number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

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Wolfram Kaiser
man-British directorate which, however, was probably impossible to bring about,
an enlarged EEC including several more EFTA states would inevitably degenerate
into "a new United Nations". 75
The second reason for de Gaulle's scepticism in relation to British EEC membership
was, of course, never touched upon in Anglo-French discussions. However,
after they had launched their EEC application in 1961 the British increasingly realized
that de Gaulle's fear of a loss of French influence within the Community as a
result of enlargement combined with his alleged deeply rooted anti-British feelings
could present a major stumbling block on the route to a European settlement. After
his summit meeting with de Gaulle in November 1961, for example, Macmillan
noted in his diary: "His pride, his inherited hatred of England (since Joan of Arc),
his bitter memories of the last war; above all his intense `vanity´ for France – she
must dominate – make him half welcome, half repel us, with a strange `love-hate´
complex. Sometimes, when I am with him, I feel I have overcome it. But he goes
back to his distrust and dislike, like a dog to his vomit." 76 Six months later, during
a preparatory meeting for the Champs summit at Chequers, Macmillan, Home and
Heath reached the conclusion that British EEC membership was perhaps altogether
incompatible with de Gaulle's "dream of domination". 77
The more difficult the French President seemed to be, the more the British perhaps
underestimated his flexibility. After all, the partnership between Paris and
Bonn was built on a mutually lucrative division of leadership into the political and
economic spheres. But the British government never gave any attention to the
crucial question, if and how a comparable Anglo-French arrangement could be
devised. There were two main reasons for this: for once, the foreign policy process
was still dominated by a deeply rooted aversion against entering into any long-term
bilateral relationship in Europe, as this would have put an abrupt end to the traditional
British balance-of-power policy which under the conditions of the post-war
bipolar world, had ceased to be a global strategy and was now limited to Western
Europe. And secondly, the transatlantic logic of the EEC application necessitated
the acquisition of more than just an equal share of political leadership of the Community,
as this could hardly justify the continuation of a special role vis-à-vis the
US. Indeed, Macmillan just assumed that Britain, once inside, would automatically
take over. Between the EEC application and de Gaulle's veto the British never
thought about where they wanted to lead Europe, but lead, they certainly would.
Perhaps more than the similarly immodest French ambitions did this implicit British
claim kindle the bilateral Anglo-French confrontation over Europe, culminating
in de Gaulle's veto. Besides, it was also characteristic of a foreign policy which
was largely based on unquestioned historical assumptions and did not take sufficient
account of the harsh economic and political realities of the post-war world.
Probably as important as this bilateral leadership conflict was de Gaulle's third
fear which he later stressed in his memoirs, that an enlarged EEC could easily
75. PRO PREM 11/3775 (2-3 June 1962).
76. HMD (29 November 1961), quoted in H. Macmillan, Pointing, p. 428.
77. PRO PREM 11/3775 (19 May 1962).