number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

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Wolfram Kaiser
ned to Thorneycroft by Messmer. Of course, de Gaulle seems to have believed that
any deterrent which was not under direct or indirect US control would automatically
be "European" at least in purpose, even if France or Britain exercised control
over its use. But from the German point of view, for example, an American nuclear
force designed to deter the Russians from crossing the Elbe always qualified more
easily for the much strained "European" label than a French force de frappe with
the operational task of deterring the Russians from crossing the Rhine, which de
Gaulle privately defined as constituting an attack on France justifying the use of
nuclear weapons. 48
The possible establishment of an Anglo-French nuclear partnership, as suggested
by de Gaulle after the Champs summit, had been discussed on and off within
the British government ever since the Suez débâcle had shown the full extent of
dependence on the United States. In January 1957 the then Foreign Secretary
Lloyd, assuming that a "friendly rivalry" would develop between Western Europe
and the US, had first advocated this option in his memorandum on a "Grand
Design" for Europe. It spoke of the need "for a closer political association and (...)
a military association between the WEU (Western European Union). Powers within
NATO (which) should stop short of federation". Western Europe, Lloyd argued,
would have to become a third world power with a common WEU nuclear force
built around close Anglo-French collaboration. 49 This suggested reorientation of
British defence and security policy towards Europe could have ideally complemented
the Free Trade Area proposal and would certainly have increased its chances of
success dramatically, but was immediately rejected by the cabinet. 50 Instead of closer
integration with Western Europe, under Macmillan's new leadership priority
was immediately given to rebuilding the "special relationship" with the US which
alone seemed to guarantee the continuation of a world power status for Britain.
This internal assessment had not much changed when the question of a nuclear
bribe for de Gaulle began to be discussed within a very small circle of a few government
ministers and leading civil servants from November 1959 onwards. On the
one hand there was some support within Whitehall for Anglo-French cooperation
on the basis that both forces should be assigned to the multilateral NATO nuclear
force (MLF) envisaged by the Americans. 51 But even in 1960/61 this was too
obviously unattractive for de Gaulle. Moreover, the MLF solution would have
involved the complete loss of theoretical sovereignty which the British enjoyed
over the use of their weapons and which was still widely perceived to be at least
politically highly important. Echoing Macmillan's strong reservations against the
MLF project, de Zulueta commented laconically at the beginning of January 1961
that even if this turned out to be the right policy, or at least the only practicable one,
he would be inclined to emigrate. 52
48. In a conversation with Walter Lippmann. Cf. UK Washington Embassy to Lee: PRO PREM 11/
3775 (15 March 1962).
49. PRO CAB 129/84/6 (5 January 1957).
50. PRO CAB 128/30,II/3rd meeting (8 January 1957).
51. Cf. Shuckburgh to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3325 (26 December 1960).
52. De Zulueta to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3325 (17 January 1961).