number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

70
Wolfram Kaiser
quo for French concessions over Europe, but until Spring 1961 he was not entirely
sure what to ask for, as his government had no agreed European policy. At the time of
the Rambouillet meeting of March 1960 and thereafter a new initiative to overcome
the economic division into Sixes and Sevens had seemed inadvisable because of the
developing confrontation between the EEC and EFTA over the acceleration of tariff
reductions. When the two leaders next met for bilateral talks in January 1961 the
Prime Minister was still waiting for the outcome of the expert discussions between
British and German, Italian and French officials which, he expected, would show that
a purely economic arrangement was now neither available nor desirable and that Britain
had to apply for full EEC member-ship.
It must be emphasized that neither de Gaulle nor any French government minister
or official ever confirmed explicitly before or after the British EEC application
that a nexus existed between Europe and "the bomb", as Macmillan used to say.
Nonetheless, the Prime Minister firmly believed that although British cooperation
on nuclear matters would perhaps not of itself bring about a satisfactory European
settlement, it was clearly the indispensable precondition for it. 16 At the turn of the
year 1960/61, having himself decided in favour of EEC membership, he wrote in
his "Grand Design" memorandum on Britain's future role in the world: "De Gaulle's
second – and to him vital – ambition is the nuclear weapon. Can we give him
our techniques, or our bombs, or any share of our nuclear power on any terms
which i) (...) are publicly defensible (...) and ii) the United States will agree to? At
first this seems hopeless. But since I think it is the one thing which will persuade de
Gaulle to accept a European settlement (...) – I think it is worth serious examination."
17 Immediately after the summit meeting with de Gaulle four weeks later he
noted down in his diary that everything now depended on whether a nuclear deal
could be struck. 18
Sometime later, after the US government had expressed its own interest in Britain
joining the Community to offset the eccentricities of Adenauer and de
Gaulle, 19 Macmillan concentrated on organizing a trilateral package deal. Perhaps
Kennedy could be brought to accept de Gaulle's nuclear ambitions and to elevate
France to a status vis-à-vis the US similar to that enjoyed by Britain. Even though
he certainly could not expect the US government to be enthusiastic about assistance
to de Gaulle, Macmillan, as always in Anglo-American relations, hoped that
his personal influence might make the decisive difference. In this spirit he approached
Kennedy during their summit meeting in April 1961, explaining the perceived
link between European and nuclear matters. 20 Although at that stage Macmillan
16. Cf. Macmillan to de Zulueta: PRO PREM 11/3131 (22 August 1960); PRO PREM 11/3322 (27-29
January 1961); de Zulueta to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/3553 (4 February 1961).
17. PRO PREM 11/3325 (29 December 1960 – 3 January 1961).
18. HMD (29 January 1961), quoted in H. MACMILLAN, Pointing the Way 1959-1961, London
1972, p. 327.
19. Initially at a meeting between the US Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Ball, and the
Lord Privy Seal Heath and leading British civil servants in March 1961. PRO FO 371/158162/45
(30 March 1961). See also A.M. SCHLESINGER, A Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy in the
White House, London 1965, p. 702.