number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

The Bomb and Europe 75
Anglo-French consultations during 1961/62 provide ample evidence of the fact
that de Gaulle was definitely interested in establishing a bilateral nuclear partnership
with the British. In this context the meeting between Macmillan and de Gaulle
at Champs in June 1962 now turns out to have been much more important than
their subsequent encounter at Rambouillet in December. In April the British Prime
Minister had sent up a ballon d'essai. In speaking about the subject of Britain and
Europe to the outgoing French ambassador to London, Chauvel, he had suggested
that in his opinion "the best solution would be for France and England to reach an
understanding with a view to making the nuclear armament". 44 Very shortly afterwards,
in a meeting with the new ambassador de Courcel, the former secretary
general of the Elysée, he again stressed the need to develop "some political and
even defence aspects" for the EEC, and that Britain and France ought "to hold their
nuclear power as trustees for Europe". 45 No concrete offer was made, but Macmillan's
comments led to a remarkably more forthcoming attitude by de Gaulle at
Champs than he admits in his memoirs. During one of the meetings de Gaulle suggested
that "an Anglo-French plan agreed with others" could perhaps be developed
to form the basis for what he rather loosely described as "a European deterrent". 46
At this stage the French President would not define his ideas more precisely than
this. He merely tested the ground, as he had done so often before since 1958, without
having any long-term plan. However, the French did subsequently approach the British
with a very concrete proposal for bilateral collaboration in the nuclear field. Only
one month later, during a meeting with the British Defence Secretary Watkinson, who
was then about to be replaced by Thorneycroft, Messmer enquired whether the British
would be interested in the joint development of an underwater missile deterrent
for the 1970s, a kind of Anglo-French Polaris. The French, having made progress
with their national project, would concentrate on the development of the missile
system, while the British, who had considerable expertise in this particular field,
would construct the nuclear submarine. 47 Such a proposal for bilateral nuclear collaboration
could most certainly never have been made without de Gaulle's explicit consent,
if not, as seems much more likely, at his own initiative.
In fact, this French plan was entirely in line with all of de Gaulle's previous
overtures to the Americans and British since 1958 which were primarily aimed at
receiving advanced scientific know-how in order to technically and financially facilitate
the development of the force de frappe. As de Gaulle's 1962 offer was strictly
limited to the joint development of a modern nuclear weapons system, it is difficult
to see how this could possibly have been presented as a project for a "European"
deterrent. After all, as long as both partners separately retained full control over the
scientific know-how involved and over the use of the weapons, the envisaged bilateral
cooperation would have left two independent national deterrents intact. It
would not in the least have affected the national French nuclear doctrine as explai-
43. W. LOTH, De Gaulle und die europäische Einigung, p. 55.
44. PRO PREM 11/3792 (19 April 1962).
45. PRO PREM 11/3775 (9 May 1962).
46. PRO PREM 11/3712 (3 June 1962).
47. PRO PREM 11/3712 (4 July 1962).