number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

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Wolfram Kaiser
ween Europe and the bomb. Prime Minister Debré, for example, indicated to Heath
that de Gaulle would certainly "want to take a broader view (which) would involve
questions of European defence, a common policy in Africa etc.", but when then
asked bluntly by the Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, Shuckburgh,
whether this meant that Anglo-French nuclear cooperation would form part
of the "final bargaining" in the Brussels negotiations, he answered evasively. 67
Political consideration for the other five members of the Community would certainly
have made any open negotiation of a bilateral package deal a very awkward
balancing act for the French government, but it would by no means have been
impossible. Instead, talking to Dixon less than a fortnight before the Champs
summit, de Gaulle, in responding to newspaper reports, actually took the step of
positively denying the existence of a nexus between the European and nuclear
questions. 68 On becoming ambassador to Paris in 1960 Dixon had been surprisingly
confident of being able to read de Gaulle diplomatically. By the time of this
meeting with the General, however, he was at a complete loss how to interpret his
utterances and almost said as much when, writing to Home and Macmillan, he
admitted that there was always the possibility that de Gaulle had meant the exact
opposite of what was said. In the end though, Dixon, the Foreign Office and Macmillan
concluded that the French leader was really not prepared to accept British
EEC membership as the agreed quid pro quo for a nuclear offer and that as a result,
none should be made before the entry negotiations were successfully brought to an
end. 69 Shortly before Macmillan left for Rambouillet six months later, however, a
small group of leading civil servants finally concluded that even then, Anglo-
French nuclear cooperation, particularly in the development of a delivery system
for the post-bomber period, would be undesirable, if only because the massive
extra costs could never possibly justify the "theoretically greater degree of independence
which we should secure for the British deterrent". 70
III
As Macmillan had never been able to come up with any other reason than a nuclear
deal, why de Gaulle should possibly wish to give his consent to British accession to
the EEC, the prospects of the Brussels negotiations looked even gloomier after the
67. PRO PREM 11/3790 (14 July 1962).
68. Dixon to Home and Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3775 (22 May 1962). Previously, relating to the
idea of a package deal including nuclear matters, the leading French negotiator in Brussels, Clappier,
had already warned his British counterparts that he doubted very much "whether the General's
mind worked in this sort of way". Cf. Roll to Lee: PRO PREM 11/3775 (10 May 1962).
69. See in connection Dixon to Foreign Office: PRO PREM 11/3775 (23 May 1962); Home to Macmillan:
PRO PREM 11/3712 (13 July 1962); De Zulueta to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3712 (6 September
1962); De Zulueta to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3712 (7 December 1962).
70. De Zulueta to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3712 (7 December 1962); cf. the attached report on
"Considerations affecting possible Anglo-French nuclear collaboration in the military field".