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The Bomb and Europe 69
as incompatible with the wider American policy for NATO which did not provide
for a special formal status for any partner, including Britain. The Prime Minister
later brought up the idea again in his first talks with President Kennedy in April
1961, but by then he had long come to the conclusion that what was really necessary
to persuade de Gaulle to accept a European settlement was a substantial nuclear
offer which would sharply accelerate the development of the force de frappe.
The French nuclear programme, dating back to the early 1950s, had almost
immediately been given top priority by de Gaulle when he came to power in 1958,
and the French successfully exploded their first nuclear bomb in February 1960. 13
By that time French interest in nuclear cooperation had shifted to the long-term aim
of acquiring a missile capability that would eventually replace the planned Mirage
IV bombers. These could not reach their targets without refuelling and would be
increasingly vulnerable to modern systems of air defence. However, the missile
development presented considerable technical problems, and a purely national programme
would also be very costly. The initial French approach to the US government
for technical assistance had already been turned down when the French
President met the British Prime Minister at Rambouillet in March 1960. This was
the first and only occasion until the breakdown of the EEC entry negotiations in
January 1963 on which de Gaulle asked Macmillan head-on whether he was interested
in a joint Anglo-French missile project. 14 Thereafter a more low-key approach
was chosen by the French. In early 1961, for example, British and French experts
discussed whether to resume the Blue Streak missile project which the British
government had abandoned the year before and which was now envisaged for use
as a satellite launcher. During these talks the French left the British in no doubt that
they were primarily interested in its potential military use, and more particularly in
the American guidance system. 15
At Rambouillet in March 1960 Macmillan politely declined, referring to the
restrictions on bilateral cooperation with third countries under the contractual obligations
of the joint Anglo-American nuclear partnership which had been re-established
in 1957/58. The same line was taken by the British experts at Strasbourg in early
1961. Macmillan was not interested in Anglo-French nuclear cooperation as such, so
long as the bilateral arrangements with the US seemed satisfactory. It was true, of
course, that after the cancellation of Blue Streak and the subsequent American promise
to supply them with Skybolt air-to-surface missiles for their Vulcan bombers,
the British were totally dependent on the US for modern means of delivery, but at
least it still seemed justified to speak of an independent deterrent in the sense of
national control over its use, and it was also by far the least expensive option available.
Macmillan was only prepared to consider a nuclear offer as a clear quid pro
12. Macmillan to Eisenhower: PRO PREM 11/2998 (17 February 1960).
13. For French nuclear policy cf. J. LACOUTURE, pp. 413-33.
14. PRO PREM 11/2998 (12–13 March 1960).
15. Dixon to Foreign Office: PRO PREM 11/3322 (21 January 1961). The then French Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville has since hinted in his memoirs that these talks had been intended as a platform
for a possible Anglo-French nuclear programme. See M. COUVE de MURVILLE, Une
Politique Étrangère 1958-1969, Paris 1971, p. 397.