number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

The Bomb and Europe 71
had no idea what would satisfy de Gaulle, he made it plain to Kennedy that if the
Americans decided to help with nuclear know-how or weapons systems, this ought
not to be made dependent on any conditions, such as the assignment of the French
deterrent to NATO. The Prime Minister rightly believed that such an offer would
probably be refused outright by de Gaulle who, as Macmillan explained to Kennedy,
wanted a national nuclear force which enjoyed at least the same degree of
independence as the British government had over its force.
There was probably never much chance that the Americans would be willing to
cooperate. Almost immediately after Kennedy's inauguration Rusk, the new
Secretary of State, had already indicated to the British ambassador to Washington,
Caccia, that the British government might feel the need to appease de Gaulle over
Sixes and Sevens, but that his government was under no such pressure. 21 By the
time Macmillan received Kennedy's official response to his proposals which, on the
President's request, he had put down in a personal memorandum, nothing much had
changed. 22 The Americans were prepared to make some highly symbolic gestures,
such as to concede the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
to a French general, if only in return for a more cooperative French NATO policy,
but they rejected any assistance whatsoever for the French nuclear programme.
This would not only have flatly contradicted American non-proliferation policy and
appeared as an undeserved reward for de Gaulle's obstruction policy within NATO;
Kennedy also feared that it could entail an increased German desire for nuclear
weapons. Finally, there was one very important domestic political reason which
Macmillan had completely overlooked: as Kennedy's national security adviser
Bundy explained to Caccia, because of the strongly anti-Gaullist mood there, Kennedy
could anyway not expect to get the necessary consent of Congress. 23
After Kennedy's initial negative reply Macmillan decided to make a final effort.
Athough Caccia had reported that the Americans had made it absolutely plain to
him that nothing could alter their position, 24 the Prime Minister wrote a second
personal letter, almost begging the President to help him out with de Gaulle. 25 Predictably,
Kennedy just reiterated his arguments. 26 In Macmillan's own logic, this
reply meant that the planned EEC application, which at that stage had not yet even
been agreed upon by the cabinet, was already practically dead. Even though Macmillan
always had a marked weakness for wishful thinking, there are clear signs
that he was aware of this. After Kennedy's first letter he wrote to Caccia that "in
order to bring the General around, the President may be able to offer something on
tripartism and some review of NATO. This may be enough (but) he may well make
his general cooperation conditional on some satisfaction for his nuclear ambitions.
I should be very glad if I were wrong about this, but I do not think that I am." 27
20. PRO PREM 11/3554 (6 April 1961).
21. Caccia to Hoyer Millar and Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3326 (30 January 1961).
22. Kennedy to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3319 (8 May 1961).
23. Caccia to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3319 (5 May 1961).
24. Caccia to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3319 (12 May 1961).
25. Macmillan to Kennedy: PRO PREM 11/3311 (15 May 1961).
26. Kennedy to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3555 (22 May 1961).