number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

The Bomb and Europe 79
application inevitable. In addition, the Six had now begun to discuss de Gaulle's
ideas for closer political cooperation. While the economic consequences of further
exclusion from the EEC were regarded as potentially very grave but bearable, nonparticipation
in political cooperation among the Six was seen by Macmillan as
disastrous in terms of the future Anglo-American relationship. From this point of
view Britain had to be part of any new emerging structure, or was bound to lose
what was still widely perceived as a world power status.
It has been argued that the British were not prepared during the EEC entry
negotiations to exchange "more Europe" for "less America". 63 In fact, the majority
of the British government, including Macmillan, wanted more Europe mainly in
order to have more America. From this perspective it is not at all surprising that the
British government never made a concrete proposal for bilateral Anglo-French nuclear
cooperation during 1961/62 which would have put an end to the existing arrangements
with the US, or responded in a constructive way to de Gaulle's approach
through Messmer in July 1962. The option of making a direct offer to the French
regardless of the American attitude, having been considered within the government,
had already been deliberately ignored by Macmillan after Kennedy's initial
refusal to cooperate. 64 His highly elliptical allusions to the possibility of an Anglo-
French nuclear deal when talking to de Gaulle at Champs in June 1962 were a
curiously ineffective diplomatic bait as it had to be withdrawn whenever the General
came too near to it; or, as the Prime Minister put it to Kennedy in April 1962, he
was prepared to leave the "carrot" of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation "dangling
in front of de Gaulle", 65 but would not let him have a bite. Unless, that is, the Americans
suddenly decided to support a solution by which an Anglo-French force
would form the European pillar within NATO, and it was guaranteed that the
Anglo-American nuclear partnership could continue unimpaired. For Macmillan
this had been the absolute precondition for any cooperation with the French ever
since he had brought up the idea of a nuclear bribe.
However, even if such a constellation had materialized by December 1962,
Macmillan would still not have made any substantial offer to de Gaulle at Rambouillet,
as his government had altogether dropped the idea of a package deal
before the Champs summit. Earlier in 1962 Macmillan had already begun to doubt
whether, if de Gaulle got what he wanted in terms of nuclear assistance or cooperation,
he would then deliver over Europe; or, in other words, whether British EEC
entry on reasonable terms would be guaranteed. Initially, Macmillan may have
been influenced by Kennedy who told him at their meeting in April that the State
Department had always believed that de Gaulle would grab whatever he possibly
could without making the slightest move over Europe or NATO in return. 66 More
important, however, even when pressed hard, neither de Gaulle nor any French
government minister or high official ever admitted that a direct link existed bet-
63. J. LACOUTURE, p. 336.
64. De Zulueta to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3557 (18 June 1961).
65. PRO PREM 11/3783 (28 April 1962).
66. Ibid.