the Peoples’ Chamber, its members should be directly 

elected by the national parliaments in the first period, and afterwards by the people. 

He spoke decidedly against the establishment of a supranational Executive Council. 

In his opinion, the Council of the National Ministers or the Council of the Foreign 

Ministers should assume this role. Deviating from the suggestions made by 

Jurgensen, Seydoux recommended that at first only metropolitan France should 

take part in the EPC, because the French government, above all Bidault, had not yet 

taken any clear position on this subject. Accordingly, France did not need to be given 

additional seats in the People’s Chamber. Along these lines Seydoux prepared 

instructions for the French delegation of the diplomatic conference in Rome. 63 

61. AN Papiers Bidault 39, Direction d’Afrique-Levant S/D d’Afrique, Note sur le problème des TOM 

dans les Travaux de l’Assemblée ad hoc, 23.3.1953; AN Papiers Bidault 39, DGAP, Direction 

d’Afrique-Levant S/D d’Afrique, Note sur la position de la France en tant que puissance 

d’Outre-mer, en présence du statut européen proposé par l’Assemblée ad hoc, 28.4.1953. 

62. AN Papiers Bidault 42, «L’Union Française et la Communauté Européenne», Rapport d’un groupe 

d’études du Centre d’études de politique étrangère, 15.4.1953, Première Partie: Les aspects institutionnels 

et politiques, Deuxième Partie: Les aspects économiques; AN Papiers Bidault 42, Lettre 

du général Catroux (président du Groupe d’études de l’Union Française) à Bidault, 5.5.1953; 

XXX, L’Union Française et les institutions européennes, in: Politique Etrangère, 4(1953), Paris, 

pp.267-276; R., SERVOISE, L’Union Française devant l’intégration économique européenne, in: 

Ibid., pp.278-306. 

63. AMAE DE-CE 45-60, Vol.578, pp.355-357, DGAP, Europe, Note 5.5.1953, A/S. Projet de statut de 

Communauté Européenne; AMAE DE-CE 45-60, Vol.578, pp.402-409, DGAP, Europe, s/Direction du 

Conseil de l’Europe, Note, 5.6.1953, A/S. Conférence de Rome pour l’étude du projet de Communauté 

Européenne; AMAE DE-CE 45-60, Vol.579, pp.94-102, DGAP, Europe, Note, 7.9.1953, A/S Communauté 

politique européenne; AN Papiers Bidault 40, DGAP, Europe, S/D du Conseil de l’Europe, Note, 

7.9.1953, A/S Conférence de Rome pour l’étude du projet de Communauté politique; Bruce David, Notebook 

14 September-December 1953, Monday September 14, 1953; Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA) Nachlaß 

(NL) Blankenhorn 24, pp.111-117, letter Blankenhorn (Paris) to Hallstein, 18.9.1953.


On 16 September 1953, a stormy council of ministers meeting took place, in 

which Bidault was forced by the pro-European wing of Laniel’s government (Reynaud 

and Teitgen) to withdraw his confederal instructions and to replace them with 

new, more concrete and supranational directives. Thereupon Bidault had to issue 

revised instructions, according to which direct elections should take place from the 

beginning, but no substantial powers should be awarded to Parliament. An executive 

of the community could be created, but it should consist of the Council of national 

ministers and the Executive Council of the EPC. The Council of national 

ministers should take “all essential decisions”. The Executive Council should consist 

of a president to be appointed by the Council of national ministers, the president 

of the ECSC’s High Authority, the president of the Board of Commissioners of 

the EDC and two members appointed by the Council of national ministers. 64 These 

new instructions precipitated a dramatic debate between proponents of supranational 

integration and their opponents. Because of this extreme discord within the 

French government, the new instructions could no longer be submitted to the Council 

of Ministers for approval. Instead, Bidault passed the new instructions to the de 

facto director of the delegation, Seydoux, 65 after obtaining assent from Laniel. In 

addition, Bidault indicated that the French delegation should not bind itself to anything 

final as long as the Assemblée Nationale had not concerned itself in detail 

with the entire question. The question of the Union Française should be excluded 

from the agenda. 66 

The governmental conference went into session in Rome on 22 September 

1953. From the beginning, the question of the Union Française was excluded from 

the discussion, after the French as well as the Belgian delegation had made a statement 

about it before the opening of the conference. 67 The conference in Rome ended 

again without result, just like the earlier conferences of the foreign ministers. It 

was decided to discuss the draft EPC treaty again at a next conference of the foreign 

ministers in The Hague. The unresolved position of France on the EPC project 

became clearer. 

64. PAAA II, Bd.859, 224-20/22, Siegfried (Brüssel) an Auswärtiges Amt, concerning: Quai d’Orsay 

gegen EPG, Brüssel, 15.9.1953; BA NL Blankenhorn 24, pp.173 ff., Vermerk für den Herrn Bundeskanzler, 

Geheim, Bonn, 14.9.1953, Gespräche mit Monnet und R. Mayer; BA NL Blankenhorn 

24, pp.147-149, Blankenhorn (Paris) an Adenauer und Hallstein, 16.9.1953, geheim; BA NL Blankenhorn 

24, pp.150 ff., Tagebuch, Mittwoch, 16.9.1953, Paris; AN Papiers Bidault 40, Note, 

17.9.1953, A/S Exécutif; AN Papiers Bidault 40, Note, 18.9.1953, A/S Instructions pour la délégation 

française à la Conférence de Rome (22 septembre 1953). 

65. The official, de jure, director of the French delegation was the French ambassador in Rome, Fouques 

Duparc. 

66. BA NL Blankenhorn 24, p.127, Tagebuch, Freitag, 18.9.1953; PAAA II, Bd. 859, AZ 224-20/22, 

p. 248, Nachrichtenspiegel, 22.9.1953; PAAA II, Bd.851, AZ 224-00, Bd.1, pp.107-108, Telegramm 

Walther (Paris) an Auswärtiges Amt, Konferenz Rom, für Staatssekretär, 22. September 

1953, Nr.444, Geheim. 

67. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Déclaration des délégations française et belge. Rome, 24.9.1953; AN Fond 

60, Vol.3077, conférence pour la Communauté politique européenne, Rome, 22.9-9.10.1953, Rapport 

aux Ministres des Affaires étrangères, Secrétariat, p.4.

82 


In a letter at Laniel on 22 October 1953, the minister in charge of France 

d'Outre-mer, Jacquinot, criticized the instructions prepared by Seydoux concerning 

the relationship between the European community and the Union Française, i.e., 

the provisional elimination of the representation of the French overseas territories 

in the European Parliament. Jurgensen supported Jacquinot and expressed that the 

EPC structurally should become even looser, so as to include the overseas areas as 

a whole into the European integration without jeopardizing the links between 

France and its overseas areas. However, the SFIO and the MRP officially supported 

the regulation of the draft EPC treaty as a result of Teitgen’s initiative. 68 

Bidault gave an important speech on the government's European policies in the 

Assemblée Nationale on 20 November 1953: “The real dilemma” was the situation 

in which France had to choose between Europe and the Union Française, in other 

words, between the “vocation européenne” and the “vocation mondiale”. In order 

to find a solution to this dilemma, one had to start out from political reality, Bidault 

argued. The ECSC had come into force. The EDC treaty was already signed. However, 

it was not a question to “federate” the nations and the states which possessed 

a long history, but to “make them share” a common function. One had to consider 

the different political situation, for example the division of Germany and the overseas 

responsibility of France. If one started from this reality, both the concept of a 

“a federal system consisting of a government or an embryo of government of the 

six countries”*, and the confederation model of the Gaullists could not meet this 

reality, because the concept of a confederation would run against the ECSC and the 

EDC. The true Europeans were “des constructeurs patients” [patient builders]. 69 

Bidault intended to balance the European policy of his predecessor with strong nationalistic 

thoughts and emotions. He saw the solution not in destroying the previous 

accomplishments, but in correcting their contents and reducing the speed of 

European integration in favour of France. 

Still, the kind of relationship that would link the Union Française to European union 

was not yet clearly defined. In France, this resulted not taking a clear position on the institutional 

questions of the EPC. So the conference in The Hague again brought no re- 

68. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Lettre du ministre de la France d’Outre-mer, Jacquinot à Laniel, 

22.10.1953; AN Papiers Bidault 42, MAE, HA/MB, M. Schumann, Note pour le président, 

6.11.1953, A.S. Communauté Européenne et TOM, Très Secret; AN Papiers Bidault 42, Postel-Vimey 

(Directeur de la Caisse centrale des TOM), La France d’Outre-mer et la CPE, Projet de l’Assemblée 

ad hoc et amendements de la Délégation française à la Conférence de Rome, 12.11.1953, 

AN Papiers Bidault 42, Direction d’Afrique-Levant, S/D d’Afrique, Note sur les relations entre 

l’Union Française et la CPE, 23.11.1953; AN Papiers Bidault 42, JDJ/LG, DGAP Direction 

d’Afrique-Levant, S/D d’Afrique, Note sur les relations entre l’Union Française et la CPE, 

6.1.1954. 

69. Speech of Undersecretary of State M. Schumann as Bidault’s representative in the Assemblée Nationale. 

Compte-rendu analytique officiel. 2ème séance du vendredi 20 nov. 1953, pp. 19-27 

(These minutes are found in PAAA Büro Staatssekretäre 1949-1967, Bd. 59, pp. 16-46); AN 

Papiers Bidault 38, Note, author and date unknown. The content indicates that the document for 

the preparation of this speech was written in November 1953. The document is situated, however, 

in the document series which was collected and kept for the conference of Rome in February 1952. 

Therefore, this classification is false.


sults, just like the earlier conferences. The six foreign ministers only set up an expert 

committee. This committee went on working until the summer of 1954, when the EPC 

project disappeared at the demise of the EDC in August 1954. 

Conclusion 

The French government was reserved and careful in its approach to political integration 

in 1952. After the replacement of the Pinay-Schuman government with that 

of Mayer-Bidault, this caution became more obvious. The underlying cause was the 

difficult problem of the Union Française: How could France harmonize the advancing 

European integration, which was mainly directed toward the monitoring of 

Germany, with its world power position mainly based on retaining the colonial system? 

Furthermore, this problem involved also the question of whether and how 

France should appear as one of the world powers or whether it should act instead as 

leader of the united Europe on the stage of world politics. France began to split 

over these questions. 

For Monnet and Schuman, a supranational status was necessary for the protection 

of a framework in which France and Germany would be reconciled and West 

Germany could be sufficiently controlled. They did not lose sight of the risk that 

the dominating role could be transferred to the Germans in a supranational community, 

against which an equilibrium had to be maintained. This equilibrium was to be 

constructed in the broader framework of an Atlantic community. According to 

Monnet, France’s world power status could be ensured on the basis of a leading 

role in the supranational European community. This conviction was derived from 

the fact that, without a close co-operation with the U.S., France’s world power status 

could not be secured. The United States pursued a world-wide anticommunist 

strategy at that time, by co-operating closely with Great Britain mainly in the 

non-European areas, and with France primarily in Europe. Schuman and Monnet 

were ready to delegate a still larger part of sovereignty to the European communities 

than the Gaullists and the high-ranking civil servants at the Quai d’Orsay who 

shared strong national feelings. 

The opponents of Monnet-Schuman’s European policy regarded supranational 

European integration as an insufficient framework to control the Germans. Rather, 

they saw therein the possibility that France would eventually lose the dominant position 

in the European community to the advantage of the Germans. The Gaullists, 

the majority of the top civil servants at the Quai d’Orsay and the EDC opponents 

generally believed that the French world power position depended more on the Union 

Française than on Europe. In view of the crisis of the Union Française, and the 

contrary attitude of America in colonial questions, they viewed Monnet’s supranational 

communities as a sellout of France’s national sovereignty and of its historical 

world power status. Therefore, they demanded to give up the supranational construction 

of the community in favour of a confederal construction. These opinions

84 


gained more influence on France’s European policy in 1953-1954 than previously 

under Monnet and Schuman. 

With his realistic European policy, Bidault intended to meet all French positions 

on the question of European integration. He could not decide however which orientation 

to give to French foreign policy, whether to give priority to the Union 

Française or to European integration. He simply postponed taking a clear position 

on this question for later. 

Despite the careful attitude of the French government, it seemed that the EPC 

would lead in the near future to a federation, a framework within which France’s 

world power status could be dissolved. France was against the final stage of European 

supranational integration, which it expected in the EPC negotiations. In view 

of this terrible prospect a number of people in France among those who had advocated 

the ECSC and the EDC as monitoring control bodies over West Germany recoiled 

from European supranational integration. The original opponents of this 

functional integration, like the Gaullists, affirmed this regression. 

In conclusion, the fear that supranational European integration would break 

down the Union Française played a great role in France’s rejection of the supranational 

construction of the EDC and the EPC. Thus the EPC project did not serve its 

original purpose, the relief of the ratification of the EDC treaty, but proved only to 

be a cumbersome burden for the ratification. France changed its attitude towards 

the problem of the relationship between the Union Française and a supranational 

European union two years later, during the EEC negotiations. At this time France 

wanted to include its overseas territories in the community. This change in attitude 

is of great importance for the success of the EEC negotiations. 70 

70. It is very interesting to study why France changed its position in such a short period. But this article 

will not tackle this question.

85 


France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in 

the European Economic Community, 1955-56 

Lise Rye Svartvatn 

The development of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1960s illustrates 

how France solved a national problem by means of a European solution. 1 By 

making France’s participation in the European Economic Community (EEC) conditional 

on the setting up of a common agricultural market and a common agricultural 

policy in accordance with French preferences, the country succeeded in giving 

French surplus production new outlets. 2 The French position during the negotiations 

that led to the Treaty of Rome indicates that there were similar ambitions 

behind the country’s claims for social harmonization. France was not the only 

country calling for social harmonization. However, while the Benelux countries 

demanded a harmonization of the social policies of the participating countries, 

France called for a harmonization of working regulations, claiming that the diversity 

in existing national regulations caused unequal terms of competition. More 

precisely, France demanded that all members of the future common market signed 

and ensured the effective application of the International Labour Organization’s 

(ILO) convention on equal pay for men and women. She also demanded the introduction 

of uniform overtime pay for hours exceeding an agreed number and the 

harmonization of paid holiday schemes. 

This article argues that the French claims for social harmonization were 

launched in order to secure time, protection and approval. When first presented at 

the Messina conference in early June 1955, the claims formed part of a scheme that 

aimed to gain time for a government unable to take a stand on the proposed common 

market. They were sustained in order to secure continued protection for 

French industry. Continued protection was in turn instrumental in securing the National 

Assembly’s approval of the government’s pro-EEC policy. Maintenance of 

protection simultaneously formed part of a superior agenda aiming at the modernization 

of the French industrial structure. France raised the stakes in order to get her 

own way. In October 1956 this led to a deadlock in the negotiations. Due to Germany’s 

will and ability to accommodate the French claims, France finally obtained an 

agreement that rendered a completion of the negotiations possible. 

A central question in studies of French European policy in this period has been 

why France took an interest in the new proposals for further integration that ap- 

1. This article originated as a paper presented at the workshop “The Nordic Countries and West 

European Economic Integration up to the EFTA period” in Turku (Åbo), September 1999. I thank 

the participants, the anonymous reviewers, Frances M. B. Lynch, Hans Otto Frøland and Siri Rye 

Salvesen for helpful suggestions. 

2. Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel pour 

les questions de coopération économique européenne (SGCI) 771468, Art.89, Note sur les objectifs 

de la France dans la politique agricole commune, 03.11.61.

86 


peared in spring 1955. Hanns Jürgen Küsters argues that it was the Suez crisis that 

“… tipped the balance for the French government’s decision to join the EEC …”. 3 

Wilfried Loth stresses that Guy Mollet’s pro-European policy aimed to tie the Federal 

Republic of Germany to the West and to further Europe’s independence from 

the USA. 4 Pierre Guillen sees France’s participation in the common market as a result 

of her wish for co-operation on research into the use of nuclear energy. 5 Thus, 

there has been a tendency to emphasize the impact of geopolitical factors. Others 

attach more weight to economic considerations. Frances Lynch argues that the decision 

to sign the Treaty of Rome resulted from the need to find a framework that 

would enable a continued modernization of the French economy through the exposure 

to increased, but limited, competition. 6 Lynch downgrades the impact of the 

Cold War. So does Andrew Moravcsik, who claims that commercial considerations 

were decisive for the French government’s decision to sign the Treaty of Rome. 7 

Explanations of the claims for social harmonization have emphasized domestic 

political imperatives. Alan Milward retraces the claims for social harmonization to 

demands from French industry, arguing that the claims were necessary for parliamentary 

reasons. 8 Likewise, Hanns Jürgen Küsters writes that 

„In Wirklichkeit waren die Diskussionen um die soziale Harmonisierung ein reines 

Politikum zur Befriedigung französischer Verbandsinteressen. Die Regierung hatte 

sich die Forderung teils notgedrungen, teils willkommen zu eigen gemacht, um 

zusätzliche Garantien und Schutzklauseln einzuhandeln“. 9 

Another view, presented by Paul M. Pitman and in line with the contemporary 

justification used by the French government, is that the claims were made in order 

to compensate for the country’s advanced social legislation, the costs of which put 

3. H.J. KÜSTERS, West Germany’s Foreign Policy in Western Europe, 1949-58: The Art of the Possible, 

in: C. WURM (ed.): Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration, 

Berg Publishers, Oxford, 1995, p.69. 

4. W. LOTH, Deutsche und französische Interessen auf dem Weg zu EWG und Euratom, in: A. WILKENS 

(ed.), Die deutsch-französischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1945-60, Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Sigmaringen, 

1997, pp.171-187, p.177. 

5. P. GUILLEN, La France et la négociation des traités de Rome: l’Euratom, in: E. Serra (ed.), The 

Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome, Bruylant and Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Brussels 

and Baden-Baden, 1989, p.515. 

6. F.M.B. LYNCH, Restoring France: The Road to Integration, in: A.S. MILWARD (et al.), The 

Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and Theory, 1945-1992, Routledge, London and New 

York, 1993; F. M. B. LYNCH, France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty 

of Rome, Routledge, London and New York, 1997, pp.214-215. 

7. A. MORAVCSIK, The Choice for Europe. Social purpose & State power from Messina to Maastricht, 

UCL Press, London, 1999, p.103. 

8. A. S. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2 nd Edition, London 2000, p 212. 

Milward traces the demand for harmonized overtime pay back to complaints from the French manufacturing 

industry that the working week in France was only forty hours whereas it was forty-eight 

in Germany and Belgium. See also A. MORAVCSIK, The Choice for Europe …, op.cit., 

pp.109 and 114. According to Moravcsik, French industry considered these claims the second best 

solution to devaluation. 

9. H. J. KÜSTERS, Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 

Baden-Baden, 1982, p.376.

France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community 87 

the country at a disadvantage in export markets. 10 While this article does not dispute 

that French industry claimed social harmonization, it aims to show that the 

French government had reasons of her own that were more far-reaching for claiming 

social harmonization among the Six. 11 

In Quest of Time 

In spring 1955 France was governed by a centre-right coalition headed by Edgar Faure 

of the Radical party. Less than a year had passed since the National Assembly had voted 

down the European Defence Community (EDC) with a majority of 319 to 264 votes. 

The dispute over the EDC had disunited the French people. In his memoirs, Robert 

Marjolin depicts dinner parties in Paris where guests broke up and left in fury, and compares 

the atmosphere to the one prevailing during the Dreyfus affair which began 60 

years earlier. 12 National unity, restored at the time of the liberation, seemed once again 

to be broken. When the Benelux-countries launched their memorandum in April the 

following year, there was still considerable division over the question of European integration 

both within the French government and in the National Assembly. Several of the 

ministers were convinced Europeans. Among those were Antoine Pinay at the Quai 

d’Orsay, Robert Schuman at the Ministry of Justice and Pierre Pflimlin at the Ministry 

of Finance. It was Pinay’s government that had signed the Treaty of Paris on the setting 

up of a European defence community in 1952, and Pinay had himself defended the 

treaty in the debate in the National Assembly two years later. However, the Faure government 

also included Gaullist ministers opposed to supra-nationality, opposed to the 

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and opposed to the very person of Jean 

Monnet. 13 The situation within the political leadership mirrored the one prevailing elsewhere 

in French society. The Foreign Ministry was aware of the danger of presenting 

the National Assembly with another insufficiently prepared proposal. The opinion was 

that the EDC incident had made French opinion extremely sensitive to economic risks 

in international politics. 14 

The Benelux memorandum consisted of two parts. One stemmed from a proposal 

launched by the Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen for a common 

market among the members of the ECSC. The other part consisted of a suggestion 

presented by his Belgian colleague, Paul Henri Spaak, for an extension of Europe- 

10. P. M. PITMAN, ‘Un Général qui s’appelle Eisenhower’: Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European 

Economic Community, in: Journal of European Integration History, Vol.6, 2(2000), 

pp.37-59, p.44. See also Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (MAE), DE-CE 1945-60: 711, Note 

pour Monsieur le Président de la Délégation française, 12.07.56. 

11. Since France was the country that launched these claims, and since Germany was the one that accommodated 

them, focus hereafter will be on these two countries only. 

12. R. MARJOLIN, Le travail d’une vie. Mémoires 1911-1986, Éditions Robert Laffont, Paris 1986, p.274. 

13. P. GERBET, La ‘relance’ européenne jusqu’à la Conférence de Messine, in: E. SERRA (ed.), The 

Relaunching of Europe …, op.cit. p.71. 

14. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 611, Note, 14.04.55.

88 


an sectoral integration into the fields of energy, transport and atomic energy. 15 In 

France even pro-Europeans were sceptical of the part of the memorandum concerning 

a common market. Pinay, for instance, feared the consequences of a more liberal 

policy for French enterprises. 16 He was, again according to Robert Marjolin, 

«profondément gêné par ce qu’il savait des sentiments français, ceux des élites 

industrielles ou administratives, comme ceux du peuple lui-même, à l’égard des problèmes 

discutés». 17 

The prevailing attitude within Pinay’s own ministry was in accordance with this, that 

acceptance of the proposal for a common market was very unlikely. The Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs argued that such a solution would demand the surmounting of very serious 

technical and social problems. The fact that European agriculture was not ready to confront 

free trade was one of these. The French Union, Benelux’s insistence on a low common 

external tariff, regional imbalances and disparities in prices and productivity constituted 

the rest of the problems. Additionally, one would have to deal with the social 

problems resulting from the above listed problems. 18 The Ministry also had political objections 

to entering a European common market. If Germany regained her sovereignty 

and the right of disposing an army, the fear was that integration would further German 

economic and political hegemony on the continent and that this in turn would imply the 

loss of all freedom of action and diplomatic independence for France. 19 Another concern 

of political character was that any development that could be interpreted as federal would 

frighten away large segments of the French public opinion. 20 

While there were plenty of objections to the proposal for the common market, 

France was simultaneously unable to reject it. Already twice in two years time the 

country had prevented the process of European integration from progressing. First in 

August 1954 with the National Assembly’s rejection of the EDC proposal, and secondly 

in 1953, when the government had turned down an earlier version of the proposal 

for a common market. 21 Since the new proposal included concessions to the objections 

raised by France in 1953, another rejection would raise serious doubts about 

the country’s will to integrate. 22 The fact that the principle of a common market also 

figured in the agreement on the Saar recently entered into with Germany, made a re- 

15. F. M. B. LYNCH, France and the International Economy …, op.cit., p.169. 

16. P. GERBET, La ‘relance’ européenne …, op.cit., p.83. 

17. R. MARJOLIN, Le travail d’une vie …, op.cit., p.279. 

18. Documents diplomatiques français (DDF) 1955, I, no.288, Note de la Direction des Affaires économiques 

et financières. 18 May 1955. 

19. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 611, Note, 20.04.55. 

20. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 611, Note, 14.04.55. 

21. In September 1953 the Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen proposed that tariff reductions 

were to take place within the six ECSC countries, and were to lead to a full customs union. On the 

1953 proposal, see R. T GRIFFITHS and A. S. MILWARD, The Beyen Plan and the European 

Political Community, in: W. MAIHOFER (ed.), Noi si mura, Selected Working Papers of the European 

University Institute, Florence, 1986, pp.596-623. 

22. The new proposal emphasized that the speed of the process of integration was to be determined by 

intergovernmental agreement. It also posed the principle of harmonization of social charges and 

production costs. DDF, 1955, I, no.308, Note du Département, May 1955.


jection even more difficult. 23 The Ministry therefore concluded that, as matters stood, 

the best (and probably only) solution was to play for more time. 24 This was to be 

done by demanding an examination of the problems that would result from the setting 

up of a common market. At the Messina conference, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 

Antoine Pinay, acted in accordance with this conclusion. It has been argued that positive 

conclusions at Messina were due to concessions made by France’s partners. 25 

The countries agreed to undertake a study of the measures necessary in order to harmonize 

the general policy of the participating states in the financial, economic and 

social fields. 26 Furthermore, they declared it essential to study the progressive harmonization 

of regulations now in force in the different states, particularly those relating 

to the length of the workday and the payment of additional benefits. 27 

In the time that followed, France made every effort to change the economic 

terms of the Benelux proposal. As it had already been established that the proposal 

could not be turned down, this was the only logical thing to do. If the economic 

terms within a common market could be improved for France, scepticism within 

public opinion would decrease at the same time as the outlooks on a dominating 

German position. Earlier research into French European policy has shown that 

French tactics before the Messina conference were to disrupt the link between the 

acceptable proposal for sectoral integration and the unacceptable proposal for a 

common market. This was to be done by focusing on topics most likely to divide 

the other countries. Social harmonization was considered to be one such issue. 28 

While there is no reason to doubt that disruption was what the Quai d’Orsay hoped 

for before the conference, several circumstances indicate the existence of additional 

motives. One of these is that the claims were sustained after the Messina conference 

was over and the disrupting tactic had failed. 

In Quest of Protection and Approval 

Scholars commenting on the French claims have contested their economic importance. 

29 Robert Marjolin considered them an absurd demand. 30 However, Marjolin 

also gave the following description of what it would take to bring France into the 

common market. 

23. Ibid. 

24. Ibid.: “il s’agirait d’étudier à loisir les conditions de réalisation du marché commun”. 

25. H. J. KÜSTERS, The Origins of the EEC Treaty, in: E. SERRA (ed.), The Relaunching of Europe …, 

op.cit., p.217. 

26. Historical Archives of the European Communities (HAEC), CM3/ Nego 001, Introduction. La 

Conférence de Messine, undated. 

27. The Messina Declaration: (http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/messina.htm). 

28. F. M. B. LYNCH, France and the International Economy …, op.cit., p.171. 

29. A. S. MILWARD, Rescue …, op.cit., p.213. P. M. STIRK, A History of European Integration since 

1914, Pinter, London, 1996, p.140. 

30. R. MARJOLIN, Le travail d’une vie …, op.cit., p.286.

90 


«La difficulté essentielle qu’il fallait surmonter était l’hostilité de la quasi-totalité de 

l’opinion française à l’abolition, même progressive, de la protection dont jouissait, je 

dirai plutôt souffrait, l’industrie française». 31 

The argument presented here is that the demand for social harmonization was 

vital in overcoming the French opinion’s hostility to the removal of protection that 

membership of the common market seemed to imply. This did not come as a result 

of the direct economic significance of the French claims, which seems to have been 

minor. 32 The indirect significance of the claims was on the contrary considerable, 

both politically and economically. Through these claims, France was able to secure 

continued protection for French industry within the common market. The claims 

were furthermore instrumental in justifying regulations for France within the 

OEEC that had resulted in considerable advantages for French trade. Finally they 

enabled French governments to avoid undertaking an otherwise necessary but politically 

undesirable devaluation of the French franc. 

Opposition to membership of a common market in the French National Assembly 

reflected prevailing sentiments in French public opinion in general, and within 

French industry in particular. The industrial sector feared foreign competition and 

was reluctant to the removal of the protection which French industry enjoyed. 33 

This protection consisted of a tax reduction on exports and a corresponding surcharge 

on imports into the Franc Area. The claims for social harmonization were 

conducive to overcoming opposition to economic integration by being instrumental 

in maintaining these special regulations for French trade. It turned out as follows. 

In Brussels France justified her resort to export-aid and special import-taxes with 

the importance of social charges weighing upon French cost prices. 34 The claims 

for social harmonization were in turn justified by the argument that they were made 

in order to harmonize social charges: to prevent countries with less developed social 

legislation from outclassing other countries. 35 Accordingly, as long as the 

French claims for social harmonization were not accommodated, special protection 

of French industry was justified. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continuance of 

this protection was considered a necessity if a treaty on a common market was to be 

ratified by the French National Assembly. 36 

31. Ibid., p.281. 

32. See pp.14-15. 

33. R. MARJOLIN, Le travail d’une vie …, op.cit., p.284. See also Ph. MIOCHE, Le patronat français 

et les projets d’intégration économique européenne dans les années cinquante, in: G. TRAUSCH 

(ed.), The European Integration from the Schuman-Plan to the Treaties of Rome, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 

and Bruylant, Baden-Baden and Brussels, 1993, p.247. Mioche explains that the employer’s 

organization, the Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF), was divided in the question 

of membership of the common market and why this was the case. 

34. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 711, Note, 15.09.56. 

35. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 711, Note pour Monsieur le Président de la Délégation française, 12.07.56. 

36. DDF 1956, I, no.67, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières, 2 February 

1956.


The maintenance of the claim for social harmonization in Brussels also contributed 

to the keeping up of advantages within the OEEC. 37 Within both the OEEC 

and GATT, the French system of tax reductions on exports had been heavily criticized, 

and France had already obliged herself to announce when she would be 

ready to diminish or eliminate these reductions. The additional tax on imports was 

likewise contested. In order to explain her modest liberalizing performance within 

the OEEC, France had invoked the disparity between French and foreign prices. 

She had argued that it was this disparity that necessitated both tax reductions on exports 

and the additional tax on imports. Thus, if France engaged in a common market 

without harmonization of social legislation at the same time as she had not fulfilled 

her obligations versus the OEEC, she would put herself in an awkward 

position. 

Table 1: Trade liberalization in OEEC countries, 1952-56 

(% of imports freed from quota restrictions; end years) 38 

Intra-OEEC trade 1952 1954 1956 

France 0 65 82 

Germany 81 90 92 

OEEC average 65 83 89 

The opinion within the Foreign Ministry was that France during the last few years 

had considerably benefited from the process of quota liberalization. In addition to the 

general advantages of liberated trade and payments following the decisions taken within 

the OEEC, exceptions had permitted her to profit from the ongoing process without 

having to commit herself to the same degree as the other countries. 39 In early 1952, 

France had suspended all import-liberalizing measures for a period of twenty months 

due to balance of payments troubles. While doing so she had been allowed to continue 

to benefit from the liberalization undertaken by the other countries. In the same period 

the other countries had accepted a 50% reduction in quota-regulated imports into 

France without introducing similar measures versus French exports. Furthermore, the 

OEEC had accepted the introduction of the special tax on imports that appeared in April 

1954. And finally, while the OEEC had decided in January 1955 to remove a certain 

number of export subventions, the organization had admitted that this obligation would 

not automatically apply to France. This decision was due to take effect from December 

37. MAE, Papiers Wormser (PW), Vol.31, Note pour le Président, 10.10.55. 

38. Source: A. BOLTHO, Convergence, competitiveness and the exchange rate, in: N. CRAFTS and 

G. TONIOLO (eds.), Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 

1996, p.121. 

39. Between 1952 and 1955 the French economy remained one of the most protected economies in 

OEEC. F.M.B. LYNCH, Restoring France …, op.cit., p.65.

92 


31 st 1955 and would as a consequence favour even more French trade. The French Foreign 

Ministry was well aware that these advantages had allowed French exports to expand. 

Exports had expanded more rapidly than imports, and exports toward the OEEC 

countries had expanded faster than exports to the rest of the world. 40 To give up a privileged 

position within the OEEC while simultaneously having to face increased competition 

within a European common market, can not have been a tempting prospect. 

Finally, the system of export-aid and import-taxes enabled French governments 

to avoid undertaking the otherwise necessary, but from a political point of view undesirable, 

devaluation of the French franc. 41 The overvaluation was estimated in 

November 1955 to reach approximately 12%. Within the Faure administration it 

was considered the sole guarantee for continued economic and hence political cohesion 

of the Franc Area. 42 It was regarded as the means that allowed the transformation 

of the French political union into the Franc Area as an economic unit constituted 

by a customs union. The internal price level corresponding to the 

overvaluation was considered advantageous in several respects. It allowed the industrialization 

of technically underdeveloped areas and made otherwise marginal 

agricultural areas profitable. A common level of prices restricted possible markets 

to the Franc Area only and led to a common level of protection against the rest of 

the world. The overvaluation also obliged the under-developed areas to renounce 

customs toward France. It obliged all territories in the Area to constitute a customs 

union and to engage in a common policy and a common investment-program ensuring 

a very advanced degree of political cohesion. The fear was that devaluation 

quickly would lead to an economic and political break-up of the French union. The 

exchange rate was considered a necessary, perhaps also sufficient, condition for the 

continued existence of the Franc Area. Thus, an artificial maintenance of an overvalued 

currency appeared as an economic and political imperative. 

In January 1956, as a result of legislative elections, a new government took office 

with Guy Mollet, the leader of the Section Française de l’Internationale 

Ouvrière (SFIO), as head of government. With the exception of a small number of 

Mendès-France radicals, Mollet’s centre-left coalition, the Republican Front, has 

been described as more pro-European than the Faure government. The composition 

of the new National Assembly has been interpreted somewhat differently. While 

some argue that it indicated an increased opposition, others claim the opposite. 43 

40. MAE, PW, Vol.80. Avantages que la France a tirés de sa participation à l’OECE dans le domaine 

des échanges et des paiements, 17.01.56. 

41. DDF 1956, I, no.265, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières, 

21.04.1956. 

42. MAE, PW, Vol.77, Note pour Monsieur Clappier, 28.11.55. 

43. Frances Lynch shows that on balance the number of deputies strongly opposed to European integration 

increased. Chapsal and Lancelot claim that the elections made away with a good number 

of representatives opposed to European integration. F. M. B. LYNCH, France and the International 

Economy …, op.cit., p.173. J. CHAPSAL and A. LANCELOT, La vie politique en France depuis 

1940, PUF, Paris, 1979, (5 th edition), p.296. I believe the disagreement is due to the fact that 

Chapsal and Lancelot only seem to take account of the decline of the Gaullists, ignoring changes 

in the number of communists and the emergence of the Poujadists.


What seems sure is that support for a pro-EEC policy still could not be, and was 

not, taken for granted. 44 Improvements in France’s economic position may have 

made it easier for the new government to lead a more pronounced policy in favour 

of a common market. 

Shortly after the Mollet take-over, the director of the economic and financial division 

at the Quai d’Orsay, Olivier Wormser, wrote a note in which he discussed the 

situation faced by the new government. Wormser emphasized that exports to the 

OEEC area had expanded considerably, that gold and currency reserves had increased 

and that the country had been able to repay an appreciable part of her 

debts. 45 However, he simultaneously established that the situation was far from satisfactory, 

and also marked by the precarious methods that had been used to obtain 

the above mentioned results. Exports of finished products were still low, and France 

had not yet seen all consequences of the loss of market shares in Indochina, of the 

situation in North Africa and of the statute for the Saar. As for the methods used by 

France, several countries were about to lose their patience with the French system 

of export subventions and import taxes. 

As Wormser put it, the government was faced with two options. One possibility 

was to devalue and eliminate the export subventions and import taxes. The other alternative 

consisted in making the other countries accept that the existing system 

was a temporary but inevitable solution made necessary by the disparity between 

French and international prices. He did not envisage that the new government 

would be willing to devalue. Nor could the disparity in prices be rapidly eliminated. 

It would take time before any policy of increased productivity and/or investments 

could produce results. The international picture, the situation in North Africa 

and the need to maintain full employment rendered a severe policy impossible. 

Consequently, he concluded that the government would have to make the other 

countries accept the French system of export subventions and a temporary tax on 

imports. Wormser emphasized the emergency character and importance of the task 

in question. Yet he was also aware that the French government seemed unable to 

reach a clear and definite solution to the problem. The only way out seemed to be 

«… de chercher à gagner du temps en érigeant des pratiques en vérité contestables, 

en système doctrinal, tout en demeurant conscient qu’il s’agit là d’un expédient provisoire». 

46 

Material produced under the new government indicates that it ended up in 

adopting Wormser’s recommendations. France’s reason to engage actively in the 

ongoing work in the Spaak-committee was “l’intérêt politique qui s’attache à faire 

un nouveau pas vers la construction de l’Europe”. 47 However, the common market 

was simultaneously considered an economic opportunity, where increased but limited 

competition would enhance a reform of the French economy. Due to prevailing 

44. Christian Pineau, in: E. SERRA (ed.), The Relaunching of Europe …, op.cit., p.282. 

45. MAE, PW, Vol.80, Note, 30.01.56. 

46. Ibid. 

47. DDF 1956, I, no.62, Note du Service de Coopération économique, January 1956.

94 


sentiments in French economic circles, the Foreign Ministry remained convinced 

of the need to take account of social and fiscal differences among the Six. The outlook 

for the ratification of a treaty that did not include clear arrangements in these 

fields was considered poor. What mattered was therefore to set up a system taking 

sufficient care of realities in order to gain the National Assembly’s approval and 

necessary support in public opinion. 48 After the elections, instructions to the French 

delegation in Brussels continued to insist on the need to harmonize social, as well 

as fiscal, policies. 

Hanns Jürgen Küsters writes that after the elections “a more open-minded approach 

to European policy was expected of France. The political personalities did 

in fact change, but the administration – and with it – its extremely anti-European 

stance remained”. 49 It is not my impression that the Foreign Ministry was opposed 

to a common market membership. Rather, it appears realistic with regard to the internal 

situation in France and what it would take to overcome opposition to the 

government’s choice of policy. 50 After January 1956 the Ministry no longer advocated 

the need for an alignment of the social charges belonging to France’s partners 

only. Just as consistently, it called for the need to undertake structural economic 

and social domestic reforms. Thus, structural problems were no longer swept under 

the carpet, and self-examination was more pronounced. As soon as the decision to 

establish a common market was taken, France would have no choice but to surmount 

the problems that membership presented. 

Other questions, including the harmonization of charges, only constituted a means 

to that end. It was made clear that membership would not be compatible with the maintenance 

of the present economic and social equilibrium in France. The safeguard clauses 

were temporary and would not spare France the necessary social and economic 

changes, the importance of which could not be underestimated. The common market 

would also constitute a step toward a merger of the economic policies of the countries 

involved, and a certain integration of the countries’ foreign policies. Finally, it would 

both legally and practically be impossible to realize simultaneously the merger of the 

European markets and the markets of the French union. Acceptance or refusal of these 

implications would have to take place. Before doing so, France would have to ascertain 

that there was no other way to ensure in a comparable manner a durable reinforcement 

of European co-operation and suitable conditions for the modernization and expansion 

of the French economy. 51 

The Ministry knew at an early point that the forthcoming Spaak report was unlikely 

to take account of the French claims in a precise manner. 52 Nor was the Con- 

48. DDF 1956, I, 67, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières, 

02.02.1956. 

49. H. J. KÜSTERS, The Origins of the EEC Treaty, op.cit., p.222. 

50. DDF 1956, I, no.122, Note du Département, 23.02.1956. 


21.04.1956. 


02.02.1956.


seil National du Patronat Français (CNPF) pleased with the report. 53 The employers’ 

organization made it clear that it considered a harmonization of the production 

conditions an indispensable counterpart to the planned liberalization of trade. It insisted 

that France demand precise obligations on this point, which in turn would 

exclude a fixed schedule for the passage from one stage of the transitional period to 

another. 54 In other words, the CNPF demanded the ratification and application of 

the convention for equal pay for men and women. It demanded the fixing of a common 

basis for overtime pay and the harmonization of paid holidays. 55 The employers 

emphasized the need to ensure the maintenance of import-taxes and export-aid. 

According to the organisation itself, this system ought to exist as long as the causes 

for the general price disparity between French and other international prices were 

not eliminated. 

It has been argued that the narrower commercial concern of export promotion 

was central to the preferences of the French, German and British governments’ 

choice for Europe. 56 There is reason to believe that French policy-makers were out 

for more than that. Material from the Foreign Ministry says clearly that while, in 

January 1956, the expansion of exports is well on its way, the need for modernization 

is still considered urgent. 57 French leaders were undoubtedly sensitive to, and 

forced to take account of, the position of French industry. But that is not to say that 

French governments claimed social harmonization only to accommodate French 

industry. French politicians had reasons of their own to maintain the claim for social 

harmonization that had little or nothing to do with the French patronat. The 

CNPF claimed social harmonization in order to maintain protection while simultaneously 

getting access to a larger market. French political leaders shared this ambition. 

In contrast to the CNPF however, the political leadership was also out to avoid 

undertaking a devaluation, and to obtain support for a policy whose overriding concern 

was more far-reaching than export-promotion, namely a much needed modernization 

of the French economy. 58 

The Problems Faced by the French Economy 

By pointing social legislation out as a trade distortion, France managed to keep 

more fundamental reasons for the country’s lack of competitive power out of the 

53. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 628, Le marché commun européen, 09.08.1956. 

54. Ibid. 

55. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 628, Le marché commun, 10.08.1956. 

56. A. MORAVCSIK, The Choice for Europe …, op.cit., p.88. 

57. MAE, PW, Vol.80, Note, 30.01.56. 

58. Ibid., DDF 1956, I, no.67, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières, 

02.02.1956, DDF 1956, I, no.265, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et 

financières, 21.04.56.

96 


searchlight. France’s problem was that the country’s industrial sector was relatively 

small and unproductive. This has been explained by the fact that no net investments 

had taken place in the period from 1930 to 1945. Low productivity and lack of 

competitive power has also been traced back to the 1931 sterling devaluation and 

the introduction of a preferential tariff within the British Empire. These steps augmented 

France’s trade with its own empire. 59 Since the French Empire was undeveloped 

and not able to compete in a free market, this trade had been highly protected. 

Due to the protection, structural changes that competition otherwise would 

have provoked, such as the merger of small firms into larger units, had not taken 

place. 60 France in the mid-fifties was still protectionist. According to the Foreign 

Ministry, economic circles took little interest in exports. Quotas were kept up not 

only for balance of payment-reasons, but also due to the will, justified or not, to 

protect. 61 The fact that France managed to keep its trade on the present level of liberalization 

was attributed to the system of import taxes and export aid. 62 

In 1956 the ILO published an investigation into the cost of labour that showed that 

wage costs and obligatory social charges in France were higher than in Germany. 

Table 2: Average hourly earnings, obligatory social charges and 

cost of days off with pay 63 

Average hourly earnings, 

1954 

Obligatory 

social 

charges 

expressed 

as percentage 

of 

asseable 

wages at 

01.01.1956 

Cost to employers 

of days off 

with pay as percentage 

of 

wages, 1952-53 

Wages + obl. 

social charges + 

cost of days off 

with pay. Indices: 

Switzerland 

=100 

In Swiss 

francs 

Indices: 

Switzerland 

= 100 

France 1.88 73 29.8 7.2 92 

Germany 1.74 68 11.7 9.8 75 

However, the ILO investigation did not take account of private agreements between 

undertakings and trade unions that, unlike in France, constituted a considera- 

59. In the constitution of 1946 the term “empire” was replaced by the term “union”. 

60. F. M. B. LYNCH, France and the International Economy …, op.cit., Conclusion. 

61. DDF 1956, I, no.265, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières, 21.04.1956. 


02.02.1956. 

63. Source: International Labour Office: Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation. Report 

by a Group of Experts, Geneva 1956, p.33. Since the three sets of data related to different dates, 

the ILO emphasized that the aggregates were approximations. It was considered unlikely that this 

affected the relative magnitude in any substantial degree.


ble part of total social charges weighing upon German employers. Nor did it take 

account of the overvaluation of the French franc and the undervaluation of the German 

mark. Thus, the disparity in the cost of labour in the two countries was, according 

to officials in the Interministerial Committee for Questions of European Integration 

(SGCI), less than indicated in the table above. The SGCI concluded that 

in the course of two years the difference in the cost of labour between France and 

Germany had decreased from 22.6% in 1954 to only 7% in 1956. 64 

The Quai d’Orsay was well aware that a harmonization of social charges would 

not compensate for the disparity between French and foreign prices. The Ministry 

was of the opinion that this disparity was mainly due to the structure of the French 

costs and to the sum of production costs. After the Second World War, subsequent 

French governments had, in contrast to the previous period, led a policy focused on 

investments. Simultaneously, a policy of increased wages had been pursued. At the 

national level the increase in income had balanced the increase in prices. At the international 

level these policies had created a gap between French and foreign prices. 

65 Consequently, harmonization of social legislation would only very slightly 

improve the situation for those branches of French industry where prices were 

higher than in other countries. Nor was such harmonization likely to be accepted by 

France’s partners. Not only would it contradict objectives with regard to competition 

pursued notably among the Six, social harmonization would also worsen the 

European countries’ competitive position on the international market without improving 

France’s position versus third countries. 66 

The Quai d’Orsay was concerned with the danger involved in describing the gap 

in prices as a general disparity. Export-aid and import-taxes did not concern all 

products. This could be interpreted as if disparities did not exist within sectors outside 

the scope of these arrangements, which would mean that the disparity was not 

general. It could also be interpreted as if disparities within these branches were 

compensated for by specific distortions to the detriment of other countries. 67 An investigation 

into general price disparities would highlight the need for reform of the 

structure of French costs. 68 Alternatively it could lead France’s partners to recommend 

with reinforced insistence a devaluation of the French franc. The Ministry 

was well aware that a permanent elimination of price disparities would take both 

devaluation and reform. Yet while the Mollet government did not share the preceding 

government’s reasons against devaluation, it was all the same against it. 69 The 

system of export aid and import taxes was conducive to avoiding devaluation. The 

argument presented by the French government was that the price disparities were 

64. CAC, 910004/2, Note sur l’incidence des charges sociales et de la charge salariale globale, undated. 

65. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 711, Note, 15.09.1956. 

66. Ibid. 

67. Ibid. One is left with the impression that this was the case, since the Ministry advised against a sector-wise 

study of price disparities since this could reveal specific distortions harmful to certain countries. 

68. Ibid. 


21.04.1956.

98 


not only of a general character, liable to be corrected by an adjustment of exchange 

rates, they also corresponded to certain differences in social and fiscal legislation. 

That was why France had demanded the harmonization of social charges as a precondition 

to the common market. The hope was that France’s partners, at least for a 

while, would accept the soundness of this. 70 

So far, little indicated that this would be the case. Outsiders had long argued 

against harmonization and in favour of a French devaluation. Harmonization, 

whether social or fiscal, was not considered a necessary precondition for a common 

market. It would, the argument went, be identical with demanding that the other 

countries would augment their production costs, which was considered a solution 

without any chances of succeeding. 71 The Secretariat of the Intergovernmental 

Committee had also produced a note on distortions in the Common Market with the 

intention of proving that prior harmonization of charges was unnecessary, and that 

it would be possible to correct the distortions of which France suffered through a 

devaluation. 72 From a technical point of view the French were not foreign to this 

kind of argument. While their reasons for not wanting to devalue were of political 

and psychological nature, they still found this way of arguing maladroit. 73 

Saved by the Germans 

In October the question of social harmonization brought the negotiations for a common 

market to a standstill. A few weeks later France and Germany hammered out a 

compromise that enabled a successful completion of the negotiations. This compromise 

simultaneously eliminated opposition to the common market within French 

industrial circles. 

Germany never believed that France’s ability to compete was hampered by social 

costs constituting a larger part of production costs than in other countries. The 

German Foreign Ministry based itself on experience from the ECSC as well as recent 

investigations undertaken by the OEEC, which rejected that the burden of social 

and fiscal costs in France would distort competition in a common market. The 

German view was that indirect pay constituted a larger part of total hourly labour 

costs in France than in most ECSC countries, but that total hourly labour costs were 

not higher in France than in the other countries. 74 Accordingly, the German Foreign 

Ministry was sceptical when the French delegation in July 1956 called for an investigation 

into the expenditures made up of social costs in the different countries. In 

its opinion, the scope demanded by the French was too narrow and could only pro- 

70. Ibid. 

71. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 612, Bertrand (OEEC) to Valéry (MAE), 11.08.55. 

72. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 612, Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre, 19.09.55. 

73. Ibid. 

74. Bundesarchiv (BA), B 146/594a, Soziallasten, Lohn- und Steuerbelastung und der Wettbewerb auf 

dem Gemeinsamen Markt, 27.06.56.


duce a result that would be used to justify a French demand for a levelling up of the 

costs in other countries to French standards. 75 The Germans were convinced that a 

more comprehensive investigation would prove that the importance of social harmonization 

was over-estimated. This was probably why the Ministry referred to the 

question of social harmonization as a false problem. Nevertheless, it was considered 

a problem and one that, on account of negotiating tactics, would have to be 

solved as soon as possible. 76 

Months went by before a solution was reached. In the time that passed, the discussion 

centred around which matters ought to be investigated in order to decide whether 

social costs did constitute a trade distortion or not. France demanded an investigation 

into the significance of equal pay, overtime pay and paid holidays. Germany pressed for 

a more comprehensive investigation into the part constituted by direct and indirect wages 

on net production value of industrial production in the Six states. 77 

The Bundeswirtschaftsministerium considered rightly that the problem of social 

harmonization was political. The Ministry was on the other hand wrong when assuming 

that the French government made use of this question in order to prevent 

the setting up of a common market that they were opposed to. Still, that was what 

they believed, and from that point of view Germany was now confronted with two 

possible options. On the one hand, they could by means of an appropriate investigation 

do away with the problem and simultaneously provide the French supporters 

of the Common Market with arguments against their opponents. On the other hand, 

it could be that the French were out to bring the negotiations to an end over this 

question. In that case the matter would have to be treated in a way that ensured that 

France was left with the blame, and in a way that guaranteed that Germany could 

not be accused of being socially reactionary. In Ludwig Erhard’s opinion the 

French claims were impossible, but in first instance they would still have to be met. 

He was convinced of the need to bring the topic up to the highest political level. 78 

This was also what finally happened. 

Prior to this, the French upped the stakes in order to get their way. When the 

delegations met in Brussels on July 26 Faure urged quick action, emphasizing the 

positive climate created by the recent debate over Euratom in the National Assembly. 

He stressed the fact that a governmental crisis could provoke a situation that 

would give the opponents of a common market time to organize. However, his efforts 

were fruitless. A decision was taken to postpone the question of social harmonization 

until the beginning of September when the heads of delegations were to 

present their objections to the system for social harmonization envisaged in the 

Spaak-report. 79 When the delegations met again on September 13 Faure proceeded 

in a more decisive manner. This time he stressed the special difficulties faced by 

75. BA, B146/594a, Kurzprotokoll über die Ressortbesprechung vom 3. Juli 1956 im Auswärtigen Amt. 

76. Ibid. 

77. BA, B146/594a, Harmonisierung der Soziallasten im Gemeinsamen Markt, 10.07.56. 

78. BA, B146/594a, Ressortbesprechung über Angleichung der Soziallasten im Gemeinsamen Markt 

bei Herrn Minister Erhard am 25.07.1956. 

79. BA, B146/593, Kurzprotokoll über die Ressortbesprechung vom 27.07.56 im Auswärtigen Amt.

100 


France where the demands of war had created price-disparities. He also stressed the 

strong political will to see a common market come true that included France. In order 

to obtain this he suggested a special agreement for France allowing the maintenance 

of her system of import duties and export support as long as price disparities 

existed. 80 When a few days later the French delegation presented the terms on 

which it would be possible for France to participate in the common market, the demands 

were even more extensive. The decision to pass from the first to the second 

stage of the transitional period was to be unanimous, and only to be taken when the 

objectives decided upon had been reached. In the field of social harmonization, 

France demanded the realization of equal pay within a period of two years. Within 

this period, measures also had to be taken to ensure the harmonization of the length 

of the working week and corresponding overtime pay at the end of the first stage, as 

well as the harmonization of paid holidays. During the following stages, measures 

were to be taken in order to harmonize total wage charges. 81 

The French terms met vivid opposition. This was particularly the case with the 

claim for the harmonization of total wage charges. As far as the question of equal 

pay was concerned, the countries agreed that this seemed to constitute a specific 

distortion that could find its solution through the system of safeguard clauses as 

proposed in the Spaak-report. In the matter of paid holidays, the countries agreed 

that this was unproblematic. To the question of harmonized overtime pay, a solution 

was still to be found. The heads of delegation seemed ready to accord France a 

regime of export-subsidies and import-taxes on special conditions. The French delegation 

argued on its side for the additional possibility of introducing safeguard 

clauses in case of a deficit in the balance of payments. This did not please the other 

delegations. It appeared, however, as if some solution was to be reached. 82 

On October 20 and 21 the six states met to deal with the questions on which 

agreement had not yet been reached. At this meeting the question of social harmonization 

brought the negotiations to a point that threatened to break them off in 

their entirety. This was not due to the other five, since they showed considerable 

will to reach a solution, but to the French who constantly came up with new demands. 

The five agreed that France could maintain export-subsidies and import-taxes 

in the transitional period under certain conditions. Safeguard-clauses 

were furthermore to be invoked in case of problems with the balance of payments. 

It was when discussing the terms for passing from the first to the second stage 

of the transitional period that a critical point was reached. France insisted that the 

decision had to be unanimous. The other delegations favoured qualified majority. 

After a long break and the intervention of the French Prime Minister a compromise 

was reached. This said that the first stage was to last for four years. If a country 

found that the targets set for the first stage were not reached, it would be able to 

80. BA, B 146/593, Brüsseler Integrationskonferenz; Delegationsleiterausschuss, Sitzung vom 13. September. 

81. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 610, Mémorandum du Président de la Conférence Intergouvernementale 

pour le Marché Commun et l’Euratom, 12.10.56. 

82. Ibid.


prevent the passing to stage two. Stage one was then to be prolonged by two years, 

after which the decision to move to stage two was to be taken by a qualified majority. 

However, France then made it clear that in making her decision on whether to 

move from stage one or not she would not only consider the question of social harmonization, 

but also the economic situation in its entirety. This provoked the German 

delegation, who refused to continue the negotiations if France did not accept 

the qualified majority voting, nor would the Germans continue the Euratom negotiations. 

They also declared themselves unable to accept the proposition concerning 

the length of the working week and corresponding overtime pay. 83 

On the surface a resolution appeared impossible. Unofficial discussions revealed 

however, that a solution that did not include France was considered impossible. 84 A solution 

was reached when the German chancellor Adenauer met with Prime Minister 

Mollet in Paris on November 6. 

As far as equal pay and paid holidays were concerned, the two heads of state sustained 

the formula from the conference in Paris in October. They further agreed on a general formula 

on social harmonization saying that this would come as a consequence of the common 

market. On the question of special regulations for France, France accepted an annual 

investigation into the conditions for maintaining such regulations. The Council of Ministers 

would also be empowered to demand a lowering of the French level of taxes and subsidies 

if other countries were to be unfairly treated by this system. If this turned out to be 

the case, countries negatively affected by the French regulations could also be allowed to 

invoke safeguard clauses. France agreed to abolish the system when her balance of payments 

had been in equilibrium for a year. On the difficult question concerning the length 

of the work-week and corresponding overtime pay, the countries agreed not to make the 

introduction of the forty hour week obligatory. 85 In spite of this decision, the German 

view was that they had made a considerable concession. This because one knew for certain 

that the forty hour week would not be a reality within the first stage. France would as 

a consequence be entitled to safeguard clauses working to the advantage of French industry. 

86 France renounced, on her side, the claim for veto in connection with the passing 

from the first to the second stage of the transitional period. 

The Franco-German agreement has been described as a “… recul sensible des positions 

françaises; sur tous les points jusque là posés en préalables, les engagements précis 

font place à des déclarations d’intention ou à des formules de compromis assez vagues”. 87 

83. BA, B146/594, Aussenministerkonferenz der Länder der Montanunion über den Gemeinsamen 

Markt und Euratom am 20 u. 21 Oktober in Paris. 

84. Ibid. 

85. BA, B146/594, Ergebnisprotokoll über die Ressortbesprechung im Auswärtigen Amt am 10. November 

über die Probleme des Gemeinsamen Marktes und Euratom. 

86. BA, B 146/594, Brüsseler Regierungskonferenz-Ergebnisse der vom Bundeskanzler am 5. und 

6.11.1956 in Paris geführten Besprechungen über die Probleme des Gemeinsamen Marktes und 

Euratom. 12.11.56. 

87. P. GUILLEN, L’europe remède à l’impuissance française? Le gouvernement Guy Mollet et la négociation 

des traités de Rome (1955-1957), in: Revue d’histoire diplomatique, 102(1988), 

pp.319-335, p.331. See also W. LOTH: Deutsche und französische Interessen …, op.cit., 

pp.181-182.

102 


While France undoubtedly obtained less than she had asked for, what she obtained was 

what she needed. French policy-makers had considered acceptance of the common market 

proposal unlikely. They had done so because of the hostility that existed within France 

to the removal of protection that membership of the common market seemed to imply. 

Continued protection was as a consequence considered a necessity if the treaty on the 

common market was to get through Parliament. Through the November agreement with 

Germany, France obtained an agreement that secured continued protection of French industry. 

88 The fact that France gave up her claim for veto in order to obtain this agreement, 

supports the affirmation that this agreement was of importance. 

Concluding Remarks 

The story of the French claims for social harmonization illustrates how France 

aimed to use the process of European integration as a means to ensure a continued 

expansion and modernization of the French economy. The claims for social harmonization 

were in turn instrumental in realizing France’s entry into the common market. 

In the beginning, these claims bought time for a government divided over the 

question of European integration. In the end, they ensured continued protection for 

French industry. In the final discussions over this question, France profited from the 

fact that other countries considered French membership of the common market a 

necessity. In the November 6 agreement with Germany, this enabled her to trade 

their wish for qualified majority voting in return for continued protection of French 

industry. At national level the maintenance of this protection was conducive to 

securing the support of French industry, and consequently the support of the 

National Assembly for the government’s pro-European policy. 

88. Philippe Mioche shows that head of the CNPF, Georges Villiers, set great store by the concessions 

obtained and that the agreement was instrumental in turning hesitant industrialists in favour of the 

common market. Ph. MIOCHE, Le patronat français …, op.cit., p.253.

An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and 

British Policy towards Scandinavia 1949-1951 

103 

Juhana Aunesluoma 

Throughout the past half-century of European economic and political integration, Britain 

and Scandinavia have formed a stronghold for “Euro-scepticism”, where reluctance 

and outright opposition to new ideas about co-operation amongst the European 

nation-states has been widespread. Britain, Denmark and Sweden have been latecomers 

in the present day European Union (EU), whereas in Norway the question of European 

Economic Community (EEC) or EU membership has been rejected twice in national 

referenda. Whether in- or outside these organisations their relationship with more 

ardent Europeans has been problematic over a long period. 

Not least because their paths joined in the European Free Trade Association 

(EFTA) in 1959-60, the British and the Scandinavians have often been seen to have 

drawn a sense of unity from the fact that they all were in the 1950s, for various reasons, 

unable to participate in such integrative experiments as the European Coal 

and Steel Community (ECSC) or later in the EEC. The similarities in their behaviour 

have led to assumptions that even more wide-ranging convergence of interests 

between the British and the Scandinavians has existed since Europe's economic reconstruction 

began in the 1940s. 

British and Scandinavian scepticism towards new forms of economic and political 

co-operation in Europe in the 1950s was embedded in national circumstances 

and preferences, but was coupled with their shared feeling of the feasibility of an 

intergovernmental alternative towards economic co-operation in Europe in the 

1950s. Further, instead of withdrawing into complete isolation, it has been argued 

that they sought “meaningful association” with the new institutions, and as can be 

seen in the following, with each other. 1 What is argued in the following is, that this 

basic convergence of interests in the early phase of European integration brought 

the British, Danish, Swedish and Norwegian governments together into regular 

consultations within a specifically established body, Uniscan, which sought to facilitate 

a degree of co-ordination of policies and eventually paved the way for the 

speedy establishment of EFTA in 1959, when the alternative to create a wider free 

trade area had been exhausted. 

None the less, before EFTA realised the original vision outlined in 1949, attempts 

towards deeper Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation beyond the 

consultative remit of Uniscan proved unsuccessful. In spite of similar thinking 

about the most fruitful approach to integration policies in Europe, co-ordinated policy-making 

and the definition of collective bargaining positions within and towards 

1. On the ‘meaningful association’–thesis concerning British policy, see Chr. LORD, ’With but not 

of’: Britain and the Schuman Plan, A Reinterpretation, in: Journal of European Integration History 

(JEIH), 2/4(1998), pp.23-46, and Chr. LORD, Absent at the Creation: Britain and the Formation 

of the European Community, 1950-52, Darthmout, Aldershot, 1996.

104 


different international organisations was found difficult. The following article discusses 

the potential and the ramifications of Anglo-Scandinavian co-operation in 

the post-Second World War international economy and in the early years of European 

integration, with particular attention to British policy-making. 

Reconstruction and Restoration: Attempts to Re-establish Britain's 

Economic Positions in Scandinavia after 1945 

British economic thinking towards Scandinavia after the Second World War was 

characterised by the persistence of traditional views, which posited Scandinavia 

apart from the rest of Western Europe. Scandinavia was in many ways a special 

case, culturally and politically different from the continent, and what was most 

important, an enclave – in European standards – of unexceptionally high economic 

interdependence with Britain. 

Although neither the continental European economies nor Scandinavia could challenge 

the primacy of the Dominions, the Commonwealth and the Sterling area in Britain's 

overseas trade in the 1940s and 1950s, the three Scandinavian countries, Norway, 

Denmark and Sweden, figured prominently in the economic geography of Europe as it 

was interpreted at the time in London. In 1946-53, the three Scandinavian countries had 

an average share of 7.4 per cent of Britain's overseas trade, while the area that would 

later become the EEC amounted to no more than 11.1 per cent. 2 

The close relationship between the Scandinavian economies with Britain and 

the network of bilateral trade agreements and financial arrangements that were established 

between the Sterling bloc and Scandinavia in the 1930s, made its position 

in British eyes to resemble more that of the Commonwealth than of Europe. Scandinavia 

could be seen in the vague terms of the “informal empire”, as was described 

by Ashton Gwatkin of the Foreign Office when he interpreted it before the 

war to have formed “a kind of unacknowledged economic empire of which London 

is the metropolis”. 3 Intense competition with Adolf Hitler's economically expansive 

Germany in the 1930s merely heightened long-held views that Britain's concerns 

in the region were primarily economic, and that the essence of foreign policy, 

when it came to Scandinavia, was about trade, finance and the maintenance of economic 

spheres of influence. 4 

2. Bulletins Statistiques de l'OECE, Commerce Exterieur, Série I, 1928, 1937-1953, Paris, 1954, 

pp.62-67. 

3. Quoted in P. LUDLOW, Britain and Northern Europe, 1940-1945, in: Scandinavian Journal of 

History (SJH), 4/2(1979), pp.123-62. Ashton Gwatkin was an economic specialist in the Foreign 

Office (FO). 

4. A comprehensive account of economic and strategic competition between Britain and Germany in 

Scandinavia before 1940 is found in P. SALMON, Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890-1940, 

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.

An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy 105 

As soon as wartime conditions permitted it in 1944-45, Britain reasserted its economic 

positions in the region, including Finland where substantial amounts of timber 

and pulp were exported to Britain. Alongside Danish foodstuffs Sweden in particular 

became a trade partner of prime importance. With its strong balance of payments position 

it afforded Britain exports of vital raw materials effectively on credit in 1945-47, as 

the Swedish government and central bank hoped that the transitory period would not 

last for too long. 5 New financial ties that persisted long into the 1950s were thus established 

between Britain and the Scandinavians in the name of economic stabilisation, reconstruction 

and the hope for gradual normalisation of relations. 

The other side of the British economic strategy towards Scandinavia was an attempt 

to seize a commanding share of the northern markets for industrial goods as 

long as German exporters were absent from the markets. 6 However, due to shortages 

of exportable goods such as coal and steel and declining competitiveness of British 

manufacturers, this strategy eventually failed to win such a preponderant position 

for British traders as had been envisaged. A good example of Britain’s 

economic decline in the region was how its shipbuilding industry lost its most important 

export market – Norway – in 1945-67 when the world market for ships was 

most vibrant. 7 None the less, still until the first half of the 1950s when German 

competition was being fully felt again, the British managed to hold an unexceptionally 

strong economic position in the region, if not much longer. 

The Scandinavians, for their part, saw their post-war relationship with Great 

Britain with certain ambivalence. An important characteristic of their economic relationship 

with Britain was that it was more important for them than it was for the 

British. The direct economic benefits from normal trade relations with Britain were 

clear enough, as the ongoing processes of modernisation of the Scandinavian economies 

and societies depended on their access to world markets of industrial goods 

and raw materials in scarce supply within the region itself, and on their ability to 

sell their own produce as freely as possible to the world. Foreign trade in general 

and trade with Britain in particular was vital for all the Scandinavian economies, 

which even in times of heavy protectionism remained open economies in the sense 

of their high dependence on international in- and outputs of factors of production. 8 

5. Ö. APPELQVIST, Bruten Brygga. Gunnar Myrdal och Sveriges ekonomiska efterkrigspolitik 

1943-1947, Santérus förlag, Stockholm, 2000, pp.340-350. 

6. Memorandum for M. L. John Edwards, MP (Parliamentary private secretary to the president of the Board of 

Trade), undated (1945), FO 371/56223; Memorandum for Mr. Marquand (Secretary for the Department of 

Overseas Trade, Board of Trade), 27 December 1945, FO 371/56223, Public Record Office (PRO), London. 

7. L. JOHNMAN and H. MURPHY, The Norwegian Market for British Shipbuilding, 1945-1967, in: 

Scandinavian Economic History Review, 2/XLVI(1998), pp.55-78. Issues such as price, failure to 

meet delivery dates and to offer competitive credit terms are listed as explanatory factors for the 

decline. Britain’s market share was taken over by Norwegian, West German, Japanese and Swedish 

shipyards. 

8. A sophisticated analysis of trade protectionism in an open economy is found in T. PAAVONEN, 

Suomalaisen protektionismin viimeinen vaihe. Suomen ulkomaankauppa- ja integraatiopolitiikka 

1945-1961 [Finnish Protectionism and International Economic Integration, 1945-1961], Suomen 

Historiallinen Seura, Helsinki, 1998.

106 


Politically most sensitive issues about Britain's post-war economic reconstruction 

emerged from the attempts by the British government to restore pre-war arrangements 

that were based on bilateralism and the implicit assertion that Scandinavia should be 

held as a special preserve for British traders. In the absence of Germany as an economic 

counterweight, the situation could be seen as an attempt to include Scandinavia within 

Britain's economic sphere of influence. 

A key element in the future of the Anglo-Scandinavian economic relationship 

when reconstruction reached its final phase in the early 1950s was to what direction 

the traditional, in trade theoretical terms classical, complementary pattern of the 

national economies would develop. Eventually, the failure of the British economy 

to create a surplus of strategic raw materials such as coal and steel in the 1950s and 

the simultaneous process of diversification of Scandinavian exports away from the 

dependence on basic raw materials (iron ore, pulp, paper, timber, agricultural produce) 

and semi-finished industrial goods towards more highly refined goods, decreased 

the complementary nature of the British and Scandinavian economies. But 

even with such structural changes and the relatively slow development of intra-industrial 

trade within the region, the volume of Anglo-Scandinavian trade in the traditional 

sectors remained high, and was eventually enhanced by EFTA, albeit its 

growth potential was limited compared to emerging economic contacts and intra-industrial 

trade between Britain and Western Europe. 

Scandinavia as a Lead in Britain's European Policy 1949-50 

The idea of a special institutional arrangement between Britain and Scandinavia 

was a recurrent theme in British thinking of its European policy and external economic 

relations. It was seen in various occasions in Anglo-Scandinavian economic 

diplomacy from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to the British Free Trade 

Area proposals in 1957. But until full restoration of currency convertibility and 

multilateral trade was realised towards the end of the 1950s, not much of tangible 

economic significance was achieved within the Anglo-Scandinavian framework. 

Likewise, the plans for a Scandinavian Customs Union, which were discussed 

intermittently between 1947-50 and in 1954-57 between Norway, Denmark and 

Sweden, ended in failure and were eventually overtaken by the establishment of 

EEC and EFTA, although other aspects of Nordic co-operation, such as the creation 

of the Nordic Council in 1952 and a common labour market in 1954 proved to be 

more successful aspects of regional economic integration. 9 

9. V. SØRENSEN, Nordic cooperation – A Social Democratic Alternative to Europe?, in: T. B. 

OLESEN (ed.), Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 

1945-1960, Odense University Press, Odense, 1995, pp.40-61; I. SOGNER, The European Idea: 

The Scandinavian Answer. Norwegian Attitudes Towards a Closer Scandinavian Economic Cooperation 

1947-1959, in: SJH, 4/18(1993), pp.307-327.


Despite political goodwill behind the plans and numerous studies, Anglo-Scandinavian 

economic co-operation never took off the ground before EFTA. None the 

less, from the viewpoint of British European policy in the 1950s, the plans for 

deepening its economic and political relations with the Scandinavians are not wholly 

insignificant, even if they lacked the final push success would have required. 

Similarly, the talks the Scandinavian governments held with the British, first on European 

economic reconstruction and later on integration policy were a substantial 

part of their general policy towards Europe as well. 

The period in 1949-51, when most pressing needs of reconstruction began to give 

way to long-term schemes of Europe's politico-economic order, is particularly illuminating 

in highlighting both the potential and the problems Anglo-Scandinavian economic 

co-operation contained. The British government's so called Uniscan-initiative 

from late 1949 is a good example of the ways in which Scandinavia was seen to fit in 

Britain's overall European policy at the time. The internal discussions in London and 

the subsequent negotiations that were held in December 1949 and January 1950 with 

the Scandinavian governments, showed what political benefits the British government 

sought from its closer association with them. The following years showed how severe 

the economic ramifications proved to be. However, despite the inherent problems of 

Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation that were soon realised, the continuing 

work of the Anglo-Scandinavian Economic Committee, Uniscan (1950-60), was valued 

as an informal consultative group where it was ascertained to which extent these countries 

could or could not agree upon a common line towards various problems of international 

economic policy and integration. 10 

The idea of re-establishing the pre-war relationship between Scandinavia and 

the sterling area surfaced soon after the war. Nevertheless, before 1949 neither specific 

plans nor written documents were presented. Schemes for closer co-operation 

in the economic field between Britain and the three Scandinavian countries were 

first put forward at an official level in the Treasury in January 1949, after a suggestion 

from the Bank of England. 11 As had been done privately before, officials then 

10. Previous authors have been unanimous of Uniscan's neglible economic impact, and largely dismissed 

it without considering its possible political significance. W. DIEBOLD Jr., Trade and Payments 

in Western Europe. A Study in Economic Cooperation 1947-51, Harper & Brothers, New 

York, 1952, pp.143-144; B. STRÅTH, Nordic Industry and Nordic Economic Cooperation. The 

Nordic Industrial Federations and the Nordic Customs Union Negotiations 1947-1959, Almqvist 

& Wiksell International, Stockholm, 1978, pp.87-92; A. MILWARD, The Reconstruction of Western 

Europe 1945-51, Routledge, London, 1984, pp.316-319; M. AF MALMBORG, Den ståndaktiga 

nationalstaten. Sverige och den västeuropeiska intergrationen 1945-1959, Lund University 

Press, Lund, 1994, pp.91-92; K. E. ERIKSEN and H. Ø. PHARO, Kald krig of internasjonalisering 

1949-1965. Norsk Utenrikspolitikks historie Bind 5, Cappelen, Oslo, 1997, pp.143-145. For a 

discussion of Uniscan’s relationship to Britain’s cold war policy aims in Northern Europe, see J. 

AUNESLUOMA, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War 1945-54, pp. 152-202. Unpublished D.Phil– 

thesis, University of Oxford, 1998, (to be published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002). 

11. E. W. Playfair (Treasury) (T) to Rowe-Dutton (T), 13 January 1949, T 236/5370, PRO; Playfair to 

George Bolton (Bank of England), 17 January 1949; Lithiby minute, 21 January 1949, OV 28/31, 

Bank of England Archive (BEA), London. See also Playfair to Allan Christelow (UK Treasury delegation, 

Washington), 20 December 1949, FO 371/78139, PRO.

108 


played with an idea of some kind of Anglo-Scandinavian economic association, or 

of Scandinavian membership of the Sterling area. But it was not until October 1949 

before the question of Scandinavia's relationship to the Sterling area and closer 

co-operation with Britain was put forward to the Cabinet and subsequently adopted 

as official policy. 12 

There were several reasons why different departments in Whitehall opened the 

issue of Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation in the autumn of 1949. The 

immediate reason for calling up the representatives of the countries to discuss further 

economic co-operation was provided by the US economic aid administration 

(ECA), when it increased pressure for the establishment of regional economic 

groups in Europe. In October 1949, the ECA chief, Paul Hoffman, delivered a 

strongly worded speech for the Ministerial Council of the Organisation for European 

Economic Co-operation (OEEC), in which he said that the US Congress would 

not accept continuance of the recovery program without clear determination by the 

Europeans to move towards economic integration. 13 On 2 November, the Ministerial 

Council of the OEEC adopted a resolution, in which “the desirability was recognised 

of promoting regional economic groupings”. 14 From the US viewpoint, this 

seemed on the short term to open the best prospects for further integration of the 

European economies. At the same time as American thinking was veering in favour 

of regional arrangements in Europe, the French finally changed sides in the longstanding 

Anglo-American dispute over the character and ultimate goals of the 

OEEC, and joined the Benelux-countries and Italy in exploring further economic 

co-operation outlined in the Finebel/Fritalux proposals. 15 This meant that the British 

were left alone with the Scandinavians in opposing the increasingly influential 

and better-consolidated Franco-American axis within OEEC. 

12. Playfair to A. P. Grafftey-Smith (Bank of England), 11 October 1949, T 236/5370; Closer Economic 

Association between Scandinavia and the Sterling Area, Report by the Official Committee 

on Economic Development, 28 November 1949, ER(L)(49)321, CAB 134/245, PRO. Once the 

plan was announced British journalists christened it as Uniscan. Other names given by journalists 

included Ukiscan, Uniskan, Scandanglia, Scanuk, Brisk (in Norway) or L'uniscan and Uniscam (in 

France). These names compared well with such contemporaries as Franebel, Finebel, Fritaluxal, 

Fraswitaluxal, Benefrit or Benefit. Cripps said that it was a 'scandangle' that such names should be 

allowed at all. Cripps' speech to the Treasury staff, 11.1.1950, Sir Stafford Cripps Papers, Nuffield 

College, Oxford. Cripps's own favourite would have been 'Skanuk', as it reminded him of 'a viking 

war cry'. G. HÄGGLÖF, Fredens Vägar, P.A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, Stockholm, 1973, p.179. 

13. UK OEEC telegram no.1224 to FO, 30 October 1949, FO 371/7802, PRO; M. HOGAN, The Marshall 

Plan. America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge 

University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp.273-276; M. AF MALMBORG, Den ståndaktiga nationalstaten 

…, op.cit., pp.90-91. 

14. Henniker memorandum, 'Regional Economic Groupings. I Closer Economic Association between 

Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Sterling Area', 12 December 1949, FO 

371/78139, PRO. 

15. G. BOSSUAT, La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944-1954, vol.II, 

Ministère des Finances, Paris, 1992, pp.707-712. See also R. T. GRIFFITHS & F. M. B. LYNCH, 

The Fritalux/Finebel Negotiations 1949/1950, European University Institute, Florence, 1984.


The potential emergence of regional economic arrangements in Europe highlighted 

Britain's problematic position. As the supranational alternative was dismissed in Britain 

and its conditional “contract out of Europe” prepared, relations with the Scandinavians 

were discussed too. A wide consensus existed in Whitehall that in the new situation it was 

important to maintain Britain's close relations with Scandinavia, whatever the future relationship 

between the continental countries and Britain should be. A contract out of the so 

called “Little Europe” of the Six, which had only a limited bearing for the British economy, 

should not be a similar contract out of Scandinavia. To maintain Britain's links with 

the Scandinavians, which were not presumed to participate in such schemes as the Finebel 

negotiations or later in 1950 in the Schuman and the Pleven plans, was a policy objective 

that was in British eyes both politically feasible and economically necessary. However, as 

discussions in late 1949 and early 1950 revealed, British policy-makers had more 

far-reaching goals too about the political utility of an opening towards Scandinavia. 

The development of Britain's political and economic relations with Scandinavia 

seemed to offer Britain a unique opportunity. As E. W. Playfair presented the Treasury 

view in October 1949, the development of closer relations with Scandinavia 

may have been “the only means of avoiding being faced by a United Europe which 

we either have to keep out or get into”. 16 Scandinavia, according to this reasoning, 

could offer an alternative route to formulate Britain's Europeanness in political and 

economic terms. From the political point of view, a step ahead on the Scandinavian 

front seemed to bring certain advantages both as to allay US suspicions of British 

procrastination in further economic integration in Europe, and to bring the Scandinavians 

closer to Britain by economic means. The economic motivations of Britain's 

Scandinavian opening arose from the perceived need to achieve a wider degree 

of liberalisation in the unflexible current trading situation, especially in the 

field of finance and payments. The bilateral, annual trade negotiations framework 

was politically troublesome and any steps towards increased flexibility were welcomed 

in Britain and in Scandinavia. 17 The Norwegians in particular were keen to 

gain access to the capital markets of Britain, and to a lesser extent, in Sweden, 

which could only be achieved through special arrangements. Furthermore, in the 

OEEC-wide liberalisation process and in the talks leading to the European Payments 

Union (EPU), the British were keen to enlist the Scandinavians on their side. 

The general approach of the British and the Scandinavian governments towards questions 

dealt with in the OEEC had been very similar in 1948-49, but in 1950 a rift opened 

between low-tariff countries such as Sweden and Denmark and the British, who sought 

further trade liberalisation through curtailing import restrictions which the low-tariff countries 

relied upon. 18 However, in organisational questions, they had all been firmly against 

the idea of a strong independent supranational bureaucracy or the suggestion of a “super- 

16. Playfair to Copleston, 26 October 1949, T 236/5370, PRO. 

17. Address by Sir Henry Wilson Smith, December 1949, HP Å 64, vol.HP 2216, Utrikesdepartement, 

1920 års dossiersystem, Riksarkivet (RA), Stockholm. 

18. V. SØRENSEN, Nordic cooperation …, op.cit., pp.40-61. Further on trade liberalisation, W. A. 

BRUSSE, Tariffs, Trade and European Integration, 1947-1957. From Study Group to Common 

Market, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1997.

110 


man” as a head of the permanent organisation in 1947-49. 19 Their approach towards internal 

financial problems was remarkably similar too, save perhaps Denmark's lesser preoccupation 

with full employment policies. 20 Otherwise the domestic economic policy of 

maintaining price stability in a full employment economy by Keynesian demand management 

using budgetary means was common to these countries. Despite disagreements 

from 1950 onwards on the most suitable instruments of trade liberalisation, in numerous 

cases, the British could find the Scandinavians on their side in OEEC discussions on economic 

policy. This convergence of the basic economic outlook of the British and the 

Scandinavians was compounded with a more deliberate policy of co-operation among the 

OEEC delegations in Paris. At the same time when the Treasury and the Foreign Office 

considered the Uniscan-scheme in October 1949, the British representative to the OEEC, 

Edmund Hall-Patch, suggested that their co-operation should be deepened by some special 

arrangement within the Paris organisation too. 21 

When the Uniscan-plan was introduced in Whitehall in the autumn of 1949 enthusiasm 

was most pronounced at the Treasury and the Bank of England. 22 Foreign 

Office officials saw the merits of the plan too, and when Uniscan was established in 

January 1950, the Foreign Office support for it was based on calculations of the political 

usefulness of a special channel to the Scandinavians in policy-making, and 

when economic benefits failed to materialise from its work, the Foreign Office interest 

proved to be decisive to its continuance. 

Above the official level perhaps the most consistent proponent for closer Anglo-Scandinavian 

economic association in Britain during the Labour government 

was the Chancellor of Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps. Whereas Hall-Patch in the 

OEEC was an ardent supporter of closer Anglo-Scandinavian co-operation in organisational 

and practical questions of European economic co-operation, Cripps 

took a somewhat broader view. His assessment was based on what he saw to be the 

fundamental unity of interest Britain and Scandinavia shared towards the “general 

problem, which was included in the talk of “economic integration” or “unification 

of Europe”. 23 It seemed 

“that England and the Scandinavian countries had to a large degree a common conception 

of the question of economic policy and that we often distanced ourselves 

from the Latin peoples in these questions”. 24 

Cripps's rather optimistic views of the fundamental similarity of outlook between 

the British and the Scandinavians in economic and social thinking reflected views that 

19. A. S. MILWARD, The Reconstruction …, op.cit., pp.171-211. 

20. 'The Internal Financial Policies of the Uniscan Countries', report by the Economic Section of the 

Cabinet Office, May 1950, FO 371/87090. 

21. Interview with Erik von Sydow (OEEC), 7 July 1970, Harry S. Truman Library, Oral History Interview 

Collection, Independence, Missouri. See further on relations between Hall-Patch and Dag 

Hammarskjöld, I. HÄGGLÖF, Drömmen om Europa, Norstedts, Värnamo, 1987, p.51. 

22. The Bank of England held that Treasury and FO enthusiasm behind the scheme was entirely based 

on political considerations. Lithiby minute, 8 November1949, OV 29/31, BEA. 

23. Cripps minute, 2 November 1949, T 236/5370, PRO; Östen Undén promemoria, 3 November 

1949, HP 64 Å. vol.HP 2216, RA. 

24. Ibid.


were widely held amongst British socialists in particular: “On the side of the British Labour 

Party, illusions were rife about Scandinavia in general”, Alan Milward described 

the socialists' “special relationship” over the North Sea in The Reconstruction of Western 

Europe 1945-51. 25 When the gap between the continent and Britain seemed to widen 

in 1949-51, both ministers and officials in London sought consolation from the presumed 

unity between Britain and the “like-minded” people of the North, the 

“champions of the Welfare state”, or “our staunchest friends and allies in Europe”, as 

Roger Makins of the Foreign Office put it in the summer of 1951, witnessing that such 

notions were not confined to socialist circles only. 26 

Besides such a heightened sense of similarities between the British and Scandinavian 

“mentalités”, and whatever political implications these – undoubtedly sincerely 

held – views may have had, the plan Cripps put forward in November 1949 

was based on political and economic arguments. For Cripps, as was the case with 

officials in Whitehall as well, Anglo-Scandinavian co-operation was not just a tactical 

ploy to manoeuvre into better positions in the Ministerial Council of the OEEC 

or an act of solidarity among the brotherhood of socialists around the North Sea. 

An opening towards Scandinavia was initially hoped to be at least a partial solution 

to Britain's numerous problems in its economic and political position in Europe, 

along lines that would build up Britain's economic strength in a way not inimical to 

current British – or socialist – economic thinking and political traditions. 

The establishment of Uniscan 

One of the most useful political arguments in favour of further Anglo-Scandinavian 

economic co-operation was that Britain needed to show that it had kept to its word 

about its commitment to regional economic groups as a fundamentally desirable objective. 

The British government had confirmed this to both domestic and international 

audiences, but words needed to be supplemented with actions. And if actions fell short 

of words, something was needed to sugar the pill in Washington at least. Desperately 

looking for a way out, Foreign Office officials agreed that it could hardly be argued on 

the basis of a closer economic association between Britain and Scandinavia 

“that we should be acting as rather bad Europeans if we associated ourselves with a 

regional group which would after all be based in that similarity of outlook and economic 

structure which is the only logical foundation for any regional groups”. 27 

In this view, there was no other serious alternative for Britain, because participation 

in the regional group including Belgium and Italy would be more difficult 

25. A. S. MILWARD, The Reconstruction …, op.cit., p.316. 

26. Henniker memorandum, 'Closer Economic Association between Scandinavia and the Sterling Area', 

30 November 1949, FO 371/78137; E. A. Radice minute, undated (1949), FO 371/78136; Sir 

Roger Makins memorandum, "Impressions of Scandinavia", 28 June 1951, FO 371/94444, PRO. 

27. Burrett minute, 8 November 1949, FO 371/78136, PRO.

112 


for Britain “for obvious reasons”. 28 Hence, if Britain was not to contract out of Europe 

completely, Scandinavia was their only chance. 

Irrespective whether this reasoning made much sense as a long-term strategy for 

Britain's European policy, the economic implications of a closer association between 

Britain and Scandinavia could not be overlooked. The original British studies over the 

pros and cons of an Anglo-Scandinavian economic association were remarkably optimistic 

both in terms of the extent of the projected association and the timetable of its establishment. 

What the British originally suggested was Scandinavia's association with 

the sterling area as “non scheduled territories”, without participation in the gold or dollar 

pools. In effect, this would have meant full freedom of currency convertibility and 

capital movements, which would in turn have led to a situation where both the sterling 

area and the Scandinavian countries would have agreed to hold each other's currencies 

without limit, i.e. would give each other unlimited short term credit. Otherwise the British 

did not suggest any far-reaching concessions in the most important and difficult 

fields of tariffs and the allocation for export of scarce raw materials such as coal, but 

such an extensive financial liberalisation within the group would undoubtedly have had 

implications on trade in due course. 

The initial Whitehall view, that there did not appear to be any serious objections 

for closer economic association, was subsequently revised when the plans were 

first discussed with the Scandinavians in December 1949 and January 1950. 29 The 

Swedes in particular were concerned lest they would end up financing the whole 

scheme, as they already held substantial sterling balances as a result of the imbalance 

of Britain's imports and exports with Sweden. As the Swedes saw it, the deepening 

of economic relations between Britain and the Scandinavian countries was 

ultimately dependent on the degree of equilibrium in the trade between the countries 

as long as multilateral trade was not re-established elsewhere. 

What proved most damaging to the British proposals was how further studies revealed 

that they would actually increase the existing disequilibria and probably lead to 

further increases of sterling balances in Sweden and Denmark in the short term at least: 

in plain words, a further increase of the credit they were already giving to Britain. 30 Not 

surprisingly, this made the Swedes especially apprehensive that they were to finance the 

whole scheme, a concern that was already familiar from studies conducted on the feasibility 

of further Scandinavian economic integration. Hence the Swedes were keen to 

find out what the British could give them in return in trade matters. As was soon found 

out, there was nothing to be expected on that side. Most important for Swedes and 

Danes were British exports of coal, which had not been touched upon in the preliminary 

discussions. Indeed, trade was scarcely mentioned in the discussions, which centred 

around financial and payments problems. 31 

28. Ibid. 

29. Treasury memorandum, 'Scandinavia. The Financial Problems of closer Union', 8 November1949, T 236/ 

5370; Treasury memorandum, 'Scansa', undated, T 236/5371, PRO; Sharman Wright minute, 3 November 

1949, OV 28/31, BEA. 

30. Berthoud memorandum, 'Ukiscan', 20 December 1949, FO 371/78139, PRO. 

31. Playfair to Christelow, 20 December 1949, FO 371/78139, PRO.


When the reluctance of in particular the Swedes and the Danes to embrace Britain's 

proposals of deepening their economic relations dawned in early 1950, Cripps 

still tried to instill more life into the Uniscan concept and continued to stress the 

importance of developing such co-operation further. But the momentum was hard 

to maintain not only because of the wider economic processes which undercut 

Uniscan's potential. The Labour Government was heading towards a general election 

and this was not the best of moments to break new ground in such a controversial 

issue as policy towards Europe. But more ominously for the long term, Cripps 

himself, his health ailing, had passed his peak as chancellor. Although he can be 

considered as the “primus motor” behind the Scandinavian orientation of Britain's 

European policy, his power was not enough to keep it running after the initial push. 

A stronger political will was lacking and nobody, either in Britain nor in Scandinavia, 

was ready to take on the initiative Cripps himself failed to take further. 

Besides bilateral trade and financial issues between the British and the Scandinavians, 

the feasibility of their economic co-operation depended on wider issues as well. 

From the British point of view, there were three main themes running alongside its attempts 

to deepen its economic and economic-political relationship with the Scandinavians. 

First, on the liberalisation of trade, the main progress was being made in Paris at 

the OEEC, and to a lesser extent under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs 

and Trade (GATT). Measures agreed in these organisations influenced the participating 

states' positions in bilateral trade negotiations as they limited the scope for granting 

exclusive concessions. In other words, falling short of creating a discriminatory 

Anglo-Scandinavian trade bloc, Britain could offer relatively little to the Scandinavian 

countries that they did not already have. 32 Second, talks about ending financial restrictions 

between Britain and Scandinavia took place at the same time as proposals for a 

European Payments Union were being launched in Paris. 33 It was realised that any concessions 

made within Uniscan might have less value if there was an effective arrangement 

covering Western Europe as a whole, backed by Marshall aid dollars. Later during 

1950, this process completely overtook the incremental and rather modest payments 

liberalisation process attempted within Uniscan in early 1950. 

But perhaps the main limiting factor allowing Uniscan to become a more wide 

reaching economic arrangement during the 1950s was the question of the West German 

economy. The re-emergence of West Germany in international markets challenged Britain's 

position as a large-scale supplier of industrial goods throughout Europe from the 

early 1950s onwards. 34 The Swedes and the Danes were keen to use their accumulated 

sterling balances for West German goods, and were therefore very hesitant about joining 

any discriminatory bloc in which West Germany was not a member. The West Ger- 

32. 'Trade with Europe', The Financial Times, 23 January 1950. 

33. For EPU see, A. S. MILWARD, The Reconstruction …, op.cit., pp.299-334; M. HOGAN, The 

Marshall Plan …, pp.291-335, 349-359. 

34. On Swedish- W.German trade, M. FRITZ, Turbulente Jahre. Schwedens Außenhandel und Wirtschaft 

1945-1954, in: U. OLSSON (ed.), Neuanfang. Beziehungen zwischen Schweden und 

Deutschland 1945-1954. Sieben Beiträge, Umeå Studies in Economic History, Umeå, 1990, 

pp.143-164.

114 


man markets were also becoming more and more lucrative in particular for Danish agricultural 

products that had previously flowed to Britain, often on prices that irritated 

Danish producers. As West Germany's participation in any Uniscan arrangements was 

considered early on politically impossible in London, this proved to be a difficult stumbling 

bloc for the Danes and the Swedes. 35 

Changes took place on the Atlantic front too as it became evident that US insistence 

on Britain's participation in regional trade groups was relaxing already in 

1950. Further, as the European ground shifted in the spring of 1950 with the announcement 

of the Schuman plan, such a limited approach as was typified by Uniscan 

had far less sales value as an example of British steps towards integration from 

a Congressional or ECA point of view than was anticipated in 1949. In trade liberalisation 

and payments questions the most important arena was the OEEC, where 

both the British and the Scandinavians had been ever less enthusiastic to follow the 

Franco-American lead. The American views had at first been rather positive towards 

Cripps's more ambitious plans about co-operation with the Scandinavians, 

but the realisation of the economic difficulties that were ahead quickly distinguished 

much of the flair of enthusiasm in Washington. 36 

The negotiations between the British and the Scandinavian governments ended 

in an agreement in January 1950 that the present economic circumstances did not 

allow the complete removal of all restrictions on payments between the four countries, 

but that there was scope for more limited action, which should be studied further. 

The practical meaning of this was that tourist allowances were increased without 

limit, with certain restrictions with Norway – the Scandinavian country, 

ironically enough, that had been most eager to develop its economic and political 

relations with Britain in the first place. 37 The declaration setting up the Anglo-Scandinavian 

Economic Committee was signed in Paris on 30 January 1950, 

four months before the Schuman Plan, when Cripps and the Scandinavian foreign 

ministers approved the officials' report. 38 On 31 January the Council of the OEEC 

was formally informed about its establishment and about the first steps towards 

payments relaxation within the group. 39 

35. British officials had at first aired a wider plan covering the Uniscan countries, Netherlands and 

West Germany in November 1949, but this was shelved in December for its potential to bring 

about unwelcomed political consequences, such as appearing to sabotage the Benelux or the 

Fritalux negotiations. Berthoud to Hitchman (T), 9 November 1949, FO 371/78136; J. B. Richards 

minute (German political dept.), 2 December 1949, FO 371/78136; Duke minute, 15 December 

1949, FO 371/78136, PRO. 

36. Sir Oliver Franks telegram no.5739 to FO, 9 December 1949, FO 371/78138; Christelow to Playfair, 

13 December 1949, FO 371/78139, PRO. 

37. I. SOGNER, The European Idea …, op.cit., pp.307-327; K. E. ERIKSEN and H. Ø. PHARO, Kald 

krig of internasjonalisering …, op.cit., p.143. 

38. Report by Officials, 21 January 1950, FO 371/87087; Agreed Minute, 30 January 1950, FO 371/ 

87088, PRO. 

39. Report by the Uniscan countries to the Council of OEEC, 'Further measures of co-operation: Anglo-Scandinavian 

Arrangements', 31 January 1950, C(50)41, microform 049, OEEC Archives, 

Historical Archives of the European Communities, Florence.


What was the most significant conclusion reached in the negotiations was that possibilities 

for further openings should be subjected to continuing study. This in fact became 

the rationale for setting up and maintaining Uniscan. Its main function was 

“to keep under review the carrying out of the financial recommendations and to 

explore further possibilities for economic co-operation” 

although later it functioned as an expert body discussing developments in Europe 

and in the international economy. The body began to work on a permanent basis, 

meeting on an official level normally twice a year in each capital. Informal ministerial 

meetings were organised occasionally, normally in conjunction with the 

OEEC Council in Paris. 

The first Uniscan meeting was held at the Danish Embassy in Paris in April 

1950. The delegations, consisting of senior officials from the four countries, discussed 

organisational questions, actions taken in each country to implement the 

January declaration, and problems of economic disequilibria. The only tangible 

move forward on the financial side was the UK delegation's statement about steps 

for further relaxations of controls over possession of Scandinavian currencies in 

Britain. 40 On the economic policy front, Swedish proposals for studies on disequilibria 

were linked up with the work, which was being done within the OEEC “harmonisation” 

resolutions. 41 

The first meeting set a pattern for the future Uniscan discussions: instead of 

spectacular advances towards Uniscan free trade, the agenda came to be dominated 

by “European” and other wider international questions. In the first meeting there 

was only one “European” question on the agenda, the forthcoming OEEC payments 

scheme. Characteristically, it was agreed that 

“it was desirable that representatives of the four Governments in Paris should keep in 

close touch and discuss the various proposals for a European Payments Union with a 

view of ensuring that discussions in the OEEC of such proposals take due account of 

the objectives of Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation”. 42 

In practice this meant an agreement that “these and other points should be followed 

continuously in an Anglo-Scandinavian group in Paris in which the U.K. 

Delegation will have the initiative”. 43 This meant, that the previously informal 

co-operation of the British and Scandinavian delegations in Paris became institutionalised. 

The OEEC offshoot of Uniscan adopted a more active role in Anglo-Scandinavian 

economic talks from autumn 1950 onwards. The FO instructed 

Hall-Patch along these lines in October 1950, but was nevertheless reluctant to reduce 

Uniscan just as part of the “Paris machinery”. 44 Indeed, the leitmotif behind 

continuing this co-operation in the EPU era seems to have been a need for a more 

comprehensive exchange of views and co-ordination of policies in the OEEC, but 

40. UK OEEC delegation telegram no.214 to FO, 4 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO. 

41. Makins to Berthoud, 3 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO. 

42. Hall-Patch telegram no.214 to FO, 3 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO. 

43. Makins to Berthoud, 3 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO. 

44. FO telegram no.1017 to OEEC Delegation, 3 October 1950, FO 371/87091, PRO.

116 


also to be able to respond to any new developments such as the Schuman plan. To 

be effective, this also required co-ordination outside the daily work of the OEEC. 45 

Co-operation with Limits 

With Conservatives back in power in Britain in late 1951, Uniscan meetings continued 

along the lines established in 1950 and wide-ranging discussions of international 

economic policy and European questions were continued. However, it is difficult 

to establish the ultimate significance of these consultations from the point of 

view of national policy-making in Britain or in Scandinavia. The British, who 

sensed how keenly the Scandinavians wanted to integrate British responses to such 

questions as sectoral integration schemes in Europe to their own, had by the end of 

1950 grown somewhat uneasy lest the regular consultations with their Uniscan 

partners forced them to tie their hands in advance of important policy-decisions in 

the OEEC or elsewhere. In November 1950, during Labour's reign, a decision was 

made in London, “that the United Kingdom could not admit that there should 

always be a common Uniscan approach to O.E.E.C. problems”. The decision 

applied to other topics discussed in the forum as well. 46 However, even if Uniscan 

was therefore not let to develop de facto decision-making functions, it was appreciated 

that even in cases when British and Scandinavian views diverged, a preliminary 

exchange of views within the group was useful. 

Despite fears in Scandinavia, that the new British government would not be as 

interested as the Labour government had been in the Scandinavian dimension, various 

developments spoke for the continuance of close Anglo-Scandinavian economic 

consultations. First of all, the Scandinavians themselves seemed to want this, 

even if the British sought to restrict the extent Uniscan may have been able to force 

their hand. 47 Second, the British delegation in the OEEC favoured further openings 

on the Uniscan front and set great value to its co-operation with the Scandinavians. 

Third, until at least 1954-55 the Treasury did not abandon its original idea of closer 

financial association between the United Kingdom and Scandinavia. And last but 

not least, developments in Europe with the establishment of the ECSC and other attempts 

towards further integration in the military and economic spheres increased 

the Foreign Office's interest to use the Uniscan framework in keeping a special 

channel open to the Scandinavians in European issues. Therefore, from early 1951 

onwards there existed a wide interdepartmental consensus about the usefulness of a 

distinctive Anglo-Scandinavian economic forum, a consensus at which the different 

Whitehall departments arrived despite their own particular interests. 

45. Hall-Patch telegram no.849 to FO, 8 October 1950, FO 371/87091, PRO. 

46. Note of a UK Uniscan delegation meeting held in the Treasury, 17 November 1950, FO 371/87092, 

PRO. Emphasis in the original. 

47. An example of the value Swedish officials in charge of European policy set on Uniscan is found 

in the memoirs of Ingemar Hägglöf. I. HÄGGLÖF, Drömmen om Europa, op.cit., p.56.


However, even if the Conservative government accepted the basic line Labour 

had had towards Scandinavia and Uniscan, new developments emerged in Anglo-Scandinavian 

relations that were partly due to the new government's foreign 

political preferences, and partly due to economic developments with which the 

Conservatives had to react soon after assuming office in 1951. The first problem 

arose with the difficulties the new government encountered with Britain's balance 

of payments in 1951-52. While disputes over coal exports or fish landings had been 

a longstanding problem with the Scandinavians, there was now trouble on a wider 

front. 48 In 1951 serious problems over Britain's balance of payments led to drastic 

cuts in imports, and this affected all the three Scandinavian economies in their vital 

export sectors. On top of this, there were problems in meeting previously agreed 

levels of coal and steel exports to Scandinavia. After much hard bargaining, larger 

quantities of coal and steel were secured in late 1951, after an intervention by the 

Foreign Office, but the continuing import restrictions led to further problems and 

strong protests from the Scandinavian governments. 

In early 1952, just as tension on the trade sphere was gradually reduced, the Foreign 

Secretary Anthony Eden introduced the idea of linking the planned European 

Defence Community (EDC) with existing European institutions. 49 This created a serious 

problem for Sweden and for them it was additional proof that the Conservative 

government had a different set of priorities towards Scandinavia than Labour had 

had. Membership in European institutions with a military role was considered incompatible 

with Sweden's neutrality policy. 50 The prospect of Sweden's forced withdrawal 

from the Council of Europe if the Eden plan succeeded, posed a grave threat to the 

Anglo-Scandinavian axis in other questions concerning Europe too. Arguments highlighting 

the need to maintain Britain's 'special relationship' with Scandinavia, however, 

were not enough for Eden to modify his European policy. Overriding concerns 

over the future of West Germany in particular, placed Sweden further down on the list 

of Britain's political priorities. 51 Further, Eden was in general less interested in the 

different new multilateral forums of economic diplomacy that had emerged after the 

war, and his general disregard for the OEEC was witnessed by the Swedish ambassador 

who in their first encounter had to explain to the embarrassed secretary of state 

what those four letters stood for. 52 In the end, the fact that the Eden plan never seriously 

endangered Sweden's already restrained attachment to European institutions 

was thanks to the French National Assembly, which rejected the EDC in 1954, and 

not to concerns over Britain's relations with Sweden. 

48. Accounts of Anglo-Scandinavian trade problems are found in B. NILSON, No Coal without Iron 

Ore. Anglo-Swedish trade relations in the shadow of the Korean War, in: SJH 1/16(1991), pp.45- 

72 and B. NILSON, Butter, Bacon and Coal. Anglo-Danish Commercial Relations, 1947-51, in: 

SJH 3/13(1988), pp.257-77. 

49. A. EDEN, Full Circle, Cassell, London, 1960, pp.47-48. 

50. M. AF MALMBORG, Den ståndaktiga nationalstaten …, op.cit., pp.268-284. 

51. Dennis Allen minute, 23 April 1952, FO 371/100931, PRO. 

52. Hägglöf to Undén, 6 December 1951, Hp 1 Ba, vol.248, RA. According to Hägglöf, Eden however 

became more interested in the OEEC later, Hägglöf to Undén, 16 December 1952, Hp 1 Ba, 

vol.116, The Archives of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.

118 


The trade disputes of 1952 and the abortive Eden plan were both signs that the 

Anglo-Scandinavian relationship had after all become more strained when compared 

to the Labour government's period in office in 1945-51. Thus in summer 

1952, while acute disagreements between Britain and Scandinavia in trade issues 

were patched up, posts in Scandinavia were increasingly apprehensive about the future 

prospects of Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation, as this time problems 

seemed to originate from London and not from Stockholm or Copenhagen. 53 

While on the trade side the British were steadily losing ground to West Germany, 

on the economic-political front even the Norwegians had become more reserved 

towards Britain than they had been in the beginning of Uniscan co-operation in late 

1949. There was a growing realisation of economic changes, which were working 

against, not for, further Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation. The last occasion 

when plans for deepening economic relations between these countries were 

discussed was in 1953-55, when under the initiative of the Treasury and the Bank 

of England, feasibility of Scandinavia's full Sterling area membership, and even 

participation in the British Commonwealth, was studied and abandoned in face of 

Swedish and Danish opposition. This time these ideas met with even less enthusiasm 

on the behalf of the Swedes and Danes than the Uniscan proposals had in 

1949, although the Norwegian response was at first positive. 54 Again in 1957-58, 

when the British government's Free Trade Area proposal was discussed, the prospects 

for any special Anglo-Scandinavian economic arrangements alongside the 

wider schemes were very low. After the shelving of the Sterling area proposals in 

1955, no substantial openings for further co-operation within this group were introduced 

until 1959. 

Conclusion 

While officials at the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office tried to counter the 

overall trend of growing distance between the governments on international economic 

policy in the early 1950s, Uniscan's meetings nonetheless continued apace 

and remained a part of the official machinery of managing Britain's relations with 

the Scandinavians and vice versa. The biannual meetings of Uniscan lasted until 

1959, when the Swedish government initiated – during what proved to be Uniscan's 

last meeting – the negotiations that led to the signature of the Stockholm Convention 

in November 1959 and the formation of EFTA. The arrangement was formally 

ended in 1960. 

53. Wright to Eden, 18 June 1952, FO 371/99082, PRO. 

54. Brittain minute, 29 February 1953, T 236/5375, PRO; Bank of England memorandum, 'Uniscan 

and convertibility', 15 April 1953, OV 29/32, BEA; H. Eggers minute, 5 May 1953; Treasury 

memorandum, 'Scandinavia and the Sterling Area', 16.May 1953; Berthoud to Coulson, 17 June 

1953, T 236/5375, PRO; K. E. ERIKSEN and H. Ø. PHARO, Kald krig of internasjonalisering …, 

op.cit., pp.144-145.


In Uniscan policy-makers found a useful forum to discuss long-term strategies 

and negotiation positions. Being a multilateral forum it brought the policy-making 

machineries together in a manner that would not have been possible using normal 

diplomatic channels. This, and the numerous studies conducted over the years for 

the use of Uniscan meetings on the national economies and Anglo-Scandinavian 

economic interaction, eventually paved the way for EFTA – when external conditions 

so permitted – and provided that loose association with an institutional memory 

concerning expectations the core members had over the potential and ramifications 

of co-operation amongst them, and the behaviour and policy-making 

processes typical on both sides of the North Sea. 

Despite considerable political goodwill behind the scheme, the economic 

achievements of Uniscan fell far short of the original British proposals of November-December 

1949, when a more comprehensive financial liberalisation had been 

envisaged. Had this approach been successful, the pound sterling would have become 

convertible within this group which would have directly strengthened the 

economic influence of Britain in Scandinavia, whose situation would then have 

resembled that of the sterling area countries. 

The utility of Anglo-Scandinavian discussions in Uniscan, were therefore of 

technical and to a lesser extent, of political nature. While the ultimate ramifications 

Uniscan co-operation was subjected to was acknowledged early on, it was nevertheless 

kept alive. Within its limits, it provided a forum for consultations, discussions 

and exchanges of view, and occasionally, a place where disagreements could 

be dealt with “on the domestic plane”, as the British described it. More than anything 

else, the history of its establishment in 1949-51, illuminates the complex set 

of perceptions and misperceptions, hopes, fears and different national policy goals 

the British and Scandinavian governments had during a key period in European integration 

history.

NOMOS Aktuell 

European Political Parties between 

Cooperation and Integration 

This volume conceptualizes political parties on an 

European level in terms of their constitutional and institutional 

regulation as well as their organizational 

foundation and evolution. The emerging European 

political parties are thus treated as organizations in 

their own right. 

Schriften des 

Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung 

Center for European Integration Studies 

Karl Magnus Johansson/Peter Zervakis (eds.) 



Scholars from Britain, Finland, Germany and Sweden 

sharing this field of expertise came together at 

the Swedish Institute of International Affairs to confront 

a series of guiding research questions. 

The book originates from a project coordinated by 

the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) with 

the support of the Constitutional Project of the Center 

for Business and Policy Studies (SNS) in Stockholm. 

Table of Contents: 

Framing European Political Parties: Historical-Institutional 

Framework – Constitutional Framework – Organizing 

European Political Parties: European People’s 

Party – Party of European Socialists – European 

Liberal Democrat and Reform Party – European Federation 

of Green Parties – Electoral Dimension: Party-Electoral 

Linkage – Party Landscape after the 

1999 European Elections 

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 

Baden-Baden 

Karl Magnus Johansson/Peter Zervakis 

(eds.) 



2002, 239 pp., Hardcover, 

46,– €, 79,– sFr, 

ISBN 3-7890-7684-8 

(Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische 

Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Vol. 33) 

NOMOS

121 

The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe. 

The Expansion of European Social Policy 

Erin Delaney 

In 1950, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Labour Party clearly 

stated its attitude towards European integration involving Britain. 1 “The Executive 

argue that no Socialist party could accept a system by which important fields of 

national policy were surrendered to a European authority, since such an authority 

would have a permanent anti-Socialist majority”. 2 Over the following forty years, 

Labour’s ideological opposition to an integrated European community fundamentally 

changed, so that by 1994, a Labour spokeswoman was able to claim that 

“Europe is now part and parcel of our domestic policy in Britain”. 3 

Traditional analysis has cited the reasons for this change as a combination of 

numerous factors, including intraparty factionalism, economic pressure, tension 

between the leadership and rank-and-file members and the role of the two-party 

system. 4 The European Community itself is one factor that has been relatively ignored 

in the explanations for this policy change, as has its potential to exert discreet 

and discernible influence on policy in general. 5 Without disregarding the importance 

of the domestic mechanisms, the aim of this article is to demonstrate that the 

changing focus of the European Community - from an economically liberal organisation 

to one concerned with social welfare - also influenced Labour’s evolving decision 

to embrace the EC. As European policies began to merge with Labour’s domestic 

agenda, ideological opposition decreased, and Labour saw an opportunity to 

affect change on the European level, especially when barred from action in the UK. 

As the European Community developed its social conscience, Labour began to 

embrace it. The social democrats first saw the possibilities for socialism through 

Europe in the 1960s, but the Labour Left was determined to achieve its aims 

through national planning and traditional nation-state socialism. After the economic 

hardships of the 1970s, and the political wasteland of the 1980s, the Labour Left 

1. The National Executive Committee (NEC or Executive) of the Labour Party conducts the Labour 

Party Conferences, and produces the Labour Party Manifesto which is ratified at the Conference. 

The Parliamentary Labour Party, the leaders of regional Labour Parties, as well as representatives 

from the Trade Unions make up the voting population of the Conference - and are the elected members 

of the NEC. 

2. R.W.G. MACKAY, Heads in the Sand, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1950, p.18. Mackay was a Labour 

MP for Reading North who published his criticism of the Labour Party's stance at the time. 

3. Quoted in D. BUTLER and M. WESTLAKE, British Politics and European Elections 1994, St. 

Martin's Press, New York 1995, p.118. 

4. See H. YOUNG, This Blessed Plot , Macmillan, London, 1998 for a detailed analysis of how these 

factors influenced both the Conservative and Labour Parties’ relationships to Europe. 

5. For a discussion of the process of Europeanization, and its relationship to the national political 

process, see R. LADRECH, Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for 

Analysis, forthcoming, Party Politics, 2002.

122 

Erin Delaney 

was prepared to review its position. It saw significant changes at the European level 

which contributed to its change of policy, and the Labour Party emerged reunified 

in the late 1980s as the party for Europe. 

The first section will provide an historical outline of the Labour Party’s opposition 

to European integration, through the 1950s until the mid 1960s. I then analyse 

the changes on the European level during 1965-1967 and demonstrate how a faction 

of the Labour Party noted the shift, leading to division and internal breakdown 

of the Party during 1967-1987. The 1980s and early 1990s marked the final transformation 

of the Labour Party; in this section, I draw the links between this move to 

Europe and the expanding possibility for Labour to implement social change on the 

European level. 6 

Labour Unified in Opposition to European Integration 

During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Labour Party remained, by and large, united 

against the integration movements on the continent. Part of their antipathy to European 

integration stemmed from the dangers they believed European integration 

posed to the Commonwealth countries, as well as to the sovereignty of Parliament. 

The other major concern of the Labour Party was that the proposed organisations 

would not further socialist ideals in Britain, or in Europe. 7 In addition, there was a 

perception that those same organisations and their institutions might go so far as to 

hinder or undo successes that the Labour Party had had in implementing a socialist 

agenda within Britain. 

Faced with the Schuman Plan, the first proposal for integration in the nascent 

European movement in the early 1950s, the NEC issued a statement on international 

affairs entitled, European Unity. 8 The document clarified the Labour Party's attitude 

toward Europe: “In every respect except distance we in Britain are closer to 

our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand on the far side of the world, than we are 

to Europe”. 9 Specifically, the statement outlined Labour’s stance, which had been 

established at the 1950 Labour Party Conference, on the fledgling European Coal 

and Steel Community (ECSC). 

Delegates had spoken out strongly against the ECSC, using socialist rhetoric. 

Mr. R. Edwards, a delegate representing the National Union of Vehicle Builders, 

6. The author would like to thank Julie Smith and Anne Deighton for their help and advice on earlier 

drafts of this article. 

7. The Party may have had reason to believe this, as the governments of the states pushing for integration 

were all led by centre right or Christian-Democrat governments. 

8. An earlier attempt at European integration was the agreement in 1950 between the governments of 

Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Britain to hold consultation in economic matters. This union was 

called the UNISCAN. Its success was short-lived, however, as by 1953 the impetus driving Northern 

economic harmonization was the Nordic Council, minus Britain. 

9. 49th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, (Margate, 1950), p.85.

The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe 123 

asked: “Is the Schuman Plan a development of workers' control of the basic industries 

of Europe, or is it a development of capitalist control and cartel agreements 

which have always been detrimental to the working class”? 10 A representative from 

a regional Labour party declared that “without public ownership and a policy of 

full employment, the unification of European heavy industry will inevitably lead to 

a restrictive monopoly, the destruction of full employment and of the workers' 

standards of living”. 11 

Members of Parliament also spoke out against joining the ECSC, focusing on 

the dangers of the supranational aspect and the fears of a European body usurping 

the Government's right to plan and direct the British economy. In 1952, while in 

Opposition, Labour remained faithful to the values it had espoused when in office. 

12 The Rt. Hon. Hugh Dalton clarified: 

“There are some who propagate the notion of a federal Europe of which Britain 

should be a member. The Labour Party, almost unanimously, has rejected that view. 

We are not prepared to join a European federation because we are not prepared to 

hand over to a supra-national authority decisions on matters which we judge vital to 

our national life; such matters as the scope of socialisation, the means of maintaining 

full employment or the distribution of wealth through the policy of fair shares”. 13 

In 1955, the Conservative Government was invited to participate in the furthering 

of European integration at the Messina Conference. The negotiations led to the 

Treaty of Rome, which served as the founding document for the European Economic 

Community (EEC). The Preamble resolved to ensure the economic and social 

progress of signatory countries, though the articles mainly focused on the complex 

details needed for economic integration. 14 The countries that elected to accept 

the Treaty became known as the ‘Six’– France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg 

and the Netherlands. Britain, under the Conservatives, sent a delegation to 

observe, but as in the case of the ECSC, decided to remain aloof. In response, Britain 

rallied the other European nations who were not involved in the Treaty of 

Rome, to join a European Free Trade Area (EFTA). EFTA would not push for deeper 

integration but would allow member countries to benefit from reduced or eliminated 

tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. 

The Labourite Shirley Williams advocated in 1958 that EFTA countries should 

agree on certain measures of ‘social harmonisation’ that were already in place within 

the EEC – in order to bring the two organisations closer together. Although the majority 

10. Ibid., p.84. It is interesting to note that at this time, because of the strong unity of the Party, the 

Labour Government is thought to clearly represent the views of the Party - this attitude and assurance 

did not continue into the 1960s. 

11. Ibid., p.164. 

12. The Conservatives, led by Winston Churchill, won the 1951 campaign, with 321 seats to 295. Party 

positions on the Schuman Plan did not figure into the election, as both parties were against joining. 

13. 51st Annual Conference of the Labour Party, (Morecambe, 1952), p.113. 

14. A section on Social Policy was included, as was the creation of a European Social Fund; however, 

concrete action was mainly restricted to ‘making studies, delivering opinions and arranging consultations.’ 

(Part 3, Title III, Article 118, Treaty of Rome) At this time, Labour was still convinced 

it could achieve its social aims through national planning.

124 

Erin Delaney 

of the Labour Party was firmly against the EEC, certain members, such as Williams, 

were beginning to see possibilities of socialism on the European stage, and a British 

connection with the EEC, in this case through EFTA. She claimed that it was necessary 

to start planning on the European level because “in ten or twenty years we will be trying 

to win the control of Europe as a whole for socialism”. 15 

By 1960, it was the Conservative Party who was warming to the idea of the 

EEC, and broached the subject of accession to Europe. In debate, the Parliamentary 

Labour Party criticised the federalist nature of the community. The most crucial 

point they stressed was whether or not socialist ideals could be implemented within 

the EEC. 16 During the October 1961 Conference, the debate on Europe, which in 

July had seemed to be a main party focus, was overshadowed by Labour’s economic 

and social proposal, 'Signposts for the Sixties'. The relationship between Labour's 

proposals and the Treaty of Rome structured the arguments against the EEC. 

Only two speakers gave unconditional support to the idea on entry, and the overwhelming 

majority voiced concerns similar to those of MP Harold Wilson's: 

“As I read the Treaty of Rome, and the intentions of those who at present operate it, 

'Signposts for the Sixties' cannot be implemented without substantial amendment to 

the relevant articles of the Treaty”. 17 

The MP Mr. Tudor Watkins explained further, and synthesised the ideological 

argument for socialism with his concern about the EEC: 

“I wonder if Macmillan would have come to us and begged of us in some way or the 

other to go to the Common Market if they were all Socialist countries. Not on your 

life! […] Ideals can make institutions, but institutions can kill ideas, the ideas and 

ideals we want as a Socialist Movement”. 18 

Although sentiment within the Conference turned against entry into the EEC, the 

Labour Party did not articulate a clear position on the issue until the following year. In 

fact, some scholars have identified an abatement in the hostility towards the EEC in the 

early 1960s. 19 Labour revisionists, such as Roy Jenkins and Shirley Williams, were 

pushing for more involvement with Europe, and even some of the trade unions began to 

point out advantages to joining Europe based on improved social welfare. At the General 

and Municipal Workers’ Union (GMWU) Conference, A.M. Donnet declared: 

“Joining the EEC will commit Britain to implementing the principle of equal pay. It 

could also give added impetus towards longer holidays and shorter hours, and may 

lead to an improvement of training methods and facilities. The harmonization of 

social policies could lead to an improvement in family allowances”. 20 

15. S. WILLIAMS, Uneasy Courtship, in: Socialist Commentary, April 1958, as quoted in R. DESAI, 

Intellectuals and Socialism: ‘Social Democrats’ and the British Labour Party, Lawrence & 

Wishart, London, 1994, p.142. 

16. It is important to remember that throughout the early sixties, Labour was sending delegations to 

the Congress of Socialist International and held its socialist responsibilities as a top priority. 

17. H. WILSON, Purpose in Politics, Selected Speeches, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1964, p.100. 

18. 60th Annual Conference of the Labour Party (Blackpool: 1961), p.216. 

19. M. NEWMAN, Socialism and European Unity, Junction Books, London, 1983 p.163. 

20. GMWU Journal, 25(8), August 1962, as quoted in L.J. ROBINS, The Reluctant Party, UK: G.W. & 

A. Hesketh, Ormskirk, 1979, p.23.


A memorandum from the Trades Union Conference (TUC) articulated the overriding 

question facing the Party: “Would going into the Community help this country 

and the six already in the EEC to work together for their own economic expansion 

and rising living standards”? 21 The answer to that question was not clear. 

Barbara Castle, on the Left of the Labour Party and a member of the anti-EEC 

Britain and the Common Market Committee, was certain that entering the Community 

would not help Britain. In a 1962 article entitled, ‘Planning and the Common 

Market: The Anti-Socialist Community’, she wrote: 

“In the context of the economic philosophy which inspired the Community this means, in 

effect, that [Britain] would be debarred from pursuing even the cautious and experimental 

Socialist policy to which the whole of the Labour Party is committed”. 22 

Richard Clements, the editor of the Left-wing paper, Tribune, outlined the paper’s 

opinion of the EEC in 1961: 

“The Common Market […] is a baited trap. If Macmillan and the Conservatives had 

got Britain pinned down and immobilized into the capitalist-oriented EEC, then their 

task in Britain would have been easier”. 23 

Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Party, had indicated some lukewarm support for Europe, 

caught as he was, between the anti-European left and the pro-European revisionist 

right. However, he shied away from openly endorsing the idea, and at the 1962 Party Conference, 

to the surprise of his revisionist friends, he effectively came down against Europe. 24 

In an effort to unify the party, Gaitskell presented Five Conditions for entry but in 1962, it 

was already clear that the Conservative negotiators would not succeed in attaining them. 25 

Because Labour and the Six could not be reconciled, general opinion, and even opinion 

within the Labour Party, recognised that Labour was thus 'against' entry to the EEC. 26 

21. L.J. ROBINS, The Reluctant Party, op.cit., p.15. 

22. B. CASTLE, Planning and the Common Market: The Anti-Socialist Community, in: New Statesman 13 

March, 1962, as quoted in M. NEWMAN, Socialism and European Unity, op.cit., pp.170-171. 

23. R. CLEMENTS, Editorial, Tribune June 1971, as quoted in T. NAIRN, The Left Against Europe?, 

in: New Left Review, vol.75(Oct.1972), p.55. 

24. Gaitskell was seen as something of a revisionist, as he had become a central figure in Friends of Socialist 

Commentary, which promoted links between revisionist groups. (See T. JONES, Remaking the Labour 

Party, Routledge, London, 1996, p.26.) One theory for his more negative stance towards Europe at the 

1962 Conference is his experience meeting European and Commonwealth socialists in 1962. His meeting 

with the Europeans at the Socialist International was marked by clashes and disagreements; in contrast, 

when he met with the Commonwealth Socialist leaders in September 1962, the conference was pleasant, 

harmonious and productive. L.J. Robins credits these experiences with reinforcing Gaitskell’s and the Labour 

Party’s commitment to the Commonwealth, at the expense of European integration. (See L.J. ROB- 

INS, The Reluctant Party, op.cit., p.28.) 

25. Gaitskell outlined his major points of concern: 1) safeguarding the interests of the EFTA countries, 

2) retaining the freedom to plan the British economy, 3) retaining the system of planned production 

in agriculture (that Labour created after the war), 4) retaining the right to maintain an independent 

foreign policy, and 5) providing for the interests of the Commonwealth countries. 

26. George Brown, the Labour Foreign Secretary in the Wilson Government, wrote in his memoirs, 

“In the years of opposition, when Mr. Macmillan was trying to negotiate British entry, Labour feeling, 

on the whole, was hostile […] the bulk of the Party was Anti-Common Market”. G. BROWN, 

In My Way, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1971, p.216.

126 

Erin Delaney 

Gaitskell had managed to unify the Party behind a stance advocating conditional entry 

and promoting nationalism. 27 His sudden death robbed the Party of an able leader, 

and perhaps of the promise of future Party unity. Nonetheless, initially, under the new 

leader Harold Wilson, the Labour Party appeared to maintain a general unanimity on 

the subject of the Five Conditions. The 1964 Labour Election Manifesto did not mention 

the EEC. It outlined Labour's approach to Europe in one sentence: 

“Though we shall seek to achieve closer links with our European neighbours, the 

Labour Party is convinced that the first responsibility of a British Government is still 

to the Commonwealth”. 28 

The Labour Left saw the EEC as “a Conservative exercise in economic escapism”; 

they believed that economic recovery would be through national planning. 

The 1964 Manifesto presented Labour's economic plans, including a reintroduction 

of a planned economy, the re-establishment of public ownership of the iron 

and steel industries, as well as an extensive regional policy designed to help the less 

developed or declining areas within the UK. At the first Labour Conference following 

the election, 29 there was little mention of entry to the EEC and the Common 

Market - the subject was confined to the speech of George Brown, the Foreign Secretary: 

“In view of the difficulties now within the Common Market we cannot talk 

airily of 'going into Europe' without defining what that means”. 30 

In the journal, Common Market, an article appeared in 1965 that, after describing 

the Labour Government's attitude toward the EEC, declared: “any direct Labour 

initiative to join the Common Market can therefore be dismissed as overwhelmingly 

unlikely.” 31 And in fact, the Prime Minister, Labour leader Harold 

Wilson, emphatically stated in April 1965 that 

“there is no question whatever of Britain either seeking or being asked to seek entry 

into the Common Market in the immediately foreseeable future. So far as this Government 

are concerned, the conditions we laid down still apply”. 32 

27. He could not, at this point, seem to unify the Party around one vision of socialism. He was unable to convince 

the Party that the much vaunted Clause IV of the Labour Party Constitution had outlived its usefulness, 

and the right-left split over that issue foreshadowed the factionalism of the 1970s and 1980s. See T. 

NAIRN, The Left Against Europe?, op.cit.; and T. JONES, Remaking the Labour Party, op.cit. 

28. Labour Manifesto 1964, in: F.W.S. CRAIG (ed.), British Election Manifestos 1959-1987, Aldershot: 

Parliamentary Research Services, 1990, p.56. 

29. A comment at this Conference foreshadows a future split between the leaders of the Government 

and the rank and file of the Labour Party. No longer were Party and Government viewed as a unified 

entity. The split would occur five years later over the EEC. The Rt. Hon. R. J. Gunter, M.P. 

and Chairman of the Conference remarked: "You know, the Labour Government is not the Labour 

Party, and the Labour Party is not the Labour Government. We all know this is so. The Government 

no more dictates to the Party than the Party dictates to the Government. The Labour Party exists as 

a party so that we may progress towards a Socialist society, and for that we must have Labour governments". 

64th Annual Conference …, op.cit., p.112. 

30. Ibid., p.181. George Brown was personally pro-Europe, as were some other ministers; however, 

he was not at this point able to push for integration against a strong anti-Europe majority. 

31. A Look across the Channel, in: Common Market 5, no.2(1965), p.28. Prior to 1966, all articles in 

the Common Market journal reflected the opinions of the Editorial Board. 

32. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 5 th Series, 711(1965): 623.


However, by 1967, Wilson was prepared to support an application for entry that 

overlooked most of the original Labour conditions. What occurred between 

1965-1967 to change Harold Wilson’s mind, and split the Party on Europe? 

A Faction of the Party Turns to Europe – 1965-1967 

Harold Wilson, elected to lead a government with a four-seat majority in 1964, was 

neither pro- nor anti-Europe. There have been suggestions that the application for 

entry in 1967 was done to appease the pro-Europeans in the knowledge that de 

Gaulle would veto the effort. 33 However, there are indications that a legitimate shift 

towards Europe was occurring in a faction of the Labour Party. Traditional analysis 

points to the economy as the overwhelming rationale for the change in attitude 

towards the EC. The benefits outlined in the Manifesto did not materialise, and the 

economy entered a downward spiral. In addition, EFTA was not as successful as its 

creators had hoped and efforts to create a linkage between the EFTA countries and 

the EEC were rejected by the Six. 34 Thus, this failure of the Labour Party to 

achieve its aims through national planning, coupled with the perceived inefficacy of 

EFTA, is thought to have led to the renewed interest in the EEC. In addition to the 

economic reasons, however, there is evidence of changes on the European level 

which also influenced members of the Labour Party to turn towards Europe. Specifically, 

the work of the new Commission pointed to an emerging promise of something 

more compatible with the socialist goals of the Labour Party. 

The leader of this first Commission was Walter Hallstein, who was a dedicated 

'European' and expanded the role and power of the Commission within the Community. 

Initially, it appeared that the Commission was only interested in achieving 

liberal economic aims – an agenda that did not include full employment or other 

Labour priorities. The immense challenge of beginning deregulation and the harmonisation 

of industry necessary for the Common Market demanded tough action 

from the Hallstein Commission in its first few years. The expansion of the institutions’ 

jurisdiction over certain social policies could have created more opposition 

from the Labour Party; however, the increased focus and the ‘left of centre’ thinking 

on social issues (complementary to the Labour ideology) were essential new elements 

of the institutions in the late 1960s. 

33. A. THORPE, A History of the British Labour Party, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1997, p.170. 

34. Wilson himself led the British delegation to the Vienna Conference where it was hoped 

EEC-EFTA ‘bridge-building’ would be successful. However, it was not only the rejection of the 

Six that weakened EFTA. “In 1962 part of Labour’s attack on the Conservative Government had 

been based upon support for EFTA as an alternative European grouping which had no supranational 

or restrictive political aspects. However, in October 1964 the Labour Government, which had 

inherited a massive balance of payments deficit, itself weakened the organisation by imposing a 15 

per cent surcharge on EFTA imports in clear contravention of the EFTA treaty”. M. NEWMAN, 

Socialism and European Unity, op.cit., p.204.

128 

Erin Delaney 

The Commission introduced ‘new ideas’ into the European debate, beginning 

with the Medium-Term Policy Programme, drawn up to cover the years 1966-1974, 

which was described as “an exercise in dirigisme”. 35 In fact, as early as 1964, the 

Commission Reports show a marked increase in their discussions of social policy 

and social harmonisation – a turn from the capitalist enterprise to which Labour objected. 

In that same year, the Commission attempted to create a measure of social 

harmonisation in the area of wages and trade unions. 'Initiative 1964' was devised 

to call “the member States' attention to the need for increasing the close collaboration 

in order to promote the levelling upwards of living and working conditions”. 36 

A law on collective bargaining was in its second reading stage, and business and 

trade unions were to participate in a task force to make changes in a wages policy. 

In addition, a social policy for agriculture was announced, and advisory committees 

were formed on the social problems of farmers, and paid farm-workers. 37 

The most important change, vis-à-vis the Labour Party’s attitude, was the introduction 

of the concept of ‘Regional Policy’, mentioned for the first time in the June 

1965 Report. The Commission stated that “social policy and regional policy are 

closely linked. A balance must be sought between mobility of labour between sectors 

or regions, which is essential for a dynamic economy, and the social and economic 

disadvantages which could arise from excessive inter-regional migration”. 38 

This section of the Report and the work the Commission had been doing directly 

addressed one of Labour's fears about the EEC, incorporated under the condition of 

retaining the freedom to plan the economy. The social policy of the Commission in 

the area of employment had consisted of an extensive retraining and relocation programme. 

Funds were pooled by the Six, and the Commission directed them to specific 

areas within individual countries for unemployment relief. However, prior to 

the change in the Commission’s priorities, most of the money went to relocating 

workers - almost twice as much for relocation than for retraining. This new Community 

regional policy was a closer articulation of Labour’s policy preference, outlined 

in its 1964 and 1966 election manifestos: that money was better spent encouraging 

industry in the poorer regions, rather than relocating those workers. 

Another new policy introduced in 1965, in line with existing Labour policies, 

was the formation of a committee designed to distribute the money of the European 

Development Fund to projects originating in the less-developed EEC Associated 

Countries. Funds were provided for infrastructure, as well as public institutions, 

such as schools and hospitals. This programme provided on a Community level 

much of what the Labour Government was interested in providing to its Commonwealth. 

In the 1964 Labour manifesto, the Government promised to create a Ministry 

of Overseas Development in order to provide funding and aid to the developing 

countries of the world. In 1966, Labour claimed that it had “increased the flow of 

35. M. CINI, The European Commission, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996, p.45. 

36. Eighth General Report on the Activities of the Community (The EEC Commission: June 1965), 

p.251. 

37. Seventh General Report on the Activities of the Community (The EEC Commission: June 1964). 

38. Eighth General Report …, op.cit., p.164.


external aid to developing nations both inside and outside the Commonwealth” and 

proposed to “make our aid more effective by helping recipient countries to plan 

their development and to select worthwhile projects on which to spend our aid”. 39 

During 1967 a faction of the Labour Party, including Prime Minister Wilson, 

began to see opportunities for social policies within the European framework. Harold 

Wilson believed Europe could advance his domestic agenda: “The question is 

whether any proposed surrender of sovereignty will advance or retard our progress 

to the kind of world we all want to see”. 40 The TUC also saw benefits on the European 

level, and when invited to join the trade union centre of the Six (ECTUS), the 

TUC sent two representatives to their Executive Committee. 41 

In retrospect, the political shift of the Community is apparent; that it was noted 

by Labour leaders and contemporary journals at the time reaffirms its importance: 

“It is evident that EEC members like France remain free to practise a high degree of 

economic planning. In the Common Market's own practice, the trend is toward more 

central control of national economic life along lines attractive or at least acceptable 

to Socialism. Many young Labour MPs and Ministers have 'discovered' the European 

institutions, and have found them less dangerous than they imagined”. 42 

The Labour leadership officially recognised the leeway allowed by the European 

institutions after Wilson's trip to meet with the Heads of Government of the Six. 

The meetings were arranged to assess the possibility of safeguarding British interests 

in an application for EEC membership, and were conducted from January to 

March 1967. During the series of meetings, which also included a February visit to 

the EEC Commission itself, Wilson began to understand the difference between the 

Treaty of Rome and its practical application within the Community. 43 In his memoirs, 

Wilson described his discussion with the Italian Ministers about an important 

Labour issue, regional policy: 

“We then turned to regional policies. The answers we received, both on the freedom 

we require for existing regional policies and on our plans to extend them, were reassuring. 

It was important to us that we should be able to report that in the matter of 

regional policies, Community practice allowed a great deal of latitude”. 44 

In other countries as well, Wilson was told that the laws of the Community in 

practice could allow for many of Labour's requirements. 

39. Labour Manifesto 1966, op.cit., p.99. 

40. H. WILSON, Purpose in Politics, op.cit., p.110. 


42. P. LEWIS, Britain in Transition, in: Common Market 6, nos.9-10(1966), pp.181-182. 

43. Upon returning from Europe, George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, said of himself and Wilson: 

“I'd long ago discovered that the Treaty of Rome, like the Bible, takes account of any possible sin, 

provides the antidote and thereby offers ways and means of obtaining sanctity afterwards. On our 

tour of Europe the Prime Minister also learned this. We found that other people bound by the Treaty 

of Rome had managed to provide for all their private troubles, and it was pretty obvious that we 

could provide for ours, even within the terms of the Treaty”. G. BROWN, op.cit., p.221. 

44. H. WILSON, A Personal Record, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1971, p.332.

130 

Erin Delaney 

In the ensuing Parliamentary debate over application to the EEC, Wilson articulated 

many of these examples and arguments to support his case for entry. No less 

than three times in his speech on 2 May 1967 did he refer to the “practical working 

of the Community”, and on 8 May he reiterated the importance of the nature of the 

institutions rather than the articles of the Treaty. “My experience with the working 

of the Community, the actual practical working, and what we have learned in our 

discussions about its working, render unfounded the fears and anxieties which I 

certainly had and very fully expressed, based on a literal reading of the Treaty of 

Rome and regulations made under it”. 45 Wilson’s comments attest to the fact that it 

was not Labour's (or his) ideology that was changing, but rather that Labour's ideological 

convictions could be accommodated within the EEC. 

Other Members of Parliament also embraced this new view of the EEC allowing 

them ideological constancy. Labour MP Eric Heffer encapsulated the vision of the 

Community: 

“We have the opportunity within our grasp as a Labour and Socialist movement to 

influence the future of Europe for all time. […] I believe that we can get a Socialist 

United States of Europe”. 46 

He elaborated at the 1967 Labour Party Conference: 

“We must fight for a Socialist United States of Europe […] I believe that the way to 

get there is first to get into the EEC, to fight for its expansion and to fight to turn it 

into a Socialist economic community”. 47 

Unfortunately for the future of the Labour Party, there never existed a consensus 

position on Europe within the Party. Compounded by economic and political concerns, 

the split within the party ran deep. At the 1967 Labour Party Conference, 

votes in all areas under discussion were very close, as the effects of joining or not 

joining the Common Market overshadowed all policies. One motion demonstrates 

both the split within the Party and some of the factors influencing the move towards 

Europe. The motion in question was carried by 3,350,000 for, and 2,697,000 

against; it read: 

“This Conference welcomes the Government’s decision to apply for membership of 

the European Economic Community and to negotiate satisfactory terms for British 

entry. Conference is encouraged by the support of our Socialist and Trades Union 

colleagues in the Six for the entry of Britain and other E.F.T.A. countries and is convinced 

that British membership would be a vital step towards European unity”. 48 

The Labour Party entered the 1970s divided on the question of Europe, with rising 

left-right tension approaching a dangerous precipice. Wilson as party leader was confronted 

with the task of unifying the party - one that he could not accomplish. 

45. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 5 th Series, 746(1967): 321-322. 

46. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 5 th Series, 746(1967): 1154-1156. 

47. Labour Party Conference Report, 1967, pp.280-281 as quoted in M. NEWMAN, Socialism and 

European Unity, op.cit., p.216. 

48. F.W.S. CRAIG (ed.), Conservative and Labour Party Conference Decisions 1945-1981, Parliamentary 

Research Services, Chichester, 1982, p.237.


Divided over Europe – 1967-1987 

During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Labour Party was weak and riddled with 

infighting on the issue of entry, and later, of remaining in the EEC. The Conservatives 

orchestrated the successful entry of 1 January 1973, and Labour remained 

opposed to entry, refusing to participate in Community institutions until after the 

1975 referendum on remaining in the EEC. Renegotiations and the referendum 

failed to unify the party as was hoped, and the anti-Europe faction continued to 

voice concerns similar to those of the party in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, in 

1983, after a bitter Conference debate, Labour advocated in its election manifesto 

complete withdrawal from the Community. 

The division within the Labour Party, forged during the 1967 application under 

Wilson, critically impaired the Party’s ability to get elected. In fact, Party membership 

was in decline, and within the last two years of the Wilson government, the 

party lost over ten by-elections. 49 Even after losing the 1970 election to the Conservatives 

by a large margin, Labour remained unable to unite on the subject of Europe. 

Tom Nairn, on the Labour Left, rearticulated the question asked in 1962 by 

the TUC in his 1972 essay ‘The Left against Europe?’. He wrote: 

“We know, indeed, that the Common Market is intended to strengthen the sinews and 

the world-position of European capitalism and its various ruling classes. What we do 

not know – and on the basis of this analysis, cannot ever know – is whether, or in 

what ways, it may also strengthen the position and enlarge the real possibilities of 

the European working classes and European social revolutionaries”. 50 

He also framed the European discussion in relation to the deeper debate within 

the Labour Party – that of the nature of socialism. The revisionists in the Labour 

Party identified themselves with the social democratic movements of the Continent 

and were in favour of entering the EEC, based on arguments of promoting socialism 

through the Community. 51 Those on the Left of the Party did not accept the 

type of socialism promoted by the revisionists, and thus refused to accept their related 

views on the positive social aspects of European integration. 52 This debate of 

ideas and ideologies would continue throughout the 1970s and the 1980s and cause 

a severe split within the Party. 

The Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath brought Britain into the Common 

Market in 1973. In the vote, 69 Labour MPs, led by the pro-European revisionist Roy 

Jenkins, voted for membership, flouting the demands of the Labour leadership who im- 

49. K. JEFFREYS, The Labour Party since 1945, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1993, p.71. 

50. T. NAIRN, The Left Against Europe?, op.cit., p.111. 

51. Alan Day credited the European social democrats with becoming “the pace-setters of European integration”. 

He also claimed that Continental, and by extension, British social democrats believed 

that there was time and opportunity to mould Europe into a socialist concept. See A. DAY, Socialists 

and European Unity, in: Socialist Commentary, August 1971. 

52. Byron Criddle commented in Socialists and European Integration that “the socialists’ espousal of 

the European cause has gone hand in hand with retreat from traditional socialist ideology into social 

democratic revisionism”. As quoted in A. DAY, op.cit., p.7.

132 

Erin Delaney 

posed a three-line whip against membership. Even though the terms of entry were negotiated 

by the Conservatives, these Labour MPs believed that it did not 

“automatically make them into ‘Tory Terms’; that is, terms which in their nature 

must by opposed by members of the Labour Party. The Labour Committee for 

Europe says these are terms that can honourably be supported by Socialists”. 53 

Notwithstanding the rhetoric of the pro-Europeans, the majority of the Parliamentary 

Labour Party voted no, and animosities deepened. 

Many members of the Labour Party remained ideologically opposed to the idea 

of the Common Market, even though Britain had joined. To the “guardians of the 

Party’s ‘ultimate purpose’”, in other words, the Left-wing traditionalist socialists, 

“there was still little to choose between the collaborationist Social Democratic Europe 

of the revisionists and the capitalist-dominated Europe of the Conservative 

Party”. 54 One Labour MP, Eric Deakins, declared: “I am not merely against Britain's 

membership of the Common Market. Even if we were not in, I should be 

against the Common Market's very existence”. 55 

In the more moderate press, however, the benefits of the EEC, as noted in the 

1965-1967 period, were still being reported. In a 1973 issue of Political Quarterly, 

for example, an article discusses the increased attention paid to social policy within 

the Community. It reviews the 1971 progress report on the actions taken by Community 

institutions, Report on the Development of the Social Situation in the Community. 

A key element of the actions taken in 1971 by the Community included the 

reform of the European Social Fund “to allow the Community to promote schemes 

itself directly instead of through national governments.” 56 This and other achievements 

were touted as successes for socialism on the European stage. 

Harold Wilson, still the leader of the party, attempted to create and maintain cohesiveness 

in the party by throwing the European issue into the hands of the British 

public. The major elements of the 1974 Labour campaign strategy were the commitments 

to renegotiating the terms of entry and to a referendum on joining. The 

renegotiation process was a balancing act between the leadership, which, while not 

enthusiastic, was nonetheless committed to Europe, those on the pro-European 

Right, and the Party's Left, which was strongly against any involvement. 

The outlined renegotiation objectives in the Labour manifesto included the traditional 

concerns for the Commonwealth and developing countries, as well as a demand 

for changes in the Common Agricultural Policy and the Community Budget. 

After Labour won the 1974 election, in an opening statement to the Council of 

Ministers, the Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, reiterated that Britain “reserved 

the right to withdraw from the Community if satisfactory terms could not be 

53. The Labour Party and the European Communities, Labour Committee for Europe, Sept., 1971 as 

quoted in L.J. ROBINS, The Reluctant Party, op.cit., p.88. 


55. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 5 th Series, 865(1973): 306. 

56. E. WISTRICH, Social Policy in the Community, in: Political Quarterly vol.44, no.2(April-June 

1973), p.212.


agreed.” 57 The renegotiated terms passed Parliament on 9 April 1975, though not 

because of Labour support. The Government had to rely on Opposition support, 

which it received: its own members were split - 137 Labour MPs voting for, 145 

against, with 33 abstentions. 

The renegotiated terms were almost immaterial at the start of the referendum campaign, 

as most of “the opponents of membership were opposed whatever the terms”. 58 

The referendum itself was also a question of intraparty factionalism, as the Left hoped 

to use the issue of EC membership in order to secure control of the leadership positions, 

by gaining support from the many members of the party who were against entry but not 

necessarily in favour of radical leftist economic policy. 59 The Left called for a national 

referendum on the issue of membership, expecting that with a withdrawal vote it could 

consolidate its position within the party. The mainstream element of the party, represented 

by Prime Minister Wilson, 60 also thought that the EC debate would provide it 

with a chance to strengthen its power – by “outmanoeuvring the left”. 61 Thus Wilson 

co-opted the Left’s strategy of holding a referendum. 62 

Wilson, in an attempt to hold the party together, waived Cabinet responsibility 

during the referendum campaign, paradoxically allowing the Left and the Right of 

the Party to criticise each other with impunity. Neil Kinnock, writing in the leftist 

Tribune, scoffed at the idea that socialism could be better achieved by going into 

Europe and attacked Roy Jenkins and other revisionists: 

“Somehow the vocabulary of radical – even revolutionary – socialism has a hollow 

ring when it comes from such conventionally Right-wing, or to use current terminology, 

‘moderate’ mouths”. 63 

In response the Right-wing attacked the ‘Labourism’ of the Left-wing, which was 

not ‘socialism’ and was blocking “the way to the establishment of social democracy on 

the European model”. 64 Labour leadership hoped that the referendum decision in favour 

of entry, on the high turnout of about 65%, would help to put the membership issue 

to rest. However, to the Labour Left, the issue was far from settled. 

After the referendum, the Labour Party sent representatives to the European 

Parliament (EP), which the Conservative Party had done from the time of British 

accession in 1973. Some pro-European Labour Members of the European Parlia- 

57. S. GEORGE, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 

1990, p.79. 

58. S. GEORGE, op.cit., p.88. 

59. G. BROWN, op.cit., p.76. 

60. Although Wilson was initially the Left’s candidate in the early 1960s, by his third term as PM in 1974, 

he had become much more centrist, and a supporter, though now lukewarm, of entry to the EC. 

61. G. BROWN, op.cit., p.77. 

62. For a thorough analysis of the referendum campaign, see J. SMITH, The 1975 Referendum, in: 

Journal of European Integration History, vol.1(1999), Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1999, pp.41-56; 

and, D. BUTLER and U. KITZINGER, The 1975 Referendum, Macmillan, London, 1999. 

63. N. KINNOCK, Socialism and Sovereignty, in: Tribune, 2 May, 1975. 

64. S. FIELDING, Labourism and locating the British Labour Party within the European Left, in: 

Working Papers in Contemporary History and Politics, No.11, University of Salford, Salford, 

1996, p.7.

134 

Erin Delaney 

ment (MEPs) took advantage of the opportunities presented, and began to pursue 

socialist aims. Michael Stewart became a vice-chairman of the Socialist Group, the 

largest political grouping in the EP, and John Evans pushed to expand the Regional 

Fund. 65 These efforts, and some successes, notwithstanding, the Labour Left refused 

to see the European Community as a route to broader socialism. 

Only the implementation of radical reforms (outlined in the 1979 general election 

manifesto) could reconcile the Labour Left to the EC. Even a newly-elected 

MEP, Alf Lomas, spoke at the Conference in negative overtones on the subject: 

“If we do not achieve these fundamental changes within a reasonable period of time, 

then we should reconsider the whole issue. A reasonable period of time, in my opinion, 

is no longer than one term of the Assembly, and if we do not get these changes 

then we should recommend withdrawal”. 66 

Labour's goodwill and effort towards achieving these demanded reforms were 

limited, as only one year later the Conference decided that the demands were incapable 

of being fulfilled. The Conference “urged the Labour Party to include the 

withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EEC as a priority in the next general 

election manifesto”. 67 Ideological opposition still ran deep within the party: John 

Shelmerdine stated at the 1980 Conference: 

“Let us face it, the Common Market is a club for capitalism. The only way we need 

to trade is through an international socialism. Our fight is not just with one country 

or another; it is with capitalism”. 68 

Labour did indeed continue to fight against capitalism, as expressed through the 

EEC, until ideology compatible with the Labour ideals of socialism became a viable 

option within the EEC institutions. 

In 1981, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Labour Party agreed 

to a policy, Withdrawal from the EEC, which was passed with 6,213,000 votes for, 

and only 782,000 against. The statement clearly articulated the view held by most 

on the Labour Left, and echoed the earliest criticisms of the EEC of the 1950s: 

“[EEC membership] has seriously hindered, and could prevent altogether, Britain 

adopting a coherent socialist strategy for industrial and economic regeneration. 

Withdrawal is thus not a substitute for Labour’s alternative economic, industrial and 

social strategy. It is a necessary condition for its success”. 69 

The hard-line approach to European affairs drove the pragmatists and the 

pro-Marketeers from the party. 

In 1981, Roy Jenkins, and other MPs, mostly revisionists and pro-Europeans, 

formed the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which entered into an ‘Alliance’ with 

65. C. JACKSON, The First British MEPs: Styles and Strategies, in: Contemporary European History, 

vol.2, no.2(1993), p.186. 

66. 78th Annual Conference of the Labour Party (Brighton: 1979), p.324. 

67. 79th Annual Conference of the Labour Party (Blackpool: 1980), p.126. This quotation is an excerpt 

of Composite 15 at that Conference, which was carried by a vote of 2 to 1. 

68. 79th Annual Conference …, op.cit., p.127. 

69. M. NEWMAN, Socialism and European Unity, op.cit., p.247.


the Liberal Party. 70 The Alliance attracted membership away from the Labour Party, 

and showed itself in by-elections to be capable of contesting both Conservative 

and Labour 'safe seats'. 71 Ignoring the Alliance threat, and with the most articulate 

pro-Europeans out of the Party, the Labour Party held fast to its strong anti-European 

rhetoric for the 1983 campaign. In 1982 there was not a single discussion concerning 

Europe at the Labour Annual Conference, except a casual remark by 

Michael Foot reaffirming the Party's commitment to withdrawal. On election day, 9 

June 1983, Labour lost further 31 seats on top of its 1979 loss, leaving the Party 

with 209 seats, and the Conservatives with 397. Labour was decimated. 

Confronted with such failure, and faced with a round of elections for the European 

Parliament, the Labour Party decided to accept the Community and Britain’s 

membership for the duration of the upcoming European Parliamentary session, 

1984-1989, and retain merely the ‘option’ to withdraw. 72 However, during the 1986 

and 1987 Labour Party Conferences there was no debate or even comment on the 

state of European affairs. After the third straight loss to the Conservatives in 1987, 

the Labour Party was officially unelectable. 

The Final Transformation: Labour Reunifies as the Party for Europe – 1987-1994 

Labour’s failures in the 1983 and 1987 elections demanded a radical change in 

policy – and in the late 1980s the Party launched a thorough Policy Review. Not 

only a result of electoral failure, the Policy Review was also designed to confront 

the perceived inefficacy of traditional Labour economic policies. The President of 

France, François Mitterrand had attempted to create a socialist state in France during 

the years 1981-1984. His experiment failed badly and forced a reversal of policy. 

“From this experience, European socialists generally drew the conclusion that a 

new strategy had to be devised which would operate on a European scale.” 73 As 

these events overtook them, anti-Marketeers began to re-evaluate their positions; 

the Policy Review was not, however, as some claim, merely a response to Thatcherism. 

It also coincided with changes on the European stage which promoted European 

policies that more closely mirrored Labour’s traditional domestic aims. 

70. Although the Liberal Party had been consistently pro-Europe since the 1950's, until the SDP-Liberal 

Alliance, they had never provided enough of electoral threat to force the major parties to consider 

seriously their impact in a campaign. 

71. In November 1981, Shirley Williams won a by-election victory for the SDP in the Conservative 

seat of Crosby. In February of 1983 the Liberals won the traditional Labour seat of Bermondsey. 

72. In 1979 European Parliamentary elections amounted to a “deep-dilemma – how [could] a profoundly 

anti-EEC party go out and ask for Votes to send its representatives to the European Parliament”? 

Ph. WEBSTER, The Campaign in the UK, in: D. WOOD (ed.), The Times Guide to the 

1979 European Parliament, Times Books, London, 1979, p.42. 

73. S. GEORGE and B. ROSAMOND, The European Community, in: M. SMITH and J. SPEAR 

(eds.), The Changing Labour Party, Routledge, London, 1992, p.178.

136 

Erin Delaney 

Jacques Delors, the President of the Commission, began to widen the mandate of 

the EC as early as 1986, in the Commission’s programme for that year. He stated that 

“The Commission can only welcome incorporation of the social dimension in the 

Luxembourg Treaty. Beginning this year it promises to translate these aims into proposals 

to demonstrate to the people of Europe that the creation of a vast economic 

area, based on the market and business co-operation, is inconceivable - I would say 

unattainable - without some harmonisation of social legislation”. 74 

After Labour’s 1987 general election defeat, this new European social dimension 

provided Labour with the only means of achieving its social aims against the 

backdrop of Thatcherite Britain. 

While the Thatcher Government was attempting to undermine the trade unions in 

the UK, Jacques Delors was visiting the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 

to garner support for his proposals for “l'espace social” 75 and a “social charter”. In Britain 

during these years, the Conservatives were privatising British Telecom and British 

Gas, and cutting back on pensions and benefits and other elements of the welfare state. 

With an overall majority in the House of Commons of 144 seats, the Conservatives left 

Labour without much recourse at the national level in the area of social policy. The Policy 

Review recognised the constraints to Labour on a national level, and Europe, and 

the EC, is portrayed as an opportunity, rather than an obstacle. 76 

The increased opportunities in Europe and the plurality position within the European 

Parliament of the Socialist Group provided the 32 Labour MEPs with more 

of a chance of defeating the Conservatives than the 209 MPs had in London. This 

fact was noted at the time as demonstrated in an article in Political Quarterly: “It is 

clear that the aims and interests of European Labour movements have more influence 

over EC decisions than the British movement can bring to bear on the Thatcher 

administration”. 77 A Labour MEP, Barry Seal, elaborated: 

“Comrades, decisions are being made in the Common market every day […] the 

decisions that affect Britain cannot be changed by Westminster. This is where the 

Labour members of the European Parliament come in”. 78 

A key example was in the 1987 debate in the European Parliament on the Baron Crespo 

von Wogau report, which considered the Commission's Paper: 'The Single Act: A 

New Frontier for Europe'. The report generally supported the Commission’s plans, and 

highlighted the importance of the creation of the espace social, as well as the efforts to 

create economic cohesion between countries or within a country by supplementing the 

Structural Funds with other programmes. In Westminster, such an effort would have been 

74. Bulletin of the European Communities (Brussels: The Commission), vol. 19, no. 2 (1986), 12. 

75. L’espace social, conceptualised by Delors, is a vague term for a new area of integration which 

would focus on workers’ rights and social issues. It is the idea behind what would become the Social 

Charter, or a charter of basic social rights introduced by Delors in 1989. 

76. M. SMITH, A return to revisionism? The Labour Party’s Policy Review, in: M. SMITH and J. 

SPEAR (eds.), The Changing Labour Party, op.cit., pp.64-65. 

77. J. GRAHL and P. TEAGUE, The British Labour Party and the European Community, in: Political 

Quarterly, vol.59, no.1(Jan-March, 1988), p.75. 

78. 79th Annual Conference …, op.cit., p.152.


immediately quashed; however, in the European Parliament, the report was passed by 255 

to 38, with the 63 abstentions including the British Conservative MEPs. 79 

It is apparent that the EP presented a broad opportunity for political and policy 

achievement for the Labour Party, and after a time serving in the EP, Labour MEPs 

and Party members realised its potential. 80 Speaking for the NEC, Tony Clarke encapsulated 

the new Labour attitude: “Each vote for a Labour Euro candidate is a 

vote for Labour and is a vote against Thatcher and her divisive policies for Britain 

and Europe”. 81 By 1988, a vocal portion of the Conference was drawing attention 

to the possibilities in Europe, perhaps partially spurred on by the visit of Jacques 

Delors to the Trades Union Conference earlier in the year. 

In 1988, Jacques Delors addressed the annual conference of the TUC. He spoke of 

issues directly affecting the unions and their members: a social Community that would 

benefit workers, not merely employers; a voice in policy-making; protection for the 

rights of the members. 82 This last concept, of workers’ rights, resonated with many in 

the trade union movement; the related idea of social citizenship had been discussed in 

the Labour press since the mid-1980s. Michael Mann wrote that “policy should be built 

on top of a simple, more universal, more radical understanding of citizen rights, to enhance 

the power of the ordinary person and family against the power of big capital”. 83 

At the 1988 Party Conference, Neil Kinnock picked up this theme of European 

workers’ rights. The Financial Times reported: 

“[The] social dimension is anathema to Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Labour argues […] 

in sharp contrast, Labour’s ‘social Europe’ as defined by Mr. Kinnock, means ensuring 

the highest standards of working conditions and workers’ rights”. 84 

The Party was primed for the emergence of the Social Charter. 

The concept of a ‘social charter’ suited the Party, as in the 1970s Labour had advocated 

its own ‘Social Contract’ as an essential tenet of its Manifesto, Let Us Work Together. 

85 However, the European Social Charter, drafted in 1980 and an element of the 

79. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Brussels), Bulletin of the European Communities vol.20, 

no.5(1987), p.118. It is worthwhile to mention that often the divisions came down on national lines, 

rather than the broader political alliances; therefore, examples of clear Labour versus Conservative 

voting are difficult to pinpoint. 

80. Ben Rosamond highlights the importance of the links built between the Labour Party and the Confederation 

of Socialist Parties. See B. ROSAMOND, Labour and the European Community: 

Learning to be European?, in: Politics, vol.10, no.2(1990), pp.41-48. 

81. 79th Annual Conference …, op.cit., p.140. 

82. S. GEORGE and B. ROSAMOND, The European Community, op.cit., p.179. 

83. M. MANN, Socialism can Survive: Social Change and the Labour Party, in: Fabian Tract 502, 

The Fabian Society, London, March 1985, p.20. 

84. Another critical element of this Conference debate was the remission of a resolution demanding change to 

the 1972 European Communities Act. The Act, passed under the 1970 Conservative Government in tandem 

with the Treaty of Accession to the Communities, accepted the primacy of European Council Directives 

in Britain. The Labour Party had, since the law’s inception, been fighting to change it and return power 

to the British Parliament. By 1988, most of the controversial laws being passed on the European level 

and 'forced' on the British Parliament were social measures that Thatcher and the Conservative MPs did 

not like. Labour capitalised on this unintended consequence and thus no longer advocated repeal or 

amendment to the European Communities Act.

138 

Erin Delaney 

‘1992’ Programme which would later be added as a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty, 

was a much wider and far-reaching document, allowing for greater reform within Britain. 

86 Margaret Thatcher called it ‘socialism through the back door’. 87 Labour was 

quick to see the potential benefits of such a charter, and prepared a policy document in 

support entitled, The Social Charter: How Britain Benefits. This document highlighted 

the similarities between Labour’s aims and those of the Commission. 88 

There was great excitement about the Charter, Delors and Europe in general. 

Ken Coates, a Labour MEP, wrote of Delors: “Suddenly, a new prophet had arisen 

in Brussels. Was it possible that all those causes which had been lost during the 

Great Waste since 1979, all those social Goods, could now, after ten corrosive 

years, be recovered in the European Community”? 89 All of the Policy Review documents 

had a European dimension, “suggesting that the EC [was seen] not only as 

a separate policy area, but also as a factor in the formulation of all other policy”. 90 

Even on the local level, Europe was having a direct impact, changing the attitudes 

of Labour councils and councillors. Authorities could apply directly to Community 

structural funds, such as the Social and Regional Funds, to support local 

projects. In fact, the links with the Commission and the Community were shown in 

several surveys to have a direct effect on the attitudes towards Europe of Labour 

councillors. Labour leaders with local government backgrounds were among those 

pushing for Labour to take a bigger role in Europe. 91 

By the time that the Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993, the 

extension of European Community responsibility to include workers’ rights, as 

well as public health policies and education, had created a social awareness in the 

community which resonated with the left of centre governments in Europe, and 

with the entire Labour Party. The Major Government refused to participate in the 

dialogue on the Social Charter, and did not agree to adopt the finished product. 

Tony Blair’s campaign promised that Britain would sign this Charter, and many of 

New Labour’s reforms within Britain have been direct results of implementing European 

directives. Thus, Europe has finally become “part and parcel” of Labour’s 

British domestic policy. Moreover, as Prime Minister, Blair has taken a lead in setting 

the agenda for the European Council meetings that discuss employment and 

social policy. Nonetheless, though social policy may have helped convert the 

Labour Party to Europe, it has not yet converted the European Union to socialism. 

85. H. PELLING, A Short History of the Labour Party, Macmillan Press, London, 1978, p.160. 

86. P. ALCOCK, The Labour Party and the Welfare State, in: M. SMITH and J. SPEAR (eds.), The 

Changing Labour Party, op.cit., p.149. 

87. Thatcher called it “a socialist charter – devised by socialists in the Commission and favoured predominately 

by socialist member states”. M. THATCHER, The Downing Street Years, Harper Collins, 

New York, 1994, p.750. 

88. B. ROSAMOND, The Labour Party, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations, in: M. SMITH and 

J. SPEAR (eds.), The Changing Labour Party, op.cit., pp.97-98. 

89. J. HUGHES, The Social Charter and the Single European Market, Spokesman, Nottingham, 

1991, pp.vii-viii. 

90. S. GEORGE and B. ROSAMOND, The European Community, op.cit., p. 171. 

91. See J. GRAHL and P. TEAGUE, British Labour Party …, op.cit., pp.83-85.

139 

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 

Andrea CIAMPANI – La CISL tra integrazione europea e mondializzazione. Profilo 

storico del «sindacato nuovo» dalla Conferenza di Londra al Trattato di Amsterdam, 

Edizioni Lavoro, Roma, 2000, 204 p. – ISBN 88-7910-934-0 – 50.000 Lit. 

This book, written by Andrea Ciampani (University of Padua) for the fiftieth birthday of the 

CISL, the Italian trade union set up by Giulio Pastore in May 1950 two years after the 

CGIL's break up, is an example of European scholars' recent but growing interest in the role 

played by pressure groups and non-institutional actors in the international system and the 

European integration process. 

The analysis of the CISL's international profile appears particularly difficult, not only 

because it is not supported by a selected bibliography, but mainly because it looks like a 

hybrid where European Integration History coexists with other subjects like Economic History 

and Industrial Relations. 

Via a careful analysis of the documents collected at the International Institute of Social 

History in Amsterdam, the author efficaciously investigates the different levels at which the 

CISL operates: national, European, and international, in an intricate labyrinth where the 

three identities often appear to be overlapping. This complex articulation is not only the 

result of the CISL's own history, but also of the Italian post-war history, which has been 

strongly influenced by international development as well as by the Cold War. 

In the first part of his book Ciampani deals with the CISL's origins, focussing on the historical 

debate developed with regard to the various splits which completely changed the history of the 

labour movement in Italy and France, ousting the united antifascist trade unions established after 

World War II. The author stresses that even though the Marshall Plan was the catalyst of the Italian 

CGIL's break up due to its implications with organised labour, internal factors also played an 

important role, as did the disputes among the various labour wings with regard to adopting different 

programs for Italian reconstruction. Since its birth, the CISL, through Giulio Pastore, its first 

Secretary, and Mario Romani, Director of the Ufficio Studi, has developed a pronounced international 

profile. It took part in the establishment of the new international labour organisation, the 

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), formed by all the Western «free» 

labour organisations which had left the Communist oriented World Federation of Trade Unions 

in 1949, and it has played an active role in Europe since the creation of the European Coal and 

Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. 

In the 1950's the links with the American labour organisations, in particular the American 

Federation of Labour (AFL), as well as its efforts to become a reliable interlocutor for the 

US programs in Italy, have influenced the identity of the CISL. It tried to establish a «new» 

form of trade unionism, free from both the political parties and the State along the lines of 

the American model, something that was completely new to the Italian tradition of labour 

organisations, strongly tied as they were to political parties. 

During the 1960's, in spite of the strong repercussions caused by internal political factors 

like the question of the opening to the left, the CISL consolidated its international approach. 

In 1965 Bruno Storti, the CISL's Secretary, was appointed President of the ICFTU, a symbol 

for the overwhelming role played by European trade unions on the international scene. As a 

consequence the CISL promoted a series of international initiatives with the intention of 

radically changing its image and becoming a trade union seriously engaged in supporting 

the establishment of new democratic organisations all over the world, like in Somalia and 

the Middle East.

140 


On the European scene, the 1960's were characterised by the CISL’s change of attitude, passing 

from its enthusiastic support of the European Community to a more critical approach. This 

was partly the result of the condition of inferiority which the Rome Treaties assigned to the 

labour movement. The Treaties were worked mainly out by governments, political leaders and 

the management, with little possibility of participation for trade unions and, more seriously, paying 

little attention to the development of an integrated policy in the social field. This condition 

became more than evident in the absence of trade union representatives sitting in European institutions. 

No labour representative took part in the Messina negotiations and in spite of the continuous 

requests for being represented in the Commission, only the Economic and Social Committee, 

a consultative body with no decision-making power, allotted one third of its seats to trade 

union representatives. In spite of this limited success, the CISL believed that the creation of a 

Common Market could provide the solution to Italian unemployment and for this reason it 

started a propaganda campaign among its members, asking for the setting up of a European 

Social Fund, seen as an instrument for financing professional training. The author stresses how 

during the 1960's the CISL consolidated its European identity through the debate with other 

European trade unions, taking part in Jean Monnet’s Committee for the United States of Europe 

and starting a dialogue with the Commissioner Lionello Levi Sandri with the aim of promoting a 

European social policy and supporting Italian workers who travelled abroad. The real turning 

point in the question of labour movement representation in Europe came about with the establishment 

of the European Trade Union Confederation in 1973, which also comprised the European 

Christian unions and, since 1974, the Communist CGIL, marking a leap forward in the new 

role played by the European labour movements in Brussels. 

During the 1970's internal political factors became preponderant: Ciampani points out 

how the Italian labour movement tried to loosen its ties with the political parties. After the 

violent protests which took place in 1968, the question of promoting the unification of the 

three Italian labour organisations became the focus of their activity, and in 1971 the 

CGIL-CISL and UIL agreed on a common program. Even though real unity of action met 

with many obstacles and actually was never achieved, the three organisations tried to find a 

“gentlemen's agreement” signing a pact for unity of action in 1972 and working towards 

common goals during that period. 

The last part of the book, focussing on the 1980's and 1990's, is particularly interesting as 

the links between internal and international factors become more complex with the radical 

changes that occurred in the international system forcing the CISL, as well as all the European 

labour movements, to start an internal debate regarding the new role played by the 

trade unions in a globalised system. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the German unification, the 

collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had obvious consequences in the 

social field, as the role played by the labour movement changed radically. 

On the European scene, the '80s and '90s appear more successful for the labour movement's 

goals. Ciampani points out the role played by the new President of the European 

Commission, Jacques Delors, in promoting a new dialogue with the social actors, with the 

aim of setting up a social space in Europe. For the first time the European Community 

acknowledged the right of the social parties to negotiate among themselves. This acceleration 

was to lead to the Social Chart approved by the Strasbourg European Council in 1989, 

which, despite lacking any real binding value, reinforced labour's participation in the European 

decision-making process. The election of Emilio Gabaglio, as the European Trade 

Union Confederation Secretary during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations was particularly 

significant as it gave the CISL an extraordinary opportunity to play a role in working out the 

Maastricht Treaty articles on the establishment of a European social policy. 

In general, Ciampani's book is a pioneering work which opens the way to a new series of 

European studies, focussing on the role played by non-governmental actors in shaping the 

European Union’s history. In this context the CISL's case appears particularly interesting not

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 141 

only for the pronounced international profile developed by the Italian trade union since its 

origins, but also because it casts light on a series of initiatives which clearly demonstrate 

how since the 1970's Italy has tried to find a space among its European partners, in particular 

France and Germany, by promoting the development of a social policy. In this context the 

role played by the CISL in close cooperation with the Italian government appears particularly 

significant. 

Maria Eleonora Guasconi 

University of Urbino 

Dimitris N. CHRYSSOCHOOU – Theorizing European Integration, Sage, London, 

2001, 240 p. – ISBN 0-7619-6286-7 – paperback: 16.99 £. 

In his book Theorizing European Integration, Dimitris Chryssochoou aims at nothing less than a 

reformulation of what European integration research should be aiming at: In place of the dominance 

of the “microcosm of sector-specific analyses” (p.2), future scholarship on the European 

Union should be more open and geared towards a re-thinking of the epistemology of EU studies 

by asking “what constitutes legitimate questions and answers for integration scholarship” (p.2)? 

Chryssochoou’s major contention is that existing theories of integration are too narrowly 

focused and conceptually confined to “grasp the distinctive nature of the European polity 

and its complex … governance structures” (p.1). He claims that this insufficiency in extant 

European integration theorizing is mainly the result of the “raw positivism of self-styled 

‘social scientists’ confining the art of theorizing to a narrow set of verifiable or falsifiable 

hypotheses” (p.6). Yet, what should integration theory do or seek to achieve instead? 

Chryssochoou has an answer ready at hand. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the 

emerging Euro-polity, its constitutive ‘civic spheres’ and ‘political spaces’, researchers have 

to free themselves from the cages of “‘strict’ science” advocated by ‘KKV’-type scholars 

(p.8). 1 Although much of Chryssochoou’s book is about existing theories of integration 

which he presents at length – half of the volume is dedicated to a review of theories from the 

functionalism and federalism of the Community’s ‘formative’ years to the present new-institutionalism 

debate – he is critical and sceptical about the contributions these theories are 

capable of making in order to meet two key challenges of the evolving European polity, the 

‘democratic deficit’ and the lack of a transnational civic sphere. In the final chapters of the 

book he proposes to remedy this situation. 

First, Chryssochoou advances an alternative characterization of the EU polity, based on 

Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism, illuminating key features of European governance 

which other characterizations, such as the federal or confederal state analogy, do not grasp. 

According to him, the EU can best be depicted as a ‘confederal consociation’ possessing 

key elements of a consociational polity: a power-sharing ‘governing’ coalition of member 

states, some form of proportional representation in the decision-making institutions, a (qualified) 

right of mutual veto, and segmental autonomy of the constituent (national) parts. He 

justifies the attribute of a ‘confederal’ polity through the existence of “equally sovereign 

demoi, each with its own distinctive national identity, political tradition, social structure and 

civic culture” (p.141). Especially in the more recent treaty amending bargains, the confederal 

nature of the polity poses an increasing challenge to EU governance. Given the increasing 

asymmetry between and politicization of an elite-controlled process of further policy 

integration and a concomitant compromising of the principles of “ruler accountability and 

1. G. King, R. O. Keohane and S. Verba, Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative 

Research, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994.

142 

responsible government” resulting in a democratic deficit, the EU’s legitimacy deficit is 

exacerbated in the absence of European ‘civic sphere’ or ‘demos’ (p.164). 

Chryssochoous’s analysis of the inadequacies of extant integration theories to ask (and 

answer) the question about how these pressing legitimacy concerns can be solved, leads him, in a 

second step, to issue a plea for more engagement in ‘metatheorizing’. He claims that existing 

integration theories are “trapped in the legacy of functionalist-driven, task-oriented and problem-solving 

modes of collective action” and are hence inapt to ask and answer the ‘right’ questions 

“of polity, democracy, identity and legitimate governance within the evolving ‘EU order’” 

(p.172). What Chryssochoou calls for is a ‘normative turn’ in European integration theorizing, 

which denotes the elaboration of a “‘system of ideas’ that attaches a priori importance to questions 

of bringing the Union closer to its citizens” (p.173). Hence, presently dominant questions in 

EU scholarship, such as how to explain outcomes and processes, should cease to be a main concern 

for future research. What is important, claims Chryssochoou, is to improve the EU’s 

grass-root support, i.e. to find and to construct the EU’s “civic core” and, in order to achieve this 

goal, reflect about “in whose name are publicly binding decisions taken in Brussels, or what 

really makes for the polity’s ‘constituting authority’?” (p.174) 

Although Chryssochoou’s book addresses interesting and pressing problems of EU governance, 

i.e. the often alleged lop-sidedness between ‘output-’ and ‘input-legitimacy’ 2 and 

the lack of a European transnational civic sphere, his reflections on how these twin-problems 

should be tackled and solved are, unfortunately, delegated to no more than a quarter of 

his book. Furthermore, his thoughts on these problems are neither convincing nor do they 

lead to the advancement of a coherent research agenda. Two main deficiencies that underscore 

this seemingly harsh statement spring readily to mind. 

First, Chryssochoou’s ‘jump’ from the alleged inadequacy of existing theories of integration 

to the conclusion that more ‘metatheorizing’ should be done, lacks the foundation upon which an 

enterprise of this type could be justified. At no place in the book does he advance a coherent set 

of criteria according to which he intends to compare, contrast and criticize existing theories of 

integration. Half of the volume provides a good literature review; however, it is not evident how 

this review adds to the general argument of the book. The author explores at the outset the somewhat 

trivial point that theories help us order and understand the world in manifold ways, i.e. 

through deduction, induction, normative claims etc. But, for various reasons, no social scientist 

would probably disagree with the assertion that theories are important. Chryssochoou’s presentation 

of integration theories illuminates how historical context and theory formation continue to 

fuel one another, although, one may ask, for what purpose? If the fundamental objective of the 

presentation of these different ‘theories’ is to demonstrate their inadequacy to ask and answer 

questions that relate to the problem of the Community’s democratic credentials, then Chryssochoou 

has undoubtedly succeeded in beheading ‘theory strawmen’. Yet, he failed to explicitly 

recognize that some of the approaches reviewed are explanatory theories (that can be tested), 

some normative and prescriptive, others – by social science standards – rather ideologies than 

theories. Hence, it is about as fair to accuse explanatory theory of being blind to providing 

answers to allegedly normative questions, as it is to accuse a football team to do badly in basketball. 

If we accept that theory has different purposes, as the author made more or less explicit in 

the first chapter, why should so much space be dedicated to integration theories which Chryssochoou 

belittles for their ‘too narrow focus’? The main criticism here is that Chryssochoou does 

not deliver on what he seemingly sets out to do when he tells the reader about the value of theorizing 

in general: Theory evaluation has to follow certain rules and standards of comparison – 

where are they? 

2. Scharpf, W.Fritz, Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State, in: Journal of European 

Public Policy, 4,1(1997), pp.18-36.


Secondly, Chryssochoou’s plea for the use of metatheory in redefining the European integration 

research agenda is equally grounded on weak foundations. Based on his characterization of 

the European polity as a ‘confederal consociation’, he shows that one of the key problems that 

troubles the present and future EU, the problem of democratic legitimacy, has to be put at 

center-stage. Yet, why should this problem be approached through ‘metatheorizing’? Chryssochoous’s 

claim for metatheory is based on two assumptions. First, the problem of transnational 

democracy-building to overcome the challenges to democratic legitimacy can only be addressed 

in the context of constructing a European civic sphere or demos; and second, theories of integration 

are too narrowly confined as to be capable of dealing with these questions. The first assumption 

is based on an ideal-typical characterization of the EU as a ‘confederal consociation’ and 

forms part of a larger debate about a ‘demos-requirement’ for the workings of democracy, a 

debate which he does not even hint at in the book. However, why should the reader be convinced 

about the ‘civic sphere’ or ‘demos-requirement’ for the construction of a legitimate and viable 

European polity when Chryssochoou does not provide compelling arguments why we should follow 

this assumption? He definitely has a case when he claims that the ‘input’-side of democratic 

legitimacy is heavily burdened, but he fails to deliver on the implications – he simply assumes 

that European democracy has to be European demos-cracy. Consequently, the second assumption 

– that extant theories of integration neither ask the right questions nor provide any answers to the 

demos-cracy-problem– is a corollary of the first. However, only if we accept the ill-founded first 

assumption does the second make sense. 

Theorizing and metatheorizing/‘self-reflection’ on the European polity should follow criteria 

which are clearly defined and transparent. Chryssochoou’s book has made a valid and 

important point when affirming that democratic legitimacy in the EU is under stress – but he 

has provided a nonconvincing argument as to why explanatory theory and positivist science 

should not be able to address and deal with the question of democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, 

even if we were to accept that we need more metatheorizing, Chryssochoou’s book 

ends merely on a plea to do just that with little in the way of suggestions as to how to 

metatheorize, and which rules to follow. 

Berthold Rittberger 

Nuffield College 

University of Oxford 

Wolfram KAISER – Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans. Britain and European Integration, 

1945-63, Macmillan, London, 1999, 312 p. – ISBN 0-333-77635-6 – paperback: 

18.99 £. 

When Wolfram Kaiser's Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans. Britain and European Integration, 

1945-63 was originally published in 1996 it was lauded on its dust jacket as 'indispensible', 

'outstanding' and 'an important contribution to British history'. At that time, the 

book deserved such commendations as it was the first archive-based study of Britain's reaction 

to the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC). It has since held a notable 

position in what has become a rich and dominant area of research and teaching, enough 

for it to be reprinted with a new preface in 1999. Kaiser's subject – essentially British policy 

from the Messina Conference of June 1955 to de Gaulle's veto of Britain's first application 

in January 1963 – gained him a place in the historiography, but it was his argumentative 

style and uncompromising judgements which motivated other historians to engage with his 

work. To determine whether the dust jacket endorsements of Using Europe remain valid, 

Kaiser's arguments have to be analysed, particularly in light of subsequent research. These 

may be divided into those specific to 1955-63 and those concerning the wider history of 

Britain and European integration.

144 

Kaiser offers numerous contentions about 1955-63 but there are four which are most significant. 

The first is that in 1955 the British were complacent, arrogant and underestimated 

the Six but did not 'miss a bus' at Messina (pp.27, 54-60). The criticisms ranged by Kaiser 

about Britain's decision making and diplomacy in 1955 were not entirely original although 

they were based on a more detailed analysis than that of preceding accounts. Kaiser has no 

sympathy for Foreign Office attitudes, especially for the then Foreign Secretary, Harold 

Macmillan, to whom he attributes personal responsibility for Britain's disastrous diplomacy 

(pp.48-49). Although the failed diplomacy cannot be gainsaid, Kaiser's views on Macmillan 

may be disputed; if Macmillan is to be criticised then it ought to be for his non-involvement 

rather than his involvement. As to Kaiser's rejection of Miriam Camps' view that Britain 

missed a bus in 1955 – questioning whether there was a bus to catch and adding that Britain 

was heading along a different road (pp.54-60) – whilst these are germane points to raise, 

they are speculative and suggest little more than the unpredictability of events for Britain 

and the Six in 1955. Kaiser is on stronger ground in his second major argument which 

explains how British attitudes towards European integration evolved over 1956-57 to produce 

Plan G, Britain's proposal for a European industrial Free Trade Area (FTA) (pp.60-87). 

Nevertheless, Kaiser's treatment of the FTA is ultimately negative and others, such as Ellison, 

Moravcsik and Schaad, have offered more positive interpretations. 

Kaiser's third and most significant argument is that Britain's first application for EEC membership 

in 1961 was 'the result of a dual “appeasement” strategy' to maintain strong 

Anglo-American relations, particularly the nuclear link, and to hold the Conservative Party 

together whilst splitting the Labour Party (pp.XXXII and pp.108-173). Without doubt this is an 

interesting explanation, if a rather contrived one. Yet that US pressure was dominant in Macmillan's 

mind, and that an EEC application was seen as a diplomatic counter to secure the deal eventually 

agreed at Nassau, underplays the other motives for the first application and overplays its 

potential by-products. Furthermore, it could be argued that the domestic political context of the 

application was not as straightforward as Using Europe suggests although extensive research on 

this subject has yet to be produced. Nevertheless, the work of Bange, Deighton, Ellison, Griffiths 

and Ward, Ludlow, Tratt, Hugo Young and John Young, amongst others, offer contrary interpretations 

to Kaiser's on the motives for the first application. 

Kaiser's fourth main argument considers the fate of Britain's first application. Here, he 

focuses on high politics, particularly the relations between de Gaulle and Macmillan, and 

the issue of nuclear diplomacy (pp.174-203). Although his account is far less developed in 

terms of evidence than his treatment of the motives for the application, it nevertheless has 

merit. Yet Ludlow's research on the conditional nature of the application and on the Brussels 

negotiations themselves, along with the work of others, demonstrates that Kaiser tells only 

one version of this story. Ludlow's concentration on the ebb and flow of the negotiations and 

their technicalities and the attitudes of the Community and the Six suggests that Britain 

failed to exploit opportunities for success prior to the strengthening of de Gaulle's power 

after 1962. The first application's demise, according to Ludlow, was thus a significant failure 

for the British, contrary to Kaiser's view that on the 'diplomatic level' it was 'a full success' 

(p.203). Whatever view is taken of de Gaulle's veto in January 1963 it cannot be denied that 

it left the British government in the position which it had worked to avoid since the Messina 

Conference of June 1955. 

Clearly, Using Europe is important in that Kaiser's arguments about 1955-63, despite the 

criticisms that may be made of them, are significant and have generated historical debate. 

Can the same be said of Kaiser's assertions about 'Britain and Europe' when he ventures outside 

of 1955-63, especially as his epilogue covers 1963-1996 and the 1999 reprint's preface 

comments on 1997-98? Using Europe does not make enough of its own historiographical 

criticisms of the 'awkward partner' school and the British Sonderweg thesis as depicted in 

the introduction (see pp.XXIX-XXXI). That Kaiser himself ultimately succumbs to 'round-


ing up the usual suspects' (p.XXX), criticising the British for their arrogance and underestimation 

of the Six and not offering a thorough-going comparative perspective leaves him to a 

degree hoist by his own petard. Neither does Using Europe distinguish itself by engaging 

significantly with the research of the noteworthy historians of the field, primarily Alan Milward 

and John Young. The 1999 preface might have been employed by Kaiser to comment 

on the literature since 1996 and to place his book amongst it but instead he focuses on party 

politics and Britain's relationship with the EU from 1996 to 1998. Perhaps his decision to do 

so reflects his own belief that it is here that his work is of greater effect? 

Despite being for the most part a diplomatic history, Using Europe also develops arguments 

about the domestic political context, particularly party political, of British foreign 

policy. This is the strength of the epilogue and of the 1999 preface where Kaiser comments 

on how Britain's European policy has consistently been driven by, and undermined by, party 

politics, especially of the Conservative kind. In this Kaiser returns briefly to the points 

raised in his introduction and states that 'Unintentionally, the Sonderweg thesis of British 

postwar history adopts the myth, created by the British political elite, of British exceptionalism' 

(p.211). Dismissing the premise that Britain's choices can be explained by its difference 

from other Western European countries, a view restated recently by John Young, Kaiser 

argues that British diplomacy set it apart from the early EEC. Moreover, he believes that this 

had, and has, party political motivation: 'What is arguably even more relevant to understanding 

Britain's relationship with its European partners was – and is more than ever in the 1990s 

– the enormous influence of party political controversies and tactics' (p.218). Whilst this 

draws Kaiser's thesis together, and explains why he chose the title he did for his book, perhaps 

it does not offer the revision of the awkward partner school that he suggests as he is 

forced to admit that 'Seen over the entire postwar period, [party political controversies and 

tactics] have been far more divisive [in Britain] than in any other member state' (p.218). 

Thus, Kaiser's main contribution to the historiographical debate, apart from his arguments 

about 1955-63, is that he adds domestic politics to the list of factors which explain why Britain 

has found it so difficult to integrate with Europe. 

James Ellison 

Queen Mary, University of London 

George PETRAKOS, Stoyan TOTEV (ed.) – The Development of the Balkan Region, 

Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001, 520 p. – ISBN 0-7546-1225-2 – 65,00 £. 

Ce livre n’a rien d’un recueil d’articles. Les douze auteurs se sont livrés sous la direction de 

George Petrakos et Stoyan Totev à une réflexion approfondie sur les limites et l’avenir du 

développement économique dans la région des Balkans. La période de transition depuis dix 

ans en Europe a soulevé beaucoup de questions, restées sans une réponse claire et convaincante. 

Par exemple, pourquoi les pays balkaniques sont-ils tellement différents en termes 

d’efficacité économique par rapport aux pays de l’Europe Centrale? Pourquoi ces pays là 

semblent-ils échouer dans leurs efforts de transition vers l’économie du marché? Est-ce que 

l’échec des politiques intérieures ou les conditions initiales désavantageuses et l’environnement 

géographique défavorable sont-ils responsables de cette médiocre efficacité? En plus, 

quelle réponse politique a été donnée par l’Union européenne aux questions susmentionnées 

et qu’est-ce qu’on peut faire actuellement? Voilà quelques questions cruciales qui se posent 

dans ce livre pour l’ensemble des pays balkaniques. 

Dans ce volume, les auteurs essayent de faire une analyse comparative des problèmes d’efficacité 

économique et d’adaptation structurelle dans les pays des Balkans. Ce livre, composé de 

seize articles au total, est divisé en deux parties. La première partie est constituée d’un travail de 

recherche comparative sur des questions politiques et analytiques. Dans cette partie du volume

146 

on fait l’analyse de la performance économique et des structures de l’industrie et du commerce 

dans les pays balkaniques, des relations commerciales inter-balkaniques et de la coopération économique, 

de l’évolution et de la distribution des investissements directs étrangers, de la réforme 

structurelles en ce qui concerne les privatisations, de l’efficacité de l’industrie balkanique, de la 

désintégration ou intégration dans les Balkans et des politiques de l’Union européenne pour la 

reconstruction et le développement de la région. 

La deuxième partie du volume est composée des études de cas et des recherches sur les 

différents pays de la région. Après avoir démontré la problématique générale du développement 

économique de la région, les auteurs se lancent dans l’analyse des facteurs spécifiques 

qui influencent les divers pays des Balkans. Le cas de la Bulgarie, de l’Albanie et de la Roumanie, 

pays en phase d’une longue et difficile transition économique, montre bien les contradictions 

de ce processus: les possibilités et les conditions pour une coopération et une 

intégration régionale et leurs limites en termes d’adaptation structurelle. L’expérience de la 

Grèce, pays membre de l’Union européenne, indique clairement le rôle important de la 

géographie dans les relations commerciales et le développement économique. Dans le cas 

grecque, la proximité géographique est un des facteurs importants qui conditionnent fortement 

l’orientation des investissements directs étrangers, comme p.ex. en direction de Bulgarie, 

d'Albanie, de Roumanie ou de la FYROM. 

Au début du nouveau millénaire les pays balkaniques, à l’exception de la Grèce, qui a 

honoré les critères de convergence pour faire partie de l’Union Economique et Monétaire, 

ont eu moins de chance que les autres ex-pays démocratie populaires de l’Est européen. 

Pour certains pays balkaniques, toute la période des années 90 a été, dans le meilleur des 

cas, une ère de crise prolongée ou, dans le pire des cas, un cauchemar. Si les indications présentées 

à travers les différents articles devaient persister dans le futur, les pays balkaniques 

seraient décrochés davantage encore par les pays développés de l’Union européenne, en 

constituant un noyau périphérique européen encore plus faible. Voilà quelques observations 

pessimistes des auteurs de ce livre. 

Dans le livre présenté ici la perspective s’approfondit et s’élargit au terme de recherches 

basées sur de nombreuses sources comme en témoignent les notes abondantes qui accompagnent 

chaque article. A n’en pas douter, cet ouvrage intéressant et riche incite à la réflexion. Il constitue 

un apport important à la recherche et nourrit un débat sur l’avenir des Balkans. 

Petrit Nathanaili 

Université de Tirana 

Jason G. HARTELL and Johan F.M. SWINNEN (eds.) – Agriculture and East-West 

European Integration, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Aldershot, 2000, pp.V-XIX, 264 – 

ISBN 0-7546-1201-5 – 39,95 £. 

Cette étude évalue les conséquences qu’entraînera l’adhésion des pays de l’Europe centrale et 

orientale (PECO) à l’Union européenne dans le domaine de l’agriculture. Elle relève 

quelques-unes des incertitudes et des contraintes fondamentales, les effets économiques et les 

coûts d’adaptation qu’engendrera l’intégration de ces pays dans l’Union. Le premier chapitre 

donne une vue d’ensemble thématique de la région en général et arrive à la conclusion que 

l’adoption de la politique agricole commune par les pays PECO aboutira à une augmentation 

substantielle de la production agricole, entraînant des conséquences macro-économiques considérables 

dans tous les pays candidats à l’adhésion. 

Après cette analyse générale, l’étude offre un examen plus détaillé et plus précis pour 

sept des pays candidats. Les perspectives qui s'ouvrent aux Etats baltes sont plutôt partagées: 

la région possède une grande abondance de terres et vient d’entamer le processus du


rétablissement de la propriété privée. Cependant, à un accroissement de la production dans 

certains secteurs (par exemple le secteur laitier), correspond une situation moins encourageante 

dans secteur céréalier où la compétitive souffre des conditions défavorables du climat 

et du sol. Les Etats baltes devraient améliorer tout aussi bien la qualité des produits que 

l’efficacité des méthodes de production. 

La politique agricole tchèque par contre s’écarte de façon frappante des objectifs de la 

Politique Agricole Commune (PAC) de l’Union européenne. Ainsi, la République tchèque 

ne se soucie guère du maintien de la parité des revenus entre le secteur agricole et le secteur 

industriel – une priorité dans l’Union européenne -, tout comme elle ne prévoit pas de ressources 

destinées à compenser le secteur agricole pour des désavantages comparés. La 

République tchèque dispose néanmoins de ressources à meilleur marché que l’Union européenne, 

pratique un système d’agriculture efficace et jouit de certains avantages en termes 

de plus grande mobilité de facteurs comme la main-d’œuvre et le capital en l'occurrence. 

L’Union européenne est le principal partenaire commercial de la République en ce qui concerne 

les produits agricoles: elle fournit quelques 50% des importations dont le pays a 

besoin et acquiert 40% de ses exportations agricoles. 

L’importance du secteur agricole en Pologne avait suscité la crainte que l’adhésion de ce 

pays à l’Union européenne, n’entraîne un accroissement substantiel de la production et ne 

rende plus préoccupantes encore les distorsions du marché communautaire. Mais les conditions 

climatiques et pédologiques sont moins favorables en Pologne qu’en Union européenne. 

En outre, le pays continue à importer des produits agricoles en grandes quantités. La 

peur que l’adhésion polonaise ne provoque une surproduction substantielle s’est avérée 

injustifiée. Il y a même des signes indiquants que les prix entre la Pologne et l’Union européenne 

ont convergé depuis le début des années 1990, bien qu’il subsiste des écarts pour 

certains produits (sucre, bœuf, lait, beurre). 

Seule la Slovénie ne pose pas de problèmes. Alors que la situation géographique de ce 

pays vallonné et montagneux entrave la production agricole, la Slovénie est le plus proche 

de l’Union européenne en termes de politique agricole: une prédominance d’exploitations 

familiales, un fort lobby et des prix élevés. Le processus d’adaptation à la PAC est en cours. 

Le secteur agricole de la Slovénie n’est pas libéralisé comme en Pologne ou en Estonie, et il 

y a des craintes que les prix chutent. Mais en fait, on ne s’attend point à des difficultés 

d’adaptation majeures. 

Ce qui n’est pas vrai pour la Bulgarie, dont la politique agricole, tout comme le niveau 

des prix, diffèrent sensiblement des réalités agricoles de l’Union européenne. Tandis qu’en 

Union européenne les agriculteurs sont subventionnés, et même fortement, les agriculteurs 

bulgares sont effectivement taxés. De plus, les relations commerciales entre les deux régions 

restent faibles: Le commerce agro-alimentaire entre la Bulgarie et l’Union européenne est 

encore instable, en partie à cause de fortes fluctuations de l’économie bulgare. 

Dans les quatre derniers chapitres (7 à 10), les auteurs tirent quelques conclusions prudentes. 

Il y a eu un mouvement de migration considérable des pays de l’Europe de l’Est vers 

l’Union européenne. Il s'en est suivi un accroissement de l’offre de la main-d’œuvre agricole 

en Europe de l’Ouest, tandis qu’en Europe orientale, la production agricole a baissé. Certes, 

les politiques agricoles de l’Union européenne et des PECO ont convergé dans une certaine 

mesure, mais il subsiste des différences notables entre ces deux régions en ce qui concerne 

le choix des instruments et le niveau de protection. A l’exception de la Slovénie (et sauf certains 

produits comme le lait dans d’autres pays candidats) le niveau de protection est toujours 

beaucoup plus bas dans les pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale. «Une ré-nationalisation» 

de la politique agricole commune, au moins en partie, pourrait constituer une solution 

possible pour affronter quelques-uns des futurs défis. Etant donné que les PECO jouiront du 

statut de bénéficiaires nets alors que les pays membres actuels de l’Union européenne 

deviendront dans une plus large mesure des contributeurs nets à la PAC, l'évolution en cours

148 

encouragera le transfert de revenus entre pays, voir même entre régions, de l’Ouest vers 

l’Est. La préférence actuelle en Union européenne pour une politique agricole hautement 

protectionniste pourrait par conséquent diminuer. 

Les réflexions développées dans Agriculture and East-West European Integration reposent 

sur des donnes antérieures à l'adoption de l’«Agenda 2000» par le sommet de Berlin en 

mars 1999. Puisque lesdites réformes décidées par le sommet de Berlin en mars sont néanmoins 

tout, sauf radicales, les conclusions de l'ouvrage restent toujours pertinentes. Par 

ailleurs, un des attraits majeurs de l’étude consiste en le double fait de donner au lecteur, 

primo, des informations de base ainsi qu’un aperçu de l’état actuel du secteur agricole dans 

les Etats candidats et, secundo, d'ouvrir une perspective intéressante grâce à une analyse 

comparative qui, il est vrai ne concerne pas tous les pays candidats à l’adhésion. Le livre 

offre pardessus le marché une multitude de données statistiques et servira autant l’étudiant 

en agroéconomie que les passionnés de la PAC. Sans parler, bien entendu, de tous ceux, 

directement ou indirectement, concernés par le processus de l’élargissement. 

Gisela Hendriks 

University of Kent at Canterbury 

Massimiliano GUDERZO – Interesse nazionale e responsabilità globale. Gli Stati Uniti, 

l'Alleanza atlantica e l'integrazione europea negli anni di Johnson (1963-1969), Firenze, 

Aida-Il Maestrale, 2000, 611 p. – ISBN 88-8329-013-5 – 33 €. 

Il est des livres dont la publication marque presque instantanément l'historiographie, pour le 

moins variée et désormais abondante, de l'intégration européenne. L'ouvrage volumineux de 

Massimiliano Guderzo, professeur associé d'histoire des relations internationales à l'université 

d'Urbino, figure assurément au nombre de ceux-là. En effet, alors que les relations entre 

l'Europe en construction et les États-Unis ont déjà donné lieu à des recherches fécondes 

pour la période qui court de l'immédiat après-guerre jusqu'aux années de la présidence Kennedy, 

rares encore sont les travaux consacrés à la politique européenne de l'administration 

Johnson trop souvent occultée dans la littérature par la guerre du Viêt-nam et par ses 

répercussions immédiates sur la politique intérieure américaine. Voilà une lacune magistralement 

comblée. Les sources exploitées sont nombreuses (papiers Lyndon Johnson, documents 

diplomatiques américains et européens, archives communautaires et militaires, 

Mémoires et sources orales, …) et la bibliographie se révèle très solide. 

A défaut de l'analyse détaillée qu'interdisent les dimensions forcément limitées imparties 

à cette recension, on se limitera à survoler les principaux thèmes abordés au fil de l'ouvrage. 

Prêtant une attention toute particulière au processus décisionnel et à la policy-making dans 

la conduite des relations étrangères des États-Unis (Maison-Blanche, Secrétariat d'État, Pentagone, 

Trésor) l'auteur passe au crible la politique atlantique américaine au cours des 

années soixante et pointe la concordance répétée entre la recherche de l'intérêt national et la 

conscience, au titre de superpuissance occidentale, d'une responsabilité globale dans le contexte 

de la Guerre froide. Il montre aussi combien cette duplicité ne pouvait inévitablement 

qu'entraîner des malentendus avec un partenaire européen de plus en plus désireux d'affirmer 

sa position économique, politique et militaire mondiale et, en ce faisant, tenté de traiter 

d'égal à égal avec les États-Unis malgré les soubresauts répétés du processus d'intégration. 

Dans un premier temps, le Prof. Guderzo se penche sur l'année 1963, endeuillée par 

l'assassinat de John F. Kennedy, pour examiner la portée du «grand dessein» atlantique du 

président démocrate en faveur d'un partnership américano-européen et décrypter les réactions 

de Washington face au projet gaullien d'Europe européenne et indépendante, au renforcement 

de l'axe Paris-Bonn et à l'opposition française à l'entrée du Royaume-Uni dans la 

Communauté économique européenne (CEE). Accordant une attention soutenue aux ques-


tions de défense, l'auteur analyse ensuite l'origine et la portée stratégique du projet américain 

de force multilatérale nucléaire (MLF) et s'attarde sur l'attitude adoptée par les stratèges 

de la Maison-Blanche à l'égard des velléités françaises de développer unilatéralement une 

force de frappe nucléaire nationale. Il précise ensuite les raisons qui ont conduit les 

États-Unis à développer une nouvelle doctrine stratégique de riposte graduée mieux adaptée 

à la menace soviétique en cas d'escalade nucléaire. Mais les Européens, qui réclament un 

nouveau partage des responsabilités atomiques au sein de l'Alliance, ne parviennent pas à 

s'entendre sur les moyens de la réformer. Dès lors, toujours plus isolée compte tenu de ses 

ambitions d'indépendance nationale, la France s'engage dans ce qui apparaît bien comme 

une logique de rupture et décide, en 1966, de retirer ses forces du commandement militaire 

intégré de l'Alliance atlantique. A cet égard, le livre fourmille d'éléments qui mettent en 

lumière, parfois au jour le jour, la complexité des relations, y compris personnelles, entre 

Johnson et De Gaulle. «Débarrassés» de l'épine française, les États-Unis réactivent alors 

leurs relations privilégiées avec la Grande-Bretagne et avec l'Allemagne fédérale qui, de 

facto, dominent les débats au sein du Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) immédiatement créé. 

La RFA, qui a fini par renoncer à la MLF et par accepter le principe d'un accord de non-prolifération 

atomique, se trouve alors enfin associée aux décisions occidentales en matière 

d'armement nucléaire. Un an plus tard, le rapport Harmel saura lui aussi consacrer le leadership 

américain, présent et futur, au sein de la coalition atlantique. 

Au total, sur fond de crise de l'Otan, de la transformation des relations Est-Ouest et des 

péripéties qui secouent les relations franco-américaines, le livre met particulièrement bien 

en lumière les difficultés de l'administration Johnson à composer avec les solidarités et les 

antagonismes intra-européens et, dès lors, à conduire une politique à la fois collective et différenciée 

à l'égard des Six malgré une approche de consultation multilatérale entre les Occidentaux. 

Il décrit aussi avec nuance les efforts menés par la Commission Hallstein (tandem 

J. Rey-R. Marjolin) pour personnifier l'Europe des Six et pour participer aux négociations 

commerciales multilatérales au sein du GATT (Kennedy Round) en qualité d'interlocuteur 

unique. Le Marché commun apparaît alors comme un rival commercial. Mais la diplomatie 

américaine sait aussi tirer habilement profit de l'évolution des rapports de force franco-allemands, 

qu'il s'agisse du dossier de l'adhésion du Royaume-Uni aux Communautés européennes, 

de l'accès des produits agricoles américains au marché européen ou de la tourmente 

monétaire de novembre 1968. 

Particulièrement dense, l'ouvrage de Massimiliano Guderzo offre un panorama détaillé 

des relations USA-Europe analysées surtout du point de vue américain et stratégique. 

L'auteur démontre que la guerre du Viêt-nam n'a pas empêché la Maison-Blanche de s'impliquer 

activement dans les affaires du monde et de l'Europe qui, au cours des années soixante, 

est elle-même en butte à des luttes internes qui ne facilitent pas le dialogue qu'elle veut 

nouer avec les États-Unis, notamment sur le terrain militaire et commercial. L'unité européenne 

et atlantique sont au cœur du propos. Mais Guderzo retrace aussi l'action personnelle 

du président Johnson en matière de politique internationale examinée notamment sous 

l'angle conceptuel de la peacekeeping et de la peacemaking. Enfin, il passe au crible les 

efforts poursuivis par l'administration démocrate en faveur de l'unité européenne bien perçue 

par les Américains comme un gage essentiel de leurs propres sécurité et prospérité. Et de 

s'interroger, pour conclure, sur la capacité, passée et à venir, des Européens à se doter 

eux-mêmes des moyens nécessaires pour assurer leur défense et ainsi contre-balancer la 

suprématie américaine. 

Étienne Deschamps 

Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve

150 


Institut für Zeitgeschichte on behalf of Auswärtiges Amt (ed.) – Akten zur Auswärtigen 

Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1951, ed. by Matthias Jaroch; 1952, ed. by 

Martin Koopmann and Joachim Wintzer, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1999, LVIII, 

816 p. – ISBN 3-486-56418-8; 2000, LVIII and 842 p. – ISBN 3-486-56480-3. – 64,80 € 

(each volume). 

In the early 1950s West German foreign policy had to face a serious dilemma: on the one 

hand, Chancellor Adenauer, who since March 1951 was acting as foreign minister, too, tried 

to reduce West Germany’s dependency on the Western Allies; on the other hand, he desperately 

needed – and asked for – Allied support, especially after the Stalin proposals of spring 

1952 concerning the unification of Germany. Thus Adenauer, at the same time, had to avoid 

the impression on the part of the Western powers that West Germany might again turn to traditional 

power politics, and on the part of the German people that he was some sort of a puppet 

on Allied strings. How successful he and his government in Bonn were in managing this 

problem is, amongst many other topics, documented in the two volumes. 

These volumes – a first one, dealing with the years 1949/1950, was published in 1997 – 

are the first steps towards filling the gap between 1949 and 1963, the starting point of the 

“official” edition project concerning the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. 

They, too, may be read in addition to the documentation on the talks between Adenauer and 

the Allied High Commission, published in two volumes in 1989 and 1990. As was the case 

with the former volumes, a summary of their content is not provided, but abstracts for each 

document and a detailed index are valuable tools for searching certain topics. The annotations 

by the editors concentrate on more or less “technical” aspects like the references of a 

certain document to others or to other record groups, the importance of documents within 

the decision making process or its political and organisational background. The main source 

of documentation in these two volumes have been the archives of the German foreign ministry; 

furthermore, they contain some records of the papers of Herbert Blankenhorn, head of 

the political department of the Auswärtiges Amt, and the Federal Chancellery kept by the 

Bundesarchiv Koblenz, of the Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv in Freiburg and of the Adenauer 

papers, kept by the Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus in Rhöndorf near Bonn. 

The altogether 469 documents, including memoranda, notes, minutes and correspondence, 

cover a wide range of topics: the West German contribution to the common Western defence 

against the “communist threat”, the European Defence Community (EDC), the ratification of the 

treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the “contractual agreements” 

between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic and the termination of the occupation statute, 

the establishment of diplomatic relations with other countries, the negotiations on the settlement 

of Germany’s foreign debts, the restitution negotiations with Israel, the problem of German 

reunification, the Saar question, and arms production, to mention only the most important. Surprisingly, 

there are only a few entries concerning the Organisation for European Economic 

Co-operation and the European Payments Union, which were without doubt of high importance 

for the integration of West Germany into the West European economic and political setting. One 

may wonder whether this fact reflects the attitude towards the OEEC of Adenauer and his administration 

or of those who selected the documents. 

Among the most interesting topics rank the Soviet Union’s proposals regarding a unified, 

but neutralised Germany and the reactions of the Western powers, as well as of the Federal 

Republic and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It becomes clear that not only the 

Federal Chancellor and his supporters were afraid of the potential consequences, but also 

the GDR government. Ulbricht and other leading politicians of the Socialist Unity Party 

(SED) feared that they might be “sacrificed cold-heartedly”, if the Soviet Union succeeded 

in keeping West Germany out of the “aggressive block” dominated by the United States. So 

Adenauer’s rigid refusal to explore the Soviet offer was received with great relief by the East


German government. Amongst Adenauer’s motives for the rejection of the Soviet proposals 

the non-recognition of the Oder-Neiße as Germany’s final Eastern border ranked very high. 

One may speculate about the chances to unify at least the Federal Republic and the GDR at 

that time, if Adenauer would have been willing to renounce the Eastern parts of the former 

German Reich. 

As far as European integration is concerned, the formation of a defence community is the 

problem most frequently dealt with in the documents. The West Germans stressed the necessity 

to be treated on equal terms and to establish some sort of political framework for the 

EDC and the ECSC as well. Although there can be no doubt regarding the Federal government’s 

willingness to integrate West Germany into the emerging European community, 

French anxiety seemed not to have disappeared until the signing of the ECSC treaty. To control 

the Germans counted, after all, amongst the predominant causes of European integration 

– a fact that Adenauer had already “forgotten” in spring 1952, when he only mentioned the 

aggressive politics of the Soviet Union as an impetus to unify Europe. 

The two volumes are a valuable and indispensable source for anyone who is interested in 

the beginnings of West German foreign policy. The documents demonstrate in detail what 

kind of obstacles had to be cleared and how “Bonn” step by step got used to a new style of 

foreign policy and to its new role in European and international politics. 

Priv.Doz. Dr. Werner Bührer 

Technische Universität München 

Marie-Thérèse BITSCH (ed.) – Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions 

européennes. Une postérité pour le plan Schuman? Proceedings of the symposium held at 

the Institute of high European studies of Strasbourg (Strasbourg University III – Robert 

Schuman), 25 -27 May 2000, Brussels, Bruylant, 2001, 609 p. – ISBN 2-8027-1500-3 – 

85,00 €. 

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the declaration of 9 May 1950, the Institute of 

high European studies of the Strasbourg University III – Robert Schuman, organized, from 

25 to 27 May 2000, a scientific symposium with the purpose of studying the posterity of this 

founding proclamation of the European Community. Following the tradition established by 

Raymond Poidevin who has set up and run for long years the Research Centre for the history 

of international relations of the Institute, this symposium gathered French and German historians 

specialists in the history of Europe and connected the subjects of Franco-German 

relations and European construction. 

Without recounting the genesis and the immediate results of the Schuman plan, already 

known by the works of Raymond Poidevin 1 and Pierre Gerbet 2 or by the symposium organized 

on that subject by Klaus Schwabe, 3 the 25 contributions collected by Marie-Thérèse 

Bitsch look back, over a period of 50 years, on the evolution of the Franco-German relations 

with regard to the Community construction. The contributions are divided into five large 

parts that successively take up the “first options” leading from the Schuman plan to the treaties 

of Rome (with in particular an assessment of the ideas of Walter Hallstein), the “pros- 

1. R. POIDEVIN, Robert Schuman, homme d’Etat, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1986, 520 p. by the 

same author, in collaboration with Dierk SPIERENBURG, Histoire de la Haute Autorité de la CE- 

CA, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1993, 919 p. 

2. P. GERBET, La genèse du plan Schuman. Des origines à la déclaration du 9 mai 1950, Lausanne, 

Centre de recherches européennes, 1962, 40 p. 

3. K. SCHWABE (editorship), Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950-1951, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 

1988, 475 p.

152 


pects of institutional evolution in the sixties”, “the standpoint of the dynamic forces” made 

up of political parties, the trade unions and business circles, the “position of the leaders of 

the seventies”, finally the “relaunch of the eighties and nineties”. The great variety of themes 

that recall the political aspects as well as social and monetary questions, and the particular 

importance attached to the personal contributions of the French and German political leaders, 

who were increasingly embodying the relation between the two countries, answer the 

general question on the adaptation of the “Franco-German couple” to the evolution of the 

European project. This often hackneyed expression finds here its true justification, each of 

the actors taking a constant interest in the European policy of the other and each of them 

conceiving his own European policy according to the interests and concern of his neighbour. 

This study of the Franco-German relations with regard to the European construction 

reveals a certain number of permanent features, beyond the evolutions and transformations 

that give a certain rhythm to the history of the two partners. 

The European construction is in the first place a matter of pragmatism and realism, rather 

than of lyricism or vision. The Schuman declaration and Chancellor Adenauer’s response to 

it at that time were only partly attributable to the power of a visionary project or to the 

necessity of reconciliation, but embraced also France’s and Germany’s immediate interests 

at the beginning of the fifties. The contributions devoted to the politicians, considered the 

most European political leaders (Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, François Mitterrand 

and Helmut Kohl) emphasize the pragmatism of their European proposals. To each 

of them could apply Willy Brandt’s affirmation in 1971 quoted by Andreas Wilkens, according 

to which the German chancellor refused “institutional perfectionism” and “integrationist 

abstractions” preferring a step-by-step policy, “the possible and practical steps that we can 

take right now”. Michèle Weinachter, in her study on Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, recalls that 

the ancient president of the Republic affirmed his support of federalism only after 1981. The 

election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, often presented together with the 

creation of the EMS as one of France’s important contributions to the European construction, 

is described by people around the President as the “least evil” in the face of the feared 

reinforcement of the prerogatives of the European Parliament. But this pragmatism also 

picked out by Georges Saunier for the years 1981-1985 during which the relaunch projects 

were being prepared, doesn’t work just one-way. It doesn’t alone put a damper on the most 

daring advances of the Community construction; it also protects its achievements in the 

name of well understood national interests, particularly at the economic level. Pierre Gerbet 

thus shows the importance of President Pompidou’s action in favour of economic integration, 

even if he basically remained loyal to the de Gaullian conception of the Europe of 

States, despite some astonishing references to prospective transfers of sovereignty in favour 

of a European government. 

Pragmatism at work in the European policy pursued by France and Germany neither 

rules out difficulties nor the will to go ahead. Differences of opinion between François Mitterrand 

and Helmut Kohl, whether about the part of the WEU analyzed by Elisabeth du Réau 

or concerning the institutional reform of Europe, studied by Hanns-Jürgen Küsters at the 

time of reunification, prove that the Franco-German relations are not self-evident according 

to François Mitterrand’s own words in 1994, that they evolve continuously and that crises or 

friction cannot always be avoided. Even then, it still must be stressed, that oppositions are 

not fixed and could never be reduced to the simple contrast between centralizing France, 

desperately defending national sovereignty, and federal Germany whose constitutional tradition 

might make it more accessible to the process of Community integration. If basically the 

idea of supranationality meets with less resistance in Germany than in France, Wolf Gruner 

nevertheless shows that from the beginning of the debates on the ratification of the ECSC 

treaty within the Bundesrat there is to be found a certain distrust of Community integration 

on the part of the German Länder. These reservations have known an important development


in 1992 with the insertion of a new article 23 in the Constitution that aims at protecting the 

rights of the Länder and at giving them a share in working out Germany’s Community policy. 

The reservations are still tangible today in the recent European proposals made by the 

Christian Democrat Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU), originating from 

Bavaria that advocates reducing and clarifying the powers of the European Union. Thus, in 

the continuation of the work of Georges-Henri Soutou on the “uncertain alliance”, 4 the proceedings 

of the symposium contribute to demythifying the idealized, almost pious image of 

the Franco-German couple. At the same time, France’s and Germany’s European commitment 

seems like the main point of contact between both countries, their most solid anchorage 

in 50 years of basic transformations. 

The necessity of cooperating that drives on the political leaders of the two countries also 

urges on part of the civil society. One of the interests of the symposium was to make room 

for economic, social and unionist actors often missing in the historical works on the Community 

construction. The studies of Sylvie Lefèvre and Werner Bührer on the business circles 

and the French and German federations of employers (the CNPF= French National 

Employers’union) and the BDI, the confederation of German industrialists, emphasize that 

despite divergent economic traditions, marked either by the mercantile system after Colbert 

or by liberalism, they were in agreement on European integration in the name of economic 

modernization. The interest of German and French trade unions, except for the communist 

CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail = French Trade Union, close to the French communist 

party), is well brought out in the contributions of Cédric Guinand and Sylvain Schirmann. 

For the powerful German DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund = Federation of German 

Trade Unions), as well as for the French organizations CFTC (Confédération Française 

des Travailleurs Chrétiens, Christian trade union) and FO (Force ouvrière), it is a question 

of bringing an influence to bear on the Community institutions with a view to give the workers’ 

interests more weight. These organizations rapidly support the Community construction, 

in which they see a means to improve the protection of their members, even if at the 

beginning they expressed reservations towards the European Economic Community that 

was less willing to lend an ear to trade unions than the ECSC. Nevertheless, the structuring 

of European trade unionism doesn’t turn out to be less laborious as the national means of 

expressing claims remain predominant. 

The panorama outlined by the contributions of the symposium on 50 years of a vivid 

Franco-German cooperation on European level bring definitively out the present lifelessness 

of the relations between the two states, the lack of confidence prevailing between their leaders, 

the diverging evolution of their policies. The lessons learned in these 50 years induce to 

be optimistic, but the theme of the symposium, that refers to the posterity of the declaration 

of May 1950, doesn’t spare the question: a temporary crisis before the nth relaunch or the 

end of an adventure initiated by the Schuman plan? 

Rémi Decout-Paolini 

Ancien élève de l’École normale supérieure 

Agrégé de l’université en histoire 

4. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 

1954-1996, Paris, Fayard, 1996, 497p.

154 


Wilfried LOTH/Wolfgang WESSELS (ed.). – Theorien europäischer Integration. 

Opladen, Leske und Budrich, 2001, 294 p. – ISBN 3-8100-2886-X – 24,90 €. 

Cet ouvrage arrive à point nommé, et non seulement en raison de la création récente de la 

«Convention pour la réforme de l’Union européenne». Si la discussion urgente et nécessaire 

sur l’avenir de l’Europe, entamée là et ailleurs, doit être menée à son terme avec succès, la 

politique et la science ont en effet besoin d’un «forum de discussion commun» réclamé par 

les éditeurs (p.7). Wilfried Loth et Wolfgang Wessels ne se contentent pourtant pas «de mettre 

en ordre ces éléments et de les examiner en vue de détecter leurs points forts et faibles» 

(p.13). Ils veulent en outre créer une base pour les recherches interdisciplinaires. 

L’ouvrage, issu d’un congrès du Centre Culturel organisé à Essen, en septembre 1999, en 

coopération avec le cercle de travail «Intégration Européenne», présente dans sa première 

partie une vue d’ensemble sur l’état actuel des travaux scientifiques relatifs à l’intégration 

européenne dans les différentes disciplines scientifiques. Dans un premier temps, Wolfgang 

Wessels évoque dans un bref sommaire la diversité dans la discussion sur la science de 

l’intégration en politologie. Wim Kösters, assisté de deux collaborateurs, développe en 

détail des éléments de la théorie d’intégration économique. Wilfried Loth présente ensuite 

des apports historiques sur l’interprétation de l’unification européenne. Armin von Bogdandy 

présente à son tour des conceptions juridiques sur le processus d’intégration européenne, 

alors que Maurizio Bach dresse un sommaire des idées théoriques pour l’analyse de 

l’intégration européenne du point de vue de la sociologie. 

Dans la deuxième partie, l’ouvrage contient des essais exemplaires sur l’évolution interdisciplinaire 

de la théorie de l’intégration européenne. Richard Münch décrit le phénomène 

de l’unification européenne comme un processus de changement institutionnel et culturel. 

Manfred Zuleeg analyse les aspects supranationaux du droit et de la procédure de l’Union 

européenne. Philipp C. Schmitter et Jose I. Torreblanca se consacrent aux effets de l’élargissement 

à l’Est sur la transformation de l’Union européenne. Pour finir, Klaus Busch présente 

l’évolution d’un modèle synoptique d’explication de théories d’intégration politiques. 

D'une façon impressionnante, les contributions des experts montrent comment les hypothèses 

de départ, les questions et les méthodes divergent non seulement entre elles, mais 

également au sein même des différentes disciplines. Malgré certains points de départ, le chemin 

vers une théorie d’intégration commune semble être encore très laborieux. 

Priv.-Doz. Dr. Ulrich Lappenküper 

Universität Bonn

155 

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 


Neo-liberal Conceptions of a European Federation, 1918–1945 

From 1918 to 1945 neo-liberal federalists advocated an institutionally founded ”liberal federation” of states 

as the ”logical consummation of the liberal programme” (von Hayek) and the desirable alternative to 

the socialist international planning. They maintained the thesis that economic systems and political structures 

were strongly interdependent. Customs unions being introduced as measures of liberal trade policy 

could be accepted (Röpke) and even understood as a synonym of ”federation” (Einaudi, von Hayek, 

Robbins). Freedom and order ought to be secured by means of a framework of legal regulation within the 

federation and by an international system of law in the worldwide inter-state relations. After the neo-liberal 

federalists had analyzed the economic aspects of federal unions from 1918-1939, they turned during 

the Second World War to the extra-economic conditions of a federation of states and recognized social 

and cultural integration as of primordial importance. They considered the social and cultural integration 

as a prerequisite for an economic integration and emphasized the necessity of an institutional framework. 

The essential features common to the different conceptions of a neo-liberal federation resulted from the 

discourse of the neo-liberal economists: the relation of correspondence between the political and the economic 

structure of society, the cosmopolitan and liberal-internationalist orientation of the conceptions of 

federation, the primacy of social and cultural integration over economic integration and the rejection of 

laissez-faire in international relations. 

Les conceptions néo-libérales d'une fédération européenne (1918-1945) 

Entre 1918 et 1945 les fédéralistes néo-libéraux défendent la conception d'une «fédération libérale» 

institutionnalisée en laquelle ils repèrent à la fois «l'aboutissement du programme économique libéral» 

(von Hayek) et l'alternative préférable à la planification internationale socialiste. Ils défendent la thèse 

de l'interdépendence des structures économiques et politiques. Pour autant qu'elles soient conçues 

comme mesures d'une politique économique libérale, les unions douanières peuvent être acceptées 

(Röpke); elles deviendraient même synonyme du terme «fédération» (Einaudi, von Hayek, Robbins). 

La liberté et l'ordre devraient être assurés au sein de la fédération par un cadre de règles légales et, au 

niveau mondial, dans les relations entre Etats, moyennant un système de droit international. Après 

avoir analysé entre 1918 et 1939 les aspects économiques des unions fédérales, les fédéralistes 

néo-libéraux consacrent leurs études pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale à l'examen des conditions 

autres qu'économiques, en l'occurrence sociales et culturelles, dont ils reconnaissent l'importance primordiale, 

voire leur indispensabilité à l'intégration économique et à la formation d'une fédération entre 

Etats. Aussi insistent-ils sur la nécessité d'introduire un cadre institutionnel. Les caractéristiques essentielles 

unissant les visions néo-libérales d'une fédération d'Etats plongent leurs racines dans les débats 

des économistes néo-libéraux: interdépendence des structures économiques et politiques, orientation 

cosmopolite et libérale-internationaliste des conceptions de fédération d'Etats, subordination de l'intégration 

économique à l'intégration sociale et culturelle ainsi que renonciation au «laissez faire» en 

matière de relations internationales. 

Neoliberale Europa-Föderationskonzepte. 1918–1945 

Die neoliberalen Föderalisten vertraten von 1918 bis 1945 eine institutionell abgesicherte „liberale 

Föderation“ von Staaten als „Vollendung des liberalen Wirtschaftsprogramms“ (von Hayek) und 

wünschenswerte Alternative zur sozialistischen internationalen Planung. Sie verfochten die These, daß 

Wirtschaftsformen und politische Strukturen in einem engen Zuordnungsverhältnis stünden. Zollunionen 

forderten keinen Widerspruch heraus (Röpke), solange sie als Maßnahmen liberaler Handelspolitik 

eingesetzt würden, und wurden geradezu als Synonym für „Föderation“ verstanden (Einaudi, von 

Hayek, Robbins). Freiheit und Ordnung sollten durch einen Rahmen gesetzlicher Regelungen in der 

Föderation und durch ein internationales Rechtssystem in den weltweiten zwischenstaatlichen Bezie-

156 


hungen gesichert sein. Nachdem die neoliberalen Föderalisten zwischen 1918 und 1939 die wirtschaftlichen 

Aspekte von föderativen Zusammenschlüssen untersucht hatten, wandten sie sich im 

Zweiten Weltkrieg den außerökonomischen Bedingungen einer Staatenföderation zu und erkannten 

der gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen Integration eine primordiale Bedeutung zu. Sie erachteten die 

soziale und kulturelle Integration als Vorbedingung für eine ökonomische Integration und wiesen auf 

die Notwendigkeit einer institutionellen Absicherung hin. Die wesentlichen Merkmale, welche die 

neoliberalen Föderationskonzepte miteinander teilten, sind aus dem gemeinsamen Diskurs der neoliberalen 

Wirtschaftswissenschafter hervorgegangen: das Zuordnungsverhältnis von Wirtschaftsformen 

und politischen Strukturen, die kosmopolitische und liberal-internationalistische Ausrichtung der 

Föderationskonzepte, der Primat der sozialen und kulturellen Integration vor der ökonomischen Integration 

und die Absage an das laissez faire in den internationalen Beziehungen. 


The Italian Origins of European Federalism during the Second World War. 

The study of the especially strong federalist current within the Resistance in Italy, enables to understand 

the very particular conditions of the emergence as well as the specificities of this ideological movement, 

that broke with the political traditions of the pre-war years and laid down as a prerequisite the setting up 

of a European political framework. Actually, the first activists in the literal sense of a current until then 

without militants gathered in Italy. They could very quickly refer to a real programme of action, a structured 

political training and they were willing to carry the ”good news” beyond the borders, i.e. to Switzerland, 

where first contacts were established during the war and from where the diffusion of this idea, 

that used to be confined to certain resistance circles of the peninsula, set off. Certainly, this first diffusion, 

accelerated by the effects of liberation, induced a great optimism within the ranks of these militants of a 

new kind who saw in the political, economic and social conditions emerging in the post-war years, the 

opportunity to rebuild a more just and coherent whole at European scale. But liberation was also the 

occasion to recognize the gap, that may exist between utopia and reality: The Italian federalism, battle-tried 

and well-disciplined, then had to take into account the existence of other currents from different 

countries, until then undreamt-of, as well as the opposition of political parties condemned a bit quickly 

and finally an international situation that questioned the prerequisite to all hopes expressed in the Resistance 

movement: the possibility of establishing a unique and independent European framework. 

Les origines italiennes du fédéralisme européen pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. 

L’étude du courant fédéraliste au sein de la Résistance en Italie, particulièrement fort dans ce pays, permet 

de comprendre les conditions très particulières de son émergence, ainsi que les spécificités de ce 

mouvement idéologique, qui rompt avec les traditions politiques d’avant-guerre et pose comme préalable 

l’institution d’un cadre politique européen. L’Italie est en effet un pays où se sont regroupés les premiers 

activistes, au sens propre du terme, d’un courant jusqu’ici sans militants, qui peuvent très tôt se réclamer 

d’un véritable programme d’action, d’une formation politique structurée, et désireux de porter «la bonne 

parole» par-delà les frontières. En l’occurrence, c’est en Suisse, en pleine période de guerre, qu’ont été 

établis les premiers contacts et lancée la diffusion d’une idée qui restait cantonnée à certains milieux 

résistants de la péninsule. Certes, cette première diffusion, accélérée par les effets de la Libération, 

prédispose à un grand optimisme dans les rangs de ce militantisme d’un nouveau genre qui voit, dans les 

conditions politiques, économiques et sociales qui se dessinent dans l’après-guerre, l’occasion de rebâtir 

un ensemble plus juste et plus cohérent, à l’échelle européenne. Mais la Libération est également l’occasion 

de vérifier le hiatus qui peut exister entre l’utopie et la réalité: le fédéralisme italien, aguerri et discipliné, 

doit alors tenir compte de l’existence d’autres courants, jusque-là insoupçonnés, issus de pays 

divers, ainsi que de la résistance de partis politiques un peu vite condamnés, et enfin d’une situation internationale 

qui remet en cause le préalable à tous les espoirs exprimés dans la Résistance: la possibilité 

d’instaurer un cadre européen unique et indépendant. 

Der italienische Ursprung des europäischen Föderalismus während dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 

Das Studium des in der italienischen Resistenz ganz besonders stark ausgeprägten Föderalismus erlaubt 

ein besseres Verständnis, sowohl der besonderen Rahmenbedingungen seines Aufschwungs, als auch der

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 157 

ideologischen Eigenheiten einer Bewegung die mit den politischen Traditionen der Vorkriegszeit bricht 

und die Schaffung eines politischen Rahmens für Europa zur Grundvoraussetzung erhebt. Italien ist in 

der Tat jenes Land in dem sich die ersten Aktivisten (im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes) einer bis dahin ohne 

Militanten gebliebenen Bewegung versammelten, eine strukturierte Formation bildeten und über ein 

regelrechtes Aktionsprogramm verfügten, dessen „frohe Botschaft“ sie über die Landesgrenzen hinaus 

tragen wollten. Der Schweiz fällt hierbei eine zentrale Rolle zu. Mitten im Krieg werden hier die ersten 

Kontakte geknüpft um eine bislang auf bestimmte Schichten der italienischen Resistenz beschränkte Idee 

weiter zu verbreiten. Die Liberation fördert diese Entfaltung in erheblichem Maß. Sie entfacht in den 

Reihen des neuen Militantismus größte Hoffnung in die sich abzeichnenden politischen, wirtschaftlichen 

und sozialen Grundvoraussetzungen eines gerechteren und kohärenteren Neuanfangs auf europäischer 

Ebene. Die Liberation gibt aber auch Gelegenheit den Hiatus zwischen Utopie und Realität zu überprüfen: 

der abgehärtete und disziplinierte italienische Föderalismus muss damals der Existenz anderer 

Geistesströmungen aus verschiedensten Ländern Rechnung tragen und dem Widerstand mancher doch 

etwas voreilig verurteilter Parteien entgegentreten. Schließlich gibt die internationale Lage Anlass zur 

Sorge. All diese Entwicklungen lassen Zweifel an der großen Hoffnungen der Resistenzler aufkommen: 

die Möglichkeit einen einzigen und unabhängigen europäischen Rahmen aufzustellen. 


France‘s Agony between “Vocation Européenne et Mondiale”: The Union Française as an 

Obstacle in the French Policy of Supranational European Integration, 1952-1954 

In contrast to the Atlantic and European dimension of European integration, historians have neglected problems 

that were related with the colonies of European powers. Although the problems regarding colonies did 

not originally concern supranational integration, they always affected the unification process. In contrast to 

Great Britain, France planned and stimulated two supranational functional Communities (ECSC and EDC) 

in spite of its world power status. France thought that it could harmonize the construction of supranational 

European integration, mainly directed towards the monitoring of Germany, with the world power status 

mainly based on retaining the colonial system. However, during the negotiations for the European political 

Community (EPC), the Pool Vert and the process of the ratification of the EDC treaty (1952-1954), France 

was confronted with a serious problem. It seemed that the EPC which was to be a ‚roof organization‘ for the 

ECSC and the EDC would lead in the near future to a federation, a framework in which France’s world 

power status could be dissolved. In view of this terrible prospect, a number of people in France who had 

advocated the ECSC and the EDC as control bodies over West Germany recoiled from the EPC project. 

This issue played a great role in France‘s rejection of the Pool Vert and the ratification of the EDC treaty. 

The study shows that supranational European integration and the retaining of world power status based on 

the colonial system was very difficult to be harmonized and that, in this sense, the breakdown of the French 

colonial system contributed to the success of the EEC negotiations (1955-1957). 

La France entre “vocation européenne et vocation mondiale”: l'Union Française, 

un obstacle au principe de la supranationalité européenne (1952-1954) 

Les dimensions européenne et atlantique du processus d'intégration de l'Europe sont bien connues. En 

revanche, les historiens ont négligé les problèmes en rapport avec les colonies des puissances 

européennes. Quoiqu'initialement ces problèmes ne concernaient point l'intégration supranationale, il 

n'en reste pas moins qu'ils ont toujours affecté la marche vers l'unification. A l'opposé de la Grande-Bretagne, 

la France, malgré son statut de puissance mondiale, fait figure de moteur de deux communautés 

fonctionnelles à caractère supranational: la CECA et la CED. Paris croyait pouvoir harmoniser la construction 

d'une Europe supranationale essentiellement destinée à contrôler de près l'Allemagne d'une part 

avec ses préoccupations de grande puissance visant au maintien de l'empire colonial d'autre part. Hélas, 

au cours des négociations pour la communauté politique européenne (CPE) et le Pool Vert, ainsi qu'au fil 

des procédures de ratification de la CED (1952-1954), le Quai d'Orsay se heurta à une sérieuse difficulté: 

appelée à coiffer la CECA et la CED, la communauté politique pouvait facilement aboutir dans un avenir 

rapproché à une fédération européenne qui menacerait de remettre en question la position française de 

grande puissance. Cette perspective inquiétante amena finalement la plupart des Français qui jadis avaient 

initié la CECA et la CED comme instruments de surveillance de la RFA à abandonner le projet de la 

communauté politique. Ce revirement jouait également un grand rôle dans le rejet français du Pool Vert 

et le refus de ratifier le traité CED. La présente étude montre qu'il était en effet très difficile de concilier

158 


une politique de puissance fondée sur les territoires d'outre-mer et l'intégration européenne supranationale. 

Aussi le déclin du système colonial français après 1954 a-t-il contribué au succès des négociations 

pour la création de la CEE (1955-1957). 

Zwischen europäischer Berufung und Berufung zur Weltmacht: die Union Française, und 

Frankreichs supranationale Europapolitik, 1952-1954 

Im Gegensatz zur atlantischen und europäischen Dimension der Integrationsgeschichte Europas wurden 

Probleme im Zusammenhang mit den Kolonien europäischer Staaten von den Historikern eher 

vernachlässigt. Obwohl diese Probleme nicht ursprünglich die supranationale Integration betrafen, 

beeinflußten sie diese doch stets. Anders als Großbritannien, bildete Frankreich trotz seiner Weltmachtstellung 

die treibende Kraft bei der Entstehung funktionaler Gemeinschaften – der EGKS und 

der EVG – welche auf dem Prinzip der Supranationalität fußten. Paris glaubte beides, die supranationale 

europäische Integration als Instrument der Überwachung Deutschlands und die Weltmachtpolitik 

mit ihrem erklärten Ziel der Aufrechterhaltung des Kolonialsystems, in Einklang bringen zu können. 

Im Laufe der Verhandlungen zur europäischen politischen Gemeinschaft (EPG) und zum Pool Vert, 

bzw. während der Ratifizierungsprozedur des EVG-Vertrags (1952-1954), wurde das Quai d'Orsay 

jedoch mit einer ernsten Schwierigkeit konfrontiert. Es schien als ob die politische Gemeinschaft, die 

eine Art ‚Dachorganisation‘ für die EGKS und die EVG bilden sollte, in naher Zukunft zur Entstehung 

einer Föderation, und damit zur Auflösung des französischen Weltmachtstatus führen könnte. Angesichts 

dieser beängstigenden Zukunftsperspektive drängte nun ein großer Teil jener Franzosen die 

seinerzeit die EGKS und die EVG als Kontrollorgan Deutschlands befürwortet hatten, auf eine 

Absage des EPG-Projekts. Ihre Furcht spielte auch eine wichtige Rolle bei der französischen Ablehnung 

des Pool Vert und des EVG-Vertrags. Diese Studie zeigt, wie schwierig es war, supranationale 

europäische Integrationspolitik mit dem Festhalten an der alten Weltmachtposition zu vereinbaren, 

genauso wie umgekehrt das Auseinanderbröckeln eben jenes Kolonialsystems schließlich seinen Teil 

zum Erfolg der EWG-Verhandlungen (1955-57) beitrug. 



France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community, 

1955-56 

During the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Rome, France called for a harmonization of working regulations, 

claiming that the diversity in existing national regulations caused unequal terms of competition. 

This article aims to explain why social harmonization was a persistent French demand. It argues that the 

claims were launched in order to gain time for a government that was unable to take a stand on the proposed 

common market. Furthermore, it suggests that the claims were sustained in order to secure continued 

protection for French industry, which was necessary if sufficient support for French membership of 

the common market was to be obtained. 

En quête pour gagner du temps, une meilleure protection et un appui suffisant: 

la France, la CEE et l'harmonisation européenne dans le domaine social (1955-1956) 

Tout au long des négociations aboutissant au Traité de Rome, Paris n'a cessé de revendiquer une harmonisation 

des conditions de travail en prétextant que la diversité des réglementations nationales faussait la 

compétition européenne. La présente contribution tache d'expliquer la persistance de cette demande 

française par trois considérations majeures. D'une part, la France cherchait à gagner du temps parce que 

son gouvernement ne voulait pas se prononcer sur le marché commun proposé par les partenaires 

européens. D'autre part, l'harmonisation sociale est revendiquée pour assurer à l'industrie française 

l'indispensable protection, et au gouvernement, un appui suffisant pour rallier l'opinion publique à une 

adhésion au marché commun.


Die EWG-Verhandlungen und Frankreichs Forderung nach Harmonisierung im sozialen 

Bereich: ein Spiel um Zeit, Schutz und die nötige Unterstützung zu gewinnen. 1955-1956 

Frankreich berief sich während den Vertragsverhandlungen zur Einführung des Gemeinsamen Marktes 

stets auf die den Wettbewerb verfälschenden unterschiedlichen Bestimmungen des nationalen Arbeitsrechts 

um seine Forderung nach mehr Harmonisierung im Sozialbereich zu untermauern. Der vorliegende 

Aufsatz erläutert die Hintergründe dieser französischen Hartnäckigkeit. Zum einen ist sie bedingt 

durch den Willen Zeit zu gewinnen, weil die Regierung in Paris sich nicht klar zur geplanten EWG 

aussprechen wollte. Darüber hinaus ging es ihr um die Einführung zusätzlicher Schutzmaßnahmen zu 

Gunsten der französischen Industrie, bzw. die Notwendigkeit in der öffentlichen Meinung die erforderliche 

Unterstützung für Frankreichs Beteiligung am Gemeinsamen Markt zu gewinnen. 


An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy towards 

Scandinavia, 1949-1951 

The British and the Scandinavians have often been seen to have drawn a sense of unity from the fact that 

they all were in the 1950s, for various reasons, unable to participate in such integrative experiments as the 

ECSC or later in the EEC. The similarities in their behaviour have led to assumptions that even more 

wide-ranging convergence of interests between the British and the Scandinavians has existed since 

Europe's economic reconstruction began in the 1940s. 

British and Scandinavian scepticism towards new forms of economic and political co-operation in 

Europe in the 1950s was embedded in national circumstances and preferences, but was coupled with 

their shared feeling of the feasibility of an intergovernmental alternative towards economic co-operation 

in Europe. What is argued in the article is, that this basic convergence of interests in the early phase of 

European integration brought the British, Danish, Swedish and Norwegian governments together into 

regular consultations within a specifically established body, Uniscan, which sought to facilitate a degree 

of co-ordination of policies and eventually paved the way for the speedy establishment of EFTA in 1959, 

when the alternative to create a wider free trade area had been exhausted. 

None the less, before EFTA realised the original vision outlined in 1949, attempts towards deeper 

Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation beyond the consultative remit of Uniscan proved unsuccessful. 

In spite of similar thinking about the most fruitful approach to integration policies in Europe, co-ordinated 

policy-making and the definition of collective bargaining positions within and towards different 

international organisations was found difficult. 

The article discusses the potential and the ramifications of Anglo-Scandinavian co-operation in 

the post-Second World War international economy and in the early years of European integration, with 

particular attention to British policy-making. What emerges is the preference of the Labour government 

in particular to develop economic, political and institutional ties with the Scandinavians, but that 

these fell short of the earlier plans of widespread liberalisation and co-ordination among the group. 

Un partenariat difficile à saisir: l'Europe, la coopération économique et la politique britannique 

face à la Scandinavie. 1949-1951 

A cause de leur refus, pour diverses raisons, de participer aux expériences intégratives de la CECA, 

respectivement de la plus tardive CEE, les Britanniques et les Scandinaves sont souvent considérés 

comme ayant développé durant les années 1950 une espèce de sens commun. Les similitudes au niveau 

de leur comportement ont même fait supposer une très large convergence d'intérêts, et ce, depuis les 

débuts de la reconstruction dans la seconde moitié des années quarante. 

La méfiance britannique et scandinave envers les nouvelles formes de la coopération économique et 

politique développées dans l'Europe des années 1950 est certes conditionnée par des circonstances et des 

préférences nationales, mais, d'un autre côté, elle est aussi l'expression du sentiment commun qu'il existe, 

en-dehors de la coopération économique pratiquée par les Six, une alternative intergouvernementale faisable. 

Ce point commun élémentaire amena les gouvernements britannique, danois, suédois et norvégien 

à se consulter régulièrement pendant la phase précoce de l'intégration européenne au sein d'un organisme 

spécifique, l'Uniscan, qui aspirait à faciliter la coordination des politiques et qui, finalement, préparait la 

voie à la rapide constitution de l'AELE en 1959, lorsque l'alternative de créer une vaste aire de libre 

échange avait été abandonnée.

160 


Pourtant, avant même que l'AELE ne concrétise enfin la vision originale déjà esquissée en 1949, 

d'autres efforts briguant un approfondissement de la coopération anglo-scandinave au-delà des attributions 

purement consultatives d'Uniscan avaient échoué. En dépit de l'unicité des vues en ce qui concerne 

l'approche la plus bénéfique en matière d'intégration européenne, une coordination des politiques ainsi 

qu'une définition commune des positions à adopter face aux différentes organisations internationales 

s'avérait difficile. 

Le présent article discute les potentialités et les ramifications de la coopération anglo-scandinave 

dans le système économique international de l'après-Deuxième Guerre mondiale et des débuts de la construction 

européenne. Ce faisant, il voue une attention particulière à la politique britannique. Il apparaît 

ainsi que, surtout le cabinet travailliste, accorda la préférence au développement des liens économiques, 

politiques et institutionnels avec les Scandinaves, ce qui cependant ne répondait guère aux plans initiaux 

d'une vaste libéralisation et coordination au sein du groupe. 

Eine schwer definierbare Partnerschaft: Europa, die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 

die britische Skandinavienpolitik (1949-1951) 

Wegen ihrer, aus verschiedensten Gründen, ablehnenden Haltung gegenüber dem integrativen Experiment 

der EGKS, bzw. der späteren EWG, dichtete man den Briten und den Skandinaviern oft die 

Entfaltung eines Sinns für Gemeinsamkeit an. Die Ähnlichkeiten in ihrem Verhalten führte sogar zur 

Annahme, es habe seit Beginn des Wiederaufbaus nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zwischen Briten und 

Skandinaviern eine weitreichende Interessenkonvergenz gegeben. 

Die britische und skandinavische Skepsis gegenüber den neuen Formen der wirtschaftlichen und 

politischen Zusammenarbeit im Europa der frühen Fünfzigerjahre war zwar durch nationale Umstände 

und Präferenzen geprägt; - sie war aber auch gekoppelt mit der gemeinsam aufgefaßten Meinung, dass 

andere, durchaus machbare Alternativen zur wirtschaftlichen Kooperation in Europa bestanden. Diese 

elementare Einhelligkeit veranlasste die Regierungen in Großbritannien, Dänemark, Schweden und Norwegen 

regelmäßige Konsultationen im Rahmen eines eigens dafür geschaffenen Gremiums – die Uniscan 

– abzuhalten. Dieses Forum sollte die Koordinierung der Politiken vorantreiben und ebnete auch 

schließlich den Weg zur raschen Entstehung der EFTA im Jahre 1959, als die Alternative einer größeren 

Freihandelszone aufgegeben wurde. 

Allerdings, noch bevor die EFTA das ursprüngliche, bereits 1949 ins Auge gefasste Ziel verwirklichen 

konnte, waren Versuche die wirtschaftliche Kooperation über die beratende Rolle der Uniscan 

hinaus zu vertieften gescheitert. Trotz aller Gemeinsamkeit, insbesondere mit Rücksicht auf die in 

ihren Augen wohl bessere europäische Integrationspolitik, gelang es den Briten und den Skandinaviern 

nur schwer eine einheitliche Haltung gegenüber den internationalen Organisationen einzunehmen. 

Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht die Möglichkeiten und die Verzweigungen einer englisch-skandinavischen 

Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen der internationalen Nachkriegswirtschaft und den 

frühen Jahren der europäischen Vereinigung. Dabei wird besonders der britischen Politik ein großes 

Augenmerk geschenkt. Es wird deutlich, dass insbesondere die Laborregierung der Entwicklung wirtschaftlicher, 

politischer und institutioneller Bindungen mit den Skandinaviern den Vorzug gab, diese aber 

nicht den ursprünglichen Plänen einer großzügigen Liberalisierung und Koordination innerhalb der 

Gruppe entsprachen. 

Erin Delaney 

The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe. 

The Expansion of European Social Policy 

In 1950, the National Executive of the Labour Party stated that European integration could not be reconciled 

with a socialist agenda; however, by 1994, the Labour Party declared that Europe, and the European 

Community, were an integral part of its ‘socialist’ domestic policy. Traditional analysis has cited the reasons 

for this change as a combination of numerous factors, including: intraparty factionalism; economic 

pressure; tension between the leadership and rank-and-file members; and the role of the two-party system. 

The EC is one factor that has been relatively ignored in the explanations for this policy change, as 

has its potential to exert discreet and discernible influence on policy in general. 

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that developments within the Community, specifically in the 

area of social policy, affected the Labour Party’s policy towards the EC. Beginning in 1950, this article


traces the changes in Labour’s policy, and relates them to the concurrent changes in the Community, 

using a variety of primary resources, including Party documents, academic and political debate in journals 

and newspapers and personal memoirs. 

Les développements de la politique sociale européenne et l'attitude changeante du Labour Party 

britannique face à l'Europe 

En 1950 encore, le comité exécutif national du Labour Party britannique déclarait qu'une intégration 

européenne s'avérerait incompatible avec son agenda; en 1994 pourtant, le même parti proclamait que 

l'Europe et la Communauté européenne font partie intégrante de son propre programme politique 'socialiste'. 

Les analyses classiques attribuent ce revirement à une combinaison de différentes raisons parmi 

lesquelles on distingue notamment la lutte des factions au sein du parti, les pressions économiques, les 

tensions entre les leaders et la base des militants ainsi que le poids du système bipartite anglais. La CE 

par contre est un facteur d'explication relativement ignoré, en l'occurrence son potentiel d'exercer une 

influence judicieuse et visible sur la politique en général. 

Le but de la présente contribution est de démontrer que les développements de la politique communautaire, 

notamment dans le domaine social, ont affecté l'approche du Labour Party face à la CE. En se 

servant de diverses sources primaires – des documents du parti, les débats académiques et politiques 

reproduits dans les journaux, revues ou mémoires – l'article retrace à partir du début des années 1950 le 

changement d'attitude des travaillistes en le mettant en relation avec les évolutions au sein de la Communauté. 

Die Entwicklung der europäischen Sozialpolitik und 

die veränderte Haltung der Labour Party gegenüber Europa 

Obwohl das nationale Exekutivkomitee der britischen Labour Partei 1950 noch verkündete, die 

europäische Integration sei unvereinbar mit dem sozialistischen Programm, erklärte dieselbe Partei 1994, 

dass Europa und die Gemeinschaft nun integraler Bestandteil parteieigener 'sozialistischer' Politik wären. 

Herkömmliche Analysen geben eine Kombination mehrerer Gründe für diesen Wandel an: parteiinterne 

Querelen; wirtschaftlicher Druck, Spannungen zwischen der Parteispitze und der Basis; der Einfluss des 

englischen Zweiparteiensystems. Die EG, und insbesondere ihr Potential einen bestimmten und erkennbaren 

Einfluss auf die allgemeine Politik auszuüben, werden dabei allerdings als Erklärungsfaktor relativ 

oft ignoriert. 

Ziel des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist es zu beweisen, dass bestimmte Entwicklungen innerhalb der EG 

– insbesondere im Bereich „Soziales“ – sich auf die Europapolitik der Labour Partei auswirkten. Beginnend 

mit dem Jahr 1950, zeichnet der Aufsatz anhand diverser Primärquellen (parteiinterne Dokumente, 

akademische und politische Debatten in Zeitungen, Zeitschriften und Memoiren) die Wechsel im europapolitschen 

Labourprogramm auf und stellt diese in direkte Verbindung mit den Veränderungen innerhalb 

der Gemeinschaft.

NOMOS Aktuell 

Zivilgesellschaft und Staat 

in Europa 

Die Untersuchung von sechs europäischen Staaten 

zeigt, wie sehr die Kulturen unterschiedliche Vorstellungen 

davon entwickelt haben, was ein Staat ist 

und welche Rolle er zu übernehmen hat. Wie Staat 

und Gesellschaft zueinander stehen, gestaltet sich 

dabei in jedem Land anders aus. Legitimation und 

Ausmaß staatlichen Handelns entspricht jeweils verschiedenen 

theoretischen Voraussetzungen und Erwartungen. 

Die Verhaltensformen der Individuen 

oder Gruppen innerhalb dieses Spannungsverhältnisses 

erklären sich in diesem Zusammenhang. 

Der Band ist ein wertvoller Beitrag zur Diskussion der 

Aufgaben und Ziele von Staat und Zivilgesellschaft 

sowie deren Verhältnis zueinander, zumal sich gravierende 

Veränderungen in diesem Spannungsfeld 

ergeben. Er bietet ebenso weitreichende Impulse für 

die Diskussion über die sich wandelnden politischen 

und gesellschaftlichen Strukturen im Bereich der Europäischen 

Union und deren östlicher Nachbarschaft. 

Er richtet sich gleichermaßen an Lehrende und Lernende 

in Politik- und Sozialwissenschaft sowie auch 

an in Politik und Publizistik Tätige. 

Günther Ammon/Michael Hartmeier (Hrsg.) 


in Europa 

Ein Spannungsfeld im Wandel 

Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien, Spanien, Ukraine, 

Weißrußland 



Günther Ammon/Michael Hartmeier 

(Hrsg.) 


in Europa 

Ein Spannungsfeld im Wandel 

Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien, 

Spanien, Ukraine, Weißrußland 

2001, 133 S., brosch., 

24,– €, 42,20 sFr, 

ISBN 3-7890-7251-6 

NOMOS

163 

Notices – Informations – Mitteilungen 

Conference on ”Actors and Policies in the European Integration 

from the implementation of the Rome Treaties to the creation of the 

‘snake’ (1958-1972)” 

Florence, 28, 29 and 30 November 2002 

Historical research on the European integration has mainly focussed its attention on 

the period between the 1940s and the 1960s, but from the 1960s, with the creation 

and strengthening of the European institutions, the historical analyses dealing only 

with the policies pursued by the national governments , diplomacies, etc. seem no 

longer completely satisfactory in order to fully understand the European integration 

process. Not only the European Commission or the European Parliament tried to 

assert themselves as autonomous actors, which could work out ‘European’ policies 

independently from the governments of the ”six”, but also interest groups and political 

forces began to organise themselves as European entities. Such an important 

development seems to offer to the historians an opportunity to further a new 

approach to the History of the European integration. To that end the next conference 

organised by the Liaison Committee of Historians will focus its attention on 

those topic. 

The conference, which will held in Florence in November 2002, will be organised 

into five sections: 

1. Institutional actors, national governments and EC decision-making process 

2. The Birth and Consolidation of a European political world 

3. Interest and pressure groups 

4. The EC ‘internal’ policies 

5. The EC ‘external’ policies 

Form information contact: 

Prof. Antonio Varsori – 

Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato – 

Facoltà di Scienze Politiche – 

Via Laura 48 – 50121 FIRENZE – 

ITALY – 

e-mail: varsori@unifi.it

NOMOS Aktuell 

Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 

2001 

Die Föderalisierungs-, Regionalisierungs- und Dezentralisierungsprozesse 

in den Mitgliedstaaten der 

EU und in den Beitrittskandidaten haben spürbar an 

Dynamik gewonnen. Auch in der Bundesrepublik ist 

eine Diskussion um die Zukunft des Föderalismus entbrannt. 

Fragen der Territorialgliederung und -organisation 

kommt in Europa eine immer größere Bedeutung 

zu. 

Das Jahrbuch vermittelt Lesern in Politik und Verwaltung, 

Forschung und Lehre sowie europapolitisch 

Interessierten einen umfassenden Überblick über die 

aktuellen Entwicklungen in Wissenschaft und politischer 

Praxis. 

Die Beiträge des vorliegenden zweiten Bandes greifen 

aktuelle Themen der Föderalismus- und Regionalismusforschung 

auf und behandeln zentrale Fragen 

der bundesdeutschen Diskussion. In Länderberichten 

werden neue Entwicklungen in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten, 

der Schweiz, Polen, der Tschechischen Republik, 

Ungarn sowie den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 

behandelt. Abschließend widmen sich einige Beiträge 

Formen regionaler und kommunaler Kooperation 

und der Rolle der Regionen in der EU. 

Die Herausgeber konnten abermals über dreißig 

namhafte Experten aus Wissenschaft und Verwaltung 

gewinnen. 

Band 2 

Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen 


2001 

Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa 



Europäisches Zentrum für 

Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen 


2001 

Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und 

Regionen in Europa 

2001, 543 S., geb., 

76,– €, 129,– sFr, 

ISBN 3-7890-7288-5 

NOMOS

165 

Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren 

Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren 

AUNESLUOMA Juhana, D.Phil, Lecturer of Contemporary History, Department 

of Social Science History, P.O.Box 54, 

00014 University of Helsinki, Finnland 

Tel: +358-9-191 24939 

E-mail: juhana.aunesluoma@helsinki.fi 

DELANEY Erin, PhD Candidate, Centre of International Studies, 

University of Cambridge; Chercheuse à L’Institut d’études Européennes, 

L’Université Libre de Bruxelles, 

Adresse personnelle: 2, Rue Jacques Jordaens, 1000 Bruxelles 

Tel: +32 2 650 3676 

E-mail: edelaney@post.harvard.edu 

SEUNG-RYEOL Kim, Dr. phil. Lecturer at the Korea University in South Korea 

Personal address: Shilim 1-Dong, Kwanak-Ku Seoul South-Korea, 1625-16 

Tel: +82 2 857 0848 

Mobile: +82 16 892 0848 

E-mail: mark.kim@gmx.de 

SVARTVATN Lise Rye is a Research Fellow at the Norwegian University 

of Science and Technology (NTNU), Department of History, 

N-7491 Trondheim, Norway 

Tel: 0047-73550563 

Fax: 0047-73596441 

E-mail: lise.svartvatn@hf.ntnu.no 

VAYSSIERE Bertrand, ancien élève de l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques 

de Paris (1990-1992), maître de conférences à l’université de Pau et des 

Pays de l’Adour UFR Lettres, Langues et Sciences Humaines, 

avenue du Doyen Poplawski, BP 1160, 64013 PAU cedex, France. 

Adresse personnelle: 50, rue Adolphe Coll, 31300 Toulouse. 

E-mail: bertrand.vayssiere@wanadoo.fr 

WEGMANN Milène, ist Dr. phil. der Universität Bern, Schweiz 

Persönliche Adresse: Beethovenstrasse 28, 

CH - 3073 Muri-Gümligen b. Bern, Schweiz 

Tel: +41 33 251 20 23 

E-mail: mawegmann@freesurf.ch

NOMOS Aktuell 

Grenzüberschreitende 

Zusammenarbeit zwischen 

den Regionen in Europa 

Die europäische Integration stellt nicht nur einen 

Prozess dar, der durch die zunehmende Dynamik 

der Supranationalität die Mitglieds- und Kandidatenländer 

der Europäischen Union miteinander 

verbindet, sondern auch eine Entwicklung, die einen 

massiven Transfer von traditionellen nationalen 

Aufgaben sowohl nach oben wie nach unten 

erforderlich macht. Gerade vor dem Hintergrund 

dieses Zwangs zur strukturellen Kompetenzverlagerung 

ergeben sich die Bedeutungen der grenzüberschreitenden 

Zusammenarbeit für den gesamten 

Integrationsprozess. Aufbauend auf 

grundlegenden Darstellungen zum rechtlichen 

Rahmen regionaler Zusammenarbeit innerhalb 

der EU und zum allgemeinen Charakter der Grenzen 

zwischen den Regionen in Europa bietet der 

Sammelband eine Analyse dieser regionalen Zusammenarbeit 

in ausgewählten Regionen und 

Politikfeldern. Untersucht werden z.B. Bildungspolitik, 

Innen- und Rechtspolitik, Umweltschutz, 

Strukturpolitik und Verkehrspolitik sowie die Regionen 

Saar-Lor-Lux, Neiße-Nisa-Nysa und das 

Rheineinzugsgebiet. In einem besonderen Teil 

werden Probleme und Perspektive der regionalen 

Zusammenarbeit in Europa aus der Sicht verschiedener 

nationaler und europäischer Institutionen 

beleuchtet. 

Schriften des 

Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung 

Center for European Integration Studies 

Xuewu Gu (Hrsg.) 






Xuewu Gu (Hrsg.) 




2002, 219 S., geb., 

44,– €, 76,– sFr, 

ISBN 3-7890-7777-1 

(Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische 

Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Bd. 39) 

NOMOS

167 

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher 

AUCHET Marc, BOURGUIGNON Annie. – Aspects d’une dynamique 

régionale: Les pays nordiques dans le contexte de la Baltique. Nancy, 

Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 2001, 312 p. – ISBN 2-86480-3. – 22,87 €. 

BARNAVI Elie, GOOSSENS Paul (éds.). – Les frontières de l’Europe. Bruxelles, 

Éditions De Boeck, 2001, 271 p. – ISBN 2-8041-3938-7. – 995,00 BEF. 

BITSCH Marie-Thérèse. – Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions 

européennes. Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2001, 609 p. – ISBN 2-8027-1500-3. – 

85,00 €. 

BITSCH Marie-Thérèse. – Histoire de la construction européenne: de 1945 à nos 

jours. Bruxelles, Editions Complexe, 2001, 356 p. – ISBN 2-87027-881-0. – 

21,19 €. 

BOSSUAT Gérard. – Les aides américaines, économiques et militaires à la 

France, 1938 – 1960, Une nouvelle image des rapports de puissance. Paris, 

Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2001, 406 p. – 

ISBN 2-11-091050-X. – Prix 22,87 €. 

BOSSUAT Gérard. – Les fondateurs de l’unité européenne. Paris, Belin, 2001, 

320 p. – ISBN 2701129621 – Prix 19,70 €. 

BOURMEYSTER Alexandre. – L’Europe au regard des intellectuels russes. 

Toulouse, Editions Privat, 2001, 127 p. – ISBN 2-7089-6934-X. – 11,89 €. 

BÖSCH Frank. – Die Adenauer-CDU. Gründung, Aufstieg und Krise einer 

Erfolgspartei 1945 – 1969. München, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, 

2002, 576 p. – ISBN 3-421-05438-X. – 39,80 €. 

COFFEY Peter. – The euro, an essential guide. London and New York, Continuum, 

2001, 260 p. – ISBN 0-8264-4766-X (Hb.). – 60,00 £. – ISBN 0-8264-4767-8 

(Pp.). – 15,99 £. 

CONWAY Martin, GOTOVITCH José. – Europe in Exile. European Exile 

Communities in Britain 1940 – 45. New-York – Oxford, Berghahn Books, 

2001, 281 p. – ISBN 1-57181-759-X (hb.). – 47,00 £. – 1-57181-503-1 (pb.). 

– 17,00 £. 

DEN JYSKE HISTORIKER. – Mødet med den europaeiske jungle. National 

strategi og identitet i dansk europapolitik 1945 – 2000. Aarhus, Aarhus 

Universitet, 2001, 178 p. – ISBN 87-7023-778-6. – 125 kr. 

DUCHENNE Geneviève. – Visions et Projets Belges pour l’Europe. De la Belle 

Époque aux Traités de Rome (1900 – 1957). Bruxelles, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 

2001, 302 p. – ISBN 90-5201-963-3. – 26,30 €.

168 


DUMOULIN Michel – DUCHENNE Geneviève. – L’Europe et la Mediterranée. 

Bruxelles, P.I.E. Peter Lang AG, 2001, 329 p. – ISBN 90-5201-967-3. – 30,10 €. 

DU RÉAU Elisabeth. – L’Idée d’Europe au XX e siècle. Des mythes aux réalités. 

Bruxelles, Editions Complexe, 2001, 371 p. – ISBN 2-87027-882-9. – 21,19 €. 

DU RÉAU Elisabeth. – L’élargissement de l’union européenne. Quels Enjeux? 

Quels Défis? Paris, Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2001, 232 p. – 

ISBN 2-87854-219-3. – 18,30 €. 

FARELL Mary, FELLA Stefano, NEWMAN Michael. – European Integration 

in the 21 st Century. Unity in Diversity? London, Sage Publications, 2002, 

232 p. – ISBN 0-7619-7218-8 (hb.). – 50,00 £. – ISBN 0-7619-7219-6 (pb.). – 

16,99 £. 

GOLDMANN Kjell. – Transforming the European Nation-State. Dynamics of 

Internationalization. London, Sage Publications, 2001, 224 p. – 

ISBN 0-7619-6362-X (hb.). – 55,00 £. – ISBN 0-7619-6327-8 (pb.). – 17,99 £. 

GRAML Hermann. – Zwischen Stresemann und Hitler. Die Außenpolitik der 

Präsidialkabinette Brüning, Papen und Schleicher. München, Oldenbourg, 

2001, 239 p. – ISBN 3-486-64583-8. – 24,80 €. 

GRUNEWALD Michel – BOCK Manfred. – Le discours européen dans les 

revues allemandes. (1945–1955) – Der Europadiskurs in den deutschen 

Zeitschriften. (1945-1955). Bern, Peter Lang AG, 2001, 472 p. – 

ISBN 3-906758-26-5. – 99,00 SFR. 

HAFTENDORN Helga. – Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung 

und Selbstbehauptung. München, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001, 524 p. – 

ISBN 3-421-05219-0. – 29,80 €. 

HIMMLER Norbert. – Zwischen Macht und Mittelmaß. Großbritanniens 

Außenpolitik und das Ende des Kalten Krieges. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 

GmbH., 2001, 296 p. – ISBN 3-428-10123-5. – 34,00 €. 

HUBEL Helmut. – EU Enlargement and Beyond: The Baltic States and Russia. 

Berlin, Arno Spitz, 2002, 487 p. – ISBN 3-8305-0271-0. – 60,00 €. 

KAVAKAS Dimitrios. – Greece and Spain in European Foreign Plicy. The influence 

of southern member states in common foreign and security policy. 

Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001, 238 p. – ISBN 0-7546-1821-8 (Hb.). – 45,00 £. 

KIPPING Matthias. – La France et les origines de l’Union européenne. Intégration 

économique et compétitivité internationale. Paris, Comité pour 

l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2002, 411 p. – 

ISBN 2-11-091056-9. – 27,00 €. 

KUSTERER Hermann. – Le Général et le Chancelier. Paris, Economica, 2001, 

427 p. – ISBN 2-7178-4338-8. – 30,00 €.

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher 169 

LAVENEX Sandra. – The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies. Between 

human rights and internal security. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001, 235 p. – 

ISBN 0-7546-1803-X. – 42,50 £. 

MAGNUSSON Lars & STRATH Bo (eds.). – From the Werner Plan to the 

EMU. In Search of a Political Economy for Europe. Bruxelles, P.I.E. Peter 

Lang, 2001, 490 p. – ISBN 90-5201-948-7. – 64,00 SFR. 

MAURHOFER Roland. – Die schweizerische Europapolitik vom Marshallplan 

zur EFTA 1947 bis 1960. Bern, Verlag Paul Haupt, 2001, 490 p. – 

ISBN 3-258-06383-4. – 49,00 €. 

MELCHIONNI Maria Grazia. – L’Identità Europea alla fine del XX Secolo. 

Roma, Università degli Studi di Roma, 2001, 468 p. 

MINISTÈRE DE L’ÉCONOMIE, DES FINANCES ET DE L’INDUSTRIE. – Le rôle des 

ministères des Finances et de l’Economie dans la construction 

européenne (1957-1978). Actes du colloque tenu à Bercy les 26, 27 et 28 

mai 1999. Tomes I et II. Paris, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière 

de la France, 2002, 572 p. et 270 p. – ISBN2-11-091048-8. – 39,00 €. 

MONAR Jörg, WESSELS Wolfgang. – The European Union after the Treaty of 

Amsterdam. London, Continuum, 2001, 350 p. – ISBN 0-8264-4769-4 

(hb.). – 65,00 £. – ISBN 0-8264-4770-8 (pp.). – 18,99 £. 

MÜLLER-BRANDECK-BOCQUET Gisela (Hrsg.) – Europäische Aussenpolitik. 

GASP- und ESVP-Konzeptionen ausgewählter EU-Mitgliedstaaten. 

Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2002, 149 p. – ISBN 3-7890-7743-7. – 25,00 €. 

MÜLLER-PETERS Anke, PEPERMANS Roland, KIELL Guido, 

FARHANGMEHR Minoo. – The Psychology of European Monetary 

Union: A Cross-National Study of Public Opinion Towards the Euro. Santiago 

de Compostela, Grafinova S.A., 2001. 562 p. – ISBN 84-607-2896-X. 

NICOL Danny. – EC Membership and the Judicalization of British Politics. 

Oxford, University Press, 2001, 287 p. – ISBN 0-19-924779-X. – 37,45 £. 

PAPADEMETRIOU Demetrios G. – WALLER MEYERS Deborah (Eds.). – 

Cought in the Middle: Border Communities in an Era of Globalization. 

Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001, 340 p. – 

ISBN 0-87003-185-6. – 24,95 $ 

QUERMONNE Jean-Louis. – L’Europe en quête de légitimité. Paris, Presses de 

Sciences PO, 2001, 126 p. – ISBN 2-7246-0822-4. – 12,00 €. 

RECK Brigitte. – Flexibilität in der Europäischen Union. Entstehung und Entwicklung 

eines alternativen Integrationsmodells. Stuttgart, Ibidem-Verlag, 

2001, 130 p. – ISBN 3-89821-134-7. – 29,90 €.

170 


RENNE Barbara. – Die Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion 

zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. Ist die EWWU des Maastrichter Vertrages 

ziel- und funktionsadäquat verfaßt? Bern, Peter Lang AG., 2001, 

148 p. – ISBN 3-631-38325-8. – 48,00 SFR. 

SCHWARZ Hans-Peter (Hrsg.). – Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik 

Deutschland 1953. Band I und II. München, Oldenbourg, 2001, 

1254 p. – ISBN 3-486-56560-5. – 99,80 €. 

SCHWARZ Hans-Peter (Hrsg.). – Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik 

Deutschland 1971. Band I, II und III. München, Oldenbourg, 

2002, 2153 p. – ISBN 3-486-56618-0. – 178,00 €. 

SPILLMANN Kurt R. – WENGER Andreas. – Russia’s Place in Europe. A 

Security Debate. Bern, Peter Lang AG., 1999, 251 p. – ISBN 3-906762-21-1 – 

23,50 €. 

TONRA Ben. – The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy. Dutch, Danish 

and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union. Aldershot, Ashgate, 

2001, 314 p. – ISBN 0-7546-1261-9. – 47,50 £. 

TORREBLANCA José I. – The Reuniting of Europe. Promises, negotiations 

and compromises. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001, 376 p. – 1-84014-527-7 (Hb.). 

– 49,95 £. 

UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN. – Annales d’études européennes de 

l’UCL 2001. Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2001, 398 p. – ISBN 2-8027-1523-2. – 

82,00 €. 

VANHOONACKER Sophie. – The Bush Administration (1889 – 1993) and the 

Development of a European Security identity. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001, 

284 p. – ISBN 0-7546-1664-9. – 39,95 £. 

WILHELM Justus. – Deutschland, Polen und die Politik in der Nato, 1989 bis 1997. 

Bern, Peter Lang AG., 2001,310 p. – ISBN 3-631-37868-8. – 72,00 SFR.

NOMOS Aktuell 

Die Konstruktion Europas 

Ist der Verlauf der europäischen Integration nur von 

materiellen Interessen bestimmt oder spielen auch 

Ideen eine Rolle? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage 

wird zunächst eine konstruktivistische Theorie der Bildung 

staatlicher Präferenzen entwickelt. Der zweite 

Teil bietet eine methodisch reflektierte, systematisch 

vergleichende Untersuchung europapolitischer Vorstellungen 

(»Verfassungsideen«) in Deutschland, 

Frankreich und Großbritannien seit 1950. Der dritte 

Teil analysiert ihre politische Wirksamkeit anhand 

der Verhandlungen zum Amsterdamer Vertrag. Ergebnis 

ist, daß in Bereichen, wo objektive Interessenlagen 

unklar sind, Ideen auch in zwischenstaatlichen 

Verfassungskonferenzen eine wesentliche 

Rolle spielen. 

Das Buch wendet sich an Leser, die an den Wurzeln 

der gegenwärtigen Debatte um die EU-Verfassung 

interessiert sind wie auch an Wissenschaftler, die im 

Bereich Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen 

arbeiten. 

Markus Jachtenfuchs ist Professor für Politikwissenschaft 

an der International University Bremen. 

Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert 

Markus Jachtenfuchs 


Verfassungsideen und institutionelle Entwicklung 



Markus Jachtenfuchs 


Verfassungsideen und 

institutionelle Entwicklung 

i. Vb., 2002, 302 S., brosch., 

20,– €, 35,20 sFr, 

ISBN 3-7890-7906-5 

(Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Bd. 9) 

NOMOS

NOMOS Aktuell 


2001 

Die Föderalisierungs-, Regionalisierungs- und Dezentralisierungsprozesse 

in den Mitgliedstaaten der 

EU und in den Beitrittskandidaten haben spürbar an 

Dynamik gewonnen. Auch in der Bundesrepublik ist 

eine Diskussion um die Zukunft des Föderalismus entbrannt. 

Fragen der Territorialgliederung und -organisation 

kommt in Europa eine immer größere Bedeutung 

zu. 

Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert 

Thomas Gehring 

Die Europäische Union als komplexe 

internationale Organisation 

Wie durch Kommunikation und Entscheidung 

soziale Ordnung entsteht 

Das Jahrbuch vermittelt Lesern in Politik und Verwaltung, 

Forschung und Lehre sowie europapolitisch 

Interessierten einen umfassenden Überblick über die 

aktuellen Entwicklungen in Wissenschaft und politischer 

Praxis. 

Die Beiträge des vorliegenden zweiten Bandes 

greifen aktuelle Themen der Föderalismus- und Regionalismusforschung 

auf und behandeln zentrale 

Fragen der bundesdeutschen Diskussion. In 

Länderberichten werden neue Entwicklungen in 

den EU-Mitgliedstaaten, der Schweiz, Polen, der 

Tschechischen Republik, Ungarn sowie den Vereinigten 

Staaten von Amerika behandelt. Abschließend 

widmen sich einige Beiträge Formen 

regionaler und kommunaler Kooperation und der 

Rolle der Regionen in der EU. 

Die Herausgeber konnten abermals über dreißig 

namhafte Experten aus Wissenschaft und Verwaltung 

gewinnen. 



Thomas Gehring 

Die Europäische Union 

als komplexe internationale 

Organisation 

Wie durch Kommunikation und Entscheidung 

soziale Ordnung entsteht 

2002, 322 S., brosch., 

20,– €, 35,20 sFr, 

ISBN 3-7890-7877-8 

(Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Bd. 8) 

NOMOS

NOMOS Aktuell 

Developing Local Governance 

Networks in Europe 

There has recently been a major rush of reforms at 

local government level throughout Europe. This cutting 

edge book provides both a conceptual overview 

of this trend and an empirical analysis of the 

new "local governance networks” which are emerging 

in Europe. 

This book examines the changing relationships between 

public, private and voluntary actors at local level 

through case studies in eleven countries and reports 

from two multi-country comparative studies. It 

also provides a research agenda for comparative local 

governance. 

This is the first book in the ‘Local Governance in Europe’ 

series from the Study Group on Local Governance 

(http://www.uwe.ac.uk/bbs/sglg/) under 

the auspices of the European Group of Public Administration 

(EGPA). 

The book will be essential reading for researchers 

and students of public administration, management 

and political science as well as for change agents at 

local level. 

Tony Bovaird (Professor of Strategy and Public 

Services Management) and Elke Löffler (Senior 

Research Associate) work at Bristol Business School 

(University of the West of England). Salvador 

Parrado-Díez is a Senior Lecturer at the Spanish 

Distance Learning University (UNED) in Madrid. 

Local Governance in Europe 1 

Tony Bovaird / Elke Löffler / Salvador Parrado-Díez 





Tony Bovaird/Elke Löffler/ 

Salvador Parrado-Díez (eds.) 



2002, 250 pp., 

42,– €, 73,– sFr, 

ISBN 3-7890-7826-3 

(Local Governance in Europe, Vol. 1) 

NOMOS

NOMOS Aktuell 

Die Beziehungen zwischen der 

EU und den Mercosur-Staaten 

Die Einzelbeiträge des Tagungsbands beleuchten 

aus wirtschafts-, rechts- und politikwissenschaftlicher 

Perspektive eine Reihe spezifischer 

Rahmendingen, die für die gegenwärtigen und 

künftigen EU-MERCOSUR-Beziehungen von beachtlicher 

Prägewirkung sind. Thematische 

Schwerpunkte sind die seit dem zweiten Weltkrieg 

in Südamerika eingetretenen Entwicklungen 

hinsichtlich der sozio-ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen 

(Hartmut Sangmeister), der 

ordnungspolitischen Leitvorstellungen und der 

regionalen Integrationsansätze (Federico Foders) 

sowie der Beziehungen Südamerikas zur 

EU (Klaus Bodemer), den USA (Wolf Grabendorff) 

und zu Südost-Asien (Manfred Mols). 

Außerdem werden Konzept und bisheriger integrationspolitischer 

»aquis« des MERCOSUR 

thematisiert (Ulrich Wehner). Schließlich wird 

untersucht, welche potentiellen Implikationen 

von der EU-Osterweiterung und von der EU- 

AKP-Kooperation für die Mercosur-Staaten sowie 

für die EU-MERCOSUR-Beziehungen ausgehen 

(Peter Nunnenkamp). 

Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises 

Europäische Integration e.V. 48 

Wulfdiether Zippel (Hrsg.) 



Stand und Perspektiven 



Wulfdiether Zippel (Hrsg.) 



Stand und Perspektiven 

2002, 155 S., brosch., 

25,– €, 43,80 sFr, 

ISBN 3-7890-7726-7 

(Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises 

Europäische Integration e.V., Bd. 48) 

NOMOS

Annual subscription: 38,– € including postage and 

packing 

Single issues: 21,– € 

Payments can be made 

– by cheques payable to NOMOS Verlag 

– by bank transfers to Stadtsparkasse Baden-Baden, 

account no 5 002 266, bank clearing number 

(Bankleitzahl 66 250 030) in the name of NOMOS. 

Please ensure you quote the Journal of European 

Integration History when instructing your bank and 

enclose a copy of your instructions to the bank with 

your order. 

– by credit card (VISA, Masters, Eurocard). 

Subscriptions and orders should be sent to: NOMOS 

Verlagsgesellschaft, D-76520 Baden-Baden, Germany. 

Inquiries concerning advertisements should be 

sent to the Editorial Secretariat, Centre d’études et de 

recherches européennes Robert Schuman, 4 rue Jules 

Wilhelm, L-2728 Luxembourg. 






EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION


The purpose of The Journal of European Integration History is to encourage the 

analysis and understanding of different aspects of European integration, especially 

since 1945, in as wide a perspective as possible. The Journal publishes the 

conclusions of research on diplomatic, military, economic, technological, social 

and cultural aspects of integration. Numbers devoted to single themes as well as 

to diverse subjects are published in English, French or German. Each number 

includes reviews of important, relevant publications. 


L’objectif de la Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne est de promouvoir l’analyse 

et la compréhension des différents aspects de l’intégration européenne 

particulièrement depuis 1945, mais sans exclusive. La Revue publie les résultats des 

recherches sur les aspects diplomatiques, militaires, économiques, technologiques, 

sociaux et culturels de l’intégration. Les numéros à thème ou ceux ouverts à diverses 

perspectives sont publiés dans l’une des langues suivantes: anglais, français, allemand. 

Chaque numéro comprend des comptes rendus d’ouvrages importants. 



Die Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration bietet ein Forum zur 

Erforschung des europäischen Integrationsprozesses in allen Aspekten: den politischen, 

militärischen, wirtschaftlichen, technologischen, sozialen und kulturellen. 

Ihren Schwerpunkt bilden Beiträge zu den konkreten Einigungsprojekten seit 

1945, doch werden auch Arbeiten zu den Vorläufern und Vorbereitungen 

publiziert. Die Zeitschrift erscheint zweimal im Jahr. Neben Themenheften stehen 

„offene“ Ausgaben, und jedesmal werden auch Besprechungen wichtiger Neuerscheinungen 

veröffentlicht. Die Beiträge eines internationalen Autorenkreises 

erscheinen in englischer, französischer oder deutscher Sprache. 


NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft 

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