number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

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Wolfram Kaiser
Very shortly after Kennedy's second letter he even referred to the European problem
as "obviously insoluble" in his diaries. 28
After the Prime Minister's return from his Washington talks with Kennedy in
April 1961 the cabinet had at first agreed the compromise formula that no new
approach should be made to the EEC unless a clear signal could be obtained from
de Gaulle that Britain was actually welcome. 29 As the French President always
spoke highly elliptically about Britain and Europe to Macmillan and the British
ambassador to Paris, Dixon, it was hoped in London that Kennedy could perhaps
elicit a more illuminating response from de Gaulle during his state visit to France at
the beginning of June. But the result of Kennedy's approach was not exactly encouraging.
In a very matter-of-fact tone he reported back that apparently de Gaulle still
"had no particular wish to see the United Kingdom join the Six". 30
In the end the British government went ahead with the EEC application regardless.
Macmillan thought that this would at least prove to the US government that Britain
was finally prepared to play a full and constructive role within the EEC, and that
the French were to blame for the economic division of Western Europe and the resulting
lack of political cohesion. At a time when a very unpredictable American administration
was reconsidering its foreign policy options, every effort had to be made to
appease it diplomatically in order to save as much as possible of the bilateral "special
relationship". In addition, the application also served a useful party political purpose,
as it would help to give the ruling Conservatives a modern image after one decade in
government, split the Labour Party and steal the Liberals' clothes. Successful negotiations
could perhaps win him the forthcoming general election, Macmillan hoped,
probably wrongly as this considerably exaggerated the importance of foreign policy
issues in British politics. On the other hand, a failed application would still be useful
as it appeared to be the best way of keeping his own party together while still splitting
the main opposition party. And finally, by July 1961 the debate about Britain's future
role in Europe both within the cabinet, the parliamentary party and the public had
moved forward so dynamically that the British EEC application only seemed a
question of time. Macmillan could now hardly put the brakes on his own policy
initiative by pointing to the negative result of his entirely secret contacts with the
American President to find a suitable nuclear bribe for de Gaulle. 31
However, even if the US government had been prepared to cooperate in 1961, it
is highly questionable whether this would have led to the successful conclusion of
the EEC entry negotiations in 1962/63 as Macmillan and de Gaulle had two entirely
different concepts of what constituted an "independent" national deterrent.
Arguably, the most Macmillan could ever hope to get from the US government was
the offer which Kennedy finally made after the Anglo-American summit at Nassau
27. Macmillan to Caccia: PRO PREM 11/3319 (9 May 1961).
28. HMD (15 June 1961), quoted in Macmillan, Pointing, p. 374; see also HMD (22 July 1961), quoted
in H. MACMILLAN, At the End of the Day 1961-1963, London 1973, p. 17.
29. PRO CAB 128/35,I/24th meeting (26 April 1961).
30. PRO CAB 128/35,I/30th meeting (6 July 1961).
31. For this interpretation see in more detail W. KAISER, Von Messina nach Canossa. Großbritannien
und die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1955-1961, Berlin 1995 (forthcoming).